ABriefHistoryofCOMMERCIALCAPITALISM

JAIRUSBANAJI

HaymarketBooksChicago,Illinois

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CONTENTS

1. ReinstatingCommercialCapitalism

2. TheInfrastructureofCommercialCapitalism

3. TheCompetitionofCapitals:StrugglesforCommercialDominancefromtheTwelfthtoEighteenthCenturies

4. BritishMercantileCapitalismandtheCosmopolitanismoftheNineteenthCentury

5. CommercialPractices:Putting-OutortheCapitalistDomesticIndustries

6. TheCirculationofCommercialCapitals:Competition,Velocity,Verticality

APPENDIX:ISLAMANDCAPITALISM

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSNOTES

SELECTBIBLIOGRAPHY

ForHenry,Javed,M.J.,andSughosh

1

REINSTATINGCOMMERCIALCAPITALISM

ANOTIONOFCAPITALIhaveshownelsewhere(seeappendix)thatinMuslimtradingcirclescapitalwasinvariablyreferredtobythetermal-mal,whichcouldalsohavethemoregenericmeaningsof“property,”“assets,”andsoon. On the other hand, in Italy terminology stabilized only gradually. In a Venetian commercialagreement (collegantia) dated August 1073, the notaryDomenico uses no fewer than three distincttermsforcapital:thesuminvestedbyGiovanni,whosecontractthisis,iscalledhabere,thetotalcapitalinvestedbyhimandhispartnersiscalledcapetanea(intheformula“ifthecapitalissaved,”capetaneasalva), and if he violates the agreement then he promises to return “everything in the double, bothcapitalandprofit”(caputetprode).1“Thecapitalandtheprofit”becameastandardexpressioninItaliancommercial contractsof themedievalperiodand suggests a clear evolution since theninth century,whenafamouswill(drawnupbyaVenetiandogein829)hadreferredtohisinvestmentsinoverseastrade(navigatio)lessstraightforwardlyas“moneyputtowork”(laborantissolidis).2

Bytheearlyfifteenthcentury,theFranciscanpriestBernardinocouldsaythatmoneywhichis“notsimply money or a thing” but, over and above that, “is meant to generate a profit” is “what wecommonlycallcapital”(capitale).3Itwasmoreorlessatthistime(ca.1433)thataleadingFlorentineofthePeruzzibankingfamilytellshisdebtors,“Ihavenomorecapitalremainingintheshop;itisallinthewoolmanufacturing,andindeedbothbusinessesareruined.Ihavemadenothingorverylittleinthelasttwoyearsbecauseallourcapitalistiedupindebtswhichcan’tbecalledin,becausethetimesare so hard.”4 And certainly by the start of the sixteenth century, the term capital was becomingcommon elsewhere in Europe. The Portuguese investment in Malabar pepper was standardlydescribedas“cabedaldapimenta.”Thiscouldtaketheformofeithergoodsormoney,sothatwhenthecapitalsentouttobuyspiceswasdispatchedintheformofcash,itcouldbedescribedas“cabedaldo dinheiro,” as SimãoBotelho described it in 1552,whenhe complained that not enough “moneycapital”wasbeingsentfromLisbon.5Sotooin1585whenthefactorSassettistatedthatthe“capitals”(icapitali)sentouttobuypepperconsistedinreales.ThesamesenseoftheformaldistinctionswithincapitalisreflectedinaVenetianreportof1603whereitissaid,“capitalhasalwaysreturnedfromtheLevantintheformofmerchandise”(mercancie).6

Thatanotionofcapitalwaspresentelsewhereaswell isshownbytheexampleoftheweaver-poetKabirwho(inthefifteenthcentury)saysabouthimself,“Kabir,thecapital(punji)belongstothesâh/and you waste it all.”7 (Bigger merchants of the bania caste were called sa¯h or sa¯hu.) In a latesixteenth-centurywork,theOttomanintellectualMustafa‘Aliwritesaboutrichmerchants“constantlyenlarging their capital” as their associates travel to India and beyond and return with “preciousrarities.”About aDamascusmerchantwho had to rent an entire caravanserai to accommodate the

goodshecamebackwith, thesameauthorsays,“hiscapitalhadproducedamultitudeofgoodsandimmeasurableprofit.”8

As Venice rapidly lost her commercial supremacy at the start of the seventeenth century, oneobserverwrote (in 1612), “It is not thatwe lack capital (Anoi nonmancano i capitali); our nobilitywantsnopartintrade,”adding,nowadays“theprosperousprefertoinvesttheirmoneyinthefinancialmarkets(suicambi).”9Afewyearslater,inawidelyreaddirectoryofcommercepublishedfirstin1638,LewisRobertsdescribedtheEastIndiaCompanyas“agreatandeminentCompany...imployinginajointStockagreatCapitol,bywhichTradeandStocktheyhavebuiltmanywarlikeships.”10Andbytheeighteenthcentury,whentheFrencheconomistTurgotprovidedacleardescriptionofthesimplestformofcapitalistaccumulation(thisin1766),usageoftheterm“capital”wasofcoursewidespread.11

Inthelate1720sBombayservantsoftheEastIndiaCompanywouldcomplainthattheyhad“nolargecapitalls to enable them tobuild large ships.”12Again, in 1788 anEnglishofficial notes that “It is ageneralcomplaintamongMerchantsthattheyareLosersupontheCapitalinvestedinShippingwhichthey find it necessary to employ.”13 And in 1766 again, the same year that Turgot published hisReflectionsontheFormationandDistributionofWealth,aFrenchreportonPortugalcouldrefertotheMarquisdePombal“scrupulouslyfleecing”Portuguese“capitalists”andshareholders.14

MERCHANTCAPITALISM,COMMERCIALCAPITALISMTheMarxistreticenceaboutmerchant’scapitalstemsnotjustfromafailuretograspMarx’smethodinCapital (the study of capital “as such” differs not just from “the study of capital in its reality,”15 itdiffersalsofromwhatMarxintheGrundrissecallsthe“realhistoryoftherelationsofproduction”16),itstemsalsoandevenmoreperhapsfromthepolemicaldividethatwascreatedinthepostwartraditionby the decisive rejection of Pokrovsky’s work in Russia in the early thirties and the concomitantstigmatization of any general category like “merchant capitalism.”17 But the transmission of thisconstructed orthodoxy was mediated, crucially, by Maurice Dobb whose influential Studies in theDevelopmentofCapitalismfirstappearedin1946.Dobbhimselfwasdeeplyambiguousabouttheterm.Thus, early on inStudies he told the reader hewaswilling to accept “merchant capitalism” in thespecific senseof an“earlyperiodof capitalismwhenproductionwas subordinated to the ‘merchantmanufacturer’ under the putting-out system,” but unwilling to see it as a characterization of the“existenceof large capitals and specializedmerchants in the sphereof trade” at any timebefore thelater sixteenth century when, he claims, capital began to “penetrate production on a considerablescale.”18 Yet, in the book itselfDobb goes on to note that “In certain Flemish towns the capitalistmerchant-manufacturerhadalreadybeguntomakehisappearanceinthethirteenthcentury.”19Andafew pages later he goes on to say, “Evidence not only of a fairly extensive capitalist-controlled‘putting-out’systeminthewoolindustrybutalsoofmanufactory-productionistobefoundintheearlypartofthefourteenthcentury.”20However,by1950whenthedebateonthe“transition”wasfirstairedinthepagesofScience&Society,thesenuanceswereentirelylostandmerchantcapitalismhad,inDobb’s

mind,degeneratedinto“thePokrovsky-bog,”thatis,somehopelesslyconfusedmiasmathatthegreatRussianhistorianhadlefthalf-lurkinginleft-winghistoriography.21

Pokrovsky,ofcourse,wasforcedtorecantby1931.Merchantcapitalism,hesaidintherecantation,is an “illiterate expression” because “[c]apitalism is a system of production, and merchant capitalproducesnothing.”22TheprostrationbeforeStalincouldscarcelyhavebeenmorecomplete.Thatitsdismal legacyhassurvivedforso longinMarxistscholarshipshowshowparalyzingthe influenceofpoliticalorthodoxiescanbe.Inanycase,amajorupshotofthisturnofeventswasthatthewholefieldof“earlycapitalism”was leftentirelyvacantforothertraditionsofhistoriographytomoveintoandoccupy firmly. The best response to Dobb’s work came not from other Marxists but from R. H.Tawney,whohadjustretiredin1949.ReviewingDobb’sbookin1950hewrote:

Mr.Dobb’slimitationoftheterm[capitalism]toaparticularsystemofproduction,underwhichlabourisemployedonthebasisofawage-contract toproducesurplus-value for theownerofcapital,mightseem,at first sight, toescapesomeof theambiguitiesinherentinlessrestrictedinterpretations;butitraisesproblemsofitsown.Itisnotmerelythat,ashewouldagree,financialandcommercialcapitalismhavebeenhighlydevelopedincircumstanceswheretheinstitution,asinterpretedbyhim,hasbeenafeebleplant,andthattoexcludethesevarietiesonthegroundthattheydonotfallwithinthefourcornersofanineteenth-centurydefinitionistobegthequestion.Itisthat,ashisworkshows,theoriginsandgrowthoftheindustrialspeciesrequirefortheirelucidationtobeconsideredinrelationtoothermembersofthefamily,someofwhichhavebeenamongitsprogenitors.

TawneywentontoaskwhethertherestrictedsenseofcapitalismfavoredbyDobbhadnot“ceasedtobetheusagemostconvenientforthepurposesofhistory.”AndintermsofEnglishpoliticalhistory,hesuggestedthatDobb’sdefinitionofcapitalism“leadsattimestoamisconceptionofthesignificanceofthepartplayedbycapitalistinterestsinperiodswhenanindustrialwage-systemwas,inthiscountry,initsinfancy.”23

In some ways the closest counterpart to Pokrovsky in the West was the non-Marxist Tawney.ReligionandtheRiseofCapitalismwaspublishedin1926.If“nosingleconceptwassoidenticalwithPokrovsky as that of commercial capitalism,”24 Tawney, too, “explained British economicdevelopment in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries through the maturing of a specificallycommercial formofcapitalism.”25 InReligion themostgeneral characterizationheoffers iswhenherefers at onepoint to “thephenomenaof early commercial capitalism.”26ButTawney’s commercialcapitalism embraced a very wide range of economic phenomena (unlike Pokrovsky and Dobb).“Then, in the late sixteenth andearly seventeenth centuries,had come thewaveof commercial andfinancial expansion—companies, colonies, capitalism in textiles, capitalism in mining, capitalism infinance—onthecrestofwhichtheEnglishcommercialclasses...hadclimbedtoapositionofdignityandaffluence.”27Again,“Foreigntradeincreasedlargelyinthefirsthalfofthesixteenthcentury,and,asmanufacturesdeveloped,clothdisplacedwoolastheprincipalexport.Withthegrowthofcommercewentthegrowthofthefinancialorganizationonwhichcommercedepends,andEnglishcapitalpouredinto the London money market which had previously been dominated by Italian bankers.” “Inindustry, the rising interestwas thatof thecommercial capitalist.”28“TheageofElizabethsawasteadygrowthofcapitalismintextilesandmining,agreatincreaseinforeigntrade...andthegrowth...ofamoneymarketwithanalmostmoderntechnique—speculation,futures,andarbitragetransactions—

inLondon.”29On thewhole,Tawney tended to eschew any special terminology and decades later,whenwritingBusinessandPoliticsUnderJamesI,hewouldrefer tothe“triumphof thiscommercialcapitalism,”butqualifytheexpressionbyadding,“tousetheconventional,ifambiguous,term.”30

Withoneprecociousandbrilliantexception,“commercial capitalism”simply failed to resurface intheEnglish-languagehistoriographytillthe1980s.TheexceptionwasEricWilliams,whoconcludedCapitalism and Slavery (1944) with the argument, “The commercial capitalism of the eighteenthcenturydevelopedthewealthofEuropebymeansofslaveryandmonopoly.Butinsodoingithelpedto create the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century,which turned round and destroyed thepower of commercial capitalism, slavery, and all its works. Without a grasp of these economicchanges,thehistoryoftheperiodismeaningless.”31Intheeighties,GeoffreyIngham,32JohnBrewer,33

andP. J.Cain andA.G.Hopkins34 all invoked a notionofmercantile or commercial capitalism asessential to any understanding of modern British history. In Capitalism Divided? (1984), InghamshowedhowinthecourseofthenineteenthcenturytheCity’scommercialcapitalismhadfunctionedas“a prop for the economy as a whole,” and how the country’s ruling class survived on “essentiallypreindustrial forms of commercial capitalismwhich have persisted in the City.”35 InThe Sinews ofPower (1989), Brewer’s seminal argument about the nature of the British state beganwith his ownimplicitacceptancethat“Britain’saggrandizementwasimpelledbythepowerfulforcesofcommercialcapitalism.” And in British Imperialism, 1688–2000, Cain and Hopkins were willing to allow forvarious sorts of commercial capitalism (“an indigenous, Indian brand of commercial capitalism,”36

“advancedformsofcommercialcapitalismsuchastheEastIndiaCompany,”37etc.)inadditiontotheirownoverarchingcharacterizationofBritishcapitalismas“gentlemanlycapitalism.”In contrast to this disjointed evolutionwas amuch tighter tradition of continental historiographywherethemajorinfluenceswerethoseoftheFrench.Vilar,aMarxist,wascircumspect,referringonlyonce to “European mercantile capitalism” in a Past and Present paper from 1956.38 But Braudel’sMediterranean and his later work were very largely structured around a vision of commercialcapitalism(inhis laterworkmostly“merchantcapitalism”) fluctuatingbetween trade, industry, andthemoneymarkets; of a “Mediterranean capitalism” driven by “a few powerful combines,” and ofindustrial capitalism itself (theVerlag system) as largelymerchant-dominated.39 To Braudel, long-distancetrade,Fernhandel,was“thevery life-bloodofcommercialcapitalism.”40 Inhis famousessay“La longuedurée” (1958), he suggested thatmerchant capitalism (capitalismemarchand) imparted a“certaincoherence”toawholefourorfivecenturiesofEurope’seconomiclifedowntotheeighteenthcentury, and described the expression as a “model that we can disengage from Marx’s work.”41

Mousnier’sownconceptionof commercial capitalismseemed to standhalfwaybetweenBraudelandTawney, both in underlining the interdependence between the grand commerce capitaliste and theabsolutisms of the sixteenth century, and in seeing Calvinism as exerting a major influence oncapitalism,evenifcapitalismitselfpredatedtheReformation,asTawneyhadargued.42

Ifweamalgamatethesestreamsofhistoriography,theneverydecadesincethesixtieshasproducedsubstantialpiecesofwork inwhich“commercial capitalism”and“merchantcapitalism”are in some

way central to their argument:ManuelNunesDias’s innovatory tomes on Portugal’s “monarchicalcapitalism”(1963),43CharlesCarrière’sstudiesofthetradeofMarseillesandofbillsofexchange(1973,1976),44CatharinaLisandHugoSoly’smonographontheputting-outsystem(1979),45 theworksbyBéatrice Veyssarat,46 Peter Kriedte,47 David Ormrod,48 Bob Shenton,49 and Joseph Miller50 in theeighties, BinWong’s comparative study of European andChinese economic development51 or LeoNoordegraaf’s paper on the “new draperies” (both 1997),52 down tomore recent work like SergioTognetti’smonograph on the business groups involved in the silk industry of Florence 53 or ScottMarler’sstudyofmerchantcapitalismintheUSSouth.54Alloftheauthorscitedabovereferexplicitlyto“commercial,”“merchant,”or“merchantandbanking”capitalism.Andbeyondthemliesanevengreater mass of writers who refer in passing to “mercantile” or “commercial” capitalism andcapitalists.55

Marxistreticence(PerryAnderson,RobertBrenner,andahostofothers)isthusstrikinglyatoddswithmuchofthehistoriographythathasevolvedanditcanscarcelyinvokeorthodoxywhenLenin,for example, admired Pokrovsky’s work and would himself use the term “private commercialcapitalism”inthe1918debatesabouttheorganizationofRussianindustry.56Left-wingacademicsandintellectualswhofeltunconstrainedbyorthodoxiescouldpositformsofcapitalismthatMarxhimselfhadneverproperlydiscussed.Amongthehistorianslistedinthepreviousparagraphs,onlyahandfulwere consciouslyworking in aMarxist tradition. Bob Shenton is probably the best example of thisgroup.Agoodexampleofanintellectual(notahistorian)whomadepointedreferencesto“mercantilecapitalism”isSartre.IntheCritiqueofDialecticalReasonherefersto“theapparatusandstructuresofmercantilecapitalism”inthecontextofadiscussionofSpain’sstruggletoretainitsmassiveflowsofAmericantreasure.57NowonecanalwayssaythatSartreismerelysummarizingBraudel’sargumentinMediterranean,whichistrue,buttheintroductoryessayQuestionsdeméthodehasSartredescribingthelong-standing commercial rivalry between the British and the French as a “secular conflict ofmercantilecapitalisms,”anaptdescriptionthatstemmedpurelyfromhisownreadingofhistory.58

CONSTRUCTINGTHECASEFORCOMMERCIALCAPITALISMAhistorianofEnglishcommercehasnotedthatintheeighteenthcentury“Londonmerchantsinvestedin provincial manufacturing on a large scale.”59 What does one make of this? In Capital, Marxmaintainsanunbreachableseparationbetweencommercialcapitalandtheproductionofcapital.Thisis because the capital that embodies capital-production is what he calls industrial capital. Theindustrialistcanalwayssellhisowncommodities,butifhechoosestodisposeofhiscommoditycapitalthroughaclassofagentswhospecializeinthecirculationofcommodities,thatis,throughmerchants,thenthecapitalofthemerchantcan(forthepurposesofanalysis)betreatedsimplyasa“transformedform” of a portion of the (industrial) capital in circulation.60 The merchant is simply an agent ofindustrialcapital;otherfunctionsareirrelevant.YetthereareclearindicationsscatteredthroughthecorpusofMarx’sownwritingstosuggestthathewouldnothavereactedwithhorrortotheideathatmerchantcapitalistsmight“dominateproduction

directly,” that is, subject it to theirownexpansionascapital. In the famouschapterofvolumethreecalled“HistoricalMaterialonMerchant’sCapital,”statementslike“commercialcapitalisconfinedtothe circulation sphere and its sole function is to mediate the exchange of commodities” or“Commercialcapitalsimplymediatesthemovementoftheseextremes”61generatethetautology“Theindependent and preponderant development of capital in the form of commercial capital issynonymouswith thenonsubjectionof production to capital,”62 but this is then almost immediatelyunderminedbyhisfascinatingbutunexploredreferenceto“themannerandforminwhichcommercialcapitaloperateswhere itdominatesproductiondirectly.”The two examplesof this cited are: “colonialtrade in general (the so-called colonial system),” that is, the vast transatlantic commercial systemwhichrevitalizedslaveryasamodern-worlddevelopment,andsecondly“theoperationsoftheformerDutch East India Company”;63 in short, two very substantial trade sectors in both of which Marxseemed to think commercial capitalwas active in new,more “direct”ways.Again, in volume two,MarxreferstothecottageindustriesinRussiathat“arealreadybeingpressedmoreandmoreintotheserviceofcapitalistproduction.”“[F]orexample,merchantssupplytheweaverswithwarpsandweft,eitherdirectlyorbyintermediateagents,”sothatthese“ruralsubsidiaryindustries”become“pointsofvantageforthecapitalist,whofirstintrudesinhiscapacityasmerchant.”64Evenmoreexplicitly,inthesupplement that he added to volume three shortly before he died, Engels described the “merchantcapitalist” “buying” labor power which “continued to possess for some time its instrument ofproduction but had already ceased to possess its raw material.” Since he could ensure regularemploymentfortheweaver,themerchantcoulddepresshiswagesand“appropriatesurplus-valueontopofhisprevioustradingprofit.”65Bothoftheselatterexamplesrefer,ofcourse,totheputting-outsystemwhichbecamewidespreadbythelaterMiddleAges.Inthesamechapterwhere,fleetingly,heallowedforamoreactiveroleforcommercialcapitalintheAtlanticandtheDutchtrades,Marxwentontopositanoverallcontrastbetweenformsoftransitiontocapitalismby saying, either“theproducermaybecomeamerchant and capitalist”or “themerchantmay take direct control of production himself.”66 Again, there was no sense here of an archetypalseparation between production and circulation, since merchants could “take direct control ofproduction.”Theexamplehecitesisinteresting.“Rightuptothemiddleofthiscentury,forexample,themanufacturer in the French silk industry. . . was amanufacturer only in name. In reality he wassimplyamerchant,whokepttheweaversworkingintheiroldfragmentedmannerandexercisedonlycontrolasamerchant;itwasamerchanttheywerereallyworkingfor.”67ThereferenceherewastotheLyons silk industry and is particularly interesting because it helps to tie upwithmore recentworkwhich I shall come back to in a later chapter.68 “A manufacturer only in name” was an implicitacknowledgmentthattheindustryinvolvedaccumulationofcapitalbythesilkmerchantsratherthanbyanyclassof industrial capitalists in amoreobvious sense.This formof capitalist industry,Marxwrote,transformedthedirectproducersinto“merewage-labourersandproletarians”workingunderworse conditions than the workers in factory production and did nothing to alter the dispersed,domestic basis of production, that is, to “revolutionize” the “modeof production,” that is, theway

production was organized.69 In fact, however, more recent work shows that while the weavers ofLyonswererapidlysubordinatedtobigmerchantsandmerchantfirmsintheearlyeighteenthcentury,thesilkindustryitselfwasmoreinnovative,eventechnologically,thanMarxallowedfor.There is no doubt that in most passages with statements of the form “the merchant becomes anindustrialist directly,”70 Marx tended to see the putting-out system as involving an actual“transformation of themerchant into an industrial capitalist.”Thus inTheories of Surplus-Value hewrites both that “The merchant as such becomes a producer, an industrialist” and that the“transformation of themerchant into an industrial capitalist isat the same time the transformation ofcommercial capital into amere formof industrial capital.”71 Itwas almost certainly this conflation thatstopped Marx from positing a distinct form of accumulation that one could identify as merchantcapitalismspecifically,sinceputters-outwerenolongermerchantsbutindustrialists.Inthisrespect,atleast, Dobb’s own study moved beyond Marx. Not only did Dobb see the putting-out system asemblematicofaspecificallymerchantcapitalism72andreferrepeatedlyto“merchant-manufacturers,”“merchant-employers,” and so on, but unlike Marx he was open to the idea that “the capitalistmerchant-manufacturerhadanincreasinglycloseinterestinpromotingimprovementsintheinstrumentsandmethods of production.” “The very division of labor which is specially characteristic of this periodpreparedthegroundfromwhichmechanicalinventioncouldeventuallyspring.”73ThiswasaradicallydifferentperspectivetoMarx’s,andoneweowetoDobb’stheoreticalperspicacityindisentanglingthemuch larger process of the “subordination of production to capital” from industrial capitalism assuch.74TheFrenchhistorianGeorgesLefebvrerestatedthisperspectiveinamoredynamicwayinhiscontribution to the debate between Sweezy and Dobb when he argued that it was the “collusionbetween commerce and the State” that “promoted the development of capitalism,” and that“merchantsplayedapart in thehistoricalmissionofcapitalism”by their role in“concentratingandrationalisingproduction.”75Allthiswasdecadesago,ofcourse,andsincethenstudiesliketheonebySvenBeckerthavebeenabletodemonstratethewaysmerchantscontributeddirectlytotheemergenceofindustrialcapitalisminindustrieslikecottontextileswhenmechanizationbegan.76

Themajorbreakthroughoftheory,itseemstome,camewithChayanovinRussia.Respondingtotheaccusationthathisschoollookedatpeasantfarminginisolationfrom“worldcapitalistcirculation,”hemadethefundamentalpointthatthepenetrationofcapitalismintothecountrysidetooktheformof“tradingand financecapitalism”establishingan“economicdictatorshipoverconsiderable sectorsofagriculture,whichasregardsproductionwillremainasbefore,composedofsmall-scalefamilylaborpeasant undertakings subject in their internal organization to the laws of the labor-consumerbalance.”77Thiswas said in the introduction toPeasantFarmOrganization (1925). Inchapter seven,Chayanovwentontoexpandonthisideabyreiteratingthat,“whileinaproductionsenseconcentrationin agriculture is scarcely reflected in the formation of new large-scale undertakings, in an economicsense capitalism as a general economic system makes great headway in agriculture.”78 Agriculture“becomes subject to trading capitalism that sometimes in the form of very large-scale commercialundertakingsdrawsmassesofscatteredpeasantfarmsinto itssphereof influenceand,havingbound

these small-scale commodity producers to the market, economically subordinates them to itsinfluence.”79 Chayanov then referred to large commercial firms like theKnoops using the advancesystemtoconvert theorganizationof ruralproductionalmost intoa special formof the“sweatshopsystem.”80 Commercial capital penetrates the countryside through “trading machines” (viz., itscommercialorganizationandnetworks)thatChayanovdescribedas“leavingthem[peasantfarms]freeasregardsproduction”while“entirelydominatingthemeconomically.”81Finally,Chayanovallowedforanevolutionofcontractfarmingbysuggestingthatthesamefirmscould“activelyinterfereintheorganizationofproduction,too.”82

Chayanov’sspecifictermforthisformofcapitalistpenetrationandcontrolviacommercialfirmsandtheir “trading machines” was “vertical capitalist concentration.” Vertical concentration was howcommercialcapitalsestablishedadegreeofcontroloverruralhouseholdsandtheirlaborpowers.TheconceptdevelopedherestrikesmeasaninnovationinMarxisttheory,andIshallreturntothewayitworkedinchaptersix.

