Journal of Economic Psychology 25 (2004) 129–134

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Critical Commentary

A charitable view of altruism: Commentaryon �What is altruism?’ by Elias Khalil

Catherine Walker *

Charities Aid Foundation, Kings Hill, West Malling, Kent ME19 4TA, UK

Received 28 May 2003; accepted 10 June 2003

Abstract

As an economic psychologist turned ‘‘charity researcher’’ I have a longstanding personal

and professional interest in the concept of altruism (defined as regard for others as a principle

of action), which, after all, forms the basis of charity (defined as giving to those in need, or

love of one’s fellow men), does it not? Thus I found Khalil’s lengthy discussion of the subject

very interesting and engaging.

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1. The problem with altruism from an economic point of view

As I see it the basic problem with altruism (and here I use it synonymously with

charity) from a neo-classical micro-economic perspective is that it should not exist.

Just as evolution rationally dictates that those who disadvantage themselves to fa-

vour others in the race for survival will not thrive, so rational man as portrayed

in neo-classical micro-economic theories – �homo-economicus’ – would not give to

charity, because there is no obvious personal economic gain. Any rational agent

would be a free rider.Of course the existence of altruism rather damns such a view. You can get around

this problem, however, if you relax certain assumptions and make a few allowances

in your models and I have summarised these elsewhere (Walker, 2002). For example,

most neo-Darwinian theorists, such as Dawkins (1976) with his idea of the selfish

gene, make the allowance that altruism can occur if it benefits the individual’s wider

* Tel.: +44-1732-520126; fax: +44-1732-520001.

E-mail address: cwalker@cafonline.org (C. Walker).

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130 C. Walker / Journal of Economic Psychology 25 (2004) 129–134

gene pool (this inclusive fitness model is described by Khalil (this issue) in what he

calls egocentric theories of altruism).

Sociologists and economic theorists have made further allowances and adapta-

tions in classical models to allow for other arrangements whereby there is some ad-

vantage to the individual to explain his/her altruistic behaviour. For example,Andreoni (2001) has proposed that there are three main schools of economic thought

which have adapted exchange theories of giving to explain the reciprocal benefits

which might accrue from charitable giving and allow for altruism within the eco-

nomic model. Briefly these are the the exchange theory (a kind of reciprocal altruism

akin to Khalil’s egoistic theory), the public good theory (fuelled by a motivation akin

to the kind of moral obligation Khalil describes in his altercentric theory of altru-

ism), and the �warm glow’ effect (which Khalil also deals with separately).

There is a more fundamental problem with altruistic charity, however: a view heldby some evolutionary theorists, which is that altruism actually has nothing to do

with charity. As one commentator in the UK voluntary sector put it: ‘‘Being built

by your genes to act selfishly in your own survival interests is not the same thing

as, nor does it have the same root cause as, refusing to give money to charity’’ (Mac-

Quillin, 2001).

This purist view of altruism is widely held amongst evolutionary biologists and

their like, where altruism is strictly defined as behaviour leading to the enhancement

of another’s survival chances and the concomitant reduction of one’s own. This isclearly not demonstrably true in many instances of charitable giving. Indeed the no-

tion that some benefits may accrue to the charitable donor (e.g. raised status in so-

ciety, and sometimes the consequential increased sexual desirability (as some have

theorised)) make such behaviour likely to bestow greater survival chances on the

donor. In this purist view charity is not altruism. Ironically then, if charity is not

altruism there is no need to try to adapt altruist models to account for its existence,

although there would certainly be a need to find an alternative explanation.

And yet charitable giving and other forms of seemingly selfless (as opposed to self-ish) behaviour are often discussed and theorised alongside, if not synonymously

with, altruism.

Khalil’s opening line betrays his position in this debate and firmly and swiftly an-

swers his self-imposed question ‘‘what is altruism?’’: ‘‘The paper defines altruism as

about charity’’ he asserts. Thus whilst I had been attempting to explain charity as

altruism, I was fascinated to read Khalil’s explanation of altruism as about charity

(understood broadly).

