A CHRONOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF GHANAâ€™S FORESTRY POLICIES IN

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Indexed and Abstracted ISSN 2045-8460 (Online) African Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2045-8452 (Print) Volume 1 Number 2 (2011), pp.125- 139 www.sachajournals.com

A CHRONOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF GHANA’S FORESTRY POLICIES IN PRECOLONIAL AND COLONIAL ERA: LESSONS FOR FOREST MANAGEMENT IN

CONTEMPORARY GHANA

TEYE, Joseph Kofi Department of Geography and Resource Development,

University of Ghana, Legon, Accra, Ghana

ABSTRACT

This article examines historical trends in the character of forest management in the Gold Coast (now Ghana). Relying on the Socio-Economic Approach to policy analysis, the paper discusses the influence of changing socio-economic factors and power structures on forest management in pre-colonial and colonial Ghana. In so doing, the article also interrogates the real motives behind the colonial forest reservation policy in the Gold Coast. Contrary to the belief that colonial reservation policy was a ploy take the management of lucrative forest resources from local people; the paper argues that centralised forest reservation policy was adopted by the British colonial administration in response to genuine environmental concerns. Finally, the effects of colonial forest policies on forest governance in modern Ghana are discussed. Keywords: Forest Governance, Traditional Authority, Colonial Administration, Ghana

1. INTRODUCTION

As a way of promoting sustainable forest management, a number of studies have been conducted on institutional arrangements and policies being adopted to protect forests in the developing world (Cline-Cole & Madge 2000; Gibson et al. 2000). Yet, very few researchers have examined historical trends in the character of forest management in West Africa (McEwan 2000; Grainger and Konteh 2007). As a result of scanty documentary evidence, there is little understanding of the factors that influenced forest policy in pre-colonial Africa. Similarly, colonial forest discourse, in Africa, has not been given adequate space in the environmental history literature. Again, while it has been acknowledged that forests and forestry are often constructed in different ways by competing groups (Cline-Cole and Madge 2000), the conflicts which characterised forest management in colonial Africa are quite poorly explored. To help fill some of these intellectual gaps, this article examines historical trends in the character of forest governance in pre-colonial and colonial Gold Coast (now Ghana).

The nature of political power structures in the Gold Coast makes it a suitable place for such an analysis. Before the arrival of the first Europeans (Portuguese) in 1471, the Gold Coast

African Journal of Social Sciences, Volume 1 Number 2 (2011); pp.125- 139

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was made up of several chiefdoms, which were governed by traditional rulers (Arhin 1979). Traditional rulers were still in charge of the various chiefdoms when other Europeans, notably the Dutch, English, Danish, and Swedish arrived. After several conflicts with other Europeans and the Asante Kingdom in the Gold Coast, the British formally established the Crown Colony of the Gold Coast in 1874. Although some forests were being protected by local people before the arrival the Europeans, it was the British Colonial Administration that introduced a centralised forest reservation policy in the Gold Coast. While a few researchers have documented some developments in the forestry sector in the colonial era (Kotey et al. 1998; Degrassi 2003), the influence of complex power structures and changing socio-economic factors on forest governance has not been fully explored.

Against this background, this paper aims to address the following research questions: How did prevailing socio-economic factors and power structures influence forest management in pre-colonial and colonial Gold Coast? What were the real motives behind the colonial forest reservation policy in the Gold Coast? What strategies were adopted by the colonial administration to deal with conflicts over forest resource use? What are the effects of colonial forest policies on forest governance in modern Ghana?

As international donor organisations and the government of Ghana are still searching for effective strategies to control rapid forest loss in the country, an understanding of character of forest governance in the not too distant past may hold some lessons for effective forest management in modern Ghana. 1.1 CONTESTED VIEWS ON FOREST COVER TRENDS IN GHANA

Actual forest cover trends in Ghana are contested (Fair, 1992; Hawthorne and Abu Juam, 1995). It is often assumed that up till the late 1890s, almost every part of southern Ghana was occupied by closed forest. Based on such assumptions, some researchers have estimated that forest cover fell from 8.2 million ha in the late 1890s to about 2 million ha contemporary (Frimpong-Mensah, 1989; Fair, 1992; Hawthorne and Abu Juam, 1995). To these researchers, deforestation in Ghana is a recent phenomenon, brought about by the expansion of farming activities (Frimpong-Mensah 1989; Hawthorne and Abu Juam, 1995).