2

THEINFRASTRUCTUREOFCOMMERCIALCAPITALISM

TRADINGCOLONIESThe dispersion of networks was a major instrument of capital accumulation. If the characteristicmobility of capital is what Marx calls “circulation,” then for centuries the circulation of capitalpresupposedthephysicalmovementofcommercialagents,whichinturnwouldmeantheirabilitytoestablish more or less stable settlements in locations abroad. The term for such a settlement was“factory.”“‘Factory’according toDr.Johnsonmeans ‘ahouseordistrict inhabitedbyTraders inadistantcountry.’”1Thus,the“factory”wasthecommunityofmerchantsofthisorthatnationality.IntheLevantintheseventeenthcentury,“thefactorieslivedself-centredlives”;amongotherthingsthismeantthat“theTurksrarelyappearedinthe(European)quarters.”2

Thehistoryof commerce is thus a rich tapestryof trading colonies that spanned the entireglobe,whereverthiswasaccessible.InGuangzhou(Canton)inthelatereleventhcentury,“Theforeignward(fanfang)iswherethosefromvariouscountriesfromacrosstheoceancongregateandlive.”3Muslimmerchants had been trading here since at least the eighth century and were both numerous andprosperous.In1216thereweresomethreethousandEuropeanmerchantslivinginAlexandria.4Twoandahalfcenturieslater,theDutchtravelerJoosvonGhisteletellsus,Alexandria“swarmswithrichmerchantswhohavecomefromallnationsimaginable.”“Themajorityofthesehavetheirownmaisonwhichtheycallfondigoes,”theVenetianshavingatleasttwoestablishmentsofthissort.5Inthetwelfthcentury,VenetiansweresonumerousatConstantinople that thousandsof themwereroundedup inMarch 1171 when the emperor Manuel Komnenos decided to curb their “insolence” after they“attackedandplunderedthenewlyestablishedGenoesequarter”inthecity,“toredownitshousesandleftitinruins.”6TheVenetianQuarteroccupiedawholestretchofthesouthernshoreoftheGoldenHorn,thedistrictknownasPerama,wheretherewerethreescalae(placeswhereshipscoulddock)andalongrowofofficinaeandergasteria,thatis,commercialestablishments,workshops,andretailoutlets.7

Venetians maintained trading colonies in all the major cities of the Levant.8 There were severalthousand Venetians settled on Crete in the fourteenth century, with the “greatest names of theVenetian aristocracy” dominating the island’s economy.9 In Acre, “[t]he Italian quarters were verycrowded,”with“self-governingquartersfortheVenetiansandthePisansclosetotheharbour,andasubstantialGenoesesection” tuckedbehind them.10Here, in the late thirteenthcentury,afterviolentclashes with the Genoese, the Venetians decided to redevelop their quarter as a solidly fortifiedenclave, with their “citizens and merchants” encouraged to reside strictly within its walls.11 Bycontrast,Palermointhetwelfthandthirteenthcenturieshadamixedquarteraroundtheport,althoughin 1184/5 theMuslims were said to live in their own suburbs, “apart from the Christians.”12 (Ibn

Jubayr also claims that “they do not congregate for the Friday service, since the khutbah isforbidden.”)InTunis,asuburboutsidetheeasternor“Sea”gate(theBabel-bahr)wasthehomeofItalianandCatalanmerchants in the early sixteenth century.13When the French colonized the country in the1880s, a more purely European city emerged next to the historic one, with “a cathedral, markets,hotels,banks,andbuildingsofallsorts,”sufficientlymodernincharacterforonetravelertocallit“uncacheteuropéen”asearlyas1885.14InIstanbul,theold(pre-Ottoman,Byzantine)GenoesecolonyofPera (on the northern side of the Golden Horn) resurfaced in the nineteenth century as a purelyEuropean enclave dominated byGreekmerchants and bankers, the nerve-center of a new, but stilllargely commercial, bourgeoisie.15 There were also large colonies of Spanish Jews in Istanbul and“aboveall”Salonicainthesixteenthcentury.16InTheMerchantsMapRobertsdescribedSalonicaasa“richandlargeCity.”“ThepresentinhabitantsareGreeks,Turks,andprincipallyJews,whoareherefound to be very rich and eminent Merchants.”17Further south, in Smyrna/Izmir “the houses of theFranks(Europeans,JB)werethebestandmosthandsomebuildingsinthecity.Theywereallinonestreetwhichranalongtheshore.”18TheFrenchbotanistTournefortdescribedSmyrnain1702as“oneoftherichestcitiesof theLevant,”butnotedthat“theTurksrarelyappear intheruedesFrancs.”19

Smyrna,onewriterhassaidrecently,“wasbothOttomanandEuropean.”20TherewerethousandsofItalianmerchants in Lisbon toward the end of the fifteenth century21 and a conspicuous colony ofEnglishmerchantsintheeighteenthcentury,whenEnglishcapitalwas“veryevidentintheBrazilianandAfricantrades.”22(AFrenchreportevenclaimed“OnpeutregarderLisbonnecommeunecolonieAngloise”!)InLondonby1860,thereweresomeeighty-sixGreekmerchanthouses.“AlmostalltheLondon-Greeks lived in Finsbury Circus, where they had luxurious residences and the companyheadquarters.”23Likewise,nineteenth-centuryMarseilleshada“verylargenumberofGreekhouses,”and was next to London the other main recipient in western Europe of cargoes sent by GreekmerchantsfromtheeasternMediterraneanandtheBlackSea.24

Finally,betweentheMediterraneanandChinawereportslikeSohar,Masqat,Calicut,andMalacca,allofwhichhadsubstantialsettlementsofforeigntraders.Sohar,ontheedgeoftheIndianOceanandtheonlytowninOmanwithanyrealurbandevelopment,was“closelylinkedwiththeOmanioverseascommunitylivinginBasra.”25ThenetworksthatextendedacrosstheGulftotheeastcoastofAfricaand to al-Mansura in Sindwere inextricably religious and commercial, and dominated by religiousdissidentsknownas Ibadis (al-Ibadiyya).Wilkinsonhasargued that“asa cosmopolitancentrewithvery close linkswith Basra,” Soharwas the “centre of a number of ‘vanguard’ philosophieswhichdispleased the reactionary ‘ulama’ of the (Omani) interior” in the ninth century.26 There werenumerousSirafimerchantsatSohar27aswellasa“sizeableJewishcommunity.”28TheGulfnetworkswerecharacterizedbyhighlevelsofinternalmobility.“Themerchantsoftheseportsregularlymovedaroundbetweenthemandoftenhadresidencesinmorethanone.”29Masqat’sowncommerciallifelatercame to bedominatedby a successionofBania (Guj.vaniyo) communities. In 1765when the SindiBhattiaswerestillstrong,theDanishexplorerCarstenNiebuhrreported,“InnootherMahometancity

aretheBanianssonumerousasinMaskat;theirnumberinthiscityamountstotwelvehundred.”30By1840,withtherulingfamilymovinghousetoZanzibar,KutchiBhattiashademergedasthe“principaleconomicpowerinMasqat”andtheBaniapopulationreachedtwothousand.31TheBaniasofMasqatretainedahighdegreeof community solidarity.Accountswerekept inGujarati, Indiandress stylesweremaintained,and,ingeneral,“theMasqatiHindumadenoattempttoassimilate.”32

WhatwassostrikingaboutCalicutwas themoreor lessstablepresenceofasubstantialcolonyofforeignmerchantsfromCairoandtheRedSeaportsaswellasotherpartsoftheMiddleEastfromasearlyasthefourteenthcentury.33In1502itwasclaimedthereweresome“4,000householdsofMuslimsjustfromCairoandtheRedSeainCalicut.”34Barbosadescribedthemas“extremelywealthy”sincetheydominated the crucial part of the circuits bywhich spices traveled toVenice viaAden, Jedda, andCairo.35SinceCalicutwasthechiefbaseofMiddleEasterncapitalintheIndianOcean,thePortuguesefailure to turn the Zamorin, the (Hindu) ruler of Calicut, against them triggered a campaign ofexceptionalviolencewhichcausedarapidflightofcapital.“Manynationsusedtohavegreatfactorieshere,”ToméPirescouldsayinlessthantwodecadesofthePortuguesecoming.36Ontheotherhand,evenaslateasthestartoftheseventeenthcenturyCalicutwasstillsaidtobethe“busiest”portinthewholeofIndiaandtohave“merchantsfromallpartsoftheworld,andofallnationsandreligions,byreason of the liberty and security accorded to them there.”TheZamorin, itwas said, “permits theexerciseof everykindof religion, andyet it is strictly forbidden to talk,dispute,orquarrelon thatsubject;sothereneverarisesanycontentiononthatscore.”37

EastofMalabar,Malaccawas“therichestseaportwiththegreatestnumberofwholesalemerchantsandabundanceofshippingandtrade.”38Thevalueofgoodspassingthroughtheportca.1511hasbeenestimatedtobeastaggeringtwomillioncruzados!39ToméPires,whospenttwoandahalfyearsthere,claimedthat“eighty-fourdistinctlanguagescouldbeheardinthestreetsofMalacca”andestimatesthenumberofforeignmerchantsinthecityin1509tobeabout4,000.40ThomazhasarguedthatMuslimsfromGujaratwere themost powerful community there and lived in a section of the richmerchantquarter(kampong)ofUpeh.Nextinimportancewerethe“Kelings”orCoromandelTamilswholivedinKampongKelingsomedistanceaway,nearthesea.41Malacca’scosmopolitanismthrewupapolicyof“broadreligioustolerance”underitsfifteenth-centurysultans,somuchsothatthefamousMuslimnavigator Ibn Majid would actually complain about the frequency of mixed marriages (marriagesbetweenMuslimsandnon-Muslims).42

Ofcourse,tradingcolonieswerenotconfinedtoportcitiesandwerefoundinmajorinlandcentersaswell. Isfahan in the 1640swas said to have “a large number of strangerswho usually frequent thisPersian Emporium on account of its flourishing trade and commerce.” The Portuguese monkManriqueclaimedthat“morethansixhundredcaravanseriesexistfortheseforeigners.”43ThesuburbofJulfacontainedacolonyof“sixtoseventhousandArmenians,”transplantedtherebyShahAbbasI;“verywealthy”becauseitsresidents“followtradeinvariouspartsofAsiaandEurope.”44Laterintheseventeenth century, theVenetian-bornwriterManuccidescribesLahore as “crammedwith foreignmerchants.”45AndCairointheeighteenthcenturyhadawealthyandhighlyorganizedcommunityof

Fasi merchants, merchants from Fez in the Maghreb. They were substantial traders in coffee andIndiantextiles,and“tendedtoagglomerateinthesamedistricts(ofthecity)fortheirbusinessesandlivedinproximitytoeachother.”46

WHOLESALEMARKETSWholesalemarketswithaglobal reachareattested invarious sources fromthe seventh to the tenthcenturies.“ReširiParsan,fromwhichcomefinepearls”washowanArmeniangeographerdescribedonemarketof this sort in the seventh century, referring toRishahron the southern coast of Iran.47

Barda‘westoftheCaspianexportedvastquantitiesofrawsilktoFarsandKhuzistaninthesouthofIran.48 Busir inMiddleEgyptwas the leadingwholesalemarket for flax.49 InKabul, themarket forindigowassaidtohaveanannualturnoverofovertwomilliondinars!50Marsaal-Kharaz(LaCalle)ontheAlgerian coast specialized in coral fishing.At any given time fifty boatswere active, eachwithroughlytwentymen.51“Thecoralisthenpolishedinaspecialmarketplace,andsoldinbulk,atalowprice.”52SevilleretaineditsdominantpositionasthechiefEuropeanmarketforoliveoilfromthetenthtothefourteenthcenturies,53andBarusinthefarnorthofSumatrawaswheremerchantswenttobuycamphor.BythetwelfthcenturyCeutawasanothermajorcenterofthecoraltrade.Al-Idrisitellsusithadamarket “where one cuts and polishes the coral and makes jewellery out of it.” This was widelyexported,thebulkofittoGhanaandtheSudan.54Tabarca,too,hadnumerouscoralreefsandagain(al-Idrisitellsus)merchantscamethere“fromallovertheworld”and“exportedagreatdeal”ofthispreciouscommodity.55Infact,theTabarcacoralmarketisastrikingexampleofhowstablewholesalemarketscouldbeovertime.In1543twomajorGenoesemerchanthousesacquireditscoralislandandby1584oneofthem,theLomellini,wasselling100,000ducatsworthofcoralinLisbon.Aslateas1633therewerenofewerthanfifteenhundredGenoesestillbasedthere.56Alexandria,too,hadawholesalemarketwhichwascalledsouqal-murjaniyya,whereawholestreetofcoralworkshopswasplunderedbyKingPeterIofCyprusin1365.57Intheearlythirteenthcenturyal-Tifashireportsthatapoundofrawcoralcostfivedirhamsinthehomeports,butthepricecouldbethreeorfourtimesasmuchonceitwasprocessedatAlexandria.58

Flax and spices were likewise wholesale trades dominated by medieval Alexandria. In the lateeleventh century, it exported between five to six thousand tons of raw flax to markets in theMediterranean,59andunderSaladinandtheAyyubids itbecamethe leadingspicemarketof theEastMediterranean. A major wholesale market could generate secondary ones elsewhere; for example,Abulafianotes,“TherewasafamousmarketforEgyptianflaxinMazara”onthewestcoastofSicily.60

Further west, Venice was Europe’s largest bullion market before the arrival of American silver,61

which was doubtless the reason why the Florence merchant-bankers decided to make the RialtoEurope’spivotalexchangemarketfromtheearlyyearsofthefourteenthcenturyandmakeVenice“themostpredictableofEurope’sbankingplaces.”62By the fifteenth century,Venicewas also the“chiefdistributorofbothhigh-gradeandmiddlingvarietiesofLevantcottontoEuropeanindustries,”63and

thekeywholesalemarketforspicesinthewest.64LisbonbecamethegreatspicemarketofEuropebythefirstdecadeofthesixteenthcentury,destroyingtheVenetian“monopoly.”Antwerpwasthegreatinternational money market of the middle of the sixteenth century. The total value of financialtransactionsconcludedontheAntwerpBourseinthecourseofasingleyearwasestimatedin1557at40millionducats.65

Danzigwasamajorgrainmarketwithmassive shipments to the IberianPeninsula.Almosteightythousandtonspassedthroughthetownin1562.66GallipoliatthesouthernextremityofPugliahadavirtualmonopolyovertheexportofhigh-qualityoliveoil.67Itwassaidtoinfluenceoliveoilpricesasfar away asNaples.68 “This trade is entirely in the hands of themerchants atNaples andLeghorn,particularly the former who have their agents at Gallipoli, and by making advances to the poorcultivator,keephimconstantlyintheirchains.”69Thesamewriteradds,“TheordersfordeliveryofoilatGallipoliaretreatedlikebillsofexchange,andhavesometimesfiveorsix indorsements.”70Thus,nexttoitssilkindustry,Naplescouldcountonbeingthegreatoliveoilmarketofthewholesouthernregion.71 Patras in the Peloponnesewas the chiefmarket for the currant trade, exporting 8millionpoundsannuallyattheendoftheeighteenthcentury.72Baytal-FaqihinYemenwasdescribedas“thegreatestmarket for coffee in theworld”; “coffee is alwaysbought for readyMoney.”73The biggestbuyers, theTurkishandArabmerchants, shipped thebeans toJeddausingYemen’snorthernports,not Mocha where the European companies were active. Also, “Egyptian merchants rarely dealtdirectlywiththeirYemenicounterparts.Instead,transactionsweremadethroughJidda.”74TheJeddamarket is thought tohavebeenten times larger involumethantheGulfmarketservedbyMocha.75

The sizeof thisOttoman trade canbeglimpsed from the fact thatbyMarch1720 the totalTurkishcapitalamassedatBaytal-FaqihcametoonemillionSpanishriyalsoveraseven-monthperiod.76

InCairo the coffee trade involved some five hundredmerchants importing roughly one hundredthousandquintals,ofwhichhalfwasreexportedtomarketsintheOttomanempire.77Muhammadal-DadaoftheSharaybifamilywasdescribedbytheFrenchconsulin1708asthemostpowerfulcoffeemerchantinCairo.78HehadcometoCairofromJeddafollowingaplaguethathadwipedoutmostofhisfamily.WhenheinheritedmanagementoftheSharaybifamilyfortuneattheendoftheseventeenthcentury,thisstoodattwoandahalfmillionpara.By1722thissumhadexpandedtoca.37millionpara,an“enormouscapital”whichwasthenrapidlyfragmentedinthedivisionhearrangedamongyoungerSharaybisofthefourthgeneration.79

In the second half of the sixteenth century most Iranian raw silk was traded in Aleppo. ThewholesalerswereArmenianmerchantswhorecirculatedthesilveracquiredfromEuropeanbuyerstofinancepurchasesofhigh-qualityindigointhewholesalemarketsofAgraandBayana.80Vastsumsofcapital poured into the Bayana region during the boom of the 1620s,81 and Armenian andMughalmerchantswere said tohave advanced asmuch as 350,000 rupees as late as 1636.82 Benareswas thecenteroftheNorthIndiandiamondtradeintheeighteenthcentury,83andthemainmoneymarketforeasternIndia.84Mirzapurwas“thegreatmartforcotton,”85anda“veryconsiderabletrade”inopiumwascarriedonatPatna.86

Salonicawasdescribedas the“greatmart for tobacco in theLevant.”87 InEurope themarketwasdominatedbyahandfulofGlasgowfirmswhodisposedoftheirChesapeakecargoesinhugesalestoFrench buyers in Scotland.88 Kingston,89 Kilwa, and Luanda were all major slave markets in theeighteenth century, the last of these “easily the greatest concentration of Portuguese commercialinvestment inwestern-centralAfrica.”90 InKingston,PortRoyal Street had extensive slave yards,91

whileKilwawasdescribedbytheFrenchas“thetradecentreforslavesonthe(east)coastofAfrica.”92

In New Orleans, the “citadel of southern merchant capitalism,” as Marler calls it, the city’s slavemarkets were the largest in the US, contributing millions every year.93 More crucially, slaverypropelledCrescentCity’srapidemergenceintheearlynineteenthcenturyasBritain’slargestsupplierof cotton. Half of all the South’s cotton production “routinely passed through the hands of NewsOrleansmerchantsonitswaytotextilemanufacturersintheNorthandEurope,”94makingitthefourthlargestportintheworldintermsofvalueofexportsbythe1840s.95

Wholesale markets were as important as ever in the nineteenth century, which saw a newproliferation of commercial capitals as industrial accumulation massively increased the demand forindustrialcropslikecotton,silk,palmoil,teak,jute,andrubber,andformassconsumptiongoodsliketea,coffee,sugar,cocoa,rice,wheat,andsoon.Thevolumeofinternationaltradegrewfivefoldinthecentraldecadesbetween1840and1870.96Liverpoolimportedaroundthree-quartersofBritain’spalmoilthroughoutthefirsthalfofthecentury,97and70percentoftotalBritishportstockofrawcottonwasin Liverpool.98 Odessa was rapidly colonized by Greek merchant firms to become the greatestcommercial port on the Black Sea, pure replica of a modern European metropolis99 with a strongrepresentationofJewishmerchants,100allthankstoasustainedboomintheexportofRussiangrain.By1846theOdessabranchofRalliBrothers“tradedyearlyincommoditiesworthmorethan1.5millionroubles.”101LeHavrewastheepitomeofcommercialcapitalslinkedtothecolonialtrades.Intheearly1880s it controlled 72 percent of the stocks of coffee in France and was France’s leading rubberimporterandimporterofUScottonbytheendofthecentury.102By1937LeHavreimportsaccountedfornine-tenthsofthecountry’stotalconsumptionofcocoa,four-fifthsof itscoffee,two-thirdsof itsrawcotton,two-thirdsofexotictimbers,andhalfofthecopperconsumedinFrance.103Ontheotherside of the Atlantic, the Buenos Aires and Rosario markets handled Argentina’s humongousproductionofwheatattheendofthecentury.SizeablegraintransactionswereconcludedontheflooroftheBolsadeComercio,whichwaslargelycontrolledbytheexportfirms.104Astheboomintensified,a handful of large companies, “in reality branches of powerful European commercial interests,”establishedavirtualmonopolyoftheexporttrade.105Likethebiggestmerchantcapitalseverywhere,theexportfirmswereresentfuloftheirdependenceonthemiddlemen(theacopiadores)andsoughttoestablishtheirownofficesandagentsintheBuenosAireswheatzone,whichonlydeepenedtensionsbetweenthelocalgrainmerchantsandthe“BigFour.”Wholesalemarketshadalwaysbeencharacterizedbyadegreeofspecializationbutinthenineteenthcenturythisbecamemoreobviousthanever.Beirutwasdefinedbyitsexportsofrawsilk,Alexandriaof cotton,Karachi ofwheat,Rangoon of rice, Foochowof tea. “The tea business in Foochowwas

generallyonagrandscale.”106Jardinesmade“vastpurchasesontheFoochowmarket”inthelate1850sand early 1860s.107 “On the whole, Western merchants obtained more tea by purchasing on theFoochowmarket thanbycontractingwith teamen,” that is,with thebig teacontractors.108Rangoonwasdescribedas“theworld’spremierriceport”towardtheendofthecentury.109By1900Karachiwasthe biggest wheat exporter in the east, the “natural port” for the immense grain production of thecanal-irrigatedtractsinthePunjab.110Alexandria’sfortuneswerebuiltoncotton,atradedominatedbya largely Greek business oligarchy,111 and Beirut’s silk exports were controlled by a partnershipbetweenFrenchfirmsandthemainlyChristianLebanesecommercialbourgeoisie.112

BILLSOFEXCHANGE“Inadditiontobanknotes,wholesaletradehasasecondandfarmoreimportantmeansofcirculation:billsofexchange,”MarxwritesinvolumethreeofCapital.113Sincebanknotesonlybegantobeissuedfromthesecondhalfoftheeighteenthcentury,hewasrighttodescribebillsofexchangeasthemajormeansofcirculationinwholesaletrade.Forexample,fromfiguresthathehimselfcites,thetotalsumofbanknotesincirculationinBritainactuallydeclinedbetween1844and1857,eventhoughBritain’sexternaltrade“morethandoubled.”114Inastricterdefinition,ofcourse,Marxalwaystreatedbillsofexchange under means of payment, that is, as a form of credit, and specifically of (short-term)“commercial credit” as opposed to “bank credit.”115 Bills of exchange were the “very basis of themoneymarket.”Thiswasas trueofVenice inthefourteenthcenturyas itwasofLondoninMarx’sday.116

BillsofexchangewerewidelyusedinVenetiantradeintheLevant.117Therearenumerousreferencesto them in the ledger or account book of Giacomo Badoer, a Venetian banker who lived inConstantinople from September 1436 to early 1440.118 As in Venice, “bills in Constantinople werehandledoncurrentaccountinthelocaldepositbanks.”119InEuropethebillmarketwasdominatedbythe Italians. Even in Bruges the exchange “was merely the daily Bourse assembly of the Italianmerchants.”120“Subjectsofothernationsusuallyhad toapply to them, if theywished tobuyor sellbills.”InVenice,hugesumsofmoneywerekeptinconstantcirculationontheexchanges,forexample,“theVenetianbranchoftheFuggerfirmisreportedtohavehadaturnoverofabout100,000ducatsinitsexchangedealingswithAntwerpalone.”121Bythelatesixteenthcentury,thePiacenzafairsactedasaclearinghouseforthevastamountsofmoneycirculatinginbillsofexchange.122If“[p]ureeconomizingon means of circulation appears in its most highly developed form in the clearing house, the simpleexchangeofbillsfallingdue,”123thenthosefairs,dominatedbyaclubofsomesixtybankers,showushowadvancedthefinancialmarketsstillwereunderItalian(inthiscase,Genoese)dominance.However,bythesixteenthcenturybillsofexchangewerewidelyusedintheOttomanempireaswell(wheretheywerecalledsuftajas)124andbyca.1700theenormousstocksofsilverincirculationintheMughaleconomyformedthebasisforamassivesystemofcredittransfersthroughbothtreasurybillsand the commercial bills known as hundis.125 And in Europe itself in the seventeenth century, thediscountingandsaleofbillsofexchangebecamealivelybusinessinAmsterdam.“Inthetradeofno

other city in this period was the bill of exchange used so freely and flexibly.” Amsterdam wasdescribedasthe“theatrewherealltheworld’sexchangesaretransacted.”126

The eighteenth century was when bills of exchange came into circulation in a big way. CharlesCarrière describes the bill of exchange as “the perfect instrument of commercial capitalism in theeighteenthcentury.”127 Inotherwords, thebulkofmoney in circulation in the sphereof large-scalecommercetooktheformofbillsofexchange.Forexample,in1783,whileMarseilles’smaritimetradereachedorevenexceeded200millionlivres,theactualcashinthehandsofmerchantswasestimatedtobe a mere 1.8 million livres at most.128 This was a time when the more substantial merchants(négociants)numbered some six to sevenhundred inFrance’s leadingport city.129By the endof theeighteenth century, bills of exchange were widely used in most trade sectors of the internationalmarket.IntheBritishAtlantic,wherethecommissionsystembegantobeusedfromasearlyasthelateseventeenth century, bills of exchangewere “the key link between the planter and his commissionagent.”130Barbados planters bought slaveswith bills and “sold their sugar not in the islands but byconsignmenttoLondon.”131Intheso-called“cargotrade,”localmerchantsinbothSouthCarolinaandtheWest Indies importeddrygoodsoncredit from theLondoncommissionhouses andmade theirreturns,eitherwhollyorverylargely,inbillsofexchange.132InIndia,salesofhundishadbecomesowidespread in Gujarat by the eighteenth century that commercial payments were seldom made incash.133 A small group of Surat bankers known as “the Bengal shroffs” came to specialize indiscountingandbuyingEastIndiaCompanybills.134TheSuratmoneymarketwasavitalpartofthefinancialoperationsoftheCompany.Moreimportantly,theCourtofDirectorsallowedthetreasuriesatitssettlementstoreceivemoney“inreturnforbillsofexchangepayableinLondonatvariousdatesatratesfixedbytheCompany.”135TheCompany’sbillsthusbecameamajorchannelforrepatriatingfortunesfromIndia,eitherdirectlyfromCalcuttaorviaCantonwherecapitalwasneededtofinancepurchases of tea. By the 1770s the Canton treasury was receiving very large sums from Calcutta,carriedtherebythe“country”shipscarryingopiumandcotton.136Finally,inBritainitselfthevolumeofinlandbillsgrewfrom£2millionca.1700to£30millionca.1775.137

Sterling-denominated bills drawn on London became the pivot around which international traderevolved by the main part of the nineteenth century. Liquidity was the key here, fueling massivecommercial expansion. The City became “a short-term money market of unrivalled liquidity andsecurity,”138awholesalemarketinthefinancingoftrade.Tradefinanceorthediscountingofbillsofexchangewasthegluethatheldthesystemtogether,theLondonmerchantbanksguaranteeingbillsby“accepting”them(“writingorstampingthewordacceptedacrossitsfaceforafeeof1or2percentofitsvalue”),thebillbrokersbuyingbillsatadiscounttofacevalue(“discounting”them),andtheBankofEnglandactingaslenderoflastresort,preparedinextremecircumstancesto“rediscount”thebetter-quality bills, thus enabling the discount houses to finance their massive bill portfolios withmoneyborrowed from thebanks as“call loans” securedon first-classbills.139 Joint-stockbankerspreferredcommercialbillsovergovernmentsecurities,140and,astheLondonbanksbuiltuptheirownliquidcashreserves,vastsumswereheldoncallwiththebillbrokers.141Bythe1850sitcouldbesaid,“TheBill

brokershavebeeninthehabitofholdingprobablyfrom15to20MillionsofMoneyatcall”fromonedaytothenext.142

Thetrulyimportantinnovationinthefirstfifteenyearsofthenineteenthcenturywastheemergenceof the manufacturer who exported directly to distant markets. In “consigning exports on their ownaccount,withtheassistanceofLiverpoolandforeign-basedcommissionagents”whointurnreliedontheLondonacceptancehouses,143 theseBritishcottonmanufacturerswerethefirstsigns,historically,ofwhatMarxwould later call the“subordination”of commercial to industrial capital.Marxhimselftelescopedthisprocessmassively,projectingitbacktoamuchearlierperiod,whereasinfacteveninthenineteenthcenturycommercialcapitalremainedlargelydominantdowntothelaterdecadesofthecentury when an entirely new breed of industrial capital, the capital-intensive vertically integratedfirms, would finally emerge to eliminate the old-style merchants by organizing their own salesnetworks.

