A Comparison of British and French mechanized forces, with particular consideration of organization,...

8/12/2019 A Comparison of British and French mechanized forces, with particular consideration of organization, armament, v

1/20

SOLUTION NO ^- ^r .-v . . . . . . . ^ ,

R

T H E C O M M A N D A N D G E N E R A LSTAFF SCHOOL

Map Probltm N o . . y . y . .L / S^rie*..^.

IN CASE OF REFLY TO BE RET UR NE D TO RE CEPTACLE BY 9:00 A M1071C. * O. S. Sri ., Fnrt l^TnOflhJ I&-3JJSM


2/20

J/.K-IonA^Dtf.'. tOR: ThoD i r e c t o r , 2d " iear Clu sa , Comund and G e n e r a lS t a f f c h o o l , F o r t L o c v o . i * o r t ; i , K u n su o , ; ' 'S1.IBJECT: Cor.iparis-)n of Di- i t iuh r adH 'euc r r .ert hanizedf o r c e s , w i t h p a r l i o M l e r c o n o i d o r a t i o n of o r-g a n i z a t i o n , a rm an ie nt, v c h i c l t t i , tnd d o c t r i n e s

to ti l

ACCOMPAl.fIl


3/20

Inspe ctor Oonoral of A r t i l l ery (cr ea t ing tho o n ic n of InspectorGeneral of Iho M otor izat ion S er vi ce ) . (4)

Tho befit though t in both G reat B ri ta in and France isth at f io ld a m ie s must ta rn toward fas t moving arxored machinesaa the spood end s t rength gained thereby wi l l increase tho re-sources of the comnonder frcn both a s trategic and tcat ical pointof view. (5) As yo t, experim ents in me chan ization have not pro -g res sed su f f i c i e n t ly to pen i i t s t ab lo conc lus ions . (6 ) TheB rit ish are coninittod to i t in a very larg e de(_.'ee with p a rt ic u la ra t t en t io n , a t p re sen t , t o tho sub jec t of t anks , the t r en d be ingtoward development of an e ff io ie n t two man tank and to a le ss e rdegree a supe r tan k, 'fliey ar e experimentinG more tha n any othe rco un try , bend ing overy effo rt to so lve problems of ra pi d movementof troo ps and su pp lie s by Mechan ical ne on s. Uppermost in boththe m i l i ta ry and p o l i t i c a l mind io the feel in g tha t a countrycannot , in fu ture , wi ths tand the casual t ies or oxpense that ob-ta in ed in tho World War nnd *ha t tho raactino is th e s o lu ti o n foreconomizing in both man power and money. (7)

As to tho maneuverabil i ty of mechanized units , GreatBri tain has achievod material success when condit ions wore pro-pi t io us but wi th the present typos of ve hi cl es , they have fui le don ce r ta in oc cas io ns , e sp ec ia l ly in the case of motor ized infan t ryu n it s , when con dit io ns were unfavorable* (8)(4 ) (0 ,3 ) (7 ,2 )(5 ) (7 ,1 - Inc l 3 ) (8 ,2 -5( 6 ) ( 9 ,2 '(7) (1,2207) (7,64)(8) (12,595-605)

- 2 -


4/20

> E ff ec ti ve employment aeeno pr ed ica ted on the 'charac ter of the te rr a in . While co nd ition s in Wostom Europe 'would appear moro or le a s id ea l, yot lo ck o f roado, unbridgedor lig ht bridged r iv er s, rugged mountains, for est a rea s, jun gle ,and swamp can s t i l l di3couDt the ir e ff e c ti v e us e. (9) i

In France, the exce ssive co st of ga sclln o and ther e la ti v e ly a-aall automotive production i s a loo a problem notonly in prosout experimentation but also in -itointenance of wartino needs. (10)

Ob viously an exa ct knowledge of many phases of thedevelopment of mechanization in England and France are not atprosont ob tain ab le. This is pa rti cu la rly ruo in the case :>fGreat Britain, who is guarding closely nony of the results ofth e ir much moro advanced exp er im en tations . (11J However, a "farDepartjnont atatoncnt in Parlianont during the discuenion of the19J0 app ropr iations ' that the nechan lzed forc e was fctill verymuch in the experimental stuge" would n on to in dicate tha t theB rit ish are far from a sol uti on as y o t. (12)

