A Buddhist Colonization?: A New Perspective on the Attempted Alliance of 1910 Between the Japanese...

A Buddhist Colonization?: A New Perspective on theAttempted Alliance of 1910 Between the JapaneseS�ot�osh�u and the Korean Wonjong

Hwansoo Kim*Duke University

Abstract

One of the most infamous events in modern Japanese and Korean Buddhist history was the allianceattempted between the Japanese S�ot�osh�u (S�ot�o Sect) and the Korean Wonjong (Complete Sect) inlate 1910, 46 days after Japan annexed Korea. The Japanese Buddhist priests involved have beencharacterized as colonialists and imperialists trying to conquer Korean Buddhism on behalf of theirimperial government while the Korean monks orchestrating the initiative have been cast as traitors,collaborators, and sellers of Korean Buddhism. All the key figures—Takeda (1863–1911), Yi Hoe-gwang (1862–1933), clergy from the Wonjong and S�ot�osh�u, and colonial governmentofficials—are portrayed in historiographies as villains. But the politicized narrative of the alliancehas neglected two crucial points among others. First, behind Yi and Takeda was a bilingual Koreanmonk named Kim Yonggi (1878–?) who played a key role in this movement. Second, the S�ot�osh�uwas not enthusiastic about the alliance, which reveals that Takeda’s vision for the alliance was atodds with that of the heads of his sect. This article draws upon these two findings in overlookedprimary sources—about the influential players, the Japanese and Korean sects’ conflicted motives,and the governments’ responses—to draw out the complex power relationships and discoursessurrounding the attempted alliance.

Introduction

This article reexamines the most infamous event in the modern relationship of Korean andJapanese Buddhism, the alliance attempted in 1910 between the Japanese S�ot�osh�u (S�ot�oSect) and the Korean Wonjong1 (Complete Sect). Korean Buddhists at the time viewed theWonjong’s actions as a betrayal of Korean Buddhism’s Imje (Rinzai) lineage and autonomy,while later Korean Buddhists came to believe that the S�ot�osh�u, representing all of JapaneseBuddhism, had attempted to annex all of Korean Buddhism in the same way that the Japa-nese Meiji regime had annexed Korea just a few months prior. The Wonjong’s head monkYi Hoegwang (1862–1933) was stigmatized as a traitor, while the S�ot�osh�u’s representativeTakeda (1863–1911), already despised for his role in Japan’s annexation of Korea, becameonly further detested. Drawing on this version of the story, nationalist-centered historio-graphy frames the event in exclusively political and binary terms.

Yet, in the contemporary scholarship on the relationship between Japanese and KoreanBuddhism from 1877 to 1945, a growing number of scholars have recently proposed anew interpretative approach. They suggest moving beyond dichotomous interpretationsthat designate figures as colonialist or nationalist, anti-Japanese or pro-Japanese, and traitoror hero. To undermine these oversimplifications and thus to bring to light the subjectiv-ity of the colonized, these scholars propose that historians emphasize the complexities ofthe power relationships between Japanese and Korean Buddhists and look beyond abinary framework (Tikhonov 2003 & 2004; Kiba 1991 & 2007; Cho 2006).2

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Because of the notoriety of the S�ot�o-Wonjong agreement, and because it seems tofit a nationalistic and anti-imperialist interpretation so clearly, it is the least likelycandidate for applying a new approach. And yet, by drawing on overlooked primarymaterials such as the K�och�u iseki (The Collection of Takeda’s Writings), the Ch�ugai nipp�o(The Buddhist Daily), and the S�ot�osh�u sh�uh�o (The S�ot�o Journal), I suggest that twoimportant factors put a small crack in this ironclad narrative. First, behind this alliancewas a Korean monk named Kim Yonggi, who, with his own vision for KoreanBuddhism, played a crucial role as a local informer, a mediator between the two sects,and a liaison between Takeda and Yi. Second, Takeda’s vision for Korean Buddhism,which would be fulfilled through the alliance, was not congruent with that of his ownsect: the S�ot�o administrators were ambivalent, passive, and reluctant to ally with KoreanBuddhism.

These findings do not alter the facts of the history of this event, but they do begin tocomplicate the understanding of the power relationships between Japanese and KoreanBuddhists. A richer retelling shows that the period abounded with divergent and con-tested visions, interests, and strategies among Japanese and Korean Buddhists, as well asamong state authorities, regarding the future of Korean and Japanese Buddhism in thecolony of Japan. As suggested by recent scholars, these findings illuminate the agency ofKorean and Japanese Buddhists in the context of colonialism, nationalism, and imperial-ism.