3

THECOMPETITIONOFCAPITALSStrugglesforCommercialDominancefromtheTwelfthtoEighteenthCenturies

BYZANTIUM:THESUBORDINATIONOFGREEKCAPITALInConstantinople the earlymodernworld inheritedan“urbanmonster,”1 but onewhose trajectoryhadinvolvedsharpfluctuationsoverthecenturies,withahistorygoingback,ofcourse,tolateantiquity(unlikemegacitieslikeCairoandBaghdad).OntheeveofitsconquestbytheOttomansin1453,thecity’spopulationhadstabilizedaroundseventythousand,2butatitsearly-Byzantinepeakinthesixthcenturyithadbeenprobablywelloverhalfamillion,andattheendofthetwelfthcenturywasagainsomewhereintheregionofhalfamillion,say,fourhundredthousand.3Betweenthosepeakscameadownturnreachingalowpoint,fortythousandtoseventythousand,intheeighthcentury(followingaplaguein747–8),4andthenasustainedrenewalorexpansionfromtheninthcenturydowntotheendof the twelfth. As the political base of an empire, however, the massive expansion of the internalmarketthatoccurredfromtheninthtotwelfthcenturieswastruenotjustofthemetropolisbuttosomedegreeofthewholeempireincludingitsvarioussecondaryurbancentersaswellastheislands.5Whatwas in play herewas a huge commonmarket, the biggest in theworld in the twelfth century (ifweexceptChina,ofcourse),anditwasboundtoexertconsiderableforceasacommercialmagnet.ConstantinopleissandwichedbetweentheGoldenHorntoitsnorthandtheSeaofMarmaratothesouth.Inthesixthcentury,asonescholarhasarguedconvincingly,theplagueof542triggeredamajorrelocation of business and residence to the southern (Marmara) coast, because bodies were beingdumped in the sea and any dumped in theGoldenHornwould not have beenwashed away.6TheGoldenHornhadbeenabandonedwellbeforethelateseventhcentury7anditwasthesouthcoastthatwasmore actively used in the seventh to tenth centuries.8 The sustained expansion of the ninth totwelfthcenturies,however,sawasuccessionofItaliancity-statesstartingtotradewiththeempireinabigway,anditwasessentiallytheirpresenceinConstantinoplethatrevitalizedtheGoldenHornintothemajorcommercialhubthatitbecamefromtheeleventhcenturydowntoearlyOttomantimes9andthenagain,withtherenewedcolonizationofPera(Galata,ontheEuropeansideofIstanbul), in themainpartofthenineteenthcentury.AllthemajorItaliancolonies(Amalfi,Pisa,Genoa,Venice)wereclustered in the lowerGoldenHorn,with jettiesor landing-stations (skalai)where seagoingvesselscouldloadandunload.Thecitycenterandtheseashoreswere“heavilybuiltupwiththree-orevenfive-storyhouses.”10InthetwelfthcenturyConstantinoplewasadenselypopulatedcosmopolitancity,sharplydivided insocial terms,andprone toviolent,uncontrollable fires.11JohnTzetzesboastedhecouldspeak to local residents inno fewer thanseven languages, includingPersian,Arabic,Russian,andHebrew.12 Eustathios ofThessaloniki counted sixty thousand “Latins” in the city,13 and a keen

observer,theJewishtravelerBenjaminofTudelatellsus,“Theysaythatthetributeofthecityaloneamountseverydaytotwentythousandflorins,arisingfromrentsofhostelriesandbazaars,andfromthedutiespaidbymerchantswhoarrivebyseaandbyland.”14ItwasthegreatestcommercialcenteroftheeasternMediterranean,15withapopulationbythennotfarshortofhalfamillion.16Finally,evenaslateas1192thenative,Greek,merchantsofConstantinoplewerea“large, influential, rich”group.17

Oikonomidès cites the example of Kalomodios, a banker who accumulated a vast fortune throughsuccessfuloperationsinlarge-scaletrade,financingcommercialtripsundertakenbyothers.18

YetthemostextraordinaryfactaboutByzantinecommercefromtheendoftheeleventhcenturytothethirteenthcenturyandlaterwastheseverediscriminationGreekmerchantsweresubjectedtovis-à-vis foreigncompetitorsbytheirownstate.By the termsof the treatyof1082,“VenetianmerchantscouldbuyandsellineverypartoftheEmpire,freeofdutyorcustomsexamination.”Manyportswereopenedand“vastterritoriesmadeaccessibletothemforfreetrade.”19“Theseprivileges,renewedbytheemperorsofthetwelfthcentury...renderedtheVenetiansvirtualmastersofthecommerciallifeoftheempire.”20Bythethirteenthcentury,whentheGenoesecameintoByzantineeconomiclifeinabigwayandsimilarwide-rangingconcessionsweregranted,“Italianmerchants,whetherGenoeseorVenetians,becamesoentrenched inConstantinople that theycontrolledtheeconomyof thatcity.”21

And by the end of the thirteenth century, the islands of the Aegean (the Archipelago) were beingdivided between Genoese and Venetian control,22 the Aegean’s east coast becoming the heart ofGenoa’smaritimedomain.Greekmerchants,meanwhile, continued topayadutyof10percentandByzantine access tomarkets in the west remained severely limited.Greekmerchants rarely gainedaccesstoItalianmarkets.23TheItaliansdiscouragedByzantineexpansionwestofthePeloponnese,24sothatGreekcapitalwaseffectivelyshutoutofthelong-distancetrade.25

AmajorupshotofentrenchedItalianeconomicdominancewas theendemichostility thatgrewupbetween the Italians and large sectors of the local population.26The violent crusader occupation ofConstantinoplein1204andthelong-standingdivisionbetweenthechurchesdidnothingtoabatethat,of course. Every attempt to bring the two churches togetherwas seen as a “national betrayal” andsparked riots.27 Greeks living in territories under Latin control were looked down upon as a“conqueredpeople”and suffered theeconomicand social consequencesof that even to thepointofbeing denied the right to have their own bishops.28 “They treated citizens like slaves,” wrote onetwelfth-centurychronicler.“TheirboldnessandimpudenceincreasedwiththeirwealthuntiltheynotonlydetestedtheRomans[Greek-speakingByzantines]butevendefiedthethreatsandcommandsoftheEmperor.”29Ontheotherhand,astheleft-winghistorianNicolasOikonomidèsemphasized,noneofthispreventedGreekbusinesscirclesfromenteringintopartnershipswithItaliancapital.Therewasextensivecollaboration,andGreekmerchantsevensoughtGenoeseorVenetiannationalitytoenjoythesamebenefits.TheemergenceofaByzantinecommercial“middleclass”wasaremarkablefeatureoftheeleventh-centuryboomintheeconomicandculturallifeoftheempire,anditsmoststrikingpoliticaloutcomewas the threedecades in themiddleof thecenturywhenastrictlyaristocraticmodelofgovernment

split wide open to allow the popular classes and commercially active strata (literally, “those of themarket place”) access, for the first time ever, to the senate and higher administration.30 No lessinterestingly,thesamerulerswhobroughtaboutthisrevolutionarychangerespondedtotheeconomicneeds of themiddle class (mesoi) by allowing for a controlled devaluation of the gold coinage—ameasurenotofcrisisbutoftheeconomicboomreflectedbyagrowingdemandformeansofcirculationand payment as Byzantium’s markets were becoming more deeply integrated into the expansionoccurringinthewest.31Whatemergedbrieflyintheeleventhcenturywasafascinatingallianceoftheabsolutist powerwith amiddle class hostile to the aristocracy. Itwas this “capitalist” dreamof theeleventh century that was shattered in 1081/2 in the violent reaction of a strongly pro-aristocraticdynasty (the Komnenoi) that set about curbing the growing affluence and power of the Greekmercantile class by abolishing “all the privileges the businessmen had just acquired”32 and (just asimportant!) granting extensive concessions to Venetian capital, effectively allowing a wholesaletakeoverofByzantinemarketsbyItalianmerchantcapitalists,with themajorexceptionof theBlackSeawhich in any case failed to attractmuch attention till the later thirteenth century. The FrenchByzantinist Lemerle described Alexios I Komnenos’s chrysobull of 1082 as a “massive economiccapitulation,” the point being that though aByzantinemerchant class survived and continued to beactivedowntotheendofthetwelfthcentury,ithadlostcontroloftheempire’smarkets.33Goingbylater experience, it is possible that the vast majority of local merchants worked as brokers for theItalianfirms.34

The last two and a half centuries of the Byzantine empire (1204–1453)were characterized by thecatastrophe of the Venetian occupation of Constantinople, which permanently dismembered theempireandleftthecityitselfdepletedandimpoverished;35byferociousstrugglesbetweenVeniceandGenoaforcontroloftheleadingtradesectors,onceByzantinerulewasrestored(in1261)andGenoaestablished a major presence through its alliance with Michael VIII Palaiologos (those struggleseruptedinthelastquarterofthethirteenthcenturyandbeganwiththeBlackSea);bythecivilwarsofthe 1340swhich saw the aristocracy contendingwith rebellions based on a loose coalition of urbanclasses that included sailors and longshoremen; by the aristocracy’s decisive turn to commercialinvestment as landedassetswereprogressively lost to theOttomanadvance from themiddleof thefourteenthcentury;andfinally,bytheoverwhelminggripthatGenoaevenmorethanVenicehadnowestablishedovermuchofthetruncatedempire’strade.Indeed,theGenoesehadcloserelationswiththeTurksthroughoutthefourteenthcentury,andaverysubstantialpartoftheirbusinesswasdoneintheOttomanterritories.36

The idea that ancient andmedieval writers were oblivious to the play of economic forces in thehistory of their respective societies and civilizations does not stand up to scrutiny. To Byzantinewriters like George Pachymeres and Nikephoros Gregoras it was fairly obvious that Genoa’sexploitation of Byzantine markets was the basis of her prosperity.37 Pachymeres himself has someremarkablepassagesonthekindofdominancetheGenoesehadestablishedovertheempireandaboutthefiercestrugglesbetweenthemandtheVenetiansforthedominationofGreekmarkets.Inoneof

thesehewrites,“theVenetiansand theircommunity(inConstantinople) formerlygreatlysurpassedtheGenoeseinwealth...becausetheymadegreateruseofthe[narrow]waters(theAegean)thandidtheGenoeseandbecause theysailedacross thehighsea(theMediterraneanmorewidely)with longships(galleys),and theysucceeded ingainingmoreprofit thandid theGenoese in transportingandcarrying wares. But once the Genoese became masters of the Black Sea by grant of the emperor(Michael III) and with all liberty and franchise, they braved that [sea], and sailing in themidst ofwinterinshipsofreducedlength...theynotonlybarredtheRomans(Byzantines)fromthelanesandwaresoftheseabutalsoeclipsedtheVenetiansinwealthandmaterial[goods].Becauseofthistheycameto look down not only upon those of their own kin (other Italians) but also upon the Romansthemselves.”38HerePachymeresdescribestwobroadperiodsinthecommercialhistoryoftheempire,inthefirstofwhich,accordingtohim,theVenetiansestablishedtheirprimacythroughastrategyofcabotageor coastal trading in thepurelyGreekpartsof theempire (aByzantineversionofwhat inIndiatheBritishwouldlatercallthe“countrytrade”).TheGenoeselatersurpassedthembymakingthe Black Sea the renewed focus of their commercial operations. This strikes me as a remarkablycoherentsummaryofovertwocenturiesofByzantinecommercialhistory.Inbothcities,VeniceaswellasGenoa,thearistocracyitselfwasverysubstantiallyinvolvedinthetradewith“Romania.”39The investmentsatstakewerethoseof the leadingfamilies inbothcenters.But commercial capitalwas stillwidely dispersed among thealberghi.On theGenoese side, the sixleading families accounted for 29 percent of all investment, a degree of concentration scarcelycomparablewiththemuchhigherlevelscharacteristicoflatercenturies.40Inca.1170theVenetianshadvastlymorecapitaltiedupinByzantiumthananyoftheircompetitors.Theyhadastrongerholdontheislands,andthiswasextensivebythesecondquarterofthetwelfthcentury.41

When theGenoese first sought to establish themselves inConstantinople, their newly establishedquarters were repeatedly attacked and even demolished—in 1162 by a mob consisting mainly ofPisans,thenagainin1170bytheVenetiansthemselves,andathirdtime,inApril1182,inadreadfullocal pogrom against all Italians (except that theVenetian quarter lay vacant at this time).42On allthesevariousoccasions,claimsforcompensationweresubmittedby themainaggrievedparties,andfromtheseonegetsat leastacrude impressionof thescaleof their respective investments.Genoeseestimatesofthelossestheysustainedin1162and1182respectivelysuggestthatinthepreviousdecadeorsotherehadbeenveryrapidenrichmentofGenoesemerchantstradingtoByzantinemarkets.43Itseemsentirely likely that thedisruptionofVenetianbusiness following the reprisalsagainst them in1171workedstronglyinGenoa’sfavor.ThattheLatinconquestofConstantinoplewaslargelyafunctionoftheendemicrivalrybetweenthetwo main commercial powers is shown by the fact that Genoa was not officially represented inConstantinopleduringtheoccupation.44Venice’sterritoryinthecityexpandedsubstantiallysoonafterthe conquest.45 The restoration of Byzantine rule in 1261 turned the tables dramatically as GenoabecamethedominanteconomicpowerinConstantinopleandsecuredaccesstotheBlackSea,whereacolonywasestablishedatCaffathatwasthrivingbythe1280s.46Thewholeperiodfrom1270to1340

sawsubstantialGenoeseinvestment.In1348,accordingtothechroniclerGregoras,revenuesfromthecustoms collected at Genoa’s colony at Pera were almost seven times bigger than the collections atConstantinople.47Thesefellsharplyinthelaterfourteenthcentury,whichsawaprolongedrecessionthatonly lifted intheearlypartof thefifteenthcentury.Competitionwassharperthanever inthesedecades,sincetherewerenofewerthanthree“colonialwars”betweenVeniceandGenoaforcontroloftheAegean,theupshotofwhichwasadivision,a“defactocarve-up,”oftheseabetweenthem.48

Thusthe“colonization”oftheByzantineempireprobablycountsasthemoststrikingexampleofa“colonial-style” economy before colonialism. The parallel has been drawn repeatedly, andOikonomidèshimselfwouldspeakofthe“economicimperialismofwesternmerchants.”49Anattemptin themiddleof the fourteenthcentury toreestablishgreaterparity in thedutiespaidbyGreekandItalian merchants led to a violent reaction which forced the emperor John VI Kantakouzenos toreversehisdecision.50 (TheGenoesereactedbyburningByzantinemerchantshipsandwarehouses!)Thetreatyof1352includedaclause“severelylimitingtheaccessofByzantinemerchantstoTanaandtheSeaofAzov.”51Themesoiwhowereactiveintherebellionsofthe1340sincludedalayerofGreekcapitalthatbothresenteditssubordinationtomorepowerfulcompetitorsanddependedonthemforitsownsurvival.InThessaloniki, themostradical faction, thoseknownas theZealots,evencontrolledthecity’sgovernmentforsomesevenoreightyearsandwereled,inpartatleast,bythecity’sharborworkers.52 Angeliki Laiou argued that the civil war was “an abortive effort to create a state quitedifferentfromwhathadexistedinByzantium,onewheretheinterestsofthecommercialelementwouldbeparamount.”53 In any case, by the latter half of the century amore substantial kind of involvementemergedasmembersof theGreekaristocracycompensatedfor falling incomesfromtheirestatesbyturningtolarge-scaletradeandbanking.AsOikonomidèsshowed,thehighestlevelsofthearistocracywereinvolvedinthis,54withthenumberofaristocrats involvedintradegrowingdramatically.“TheurbanupperclassofByzantiumwasatlastunitedinpurelycapitalistaspirations,”hewrote,55andthepreviousdistinctionbetweenthemesoiandthearistocracyeventuallydisappeared.Afinalword.NoneoftheleadingItaliantradecentersthattradedwithByzantiumsimplyreplicatedthepatternof theircompetitors. In theeleventhcentury,Amalfi (where,again, thearistocracywerekey drivers of external investment, unlike the other southern nobilities)56 had specialized in luxuryimportsfromConstantinopleformarketsinRomeandNaples,integratingitstradewiththesouthernMediterranean by using the gold from the Sahara acquired in theMaghreb ports and in Egypt (inexchange for grain, timber, linen cloth, and so on) to finance purchases from the Byzantines. InConstantinople theAmalfitanswere buyers, not sellers.57 In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, theVenetianshadtradedinthe localproduceof theGreekmainlandandGreekislandsandofsouthernItaly,initemssuchasoliveoil,cheese,wine,wheat,rawsilk,andrawcotton.AboutsixtypercentofVenice’s tradewith theempire is said tohavebeen transacted inGreece.58 SouthernCalabriawas amajorproducerofrawsilk59andthismustalsohavereachedmanufacturingcenterssuchasThebesinVenetianships.OliveoilcamefromthePeloponnese.60AVenetianbythenameofVitaleVoltani,whosettled inGreece in the 1160s, was said to have “dominated the oilmarket inCorinth, Sparta and

Thebes.”61Fortheirpart,theGenoesecombinedthebulktradesoftheBlackSearegion,Phokaia,andChios (grain, alum, leather, cotton, etc.)with the importationof expensive fabrics, “manydifferenttypesofEuropeancloth,”62theexportofAnatoliancarpets,63Russianfurs,64andsoon.

VENICETOPORTUGALUnliketherulersofByzantium,itwasMamlukpolicynottointerveneintheconflictsbetweenVeniceandGenoa.In1294thecommercialbattlebetweenthemhadspilledoverintothefarendoftheeasternMediterranean. The Syrian chronicler al-Jazari notes that in 1294 “witnesses reported that largenumbersofFrankscamebyseatoAyasforpurposesoftradeandthattheybelongedtotwonations(taifa).OnelotwerecalledVenetians,theotherGenoese.”Asactsofhostilityescalatedbetweenthem,theygotintoabitterfightand“ononedayaloneover6000peoplewerekilled.”“TheGenoesegotthebetteroftheVenetians.”65Al-Jazariwasdescribingacrucialpartofthepreludetothemajorwarthatdeveloped two years later, which began and endedwith the Venetians setting fire to Pera and theGenoeseretaliatingbymassacringlargenumbersofthemintheirquarterofthecity.In the twelfth and thirteen centuries, the expansion of Italian business interests in the Levant ran

parallel toarapidgrowthofMuslimtradeandsettlementontheMalabarcoast.66TheLevantcottontradewasdominatedbytheItalians,sothatbythelatefifteenthandsixteenthcenturies“inpeakyearsthe total volume ofVenetian cotton imports from all sources could exceed 4,000 tons.”67They hadsubstantial interests in theLevantinesugar industry, forexample, in thevillagesaroundTyrewherethemostimportantsugarplantationsoftheSyro-PalestiniancoastpassedintoVenetianhandsin1123(betweenthefirstandsecondCrusades).68WiththefallofAcrein1291,Venetiansugarinterestswererelocated to the islands. In Cyprus in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Corners, apowerfulVenetianfamily,builtathrivingenterpriseinsugar.69In1183theSpanishtravelerIbnJubayrsawinnumerableloadsofpepperbeingshippedtotheSudaneseportofAydhabandtransportedfromthere in numerous caravans.70 Barely seven years later, the value of goods exported by ChristianmerchantstradingthroughtheNileportswasestimatedtobe“wellover100,000dinars,”andthisatatime of considerable political tensions (Saladin had captured Jerusalem in 1187).71 The number ofmerchantsfromthewesttradinginAlexandriain1216was(asInotedearlier)putatthreethousandbythehistorianal-Maqrizi.72Inca.1260Venetiansourcesindicate“largecottonshipmentsfromAcre.”73

CandiainVenetian-controlledCretebecameamajorspicemarketintheearlyfourteenthcentury.ThesugarandcottonexportedtherefromAlexandriawerereexportedtoItalyinVenetiangalleys.74BythemiddleofthecenturythepapersoftheVenetiannotaryBrescianoreflectmassiveimportsofItalianandFlemish textiles intoCandia, something thatwasdoubtless trueofotherVenetiancolonies.75By theendofthecenturythevolumeofItalianbusinesshadincreaseddramatically.Investmentscouldrunashighas450,000dinarswiththeVenetiansinthe1390s,andbetween200,000and300,000dinarseveryyear between 1394 and 1400 in Genoa’s case. (The Catalans came third with an annual averageca.200,000.)76 And by the fifteenth centurywhen, as Braudel says, “Venicewas unquestionably thevigorousheartoftheMediterranean,”77 thanks largelyto its tradewiththeLevant,merchantgalleys

withgoodsworthonemillionducatsplus400,000incashweresailingfromVeniceforAlexandriaandBeirut.78

TheLevanttradewasthemiddlesegmentofacircuitthatextendedtotheportsofMalabarinSouthIndia and beyond them into Southeast Asia. Here the great counterpart to the crusading period’s“creation of numerous Latin trading colonies in the Near East with their own consuls, hostels,warehouses,marketplaces,andchurches”79wastheexpansionofIslam,which,similarly,beginsinthetwelfthcenturyandreachesitscommercialzenithinthefifteenth.TheoldestreliablydatablemosqueontheMalabarcoastwasfoundedin1124,atMadayi.80Bytheendof the thirteenthcenturyMuslimsettlementswerewellestablishedboth thereandon theCoromandelcoast,81 reflectinganexpansionacross theentirewesternhalfof the IndianOcean.Even in theearly thirteenthcentury, ithasbeenclaimed, the East African coast was largely Islamic,82 and certainly by the end of the century theevidence from Kilwa implies a “very large Muslim resident population.”83 By ca.1331 Ibn Battutadescribes a “vast network ofMuslims all around the periphery of the IndianOcean.”84ThesewereessentiallycommercialnetworksdrawnfrommanydifferentpartsoftheNearEast.Calicut’sMuslimswho tendered their allegiance to the Rasulid sultan al-Ashraf II in 1393 reflected a multiplicity ofgeographicorigins,85 and thesame is suggested inBarbosa’s report thatby theseconddecadeof thesixteenthcenturythesecosmopolitanmerchants“departedtotheirownlandsabandoningIndiaanditstrade,”86 following thedramatic andviolentway inwhich thePortuguesemade their entry into theIndianOceantradewithVascodaGamainsistingontheexpulsionoftheMuslimsfromCalicutandbombardingthetownwhenitsrulerrefused.87

ThatthecrushingoftheVenetianspicemonopolywasthepremeditatedgoalofPortugal’smaritimeexpansion in the fifteenth century can, of course, be ruled out. The strategy of Atlantic expansionevolvedonlygradually.88Therewas,asLuísFilipeThomazhasargued,nocoherent imperialprojecttill the last twodecades of the fifteenth century andwhat he calls the “calculated imperialism”of amodelthatwas“imperial,globalizing,andstate-driven.”89FromthereignofDomFerdinand(1367–83),Portugueseroyalpowerhadfounditsstrongestsupportinthepopulationoftheports,90wherethePortuguesemerchantclassgrewinstrength.91But inthepartnershipthatevolvedoverthefollowingcentury between themonarchy and private capital, the state can scarcely be described as a passiveagent of the latter. Financially, it depended on the resources of big Lisbon merchants like FernãoGomesca.1469and, later,ofpowerful syndicatesofGermanandItalianbusinessmen,but itwas thecrownthatbothdroveandmonitoredtheprocess,and(justasimportant)therewasneverany“clear-cut demarcation between the finances of the State and its commercial capital.”92 All commercialcapitalisms of the sixteenth to eighteenth centurieswould come to be inextricably bound upwith thestate,butinPortugal’scasetherelationshipwaspositedasimmediate.Itwasthecrownthatwouldactas amerchant companyon thewest coast of India, “setting up feitorias (trading posts, factories) invariouskeyports,buyinguppepper,spicesandotherpreciouscommodities,whichtheywouldshiptoEuropeandsellthereatahugeprofit.”93

ThePortuguese, of course,were quite clearwho their competitorswere.Trying to convince themembers of his council of the need to capture and retainMalacca, Albuquerque wrote, “Since wegainedcontroloftheMalabarpeppertrade,CairohasnotreceivedanyexceptwhattheMoslemshavebeenabletotakefromthisregion(theStraits)...Iamverysurethat,ifthisMalaccatradeistakenoutoftheirhands,CairoandMeccawillbecompletelylostandnospiceswillgototheVenetiansexceptthosethat they go to Portugal to buy.”94 The target here, in 1511, was the entire Red Sea route, a circuitdominated by a sort of massive joint venture between Venetian capital, Cairo merchants, and thesuppliers in Calicut. But moving back along the chain, the majority of his captains agreed withAlbuquerque,itwasessentialto“takethecityofMalacca,toexpeltheMoslems,andtobuildafortressthere.”95 Portugal’s “commercial and religious war against Islam”96 occupied the greater part of acenturyandwasnevercompletelysuccessful,butinCalicuttheeffectsofherintrusionwerefeltalmostimmediately.Alreadyby1507onetraveler, theItalianLudovicodiVarthema,waswriting,“CalicutwasruinedbytheKingofPortugal,forthemerchantswhousedtocometherewerenotthere,neitherdidtheycome.”97ItwasCochinthatbecamePortugal’seconomicbaseintheregionandthebulkofPortuguesepepper fromMalabarwasexported from there.98By1512Albuquerquewas tellingKingManuelthatthenetvalueofshipmentsfromIndiawasnow“worthamillioncruzados.”99 Ifso, theselevels were never subsequently sustained. The majority of actual cultivators were St. ThomasChristians.100 Pepper was sold to the Portuguese factory in Cochin by merchants from theircommunityandbyCochinJews.101Apparently,thekinghadaskedofficialstodealwithChristianandHindu traders (Nairs were used as brokers) “and to keep the Muslim merchants away from tradeactivities.”102 Dom Manuel’s “royal capitalism”103 was a curious mixture of mercantilism andmessianism104 where hardheaded business decisions and a Mediterranean-style economic war werecloakedinreligiouszealandagreatdealofbothignoranceandbigotry.Thehabitualuseofforceasanacceptablepartofthecompetitionbetweensubstantialblocsofcapitalwas now, for the first time in the history of either sea, transposed from a theatre where it hadflourished for centuries (sinceVenice’s devastating attack onComacchio in 932, say) to the IndianOcean, where its major targets were the powerfulMuslim commercial networks that straddled theentireoceanfromKilwaandSofalainEastAfricatoSumatraandthesouthernPhilippines.InCochinitselftheprincipalmerchantsoftheport(MuslimconvertsoftheMarakkarfamily)relocatedtoCalicutby the 1520s, forced out by what one historian calls an “atmosphere of coercion and violence.”105

AhmadZaynal-Din’slatesixteenth-centuryhistory,Tuhfatal-mujahidin,hasgraphicdescriptionsoftheviolenceinflictedonMalabar’sMuslimcommunities.Hewritesoftheburningofthejami‘masjidinCalicut in 1510, the earlier demolition of the Cochin mosque, the seizure of ships, destruction ofproperty,andsoon.TherewasalsotherepeatedpersonalhumiliationMuslimsweresubjectedto,andofcoursebloodshed.Zaynal-Dinhadanacutesenseofthehistoryofhisownlifetime,knowingthattheadventofthePortuguesehadbeenruinousfortheprosperityofMuslimcommerceintheIndianOcean.ThePortuguese,hewrites,hadsoughtto“secureforthemselvesamonopolyofthistrade”(thespicetrade).106Theyhadestablishedthemselves“inthegreaterpartoftheseaportsofthispartofthe

world.”107 They had even “found their way to the Chinese empire, carrying on trade in all theintermediate and other ports, in all ofwhich the commercial interests of theMuslims have been inconsequenceconsignedtoruin.”ThePortuguese“rendereditimpossiblethatanyothersshouldcompetewiththem”inthetradestheysoughttodominate.108TheMuslimsofMalabarhadseenthebulkoftheirinternationalcommercemassivelydisruptedandwereleftonlywiththecoastingtradeofIndia.Theyhadbecome“impoverishedandweakandpowerless.”109

Thereisafascinatingreferenceinthesepassagestoaself-financingmodelthatbecamecharacteristicnotonlyofPortugal’s tradeinAsianwatersbut,evenmorecrucially,ofthebetter-organizedDutchexpansion that would later replace it in the seventeenth century. The Portuguese monarchy waschronicallyshortofcashandsoughttosustaintheEuropeansideofitsmonopolyofthespicemarketby involving thebiggestGermanand Italiancapitalists as investorsandencouraginggovernors likeAlbuquerque to finance the royal share of purchases from profits generated by Portuguese tradingwithin Asianmarkets.110 At the Malabar end, there was never any real monopoly, since exports toLisbonneverseemtohaveexceededabout40percentofthetotaloutputofpepperevenintheearlysixteenth century and fell dramatically by the endof the century,whenFranciscodaCosta reliablyestimated that of a total production of 258,000 quintals, exports to Portugalwere ameagre twentythousandtothirtythousandquintals.111In1587FerdinandCron,CochinagentoftheFuggers,wrotethatalthoughca.threehundredthousandquintalsofpepperwereproducedannuallyinsouthernIndia,onlyaverylittleofthiscameintothehandsofthecontractorstobetakentoEurope.112Thomazhasargued that “Portuguese commerce in the sixteenth centurydevelopedpredominantly in the IndianOcean,overanetworkofshortandmediumrangerouteswhichactuallyencompassedalmosteverycoastofAsia...ThemainreasonwhichdrovethePortuguesetoapplythemselvestothelocaltradeseemsto be that theCape route to Portugalwas often a loser.”113 In short, Portugal’s Asian trade cross-subsidizedthetradetoLisbon,sinceoverheadsweresohighinthelatter.Pepperwasgrownon literally thousandsofgardens inMalabar.114ThePortuguese simplydidnothavethelogisticalset-uptodealwithproducersdirectlyandcertainlyhadnowayofcontrollingtheproducers.115Therefore, price domination had to be enforced through agreementswith the ruler ofCochinandotherlocalrulers.AlowfixedpricewasvitaltothewholeenterpriseaskingDomManuelhadconceivedthisinitially.In1503thepriceofabharofpepper(thatis,ofabatchofca.166kg)wasfixedatlessthanhalfthemarketpriceprevailinginCalicutthreeyearsearlier.116Priceswouldremainfixed for decades.ButMalabar pepperwas a highly competitivemarketwith over a dozen regionalcenterswheremerchantsbought theproducewholesale.Competitionwas fierce in thosemarkets.117

This accounts for the purely theoretical nature of the Portuguese monopoly, since, as Cesare deFedericinoted,probablyinthe1570s,thebulkofgood-qualitypepperwasbeingshippedtotheRedSeabecausemerchantsconnectedwiththattradepaidmoreandgotabetterqualityofproduce,“cleaneand dry and better conditioned.”118 This is the essential reason behind the resilience of theMediterraneanroutethatBraudelconstantlydrewattentionto.119

If the “royal capitalism” of the early sixteenth century was eventually abandoned for a “morestraightforwardsemi-Absolutistconceptionofthestate’srelationshiptotrade,”120Portuguesecolonialenterprise,or theAsianthalassocracythat formeditscore,becameevenstrongerasamagnet foranagglomeration of capitalist interests that is probably best described in Henry Bernstein’s idea of“classes of capital.”At the topwere the biggestGerman and Italian capitalist houses (theWelsers,Fuggers, Höchstetters, Affaitadi, Bartolomeo Marchionni, Giovanni Rovelasca) who combined inpowerful syndicates to finance the actual expeditions to India, such as theone in 1505 inwhich theWelsershadaverysubstantial investmentoftwentythousandcruzados,oragreedtohandlesales inEurope,with pledges to buy a stipulated quantity of pepper at an agreed price. Both arrangementswerefraughtwithtensionsboundupwiththevolatilityofthismarket,withthecrownquitecapableofreneging on contracts. Florentine merchants were well-entrenched in Lisbon and many of them“financedandjoinedthePortugueseontheearliestventurestotheIndiesduringthefirstquarterofthesixteenthcentury.”121TheSouthGermancommercialhouseshadstrongorganizationalstructuresandworked through cartel arrangements with one another.122 They “amassed capital far beyond thecapability of any Florentine merchant-banker,”123 so that even at this rarefied level there wereinterestingdifferences.Considerablybelowthesegiantcapitalistswere the richercasadosofCochin,settlers ofPortuguese origin,who at various times acted as financiers to theEstado and dominatedCochin’s coastal trade.124 Between 1570 and 1600 the casados, “a powerful mercantile group withconsiderablecapitalresources,”“virtuallyturnedCochinintooneofthebiggestentrepôtsofAsia.”125

Their interests extended all over the Indian Ocean.126 However, from the second decade of theseventeenthcentury,therewasamassexodusofcasadotradersfromCochintotheoppositecoast,asthe latterpartof the sixteenthcentury sawdwindling suppliesofpepper thanks tomassdisaffectionamongSt.ThomasChristianswhohadseentheirbishoparrestedtwice(anddieinRomein1569)and“beguntocooperatewiththetradersoftheghatroute”inretaliation.127Finally,Malabar’sownnativeMuslims, theMappilas,were among the“largest financiersofPortugal’s imperial project inAsia”128

andweredoubtlessactiveinmuchofthetradethatescapedPortuguesecontrol, thevastamountsofpepperthatcrossedtheghatstomakeitswaytotheeastcoast,fromwhereitwaswidelyexported.Ineconomicterms,thefragilebasisonwhichPortugal’sarmedthalassocracyrestedwasobvioustomembersof its élite. In 1563 theOttomansoffered thePortuguese a free trade agreement,with thelatterbeinggiventherightto“establishtradinghousesinBasra,Cairo,andAlexandriaandtotradefreely in all theOttoman-controlled ports of both thePersianGulf and theRedSea,” in return forsimilar freedoms for Ottoman merchants to trade throughout the Indian Ocean, with the right toestablishcommercialagenciesoftheirown“inSind,Cambay,Dabul,Calicut,andanyotherporttheydesired.”129 Against this quite remarkable proposal one fidalgo is supposed to have argued, “if theTurkswereallowedtotravelfreelytoIndia,andestablishfactors,andtradeinmerchandisewherevertheywished,notonlywouldYourMajesty’sownprofitssuffergreatly,buttherestofuswouldbeleftcompletelyemptyhanded,becauseallofthebusiness[handledbythePortuguese]wouldimmediatelyfalltotheTurks.”TherewasaclearreferenceheretoPortugueseprivatecapital.Hewentontosay,“As

for [the state monopoly in] pepper and other controlled spices, this would also be threatened byallowing theTurks toestablish factors in India.Evennow,when theyhavenot beenallowed to openlycompete against the Portuguese, it is known that they conduct a trade in secret, carrying spices toHormuz,toBasra,andtoBengal,Pegu,China,andotherlands,andespeciallytotheirownmarkets,despite the great risks involved. Thus, [if allowed to operate freely, their ties with] local Muslimswould leave them even better informed and better organized, such that bymeans of the [Red Sea andPersianGulf]theycouldsendasmuch[pepper]astheywanted,andbecomemastersofthelion’sshareofthetradeinspices.”130Hereitwasanentrenchednetworkoftradingcommunitiesthatwasseenasthebiggestpotential“competitiveadvantage”theOttomanswouldhaveifcommercewascompletelyfree,thatis,notdeterredbythepermanentthreatandactualuseofviolencefromthePortugueseside.131

InhisgreatHistoryof Italy,FrancescoGuicciardini sawPortugal’sbreakingof theVenetian spicemonopolyas“themostmemorablethingthathashappenedintheworldformanycenturies.”132Thiswaswrittenlateinthe1530sandwasaremarkablyaccurateassessment,notonlybecausecommercialpositions that Venice had built up over centuries were (momentarily) plunged into depression anddrasticallyaffectedbythenewtraderegime,133butmoreobviouslybecausePortugal’sopeningoftheAtlanticreconfiguredthewholeshapeofcommercialcapitalismastheworldhadknownittillthen.ItopenedthewayforanewcapitalismwhichwouldsoonbereflectedinthecommercialdominanceoftheDutchintheseventeenthcenturyaswellasEngland’sexpansioninthesamecentury.In1519theVenetianswereperfectlyawareofPortugal’sdevastatingimpactontheLevantpeppertrade,andforthenexttenyearstheyweretotallyatthemercyofthePortugueseasglobalsuppliesofpepperwerecornered by the latter.134 But Braudel rightly insisted that Venice remained a formidable economicforcethroughoutthesixteenthcentury.Aslateas1585therewerestillsomefourthousandVenetianfamilies“scattered throughout thecities and landsof Islam”as farawayasHormuz.135Norwas theRedSearouteevercompletelystifled.In1560thePortugueseambassadoratRomereceivedreportsthatenormousquantitiesofpepperandspicewerearrivingatAlexandria.136In1593theFuggersweresimilarly told that Alexandria was supplying Venice with as much pepper as Lisbon received.137

However,bytheseconddecadeoftheseventeenthcenturyVenice’sprimacyintheMediterraneanwasfinally over.138 The Italian crisis of the seventeenth century has been characterized as a “gradualintroversionofthenorthernItalianbourgeoisie,”a“progressiveclosuretotheworldbeyondItaly.”139

Ifso,Guicciardini’sjudgementwasevenmoreprophetic.