Th* present idea in Great B ri ta in i s to ovo ntu allyelim inat e the horse in a ll except nountod coiabut un its* (13)Vfhilo they recognizo the necessity of maintaining an adequutocavalry ana, pack artillery, and a lliaitod proportion of horsoartillery, thoy are tending toward the elimination of animaltranspo rt e:rd su pp lies wherever p o ss ib le . They hold that(9) (7 ,5) (9 ,2)(10) (7,4)(11) (7,3)(12) (4,6)( 1 3 ) 0 , 8 )(14) (7, 27-31)


5/20

mechanization is moro economical. The French, while eonorallyin uccord, have not aa yot docidod


6/20

r ApiTt I'VOM experimental u n it u , noc.i. .nizution in tlioBv itiah rdg ulor aniy lo boing confined to motor izatior* of tru na -portaUon, asslgnraont of tructors in proforonco to homos in thearti l lery, and the predual addit ion of aunorfld fitr* and tanks

, , , ' , ' ' , l

both at hoiwa and in forei gn p a r t s . (19) In the French reg ul ar kor of oinorod car u n it s in tho cuvali'y rec im ont , (20)11 . 0R0/J1IZATI0N.

Based on its success with toi;ks and other automotivevohicleo during the World War, the briîoh oeôn concentratingon tho development of nechanical V.tuisport agencies ohortl>a f t e r du 'uob ilisu tio'n in 1929, Thia duveloprênt liao been c&rriodon ty tho Royal Tank Corps, tho tirtillory, ard the i-ioâl AiuyService Corps, al l activit ies beint coordinated by tho Got?oralStaff. Uxperj-nen+s ht ve been co ri'i ed on inv olv int; th e co op era -tion of tnnkn and armored cars in combat exorcises and in thouovemont of a r t i l lo r y and infa ntr y by motor tra ns po rt but TJOIIordered development of a corapleto laechanized unit did not startu n t i l 1927 . (21) Tho force b r o u ^ t "logcth?r ichttt yeor wao asfollows: (22)

Heed


7/20

Royal Tank Corpo, co ns is tin g of tv;o bu tt rl io n n (4i;t a n k o ) , twenty aruoro d eu ro , wid olfcht tu n k o tt e a. Ouo of f.o aoba tt ol * >ns was org aniz ed in to th ro e coniiianica of throo cojtioiu*each, each eoo tion having five V ic ko ri, Murk I I tunk s. Tneother battulion consisted of two coaponlos of aruoixjd cero, onocompany hnvinG two so oti on a and ono with t hr ee aoo tion o (f ou rrora por se c ti o n , a l l H ollo Ro/ce) Thoro vws alno u Radio ondTolophono Soot ion with four ta nk 8, one tank for each companycoc nan der, and two Bix whool 1;V tou tr uc i:a fo r uo ad qu ar ter atr an op or t. x company ta nk ot te a (one or two aon tunka of 2 or'6ton s) c on si st in g of four aeotion a of 2 tonka each (Moi-ric-Martol and Cardon-Lloyd),

A r t i l l o r y . :y / ; ; iTureo b st to ri o a of 10 poundera 1 ba tte ry 4,Jj", one

bat to ry lb poundero , ono bu t te ry 3" rmti rc ra f t* /J.1 b a t to r i eavtere mo torized, s elf -p rop ol led nou nta f drcvjot> tractor8, Kof:d3setruck tr a ct o rs (s ix wiieel tra ck t r a c t o m ) , aix v.'lieel Karri t.ntrucko porteo, and three ton four ffhoel rear drive trucka, al l vDoing used* (S3)

S i g n a l ,your oectiotui as follows:Ono equip ped w ith two 100 m ile and four 30 n i l o

radio sets , dio with four '6 n il o s e t s , one with four CO m ileso ts (one sot In a ta nk ) with a 12 n il o range on tl.e ro ad , andono aootion with 2 th ro o- ni lo jeCa for ar t i l l er y * Al l sec tio nswore ca rri ed on tr uc ko , V(IV6)(7 ,5 6) ' \ ',;.