The above estimates, which dominate the conventional literature on forest cover changes in Ghana, have been contested by Fairhead and Leach (1998). These two researchers have argued that most of the early estimates of forest cover trends were inaccurate because they were based on a wrong assumption that the entire southern Ghana was forested in the 1890s. Relying on anthropological and historical data, they asserted that the Ghana’s forests before the 1890s may have just covered 5.5 million ha, of which 2 million ha still remain. These researchers also demonstrated forcefully that a significant proportion of forest loss in Ghana may have occurred even before the 1890s. An understanding of the long term trend in the character of forest management in Ghana will, therefore, help to explain the contribution of policy weaknesses to forest loss that occurred before the present era.

2. METHOD AND MATERIALS 2.1 MODELLING CHANGES IN FOREST POLICY

There is no doubt that a robust model of policy change is required to analyse historical trends in the character of forest governance (Lane and McDonald 2002). A review of the literature shows that the Advocacy Coalition Framework, which views public policy as a product of interactions among policy makers and coalitions of interest groups, has been proposed for similar studies (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). However, this


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model was considered inappropriate for analysing forestry in colonial Ghana, as the policy communities during this era were largely not open. The Balance of Policy Pressures Model, which assumes that forest policy is the balance of power between exploitative and protectionist groups (see Grainger and Konteh 2007), was also rejected on the grounds that it failed to provide a useful framework for analysing intra-group conflicts that characterise forest management.

In view of the weaknesses of these and other models reviewed, the Socio-Economic Approach to policy analysis was chosen for the analysis in this paper. This approach posits that public policy is driven by powerful socio-economic forces that sets the agenda, structure decision-makers’ choices and constraint implementation (John 1998). There are two perspectives on how socio-economic factors influence policy changes. One school of thought emphasised global factors more than local factors. It is argued that in order to understand changes in national policies, researchers must focus on changes in the global economy, since local authorities tend to adopt policies that are in line with global political and economic trends (Peterson 1981). Another school of thought argued that there is a complex relationship between public policy and the wider socio-economic world, but then researchers must focus on local economic factors (Sharpe and Newton 1984).

Although the Socio-Economic Approach could be criticised for neglecting the influence of interest groups on public policy outcomes, it is still very useful for explaining changes in natural resource policy. In this paper, insights from this approach will be relied upon to analyse how various political, cultural and socio-economic factors have historically influenced actual forest policy in pre-colonial and colonial Ghana. It is assumed that changes in factors, such as international timber trade, land ownership, religious beliefs and politics of the country, would have influence on forest governance in Ghana. 2.2 DATA SOURCES

The nature of this study necessitated relying heavily on secondary sources of data. Relevant documents, such as policy statements, administrative records, and official reports, were analysed. Other secondary data sources include journals and books. In addition to these documentary sources, some key informants were also interviewed to enhance the quality of the discussions. A key informant is a person who is considered to have some depth of knowledge concerning the research problem and who is willing to talk (Broshenka and Castro 1983). In-depth interviews were held with twelve experienced directors and foresters of the Forest Commission of Ghana. Seven elders and traditional rulers in selected communities in the Eastern and Central Regions of Ghana were also interviewed about the history of forestry in Ghana. These oral communications enhanced the researcher’s understanding of the effects of colonial forest policies on forest management in modern Ghana. In the next sections of this paper, the key findings are outlined and discussed, within the framework of the theoretical perspectives presented earlier. 3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents and discusses historical trends in the nature of forest governance in Ghana within the framework of the socio-economic approaches to policy changes.