DUTCHPRIMACYThefallofAntwerpinAugust1585triggeredavastexodusofrefugeesfromthesouthernprovincesofthe Netherlands to the North, with major consequences for Amsterdam and Dutch commerce.Amsterdam’s prosperity after 1600was built by émigrés fromAntwerp.140Over half theDutchEastIndia Company/Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC’s starting capital of 6.42 millionguilders was subscribed in Amsterdam, but among Amsterdam investors the biggest individualinvestments were made by men like Isaac le Maire and Balthasar Coymans, all émigrés from

Antwerp.141TheywereWalloonorFlemishexilesandprovidedcloseto40percentoftheCompany’stotalcapital.142Itwastheir“vastwealthandinternationalconnections”143thatenabledHolland’srapidbreakthroughintotherichtradesoftheMediterraneanandAsia.TheseventeenthcenturywasdominatedbythecompetitionbetweenEnglishandDutchcapital.Thetrajectory ofDutch capitalism runs from its rapid expansion in the early seventeenth century to itsdecline in thesecondquarterof theeighteenthcentury,withapeak in thedecadesaround1647–72,describedbyJonathanIsraelasthezenithoftheRepublic’s“world-tradeprimacy.”144DutchtradewithAsiahadfaroutstrippedthatofthePortuguesepossiblyasearlyas1601.145TheclashwithEnglandformastery of the Mediterranean trade exploded in the late 1640s, prompting the first of several“Navigation Acts” by which English capital sought to curb Dutch dominance. In 1661 ColbertassumedthedirectionofcommercialaffairsinFrance,andbythelateseventeenthcenturytheFrenchhad emerged as amajor commercial power,146 with the last quarter of the century dominated by aconfrontationbetweenthemandtheDutch.147The1680swasalsowhentheVOCwasatthepeakofitssuccessasanAsianpower.148

ThecrushingItaliansupremacyofthetwelfthtofifteenthcenturieshadencapsulatedacapitalismofnetworks,theonlykindindigenoustotheMediterraneancountriesandthewiderworldofIslam.Thenew capitalism of the seventeenth century was driven, in contrast, by joint-stock companies thatemergedfromthemaritimefringeofnorthwesternEuropeandenjoyedthestrongbackingofthestate(as, indeed, Venetian capital had). They were capitalist enterprises of a higher power than theimperfect“royal capitalisms”of Iberia,but like them they retainedapublicor semi-public characterthatembodiedaquasi-formaldelegationofsovereigntythatmadethemformidablecompetitors.149ThemainEastIndiaCompanies(English,Dutch,andFrench)were themostpowerfulof the joint-stockcompanies in the seventeenthandeighteenthcenturies, and thecompetitionbetween themwas suchthatDavidHume,inanessaypublishedin1742,couldfamouslysay,“Tradewasneveresteemedanaffairofstatetillthelastcentury.”150Thehead-onclashbetweentheEnglishandtheDutchgeneratedthedoctrine thatcame tobecalled“jealousyof trade.”151Toward theendof theeighteenthcenturyAdamSmithagreedwithHumethattradehadchangedEuropeanpoliticsintheseventeenthcentury.InWealthofNationsherefersto“mercantilejealousy”which“inflames,andisitselfinflamedbytheviolenceofnationalanimosity.”152Stateandcapitalnowhadaunifying“national”interestinsecuringorretainingcommercialdominance.In“OftheJealousyofTrade”(1752)Humewrote“Nothingismoreusual,amongstateswhichhavemadesomeadvancesincommerce,than...toconsideralltradingstatesastheirrivals.”153InthelatenineteenthcenturyGustavvonSchmollerexpressedthismoreforcefully.“Commercial competition, even in timesnominallyofpeace,degenerated intoa stateofundeclaredhostility: it plungednations intoonewar after another, andgave allwars a turn in thedirectionoftrade,industry,andcolonialgain....”154

To JosiahChildwho became governor of the English East IndiaCompany in 1681, the essentialcharacteristicoftheDutchmodelwasitspeculiarintegrationofstateandcapital.AtthetopofChild’slistofreasonsforDutcheconomicsuccess“wasthefactthatDutchCouncilsofState,thelaw-making

bodies,werecomposedof tradingmerchantswhohad livedabroadmostof their livesandwhohadgreatpractical and theoreticalknowledgeof commercialmatters.”155 InObservationsupon theUnitedProvincesoftheNetherlands(1673),SirWilliamTemplewouldlikewisenotethisparticularfeatureoftheDutchRepublic;amongitsstrengths,heclaims,was“[a]Governmentmanag’deitherbymenthattrade,orwhoseFamilieshaverisenbyit,orwhohavethemselvessomeInterestgoinginothermen’sTraffique, or who are born and bred in Towns, The soul and beeing whereof consists wholly intrade.”156 In other words, the VOC and its predecessor companies “typified the high degree ofinteraction of ruling oligarchywith private enterprisewhich characterizedmuch, if notmost, ofDutchoverseascommerce.”157TheVOCwas“thecreationof theDutchstateasmuchasof themerchantswhohadactuallyopeneduptheEastIndiatraffic,”158and,likeitslater,Atlantic,counterpart,theWestIndiaCompany,“intimately entwined”with the country’s “regentoligarchy.”159 In short, thenexusbetweenstateandcommercial capitalwasaltogethermoredirecthere thananythingreflected in the“strongsocialandcommercialtiesbetweenthemerchantsandfinanciersoftheCityofLondonandtheBritishstateandaristocracy”160thatwerecoevalwithit.The sheer efficiency of Dutch capital stemmed from the remarkable efficiency of its shippingindustry,themassiveconcentrationofcapitalinAmsterdam’sexchange-bank,establishedin1609(oneearlyeighteenth-centuryestimateputthebank’sholdingsataroundthreehundredmillionguilders),161

thetechnicalsophisticationandflexibilityoftheDutchfine-clothindustry,162andthe“sophisticationofDutch methods and technology”163 more generally. But beyond these factors, all essential, was acommercialstrategydefinedbyitssingle-mindedconcentrationontherichtradesofEuropeandAsia,byfar-reachingverticalintegrationintosource-marketsand,moststrikingly,bythesheerscaleofitsAsiantradenetwork164(unmatchedbytheEnglish)165andthewaytheVOCwasabletointegrate itslocal,inter-Asiantradeintoalargelyself-containedifexpandingcirculationofcapitalthatminimizedtheneedforpaymentsinsilver.166Inmostways,itwastheAsianpartofthisstrategythatshowedjusthowmuchtheDutchentrepôtwasharnessedtotheactualmachineryoftheDutchstate,167sinceDutchcommerceinAsiawas“heavilyarmed”fromtheoutset.168By1623,theDutchhadninetyshipsintheEastIndiesandtwothousandregulartroopspostedintwentyforts!169

Ralph Davis explained why Dutch shipping was more efficient. Before the seventeenth centuryDutch shipbuilders did not have to look out for the defensibility of their ships but simply carryingcapacity and costofoperation. “They evolvedhull forms thatmaximised cargo space in relation tooveralldimensions.”Becausetheywereflat-bottomed,“theydrawenotsoemuchwaterasourshipsdo,”wrotetheEnglishexplorerGeorgeWaymouthin1609,“...andthereforemusthavelessMasts,Sayles,TacklingandAnchors,thanourshave;andarethereforeabletosaylewithonethirdpartofmenlessthanours,ortherabouts.”“Thus,bytheadvantagetheygaynofus inburden,andbythechargethey save in marriners wages, and victuals, they are able to carry their fraight better cheap thanwee.”170

WithinEuropeandlargepartsoftheMediterranean,barterwaswidelyusedasamercantilestrategybecauseitwasalways“moreprofitabletotraderstoexportgoodsratherthanmoney.”171However,in

Asia the crucial constraint on European trade, as the Portuguese rapidly discovered, was Europe’s“inabilitytosupplywesternproductsatpricesthatwouldgeneratealargeenoughdemand”toprovidethenecessary revenue for thepurchaseofAsiangoods.“Theonlymajor item thatEuropewas inaposition to provideAsia [with]was preciousmetals.”172 (Even down to the end of the seventeenthcentury, “treasure” accounted for 70 to 90 percent of the English East India Company’s totalexports.)173 The resurgence of economic conflict between Spain and the Dutch in 1621 and theembargo on Dutch shipping in Iberian ports174 were therefore potentially disastrous to continuedDutch expansion in Asia, because they choked the transfer of Spanish American bullion to theNetherlands and created an endemic shortage of specie there; the VOC in particular required “animmense regular input of bullion to settle its balances in the East Indies.”175 Instead of seekinginfusionsofcapitalfromAmsterdam,theVOC’sgovernor-generalatBatavia,JanPieterszoonCoen,evolvedacommercialstrategyor“masterplan”thatencouragedtheDutchtoparticipateextensivelyinthetradeoftheIndianOcean.176NootherEuropeancommercialpowerdidthisonquitethesamescaleor with the sophistication and ruthlessness demonstrated by the Dutch through most of theseventeenth century.With their precocious base inTaiwan, they commanded amajor share of theNagasaki trade(basically,anexchangeofChinesesilkyarnforJapanesesilver),whichmeant thatalarge part of theirAsian operations could be financedwith Japanese silver and, to a lesser degree,Chinesegold.“In1652,forexample,theVOCexportedfromNagasaki1,555,850guilders(equivalentto17,022kgs.)ofJapanesesilver”ofwhichlessthan9percentarrivedattheCompany’sheadquartersinBatavia,theremainderendingupinChina.177

YetbullionstockswereneverenoughtoresolvetheproblemoffinancingcommercialaccumulationinAsianmarkets, and theVOCwould eventually create a vast continental systemof barterwhich,reducedtoitssimplestelements,embodiedanexchangeofIndonesianspicesforIndiantextiles.Thisisthesenseinwhich“thesalesofspicesformedthebasisofCompanyexpansioninotherspheresoftradeinAsia”178andthereasonwhythedirectorscouldstatein1648,“Thecountrytradeandtheprofitfromitare thesoulof theCompanywhichmustbe lookedaftercarefully.”179TheCompanybecameanAsiantraderonalargescale,180withmajorpositionsatonetimeoranotherineverythingfromChinesesugarandJapanesesilvertoJapanesecopper,spicesfromtheArchipelago,indigofromBayanaandGujarat,cotton cloth from theCoromandel, pepper fromMalabar, cinnamon fromCeylon, raw silk,DaccamuslinsandopiumfromBengal,silkfromPersia,coffeefromMocha,andsoon.In1619whenCoensent his blueprint of the Asian trade to the directors in Amsterdam, the Company already had a“permanentlycirculatingcapital”ofbetweenƒ2.5andƒ3.5millionintheEastIndiesandCoenwantedmore.181After1647theresumedflowofSpanishsilvertoAmsterdamreversedthedeclineofbullionremittancestotheeast,182andbythemiddleofthecenturytheEastIndiafleetwasreturninghomewithcargoesworthbetweenfifteenandtwentymillionguilders,roughlyequivalenttothecombinedvalueof theCadiz and Smyrna fleets!183 By 1673 SirWilliamTemplewould refer to the “vastness of theStock turn’dwholly to thatTrade”and to theVOC“engrossing thewholeCommerceof theEast-Indies.”184

RenewedaccesstoSpanishsilverinthelate1640sandaboominLeiden’stextileindustrytriggeredbyconversiontotheexpensivefabricsknownascamletsandlakenmeantrapidDutchdominationofMediterraneanmarkets,185withTurkeynowabsorbingathirdofLeiden’soutput.FortheEnglishthisspelledasuddencrisisas“massivequantitiesoffinegoodsbegantobeloadedontoDutchvesselsatLivornofortheEnglishaswellasfortheDutchmarket.”186Itwasthis“suddenmaritimecrisis”thatformedthe“backgroundofthefirstthoroughlyworkedoutpieceofEnglishprotectivelegislation—theNavigationActof1651—andoftheFirstAnglo-DutchWar.”187Theordinanceof1651establishedamodel for the tighterNavigationAct of 1660,which “remained at the heart of Englishmaritimepolicyfornearlytwocenturies,”providingthat“allgoodsimportedtoEnglandshouldcomedirectlyfromtheirplaceofproduction(thuseliminatingtheDutchentrepot)”andthat“noforeign(i.e.Dutch)shipsshouldtradewithEnglishcolonies.”188Theyearsfrom1651to1672havebeendescribedas“thepeak ofAnglo-Dutch commercial rivalry.”189 However, from themid-1660sColbert’smercantilismbecame the pivot of a new struggle for Mediterranean dominance, this time between France andHolland, with the French tariffs of 1667 unleashing a commercial war in which Colbert’s “clearobjectivewastocapturetherichtrades,”wrestingcontrolfromtheDutch.190Bythe1690stheFrenchcouldmake rapid inroads into theOttomanmarket, andby1701were sellingmore fine cloth therethantheDutch.191TheDutchhaddominatedSmyrnaformostoftheseventeenthcentury.192Aslateas1680silverremittancestotheLevantwererunningatwellovertwomillionguildersayear.193In1675themajorityofEuropeansinSmyrnawerereportedtobeDutch.194However,between1688and1719thenumberofDutchmerchanthousestherefelldrasticallyfromca.twenty-fivetoonlysix,195clearingthewayfortheoverwhelmingFrenchdominationthatcharacterizedtheLevantforthegreaterpartofthe eighteenth century. Richelieu and Colbert reflected ideas that overtly aligned the interests ofcommercial capital to those of the state. In the words of the French diplomat Nicolas Mesnager,Richelieu“didnotfindanymeansmoreeffectivetoincreasethepowerofthekingandthewealthofthestatethantoincreasenavigationandcommerce.”196

Much of the précis above is based on Jonathan Israel’s tightly-argued history of the Dutchcommercial system,which ends by suggesting that “the basic reason for the decisive decline of theDutchworld-tradingsysteminthe1720sand1730swasthewaveofnew-styleindustrialmercantilismwhichsweptpracticallytheentirecontinentfromaround1720.”197A“comprehensiveinterventionism”took hold of northern Europe, with fatal consequences forDutch exportmarkets and industries.198

Within Europe, the Dutch rich trades were “devastated” during those decades, and in India theEnglishEastIndiaCompany“haddecisivelyovertakentheDutch”inmostpartsofthecountrywherethey were present by 1740.199 The essential vitality of the seventeenth-century entrepôt had beenlargelydestroyedbythemiddleoftheeighteenthcentury.200

ENGLAND’SRISETODOMINANCEIn England the “conscious use of state power for commercial ends”201 first came to the fore in therevolutionary decades in themiddle of the seventeenth century, roughly a whole century after the

Elizabethancommercialexpansionbegan.Thatexpansion,asBrennershowed,wasdrivenbytherapidgrowth of the import trades and had nothing to dowith English clothmerchants looking for newmarkets.202 The remarkable feature of the import trades of the late sixteenth century is theirinterlocking structure, with the same groups of entrepreneurs dominating the various companiesfloated between 1573 and 1592.203 English overseas commerce was thus highly concentrated and ofcourse remained so as long as it was organized as a cluster of commercial monopolies ruled by ahandful of big London merchants. A “close-knit group of Venice Company merchants withwidespreadoperations”helpedorganizetheLevantCompanyin1592,andtheEastIndiaCompanyinturn,whenitwasfoundedin1599,“wasdominatedbytheLevantCompanymerchants.”Sevenoftheoriginal fifteendirectorswereLevantCompanymerchants.204“LevantCompanymembersprovidedbetweenone-fourthandone-thirdofthetotalfundinvestedinthefirst,third,andfourthjointstocks”oftheEastIndiaCompany.205By1630thetotalcombinedvalueofItalian,Levantine,andEastIndianimports was £527,000, in 1634 £689,000, and in 1669 £1,208,000, showing where the dynamism ofEngland’s trade lay formuchof the first half of the seventeenth century into the earlyyears of theRestoration.Nothingbetterdemonstratesthedominanceoftheimporttrades(inbothEnglandandtheNetherlands)throughouttheseventeenthcenturythanthefactthatexportswereverylargelyafunctionof the need to finance these substantial and rising levels of imports; for example,Englishmerchantimporters“increasedtheirclothexportsinordertopayforincreasedimports,andtheygenerallyfellfarbehind.”206ItwasthisthatcausedmajorconcernaboutthebalanceoftradeinEngland.The import boom of the second quarter of the seventeenth century207 fueled a steady increase in

reexportsfromthe1630sonwards.208Infact,thegrowthofareexporttradewasthechiefinnovationofthelaterStuartperiod209andboundupbothwiththemonopolycreatedbytheNavigationActsaswellasthenewmassproductionindustrieslinkedtothecolonialtradesinplantationproduce.210Betweenthemimportsandreexportssustainedanew,giganticwaveofexpansionofEnglishmerchantshipping,especiallyintheyears1660–89.211NotonlydidtheLevanttraderankhighintheoverseascommerceofRestorationLondon,212but thesameyearssawanear-doublingofEngland’splantationtonnage(thedeadweight tonnage of this shipping sector). 213 Tobacco imports had registered a fivefold increasebetween1620and1640,leadingthewaytosugar.214London’ssugarimportstrebledbetweenthe1660sand1680s,withsixhundredimportersactiveinthetradein1686.215Inthesameyeartherewere1,283merchants trading to the West Indies, of whom twenty-eight, with turnover exceeding £10,000,accountedforjustover50percentoftotalimportsbyvalue.216Theywereamongthebiggestcolonialmerchantsandcould“accumulatesufficientcapitaltodiversifyinvestmentaroundtheircorebusinessinto ship-owning, joint-stocks, insurance, wharf-leases, and industry.”217 London accounted for 80percent of colonial imports and 85 percent of all reexports ca.1700, and in the last decades of theseventeenth century “England established a larger stake in the Atlantic than any other country inNorthern Europe.”218 Tobacco, sugar, and Indian calicoes accounted for the bulk of England’sreexportsandprefiguredthemassmarketsoftheeighteenthcentury.219By1700theEnglishplantersin

Barbados, Jamaica, and theLeewardswere supplying close to half the sugar consumed inWesternEurope.220

Ofthe170LondonmerchantsclassifiedbyZahediehas“bigcolonialmerchants,”two-thirdsaresaidtohavehada“substantial trade in theCaribbean.”221Thatwouldmake around 110merchantswithsubstantialstakes,whichmakestheAtlantictradesvastlymoreaccessiblethananyofthetradestotheeast,Levantine, orEast Indian.By its charter of 1592, theLevantCompanywas restricted to fifty-threepersons,andrecruitmenttotheLevantinetraderequiredbothwealthandfamilyconnections.222

The richest and most active traders were, in Brenner’s words, “joined in a ramified network ofinterlocking familyrelationships, themembersofwhichcontrolledamajorshareof the trade.”223 IntheEast IndiaCompany, the largestof the joint-stockventures, twenty-fourdirectors“claimed thatthey held more stock than four hundred of the generality.”224 Again, it is useful to conceptualizeLondon’scommercialcapital intermsof“classesofcapital,”withtheeastward-tradingcombinethatformedtheheartofLondon’scommercialestablishment225formingasubstantiallymorepowerfullayerthan the “middling stratum” fromwhich the vastmajority of colonialmerchants derived.226On theother hand, in terms of commercial concentration, the two trade sectors were not vastly different.During 1627–1635,when the trade to the Levant ran between £200,000 and £300,000 a year, sometwenty-four Levant Company merchants controlled 54 percent of the trade,227 which is notdramaticallyhigherthanthe50percentsharecontrolledbythebiggesttwenty-eightmerchantstradingto theWest Indieswhowerementionedpreviously.Regardlessofwhether tradeswere reservedoropen,economicconcentrationworkedinthesameway.IntheMediterraneanintheearlypartoftheseventeenthcenturyEngland’smaincommercialrivals,theVenetiansandtheFrench,bothlostgroundrapidly.TheVenetianswere“undersoldanddrivenoffthe stage,” their agents complainingof the lowpriceof the cloth sent out by theEnglish.228 By the1620sLivornohademergedastheprimecommercialbaseforEngland’stradewithsouthernItalyandthe Levant. “In 1629,”Wood reports, “therewas said to be fourmillion crownsworth of EnglishgoodslyingonthequaysofLeghorn(Livorno).”229InTheTreasureofTrafficke(1641)LewisRobertsnoted thatamillionducats incashwereexported fromLivornoannually.230The“mostmodernandfullyequippedportintheMediterranean,”231itplayedacruciallyimportantpartintheLevanttradeasa centerwhereEnglish exports and reexports could be converted into currency.232 That the LevantCompanycouldrepeatedlyattacktheEastIndiaCompanyforitsexportofbulliontoIndiasuggeststhat the Levant trade itself was largely a barter trade, that is, one where the bulk of imports wasfinancedbytheexportofcloth,tin,spices,andsoon.ThomasMunclaimed,“OfallEuropethisnationdrove themost profitable trade toTurkeyby reasonof thevast quantities of broad cloth, tin,&c.,whichweexportedthither;enoughtopurchaseallthewareswewantedinTurkey—whereasabalanceinmoneyispaidbytheothernationstradingthither.”233Ontheotherhand,inthe“currantislands”wheretheEnglishpurchasedabouttwo-thirdsofthecrop,therewas“practicallynomarketforEnglishgoodsandpaymenthadtobemadeinreadymoney.”234In1629theVenetianambassadorreportedthat theLevantCompany,“havingaconsiderablecapital,buyupbeforehandtheproduceofthepoorestofthe

inhabitants of these islands . . . so that for them the prices are almost always the same.”235 Advancepaymentswereusedtoensurelowstableprices.InItaly,Englishmerchantsranadeficitonthetradeingoodswithall Italian states throughmostof the seventeenthcentury,which theycould successfullytransform into a trade surplus thanks to the surplus on “invisibles,” that is, net earnings fromshipping,236 insurance, and the commissions charged on English exports.237 It was this commercialstrategythatwouldlaterformtheheartoftheCity’seconomicdominanceinthenineteenthcentury.TheLevantCompanywasnotajoint-stock,memberstradedindependentlyona“regulated”basis.238

Factorswererecruitedasapprenticesonseven-yearterms,afterwhichtheywerepaidacommissiononallgoodstheyhandledthatvariedfrom2to4percent.Ofcourse,aswiththeEastIndiaCompany’sservants in India, “factorsmade a good deal of profit from their own personal trading.”239Wood’sHistoryoftheLevantCompanysuggeststhatthethreefactoriesatConstantinople,Smyrna,andAleppo“reachedtheirgreatestprosperityandsizeinthelatterhalfoftheseventeenthcentury.”240However,thebulkofthecommercewasconcentratedonlyinthosefactoriesandtherewasastrongtendencytodiscourageexpansionatothertradingstations.241Bythe1680sboththeEastIndiaCompanyandtheFrench had becomemajor sources of competition. The Levant merchants would complain bitterlyabouttheimportofIndianrawsilkandsilkgoodsbytheformer,but“thecrownconsistentlybackedtheEast IndiaCompany against its critics.”242Meanwhile,Colbert’s revival of theLanguedoc clothindustrymadetheFrenchevenmoreformidablerivals,astheyprovedtobefortheDutchaswell.Bytheendofthecentury,FrenchimportsfromtheLevantweresoaring,andbythe1720ssignsofarapiddeclinebecamevisibleinthefortunesoftheEnglishcompany.243

The eighteenth century saw the decimation of English trade in the Levant,244 the result both ofFrance’sdominationofthetextilemarketandoftheCompany’sownfatalpolicy“tocurbattemptsatexpansionandtodiscouragetheopeningofnewmarkets.”245ItwaslefttotheEastIndiaCompanytonote,in1696,“ithasalwaysbeenobservedthattheparticulartradersinaregulatedcompanycontentthemselvestogotoacertainknownplaceintrade,evertakingameasureoftheirprofitandlossbeforetheygoout....”246Inadditiontowhich,throughoutthelateeighteenthcenturytradewashamperedbyaCompanyregulationforcingmerchantstomakeallpurchasesintheLevantbythebarterofgoodsexportedfromEnglandandforbiddingtheexportofcoinorbulliontoTurkey,whereasFrenchandDutch merchants “carried large quantities of coin to the Levant,” where local traders preferredoutrightsalestobarter.247Bythe1730sonlysomefiftyorsixtyLevantCompanymerchantsremainedactivetraders,“anditwaswidelybelievedthishandfulofmonopolistsdeliberatelycurbedallinitiative,enterprise, and expansion inpursuit ofhighprofits on a limitedbusiness.”248Again, theCompany’sfactorswerecruciallydependentonJewishbrokersintheOttomanmarkets,butthefearofpotentialcompetitionfromthemsustainedstrongresistance to theadmissionofJews to theCompany.Whenthey finally were admitted (in the 1750s) Jewish members of the Company were banned fromemployingfellowJewsasfactorsintheLevant!249