' . - . ' - ' - G - ' : ' " " ' ' ' ' . ' " '


8/20

Ono pi'ovioional machine ^un battalion of throocoinpanios, with 36 Vickoru and 10 Lewis machino guna , 14 hulftrao l: l i g h t coru, 4 six whool l i g ht l o r r i e s , 33 one un


9/20

Til no dlu n arr.iorod bri^'i.do was organ ized in 1930ana consisted of three tank b'attullons find txc lose suppor ttank b a tt o r y . Tlio b at te ll jr io wore organ ized in to two co:::ponlos each having sixtoon medium tunku and ono company ofth ir ty two li c h t tank s ( tho ' l u t t o r company bolus re pres ente dby Garden L^.oyd noohino sun carriora ponding tho dovolopinentof u l i f M tcuil:) This or^u niz atio n nas modil 'iod th e followingjoar (1031) und ut pvoaent tho lrif?ide comprises ono lighttank bottulion and throe nixod battalions each nudo up ofth re e compunles and u sec tio n of cloo e support ta nk o. Eachcompany hao both uodlvcn and l i c h t tankfl, ono se ct io n of fiv eciodiun and ono of DOvon i i[ ?i t . (26)

To date th ere has boon no de fi ni te org an iza tio n inFrance of a otriotly nechanizod force olthoutfi tho formation ofouch a un it ia conta npleto d in North Africa as a pa rt of afu lly motorized forc o. (27) For the cav alry , the ult im ateob^ jt i v o i s tiio ncchtsTiizution of th present raountod d iv is io n(SO) baso o ^ho followin c cone rnl or ca niz utl oru

Koconjiaissonce v eh ic le s: tin 'ee or four squa dron s. >Re ei^on t of nodiiD; ta nk s (3.1> t o 2& t o n s , co n ai s ti n g

of throe battalions of twenty tanks each*

[20) (J',2207)(27) (2,41^3)(28) (2,4109)

- 0 -


10/20


11/20

i n . vaiiCLas ijrj AjrAMKirr.As previouoly ututod, experUionution to develop

vohiclOB to Bult the variously triod tacticul mid terrainconditions has procoodod npeoo l'or a number of yeurs, par-ticularly in Groat Britain. Tho details of those oxporioontsare somewhat vogue and do not permit conclusions pertinent tothis research, Thereforo consideration ie plven only to thotypse es now employed* (32} .- .

The British taodium tank vfoighs 10 tons; it has a100 horsepower Ariatron-iiddeley eiicooled on^ino uidstorapod steel tracks with o lire of JJOOO railea or more. Thosuspension is much inpvovod. Three turrets are fit ted. Thoralddlo turret contains a 3> pounder and a ,303 coaxiallyini. Tho two aiallor t u r r e t B have .LO or .303 Machine #Tne buaponsion is much iraproved and arrancononts for contiolby the corauandor havo loen oinpllfied. ITie tenk provides u veryotoady gin plotforn. Many safety devices huvo been added in-cluding a Pyreno oxtincuioher syotua wiiicj eithor the tankcoctnander or drivor can loose at will. . direction indicatornow boing tested is giving good results. Tiio gnsoline oyolaiis aituated on t'.;o top of tho nud guards. An electric funprovonts the ingress of poison (;us.

(32) 7,1-13, and C Tn-j)

- 1 0 -


12/20

Tho lirf it tank in nouutod on a Curdon-Lloyd nhaoiu with Gve ry sh or t tr uc k buoo A n^ i-u u of cuaponoJon has boen produced nhichonublos tho unor to keep Lis eye on the toloocope ovor nwstte rr a in con dit io ns und nakos the ve hic le more couu'ortablo tori d e in* A Meadows engine de velo ps 00 horsepower und \hn tunicthus possesses oncugh speed to scout in front of tlio nodiUii tuni: -i t hos covorod ninety u l l o s in three hoar s . Tho t ra ck l i f e i sgoad, Tho unnaaent io e it h e r a ,'60'inaciiino gun or u . "/' nach iiiegun* Tnore is e co ntro ver sy as to rtietunr t h i s tank oaould bn atwo or t hr ee nun v e h ic le , bu t at pre sen t Uio tvro nan orow is favorod,