History of the 1910 Alliance

While Western powers were continuing to further their colonial ambitions in East Asiain the late nineteenth century, one Asian country emerged as ‘the only non-Westernimperium of modern times’ (Myers & Peattie 1987, 6): Japan. The Japanese Meiji regime,after a brief and intense period of modernizing the homeland, set its sights on Taiwan,Korea, Manchuria, and elsewhere in Asia. Just as America had coerced Japan to openitself through ‘gunboat diplomacy’ in the 1850s, Japan forcibly opened Korea in 1876.However, Japan competed with China, Russia, and other Western countries for controlof Korea because of its critical strategic importance as a peninsula. Japan emerged thevictor after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–5, and then intensified its intervention inKorean affairs. After winning the Russo–Japanese war of 1904–5, Japan made Korea aprotectorate and gradually took over the major functions of the Korean government,giving Korea a semi-colonial status. In 1910, the 500-year rule of the Korean Chosondynasty (1392–1910) came to an end with Japan’s full annexation (Robinson 2007,32–34). In tandem with Japan’s advances, the major Japanese Buddhist sects sent theirpriests to Korea to do missionary work, in the same way that Christian denominations inthe West had dispatched their missionaries.

When Japanese Buddhist priests arrived in Korea, they found that the glorious KoreanBuddhism of the Unified Silla (668–935) and Koryo (918–1392) dynasties had becomegreatly diminished because of persecution by the Neo-Confucian aristocracy during theChoson dynasty. Over the centuries, Korean Buddhism lost state patronage, hundreds oftemples were shut down, and monasticism became one of the lowest castes of society.While in the thirteenth century, there had been over 100,000 monastics and 2,500temples, by 1910, there were a mere 8,000 monastics and 1,200 temples. Thus, the rapiddisintegration of Korea at the close of the Choson dynasty and the eroding of Neo-Confucian hegemony paradoxically provided Korean Buddhism an opportunity to returnto the center of Korean society and to restore itself.3 The founding of the Wonjong in

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1908 with the election of a leading reformist monk Yi Hoegwang as its head was the firststep in Korean Buddhism’s revitalization.4

One of the Wonjong’s highest priorities was to receive recognition from the state,which would provide important legal protections for temples, properties, treasures,abbots, and monastics as well as a return to access of government support. Moreover, theWonjong monks believed that Japan had ‘achieved having a rich nation and strong army’because it ‘made Buddhism a state religion and respected priests’. They proposed that‘Our country should unify religions under Buddhism to be like Japan. Hence, we areresolved to acquire approval for the propagation of our religion [the Wonjong]….’(T�okanfu bunsho 3 May 1909). However, lacking political clout and connections, therewas not much hope that this fledging institution would receive recognition from theweakened, fractured Korean imperial court and the still-shaky Japanese Resident-General’s Office amid the social and political turmoil of the times. Indeed, the Koreanand Japanese governments were unresponsive and even uninterested in revitalizing Kor-ean Buddhism through legitimizing the Wonjong. The Wonjong’s petitions wentunanswered. Thus, in the adverse conditions of the early 1900s, institutional support froma powerful Japanese Zen sect such as the S�ot�o was some kind of hope.

As it turns out, the head of the S�ot�osh�u’s missionary effort in Korea was also one ofthe most politically influential figures in Korea. Takeda Hanshi,5 a S�ot�o priest, hadarrived in Korea 17 years earlier with like-minded Japanese imperialists6 to promote aparticularistic Pan-Asian vision7 and to maneuver the Japanese government into takingmore aggressive measures in establishing control over Asian affairs (Ishikawa 1998). InKorea, Takeda became the advisor to the most influential Korean political and religiousorganizations, the Ilchinhoe (Advancement Society) and the Sich’ongyo (Heaven-ServingReligion), respectively.8 In addition, Takeda had deep connections to the Meiji govern-ment, to Resident-General It�o Hirobumi (1841–1909), and others in the pre-colonialKorean government.

Aware of his connections, the Wonjong strategically invited Takeda to become theiradvisor in 1908 as a way of harnessing the S�ot�o’s influence with Korean and Japaneseauthorities. In many ways, Takeda was the right person for the job: he, too, envisioned,at least until annexation in 1910, that Korean Buddhism should be elevated by creating acentral governing body that would be both state-sanctioned and autonomous.9 Hebelieved that the Wonjong would become equal in stature to Japanese Buddhist sects ifit, rather than the government, had the power to nominate the abbots of head andbranch temples.10 With the same ends in mind, Takeda and the Wonjong togetherpetitioned and lobbied both governments for almost 2 years. However, the Resident-General’s Office and the Korean government simply ignored it.