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3.1 TRADITIONAL POWER STRUCTURES AND FOREST GOVERNANCE

During the pre-colonial era (1471-1874), the various chiefdoms in the then Gold Coast were governed by traditional authorities. Documentary evidence suggests that the management of forests in this era was shaped by both conservation and exploitation interests of traditional societies. Conservation interests led to the protection of sacred groves and forests at the bank of river bodies. These ‘traditional reserves’ were protected based on unwritten community by-laws (Owubah et al. 2001), which were formulated on the foundation of traditional religious beliefs that emphasised the harmony between the community and trees. Shared religious beliefs played a significant role in the enforcement of these by-laws. It was feared that citizens who disobeyed rules on the protection of trees in sacred groves would face the wrath of the gods of the land. As some cultural theorists have pointed out, such traditional rule systems are effective because members share similar interests and beliefs which make rule enforcement and internal monitoring possible (Landa 1981; Fearon and Latin 1996). The power of the traditional ruler was also enhanced by the fact that he was and is still seen as a representative of the ancestors. In some societies, such as the Akans who constitute the largest ethnic group in Ghana, the traditional ruler was even seen as an incarnation of the god of the land (Nukunya 2003). Consequently, rules imposed by him were respected and seen as being in the interest of the entire society. This involved the operations of power based on ‘authority’. The subjects complied because of the conviction that the power holder had the legitimacy to command (Ledyaev 1997).

While community by-laws prohibited extraction of forest resources from sacred groves, there is no evidence that they prohibited exploitation of timber outside them. Timber and other forest products were extracted for sale both within and outside Ghana. Thus, forest exploitation in Ghana started long before the advent of formal colonialism in the Gold Coast. This pre-colonial exploitation, which was more concentrated on the coast (Parren and Graaf 1995), was largely driven by trading networks between traditional rulers and European merchants. Trade with Europeans started after the Portuguese arrived in 1471, and became even more intense with the subsequent arrival of other Europeans. Chiefs played a very important role in this early trade. Visiting traders needed protection and that could be secured only through the political power. Chiefs granted such protections and accepted payments in return (Reynolds, 1974; Arhin 1979).

Although this early international trade largely involved gold and slaves, forest products were also exported to Europe. It is on record that the export of cola nuts from the Ghanaian forests started in the 15th century and became a major export commodity when the slave trade declined in the 1820s (Lovejoy 1985). Palm oil, initially obtained from wild trees, was another forest product exported outside Ghana as early as 1790 (Parren and Graaf 1995). Wood products exported from Ghana during the pre-colonial era included ebony (diospyrus ebenum), barwood (ptercarpus erinaceus), camwood (Baphia nitida) and some redwood species (Reynolds 1974). Such pre-colonial international timber trade occurred in other West African countries (Adeyoju, 1976). Indeed, large quantities of West African timber oak was imported into Liverpool for the purpose of ship building as early as 1823 (Adeyoju 1976; Parren and Graaf 1995). Thus, although the level of exploitation was not so high, it is still important to put on record that some level of exploitation occurred in the whole West African sub-region before the advent of colonialism. The argument that timber exploitation in Ghana predates colonialism is consistent with the findings of Fairhead and Leach (1998) that significant portions of Ghanaian forests were destroyed long before the 20th century. Such destruction might have been due to a combination of farming and logging activities.


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The preceding analysis shows that while religious interests of traditional societies led to the conservation of sacred groves, economic interests and trading networks between traditional rulers and European merchants contributed to some form of exploitation of forest resources outside sacred groves. These ‘exploitation networks’ were sustainable because they were based on mutual dependencies. The merchants had economic interests, which were based on their desire to get a cheap supply of African goods. On the other hand, chiefs also needed merchandise goods, such as guns, gunpowder, spirits, jewels to enhance their political and economic interests (Arhin 1979; Reynolds 1974). Actor-Network theorists have used the term ‘actants’ to refer to such non-human items that link various actors within any network (Law 1992; Morris 2003). 3.2 FOREST EXPLOITATION AND STRUGGLES FOR CONTROL OVER NATURAL

RESOURCES

Timber exploitation which started during the latter part of the pre-colonial period continued without any control in the first three decades of the colonial era (i.e. 1874-1900), since it satisfied both the executives and the traditional rulers, who were sharing power. Traditional authorities were still interested in natural resource revenue to govern their states, while the colonial administration was interested in generating more revenue, which would provide financial security for running the new colony. Although both the colonial administration and the traditional rulers apparently favoured exploitation, there were some conflicts between the two groups. One factor which brought about these conflicts was the desire of colonial administration to control lands, apparently in order to control natural resource revenue. To fulfil this interest, the administration attempted, in 1894, to create Crown Lands by passing the Crown Lands Ordinance. This sought to vest ‘waste and forest lands and minerals’ in the hands of the local colonial administration. The Bill was strongly opposed by local people on the grounds that it ignored the fact that they had inherited lands from their ancestors. In 1898, Her Majesty’s Government ruled that the local colonial administration should allow the natives to exercise ownership of such lands (DeGrassi 2003).