.Trio lifciit o-nioi-ed c o r hu5 oup..-reeded cho ii eav io rtype sia it and modiuin tan ko 'IQVO toon eed* Tl;is l l f j i t c ar cu rr ie sa crow of thr e e m en -dr ive r, eunn"**, ane a cur ooarawider. I t i s asix whooled uiuorod car l u i l t un u Croosloy clicsie, which is cn ot i f i ed cornr:orcia l chas ia , unl has u oruis iug rad ius cf t io ut200 n i l eo . V

Tiio na chln o gun c a r r i e r now in jflo io th e Marl: VJCordon-L loyd, Tho crew of fou r mon i3 convoyod on a t r a i l e r ar.dis unp rot ec ted . Tlio uachJne jîn can bo f ire d fr o i tho c a rr ie ror can be l i f t e d out end f iixjd on the ground, Tiio v i i i c l o i to el fi s su f f ic ie nt ly uîored to reo iot o rdinery nachlne ûn f i re exceptfrom the air.

- 1 1 -


13/20

The tx'cmd of proaont design io towurds & ton/. tuMti$ very fa st ur*l pow erful, capable 01* trav ora irig Io ns di sta nc eswithout rofuolinc and endowed filth tho aWiina which has beenlacking her etofo re in tank co ns t r uc t ion . Tor reasons of f inance.iid to fa c i l i t a t e production upon tho outb reak of war, i t ieconsidered edviseblo to otondtrdizo each machine *^ien adopted,(3Z) , v

/inothor tw k vriiich ia bein/j expe rine nto d w ith ,but not yet adop tod, i c tho h r i t ie h C'-rdop-lJL'jyd l i^ h t ai.iphi-fciou.i tu ik . In recen t te at o i t hao crossed wide s tr et ch ea ofdeep w ater, climb u continuous 3lope of 30 dec rees at o n ll c aper hour, end short elone o' 4b decrees, and lies a ro&d 3peodof 40 nph* I t weigl:s about 2 to n s, c a rr ie s a crew of two men,haa Hturn ing c ir c le o* 23 fee t , is arood wit ti one i .achlne twn,tn d huB or.tjorp ro tec t ion aa in t ; r i f l e f i ro and e i tio r p i e rc ln ettriunition ot a ronfio of 150 ya rd o . (34 ) V

R o lt tiv e to nair.tenunce of a Ljechuiiized force in th efi e ld \. .e B ri ti sh plan at preoont ia oa follow s; (3&)

Minor re p ai rs to te dea l t with by ur . it a r t lc i f e rsn i t ) , hand to ol 3 /ir.d spare pa rt s c ar r ie d in the u n it .

(34) (3,37-30)(3t>) (1O,P


14/20

i-S ever 24 l.ovva r r i l l be car r ied outby fojsir-tion work cliopc (rtivluiott end co:v


15/20

Maintenance of mechanized vehic.Tos in the Frenchemy i3 handled by ocparute companies of tank \rorkncnboth for mobile fie ld employment and depot re p a ir shops, (30)

Fron the above it~wiil be noted that the dovoloprxsntof mcchanizod v e h ic le s in the French Army ha s been co nc en tra tedp ri n c ip a ll y on the armored car for use in conjunction w ith thecavalry while the Bri t ish ere working on a bnlonced force ofal l types ceprble of independent act ion,IV. TACTICS:

Both the Bri t ish and French oelieve that anoch anized forc e con be employed to adv antage on th e follo win gnis3 ion y: . /

Adveiico guard,V/ide rianking Movements.