By June 1910, Yi Hoegwang was increasingly concerned about the failure to getapproval. He consulted with his associate Yi Yonggu (1868–1912), who was the head ofthe Sich’ongyo, the powerful religious organization that Takeda also advised. Yi Yonggurecommended that the Wonjong ally itself with the Sich’ongyo to push the Wonjong’scase through. Yi Hoegwang declined (TaeHan maeil sinbo 29 June 1910) because althoughthe Sich’ongyo had been supportive of the Wonjong’s cause,11 it neither shared doctrinalaffinity with the Wonjong nor had as much political clout as the Japanese Buddhist sects.Yi Hoegwang’s instincts to avoid a partnership were right in that soon after Japan’sannexation of Korea the colonial government disestablished the Ilchinhoe, whosemembers were also members of the Sich’ongyo. A few weeks after the Ilchinhoe wasdissolved, Yi Hoegwang convened a 4-day gathering of the Wonjong on September 13,1910. Deeply concerned that the same fate might befall the Wonjong, the monks agreed

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that they should proactively seek the S�ot�osh�u’s support. Yi conveyed this to Takedaand proposed that the Wonjong form an alliance of equals with the S�ot�osh�u, to whichTakeda enthusiastically agreed.

In early October, with backing from the Wonjong monks, Yi visited the S�ot�osh�u inTokyo to negotiate. He took his protege Kim Yonggi (1878–?) as an interpreter andadvisor. Yi and Kim were clear that the new relationship with the S�ot�osh�u would befounded on an alliance of equals (reng�o) and that it would be neither a merger (gappei orheig�o) nor an annexation (fuzoku),12 either of which would have forced the Wonjong togive up its institutional identity or become a subordinate. In case the negotiations withthe S�ot�osh�u failed, Yi’s backup plan was to work with the Rinzaish�u, another Zendenomination (Takahashi 1929, 922 and Ch�osen Bukky�o 125 1935, 12). Yet, he greatlypreferred the S�ot�osh�u because the Rinzai had significantly less institutional power.

Two significant events, which occurred prior to 1910, had led the Wonjong to estab-lish a strong relationship with the S�ot�osh�u. First, in mid-1908, right after the founding ofthe Wonjong, Yi and several Wonjong monks, accompanied by Kim, visited Japan anddelivered a letter to the S�ot�osh�u requesting that they help influence the government intoprotecting Korean Buddhism. In response, the S�ot�osh�u sent a letter in June pleading withIt�o to help (F�uky�o ni kansuru zakkentetsu 5 June 1908). Second, in late 1908, the S�ot�osh�uand Takeda assisted the Wonjong to remain at its headquarters in Wonhung Templewhen it appeared the Wonjong would lose it to the J�odosh�u, another influential JapaneseBuddhist sect, and to Korean officials. Takeda had mobilized his connections with gov-ernment authorities to resolve matters favorably for the Wonjong (K�och�u iseki III 1–171928).

Despite this prior cooperation, the initial negotiations between Yi and the S�ot�osh�udid not succeed in reaching an agreement. The S�ot�o head priest Ishikawa and theadministrative head Hirotsu Sessan (1862–1932) insisted that the Wonjong could not begiven equal status to the S�ot�osh�u because it was not the same size, did not have com-mensurate political power, and most importantly was not a state-recognized institution,yet. Ishikawa suggested that the Wonjong become a branch (fuzoku) of the S�ot�osh�u fora year before moving to an equal status. Yi and Kim declined the offer and threatenedto approach the Rinzaish�u unless the deal could be based on an ‘alliance’ (reng�o).(Takeda was not at the meeting because he was in a hospital in Seoul fighting cancer).The threat is strong evidence that Kim and Yi were not passive about this deal andfought to retain autonomy. The next day, Ishikawa and Yi managed to agree on termsfor an alliance.13

Although this agreement appeared to provide equal terms to the two sides, in fact itgave the S�ot�osh�u the upper hand. For one, the deal was signed not by Ishikawa but byhis underling Hirotsu, signaling a power differential. Second, the agreement required thatthe Wonjong be advised by the S�ot�osh�u and that it provide maximum convenience toS�ot�o missionaries in Korea for propagation and education. Still, Yi and Kim had theirown plan in mind and were able to include a key clause: the S�ot�osh�u shall help theWonjong receive legal recognition from the colonial government.

After his return to Korea, Yi proceeded to file another petition with the colonial gov-ernment. To the chagrin of all involved, the colonial government’s response was cold.Undeterred, Yi traveled around Korea receiving signatures for the approval of the dealfrom the abbots of major temples. But because the terms of the alliance with the S�ot�osh�uwere not entirely favorable to Korean Buddhism, some monks were infuriated. They per-ceived the deal as a ‘merger’ that compromised Korean Buddhism’s unique lineage andautonomy. It was unacceptable to them that Korean Buddhism, which traced its identity

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back to the Imje (Jp. Rinzai) tradition from China, would be ‘converted to the S�ot�otradition’ (Takahashi 1929, 924). On February 11, 1911, the objectors held a sanghameeting. Prior to the meeting, they distributed a prospectus on establishing a new sect,the Imjejong, and a central religious office. The prospectus dictates that the Wonjong‘deceived’ people and ‘damaged’ the unity of the sangha by ‘forcibly’ including othermonks into theirs. It maintains that therefore monks who protested should establish anon-superstitious, non-political institution to counter the Wonjong.14 Interestingly,although, this new sect defined itself very similarly to the Wonjong, as it sought to bemodern. In this way, the Imjejong was formed not in protest of the Japanese but as aprotest of the Wonjong (Kim 2008a, 86). The S�ot�o-Wonjong alliance rattled not onlyKorean monks, but also vexed other sects, such as the J�odosh�u, whose priests had madesimilar but unsuccessful attempts to win Korean Buddhism over to their denomination.The sects made their objections known to the colonial government.