The scenario here contradicts the assertion by some political theorists (Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Smith 1993) that there is always a high degree of consensus within close policy communities (i.e. governing networks characterised by only a few people). Such assertions failed to recognise the fact that interests within networks are constantly being negotiated, since each group of actors may want to maximise their interests. In this Ghana case, while both traditional rulers and the colonial administration were cooperating because they both favoured exploitation, each group also wanted to have significant control over resource revenue. These conflicts can also be explained in terms of tensions at the ‘zone of congruence’ between two different networks (Machado and Burns 1998). The explanation is that as the traditional rulers belonged to both the local community and the governing policy community, they were actually located at the interface of the local community and governing policy community. In order to contest the Crown Land Bill, traditional rulers followed the interests of the local community. Here, they even relied on the support of the citizens to fight the bill. This scenario is consistent with the theoretical assumption that in any network form of governance, members of the secondary policy community may become outsiders, if they feel that their interests are threatened by the activities of other actors in the core policy community (Smith 1993).

If it is taken that traditional rulers and the colonial executive belong to the co-governance network (i.e. policy community), then the struggles between the two groups could be seen as ‘intra-network struggles’. On the other hand, if it is understood that traditional


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authorities belong to the local community network, then these struggles could be seen as ‘inter-network struggles’. These complex intra-group struggles also demonstrate why it is not appropriate to classify stakeholders as either exploitationists or protectionists (as wrongly theorised by Grainger and Malayang 2006). Such a dualistic classification scheme does not provide an adequate framework for analysing intra-group conflicts around natural resource policy. In this case, both traditional rulers and colonial administration could be seen as an exploitative group, yet they did not agree on how resource revenue must be controlled. 3.3 EMPLOYMENT OF SUBTLE FORMS OF POWER TO PROMOTE FOREST

CONSERVATION

The forest interests of the colonial administration shifted from exploitation to conservation in the early 1900s in response to environmental concerns which were dramatised by visiting colonial foresters (see Chipp 1922; Grove 1997). In view of these environmental crisis narratives, the first regulations to control timber harvesting were set out in the Concession Ordinance of 1900. In 1907, the Timber Protection Ordinance was passed to prevent the felling of immature trees (Troup 1940). Under this ordinance, a forest officer was appointed to inspect trees before they could be felled. In 1909, a Forestry Department (now Forest Services Division) was established and given the responsibility of supervising the creation and management of state forest reserves. However, these early attempts by the colonial administration to rely on its authority to pass a comprehensive forest reservation policy were resisted by native people, who thought that reservation policy was a ploy to gain control over land ownership.

In view of the strong opposition to formal reservation, a 1910 Forest Ordinance that empowered the Governor to constitute as reserves any “wastelands”, defined as lands that were “unoccupied or uncultivated” could not be implemented (Degrassi 2003: 3). This definition of wastelands as lands that were “unoccupied or uncultivated” reflects policy ambiguity, given that farming in Ghana and elsewhere in Africa involves a long period of fallowing. This ambiguity appeared to be brought about by the strong local opposition to centralised forest reservation at the time. The colonial administration probably thought that the best way to get the reservation policy accepted was to state that it would not affect other land use patterns, hence the choice of the word ‘wastelands’. Thus, this was an ambiguity which was related to attempts to find words that would be acceptable to local communities. Thus, the administration attempted to use manipulation - a subtle form of power - to control traditional rulers, but the strategy did not work.

Given the strong local opposition to direct state forest reservation, the colonial administration eventually persuaded local communities to undertake forest reservation under their own by-laws. This scenario resonates with Foucault’s assertion that governance is a strategic game that requires craft, imagination, shrewd fashioning and the use of tacit skills (Foucault, 1991). Yet, the use of such tacit skills brought about a policy ambiguity. A Forest Ordinance, which was passed in 1927 to support centralised forest reservation, was characterised by some interesting policy ambiguities characterised. First, in view of resistance to any attempt to take land ownership from the local people, it was stated clearly in the 1927 Forest Ordinance that the reservation of any area would not change ownership. Yet, the same policy provided for the Governor to be able to reserve any land it so wished, even if it was without the consent of the traditional authorities. Further, the policy provided two separate modes of forest management. The first was centralised management by the Forestry Department. The other was a decentralised mode of management by the owner(s) under the