re30;*ve to overcome unexpected resis tance,guard in the novenont of larcc bodies of

t roopo in to pos i t ion .Rear gusi 'd.Clos ing guys in tho l ino of bat t le and penet ra t ing

h o a t i l o gap3.Jx\tho l a s t fio ld maneuvers (1931) the mechanized

bric ud e a ppears to have been cnployod ao a rioro or l e s s indepen dentun it on miasiona invo lvin g tno a t tac k of cm oneny in p o si t i o n (withwid v.itliout tho protection of imtittvnk guno) and tlio attack of amarching column. Tao b u tt lo f i o ld t a c t i c s used in tne se problonvo(b&) (8,4100)( ) (7 ,4 )

- 1 4 -


16/20

should bo of intoi*o3t Q3 they cvonot only tho result ofoevoral years experimentation but wore also considered eahighly successful by moot British observers.

Tlie tank brigade, organized as previously des-cribed with light und medium tanks in each conpony, approachtho hostile position in three waves - first the brit idieraccompanied by his assistants (two field officers) and thebattalion canraonders, oil in tenks; ne/.t the companycommanders al3o in tanks; and last the brigade mass temporarilycomendod by a field officer of the General's Stuff* Aftertho necessary reconnaissances by the two loading v/avea andthe attack orders given, company commanders rejoined theirunits and led them along their respective lines of attack.Daring the reconnaissances by the lower unit comanders, thebrigade mass is led toward tho line of departure in order tooxpedito the action and to prevent presenting a stationary targotto hostile fire.

In Goncrnl tho light tanks acroon the novemont andprotect tho action of tho medium tanks by attacking the anti-tankguns. Tito light tanks were employed also as a secondary effort,either frontally or on tne opposite flank, to draw the hostileantitank defense from the nain effort. Awide noneuvor attackstriking the rear of tr.o hoatilo artil lery area and the exposedflank of a marching colienn i3 tho characteristic type of action.(40)

(40) ( . . . . . - 1 5 -


17/20

In tho se maneuvers, che Mechanized foroe p re se nt ed avery v is ib le , i f fa s t nerv ing, ta r ge t f ron t i e a i r whi le in d r i l lformation, but when the itannation broke up as tiie attack pro-gress ed, obs erv atio n was more d i f f i c u l t . Whilo tho no ise oftheir tracks gave warning of tho upproach apparently it was adeceptive noise to locate, and the presence of so largo a numberof tan ks confus es the li s t e n e r , iinoke was vuisd t o 30-r.e extentto screen the approach. (41}

v.;;. So fa r as reco nna issan ce i s concerned, i t app earsto bo the general opinion in both Great Britain and Francetha t horse cave lry is s t i l l sup er ior and more effe c t iv e thanmechanized units cs it alone is capable of searching woodsor a village, c-nd of assuming in any weather, i'Xa l l seasons ,in a l l k inds of to rr a i n , the pro tec t io n of the Inf antr y , Butduo to i t s offen sive power, and i t s a b il i t y to ^over gr eetdis tan ce s when t i n e io of v i t a l importance, i t i s agreed th atboth ti.o hors e and the nochani/.od u n it s aiou ld bo used t o -gether on thin mission, bein3 cowplinentary to one another.(42)

As the offoctivencoD of maneuvor of the mechanizedforce deponds upon su i tab le te r r a in , a i r su pe r i or i ty , andsurprise, to a grecrtoi1 exten t thnn does the op eratio ns offoot t roop s , i t i s considered in both coun tr ies th a t i t semployment w i l l be co nt ro lle d by tho hig her ech elo ns . Thefollowing problems o t i l l remain to bo solved: (43)(41) (3, 18)(42) (4,6) (b,LS6)(43) (1,3209) - 1 6 -


18/20

Protection on tho narch und at ni^vt Yfhen boyond thosupport of infantry.

Anuorod forces, af tor having found tho enoay, r.iujjt besupported by nachino guns and ur t illory.