The S�ot�osh�u’s Ambivalence

Although it could be expected that not all Korean monks would sign on, that otherJapanese sects would oppose the S�ot�osh�u’s coup, and that the colonial government wouldbe hesitant to empower a new Korean organization, the most striking response to thealliance came from within the S�ot�osh�u itself. In November 1910, a month after theagreement was reached, Hirotsu, at a Congressional Meeting of S�ot�osh�u councilmembers, made disparaging remarks about the agreement with the Wonjong. Hiscomments are baffling because he had signed the treaty himself and had long-standingrelationships with Korean monks.

Hirotsu gave an extended presentation about the S�ot�osh�u’s propagation activities inKorea. Then, as if he were revealing a top secret, Hirotsu brought up the S�ot�o-Wonjongalliance: ‘Although I am extending my speech a little bit, it is related to the KoreanWonjong and the S�ot�o mission in Korea’. Hirotsu introduced the origin of the Wonjong,which he said derived from the lineage of the sixth patriarch, Huineng (638–713).15 Hethen mentioned the visit of a Wonjong representative some years ago, meaning in May1908, right after the establishment of the Wonjong. Hirotsu reported that during a visitfrom Wonjong monks, they investigated the system of the S�ot�osh�u and ‘intended toestablish a similar central religious office like ours and to elect among their fellow monksa head priest’. However, he told the Congress that ‘the Resident-General’s Office didnot approve’ the Wonjong and thus that ‘the Wonjong rushed to the S�ot�osh�u to seekassistance to help them accomplish this’ (S�ot�osh�u sh�uh�o 31 October 1910). If his words aretaken at face value, it is apparent that the Wonjong approached the S�ot�osh�u to use it topressure the government. That the Wonjong courted the S�ot�osh�u, rather than the otherway around, challenges the assertion of historiography that the S�ot�osh�u acted aggressivelyto take over Korean Buddhism.

Hirotsu commented on the two favors, as discussed earlier, that the S�ot�osh�u had pro-vided to the Wonjong. Therefore, he thought that the Wonjong felt favorably towardthe S�ot�osh�u and as a result wanted to ally itself with the S�ot�osh�u to promote KoreanBuddhism. But Hirotsu was not comfortable with the Wonjong’s move and expressedconfusion about the Wonjong’s reason for preferring the S�ot�osh�u over others as its ally inthe first place:

Although the Korean temples use the name Wonjong, they have inherited the lineage ofBodhidharma [e.g., a different lineage than the S�ot�osh�u’s].16 Despite this connection, they



would not go to the Rinzaish�u or �Obakush�u17 but have come to the S�ot�osh�u…. (Ibid., 336November 1910).

Although he could explain why the S�ot�osh�u should help, he could not understand whyYi had to choose the S�ot�osh�u over the other Zen sects. The mismatch in lineages isanother piece of evidence that Yi and the Wonjong were using the S�ot�osh�u for strategicrather than other purposes.

Hirotsu was also reluctant to endorse the plan because of a discouraging fact. Becauseof the centuries-long marginalization of Korean monks in the Choson era, Hirotsuassesses, ‘It is rather difficult to propagate by suddenly making use of Korean monks andtemples’. The S�ot�osh�u’s assistance to Korean monks, he argues, would not be able tochange Koreans’ negative perception of Korean monks ‘suddenly, in a matter of 5 or10 years’, nor would it be able to elevate their status to be equal to that of Japanesepriests in the near term. Rather, Hirotsu proposes that it would be more effective to haveyoung S�ot�o priests learn the Korean language and be dispatched as Buddhist missionaries.He concluded that, ‘For these reasons, I would like you to know that there will be nobenefit or convenience for the S�ot�osh�u whatsoever’ (Ibid.). The denominational Congressmembers listening to Hirotsu’s speech did not question his stance on the matter, indicat-ing their tacit agreement. Hirotsu’s low view of Korean monks was typical of the Japa-nese attitude to Koreans during that period. However, it is also important to note thatupon institutional alliance, he had to worry about the image of his own sect in the eyesof the Japanese public and, most importantly, the Koreans his sect desired to convert.