In the eighteenth centurywell over half the seaborne trade between Europe and theMiddle Eastcame tobecontrolledby theFrenchmerchantsofMarseilles,250 andFrench competitionwaswidely

acknowledgedtobethemaincausebehindthecollapseoftheLevantCompany.IftheMediterraneanhadbeentheseminalgroundofEngland’scommercialexpansioninthelatterpartofElizabeth’sreign,bytheeighteenthcenturythedecisivecentersofgravityhadfirmlyshiftedtotheAtlanticandtheEastIndies.By1750almosthalfofEngland’smerchantfleetwasengagedinthetransatlantictrade.251Fromthe 1730s therewas a huge increase in the volume of capital advanced to the colonies by specialistgroups of commission agents.252 Jamaican estates tripled in value and planters like Peter Beckfordcoulddie leavingfortunesworth£300,000.253Sugarbegan tobe financedby longer-term lendingonmortgage,andwhenHenryLascellesdiedin1753,hehadca.£194,000(sterling)outonloantoclientsin Barbados and Jamaica.254 Lascelles had financed his loans by borrowing from London bankers,which showsus thatNewWorld slaverywas tightly integrated into financial and commercialwebscentered inLondon.255 By around 1770 the total sum owing to Londonmerchants byWest Indiansugarplanterswasintheregionofseveralmillionpounds.256DoubtlessthesamewastrueofAmericanplanters.In1784ThomasJeffersondescribedthemas“aspeciesofpropertyannexedtocertainmercantilehousesinLondon”!257By the1770s theAmericancoloniesprovided40percentofBritish importsandtookover40percentofBritain’sdomesticexports.258

The transformation of the East India Company from a purely commercial organization into a“political power”259 was of course its most distinctive feature historically. However, an inordinatestressonwhatJohnBrewerhascalledthe“privatizedimperialismoftheEastIndiaCompany”260runsadoublerisk,bothofdistractingattentionfromthefactthattheCompanywasalwaysrun“byagroupofextremelyrichcapitalists”261andoffailingtosee,ornotseeingsufficiently,thatitstransformationfromapurely commercial entity intoan imperialistone redefined the frameworkwithinwhichnewformsofcommercialcapitalproliferatedfromtheendoftheeighteenthcenturytospawnthepowerfulcommercial lobbiesofthenineteenth,suchasthosewhichlaybehindtheOpiumWars.InthepagesthatfollowthefocusisthusonthepurelycommercialorcapitalistaspectsoftheCompany’soperationssimilartothosethatK.N.ChaudhuriforegroundedinhissubstantialmonographTheTradingWorldofAsiaandtheEnglishEastIndiaCompany.The English East India Company was a tightly centralized business organization where theinvestment decisionsweremadeby theCourt ofDirectorsworking through the centralmanagerialcommittees in London. Capital sums were assigned to individual “factories” from London.262 Thebusinessmodelwasofcourseimport-driven,whichinturnimplied(a)amassiveexportofcapitaltofinance imports and (b) thevital part playedby the re-export trades“in closing thegap thatwouldotherwisehaveopenedupinBritain’svisibletradebalance.”263IntheEIC’scase,capitalexportstookthe form, overwhelmingly, of preciousmetals, which were purchased initially in London from thegoldsmith-bankers and later, from the eighteenth century, on the continent (in Cadiz andAmsterdam).264TheCompany’sAsianimportportfoliowas“sofinelydifferentiatedthatittookmorethantwohundredpagesintheLedgerBookstolistthem,”265butbyandlargeimportsweredominatedby a few key commodities such as cotton and silk piece goods, raw silk, pepper, tea, and so on.DistributionattheLondonendtooktheformofquarterlysalesattendedbyindividualmembersofthe

Companywhowere themselves substantial exporters aswell asbywholesaledealers fromHolland,Germany,andelsewhere,266withorders for future suppliesbeingadjustedon thebasisof the actualpricesreceivedatthoseauctions.At the Indian end, the advance contracts had to be made in anticipation of the exact orders andfinancialresourcesthatweretocomefromEngland.Thepost-Restorationperiodsawcalicoesrapidlygaining inpopularity,andby the1680s theCompanywas importingmore thanamillionandahalfpieces, with the textile share of total imports exceeding 80 percent by value.267 To secure this vastsupplytheCompanyreliedonsubstantiallocalmerchantsactingasbrokerswiththepowertoensurethatorderswouldbefulfilledontime.“[T]heCompany’sservantsadvocatedtheuseofmiddlemenontheground that if they dealt directlywith theweavers, ‘att theyeares end,whenwe expected tobeinvestedofourgoods,weshouldundoubtedlycomeshorteofhalfourquantitye.’”268Inotherwords,theriskofdefaultbytheweaverswasshiftedtotheshouldersofthemerchants.Chaudhurinotes,“Allcommercial risks were to be borne by the Indian merchants, and if the latter made a loss on theCompany’sbusinesstheywerestillexpectedtocarryoncontractingforgoodsasbefore.”269Weavers,of course, refused to work without substantial advances which Chaudhuri confusingly calls their“workingcapital,”270whentheadvances,thecapitallaidoutonlaborandonrawmaterials,camefromtheCompany.The “working capital”was strictly that of theCompany, since the disbursements ofcash made through their brokers (and later, more directly through the agents called gumashtas)involvedacirculationofthatpartoftheCompany’scapitalwhichwentintoenablingthelaborprocess,includingreproductionofweavers’laborpower.Inthe1720sAlexanderHumenoted,“TheEnglishandDutch,whoarethegreatestTradersinthiscountry (Bengal), do their businesswholly by their Brokers,who are their principalMerchants.”271

Forward contracts with large wholesale merchants were the rule both in the Coromandel and inBengal,272 with merchants who contracted for the investment frequently borrowing “large sums ofmoney to carry it on” and wealthy bankers acting as their guarantors.273 The Company wouldn’talways secure such guarantees. “The wealthy merchants living in Hugli or Kasimbazar habituallyrefused the Company’s demand for financial security as their credit and business status wereunimpeachable.”274HumestatesinthesamememoirthatthegreatertheadvancethemorecertaintheCompanywasofreceivingthegoodsontime,whichisprobablywhyinBengalthegroupknownasdadni or dadan merchants were usually paid as much as 50 to 75 percent of the contract value inadvance.275Fromthe1750s,withlargepartsofIndiareelingundertheimpactoftheMarathaincursionsandthedamageinflictedonmercantilefortunes,thesubstantialmerchantswhoactedasbrokersfortheCompanyfounditlessandlesspossibletoguaranteedeliveryandthesystembrokedown.ThedadanmerchantswithdrewfromtheCompany’s trade, thus forcing it toestablishmoredirectcontroloverproducers, adrive that culminated ina seriesof regulations (between1773and1793) that sought toreduce weavers to the status of Company employees, with restrictions on their mobility, tightersupervisionoflooms,andamoreovertlycoerciveuseofdebt.276Indebtednessbecamean“integralpart

of production for the Company” in the final decades of the eighteenth century, and abscondingworkerswerepursuedremorselessly.277

Dutch exports from theCoromandel ran at almost twomillionguildersby the late 1660s,278whiletotalEICexportswereofteninexcessof£1millionayearacenturylater.279Volumeproductionmeantthat the European companies dealt withwhole clusters ofweaving villages, either on their own ormoreusuallythroughtheirbrokers(“principalmerchants”),onamodelbroadlysimilartothewidelydispersedVerlag networks that South German commercial firms like the Fuggers had built theirprosperityon in the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries.280 Formost of the seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies the Companies were crucially dependent on local merchant capitalists281 who had theresources to run their own commercial networks and even finance production on behalf of theCompany.BoththeEnglishandtheDutchusedthebigmerchantsofKasimbazarfortheirsilkbuyinginNorth Bengal.282 Bengal silk, Coromandel calicoes, Agra and Bayana indigo, etc. were all, likeMalabarpepper,highlycompetitivemarkets;forexample,“thecontractpriceforsilkwasanobjectofintense bargaining between the (Bengal) merchants and the European trading companies.”283

However,bytheeighteenthcenturythecompetitionofprivate,mostlyEnglish,merchants injectedanewdimensionintothecommercialdynamicsoftheEastIndiaCompany.Britishprivatecapitalandits involvement in thecommerceof India sawa steadyexpansion in theearlypartof theeighteenthcentury and then a bigger and more rapid expansion in the later eighteenth century, followingdevelopments that quickly opened the inland trade of Bengal to private capital and saw thecontemporaneouscaptureofSuratin1759.Alreadybythelaterseventeenthcentury(the1660s,infact)theCompanyextendeda“widemeasureof official toleration” to the private shipping that emerged in Indian ports with sizeable Europeantrading communities over which the British had some control.284 Masulipatnam (not a Britishsettlement but a cosmopolitan port),285 Madras and Calcutta became, in turn, the major hubs of aburgeoning “country trade” that was progressively dominated by private capital. In the context ofCompanydominance,theterm“privatecapital”isofcourseambivalent,sinceitwouldhavetocoverthe private trading activities of officials like the Governors of Madras who were big-time privatetraders at the start of the eighteenth century, otherCompany servantswith commercial interests oftheir own, as well as the greater mass of so-called free merchants who were entirely outside theCompany. In 1681 came theCompany’s “dramatic and suddendecision towithdraw from the localtrade of the Indian Ocean,”286 and a potentially vast field opened up for the expansion of non-Companycommercialcapital,wherethemaincompetitionstemmednotfromtheCompanyitselfbutfromindigenousAsiancapitalstradingtotheRedSeaandtomarketslikeAchehandtradingbetweenthemain coastal regions of India. In the trade between Surat and Bengal, the freemerchants whoeventually gained control of Calcutta’s shipping faced “formidable competition from Asianshipowners.”287 Yet British dominance of India’s carrying tradewas swift, and by the 1730sAsian-owned ships had largely ceased to trade betweenBengal and Surat. 288 By the 1780s freemerchantsweregrowingrapidlyinnumbersandwealth,289begantosupplyalargepartoftheCompany’sexports

oftextiles(intheDhakaarangsvastlymorethaneithertheCompanyoritsCommercialResident),290

andtooktheleadinopeningupnewareasfortrade.291Oneupshotofthissurgeofprivatecommercewas that asmuchas ca.£15million couldbe senthome in remittancesover the twenty-sevenyearsbetween1757and1784.292Bythe1790sthemassiveexpansionofBengalindigo,muchofwhichcamefromAwadhandfurtherafield,wasdominatedbyprivatemerchants.293TheirchiefcontributiontothecommercialhistoryofbothBritainandIndiawerethe“housesofagency”whichCalcutta-basedfreemerchantswerelargelyresponsibleforestablishing.ItwasthislayerofcapitalthathelpedtodestroythemonopolyoftheEastIndiaCompanyearlyinthenineteenthcentury.294

The transatlantic trades were roughly a century ahead of British private enterprise in Asia ininnovatingthecommissionsystemasthechiefmethodoftradingtypicalofcommercialcapitalsinthatsector.Thereasonshouldbeobvious:privatecapitalwasdominantinthecolonialtradesbythemainpartoftheseventeenthcentury,indeeditneverfacedthechallengeofthebig“Companymerchants”except for the Royal AfricanCompany’s short-livedmonopoly of the slave trade. This precociousdevelopment of non-monopoly, private enterprise was significant because already by the 1660s thecolonial trades were “among the greatest of English trades.”295 In India, Houses of Agency onlyevolvedfromthe1770sandthenmorerapidlyfromthe1790s,followingCornwallis’sbanonservantsof the East India Company engaging in private commercial enterprise.296 But the Calcutta agencyhouses are themost palpable linkbetween the twomainperiodsor “epochs”ofBritish commercialcapitalism,whosedividing line lies at the startof the“longnineteenthcentury” (1784–1914), in theyears after 1784 which saw the ending of the American War of Independence, a boom in newcommissionhouses,297andaradicallyneweconomicconjuncturethatsawbankingrevolutionsonbothsides of the Atlantic, a dramatic expansion of the cotton industry in Britain, and a surge inmanufactured exports to the US and other international markets. Meanwhile, the EIC’s tradingmonopolywasformallyterminatedin1813,thatoftheLevantCompanyin1825.

4

BRITISHMERCANTILECAPITALISMANDTHECOSMOPOLITANISMOFTHENINETEENTHCENTURY

AGENCYHOUSESTOMANAGINGAGENCIESIn Aden in 1927, a young French socialist by the name of Paul Nizan found a microcosm of themercantilecapitalismofthelatenineteenthcentury,butherestrippedtoitsbareelements,devoidofthecosmopolitanculturalfaçadesofBeirutorAlexandria.“Therewasnonewsexceptwhatcameincablesfromtheagencies.”Europeannewspaperspiledupunopenedinthecornersofbedrooms.1“Notheatres,nopublishinghouses,nolibraries...allthedécorwasforgottenandtemporarilyabolished.”2

“Everysecondoftimethattheypassed—orrather,thatpassedthemby—wassubjecttothepressureoftheworldmarket...InAden,thispressurewasanimmediatepresence,therewerenointermediaries.”3

“Everyhearthungon the electricwaves that traveledundermountainsof seaata rateof speedwhichnoshareholder ofShell tried to imagine.”4 “Thesemenwere replaceableparts of an invisiblemechanismthat slowed down on Sunday, because of religion, and was periodically jammed by the violentaccidentsofeconomiccrises.Thiswholemassofmachinery,bolted together,without safetyvalves,vibratedlikeastructureofsheetiron.”5“Theyweremenobsessed,andtheyweredyingbyinchesintheserviceofanonymouscapital.”6

IfNizan is tobebelieved, themostpowerfulcapitalist inAdenat the timewasa leathermerchantfromLondon,thechiefofa“greatcompany”whoseoffices“wield[ed]morepowerbetweenSuezandKenyathananyEuropeanministry.”7Mr.C,asNizancalledthisbusinessman,“possessedwhatthree-quartersoftheindividualsmostliberallyendowedwithasenseoftheirownimportancedonothave:cable addresses in Bombay, New York, Marseille, and London, and a private cable code.”8 Thetelegraph had revolutionized communications between Europe and India in 1865, and Nizan’sreferenceshereareadistantechoofthetransformationsthatwereboundupwiththatchangeandwiththelayingofthefirsttransatlanticcablein1866.The1860swereawatershedinnumerousotherways.InSyriasilkproductionexpandedfromjustunder1millionkgsofcocoonsto3.4millionkgsin1866,thenfellsharplyagainbytheendofthedecade.9InEgyptthecottonharvestexpandedfourtimesinsizeintheboomof1861–66.10VaglianoBrothersestablishedthefirstandlargestGreekshippingofficeinLondon.11 The introduction of steamships increased competition in the shippingmarket.12Therewas franticactivityamongBritish tradingcompanies inIndia.Theagencyhousesnowfirstevolvedinto what would come to be known as “managing agencies.”13 The Sassoons, Iraqi Jews who hadmovedtoBombayshortlyafter1830,fleeingpersecution,corneredtheIndianopiummarket,forcingthe biggest opium trader, Jardines, to move out of commodities into services.14 Large financialinstitutionslikeCréditLyonnaisandSociétéGénéralebegantospecializeinthebusinessoflendingto

Middle Eastern governments.15 In 1862, Egypt’s ruler, Sa‘id, turned to a syndicate of English andFrench banks, agreeing to borrow £3,292,800 (by 1875 the country’s foreign debt stood at £91million!).16In1862itwasestimatedthattheGovernmentofIndia(nowremovedfromthehandsoftheCompany) earned a net income of £4million from the sale of opium to the commercial firms thatexported it to China.17 1863 saw a major bull market, with some seven hundred new companiesregistered inLondon.18 In 1864Wallace&Co. floated the Bombay BurmahTradingCorporation,extendingBritishcommercialinterestsbeyondeasternIndia.19OnMay11,1866,theBankofEnglandwas forced to lend£4million tobanks,discounthouses, andmerchantsonwhatwasdescribedasa“dayoftheseverestcreditpanic.”20AndNovember1869sawtheofficialopeningoftheSuezCanal.Theblurringoflinesbetweencommercialandindustrialcapitalwasnowheremoreevidentthaninthe evolution of the agency houses into “managing agencies” and “investment groups” in the finaldecades of the nineteenth century. The managing agencies would become the backbone of BritishbusinessinAsia,consolidatingtheirholdoverentiresectorsoftheeconomy.Buttheearlyhistoryoftheagencyhouseswasdefinedbyachronicoveraccumulationofcapital(thanksinparttothesuddeninfluxofprivatecapitalsintotheEastIndiatrade)thatcreatedaconstantpressuretodiversify.Amongtheearliestagencyhousemerchants,JohnPalmerwasdescribedas“anindiscreet,fussy,petulant,andindecisiveman,”“obsessedwithstatus,”“gullible”and“naïve.”21Alreadyby1820hehadtowriteoffbaddebtstothestaggeringsumofca.£1.25million(thesterlingequivalentof100lakhrupees).22 In1823 he was complaining bitterly that Calcutta was “crowding out” with competition.23 His chiefcreditors in the City became progressively disillusioned and eventually abandoned the companytowardtheendofthedecade.24Inthe1820s,itseems,theestablishedagenciesfounditimpossibletosustainprofitabilitytocovertheinteresttheyhadtopaytodepositorswithoutrecourseto“imprudentspeculations.”25Thiswascodeforindigo,whichhadseenfreneticexpansioninthe1820sandthepriceofwhichhadbeguntoslideby1826,whenEnglandwasinthemidstofatradedepression.Around80percent of the indigo grown in the Presidency was financed by six agency houses, among whomPalmer&Co.andAlexander&Co.hadthelargeststakes,£5millionand£3½millionrespectively.26

Itwasestimated thatnearly threehundred indigo factorieswerepartof this financialweb.27 In1827John Palmer was boasting that “his house enjoyed a degree of confidence on the part of Indianmerchantsunmatchedbytheotherhouses,”butbylate1829,whenitwasobvioustothemthatPalmer&Co.was in serious trouble, the company’s credit among Indianmoneylenders simply collapsed.28

The failure of the company in January 1830 has been described as “a fatal blow for the system ofmercantile capitalism which had operated since the 1780s.”29 Within four years all the other majorCalcuttaagencyhousescrashedaswell,opening theway toa reorderingof thecommercial capitalsactiveintheEastIndiatrade.William Jardine became the leading figure among the Country traders in Canton as China wasflooded with cheap opium in the 1830s.30 Exports from India reached the enormous level of fortythousand chests by the end of the thirties.31 By 1832 Jardine and James Matheson had taken overCanton’s leading opium firm,CharlesMagniac&Co., renaming it JardineMatheson&Co., some

eightyearsafterMagniacdied.32BothpartnerswereWhigsandavidsupportersofashowdownwiththeChineseauthorities,denouncingtheEIC’sconductasoneof“subservienttimidity”andlobbyingfuriouslythroughtheirpaperTheCantonRegister, throughpetitions to theHouseofCommons,andthroughprivateconversationsat the top level in theForeignOffice.33As thegovernment inPekingswungintoactiontostopthetraffic,Jardinein1838wouldcomplaintoJamsetjeeJeejeebhoy,JardineMatheson’sbiggesttradeconstituentwithwhomtheyweretransactingmorethan£1millionworthofbusinessannually,34thatthe“persecution”oftheopiumdealershadnowspreadtoeveryprovinceinChina.35 A year later, now back in England and asked for advice by the foreign secretary, Jardinesuggestedashowofforce.36ThemainupshotofthefirstoftheOpiumWarswasBritain’sacquisitionofHongKong,aboutwhichMathesontoldJardine,inJanuary1841,“SoindependentwillHongKongbethatitwillevenbeallowabletostoreopiumonitassoonaswebuildwarehousesthere.”37ItwasnoexaggerationforonescholartowritethatWilliamJardinehad“mastermindedBritishstrategyintheOpiumWar”or“literallymasterminded thegovernment’s approach towardsChinaand theOpiumWar.”38

In the middle decades of the century, Jardines had more than 150 correspondents in Calcutta,Bombay,andMadras,but thiswasessentiallyan informationnetwork, important though thatwas.39

The most important of their Bombay associates acted as brokers only, refusing either to buy oradvanceoncrops.40WhentheChineselegalizedopiumin1858andalldealersinChinafacedsimilarcompetitive conditions “so that prices and costs in India became crucial to continued success in thetrade,”41Jardineswouldloseouthugelytoacompetitorwithmuchhigherlevelsofverticalintegrationonthesupplyside.Inabrilliantmonograph,EdwardLeFevourarguedthat“therealstrengthoftheSassoongroup lay in theirpracticeof advancingashighas three-quartersof costs to Indiandealerswillingtoconsignshipmentsonaregularbasis.Jardine’sassociatesinIndiaattemptedthesamebut,astheir advanceswere provided through large agency houses in Bombay andCalcutta, they failed toaffect the producing areaswhere Sassoon purchased unharvested poppy crops through experiencedagents.”42 “Sassoon’smethods were so successful that by 1871 Jardine’s had only one considerableaccount...andhadceasedtoinvestitsowncapitalregularlyinopium.”43“Earlyin1871,theSassoongroupwas acknowledged to be themajor holder of opium stocks in India and inChina; theywereowners and controllers of 70 percent of the total of all kinds.”44 Beaten out of opium, Jardinesdiversifiedintoshipping,railway-construction,banking,andinsurance,andlaterboughtoutMatheson&Co.whichwasprobablythebiggestmanagingagencyinChina,with itsowninterests inmining,insurance,andrailways.45

Strong capital growth became characteristic of many of the agency houses that developed intomanagingagenciesinthelatenineteenthcentury.Jardine,Skinner,&Co.,afirmfoundedbyoneofJardine’snephews,sawitscapitalexpandfrom£100,000ca.1845to£660,000by1860and£1.3millionin1890.46By theFirstWorldWar itwas“oneof thebiggestmanagingagencyhouses inCalcutta,”withinterestsintrade,industry,andshipping.47AnotherScottishfirm,JamesFinlay&Co.,expandeditscapitalby£2.21millionovertheyears1861–1910,thatis,atanaveragerateofca.£45,000ayear.48

Harrisons&Crosfield(H&C),asmallfirmofteamerchantsthatevolvedintoaglobal(or,asitcalleditself,“Eastern”)plantationsand tradingcompany, saw the totalbookvalueof itsassetsgrowfrom£564,436 in1908whenitbecamea limited liabilitycompanyto£2,867,168tenyears later!49Muchofthissortofexpansionwasfueledbyagencyhousesdiversifyingintocontrolofjoint-stockcompaniesin the jute, coal, tea, and rubber industries, showing how problematic the distinction between“mercantile capital” and“industrial capital”hadbecomeunder this transformed formofmerchant’scapital.From the 1870s on, commercial firms became active promoters of joint-stock companies. ThetechniquestheyevolvedtoenhancecontrolovercapitalwereeverybitasmodernasthatascribedbyHilferdingtothefinancingoftheAmericanrailwaysystem.InFinanceCapital,Hilferdingposited“adistinctivefinancialtechnique,theaimofwhichistoensurecontroloverthelargestpossibleamountofoutsidecapitalwith thesmallestpossibleamountofone’sowncapital.”50When theCalcuttaagencyhouses “floated numerous jute, tea, and coal companies on the British and local capital markets,retaining a percentage of the equity and amanaging agency contract,”51 theywere of course doingpreciselythat.Chapmannotesthat“fromadispersedshareholdingofperhaps£2–3million,BirdsandHeilgerswereabletodirectaninvestmentof£20million.Yules’capitalwasonly£1.2million,anditlooks as if the firm controlled an even larger capital investment than Birds.”52 The disproportionbetweenownedcapitalandeffectivecontrolovera largermassofcapitalmobilizedfromthemarketwasakey feature, indeed theverybasis,of themanagingagencysystem.Ontheeveof theSecondWorldWarsixty-one foreignagenciesweremanagingmore thansixhundredrupeecompanies;“ofthetenmajorBritishhousesorgroups,AndrewYulemanaged59,Bird-Heilger37,MartinBurn34,Begg-Sutherland 27,” and so on, and of the agencies listed here AndrewYule, Bird-Heilgers, andMartinBurnwereamongthetenlargestcorporategroupsinIndiain1951.53YetKidronpointsoutthatbythelateforties“foreignmanagingagenciesheld,onaverage,under15percentofthepaid-upsharecapitaloftheirmanagedcompanies.”54

Other featuresareworthunderscoring.Latenineteenth-centurymanagingagencieshad the strongbacking of the City firms they were connected with, established substantial interests in individualsectorssothatbetweenthemtheleadingagenciesdominatedthemainsectorstheywereactivein,andwere often highly diversified concerns. To illustrate these aspects briefly—among the rupeecompanies(thoseraisingtheircapitallocally),sevenmanagingagencyhouses“controlled55percentof the jute companies, 61 percent of the tea companies, and 46 percent of the coal companies,” thisca.1911.55 Indian jute manufactures remained “almost completely dominated by British. . .businessmen right up to the end of the SecondWorldWar.”56 The involvement of agency houses(H&C in London and Guthrie’s in Singapore) in the great rubber boom of the 1900s57 wouldeventuallymeanthatinMalayaaslateasthemid-1960s“over180Britishcompaniesownedinexcessof800,000acresofrubbertrees.”58AndrewYule&Co.whichmanagedoversixtycompaniesinIndiaby1917andhadastrongpresenceinthejuteindustryalsodescribeditselfas“thelargestproducerofcoal in theprivatesector” in1963.59Most juteand teacompanieswere in turn trade-financedby the

City.In1871JamesFinlay&Co.’s“GlasgowheadofficeadvisedtheCalcuttaandBombaybranchesthattheRoyalBankofScotlandwouldcoveracceptancestotheextentof£100,000.”60In1890Finlays’sCalcuttamanagerreported“thathewasrunningasmuchas£40,000or£50,000ofbillswithdifferentbanks for eachof the twomajor (tea) companies.”61Finlaysbuilt a very substantial stake in the teaindustryattheendofthedecade,whenitcontrolledacapitalof£4,458,400,hadseventy-fourthousandacres under cultivation and as many as seventy thousand workers in India and Ceylon.62 Finally,Forbes andForbes in the 1930s “had over a score of interests as exporters and importers, bankers,brokers,shippingandinsuranceagents,merchants,commissionagents,andengineeringandbuildingcontractors.”63BalmerLawrie, aCalcutta agencyhouseofLondonparentage, had interests rangingover “the production, warehousing, and marketing of tea; heavy and light engineering; steelfabrication, including a wide range of containers, and the manufacture of switchboard and otherelectrical equipment.”64 The London house of Steel Brothers & Co. were into “timber extraction,paddy buying, oil drilling, cotton ginning, cement making, tin dredging and rubber planting.”65

BetweenthewarsSteelsbecamethelargestoftherice-millingandexportingfirmsinBurma,“withatotal milling capacity of 5,500 tons of cleaned rice daily” ca.1915 and control of close to half thecountry’spaddycropbytheSecondWorldWar.66

ThepointworthretainingfromallthisisthatthemanagingagencieswerepureemblemsofBritain’smercantilecapitalism,reversingtherelationshipbetweentradeandindustryinthesensethatcontrolofindustrialenterprisewasheresubordinatedtowhatwereessentiallytradingcompaniesthatstillearnedamajorpartoftheirprofitfromcommissions.AmiyaBagchi’sstatementthat“themanagingagencyhouseswithlargeindustrialinterestscontinuedtohavestronginterestsintrade”67understatesthecase,sincetheagenciesremainedmerchanthousesandcommercialfirmsandcanhardlybecomparedwiththeindustrialenterprisesthathademergedbothintheUKitselfandelsewhereintheworldby1914.68

CITYCOSMOPOLITANISM:“THEWHOLESURFACEOFTHEGLOBE”To Marx and Engels who linked the idea of cosmopolitanism to the trade expansion of the mid-nineteenthcentury, itseemedself-evidentthatcapitalwouldscourthe“wholesurfaceof theglobe,”“nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere,” in an endless search formarketsandforrawmaterials.69Infact,confiningourselvestotheScottishandEnglishfamiliesthatdominatedmostmanagingagenciesinIndiarunstheseriousriskofunderestimatingthedistinctivenessaswell as the real strength of Britishmercantile capitalism in the nineteenth century. At one level,VictoriancapitalismwasstrikinglycosmopolitaninthatLondonandtheindustrialtownsinthenorthofEnglandactedasmagnets forcommercial firms fromallover theworld.ThenumberofGermanmerchanthousesinManchesteralonegrewfromtwenty-eightin1820toninety-sevenca.1850.70ThemoresuccessfulofthemincludedN.M.Rothschildatonelevel(hewasalreadyamillionairebythe1820s) and Engels’s father at another. The number of Greek firms settled in Manchester rosedramatically in the late 1840s and 1850s, and exceeded the number ofGerman houses by themid-sixties.71 Among the richest of these, Spartali & Co., based in both Manchester and London, was

probably typicalof theUK-based tradinghouses thatpioneeredBritain’s commercialpenetrationoftheMiddleEastinthemid-nineteenthcentury,giventhatalmostnonativeBritishfirmswereresidentinBeirutintheseyears.In1855BritishimportstoSyriawereestimatedtobeabout£1,200,000.72Inanofficialreportfromthatyear,oneofthekeyfactorsintherecentsurgeofBritishtradewasdescribedas “rivalry amongst theLevantinemerchants inLondon engaged in theSyrian trade, especially thefirmsofSpartaliandLascaridi,whohavegivenunusualfacilitiestotheircorrespondents,therebyenablingthemtosellBritishgoodsinSyrianearlyascheapas inEngland.”73Thestrikingfacthereisthat“theincrease inBritish tradeseems tohavebeencarriedoutmainlybyLebanese firmsengaged indirecttrade with England,” and that the twenty-nine Lebanese houses that dominated this trade (in fact,dominatedLebanesetradeandfinancedowntoWorldWarII)usedahandfulofGreekandLebanesefirmsastheiragentsinEngland,amongthemSpartali&LascaridiinLondon.74In1857thisfirmwassaidtobe“worth£100,000,”75whichwouldmakeitoneofthewealthiestmerchanthousesinBritainatthetime.Again,whenDavidSassoonsworeallegiancetotheQueenin1853,hespokenotawordofEnglish, “signing his naturalization certificate in Hebrew.”76 The Sassoons of course had theirheadquartersinBombay,buttheirheadofficeinLondon(at12LeadenhallStreet,whichalsohousedthe offices of the Cuban sugar merchants, Fesser & Co.) was “almost entirely manned by co-religionists recruitedmainly fromBaghdadandPersia.”77When the family-patriarchDavid’s eldestson Abdullah (later Sir Albert) finally moved to England in the 1870s, London became the firm’s“nerve-centre, with all major policy-decisions and directives originating from Leadenhall Street.”78