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supervision of the Forestry Department (Kotey et al. 1998). However, the policy did not clearly state how the second option was to be achieved. It appears that the decentralised mode was inserted just to make the policy attractive to traditional rulers. Ambiguity was, therefore, caused by attempts to make concessions to the demands of powerful actors within the policy community. Ambiguity is one of the forms of deception often employed by governments to maintain their autonomy (Ramsay, 2000) and deal with conflicting demands from various resource users (Rees, 1990). Habermas (1984) was sceptical about the legitimacy of a consensus achieved by such a complete deception. However, as Grainger and Konteh (2007:48) noted elsewhere, this is often the most effective way for policy makers in Africa to “bridge the gap between groups”. To win their support, traditional rulers were also giving control over timber revenue. Through the employment of these kinds of manipulations and deceptions, traditional authorities came to support the colonial reservation policy. The strategy employed by the colonial administration is in line with the position of “analytics of government” school of thought, i.e. governing is not only about controlling subjects, it also entails persuasive tactics (Dean, 1999). 3.4 THE COLONIAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE

The main motive behind the British colonial administration’s forest reservation policy in Africa has been a source of debate in the literature. While some scholars believe that the centralised forest reservation policy was adopted in response to genuine environmental concerns (Smith 1996), others believed that it was a ploy to take the management of lucrative forest resources from local people (see DeGrassi 2003; McEwan 2000). In support of the second thesis, Degrassi (2003:7) wrote:

“Colonial powers seeking to elicit consent by recalcitrant subjects to more direct, centralized control over lucrative timber and cocoa revenue constructed, circulated, and invoked scientific discourses that savannization - a trans-boundary and trans-generational agro-ecological process - was endangering the public goods provided by forests.”

Documentary evidence suggests both direct benefits of forests and environmental

concerns influenced the forest interests of the British colonial administration. However, there is enough evidence to suggest that, in the Gold Coast, the prime factor that pushed forward reservation policy, at least in the early 20th century, was environmental concerns. The benefits of forestry (such as the preservation of good climate for cultivation of cocoa and timber supply) were often used by the visiting foresters to justify the need for centralised forest reservation. For instance, Chipp warned, in his Forest Officers Handbook, that rapid deforestation would inevitably result in the “disappearance of cocoa, kola and oil palm industries as commercial ventures” (Chipp 1922: 47). Section 4.4 of the 1927 Forest Ordinance also emphasised the indirect benefits when it stated that:

“The destruction of the forests thereon is diminishing or is likely to diminish the water supply, or is injuring or is likely to injure the agricultural conditions of neighbouring lands…” (Forest Ordinance 1927, Section 4.4)

Ghana’s forest statement to the 1928 Empire Forestry Conference also noted that: “the

reservation of areas of permanent forest suitably distributed through the cocoa growing zone…


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to maintain that zone as a forest climate (Gold Coast 1928, cited by Kotey et al. 1998: 44). Such statements about the indirect benefits were also given by foresters in the 1930s when formal reservation had already started. Oliphant, for instance, stated that:

“Property of this kind [forest], from which derive the well-being and prosperity of the country, is peculiarly the heritage of posterity, not for the sole enjoyment of the existing generation. If the British Government be regarded as trustees of these people, then the present beneficiaries have been allowed to squander valuable capital and impoverish the trust.” (Oliphant 1932: 2)

The emphasis on indirect environmental benefits was even clearer when he wrote that:

“Legislation for forest conservation must be based on the recognition that the forests set aside for ensuring climatic stability and the permanent satisfaction of the timber requirements of the country are national property, held in trust for posterity.” (Oliphant 1932: 7, 8)

It is, therefore, clear that external pressure, stemming from environmental concerns rather than what Grainger and Konteh (2007) term “exploiting forests as a commodity”, was the main driving force for forest reservation in the Gold Coast in the 1900s. This launching of scientific forestry in Ghana was actually part of a broader environmental discourse, which became prevalent in all British and French colonies at that time. It was feared that rapid deforestation, especially in the cocoa growing zone of southern Ghana, threatens the economic viability of imperialism (Smith 1996; Grove 1997). Indeed, a number of policy statements attributed rapid forest loss to farm extensions and shifting cultivation rather than logging. For instance, the Chief Conservator of Forests, Moor wrote:

“[M]any of [the] forested areas are honeycombed with farms that are continually expanding… the state of affairs appears to have been brought about since the introduction of cocoa, i.e., within the last 30-40 years. With the rate of expansion in the future being the same as it was in the past it is obvious that the coming generation will see the destruction of the remaining forests.” (Moor 1924:82)

However, there is no doubt that the colonial administration knew that the forests so reserved could be a major source of timber in the future. In fact, some statements openly noted the direct timber benefits alongside the environmental concern. For instance, Moor, the Chief Conservator wrote:

“A forest reserve is not a museum piece to be looked at, but not touched, it is something to be worked. When any commercial industry creates the demand, the reserve is there to satisfy it.” (Moor 1935, as cited by Degrassi, 2003:6)

Chip (1923:68-69) also emphasised the direct benefits when he noted that the forests of

Gold Coast were “a source of lumber to the heart of the Empire”. The argument is that colonial foresters were aware of the fact that reservation might help to produce more timber in the near future. Yet, the prime factor that pushed the forest reservation policy forward in 1900 was environmental concerns raised by visiting foresters. Reservation policy, therefore, did not originate from the local colonial administration in the then Gold Coast. It was adopted in


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response to external pressures from visiting foresters. The content of the 1927 Forest Ordinance of the then Gold Coast was similar to versions implemented earlier in India, Nigeria and Burma (DeGrassi 2003). All these suggest that the policy texts were imported from overseas. 3.5 ECONOMIC CHANGES AND TIMBER EXPLOITATION

Global political and economic changes in the early 1940s shifted the forest interests of the colonial administration from conservation to timber exploitation. Instead of focusing on forest reservation, the emphasis was now placed on harvesting and exporting of timber from to Europe. This change was largely brought about by increased international demand for timber products during and after the World War II. The export demand was so high that some tree species, which were hitherto not traded internationally, were now being exported from Ghana. The minimum allowable diameters, which various species in the Ghanaian forests must attain before they could be harvested, were relaxed just to meet the international demand (Parren and Graf 1995). When, Moor, the Chief Conservator wrote, in 1935, stated that a forest reserve is not a museum piece and that it would be worked when any viable commercial industry creates the demand he was probably thinking of a local industry that might emerge some decades later. However, the war brought his expectations forward, and even created a stronger demand than he probably imagined. So the war created a powerful condition that distorted the environmental concerns raised by the colonial foresters. This scenario is consistent with the assertion that major policy changes are driven by powerful economic factors that affect the interests of policy makers (Peterson 1981; John 1998). 3.5.1 THE 1948 FOREST POLICY AND ITS EFFECTS ON FOREST MANAGEMENT

These short term economic benefits of forest exploitation influenced the formulation of the 1948 forest policy, which was the first comprehensive forest policy passed in Ghana. Among other things, this policy provided for: (1) conservation of forests by protecting major water catchment areas and maintaining a conducive climate for the production of major crops; (2) sustainable management of the permanent forest estate; (3) promotion of research in all branches of scientific forestry; (4) maximum utilisation of areas not dedicated to permanent forestry (Kotey et al, 1998).

This policy, which was the main forest policy up to 1994, negatively affected forest management. First, it created forestry as a ‘technical’ venture. The possibility of active local community participation in forest management was not seriously considered on the grounds that they were ignorant about scientific forestry. It was also argued that it would take a long time to educate local people about scientific forestry. Some of these arguments were even made by colonial foresters as early as the 1930s. Oliphant (1932: 2), for instance, wrote that: “the forests could not be kept intact over the long period required to educate a primitive people”. As demonstrated by the statement below, these kinds of statements are still made by some forest officials in Ghana:

“Since the days of the white man, forests have been managed by well trained scientists. Local people do not know anything about tree management, yet they now want to be allowed to manage their forests. How can we allow them to do so? (53 year old Forest Manager, Accra)


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Thus, the current situation in Ghana whereby state foresters tend to think that local people are ignorant about scientific forestry is rooted in the colonial forestry discourse. The late colonial era was also characterised by over-restriction of local community rights over forest resources. As a result of these restrictions, local communities have historically not been interested in collaborating with the state Forest Services Division.