Hirotsu’s comments reveal that Takeda and the S�ot�o administrators’ visions wereincongruent with each other. The difference in institutional vision among JapaneseBuddhists even in the same sect was common. Buddhist missionaries in Korea, workingfar away from the homeland, had to cope with the rapidly changing social and politicalsituation in Korea. They often developed ideas and programs that were not fullycommunicated to nor endorsed by the homeland sect. Likewise, Takeda had disagree-ments with the S�ot�osh�u regarding the future of the S�ot�osh�u and the Wonjong. Whereashe firmly believed that the S�ot�osh�u’s alliance with Korean monks would further theS�ot�osh�u’s expansion into Korea, Hirotsu and others considered associating with sociallylow Korean monks to be deleterious to the S�ot�osh�u’s image and mission. Therefore, aretelling of this history must distinguish between Takeda’s position on the alliance andthe S�ot�osh�u’s: they were not necessarily of one voice.

The Role of Kim Yonggi

The historiography of the merger not only fails to account for this internal division inthe S�ot�osh�u, but also puts the Korean monk Kim Yonggi in a footnote when he shouldbe given nearly the same consideration as Takeda and Yi Hoegwang. Kim18 playedan indispensable role not only in getting the S�ot�osh�u to petition It�o on behalf of theWonjong, securing the Wonhung temple, and persuading Yi to consider the S�ot�osh�u asthe best ally, but also in reaching the alliance deal itself. Kim is also a good exampleof the kind of monk who, like the well-known enlightenment monk Yi Tongin(1850?–1881),19 was both a nationalist and worked with the Japanese, and who wasindependent-minded.20

Kim has been overlooked because the narratives of the alliance predominantly revolvearound the two well-known and easily typecast figures Yi and Takeda. Nationalist histo-riography in Korea puts historical actors into three categories: colonialists, collaborators,

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or nationalists. In this story, Takeda is the colonial aggressor, Yi Hoegwang is thecollaborator who tried to sell Korean Buddhism to the Japanese, and the founder of theImjejong Han Yongun (1879–1944) is the avatar of Korean nationalism. Those actorswho are in between or who have multiple characteristics have little place in conventionalnarratives. As a result, primary sources related to Kim have received no scholarlyattention. Bringing Kim back into the narrative disturbs nationalist historiography becausehe cannot be easily categorized as either a traitor or a nationalist. As there are no bio-graphies of Kim, the foregoing makes efforts to provide some detail on his history as itrelates to the alliance.

Kim, age 33 in 1910, spent 7 years in Japan studying Japanese and Buddhism atthe S�ot�o-affiliated Komazawa University and later law at Nihon University. As an eliteKorean monk who ‘mastered old and new academic studies’ (TaeHan hunghakhoebo 9January 20, 1910: 53), Kim lived in the renowned S�oji-ji temple, a major head temple ofthe S�ot�osh�u (Ch�ugai nipp�o 10 February 1910). Despite the funding and respect theS�ot�osh�u accorded him, Kim was often critical of the S�ot�osh�u. At one point, in personalmeeting with the S�ot�o head priest Kennin Mokurai he stated that there was no true Zenmaster in the S�ot�o tradition. His remark was reported in the newspapers resulting in a stiramong the S�ot�o students (Ibid., 18 April 1907).21 This boldness shows that Kim had notnecessarily become indoctrinated by his education in Japan but thought independently.

Kim was also a patriotic Korean and was actively engaged in the societies founded byKorean students in Japan. These groups published monthly journals in which Kim wasinvolved as a key member22 and for which he contributed essays and poems. In one piecepublished in January 1907, Kim jealously contrasts the discrimination of Korean Buddhistsin Korea with the power of Japanese Buddhists in Japan. The Paekjae (18 BCE–660 CE)monk Hyegwan of ‘our country’, he states, transmitted Buddhism to Japan 1,300 yearsago and since then, Japanese emperors, upon ascension, have received Buddhist precepts.He continues that therefore many emperors ruled the country based on Buddhism and,in times of war, soldiers donned monks’ robes, waving flags printed with the phrase‘homage to the Lotus Sutra’ (namu my�oh�o rengeky�o). Kim quotes the Japanese intellectualInoue Tetsujir�o (1855–1944) as saying, ‘The spiritual civilization of Japan has beenacquired by the continuous practice of Buddhism; material civilization has become popu-lar by following the West’ (Taeguk hakhoebo 7 [February 1907]: 24). Hence, Kim indicatesthat the current power of Japan is largely derived from the influence of Buddhism insociety and politics, the exact opposite of the fate of the Korean state and the conditionof Korean Buddhism.

Kim’s involvement in a reform movement in Korea led him to form relationships withleading political and religious figures. Like some Korean monks, he became an Ilchinhoemember and interacted with the Sich’ongyo leader Yi Yonggu. Kim met with Takeda inmid-1908 when Kim was assigned by the S�ot�osh�u to investigate the progress of theS�ot�osh�u’s foreign mission in Korea. Kim also enjoyed acquaintances with S�ot�o high priests.For example, Kim accompanied the prominent S�ot�o master Hioki Mokuzen (1847–1920)when Hioki visited the T’ongdo temple on his return from China to Japan in early 1907(Tanaka & Okumura 1907, 82; see Figure 1). When the head priest Ishikawa held aprecept ceremony at the S�osen-ji temple in the port city of Pusan in southeast Koreain early 1910, Kim took Yi Hoegwang to the ceremony for observation and introducedhim to Ishikawa (S�ot�osh�u sh�uh�o 1 August 1910). These examples, among others, provideevidence that because of his linguistic fluency and familiarity with the two traditions, Kimworked as the key liaison between Yi and the Wonjong monks and Takeda and S�ot�opriests.



