A Compendium of Analytical Trade Craft Notes

8/9/2019 A Compendium of Analytical Trade Craft Notes

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Directorate of Intelligence

A Compendium oAnalytic Tradecr


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Directorate of Intelligence

A Compendium of.,LIG~


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Contents

ForewordSummaryNote 1 Addressing US Interests in DI AssessmNote 2 Access and CredibilityNote 3 Articulation of Assumptions


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A Compendium ofAnalytic TradecraftNotes

Foreword by the Deputy Director for IntelligencThe core mission of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligeremained the same despite a decade rocked by profouAs the analytical arm of the CIA, we seek to provide


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Pursuit of expertise in analytic tradecraft isOur tradecraft enables analysts to provide "intelligence by ensuring:* Dedication to objectivity-tough-mindedexplicit defense ofjudgments-which enhsumers dealing with complex and sensitiv* Delivery of our products to the right peopdecisionmaking, and using feedback and tcollection of the basic intelligence that we


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SummaryBelow is a brief characterization of eachthis volume.Note 1.Addressing US Interests in DIAPES launched the tradecraft series with acan assure value added for their importanpolicymakers, warfighters, and law enfor

One tradecraft tip recommends conv


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* Presenting the argumentation in textboxes,appropriate to belabor the text with detailsthinking underlying key judgments.Note 4. OutlookThe outlook sections of DI assessments must abelieve to be the most likely course of developalternative outcomes that could confront US of* On issues vital to US security such as the madversaries, analysts must help policymake


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a Deft organization of data in support of* Insight into the decisionmaking procesNote 7. Effective SummaryAn effective summary makes the distinctivintended consumers within constricted spac* When the clients for a DI assessment a

interests regarding the issue at hand arecraft a summary that presents in a coupand the so what.


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Note 10. TradecraftandCounterintelligenceGuidelines for countering deception efforts toof what is going on abroad build on the adviceinformation contained in Notes' 5 (Factsand SFo r issues where analysts suspect the presenceassessments on which policy officials ma y diron whether to take military or other action to drecommend a structured effort to validate theOn these suspect and sensitive issues, we urgequestion:


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Notes on Anari-__ 1 ._ rDirectorate of I rac3 ecraItIntelligence

Note I

Addressing US Interests in


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How to proceed? Each analytic assignment represents a distisupport to policy officials and the policymaking process. Thamanagers have garnered from direct experience and feedbackproducts are usually best directed to meet the needs of the usorganized around or specifically highlight one or more of the* Opportunities and dangers for US interests, especially unerequire a US reaction.* Motives, objectives, strengths, and vulnerabilities of adver


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* Target the policymakers specific interest n a substaanalysis that provide value added, analysts should thiknow if they were policymakers chargedwith leveraan assessment or outlining a briefing, the analysts brisubstantive expertise, distinctive collection resources* Be aware that consumers' needs may change as the pofficials often are receptive to broad analytic treatmethey are in their long-range planning or goal-setting pare set, their focus shifts to specifics about vulnerabil


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* Use the "so-what" test. In reviewing a first draft, analyststhe paper from the intended customers' point of view andaddress specifically and effectively what key policymakersdone?* Or use the "action-support" est. As an alternative test ofanalysts can list the five or so matters they personally wou

were directly responsible for managing US policy action.paragraphs of the draft that provide actionable information


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t.^ Notes on AnaDirectorateof TradecrafIntelligence

Note 2

Access and C

This is the second in a series of Produ


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Increasing AccessAddressing US Interests. The most important and demandingto assist US officials to fulfill their obligation to design, impsecurity policy. The highest standard is to structure DI assesofficials need to know to get their jobs done (for example, aof adversaries). When this is not practical, DI deliverables ssection that addresses implications, dangers, and opportunitipolicymakers, warfighters, and law enforcement officials as


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Sources of the Facts-How We Know It. DI assessmeinformation on which consumers are asked to rely wevidence. Direct evidence (for example, imagery anddistinguished from testimonial evidence (for examplereporting). On complex matters (for example, the attanalysts should make explicit their levels of confidenConclusions. Assessments should enunciate the conc(for example, well-documented events) in terms of trunderscore dangers or opportunities for US policyma


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Notes on AnaDirectorate of TradecrafIntelligence

Note 3

Articulation of A


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* Logical-soundly reasoned.* Precise-clearly tated.* Realistic-attunedo the hazards of forecasting error.Drivers and LinchpinsThe DI tradecraft for the articulation of assumptions places edrivers or key variables-the uncertain factors that analysts joutcome


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TradecraftTips1. Each assessment represents a distinctive challenge iargumentation. As a rule of thumb, the more complexthe analysts should make clear the sinews of the reason* For some papers, the assumptions can be adequately* For others, a textbox may be needed to clarify the ca* At times, the entire assessment should be organized

critical thinking.