Khalil explains at great length what he believes altruism not to be, and then whathe believes it to be. Whilst not altogether presenting a theory of altruism all the edge

pieces of his proposed jigsaw are here, leaving only the detail to be filled in.

2. The problem with normative models of altruism

Khalil proposes that altruism as charity is distinct from the pursuit of self-interest

whilst still remaining the product of rational choice, which allows him to distinguish

C. Walker / Journal of Economic Psychology 25 (2004) 129–134 131

altruism from what he calls ‘‘sentimental foolishness’’ – defined as altruism going be-

yond one’s means. In other words, giving everything one owned to charity would be

sentimental foolishness not altruism as modelled by the neoclassical economist (be-

fore death presumably – or maybe that too would count?). I found the notion of

‘‘sentimental foolishness’’ rather simplistic and condescending at first, but perhapsI am quibbling more at the terminology than the concept, which is useful insofar

as it makes the theoretically important distinction between �a little bit of charity’

and the survival-threatening advantaging of another over oneself by giving every-

thing away.

Khalil also rejects many of the explanations which have been employed by Andre-

oni and others to allow economic theories to accommodate charitable altruism. In

this respect Khalil is arguing for a �purer’ theory of altruism to evolve in its own right

rather than being an exception to neo-classical theory. This is perhaps where the evo-lutionary biologists would agree with him, or rather might say that the altruism

which Khalil proposes as being about charity is not the same altruism as they de-

scribe in their theories which is about giving away evolutionary advantage.

Thus Khalil rejects the idea that altruism could be a result of habituation in a par-

ticular culture – a learned behaviour. Although he admits that institutions can influ-

ence the development of tastes, he argues that altruism stems from the utility

function whereas institutions act as part of the constraint function, therefore any ex-

planation on these grounds begs the question of the origin of the behaviour: They areexternal reinforcers of the behaviour.

Conversely he rejects the popular ‘‘warm glow’’ theory as cause of altruism on the

grounds that it cannot explain the necessary pre-existent sanctioning of altruistic acts

by others instead of altruism being rejected as ‘‘sentimental foolishness’’. Warm glow

‘‘presupposes the accomplishment of what one considers being worthy of pride’’

Khalil asserts. It is again a reinforcer not a causal origin. He goes on at a later stage

in the paper to outline Mead’s theory of the origins of self-pride, being externally for-

mulated, to reinforce this point.This, however, appears to me to be a fairly weak argument, since to my knowl-

edge it has not yet been proven what the actual causal origin of warm glow is,

and therefore it cannot be ruled out that a warm glow could be produced internally

without external approval from the act of seeing or imagining an amelioration in the

conditions of another to whom one has shown altruism/charity. It also seems to me

eminently feasible that one could experience a warm glow from giving everything

away (sentimental foolishness), which Khalil rejects.

One example I found particularly intriguing at this juncture was the notion ofwhat could be called �accidental altruism’ – altruism arising from stupidity, lack of

self-assertiveness, or miscalculation which does not elicit warm glow. Khalil points

also to the possibility of engendering warm glow by selfish acts of generosity – those

calculated to attain attention, vanity and false pride, which is a very interesting point

and certainly calls into question some of the motivations for certain acts of charity.

These arguments do weaken warm glow theory as an all-encompassing explanation

for charitable altruism but do not in my opinion ultimately dismiss it as a strong con-

tender. Although warm glow may not be the original cause of altruistic behaviour,

132 C. Walker / Journal of Economic Psychology 25 (2004) 129–134

alongside socialisation, culture and habituation it forms a very plausible candidate

for its continuation via reinforcement. ‘‘I give because I feel good when I give’’ is un-

doubtedly a circular argument, but it is a very strong motivation in charitable givers.

So I was not sure that I totally bought into Khalil’s quest for the origins of altruism

at this point.