Kim frequently exchanged letters with Takeda and Yi regarding Wonjong matters. Forinstance, Kim was deeply involved in the struggle to secure the Wonhung temple.As mentioned earlier, in 1908, Korean government officials in collusion with a J�odomissionary attempted to oust the Wonjong from the temple. Kim sent a letter to Takedafollowed by additional notes:

…Since this lawsuit will greatly affect our future work from now on, I beg you to resolve thismatter to the end. …I would be greatly appreciative if you could telegraph Home MinisterSong about our [the Wonjong’s] determination.

At 8:00 this morning, I sent a telegraph to head of the Wonjong Yi not to worry. At 9:30, Ialso sent a letter to Yi that you would do your utmost to resolve this matter and that youwould send a telegraph to Internal Minister Song, as well. (K�och�u iseki III 1–17).

This letter shows the level of Kim’s involvement for the cause of the Wonjong, businghimself between Takeda and Yi, and the S�ot�osh�u and the Wonjong. As a result of Kim’smediation, the decision from the government regarding use of the Wonhung temple wasto the benefit to the Wonjong. Kim wrote to Takeda,

I received and read your letter with gratitude this morning. Everything worked out well as theresult of your effort on behalf of the Wonjong and the Preaching Hall (the Wonhung temple).… Ven. Hoegwang should be delighted…. (Ibid.)

Therefore, given Kim’s role as both a translator and administrator, it is not surprising thatKim accompanied Yi to Japan to strike a deal with the S�ot�osh�u. The negotiation andfinal agreement between the Wonjong and the S�ot�osh�u would likely not have been pos-sible without Kim’s involvement. After all, he had majored in law. But, as his writings

Figure 1. Kim, front row, first from the left, at the T’ongdo temple with S�ot�o master Hioki Mokuzen (1847–1920)during Hioki’s visit to the temple in 1907. Source: Tanaka & Okumura (1907, 88).

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on Korean Buddhism indicate, Kim was not just a messenger: he had his own visionfor Korean Buddhism and acted on it by influencing Takeda and Yi. The Buddhist Dailyrecognizes Kim’s role in reaching the alliance by stating:

As seen from the outside, there is Takeda Hanshi who has been active behind the scenes forover a decade in Korea and who has mediated [between the two sects]. From inside, there isKim Yonggi….

Aftermath (1911)

The failure of the alliance can be attributed to four major factors. First, the newly formedImjejong was rallying a growing number of Korean monks to oppose the unequalcontract. Second, other Japanese sects were pressuring the government to obstructrecognition of the Wonjong, thereby preventing the alliance (Murano 1933, 10; Han1988, 65). Third, everyone knew that Takeda, the major force behind the alliance, wouldsoon pass away from cancer. Takeda’s collegial relationship with Terauchi was one of thereasons that Yi and the S�ot�osh�u thought approval of the Wonjong from his office hadany chance of success. Fourth, the S�ot�osh�u’s ambivalence about the whole project mayhave prevented it from making a concerted effort to move things forward.

What really put an end to the Wonjong’s hopes of allying with the S�ot�osh�u, however,was the promulgation of the Temple Ordinance of 1911. Two weeks before Takeda’sdeath, Terauchi issued the Temple Ordinance on June 3 (Ch�osen S�otokufu kanp�o 257 3June 1911: 619). On July 8, the colonial government further followed up with theRegulations for Enforcement. The effects of the Ordinance and Regulations on Koreanwere tremendous. They authorized the Governor-General to assume all executive powerover temple matters. Many key decisions from the nomination of abbots to dealing withtemple properties to the moving of temples required approval from the Governor-General. Thus, personal and institutional alliances between Korean and Japanese Bud-dhists, widespread up to that point, were nullified, including the S�ot�o-Wonjong alliance.

The colonial government had begun working on laws regulating religion and propaga-tion well before the alliance meeting in Tokyo. Thus, while the S�ot�o-Wonjong alliancewas not the direct cause of the 1911 Ordinance, it sped up its promulgation. HavingKorean Buddhism divided between the Wonjong and the Imjejong over the alliance wasnot good news for the fledging colonial government, especially when its control overKorea was shaky just after annexation. The growing discomfort from other sects that theS�ot�osh�u would be the ultimate winner in the battle to control Korean Buddhism has-tened the government to simply end any chance for any sect. Moreover, it was clear thatthe Governor-General Terauchi felt that Japanese Buddhist missionary work had not beensuccessful (especially in comparison with the work of Christian missionaries, who hadmade significant contributions to the welfare of Korean society). In a newspaper inter-view, he indicated that Japanese Buddhist sects should be ‘passive’ in their propagation‘for 1 or 2 years’ (Ch�ugai nipp�o 15 February 1911) because the situation in Korea is‘unstable’ and the government needs time to get things under control. The colonial gov-ernment’s intention to administer the affairs of Korean Buddhism directly explains why itgave no response to the petition filed by the Wonjong and the S�ot�osh�u.