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* Also test key assumptions against any contrary judgmentsobservers. What hard evidence and inferential reasoning, falternative interpretations?4. Analysts should review their first draft against a tough stan* Could a consumer who was not reading all the traffic quickessential elements of the assessment's reasoning?5. Some specific questions analysts should ask about the draft


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Notes on AnarTV,_ 1 - -___Directorateof I raa.ecraITIntelligence

Note

Outloo

This is the fourth in a seriesof Produc


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* Officials also require an understanding of unlikely developplans against low-probability, high-impact dangers (such assuppliers from another Iraqi military attack on Kuwait or anofHormuz).

Finally, the outlook on important issues can be subject to deepamong and between analysts, Administration officials, and cosuspicions about the objectivity ofDI memoranda and briefing* At such times, DI credibility can depend more on explanati


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* Signposts or indicatorsof change. What intermediaevents may not be working out as originally expecsignposts for regime stability as the advent of coup* Events that could triggeramajorshift in directioncould precipitate the unexpected outcome? For exanatural disaster, or anti-government demonstrations3. On issues vital to US security (for example, militarmust help policymakers and warfighters engage in co


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5. To understand the often intense concern of hands-on policpercent likelihood of a disastrous turn of events happening onconsider whether they would voluntarily get on an airplane thcrashing.6. To deal rigorously with unlikely developments, analysts shwhether something will happen to how it could happen. Somcredible alternative scenarios by structuring the available evi* Who and What Counts. Generate lists of the key individual


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Notes on AnaDirectorate of TradecraIntelligence

Note

Facts and SThis is the ifth in a series of ProductE


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Definitions

DI analysts have a good track record in conveying what theyconsumers of intelligence. What is undertaken here is codificgeneral guidelines.The following definitions are an attempt to promote standardiconcepts relating to intelligence information.Fact:Verified information; something known to exist or to haInformation: The content of reports, research, and analytic ref


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under scrutiny is factual. The information can be eion observation by US Embassy officers) or indirectby a liaison intelligence service.These terms are illustrated by the following hypothWe believe countryX has begun a majorcrackdowthe government holds responsiblefor he campaignThe Army has been ordered to support the police in


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Best Practices* According to special intelligence, President X has cancImagery indicates no signs of the airport security procefor a Presidential flight. The media in both countries, hthe scheduled peace talks between the two countries.* We have no direct information on President X's involvpersistent charges in the media by his political opponenbeing financed with funds he obtained from his engageAnalysts should be precise as well in sourcing information


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They must be amply argued in terms of the ensound inferential reasoning.Best Practices

* We believe recovery is under way in CountDatabase" shows sustained improvement oproduction and exports and in containing inclandestine source, the Finance Minister hacorner toward recovery.

Also, care should be taken to avoid confusionan estimative judgment or a source is express


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The mindsets of foreign leaders-their attitudes, for examverify, even with direct or firsthand information, and shoappropriate, mindset can be a subject for the analyst's estBest Practices

* Multiple reliable clandestine sources report President Xprospects.


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Best Practices* The following information relates to the recent beunder the US economic assistance agreement, toforces in country Y:

-The President of country X told the US Ambasterminated, although small-scale shipments ofsympathize with the guerrillas' cause might sti-According to a reliable clandestine source, a seordered the military to hide small shipments of


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coup planning or unusual m ovements of troops. Opposithat they are unaware of any serious coup activity, accoclandestine sources. The government, therefore, could involving Colonel X, to smoke out "disloyal" officers.

Rule 7. Use tie term "evidence" sparingly.This tradecraft note uses the term information as synonym


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Notes on Ana1 1

Directorate of 1 racdecraIntelligence

Note

Analytic E


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How much expertise needs to be demonstrated? Taking spaaccount, the more the better. The DI not only has to stand odepth of its analytic expertise, it also has to convince its keyexpertise to use for their benefit.Again, the appropriate means through which to convey expassignment. As a general test, we recommend that analystsanswer the following questions as if they were posed by aprely on the DI to meet the challenges on his or her agenda.