And the Greek merchant houses in England were no different. The Ralli Brothers’ head office inLondonwasalmostentirelystaffedbyGreeksfromChios,wherethefamilyoriginated.79BytheendofthenineteenthcenturyRallis surpassedbothJardineMathesonandFinlay&Co. in termsof sizeofcapital.80

Atanotherlevel,Britishcapitalismdrovetradeexpansionformuchofthenineteenthcentury,eveninthedecadeswhenBritain’schiefmanufacturedexport,cottonpiecegoods,wasrapidlylosingmarketshareinEuropeandAmerica,andBritain’sshareofworldtradeinmanufacturesdecliningmarkedlyafter1870.81The volume of international trade grew fivefold in the years between 1840 and 1870,82 andmuchofthiswastheworkofBritishcommercialfirms.Atmid-century,accordingtodatacompiledatPalmerston’srequest,thedistributionofBritishmercantilehousesworldwidewasasfollows:innorth& central Europe, 501; in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 281; in North America (excludingMexico),142;inSouthAmerica,460;andinIndiaandChina,111.83Thesefigurestellusnothingaboutthescaleofcommercialinvestmentinthesevariousregions,sincehousesvariedconsiderablyinsize,but they do convey a clear impression of the sheer spread of British businesses, which dominatedinternationaltradeinIndia,SouthAmerica,andChinaformostofthenineteenthcentury.Totakeoneexample, there were forty-one British houses in Buenos Aires in 1836, more than all the otherEuropeancountriescombined.84 Inparticular, theprodigiouscommercial expansionof theVictorianerasawaverywiderangeofcommoditiestradingatincreasinglymassivelevels.Palmoil,rawcotton,opium, wheat, tea, teak, rice, coffee, cocoa, jute, rubber, and groundnuts all sawmajor periods of

expansion in themid-to-latenineteenthcenturyor in theearly twentiethcentury.Thus thevalueofUK’spalmoil imports rose from£58,286 to£1,755,982over theyears 1817–1854.85These, asLynnsays,were“massivevolumesfortheexportmarket.”86ThevolumeofcottonexportsfromEgyptgrewfromanannualaverageof65,160cantars in1822–24(1cantar=94lbs)to6,982,000cantars in1910–13.87India’sopiumexportstoChinaclimbedtoastaggeringlevelofover90,000chestsor5,715metrictonsayearbythe1870sand1880s(fromareportedfigureof24,000chestsinthemid-1830s).88Brazil’sexportofcoffeerosefrom9.7millionsacksinthe1830s(1sack=165lbs)to26.2millionsacksinthe1850s.89TeakexportsfromBurmawentfromanaverageof85,000tonsin1857–64to275,000tonsin1883–4.90Colombia’scoffeeproductiongrewfrom114,000sacksin1874(1sack=60kg)to3,453,000sacks in 1932.91 Rice exports from Saigon increased from 284,000 tons in 1880 to 1,548,000 tons in1937.92By1895Siamwasexporting61,800tonsofteak,virtuallyallofitfelledbyBritishcompanies.93

The value of Gold Coast cocoa exports rose from £27,000 in 1900 to £10,056,000 in 1920.94 AndSenegal’sgroundnutexportsmorethandoubledfrom227,000tonsto504,000tonsin1910–30.95Thespasmodicnatureofsomeofthiscommercialgrowthmeantthatsomecommoditiessawshortburstsofexpansion in particular years.Thus therewas a “vast expansion”of tea cultivation inAssam in theyears1856–60;96 the raw juteconsumedbyIndian jutemills rose from2,248,000bales (1bale=400lbs.)to4,459,000balesinthe1900s;97therewasanunprecedentedboominrubberin1909and1910;98

and the new rail connection from Kano to the Niger saw an “enormous expansion” in Nigeria’sgroundnutcropin1912–14.99Movingperspectiveslightly,thetonnageclearingBlackSeaportsgrewfrom228,000 tons in1831 to almost 12million tonsby1910;100 therewasa threefold increase in thevalue of Britain’s total trade with Latin America in 1865–1913;101 India’s export values “increasednearlyfivetimesbetween1870and1914”;102andKarachi’stradeexpandedbyafactoroffourbetween1882–83and1904–5.103With theexceptionofSaigonandSenegal,almostallof thesemovementsofexpansionwereboundupwithBritishcommercialinterests.Forexample,Liverpoolwasthecenterofthe British palm oil trade; Britain was the main consumer of Egyptian cotton and exercised directcontroloftheEgyptianeconomyafter1882;opiumwasagovernmentmonopolyfirstestablishedbythe EIC and remaining so throughout the nineteenth century; British export houses like PhippsBrothers&Co. dominated theBrazilian coffee trade in the 1870s (when exportswere valued at £2million);104modernKarachiwasapurelyBritishcreation,BurmateakwascontrolledbytheBombayBurmahTradingCorporation(BBTC)whichhada65percentexportsharebythe1890s;105andsoon.BecausethecomputedrealvalueofimportsintotheUKwasapparently“notascertained”until1854,when itwas it becameobvious thatBritainhad runupwhat J.Y.Wonghas called a “phenomenalglobal trade deficit” (on Wong’s calculations, £41.67 million by 1857),106 and the gap “widenedmarkedlyduring the period 1875–1900,” as exports slowed andmanufactured imports began to risesharply,thetradedeficitwithindustrialEuropeandtheUSgrowingveryrapidlyafter1870.107Yetthebalanceofpaymentsoncurrentaccount(thatis,inclusiveofnetservicesincomeandnetincomefromforeigninvestment)remainedpositivethroughoutthelatterpartofthenineteenthcentury,108thankstothe growth in “invisible” exports or Britain’s dominance in world shipping, insurance and other

commercial services, and to the gigantic surge in British investments overseas,109 in short, to theprimacyofBritishmercantilecapitalismconceivedinthebroadsenseoftheentirerangeofcommercialandfinancialinterestsboundupwiththeCity.Thus, the late-nineteenth century “Gladstonian Treasury” model depended crucially on invisibleexportsandBritain’sabilitytosustainthoseinthefaceofwideningtradedeficits.In1898,whenthecountry’svisible tradegapswelled to£194million,EdwardHamiltonhad toallay fearsbypointingout: “In the first place, we supply foreigners every year with a huge amount of capital. . . theaggregate amountmaybe put at £2,000,000,000.The interest on this at 4.5%would be£90,000,000which isbeingpaid in the formof importswithoutanycorrespondingexports. In the secondplace,therearealso‘invisible’exportstobetakenintoaccountintheshapeoffreightsandprofitsonourvastshipping trade. . . [which]may be put at £90,000,000.When therefore the excess [of imports overexports]goesonincreasing,thereisnoreasontosupposethatitisduetoothercausesthaninterestdueontheincreasedcapitalinvestedabroadandanaugmentedcarryingtrade.”110Theupshotofbeingabletosustainsucharegimedowntoitscatastrophiccollapsein1913–1937wasthat“in1913Britainwastheonlynationwhoseinterestswereglobal”or,moreaccurately,trulyglobal.111

The liberal cosmopolitanismof theCity,whichdescribed itself as“free trade,” reflected the rapidinternationalization of theBritish economy from themid-nineteenth century.On the other hand, itnever precluded imperial aggression when this was required in the strict interests of bondholders,bankers, and the agency houses. Numerous commercial lobbies were strident in their support forPalmerston’s government during the second Opium War.112 Similar interests prevailed in theannexation of Sind in 1843,113 or in the annexation of Burma in 1886 which had been preceded bydemands for “decisive government action” to forestall the French treaty with KingThibawwhichwouldhavegiventheFrenchextensiverightsinUpperBurma.114HereWallaceBrothersplayedakeyrole in coordinating a wave of protests by Chambers of Commerce all over Britain, leading the“mercantilepressureforBritishintervention,”giventhatthehugeforestryinterestsofitssubsidiary,BombayBurmahTradingCorporation,were at stake.115However, Britain’s occupation ofEgypt in1882wasbyfarthemostextremecaseofaneconomically-drivenintervention.HerebothFrenchandBritish economic interestswere atwork.WilfridBlunt, diplomat-turned-anti-colonialist,wrote thatGambettawas“closelyconnectedwiththehautefinanceoftheParisBourse,andwasintimatewiththeRothschildsandothercapitalistswhohadtheirmillions invested inEgyptianBonds.”116TheAnglo-Frenchregimeof jointcontrol“lookedsolely to financeandtroubled itselfhardlyatallaboutothermatters.”117DavidMcLean, Londonmanager of theHongkong and Shanghai Bank, is supposed tohavesaid,“IwanttoseeEnglandtakeEgyptandholdit.”118Gladstonehimself“hadanexceptionallylargeholdinginEgyptiangovernmentbonds:£40,567,or37percentofhisentireportfolio.Sixty-fiveotherMPsalsohadinvestmentsinEgypt.”119ThebombardmentofAlexandriainthesecondweekofJuly1881was, asKynastonhascalled it, a“turningpoint” inGladstonianLiberalism.120 By July 20therewere about thirty-eighthundredBritish soldiers, sailors, andmarines in the city.121YetEgyptalreadyhadoverninety-thousandEuropeanslivinginthecountry,anditwascertainlytheemergence

of a popular, nationalmovement in 1881 and 1882 that triggered the call for occupation byBritishtroops.122

GREEKDOMINANCEINTHELEVANTINEBOOMTheoriginsof theGreekLevantinedominancehave tobesought in thedramaticdeclineofFrenchtradeintheMediterraneantowardtheveryendoftheeighteenthcentury.Downtothe1780sFranceaccountedforthebiggestshareofOttomantradewithwesternEurope,123butinthe1790sFrenchtradein theMediterraneanwas almost totally destroyed.124 By the end of the eighteenth centuryGreek-ownedshipswereenteringthewesternMediterraneanportsingroupsoffour,six,eight,tenvessels,ormore.125 By 1798 one out of every three ships arriving at Marseilles from the Levant was Greek-owned.126Furthereast,Greek-ownedshipsrepresentedoverhalfofallentriestotheportofAlexandriain1780–1821andcloseto60percentofallentriesintheportofOdessain1801–21.127BythenGreekcommercialhouseshadalsotakenoveralargepartofSmyrna’stradeandthericheronesamongthemhadcorrespondentsalloverwesternEurope.128Bythe1810sGreeksfromtheOttomanregionsweresettlinginOdessa,Marseilles,andLivornotosetupcommercialnetworksfortheburgeoningtradeinUkrainiangrain.129Bytheearly1820sbothoftheleadingGreekhouses,RodocanachisandRallis,hadsettledinOdessa.130Theyearsaround1850weretheheydayoftheGreekmerchanthousesexportingfromOdessa.131By1863theownerofoneofthemostimportantfirmsinOdessawastellingtheFrenchconsul: “We can no longer competewithAmerican grain in the Englishmarket. . . themeans oftransportremainexpensiveandthedistancegreat.”132RallisadjustedtotheslumpinRussiangrainbyexpandingglobally,establishingbranchesinCalcutta(1851),Bombay(1861),andNewYork(1871).TheriseofGreek-ownedshippingandtheresurgenceofGreeknationalismintheeighteenthcenturywerebothpowerfulfactorsinconsolidatingamercantileGreekdiaspora.Thisincludedbothpoliticalrefugeesand“membersoftheoldcommercialhousesofConstantinople,Salonica,andSmyrna,sentouttosetupbranchesabroadandextendtheoperationsoftheparentfirm.”133Asearlyas1812,oneobservernoted,“Somebranchesofthemigratingfamilies...arealwaysleftinTurkey... fromtheconveniencetobothpartiesinacommercialpointofview.ThusbyfarthegreaterpartoftheexteriortradeofTurkey,intheexchangeofcommodities,iscarriedonbyGreekhouses,whichhaveresidentsathome,andbranchesinvariouscitiesofEurope,mutuallyaidingeachother.”134OfthemainportsoftheeasternMediterranean,ConstantinoplehadthelargestconcentrationofGreeks,whileSmyrnahadavery largenumberofChianmerchant houses by the endof the eighteenth century.135TheGreekupper class of Istanbul contained two sectors of verydifferent origin, on theone side anOttoman-bureaucraticéliteofprovincialoriginthatlivedintheoldquarterofPhanarwhichwastheseatoftheOrthodoxChurchandarepositoryoftheeducatedGreekdialectofConstantinople,136henceknownas“Phanariots”;ontheother,a largermassofmerchantsactive in textiles,banking,andshippingwhowere“almostallfromChios,”asamid-eighteenthcenturyFrenchreportputit.137ThebulkofChianfamilieswhowere settled inPerawere decimated in themassacres of 1822.138Theywere all strongsupportersofthestruggleforGreekindependenceandincludedthemostimportantbusinessfamilies

of thediaspora thatwouldnowdevelopanevenwider radius in thecommercial centersoutside theOttoman empire—the Calvocoressi, Rodocanachi, Ralli, Schilizzi, Baltazzi, and other families. By1860overhalfofalltonnageenteringBritishportsfromtheeasternMediterraneanandBlackSeawashandledbyGreekmerchantsofChianorigin(Harlaftis’“Chiotnetwork”).139AmongthemtheRallisandRodocanachiswerethebiggestGreekcommercialhousesinOdessainthe1850s,140werestronglyrepresented in ports like Liverpool andMarseilles, and “probably had the largest organisations andcapitalsofanymerchantsoperatinginLondon”atthetime.141Intermarriagewasextensive,soSchilizzi&Co.,thebiggestshippingbrokersinLiverpool,weresimplytheLiverpoolbranchofRalliBrothers.142

The Baltazzi, in a rather different pattern of evolution, rose rapidly in the world of internationalfinance and became leading bankers of Istanbul,with banking networks that straddled all themainfinancial markets of Europe and the Mediterranean.143 Another banking family, the Zarifi, of local(Fanar) origin, likewise stayed inConstantinople, acting as bankers and diplomats to SultanAbdulHamid.144DimitriosVikelas’s autobiographyMyLife tracks the complex trajectories throughwhichGreek merchant families affected by the struggle for independence found themselves having toreassemble businesses both in Istanbul and in the wider networks that now included London as aleading hub of the diaspora. Both his grandfathers were from Istanbul families which experiencedmassivedisruptioninthe1820s,butsurvivedandprosperedeconomically.VikelashimselfwassenttoLondonin1852toworkasaclerkinthefamilybusinessthereandeventuallybecamemorefamousasawriterandasthefirstpresidentoftheInternationalOlympicCommittee.145

As the Ottoman empire was opened up economically between 1838 and 1843, starting with theAnglo-Ottoman commercial treatyofBaltaLimani,Pera inConstantinople sawamassive influxofEuropeans.In1839–79ahundredthousandEuropeansmovedtoPera,whichbecameConstantinople’spredominantlyChristian diplomatic and commercial district.146Anastassiadou claims that theGreekpopulationalonegrewfiveorsix times in the latenineteenthcentury.Butnext toIstanbul,ormorepreciselyBeyoglu(Pera),itwasIzmir/Smyrnathatwasdescribedasthetruecommercialcapitaloftheempire.147HeretheGreekpresencegrewverysubstantially,sothatGreeksoutnumberedTurksbythe1870s.148MostbanksandbankmanagerswereGreek,halfthetopmerchants,lawyers,anddoctorsinSmyrna were Greek, and the buildings on the Cordon were mainly Greek-owned.149 Thesedevelopments were part of the wider economic boom that engulfed the Levantine ports in thenineteenth century and apply with modifications to Beirut (where a purely Lebanese, and largelyGreek-Catholic, “commercial/financial oligarchy” played the equivalent role)150 and of course toAlexandria. Beirut’s population grew from ca.6,000 around 1820 to 150,000 in 1905,151 whileAlexandria’sgrowth,given thebigger sizeof thecity,was justas formidable: from181,000 in1865,232,000in1882,319,000in1897152toalmost600,000(573,063)in1927!153Bythe1920sforeignersmadeup 17.4 percent of Alexandria’s population, and of those almost 50 percent (48.9 percent) wereGreeks.154

BeirutandEgyptwereconvulsedbythesilkandcottonboomsofthe1860s.InMountLebanon“thesilkindustrywasrestructuredandindustrializedtothebenefitof”Frenchcapital,155whileAlexandria’s

rapidexpansionas themaineastMediterraneanport sawthenumberofEuropeansquadruple in thenineyearsofSa‘id’sreign(1854–63).By1864therewerefiftytosixtythousandEuropeansinthecity,mostlyGreek,Italian,andFrench.156AlexandrianfamiliesofMuslimoriginhadalmostnoshareinthe“fantasticenrichmentthatcharacterizedcertainGreekorSyrianfamilies”inthe1860s.157Asearlyas1839,whenforeignmercantilefirms,theso-called“maisonsdecommerce,”hadbeenexpandingrapidly,twelveGreekmerchant houses, Ralli included, had already “captured 33 percent of theAlexandriacottonexportmarket,with the largestGreekhouse,TossizzaFrèresetCie, exporting11percentofEgypt’s cotton.”158 In these earlyyears, twoGreek friendsofMuhammadAli (MichelTossizza andYanniAnastasi,later“Jeand’Anastasy”)weresaidtobeamongtherichestmerchantsinAlexandria;both “cosmopolitan merchants with agents in other Mediterranean ports such as Marseille andLivorno.”159By1872,whenexpansionresumedwithmorethan200millionpoundsofrawcottonbeingshipped toEuropeanmarkets,160 theGreek hold on the export economywasmore entrenched thanever.What finally clinched it and secured its dominance for the next four or five decadeswas thedefeatofEgyptiannationalismbythedisplayofmilitaryforcein1882.161Britain’soccupationofEgyptusheredinthe“heydayofcosmopolitanAlexandria,”162thepalmyyearsfrom1882to1936,whenthesize of the cottonharvestmore thandoubled in the years before the outbreakof thewar.163 Britaintransformed Alexandria into a trading station (comptoir) where cotton was “amassed, controlled,sorted,weighedanddespatched.”Theagentsoflargeinternationalfirmshadtobebasedthere.164Butthe tradewas tightlycontrolledby thebigcottonexporters,ofwhomthebiggestwereGreek firmslinked to the Benachis, Choremis, Salvagos, and so on. These large Greek exporters formed “thewealthiestandmostpowerfulgroupwithintheGreekcommunity.”165InlessthanayearoftheBritishtaking over, the bigger export firms would move to establish the Alexandria General ProduceAssociation,which exerted a firmgripon the city’s cottonexchange (next toLiverpool, the secondbiggest in theworld)166 andwhichnativeEgyptiangrowerswouldcome to lookuponasa cartelofsorts.167“Ofthetwenty-fourfoundingmembersoftheAssociation,fifteenwereGreekwithTheodoreRallis aspresident andEmmanuelBenakis asvice-president.”168 Ilbertwrites that between 1885 and1934 the “power of the Association was such that no one could touch it.”169 By 1890 Alexandria’sbusiness élitenumbered somehundredand fifty individuals,with a smaller circleof sixty capitalistscontrollingthelargestshareofassets.170

ThebiggestoftheGreek-ownedfirmswasChoremi,Benachi&Co.Again,thefounderofthisfirm,EmmanuelBenachi,camefromaChianfamilythathadfledthemassacresof1822tostartupatextilesbusiness,importingLancashiregoods,onSyros.171HebelongedtothesecondgenerationoftheGreekdiaspora, the defteroclassati, whose fortunes were closely bound up with the British. TheChoremi/Benachi business had dozens of branches in the Egyptian interior, in rural towns likeZagazigwhich thrived on the cotton trade.They employed onlyGreeks in theirAlexandria office.Followingtheoccupation,theGreekcommercialbourgeoisieofAlexandriabuiltanentirequartertotheeastofthecitycalled“QuartierGrec.”TheBenachismovedherein1884,livinginavillaoppositeTheodoreRallis.Herewasagroupwithafiercesenseofitsownclasslocation,ferventAnglophiles,

fluent in English and French, and almost totally ignorant of Arabic. Emmanuel Benachi himselfpreferredGreektootherlanguagesandexudedastrongnationalism.TheBenachiswerepassionatelyinterested in political developments in Greece and became avid supporters of the ultra-nationalistVenizelos.BenachihimselfleftAlexandriain1911tobecometheGreekministeroffinanceandthenmayorofAthens.172

Kitroeffunderscoresthecosmopolitanoriginsof theGreekcapitalistswhodominatedAlexandria’scotton tradeandmanyof its insurance,banking,brokerage,and importbusinesses.173But thiswasacosmopolitanismthatallowedforbothracism(towardEgyptians)174andasometimesvisceralGreeknationalism.Trimistates that theBenachiswere“cosmopolitans,”yet“theirmore intimaterelationswerealmostentirelyconfinedtoGreeks.”175Manselsuggeststhattheybecame“Greeknationalistsaswell as cosmopolitan Alexandrians.”176 Alexandria’s upper-class residential areas were less mixedethnicallythan,say,theoldhara,theJewishquarter,whereGreeks,Italians,andSyrianslivedsidebyside.177Businesscosmopolitanismrequirednolevelofinteractionbeyondthosedictatedbythepursuitofaccumulation.“TheBenakisknewlittleofEgyptexcepthowtoexploitor—dependingonthepointof view—develop its economy.”178 A description of Alexandria ca.1909 recalls Nizan’s portrait ofAden. “All considerations of science, art, and archaeology are choked by the city’s strenuouscommercialactivity,”itstates.“Affairsofcommerce,thestateoftrade,themovementsinstocksandsharesformthestapleofthedailyroundofconversationintheclubs,inthestreets,onthewharves,onthetrams,inthetrains,inshort,everywhereinthiscity...nowwhollyandwhole-heartedlygiventothe worship of the modern deity Mammon, who exacts the most exclusive devotion from hisfollowers.”179

Alexandria exerted a peculiar fascination on its Levantine residents. The celebrated poet Cavafywhose father’s firm P. J. Cavafy & Co. had traded in cotton and grain, with branches in Cairo,London,andLiverpool,and failed in1876whenhewas thirteen, forcinghisbrothers to take“whatjobstheycouldasclerksandmanagerswithotherGreekcompanies,”180knewhewouldneverbeabletoleave.Yousaid:“I’llgotoanothercountry,gotoanothershore,findanothercitybetterthanthisone.”

Cavafythentellshimself:Youwon’tfindanewcountry,won’tfindanothershore.Thiscitywillalwayspursueyou.You’llwalkthesamestreets,growoldinthesameneighbourhoods,turngreyinthesesamehouses.

You’llalwaysendupinthiscity.181

5

COMMERCIALPRACTICESPutting-OutortheCapitalistDomesticIndustries

Marx’sownrecurringcharacterizationofcommercialcapitalasinexorablysubordinatetoindustryandtoindustrialcapitalobscuresthefactthathistoricallyawiderangeofindustriesworkedformerchant’scapital. The chief but not the only form this took was what historians writing in English call the“putting-out system.” Hilferding referred to industrial sectors organized in this way as “capitalistdomestic industries.” 1 Next to large-scale commerce, which Marx was willing in one passage todescribeasa“formofcapitalistproduction,”2thecapitalistdomesticindustrieswereprobablythemostwidespread formof capitalism forcenturies together. JohnClapham regarded capitalist outwork as“stillthepredominantform”ofindustrialorganizationinBritaininthe1820s.3Whenthespinningofcottonbegan tobemechanized in the last twodecadesof theeighteenthcentury,“avastamountofextraweavingcapacitywasrequired . . . toworkup thevastquantitiesofmachine-spunyarnnowbeingturnedout,”andthisextracapacity“wassuppliedbyanenormousexpansionalongtraditionaloutworklines,asawholenewarmyofmen,women,andchildrenwererecruitedtothehandloom.”4

Thus“outworkwasnotsomedyingpre-industrialdinosaur,but... aperfectlyrational,viable,andadaptable form of organization in many industries.”5 It showed remarkable powers of survivalthroughout thenineteenthcentury in thewholesalemass-productionofcheapready-madeclothing.6

Withthecomingoftherailways,Londonwholesalehousesintheshirttradesenttheirworkintothecountryaswell as to theEastEnd.7 In fact,Londonremained“the largest singlecentreofoutworkproduction”anywhereinBritaininthenineteenthcentury.8

CarloPoniofferedaconvenientdefinition in1985:“Production thatwasessentiallydomestic,andthereforedispersed,wasorganized anddominatedby entrepreneurswhowere traders and exported tonearanddistantmarkets. . . In its ‘classic’ form theworkers (often spinners andweaverswho stillownedtheir instrumentsofwork)receivedtherawmaterialfromthemerchant-entrepreneurandwerepaidby thepiecewhen theyhandedover the finishedproduct.”Hewenton to say, “According toSombart, this cottage industry is already a ‘manifestation of the modern capitalistic mode ofproduction,’ the essential characteristic of which was ‘the laborer’s dependence on the capitalisticentrepreneur.’”9

InGermanthis“dispersed”ordecentralizedformoforganizationisusuallyreferredtoasVerlagandthe merchant deploying it as aVerleger, in English as the putting-out system or as “outwork” or“homework,” and the merchant as a “putter-out” or just as often as a “merchant-manufacturer.”Capitalistproduction inthestrictsensemaybesaidtohavebegunwiththeputting-outsystem.10Theessence of the system was that the subjection of labor to capital occurred in a form that did not

presupposeitssimultaneoussubordinationthroughthelaborprocess.(Marxcalledthelatterthe“realsubsumptionoflabortocapital.”)Itwasnotembodiedinthestructureofthelaborprocessorreflectedinits“technicalcharacteristics.”AsMarxsaysrepeatedly,“Attheoutsetit(capital)takesit(thelaborprocess)asitfindsit.”11“Itdoesnotthereforedirectlychangethemodeofproduction,”12where“modeof production” simplymeans the labor process itself.On the other hand, and this is crucial, itwasessential that the merchant controlled, managed, and coordinated production itself, that is, theinterconnectedlaborprocessesthroughwhichthecommoditywasfinallyproduced.Thedispersaloflivinglaborwasre-totalizedinthefinalcommoditythankstothemerchant’scontrolandintegrationofproduction.Poni’sdefinitioncontains theessential elementsof thisparadox: thedispersednatureofproduction, its organization and control by “entrepreneurs” who are basically merchants, themerchant’scontroloftherawmaterialanddesigns,thewidespreaduseofpiecerates,andfinally,fromSombart,thesubjectionoflabor.Fromitsbroadorigins(inEuropeanyway)inthetwelfthcentury,theputting-outsystemreachedacrescendo in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.Even after its heyday, it showed astonishingresilience.Whentheoptionoffactoryproductionbecameavailabletomanufacturersinthenineteenthcentury, they could still prefer outworkbecauseof its loweroverheads, higher rates of exploitation(greaterintensityoflaborlinkedtolowpiecerates),andgreaterflexibilityinhiringandfiringlabor.13

Thesewereallcharacteristicsofthesystemthatfavoredthecountrysideoverurbanlocations,sothatbytheearlyeighteenthcentury“thebulkofallwool,linen,cotton,andblendedclothinEuropewasproduced in the great rural districts of England, France, Germany, the Low Countries, andSwitzerland.”14Thecrucialconstraintwastheavailabilityofhomeworkers,andwhereemployershadtheoptionofcuttingcostsbymovingtocheaperlaborinthecountryside,theydidso.Whentheydidsoinabigwayintheeighteenthcentury,whatevolvedwasthekindofcapitalismthathasbeenlabeled“proto-industry,”thatis,concentratedindustrialregionsthatspecializedinmassproductionforexportmarkets,15 what Lis and Soly have called “industrial mass production in the countryside.”16 In theBeauvaisis in northernFrance, a typical regionof this sort, textile productionwaswidelydispersedthrough the countryside, with enormous levels of output even in Colbert’s day and sales outletscontrolled by powerfulmerchants.17But asPoni pointedout, proto-industrywasnot a purely ruralsystem.18TheFlemishwoolenindustryofthethirteenthcenturywasalargelyurbanindustry.Sowasthewool industryofFlorence from its inception in the thirteenth century to its decline in the earlyseventeenth.Andwhenconcentratedinthetowns,asitlargelywasinitially,theskeinofVerlagcouldgivemedievalandearly-moderncitiestheappearanceof“greatmanufactories”(grandimanifatture),19

of“onevastfactory,”asEleanoraCarus-WilsondescribedthegreatclothingtownsofDouai,Ypres,and Brussels as they were in the thirteenth century.20 In both periods (medieval as well as earlymodern), and regardless ofwhether production occurred in towns or in the countryside,when theputting-outsystemwasusedinaregular,systematicwayitalwaysimpliedmassproduction,“salestoageneral market,” in Marx’s expression.21 In England by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,“outworkers were producing at the behest of capitalists for a mass market, not for individual

customers.”22Some industries“reliedheavilyonoutwork.”23Bythellnotes that“at thebeginningofthenineteenthcentury... severalindustries(inEngland)weretoalargeextentorganizedontheselines:thespinningandweavingofbasictextiles,muchofthemanufactureofpersonalconsumergoodssuchasclothes,boots,andstockings,andthemakingofcertaincommonitemsofhardware,ofwhichnailswerethemostimportant.”Thesewere“massmarkets”inconsumergoodswhichweresuppliedby“largecapitalists”24variouslydescribedas“bigurbanmanufacturersandmerchants”or“merchant-manufacturers” or “large wholesale houses,”25 while the workers were wage earners working withtheirowntoolsintheirownworkshopsandhomes.26

The basis of themerchant’s dominancewas a dual one, the first lying in amonopoly of the rawmaterial,whichwaseitherinaccessiblelocallyandthustooexpensiveor,whereaccessible,thefocusofaferociousstrugglebetweenmerchantsandartisans.InaveryfinestudyoftheCholetlinenindustryTessieLiuarguesthat“Successfulputting-outrequiredmerchantstobuyupasmuchyarnaspossibletodeprivedirectproducersofindependentaccesstorawmaterials.”27Putters-out“couldonlyachievetheir goals bymonopolizing rawmaterials,” “buyingup theyarnbefore it reached themarket, andforcing weavers to sell to or take commissions from them exclusively.”28 The other foundation ofmercantile control over artisan labor was the merchant’s ability to organize the overall productionprocessinwaysthatwouldhavebeenimpossibleforisolatedgroupsofworkerswithinit.The following pages summarize some of the historical work that concerns industries that madeextensive use of the putting-out system.Thekey fact to note is thatmerchant firmswere themainownersofcapitalandemployersoflaborineachoftheseindustrialsectors.