The Ordinance had a long-term impact on the relationship between Korean andJapanese Buddhism in the following colonial period (1911–1945). It effectively severedpotential institutional relationships between the two Buddhisms, and thus ended thepossibility that any Japanese Buddhist sect could make major gains in Korea through



co-opting Korean Buddhism. Despite the repressive character of this Ordinance, theattenuated institutional relationship between the two Buddhisms ironically helped KoreanBuddhism (Sørensen 1991, 57, 1999, 131–2; Kim 2008a, 130). With governmentoversight, Korean Buddhism was able to consolidate its own institutional identity separatefrom that of Japanese Buddhism during the remaining colonial era.

The origins of and reasons for the 1911 Temple Ordinance reveal that there wassignificant tension between Japanese Buddhism and the colonial government. As seen inthe case of the S�ot�o-Wonjong alliance, the Korean and Japanese Buddhists exerted theirown personal and institutional interests by bypassing the state authorities.23 Whilehistoriographies render Japanese Buddhism as nothing more than the ‘vanguard for Japan’sinvasion of Korea’ (Han 1988, 15; Ch’oe 2001, 94), in fact, the Meiji and colonialgovernments sometimes had to limit Japanese Buddhist missionaries’ involvement in thematters of Korean Buddhism.

Conclusion

The attempted alliance has its centennial on October 6 in 2010. Despite the passageof decades, the event continues to be rendered in black and white terms and otherpossibilities are excluded. Yet, just two pieces of new evidence, Kim’s central role andthe S�ot�osh�u’s ambivalence, force us to pay more attention to the different visions andstrategies among individuals, groups, and institutions. Kim and Yi never envisioned amerger of their sect and the S�ot�osh�u in such a way that the Wonjong’s identity andautonomy would be significantly compromised. Although the contract had terms partialto the S�ot�osh�u, the sum of the terms tilted the agreement toward an alliance, not amerger. The S�ot�osh�u was aware that the Wonjong was using it for a strategic purposeand was not comfortable with an alliance in the first place. The colonial governmentcould not ratify the alliance agreement because such would result in a new institution thathad significant administrative autonomy from the state. At the time, the colonial govern-ment sought to establish a modern nation-state and thus intended to exert tight controlover the social and religious spheres of colonial Korea.

In sum, if the case of the 1910 alliance reveals this much complexity, then in theseven-decade pre-colonial and colonial relationship between the two Buddhisms, thereare surely many other threads of historiography that beg for a fresh interpretation. Forexample, what degree of agency did Korean monastics have in this pre-colonial andearly-colonial period; what were the effects of sectarian rivalry among Japanese Buddhists;and how were Buddhists from both countries reacting to Christianity’s advances?Revising this particularly intricate era will require meticulous examination and thought-ful, balanced incorporation of primary materials from both countries. One major reasonthe actual revision lags behind the new frameworks proposed by contemporary scholars isthat the nationalist ⁄ anti-colonialist interpretation of events has been so widely acceptedthat there has been little reason to look for sources that would call it into question.Without addressing this issue, among others, it will be difficult to recover the distinctvoices and discourses of Buddhists in this period from the highly emotional, politicizedversion of history.

Short Biography

Hwansoo Kim’s primary research concerns Korean and Japanese Buddhism in the latenineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries in the context of colonialism, imperialism, and

296 Hwansoo Kim


modernity. His broader scholarship includes East Asian religions, the modernization ofBuddhism, clerical marriage, rituals, and ethics. Recent articles include The Adventures of aJapanese Monk in Colonial Korea: S�oma Sh�oei’s Zen Training with Korean Masters (2008) and‘The Future of Korean Buddhism Lies in My Hands’: Takeda Hanshi as a S�ot�o Missionary(forthcoming). He is currently working on a book about the dynamic relationshipbetween Korean and Japanese Buddhism from 1877 to 1912. The book brings to lightthat Korean monks, aware of the political, economic, and social stature of JapaneseBuddhist missionaries, strategically allied themselves with Japanese sects to furthertheir personal and institutional aims. This revision also highlights how Christianity, as asignificant other, informed Korean and Japanese Buddhists’ approach to institutionalstructures, foreign missionary efforts, and modernity. Kim has a BA in Buddhist studiesfrom Dongguk University in Seoul, Korea (1996) and received his master’s (2002) anddoctoral (2007) degrees from Harvard University. Before joining the departments ofReligion and Asian & Middle Eastern Studies at Duke University (2009), he was apostdoctoral fellow at Harvard’s Reischauer Institute (2007) and assistant professor at theUniversity of Arizona (2008).