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* Evidence ofprevious research.In a preface, foofinished intelligence on the subject at hand. Beby citing the works of other production units.* Evidence of scholarship.Often one footnote oranalysts' grasp helps to establish credentials. Foeither common or contrasting elements to the is* Evidence ofdata bases. Expertise can be demonpresents a chronology, a series of quotes over ti


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* The only game in town. Understandably, policy officiaimplementation is the reason why intelligence exists, ademonstrate-in a cover note, preface, or footnote, ifninformed on the policy timeline and the key matters unthe DI's reputation into question more than an assessmbeen made or that addresses in a conventional mannerboth broad knowledge and consensus among policy of

* Customized support. When writing for a small numbedemonstrate by the issues they highlight that they know


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Note

Effective Su

This is the seventh in a series ofProdu


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To account for the diversity of the potential audienceintroductory sections can be put to use in flagging theexpertise. In particular, an introductory textbox, placedbe used to meet the needs of specialized segments of t* For example, a depiction of the background or gene

of the officials already directly engaged on a policyserve the needs of peripherally engaged intelligence* Similarly, technical findings needed to meet the thr


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* Break up the typography. Many readers interpret run solidly from margin to margin as a signal thatunfriendly":-Use short paragraphs, bullets and subbullets, boand to help the busy decisionmaker latch on qurelationships, and judgments.

* Fit the writing style to audienceandpurpose. Whincluding many policy officials with whom the pr


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@t^ Notes on AnaDirectorate of TradecraIntelligence

Note

Implementati


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Why and WhenPolicy implementation regularly involves attempting to advand often risky conditions. In these circumstances, policy ofobjectives can be difficult to achieve. Deterring rogue statesmass destruction and promoting democratic practice in polittraditions, for example, require overcoming deeply imbeddesupport from intelligence analysts in identifying and assessiIntelligence analysts, through Implementation Analysis, canthe policymakers' table:


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* Regularly scheduled repeat briefings or memora* An increase in the circle of recipients.* Incorporation of the analysis into policy planninTradecraftTipsVeteran analysts offer the following tradecraft tipspractice:


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* Implementation Analysis often requires divergent thinto mainstream interpretations and the most likely outcorange of plausible alternative interpretations and outcobrainstorming, role playing, and "thinking backward"low-probability event could occur) can help identify lieffect a change in momentum:-When analysts are pessimistic about prospects for a

employ a variation of the Sherlock Holmes methodothere is no promising suspect in a murder case. Prov


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t

Note

ConclusThis is the ninth in a series of Prclarify the standardsusedfor ev


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* The DI database shows that terrorist incidents in counattempting to intimidate the foreign business commun* Examination of DI chronologies of the seven nationalcivilian government in country "A" indicates that recto break up opposition political rallies is withoutprec* The cause-and-effect relationshipbetween Premier "

calling for military exercises to turn public attention testablished.


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TradecraftTipsDI veterans offer the following recommendations for con1. When analysts have reached firm conclusions on compissues, take the time to present the data, to point to the reand to state the conclusions forcefully. For example:* The latest technically collected information, when comreporting, indicates that country "X" has the means tomonths, if not weeks.2. Again, when an issue is complex and controversial, de


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8. Conclusions are the bedrock foundation for estimative jaddress future patterns of development. In papers that areout the findings and those that make predictive judgments,summarize the findings in a textbox immediately precedinhelps clarify the argument for the critical reader. It can alslogic trail.


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Notes on AnaIDirectorate of I racecraIntelligence

Note 1

Tradecraft and Cou


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defense for countering deception-exercising increased caretesting working assumptions-places pressures on the DI coservicing consumer demand for tailored products.The key to holding down the opportunity costs of counteringclosely as possible to the normal processes analysts use to exquality and policy utility in their memorandums and briefing* As analysts become more accomplished in countering decqualified to provide value added to decisionmakers and ac


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Enhanced knowledge of both the reach and the vulnerhelp analysts in dealing with the everyday challengesambiguous information.3.Motive. A motive to deceive is believed to be preseservices-for example, in Russia, China, or Cuba-hadenial and disinformation operations virtually acrossfrom distorting analyst and policymaker perceptions * Knowledge of which secrets an adversary most seeperspective to the analysts' understanding of the co


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Tradecraft TipsThe effort needed to meet the DI standard of ensuring apprdeception at the lowest net cost to timeliness will vary fromassignment, analysts and managers will have to weigh the cdeceived against the opportunity costs of increased care. Beproceeding efficiently against two distinct levels of risk forissues.Regular Issues. We recommend a two-step defense againstwhich there is no specific reason to suspect deception is atvalue added to consumers is a general increase in understansupport for decision and action):


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as an essential element of the analyst's effort, even in instunnecessary to publish it.The content of the recommended assessment of the integrcircumstances. But at a minimum it should convey that (1deception has been taken seriously, (2) analytic tests to dehave been executed, and (3) any reasonable doubts are forSpecific questions that analysts can address with profit in1.What is known of the ability of the country or group un


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01-OSS 21 PRIMER Essential Elements of Info

Other Than War and Open Source IPrevious INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS IN A NEW CENTURY: A CUMUDGE

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A Compendium of Analytical Trade Craft Notes

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