MERCHANTMANUFACTURING“The great Florentine fortunes were made in banking and trade, never in manufacturing,” wroteRaymonddeRoover.HenotedthatonlyaminorpartoftheMedicicapitalwasinvestedinthewooland silk industries.29However,SergioTognettihas since shown that the rapidexpansionof the silkindustry,especiallyfromthelaterfifteenthcentury,wasverylargelyfinancedbythecity’sgreatcasate,thebankingandcommercialhousesthatwereatthecuttingedgeofnorthItaliancapitalism.30Itishardtosayhowfarthesamewastrueofthewoolenindustry.Inthe1480s,forexample,oneofthebiggestcommercialhouses,theStrozzi,hadatotaloftwenty-onewoolfirms.31Thiswasprobablyfarhigherthan the average investment of other families from the Florentine banking and commercial élite.Braudel’sviewofaverticallyintegratedindustrywhere“oneendofthechainwouldberepresented,forexample,bythepossessionofawoolwash-houseinOldCastile;theotherendbypilesoftextilesina store in Alexandria”32 is largely contradicted by more recent accounts of the industry, notablyGoldthwaite’s,whichsuggestsinsteadboththat“Noonefirmhadasignificantshareofthemarket”33

(the industry was characterized by extreme fragmentation), and that “a firm sold its productsimmediatelytoanymerchant-exporterwhowouldbuythem.”34

Themostimportantwoolenindustriesofthelatermiddleagesgrewupinregionswheretherewasanabundant supply of cheap labor. In Florence wage costs amounted to 60–65 percent of total

manufacturingcostsintheindustry.35Whentop-qualityEnglishwoolbegantobeusedbythe1320s,thesectorsawrapidreconversiontobetter-qualitywoolandgrewrapidlyintermsofvalueofoutput.Themerchant-chroniclerGiovanniVillanitellsus(writingabouttheyears1336–38specifically),

TheworkshopsoftheArtedellaLanawere200ormore,andtheymadefrom70,000to80,000piecesofcloth,whichwereworthmorethan1,200,000goldflorins.Andagoodthird[ofthissum]remainedinthelandas[thereward]oflabor,withoutcountingtheprofitof theentrepreneurs.Andmorethan30,000personslivedbyit. [Tobesure,]wefindthatsomethirtyyearsearlier therewere300workshopsorthereabouts,andtheymademorethan100,000piecesofclothyearly;buttheseclothswerecoarserandone

halflessvaluable,becauseatthattimeEnglishwoolwasnotimportedandtheydidnotknow,astheydidlater,howtoworkit.36

ThefirmsthatranthewoolindustryinFlorencewereshort-termpartnershipsbetweeninvestorsandmanagingpartners,wherethemanagingpartnerdealtwithproduction,37showingthatevenwhenthecity’s big merchant-bankers (grandi mercanti banchieri, in Tognetti’s description)38 did invest inindustry, they cannot be described as “industrial entrepreneurs,” much less “magnates,” as AlfredDorenimaginedthemtobeinhisclassic,quasi-Marxist,monograph.39Amorerealisticpictureoftheindustryshouldhavedivideditbroadlyinto(1)“richownersoflargefactories,”(2)alargermassofsmallentrepreneurs,and(3)thegreatmassofclothworkers.40Dyers,fullers,stretchers,andmendersoperated theirownshopsandapparently“chafedunder their subjection to theWoolgild,”wantingfreedomtobargainwiththemanufacturers.41Theproductionorganizerswhofunctionedasmiddlemenintheputting-outsystemwereincludedamongthesesottoposti,belowwhomcametheworkersproper,the “thousands who lived by wages.”42 Similar divisions characterized the labor force. Beating,carding, and combingwere operations performed on the employer’s premises (the shops known asbotteghe).Thesewere“menialandtedioustasks”andtheworkersdoingthemwereamongthe“mostdowntroddenandthemostpoorlypaid.”43Itisthereforeinterestingthatthesegroups(beaters,carders,andcombers)playedaleadingpartintheCiompirevoltof1378,whenalargemassofworkersintheindustry (nine thousand on one estimate)44 seized the government in the summer of that year and(briefly)wontherighttoformtheirownguild.45Spinningandweavingwerehome-basedoperations,andheretoothemajordifferencewasthatfirmsreliedonlaborcontractorscalledfattoritorecruitandpay the thousandsofwomen involved in spinningbutmade sureweavingwas closely supervised.46

Weaverswerepiece-rated,ownedtheirownlooms,anddidnotstaylongwiththesameemployer.47

Theywereoftenforcedintodebtsothatfirmsweresureofhavingreservesoflaboravailableinthefuture. Given that the likely average payroll size of most wool firms was anywhere between, say,fifteenandfifty,48thebulkofthelaborforceconsisted,clearly,oftheworkersemployedintheputting-out sectors of the industry. Interestingly, the weavers themselves played no significant role in theCiompiRevolt.49

Thus, in the textile industries“putting-out”washardlyeverastand-alonesystem,butwasusuallyintegrated into total production processes characterized by their “combined” nature. In themanufacture ofwool, some operationswere performed centrally on the employer’s premises, somesubcontracted to other, independent firms (this applied to wool-washing and dyeing), and the rest(spinningandweaving)“putout.” Inkeepingwith this, thewool itselfkeptmovingbackand forth

betweenlocationsandbetweenthecityandareasinthecontado.GérardGayot’sstudyofthewoolenindustryinSedan(inFrance)showsthesamecomplicatedmovement.50Nexttomonopolyoftherawmaterials (woolof different qualities, dyestuffs, alum), integrationof control over all these separateprocesses was the true basis of the merchant’s dominance in capitalistically organized domesticindustries.51FederigoMeliscalculatedthatinthewoolbusinessrunbythePratomerchantFrancescodiMarcoDatini,theproductionof222½piecesofwoolenclothoverathree-yearperiodrequiredtheemployment of no fewer thanone thousandpersonswho in turnwere involved in 6,088distinct or“partial”operations.52

Thebulkofawool firm’scapitalwas tiedup inrawmaterialsand in theoutlayforwages,mostlyadvancepaymentstospinnersandweavers.Whatpredominatedinproductionwascirculatingcapital.(ThebigexceptionstothisamongtheVerlagindustriesweremining,iron-making,andshipbuilding,allofwhichinvolvedsubstantialamountsoffixedcapital.)Goldthwaitearguesthatnoneofthefixedcapitalusedintheindustrycamefromthefirms;forexample,themassivetenteringshedsscatteredallover the city or the fullingmills located in largemill complexes outside the city, along the Arno,belonged either to theWool guild or to landowners.53 This may explain why de Roover himselfderivedthecapitalistnatureoftheindustrymorefromitssubjectionoflaborthanfromanyostensible“giant”enterprisesofthekindAlfredDorenrootedfor.“Althoughthewoolworkersforthemostpartwereemployedintheirownhomesandusedtheirowntools,theywerenotindependentartisansbutwage-earnerswhoworked onmaterials supplied by their employers.”54 “The employers, subject toseverecompetitionineverythingelse,wereunitedinagildanduseditsmachinerytokeepwagesdownandtopreventworkersfromorganizing.”55Thechiefadvantageof“outsourcing”thebulkofproductiontooutworkerswastheflexibilityitgavethefirmsthemselves,inotherwords,theeasewithwhichtheycouldcurtailproductionbylayingoffworkerswhenevermanagersneededto.Silkwasamassivelycompetitivemarketcharacterizedbyvolatiledemand(rapidchangesinfashion)and ahugevarietyof fabrics.56 From the early fifteenth century it became the leading sector of theItalian economy for the next several centuries.57 As competition mounted rapidly in the sixteenthcentury, Florence, a leading producer, drastically reduced production of higher-quality silks,“downscaled”tosimplerfabrics,andbasicallyretainedvitalitythroughouttheseventeenthcenturybyadaptingtothenatureoftheEnglishmarket.58Bythe1660s“thecity’ssilkindustrywasalmostentirelygearedtomeetingthedemandsoftheEnglishmarket”59andEnglandherselfaccountedforoverhalfofFlorence’stotalproductionofsilks,60untilanindigenous(English)silkindustrybegantotakeoverthedomesticmarket in the finaldecadesof the seventeenthcentury.61Butby the startof theeighteenthcenturyitwastheLyonssilkindustrythatemergedasbyfarthemostadvancedinEurope.The twenty-oddyearsbetween1712and1732sawrapidconcentrationofcapital inLyons’Grande

Fabrique,asthenetworkofputting-outfirmsinthesilkindustrywascalled.Inhismonographontheindustry JustinGodart cites amémoire dated 1712 that gives the total number of bigmerchants (ormaîtres marchands, as they were called) as around two hundred and the number of homeworkersemployedbythemonpiece-ratesasbetweenthreethousandandfourthousand.62Betweenthosepoles

lay a mass of weavers working “on their own account” (pour leur compte), who were described as“merchantsandworkersrolledintoone”andforwhomnofigureisgiven.In1732,bycontrast,alatermémoire cited by Poni puts the number of big merchants or marchands fabricants (“putting-outentrepreneurs”)atca.seventyandthenumberofworkersatca.eightythousand.63Thus therewasasubstantial reduction in numbers at the capitalist endof the industry and a doublingof themass ofweaversatitsbase.Betweenthosedates,thecityauthoritieshadgoneonamajordrivetoeliminatetheindependentweaversaspartofaconcerted“subordinationoflabortocapital”thatwasbeingenforcedatasocial,collectivelevelbytherepresentativesofcapital.Thecampaigninvolvedallegationsthattheindependentweavers, unable to afford the services of designers,were stealing designs from the bigmerchantfirmswiththeactivecollusionoftheworkersemployedbythosefirms.TheGrandeFabriquehasbeendescribedasa“hugeindustrialandcommercialcomplex”employing

ca.thirty-fivethousandworkersbythe1780s,nearlyaquarterofthecity’spopulationandalmosthalfits labor force.64 Its basis remained the dispersion of labor in domestic units controlled by capital.Sewellhasargued that themasterweavers themselvesarebetterseenassubcontractors thanaspurewagelaborers,sincethey“hiredandsupervisedtheirownjourneymen.”65Buthealsonotesthat“[t]hemerchant simply paid theweaver, his subcontractor, enough to keep his family unit going.”66 Thefamilylaborthatwasessentialtothisformofcapitalistorganizationwasofcourseunpaid.ThisonlyaddstotheironyofbeingtoldthatLyons’silkindustrywas“themostinnovativeoftheeighteenth-centuryFrenchtextileindustriesindesign,marketing,andtechnology.”“Intermsofvalueofproduct,itwaseasilythemostimportantindustrialcomplexineighteenth-centuryFrance.”67Lyonsdominatedthe“very lucrative high end of the European and transatlantic silkmarket.”68Against the claims of itsweaversthatthesuccessoftheindustrywasdueto“thehighprofessionalqualityoftheirwork,”themerchants chose to argue (in 1759) that theweaversweremore likemasons on a construction site,whereas they themselveswere thearchitectswithoutwhomnobuildingwouldhavebeenpossible.69

Whattheanalogypointstoisthetotalizingroleofmerchant’scapitalinputtingtheindustrytogetherandsecuringitsdominancethroughathoroughknowledgeofthemarket.TheLyonssilkmerchants“were the first. . . to use annual product differentiation as a strategicweapon to create barriers toentry,tocaptureimportantsharesoftheinternationalmarketandtooutmaneuverfirmsincompetitionwith them.”70 This presupposed substantial investment in the production of new designs71 and the“extraordinary flexibility”withwhich informationwas used to respond to rapidly changingmarketconditions.72Theuseandtrainingoffirst-classdesignerswascrucialtothewaytheindustryretainedcompetitivedominance.Youngdesignerswouldcontinue tospend longperiods inPariseveryyear,visitingthemostfamoussilkwarehousesintheareaaroundChâteletandPalaisRoyal.“Thesevisitsgaverisetosubstantial interactionbetweentheproducerfirmsandtheneedsandexpectationsofthemarket.”73 Back in Lyons, designers would “work in cooperation with a weaver and specializedtechnicians to transfer the designs from paper to loom before theywere put out to theweavers.”74

DesignerswerewellpaidandpivotaltothewholecommercialstrategytokeepaheadofandactivelyshapetheParisfashionmarket.“Innovationshadtobenotonlyrapidbutalsoappealing,”75anditwas

only in Lyons, or in Lyons and Paris, that this programmed “production of novelty,”76 “changingdesigns from one season to another,” became a ruthless market strategy that defeated even theimitationindustries.Ontheotherhand,noneofthiswouldhaveworkedwithoutwhatPonicallsthe“flexibilityofferedby the artisanorputting-outorganizationof production,”which, ashe says, theLyonsmerchantswere “the very first to exploit fully and systematically.”77 Amajor aspect of thatflexibility was the fact that outwork was, as Bythell described it, “eminently capable of rapidexpansion,givenanabundanceofcheap labor.”78 InLyons, industrial capacityalmost trebled in thedecadesbetween1720and1788.79

TheOrientalCarpetManufacturersLimited(OCMforshort),finally,isaconciseillustrationofthecombination of relatively advanced forms ofmodern commercial capitalismwith domestic industry.OCM’s carpet manufacturing used both factories and domestic production in widely dispersednetworks thatwere put together by a remarkably energetic field staff (“carpetmen”) across a vastregion fromAnatolia throughIran toMirzapur innorthernIndia.80Ottomantradedatashows therewasadramaticgrowthinthecarpettradeat theendof thenineteenthcentury,witha largeshareofexportsbeingsourcedfromtraditionalweavingtownslikeUshakontheplateauca.twohundredmilesnortheastofSmyrna.81Inthesetowns,Smyrnamerchants“hadagentswhowerepaid3or4percentofthe purchase price to supervise themanufacture and to accept the finished carpets.” “The Smyrnadealerswere either agents ofEuropean firmsworking for commissions of 3 to 5 percent, or sellingdirecttotheiroverseascustomersonFOBbasis.”82Competitionwasfierce,and, in1907,agroupofSmyrna-based Levantine merchants, “the most important and wealthiest carpet manufacturers ofSmyrna,”as theydescribed themselves in theprospectus,83 amalgamated to formwhat soonbecameOrientalCarpetManufacturers.84OCM,whichbeganessentiallyasacombinationoftheseLevantinecarpettradersandtheLondonfirmofG.P.&J.Baker,wasfromitsinceptiona“completelyverticallyintegrated” concern,with “an immense trading capital of £400,000” and branch offices in London,Paris,Constantinople,Cairo,Alexandria,andNewYork.85“Afterthreeyearsoftrading,thecompanyhadearnedhugeprofits, amassed strong reserves andpaidhandsomedividends to its shareholders”andwas“responsiblefortheexportof90percentofTurkey’scarpets.”86By1912OCMhadbranchesalloverEurope, inCairo,Sydney,andBuenosAires,andwassaidtoemploy“somefortythousandweaversandfactoryworkersinAnatoliaalone,”andwasseekingshareholderapprovalforadoublingoftheircapitalto£1million.87Expansionwasrapidand“[t]oincreaseproductionasfastaspossible”OCMhad“sentagentsouttotownsandvillagesacrosswesternAnatoliatoestablishloomsinprivatehousestoweaveforthemundercontract.”MostoftheweaverswereGreekorArmenianChristians,sincetheywereless“shyaboutlettingmenfrom outside the family into their houses.”88 The company’s biographer AntonyWynnwrites that“[e]normouseffortwasexpendedongettingboththequalityanddesignsright.”89“ThedesignhouseinSmyrnaemployedskilleddraftsmentoproduceandcopydesignsonsquaredpapertosendouttotheweavers.”90Weaverswerepaidpiecewages,withratesdecliningandtheintensityoflaborgrowingasonemovedtotheouterconcentriccirclesofproductionsiteswhichsharedtheircommoncenterin

Smyrna.ThusthenumberofknotsrequiredtoearnonepiastreorkurushwasseventeenhundredforweaversinSmyrnabutashighasthreethousandinBursaandSivas.91Ontheotherhand,rapidityoflaborwasnotalwaysanadvantage:acompanyofficialwouldsaylater,abouttheweaversinTabrizinthenorthofIran,“Theyareverypreciseandcleverweavers,buttheygivethecarpetsuchaprecisionjobthatitlookstoomuchlikeamachinemadecarpet.”Theseweavers,bothmenandwomen,weresaidtobeabletoweave“attherateofjustoveroneknotpersecond”onstretchesofsinglecolor.92Atthe timeOCM entered the Persianmarket, a large colony of Tabrizi merchants in ConstantinopleexertedavirtualmonopolyofthePersiancarpettrade.Americanfirmsfirstbrokethismonopolybypayingmuchhigherprices.93“Financewasthekeytothecarpettrade,”writesWynn.“Anyonewhocouldpaycashforready-maderugs,orpayadvancestoweaversforcarpetstobedeliveredlater,hadahuge advantage over the local merchants,” who paid weavers in promissory notes payable severalmonthslater.94Also,a“muchbetterpricewas tobehad ifadvancesweregiven to theweavers,”25percentlowerthanthepriceoftheready-madecarpet.95Advancesconsistedofacombinationofrawmaterialsandwages. InHamadan in1917,whenfoodwasscarce, three-quartersof theadvancewasdescribedasbeing“inmaterials,whichtheweavercannoteatanddarenotsell.”96CecilEdwards,wholaid the foundations of the OCM operation in Iran, worked rapidly so that by the end of 1912“[p]racticallynocarpet-weavingareaofIranandthesurroundingcountrieswasleftuncovered,”andthecompanywasthoughttocontrolaboutathirdofallPersianexportproduction.97InIrananywayasubstantialpartofthiswasactuallybasedonchildlabor.98

OCM introduced an altogether more advanced organization into the industry, concentrating onlarge-sizecarpets,rigorousqualitycontrol,99 theaccumulationofahuge libraryofdesigns thatwere“drawnupinminutedetailonsquaredpaperandsentouttoTurkey,Greece,Persia,andIndiatobecopied and given out to the master weavers,”100 intense training of the OCM buyers,101 forwardintegration intomajor retail outlets in NewYork, Constantinople,102 etc., and so on. The Turkishdisasterof1922sawa large-scaleexodusofConstantinoplecarpetmerchants(Jews,Armenians,andGreeks) to London,103 which became the international wholesale market for medium-grade andspecialtycarpetsfromtheEast.Bytheendofthe1920s,“85percentoftheOrientalcarpetsimportedintoLondon...werere-exportedtoEurope,theUSA,SouthAmerica,andSouthAfrica.”104

InIndiaOCMworkedlargelythroughE.Hill&Co.,whichitacquiredfullyonlyin1944.Hill’swasbased in Mirzapur and ran an entirely home-based industry, “with no factories and no heavyoverheads.”105TheMirzapurvillageswere“company”villagesweavingforoneorotherofthecarpetcompanies.106In1969OCMwassoldtoRalliBrothersandmerged,alongwithothercompanies,intoRalliInternational.ARallicompanyhistorydescribesthewayproductionwasorganizedinMirzapur.

Carpetmanufacture isstillverymuchacottage industry intheMirzapurdistrictbut it isclosely regulatedbyE.Hillwho remainresponsibleforqualityandproduction.Thoughtheactualweavingisdoneinloomhousesintheweavers’villages,E.Hillbuytheyarn,dyeittotherequiredshadesandproducetheloomdrawings.Theseareissuedtothevillagerswiththeweavinginstructionsforstitchandsizeandthecottonforthewarpsandwefts...Carpetsareinspectedregularlyduringthecourseofweavingbymembersof the company on visits to the various villages . . . The finished carpets are then packed and transported by road some five

hundredmilestoCalcuttawheretheyareshippedtoLondon,NewYorkandCanada.107

ThecarpetmadefortheMorningDrawingRoom,HolyroodHouse(theroyalpalaceinEdinburgh)wascommissionedtoHill’s(that is,OCM),whichhadtheweavingdone inoneof thevillagesnearMirzapur.Themassive loomonwhich itwasmadewasworkedby twelveworkers, allmales, agedbetweensixteenandthirty,eachpaidaboutsixhundredrupeesamonth(equivalenttoca.£24amonthin1988whenthecarpetwasmade).Thesizeofthecarpetwas10.3mx7.6m,withaknotdensityorrefinementof210,000knotspersquaremeter.“ThetimetakenfromcompletionofthedesignofthismonsterinNovember1987todeliverytoHolyroodinMay1989hadbeenseventeenmonths.”108

6

THECIRCULATIONOFCOMMERCIALCAPITALSCompetition,Velocity,Verticality

The drive to monopolize markets, vertical integration, concentration of capital, and a striving forflexibility are features typical of capitalism that likewise run through the history of the biggercommercialfirms.Scaleandflexibilitywerelinked.“Lessermerchants...lackedsufficientcapitaltomove rapidly fromonebranch to another,”1while another historian tells us that “[t]he trade of thesmallermerchantsdifferedfromthatofthelargeronesinbeinghighlyspecialised.”2Thebiggercapitalswerebothdiversifiedandverticallyintegrated.3Bycompressingthechainofcirculation,whatChayanovhadcalledthe“tradingmachine,”verticalintegrationincreaseditsvelocityandreappropriatedapartofthesurplus-valuethatotherwiseaccruedtomiddlemen.ThusPeirceLesliedescribedthebusinessofSouthIndiancoffeebysaying,“WhereaswewereexpectedbyLondontodependentirelyonwhatwecould buy on the Coast in Tellicherry andMangalore, Volkart Bros. had a network of upcountryagents, and consequently were able to buy a large part of their requirements up-country at pricescheaperthanthoserulingontheCoast:thushavingsecuredthecreamofthemarket,theywereabletodictatethepriceontheCoast,andwereinapositiontooutbidus...IttookalongtimetoconvincetheLondonofficethatwewouldhavetofollowsuit,largelybecause...nobodyinLondonhadanyknowledgewhatever of conditions in India.”4 Big capitals were alsomore diversified. The leadingLondon merchants of the early seventeenth century had portfolios characterized by “multipleinvestments”;forexample,inRabb’sstudyabouttwenty-fiveoftheleadingmerchantswereinvestedinnineormorecompanies.5OfthesilkenterprisesrunbyMilan’scommercialhousesStefanoAngelitellsusthebiggesthousesshunnedspecialization.Hereferstoan“intensediversificationofsectorsandmarkets” as typical of their economic behavior.6 Evenwithin core businesses, the same striving fordiversificationwas evident.Thus,Molà points out that “Venetians diversified their output of everysingletypeof(silk)fabric,producingitindistinctvarietiesathigherorlowerprices.”7Andoneoftheways inwhich theEnglish textile industrybegan todominate themarkets of Spain and Italy in thesecond quarter of the seventeenth century, turning the table on the Italians,was through the sheerassortmentofdifferenttextilesitchurnedout.8

International tradewas in any casealways characterized by a highdegree of concentration. In hisclassicmonographontheVenetianstateanditsbigmerchants,GiorgioCraccolaidouttheaxiom:tocompete effectively on the international scale required a “concentration (both) of capitals and ofmercantile structures.”9 As in large-scale industry and banking, concentration was driven bycompetition among the big players (although Marx correctly saw competition itself as merely“externalizing”thelawofaccumulation).Hereareafewexamplesofthis.Attheendofthethirteenth

century,atthestartofthereignoftheMamlukrulerNasiral-DinMuhammad,therewereovertwohundredKārimīmerchantsinEgypt,eachemployingdozensofcommercialagentsinvariousmarketsoverseas.10TheKarimiswerewell-organizedmaritimetraderswhodominatedthespicetradefromitsEgyptianend,tradingtotheMalabarcoastviaAden.Yetacenturylater,bytheendofthefourteenthcentury, a largepart ofAden’s trafficwithEgypthadbecome concentrated in thehandsof amuchsmaller groupofKarimi familieswhowere said tohave close tieswith theMamluk rulers.11At theclose of the sixteenth century, some sixtyGenoese bankers dominated the Piacenza fairs, the greatfinancialclearinghouseofEuropeancapitalismwhere“hugesumsofmoneychangedhands.”12IntheAtlantictrades,in1686,fortyfirmshadhandled86percentofLondon’stobaccoimports;by1775whenLondon tobacco imports had trebled in value, 90 percent of the tradewas handled by twenty-eightfirms.13IntheWestIndiatradeintheeighteenthcentury,twentyleadingcommissionagentsengrossednearly two-thirds of a hugely lucrative business.14Of the total iron imported intoHull in 1751, 87percentwashandledbytenmerchants,andalmostsixtypercentbythetoptwo.15Theoliveoiltradeofsouthern Italy was likewise “to a large extent” in the hands of a “relatively small group of bigNeapolitanmerchantsandforeignmerchanthouses”formuchoftheeighteenthcentury.16Formostofthe early nineteenth, about two-thirds of the private trade in opium was controlled by just twoagencies,Dent&Co.andJardines,17andby1871anewcomer,theSassoons,hadacquiredcontrolof70percentofIndianopiumofallvarieties.18IntheWestAfricanpalmoiltradebetween1830and1855,a half-dozenmainlyLiverpool firms controlled over half themarket each year.19 Between 1895 and1910 sixor seven firms,AmericanandGerman, exportedup to sixtypercentof theBrazilian coffeecrop.20Around1900fiveFrenchhousesatmostwereresponsibleforpurchasingtwo-thirdsofBeirut’ssilkexports.21 InArgentina the “Big Four” grain tradersmassively controlled the exportmarket inwheat“andstronglyinfluencedlocalmarkets.”22Inthe1925–26season,thetopfiveshippers,threeofthem Japanese, accounted for two-thirds of all raw cotton exports from Bombay.23 By 1928WestAfrica’stradewasdominatedbyjustfourlargefirms,twoofwhomwouldmergeayearlatertoformUnilever’s trading armUAC.24 Among this handful of giants, the French firmsCFAO and SCOAwere, on one description, “vertically integrated trading and shipping combines.”25 In Indochina by1938fiveFrenchbankinggroupscontrolled70percentofthelandplantedtorubber.26AndinBurmaby1939,1.7percentofthericemillshandledaround44percentofthepaddycrop.27

Allofthenineteenth/earlytwentieth-centuryexamplesherecomefromwhatarecalledthe“producetrades.”Thesewere fiercely competitive, both among thehandfulsof bigmerchant firms thatwereactiveinthemandbetweenthemandthebrokerstheyreliedon.Bythelatenineteenth/earlytwentiethcenturies, “[c]oncentration and centralization (of capital) were the only means of commercialsurvival,” Bob Shenton has argued.28When SirGeorgeGoldie headed an amalgamation of BritishmerchantfirmstradingintheNigerDeltaregionandformedtheUnitedAfricanCompanyin1879,theexpress purpose of this, Shenton explains, “was to circumvent the Delta middlemen and to tradedirectlywithpalm-oilproducersontheNigerRiverproper.”29Butthedriveforverticalintegrationwasnevercompletelysuccessful.Inthedecadesthatfollowed,aspateofacquisitionsgaveLeverBrothers

directaccesstooilseeds.Butthiswasasoapmanufacturer-cum-margarineproducergainingaccesstomarkets inBritishWestAfrica through trading companies, ofwhich thebiggestwas theNigerCo.(Goldie’soriginal1879company, recast asa charteredcompanycalled the“RoyalNigerCompany,CharteredandLimited”).30WilliamLever acquired theNigerCo. in 1920 for a price exceeding£8million, funded, evidently, through themarket.31When this was thenmergedwith its closest rivalA&E(itselfanamalgamationofLiverpoolfirms)in1929toformtheUnitedAfricaCompany(UAC),thecommercialarmofUnileverwhichnowassembledsomeninety-threeseparatecompanies, itwasUAC’sexperienceinAfricathatbestdemonstratedthelimitstotheverticalintegrationofamerchantfirm.