3. The problem with rationalistic models of altruism

Khalil outlines three major theories of altruism only to dismiss them as explana-

tions of ‘‘other kinds of resource sharing’’: the egoistic (reciprocal altruism; character-

ised by Axelrod), egocentric (kin selection or inclusive fitness models; characterised by

Becker) and altercentric (group selection or moral obligation models; characterised byFrank, Simon, and others) theories. In this way Khalil describes and dismisses several

theories which I had hitherto subscribed to or at least considered reasonable explana-

tions of altruism. He illustrates each view with interesting examples which appealed to

my experience of charity.

For example, as an illustration of the egoistic view of altruism Khalil talks about

companies who donate money to charity in order to enhance their brand, generally

via what we in the trade call ‘‘cause-related marketing’’ – the packet of washing pow-

der with a charity logo splashed all over it inducing customers to prefer to buy thisbrand over its competitors because this firm will donate a (usually very small) per-

centage of the price to the charity. It is an interesting question whether this is ‘‘char-

ity’’ or ‘‘altruism’’ per se. It is generally regarded within the voluntary sector as a

win–win situation and it brings in the money. Charities only have to be careful

who they ally themselves with in terms of companies and reputations. True that from

a consumer’s point of view it is not a pure ‘‘gift’’ as they receive goods in return, but

if their preference for the brand has been swayed by the charity advertising, espe-

cially where this means they have had to pay more for a similar product, is it notat least partly charitable (if not altruistic?) Khalil however argues that companies

will only engage in this kind of act so long as the benefit outweighs the cost and

so it is not in his definition of altruistic charity.

Khalil’s rejection of the egocentric theory hangs on the possibility that the donor

might revel in another’s misfortune because it provides as opportunity for them to

maximise their pleasure in being able to help, thus being indistinguishable from

the masochist who welcomes suffering in order to see the pleasure of the sadist. Thus

bringing up again the debate about whether a person’s motivations in giving matterso long as a good deed is perpetrated? To Khalil the motivation is paramount to the

definition of altruism as charity, I am not so sure that in the real world (my real

world – the voluntary sector) this distinction is so important.

The altercentric theory falls down, according to Khalil, in that it explains altruism

as the outcome of moral dictums rather than the outcome of sympathy (which, ac-

cording to Khalil is the basis of altruism). Therefore it does not distinguish altruism

from honesty or fairness, and in that a person who decides not to give to charity is

not the same as a person cheating, lying or stealing. This is an interesting dichotomy.

C. Walker / Journal of Economic Psychology 25 (2004) 129–134 133

Recently there was a media story which illustrated both honesty and altruism – Heidi

Tomassi, a Kansas waitress, was praised for her honesty in handing in an envelope

left in the restaurant where she worked containing $3300. Not only did the owner of

the money reward her with $100 for her ‘‘good deed’’, but when it emerged in the

media that she was $15,000 in debt because of medical bills for her four and a halfmonth old son who was born with a heart defect, other people started to send in do-

nations to more than the amount in the envelope. The fact that they were partly in

response to, and acted as a social reward or reinforcer for honest behaviour is a very

interesting proof of the theory that honesty evolved as a result of group selection.

The acts of donation/altruism are a similar story to the Amish family Khalil portrays

at the beginning of his article, and equally unexplained by the altercentric theory.

4. Other things altruism is not

In some ways what Khalil defines altruism as not being is as interesting as what he

says it is: for example, altruism is apparently not philanthropy, parental care, fair-

ness or honesty.

The difference between philanthropy and charity according to Khalil is that phi-

lanthropy in general is geared towards maximisation of the productive capacity of

the recipient (part of the constraint function) where altruism/charity is aimed at sat-isfying the objective function (utility) of the recipient (bypassing the productive func-

tion and directly expanding the possibility consumption bundle). Charity is an end in

itself. Philanthropy is a way of enhancing the possibilities of an extended self (‘‘ex-

panded self’’). It is entrepreneurial. I found this distinction fascinating since philan-

thropy is such an elemental part of the world of charity and often the two terms are

used synonymously (more so even than altruism and charity). It is especially inter-

esting at the current time when the voluntary sector in the UK is expanding to in-

clude social enterprises in its realm thus expanding the notion of charity toinclude entrepreneurialism. This leads one to suggest that perhaps the definitions

of charity, philanthropy and altruism are quite fluid and may be constantly evolving.