Notes

* Correspondence address: Hwansoo Kim, Duke University Department of Religion, 118 Gray Building, Box90964, Durham, NC 27708, USA. Email: [email protected].

1 In Japanese, sh�u has the meaning as jong in Korean. Chong and sh�u are used throughout this article to refer toKorean and Japanese Buddhist sects.2 For more Japanese language scholarship, see Fujii (1999) and Sueki (2004); for Korean language scholarship, seeCh’oe (2006), Kim (2006), and Kim S. (2008); and for English language scholarship, see Sørensen (1991, 1999) andAuerback (2007, 2008).3 For the situation of Korean Buddhism during the Choson period, see Buswell (1999).4 For more detail, see Sørensen (1991, 1999) and Tikhonov (2004)5 For Takeda’s biography, see Ishikawa (1998), Hur (1999), Kim (2007), and Auerback (2007).6 They include members of Kokury�ukai (‘Amur River Society,’ or ‘Black Dragon Society’), an offshootof the Geny�osha (‘The Black Ocean Society’), both of which were ultra-nationalist and imperialist societies. TheKokury�ukai’s leader was Uchida Ry�ohei (1874–1937), and Uchida’s protege was Takeda.7 For more on Japan-centered Pan-Asianism, see Saaler and Koschmann (2007).8 The Ilchinhoe was established in 1904 as a political organization and its members also belonged to the Tonghak(Eastern Learning). However, when the Ilchinhoe became pro-Japanese, the Tonghak leaders excommunicatedthem. In response, Ilchinhoe leaders, such as Yi Yonggu and Song Pyongjun, established an independent religion,the Sich’ongyo, in 1906 (the Tonghak was a religious organization). For practical reasons, Yi served as the leader ofthe Sich’ongyo while Song led the Ilchinhoe.9 After annexation, Takeda took a more hierarchical approach, advocated that the Wonjong be merged into theS�ot�osh�u (as opposed to forming an alliance of equals). Takeda probably sought an alliance, pre-1910, because heknew that the Wonjong would never agree to a merger, which would have compromised Korean Buddhism’sautonomy.10 For Takeda’s programs on Korean Buddhism, see Kim (2007).11 Some monks joined the Ilchinhoe in part because it included in its reform charters permanently abolishing theprohibition of monks from entering the capital and permission for monks to marry (Ch�ugai nipp�o 17 August 1907).The Ilchinhoe also played a leading role in fighting the corruption of central and local officials (Moon 2005),the same officials who marginalized monastics during the Choson dynasty. Therefore, it is not unmerited that YiYonggu proposed that the Wonjong ally with the Sich’ongyo.12 These terms and their corresponding meaning will be used consistently throughout this article.13 For the seven articles of the agreement in English translation, see Kim (2007), 224. For the original in Japanese,see Takahashi (1929), 923–4.14 For a partial translation of the prospectus in English, see Kim (2007), 227–8. For the original text, see Kim(2000), 61.15 Huineng is one of the figureheads of Ch’an Buddhism from whom five major Ch’an schools were derived. Formore detail, see McRae 2003. The S�ot�osh�u also traces its origins to Huineng.



16 Hirotsu is incorrect in implying that the S�ot�osh�u did not descend from Bodhidharma, the first patriarch of theCh’an (Zen) lineage. However, Hirotsu more likely meant to say that the Wonjong, as well as the Rinzaish�u andthe �Obakush�u, derived from the Linchi tradition, one of the five strands of Ch’an Buddhism. The S�ot�osh�u tracesitself back to the Caotung lineage, also one of the five Ch’an lineages.17 A third Zen sect in Japan.18 He was also known as Kim T’aeun and as Il-u, his dharma name.19 Yi, a former Confucian yangban (sosaeng), played an essential role in mediating between Japanese intellectuals,such as Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–1901), and reform-minded Korean leaders. Yi gained the support of KingKojong, assumed a high military post, and was instrumental in negotiating a diplomatic relationship between Koreaand America. For more detail, see Yi (1985).20 For more on Yi Tongin’s role as a mediator between Korea and Japan in English, see Tikhonov (2002).21 Komazawa students protested and demanded an apology from the newspaper for making a personal statementpublic.22 The Taeguk hakhoebo published 26 issues from August 1906 to December 1908, the TaeHan hakhoe wolbo nineissues from February to November 1908, and the TaeHan hunghakhoebo thirteen issues from March 1909 to May1910.23 Satona Suzuki suggests that there was no significant cooperation between the Meiji government and JapaneseBuddhist missionaries in Korea. Although this is debatable, it is true that Japanese Buddhist missionaries had muchlatitude in acting on their own interests (Suzuki 2000, 236–237).

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