Apart from alienating local people from forest management, the goals of the 1948 Forest Policy were largely exploitative. It designates 70% of forest reserves for timber production. It also provided for “maximum utilisation” of all off-reserve trees. This was justified on the grounds that cocoa farmers would inevitably destroy the trees, so it would be more appropriate to harvest them as soon as possible (Smith 1996). Though poor record keeping makes it difficult to demonstrate the corresponding increase in logs produced and exported during this period, available data show that between 1950 and 1955, for instance, the volume of industrial logs produced increased by over 100% from 0.56 million cubic meters in 1950 to 1.14 million cubic meters in 1955. More than half of the logs produced in 1950 were exported (Page 1974; Gillis 1988). 3.6 EFFECTS OF COLONIAL FOREST POLICIES ON FOREST MANAGEMENT IN

MODERN GHANA

While some of the effects of colonial forest policies on forest management in modern Ghana are positive, others are negative. One positive effect is the fact that it was the colonial administration which introduced scientific forestry in Ghana. Centralised forest management has also helped to overcome some of the potential boundary conflicts that are associated with forest management elsewhere (Rees 1990).

Despite these positive effects, some of the problems that characterise forest management in contemporary Ghana has historical undertones, dating back to the colonial era. To begin with, the colonial administration’s economic interests have influenced the spatial distribution of forest reserves in Ghana. As hinted already, the main concern of colonial foresters was to ensure that rapid forest loss did not affect the production of cocoa, which was the main export crop at the time. As a result, colonial forest reserves were created only in Southern Ghana where cocoa (the then main export commodity) was and is produced. Savannah forests in northern Ghana were not protected, apparently because their destruction was not thought of as a threat to the production of any export commodity. As most reserves in Ghana were created during the colonial era, forestry in Ghana till date is only concerned with the closed forest zone where cocoa is produced and lucrative timber exists. This situation, which has been termed ‘timberisation’ of forestry (Kotey et al, 1998: 21), is not helpful, given the fact that the savannah forest zone is still a source of very useful livelihood resources (e.g herbs, fodder, fuel wood etc). The fact that some important game reserves and sacred groves are still located within the Savannah forest zone is an indication that if well protected, it would enhance biological diversity in Ghana.

The negative effects of colonial forest discourse are not hard to come by. Although the colonial policy of indirect rule has enabled the colonial administration to control local opposition to centralised forest reservation, the policy has sown the seeds for the conflicts and injustice that characterised the distribution of forest revenue in modern Ghana. In fact, indirect rule has led to the formalisation and strengthening of chieftaincy (Kotey et al, 1998). Consequently, unrepresentative traditional rulers have historically been allowed to exercise de facto ownership rights over timber, despite the fact that these resources actually belong to the community (Degrassi (2003). As the quotation below shows, traditional rulers, on the other


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hand, tend to cite these historical developments to justify why they still want to collect royalties:

“We [chiefs] are the people in charge of the natural resources in these communities. Even the colonial government recognised us as such, and this is why they paid royalties to traditional rulers.” (78 year old traditional ruler, Koforidua)

The above statement shows that any attempt to change the formula for distributing

forest revenue will be resisted, given the fact that it has existed since the colonial era. It is also clear that, some of the contradictions and ambiguities in formal forest policy in Ghana emanated from attempts by the colonial administration to control the demands from traditional rulers and local people. As noted already, for instance, in order to make concessions to traditional rulers who did not want to relinquish their control of lands, the colonial administration agreed, in 1927, that the constitution of an area as a forest reserve would not transfer the title to that land or the forest to the state. As a result of this agreement, all forests in Ghana are still owned by local people, yet management and utilisation rights are still held by the state. This often creates tensions between local people and the Forest Services Division. It has also already been stated that by establishing forestry as a technical venture, the colonial administration did not promote community participation in tree management. Finally, the administration was not interested in the protection of trees outside forest reserves. This continued after independence. It was only recently (after 1994) that some legislative instruments were passed to protect trees on farmlands outside reserves. 4. CONCLUSIONS

The findings presented in this paper have clearly shown that the trend in the character of forest management in the Gold Coast is consistent with the predictions of the Socio-Economic Approach to Policy Change. In both the pre-colonial and colonial periods, forest policy was influenced by changing socio-economic, cultural and political factors. In the pre-colonial era, religious interests of local people led to the formulation of by-laws that ensured the protection of sacred groves. On the other hand, economic interests and trading networks between traditional rulers and European merchants led to exploitation of forests outside sacred groves.