If this is the case Khalil’s quest for a theory may be in vain.

Like philanthropy, parental care is deemed self-interested and therefore is not al-

truism (altruism would spoil a child – maximising their utility all the time). Parental

care produces a chosen ethic to enhance the child’s own productive ability, and is

therefore, rather counter-intuitively, better than altruism!

Khalil spends a lot of words explaining the differences between altruism, honestyand fairness. Altruism is not fairness and should not be measured by the fair division

of income in an ultimatum game or in society, explains Khalil, because the beneficiary

is no more deserving than the donor. Altruism should not then be explored in public

good experiments or tests of fairness or reciprocity as has been traditional amongst

experimental economists. Altruism is not honesty as honesty is the pursuit and rein-

forcement of self-integrity and is therefore the pursuit of self-worth and not selfless.

Khalil likens honesty to a sense of moral obligation and offers the example of the life-

guard or firefighter whose job it is to save people’s lives. Altruism may come into the

134 C. Walker / Journal of Economic Psychology 25 (2004) 129–134

picture if the lifeguard or firefighter chose that career because of a desire to help

people, then his/her choice may be what Khalil calls ‘‘proportionately altruistic’’ –

a bit altruistic. The obvious conclusion from this is that giving to charity is not a duty

but a free choice – exactly how many people define it when asked in focus group stud-

ies, etc. in my experience. Calling on Adam Smith, amongst others, Khalil concludesthat altruism, fairness and honesty are complementary goods but not substitutes.

5. Altruism as charity – a new theory?

In isolating altruism from many concepts and theories which have hitherto been

associated with or invoked to explain it Khalil has created a vacuum which now

must be filled. What is altruism and how to explain it? We are left at this stage withthe simple claim that voluntary sympathetic motives are the basis of altruism, and

that: ‘‘The challenge is to construct an alternative theory’’ to those discussed in

his paper. Whilst he may have laid down the edge pieces of this jigsaw, I felt that

Khalil had not really left good clues as to how to fill in the middle pieces and it

was unclear what the resulting picture was supposed to look like.

He gives us a few hints, for example: Adam Smith’s notion of sympathy would be

a good place to start, he claims; and he likes Smith’s idea of the self’s development of

principles and moral tastes – by being defined as how others see one’s self. Fittingsuch disparate pieces together might require more than a rainy afternoon and a

bit of theoretical ingenuity.

Khalil’s ending is really the starting point: ‘‘This paper tried to clarify issues that

cut across disciplinary lines. The phenomenon of altruism proves to be a fertile soil

for interdisciplinary dialogue that, hopefully, can lead to a unified theory. Such a

theory can be an example for cooperation with regard to other questions. While

the understanding of human behavior is a formidable task, it is possible to make pro-

gress through the re-examination of basic assumption in light of the contributions ofother disciplines.’’ No easy task, but Khalil seems intent on completing the jigsaw

and it is his multidisciplinary approach, more than anything else perhaps, which

makes this paper exciting, rewarding, and interesting. Now everyone start looking

down the back of their theoretical sofas for those missing jigsaw pieces. . .

References

Andreoni, J. (2001). The economics of philanthropy. In N. J. Smelser, & P. B. Bates (Eds.), International

encyclopedia of the social and behavioural sciences. London: Elsevier.

Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Khalil, E. (this issue). What is altruism? Journal of Economic Psychology.

MacQuillin, I. (2001). Born to give. Professional fundraising magazine, June 2002.

Walker, C. M. (2002). Altruism, guilt and the feel-good factor – why do people give to charity? In

Walker, & Pharoah (Eds.), A lot of give: Trends in charitable giving for the 21st century. London:

Hodder & Stoughton.