Intercommunication between tho unita und thoir comar.dor.(44)V. CONCLUSIONS

It io not boliovod that tho procress nude In ex-perimentation just if ies tho optoniatic assertions now beingnode by Lrit iah vrritcrc, (4l>) The problens of supply, r.aln te-nunco, comunication , vulnerabili ty, contivl, fcnd to rruiu wouldseen lost ai^ht of to u lar^o extent because of tlio vividneosof tho view presonted by a .ncchanized force ncneuvorint; overfcvorallo teiTnin . Horrovor, the resul ts obtained to Aute v.ouldcortainly indicate taut a mochunived i'oj"co is prucuicublo, anda potential v?oapon of great vuliic on oiecion.s pri-viously nen-tiono^t j'.a'tho'*voro, dof^nciva meusuroo uyuiaot oucli a forcepresent u difficult problax that :.iuot be givon :.nich conaidoi'o-tion. (46)

As the j^rotich have not a3 yet a33or.ibled a st rict lymechanized i'orce nor produced tbe retiuirod vohicloo for thoaaploy.aont eonta'.platel in thoir atudie3, no definite con-cluatono can be dravm, of course, in u conyurison rritli thooe

of Grcit Brit ain. Ao to tho prohablo tuctics and cnployrientof ouch un an ti.oir thoucht ooo.:o ai ii lar but i t io to bonoted tht t tho iVeu i. are :;iore cautiouu in urrivinc at unydefinite concluniona or wa'cin^ any aat ericd ehimQcs in thei rproaont(44) (8,3-3) (11,9)(453) (7,3) (4,0)

-17-


19/20

It is bolioved that tao xtont to which arty force' : ' ' " ' /Mttl/ ' ' ' * > -

iiuy be nccliunized i3 & lnte 4 by tho te rr a in ovo r which vhoapproach lur ch es tu*y to bo made, ond it is do ub tful whethereven s lx-wheelers wil l bo able to nove at wil l s ince cvorylin o of approach nuot l ' i r s t bo recon noitore d and then placedunder sono so rt of t r a ff ic co n tr o l , except in the case ofl 'i^htiHG voh iclos in tho ac tu al encoun ter . Only a d ef in i teporcontage of any force is l ikely to bo entirely Mechaniseddue to the d if f i c u lt ie s of maintenance and t e r r a i n , and ouch.a force w il l probably bo kept ag a mobilo army re se rv e . Thisporcent&GQ muot bo Governed by the size of a self-containedforce which can for a very l i n i t e d t in e e x is t unsupported bya line of communication for the purpose of a special operationThe problems i t br inco to tho ordnance and tr an sp o rt ser vic esv d ll bo the moat di ff ic u lt with which the s ta ff and thoseservices wi l l have to deal*


20/20

BIBLIOGRAIHY

1 . B r i t i s h a n p i r o - C.iJ, S.S. Co mb at .2 . Frcince - C . 2 . ; 3 .o . Co mb at.3 . C a v a l r y J o u r n a l ( J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y , 19324 . C av a l ry Jo u r n a l (March -Ap r" i l , 193 1;)5 . C a v a l r y J o u r n a l ( I T o v e n b e r- D e c e i v e r,6 . C a v a l r y J o u r n a l ( J u l y -A u e i m t , 1931)7 . F o r o i f ji d e v e l o p m e n t s in t io o r c a n i z a o i o n and U30 ofM e c h a n i z e d F o r c e s , WarD e p a r t m e n t, 1927.8 . Ad i s c u s s i o n on the o f f i c i a l H an db oo k on M e c h a n i z a t i o n -L t . Col .M a r t ' jl - G-.TVfor De pai* tMcnt9 . Lecture on Mechanization, Gonoral tumot t -Stuar t , Attache Hoport.

10 . Furthor Aapecto of Mechanization - Drig. GOJU Ii. Rowon-Hobinoon -Vftn. Clowes and oons, London. 1929,1 1 . Sorao Aspects of 1'ochanization - Col. H. Rowan-Robinson. Vftn.Clowo3and Sons, London.12. Mechanical l.fobility - Royal Unitod Servico Inst it ut ions -AugU3t, 1931.1 3 . Motorization and Mechanization of An:iie3, Captain Hintorhoff-Hoyal Tank Corps Journal, July 1931.

A Comparison of British and French mechanized forces, with particular consideration of organization,...

Documents

Transcript of A Comparison of British and French mechanized forces, with particular consideration of organization,...