There was no attempt to control forest exploitation in the first three decades of the colonial era (1874-1900), since it still satisfied the interests of the dominant policy actors, namely traditional rulers and the colonial executive. By 1900, colonial environmental discourse shifted actual forest policy from exploitation to sustainable forest management. Forest policy shifted again from sustainable forest management to exploitation by the early 1940s, as the World War II made the timber trade very lucrative. Consequently, exploitation became a priority for the dominant policy actors. Given these exploitative interests, the first comprehensive forest policy which emerged in 1948, was largely exploitative. Forest exploitation continued throughout the remaining colonial period.

A number of important issues came out from the analysis. First, contrary to the popular belief that timber exploitation in Ghana started during the colonial era, the documentary evidence analysed here shows that the export of timber from Ghana to Europe started during the pre-colonial era. The historical trends in Ghana, is therefore, consistent with what has been reported by Grainger and Konteh (2007) in their study of forestry trends in Sierra Leone. Again, contrary to claims that the British colonial forest reservation policy in West Africa was largely


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influenced by the desire to control forest resource revenue (Degrassi, 2003), this paper concludes that genuine environmental concerns raised by visiting colonial foresters was the prime factor that contributed to the formulation and implementation of forest reservation policy in the early 20th century.

The findings also demonstrate the fluidity of power that characterised forest management in Ghana. Changes in power structures have affected forest management within different periods. In the pre-colonial era, management of traditional forests were successful because the legitimacy of traditional authorities to enforce bye-laws was never questioned. In the colonial era, however, power was more fluid as neo-traditional power sometimes clashed with state power. It was shown, for instance, that attempts by the colonial administration to take land by force and constitute reserves directly did not work as local people were able to resist these dominations. As Sharp et al. (2000: 10) noted: “through resistance by non-consenting and non-cooperation leading to disobedience, subjects decline to supply power-holders with their sources of power”. In view of these complex power structures, subtle forms of power (e.g. persuasions and manipulations) were more effective than the use of force. Indeed, opposition to forest reservation were only resolved after the colonial administration provided traditional rulers with financial incentives. The strategy adopted here resonates with Rose’s (1999: 21) assertion that ‘governmentality’ involves: “[The] studies of stratums of knowing and acting. Of the emergence of particular regimes of truth concerning the conduct of conduct, ways of speaking the truth, persons authorised to speak the truth”. Indeed the actions of the traditional rulers were shaped by working through their “desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs for definite and shifting ends” (Dean, 1999: 16). The findings also buttress the assertion that power is not only about controlling observable behaviour and decisions (Sibeon, 2004), it also consists of non-observable realm of decision-making.

It also came out clearly that while the British colonial administration could be credited for introducing the scientific forestry in Ghana, their policies created some problems for forest managers in modern Ghana. It was demonstrated that some of the ambiguities that characterised forest management today are caused by attempts by the administration to make concessions to local people. Customary laws have been maintained alongside state regulations, creating a confusing ‘pluriform legal situation’ (Dubois, 1999:7). For instance, land is owned by local communities and governed by customary rights, yet the management and utilisation rights over lucrative trees are held by the forest Services Division.

A number of lessons can be gained from the findings of this study. In view of the revelation that forest sector has historically been characterised by a fluidity of power, any forest policy that does not satisfy the interests of local people is bound to fail. As Dubois(1999) noted elsewhere, current forest policies, often inspired by exclusive colonial forestry laws, are inappropriate to local realities, because they tend to focus on technical aspects and ignore the socio - cultural dimension of forest use. It has also been concluded that local people in Ghana have the tendency to work with the Forest Services Division, once they are motivated. On the basis of these findings, policy makers in Ghana must be reminded that collaborative forestry is the best way of controlling conflicts between local people and stated actors. It is hoped that recent attempts by international donors to influence the government of Ghana to adopt participatory forest management will yield positive results. REFERENCES

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