THE“RELATIVEAUTONOMY”OFBROKERSBytheearlypartofthetwentiethcenturythebiggestmerchantfirmshadreachedenormousscalesofoperation. In British West Africa alone UAC paid £12.3 million for produce in the year endedSeptember1933.32Evenaslateas1952thevalueofallproduceboughtbyit inNigeriaandtheGoldCoastwasover£42million.33Theproducetradesdependedonsubstantialvolumesofworkingcapitalthat were circulated as advances, and even if firms exercised tight control over the prices paid toproducers,theadvancesonlycirculatedviabrokersandmiddlemen.InpalmoilUAChada“largeandcomplex”organization.InNigeria in the late1940s“therewerefivemainadministrativecentres. . .thirty-four local centres, and some two hundred outstations” that dealt with African or “Syrian”middlemen and employed African produce-buyers.34 In groundnuts in 1948–9 “it had 150 buyingpoints in Northern Nigeria and 55 in the Benue area, divided between main local centers andoutstations.IntheKanoareaitdealtthroughtwenty-eightcontractors,seventy-ninemiddlemen,tenfactors and 102 outstation clerks.”35 (Overall, by 1939 it employed twenty-seven hundredmiddlemen!)36 Contractors, writes Fieldhouse, “were an essential feature of the system, but theypresentedoneproblem:becauseoftheirverysizetheywerehighlyindependentandwereliabletouseUACcommissionstofinancetheirownoperationsorpurchasesforothertradingfirms.”37Thusthe“reallybigabuseandalsothemostdebatedissuebetweenthefirmswastheadvancemadetomiddlemenandfactors.”38 Yet the system of advances “remained virtually unchanged so long as the foreign firmscontinued in theproduce trade,”39which demonstrates the “structural” impossibility of doing awaywithbrokersforfirmsthattradedoutsidefamilytradingnetworksofthekindcharacteristicofthebigItalian firms in the latermiddle ages or of theGreek commercial houses of the nineteenth century.Extendingnetworksinlandratherthan“relyingonAfricanmiddlementobringproducetothemaincollectingcentres”wouldhavemeanthavingtomaximizepurchasestocovertheoverheadsofthoseadditionalbuyingpoints,whichwouldfurtherincreasecompetitionandstrengthenthepositionofthebrokers.40Oneresponsetothisdilemmawaspoolingagreementsorbuyingpoolswhich,asaCFAOannual report explained, were directed specifically at middlemen and created to “remedy” their“abuses.”41 In Burmese paddy, four of the largest rice-milling and exporting firms (Steel Brothersincluded) formed thenotoriousBullingerPool in1921,directed, again, against the sellersofpaddy,

that is, against “brokers, speculators, traders, and other middlemen.”42 The Entente Sénégal waslikewiseacombinationof this sort, formed in1889by theexporthouses inBordeaux tocontrol theprice of groundnuts.43 Frédéric Bohn, founder of theMarseilles giant CFAOwhowas part of thisbuyingpool,hadstrongviewsontheAfricanbrokers,describingtheminoneletterfrom1894as“ourworstenemies.”44AllthemaisonsdecommerceinFrenchWestAfricawereinprincipleopposedtotheadvancesystem,“evenastheyknewitwastheverybasisoftheireconomictransactions.”45

Brokerswereanendemicfeatureofthewaycapitalcirculatedinvastsectorsofthewholesaletrade,andtheeconomiesofscaleofdealingwithlargebrokerscreatedastrongtendencyforfirmstorelyonbiggermiddlemen.WhenVenetianmerchantsmovedinlandfromAlexandria toCairo in1552,withtherevivingtradeinpepper,“themovewasmotivatedbythedesiretodispensewithintermediaries,the Jewish wholesalers and traders of Cairo” whom Braudel describes as “opulent rivals” of theVenetians. “In fact European merchants were usually obliged to work in collaboration with them.”46

About Calicut the traveler Varthema wrote, “The merchants always sell by the hands. . . of thebroker.”47 InBengal textiles in the early eighteenth century, the total number ofmerchants dealingwiththeEnglishEastIndiaCompanyvariedfromtwentytoforty,andtheywere“certaintobemenofsubstance.”48TheEIC’sBengalassociatesKhemchandandMathuradaswhodominatedthecommerceofBalasoreandHugliattheendoftheseventeenthcenturyinturnweresaidtohavethebackingofpowerful financiers inDhaka,“menofverygreatEstates[,]moneyedmen.”49 In thepalmoil trade,tradegoodswouldbe“advancedtobrokersbyEuropeantraders;brokerswouldthenusethesegoodstopurchaseoilintheinteriormarkets.”50“[T]hebrokersofWestAfricacutimpressivefigures...theleadingfiguresofthetrademadehugesumsfromtheirskillsintransportinglargevolumessmoothlyandefficiently to thecoast.”51AndLynnnotes, “Thecapital required to enter theoil tradewas toogreatforsmall-scaletraderseffectivelytochallengetheexistingoligarchyofbrokers.”52Economiesofscale in transport especially gave large-scale African brokers “considerable advantage vis-à-vissmaller-scaleones.”ARallisBrothershandbookdated1888statesthatthecompanyusedtobuyriceinIndia“fromMussulmandealers,butastheirmeansaresmall itwasdifficult inadvancingmarketstoobtaindeliveryofourpurchases,anditoftenhappenedthatwewereunabletocompleteourshippingarrangements.”Thesolutionwasto“buyonlyfromarichnativemerchant,whomakesadvancesintheinterior, and can secure large quantities at a time.”53 Here the cost of financing was shifted to thebroker, in a move similar to Volkart Brothers’ use of so-called “guarantee brokers” to financepurchases of raw cotton in Bombay’s up-country markets.54 In the Nigerian groundnut trade the“Syrian”SaulRaccahwastheepitomeofthislayerofcapital.Intheearly1950shewasUAC’slargestsinglecontractor.“In1954UACdecidedtoenditscontractwithhimbecausehehadbeenusingthe£1.25m. advanced tohim tobuy in competitionwith its otherbuyers.”55Thismust refer toRaccahbuyingasubstantialpartoftheKanogroundnutcroponhisownaccount,usingcapitaladvancedbyUnilever.Shentontellsusthatthroughoutthe1930sRaccahhad“madesteadilyincreasinginroadsintotheEuropeanfirms’groundnuttonnage.”56WhentheSyriansattemptedto“bypasstheEuropeanfirmsaltogetherbytradingdirectlytoEurope,”thelattertriedtohavethecolonialstateabolishthenative

producemarketinwhichindigenoustraderssoldgroundnutstotheSyrians.57ThewholeperiodfromtheDepressiontotheSecondWorldWar,Shentontellsus,was“dominatedbytheattackofthemoreorlessunitedEuropeanfirmsontheSyrianandAfricanmiddlemen.”Indeed,the“tenaciousexistenceofthesemiddlemennecessitatedtheexpensiveexpansionofthefirms’outstations,andensuredthattheUnitedAfricaCompany...couldnotestablishcommercialhegemony.”58

Oneisdealinghere,incompetitionofthissort,withaprocessofcombinedaccumulationwhere“leadfirms” and contractors shared the surplus-value extracted from peasant households59 because bothcontributed to the exploitationof the latter. Itwouldbewrong to see thebiggerbrokers asmerelypassive agentsofwhatFieldhousehas called“large-scale foreignmerchant capital.”60 In somewaysthis “sharing” resembles the joint-venture agreements that became a favorite medium for theexpansionof foreignmanufacturing firms intomarkets likeBrazilandIndiaafter theSecondWorldWar.Thedifference, of course, is that substantial brokerswere also actual competitors, so that therelationship was fraught with tension and contracts could be terminated and then restarted just aseasily. What the ubiquity of the broker reflected both in China and in India was the entrenchedpositionof indigenousmerchantcapitalsthatwereoftenverysubstantial indeed.AsoneBritishfirmexplained,“intheearlydayswe(PeirceLeslie&Co.)didbusinesswithlargeandwealthydealers.”“Those were the days of the big merchantswho had complete control of the market.”61 Yang Feng,JardineMatheson’sShaghaicompradorinthe1850s,was“immenselywealthy.”62SowerethevariousIndian merchant communities that sustained Britain’s imperial grip over India and helped financeBritishexpansioninthecountry.63

Havingsaid this, it’s important tobear inmindthat therewerenumerousmarketsdominatedbyamassof smaller capitals.Thus, inSantos, amajorwholesalemarket forBrazilian coffee, “some150local brokers handled coffee, which strengthened their hold on trade.”64 In Lebanon, a mass ofmiddlemenactedasbrokersfortheBeirutexporthouses,themselvesasnumerousasseventy-threeintheyears between 1904 and 1910.Lebanesebrokers obtained credit from thebanks inBeirutwhichthey recycled into loans and advance payments, working as independent intermediaries betweenhouseholdsengagedincocoonproductionandthespinningmillsandtradinghouses.65AndinEgypt,whereGreekmiddlemen likewise borrowed from the urban banks to re-lend to cotton growers atmuchhigherrates, theGreekconsul inAlexandriacoulddescribe themin1913asa“numerousandprosperingclassofGreeks...intheinteriorofEgypt,”whomadeforwardcontractsforcottontobeableto“sellittothelargeexporthouseswithbranchesintheinteriororinAlexandriaafterithadbeenginned.”66

“CHAINS”INTHEPRODUCETRADESH.J.R.Rawlings,themanagerinchargeofHolts’producetradeinLiverpool,describedtheadvancesystemas“financingthemarketingofthecropinthehopeofgettingasubstantialproportionoftiedcustomersandbeingabletobuyataratherlowerpricethanthey(theexportinghouses)wouldhavetopay”ifalltheproducewerefreeproduce.67Fieldhousecallsthesystem“oneofthemanydevicesused

byUACandvirtuallyalltheotherforeigntradingcompaniesasanessentialmeansofmaximizingtheirpurchasesofexportproduce.”68Competitioninmostareaswasfierceandallfirmswereanxioustokeepuptheirpurchasestoretainmarketshare.AsonemanagingdirectorresponsiblefortheproducesideofUAC’sbusinesswrote,“wemustatallcostsmaintainourturnover.”69Advanceswerethusintegraltothewaybigcommercialfirmsmanagedtheirinvestmentstowardoffcompetitors.Asearlyas1670theEnglishFactoryinSurat,hardpressedforcash,hadborrowedverylargesumsofmoneybecauseof“thelargenessof theInvestments inallplaceswhichmustofnecessitybe suppliedwithcash tokeep theweaversfromfallingofftoothermerchants.”70

Marx encountered the advance system in its simplest form when he allowed for the theoreticalpossibilitythattheadvancesdisbursedbytheBengalOpiumDepartmenttothegrowersofpoppyitsigned contracts with embodied a circulation of capital.71 The theory of commercial capitalismdevelopedinthisbookdependstosomedegreeonextendingthisconceptiontothenumeroustradesandbusinesseswhereadvanceswereusedonaregularbasis.ThecaseMarxreferredto(inpassing,ofcourse) was fairly simple in the sense that essentially it involved only three parties, (1) thegovernment, (2) thecultivators,and(3) theopiummerchantsanddealersat the“sales” inCalcutta.The cultivators mostly came from peasant castes traditionally associated with labor-intensive cashcropsliketobaccoandopiumalongavasttractinpresent-dayeasternUttarPradeshandBihar,72andwere described as cultivating opium “at a great loss to themselves”73 and “only for the sake of theadvance.”74 Inmostmarkets,however,capitalcirculated throughmorecomplexchains thatboundawholebatteryofmercantileinterestsatverydifferentlevelsofthecommercialsystem.Noneofthesechainsor“tradingmachines”waslikeanyother,asthefollowingrapidsurveyofexamplesshows.Itwouldbeeasiest toarrangethembymovingconsistentlyeast, startingwith theAtlanticseaboardoftheUS,thestatesofMississippiandLouisianawhichhadwelloveronehundredthousandslavesintheearlynineteenthcentury.Thearticulatedorchain-likestructureofcirculationundercommercialcapitalismcanbeviewedinatleasttwoways,first,intermsoftheinternalcomplexityofthe“tradingmachines,”howcompressedordistended the chainswere and their financial arrangements, and then also as vast conglomerations ofcommercialinterestswhich,onaglobalscale,isessentiallywhatcommercialcapitalhadcometosignifybythenineteenthcentury.Thus in thecottoneconomyof theUSSouth,“[c]ontemporaryestimateswere that the shippers, insurers,bankers,andmerchantsofNewYorkreceived fortycentsofeverydollarspent inthecottonmarket.”75NewYork’shighlycapitalizedbankswereabletooffer“longercreditonbettertermstothoseinterestedinbuyingcotton.”76Inthewintermonths,“[a]sthecropcametomarket inNewOrleans, cottonmerchants—whowere often agents ofmerchant banks based inNew York or Liverpool (Brown Brothers, Barings, N. M. Rothschild and Sons) . . . providedadvancesagainstitseventualsale.Inreturnforlendingthefactors(andthustheplanters)money...these cottonmerchants and theirmerchant-bankerbackers received the right to sell (the crop)onaconsignmentbasis.”“Thecredittheyofferedgenerallytooktheformofasightdrafttypicallypayablein New York or Liverpool sixty days after presentation.” “In order to limit their risk, merchant

bankers generally tried to limit the amount they advanced to three-quarters or so” of the expectedvalueofthecotton.77AmericanimporterswereabletobuysterlingdebttopayforEuropeanimportsonce the sterlingbillsof exchangewere sold into the interregionalor internationalmoneymarket,78

and so on, to illustrate the point about diverse commercial interests being “conglomerated” in themovement of circulation.And of course, all of these commercial interestswere bound upwith thedesiredperpetuationofslavelabor.79

SamuelSmith,aLiverpoolmerchantwhosefirmwouldlaterbecomethebiggestofthecity’scottonbrokers,hasleftaconcisedescriptionofthecottonchainasitoperatedduringtheboominWesternIndia in the early1860s. In letterspublishedasTheCottonTradeof India, hemappedout fourverydifferent levels of a trading hierarchy (“the machinery of the cotton trade,” as he called it) thatextended from the villages in the cotton districts to large towns in the interior and from there toBombay. They were (1) the petty village dealers or “small capitalists” whomade advances to thegrowers at the time of sowing, (2) the “wealthier dealers in the large interior towns,” wholesaledealers,whofinancedamajorshareof thoseadvancesandalso,“veryfrequently,”“simplyactedasagents”fortheBombaymerchants,(3)the“wealthynativemerchantsofBombay”withwhomthoselarge dealers in turn signed contracts that gave them advances ranging from 25 to 50 percent ofanticipatedvalue, and finally, (4) theexport firmsor“shippers toEngland”withwhom“thenativemerchantsofBombayhavebeeninthehabitofmakinglargecontracts,”“thoughinthislattercaseitisnot the custom to give advances.”80 The forward contracts between the Indian merchant and theforeignhousesagreedondeliveries“atsuchapriceastoreimbursehimforhisriskinadvancing,paythecostoftransport,andleavehimafairprofit.”81QualitywasamajorproblemincottonbutSmithwasskepticalaboutargumentsforthe“introductionofEuropeanagencyintotheinterior,”thatis,forexport firms integrating vertically, and strongly underscored the lower transaction costs of dealingwith“nativedealers.”“ThisisabusinesswhichcanneversuitaEuropeanhouseinBombay,”sinceitwouldhaveto“makeseparateagreementswithsomethousandsofcultivators,andbewillingtolieoutof£50,000or so,atpresentprices, for severalmonths.”82All the same, in thedecades that followedEuropean exporters did find solutions to these problems and had even driven the bigger Indianmerchantsoutofthetopendofthetradeby1875.83

Elsewhere in India, the capital invested in indigowas largely borrowed capital,84 and it has beenpossible to argue that indigo planters simply “acted asmiddlemen between the cultivators and theagency and business houses in Calcutta.”85 The planters were essentially “up-country merchantssupported by advances from the Calcutta agency houses.”86 In Farrukhabad in theNorth-WesternProvinceswhereby1860 some fiftydifferent indigoconcerns ran ca.150 factories, each suppliedbytwenty-fivetothirtyvillages,87 itwassaidthat“indigoismadeat factories fromtheplantpurchasedfromlandlords,whocontractwiththeryots.”88InLowerBengaltheregimewasmoredirect, inthesense that households grew indigo under contract to the factory against advances that usuallyamounted to two rupees for every third of an acre. Benoy Chowdhury suggested that planterspreferred this system (called ryoti) because it was more profitable than using hired labor, since it

essentially“involvedanunpaidlabourprocess.”89Asoneplanterputit,“thenativeswillnotvaluethelaborofthemselvesandfamiliesatanythingwhileworkingforthemselves.”90Peasantfamilylaborwastheproductivebaseofmostoftheproducetrades,anditssubsumptionintocommercialcapital throughthechannelsofcirculationdescribedhereinvolvedtheappropriationofvastamountsofunpaidfamilylabor. Cultivators had to sign a “properly stamped contract” at the time of the indigo advances,balancesdeliberatelywerenever settled (doing so“wouldbe tantamount to closing the factory,” asoneplantertoldanofficialenquiry)91andsupervisionwassointenseitwasdescribedas“harassingandvexatious.”“Theysaythattheyarerequiredagainandagaintoplough,tocrushtheclods,toremovestalks,tosmooththeground,tosowattheprecisemomentwhichtheplantermaydictate,untilneithertheirtimenortheirlabourcanbecalledtheirown.”92Macaulaylookedupontheindigocontractsas“ofthe same kind as one between a capitalist and a worker.”93 The dye went through a succession ofboom/slump cycles in the course of the nineteenth century, but in the 1870s when there wasspectaculargrowth,oneestimateputtherepatriationoffundsfromnorthBihar“atonemillionpoundssterlingperannum.”94

Jute was completely different, an “intensely competitive” market with a “profusion ofintermediaries.”95TheBengaljuteindustrywasalmostcompletelydominatedbyBritishcapital.96Onthecommercialside,thebiggestmerchantsinwholesalecenterssuchasNarayangunjandDhakawereEuropeanorArmenian,andbothtradeandmanufacturehadaplethoraoftradeassociationsofwhichsome overtly excluded non-Europeans.97 Jute was a highly organized industry, but also a perfectillustrationoftheintegrationofpettycommodityproducersintocirculationchainswherethecoercionofthemarkethadlesstodowiththedebtdevicestypicalofopium,cotton,andindigoandmorewiththe more general state of dispossession of India’s small peasantry. Jute was grown on minusculeholdings;bythe1930smorethanthree-quartersofruralfamiliesinthejutebeltpossessedlessthantwoacresof land.98KrishnaBharadwaj calculated that jutewas“particularly favouredby thevery smallfarmsof under 1.25 acres,” since it absorbed a large amountof labor per acre andyielded a highergrossrevenueperacreaswell.99Asiftoreflectthisfragmentation,circulationupthechainstartedwitha mass of petty traders called farias or paikars who, in eastern Bengal, went about in small boatscollectingsmallbatchesofrawjutewhichwerethencentralizedatoneofthebiggervillageswherethebepari’sormerchant’sboatwasanchored.100“Thissmallerman(thefariaorpaikar)suppliesthebiggerbepari who collects in larger quantities and takes it to bigger centres,” G. Morgan told the RoyalCommissiononAgricultureinthemid-1920s.101MorganwasproprietorofMorgan,Walker&Co.,afirm of Calcutta jute brokers, and had been active in the trade for over forty years.102 His oraltestimonythat thepetty trader“buys thestuffoutright”suggests thatnoadvanceswere involved injute.103Thebiggertraders(beparis)whocollectedfromthefariasthenpassedtherawjuteeithertoup-countrybalersortothebigwholesalebrokers/commissionagentscalledaratdars,dependingonwhosecapitalfinancedtheirpurchases.104(Inthewholesaleor“secondary”marketsandinCalcutta“virtuallyallaratdarswereMarwaris.”)105Thepricingofthejutewasdonebythebigjutebrokersintheimportshedsof thebalersbefore itwasweighed, sorted intogrades,baled,andshipped toCalcutta.106Up-

country balerswould sell their share of the half-pressed jute to themills inCalcutta either throughbrokers such asMorgan,Walker&Co. (there were “about twenty” European jute brokers in the1920s)107ordirectlythroughtheirownoffices.108Ofthe5.5millionbalesofjuteconsumedbythemills,a littleoverhalf (threemillionbales)weresolddirectlyby the“bigEuropeanbalers”suchasSteelsandRalliBrothers,andtherestsoldthroughthebrokingfirmsgatheredintheCalcuttaJuteDealers’Association.109 At the factory gate the mark-up on unit cost (what the cultivator received) wasgenerally around 25 percent.110 Despite this, it was generally thought that the way jute was traded“keptrawjutecheap.”111ThekeytoprofitabilitybothinCalcuttaandDundee“wastobuyrawjuteatas lowapriceaspossible.”112The sharp reduction ingrossmoney income fromrice and jute in themain jute-growing districts during the crash of the early 1930s triggeredmassive transfers of landthroughmuchofBengal,leavingaland-poorpeasantryinanevenworsestateofdispossession.113

Finally,briefly,inCochinchinawheretheproductionofriceexpandedfromfortythousandtonsinthe late 1870s to 3,360,000 tons in the late 1920s,114 the rice trade is a good example of the denseconglomerationofcommercialintereststhatcharacterizedtheproducetradesofthelatenineteenthandearly twentieth centuries.A powerful syndicate of paddymerchants atCholon,115whichhad eightymembers in 1930,116 exerted a virtual monopoly over a massive wholesale trade, acting as the solemiddlemenbetween thepaddygrowersand themillingandexporting firms.Theyemployedagentswhowentfromvillagetovillageintheirboats,“gatheringinsacksofriceanddrainingtheharvesttothetown.”“Exceptforitsactualgrowing,thecollecting,husking,andexportationofriceisinChinesehands,”wroteayoungAmericanscholarinthe1930s.117Chinesemerchantsdominatedeveryaspectofthericetrade.118Inparticular,theFrenchweresimply“unabletogainafootholdinthewholesalingofrice.”119 The rice millers, also Chinese, unlike in Burma where Europeans dominated the millingindustryand financed thewholesale trade,120were adistinct layerof capital from theCholonpaddymerchantsandwerelargelyfinancedbytheexportersthroughforwardcontracts.121Thebiggestmillscouldprocess fivehundredtoonethousandtonsadaybutcompetitionwas intense.122Finally, therewere the Saigon-based export firms, both French andChinese,who in turnwere supported by thepowerful French banking interests that financed the colony’s export trade, the giant Banque del’Indochine not the least of those. (There was a saying in Cochinchina—“Cholon belongs to theBanque de l’Indochine through the intermediary of theChinese.”)123 In 1930, “some fortyChinesetrading houses and eleven French concerns controlled more than 80 percent of exports.”124 Saigonitself,oneoftheworld’sbiggestharborsforriceexports,wastheonlyIndochineseportaccessibletomodernships.

VELOCITIESOFCIRCULATIONThe velocity of circulation of capital was a major determinant of the profitability of commercialcapitals.MaxineBerghasevenargued,“profitsinthepre-industrialeconomyweredeterminedbythevelocityofcirculatingcapital.Capitalwasaccumulatedbyreducingthedurationthatstocksofgoodsweretiedupbetweenstagesoftheproductionprocessandmarketing.”125Oragain,“Justascirculating

capital dominated capital formation, so thegreatest gains in productivitywere to behadby cuttingdownthetimeofcirculation,or,inotherwords,increasingthevelocityofcirculatingcapital.”126ThusvelocitywasalreadyanimperativewhenTurgotwrotehisReflectionsinthemiddleoftheeighteenthcentury. He says there, “the Entrepreneur has the greatest possible interest in getting his capitalreturnedtohimveryquickly.”127Andalmostacenturyearlier,in1681,WilliamFreeman,aLondonmerchantinvolvedinsugarandslavetrading,wouldaver,“aquickreturnisthelifeoftrade.”128

IntheBalticgraintrade,whichwasdominatedbytheAmsterdamgrainmerchants,“moneycouldbeusedthreeorevenfourtimes inoneseason,”129butthiswascertainlyexceptional.Mostvelocities ininternationaltradeweremuchlonger.MichelBalardhascalculatedtheaverageturnoverinthetradebetweenGenoese capital andByzantinemarkets at 12.3months.130TheVenetianmude (voyages) toSyria to fetchbulk bales of cotton involved a round trip of sixmonths and “represented the fastestavailable return onmerchant capital,” according toBraudel.131Themude, which initiallymeant theperiodsprescribedforloading,wereorganizedtoencourageamoreefficientuseofships.TheSenatefixed terminal loading dates to force merchants to end their haggling and keep the ships moving.“Quicker turnaroundmeant not onlymore efficient use of shipping, but alsomore efficient use ofmerchants’ capital. The shipper benefitted not only from cheaper freight rates but from quickerturnover of hismercantile investment.”132 In the East India trade, advances for cotton piece goodscouldbeginnineortenmonthsbeforetheclothwouldbereceivedbytheCompany’sservants,133whiletheactualinvestmentordersthatalsofixedweavers’wagesprecededdeliverybysometwoyears.134Ofcourse,thesetemporalitiesofcapitalwererevolutionizedinthethirdquarterofthenineteenthcenturywith theexpansionof railways, steamshipping,andnewcommunication technologies,but themoreefficientorganizationofthebigfirmswouldinanycasehaveentailedatendencytocompressturnovertimes.Thus,thewealthymerchanthousesthatdominatedGlasgow’stobaccotradeintheeighteenthcenturywere keen “to achieve rapid turnover of capital,”135 and did so aswell, at both ends of thecircuitoftheircommercialcapitals.Byusingthestoresystemto“acquireasmuchtobaccoinadvanceaswasnecessary,”theycouldcutdowntheturnaroundtimeofincomingvesselsandsaveonfreightcosts,thusfreightingshipsintheshortestpossibletime,136and“[b]ecausetheGlasgowfirmsactuallyowned the cargoes they imported they could dispose of it in huge sales to the French buyers inScotland,” again “turning over capital quickly by selling tobacco rapidly in bulk to Europeancustomers.”137Probably reflectingboth sorts of influences (speedof transport and size of firm), theaveragedurationoftheUAC’sadvancestoitsmiddlemeninWestAfrica“rangedfromaminimumoften days for Gold Coast cocoa to twenty-eight days for Nigerian palm kernels.” “In 1947/8,”Fieldhousewrites, “the largest amount advanced toAfricanswas£1.5m.,which in fact turned roundseveraltimesduringthecourseofasingleseason.”138Thispracticegoesbacktothenineteenthcentury,oneBritishmerchant tellingparliament,“Themoment theproducecomes tohandwemake themaremittance,sothattheyturnitoverasoftenaspossibleinthecourseofayear.”139

Velocities of circulation were affected by both transport and communication technologies. TheRussian economist Lyashchenko described banks and railways as “instruments of capitalist trade

turnover” and argued that “more rapid turnover by capitalist commercial methods” such as thediscountingofinvoicesforgoodsintransithadallowedamassofsmallercapitalstoentertheRussiangrain trade in a big way.140 “The colossal expansion of means of communication—ocean-goingsteamships,railways,electrictelegraphs,theSuezcanal—hasgenuinelyestablishedtheworldmarketforthefirsttime,”wroteEngels(withsomeexaggeration!)inanotetovolumethreeofCapital.141Oragain,“Themainmeansofcuttingcirculationtimehasbeenimprovedcommunications,”hewritesinanotherofhisaddendatovolumethree;“...thewholeearthhasbeengirdedbytelegraphcables.ItwastheSuezcanalthatreallyopenedtheFarEastandAustraliatothesteamer”;“Theturnovertimeofworldtradeasawholehasbeenreducedtothesameextent(frommonthstoweeks,JB),andtheefficacyofthecapitalinvolvedinithasbeenincreasedtwoorthreetimesandmore.”142The“turnovertimeofworld trade”wasof coursea reference to thevelocityof circulationof commercial capitals.Marxwasperfectlyawareof these“material” influences,of thewayuse-valueassuchcouldacquireeconomicsignificance.IntheGrundrisse,ofthetwoexampleshegivesofthis“form-determining”roleof use-value, one relates to the durability ofmachines, since this purely physical aspect affects theturnovertimeofthetotalcapital;theother,interestingly,concernstheremotenessofmarketswhich,giventheconditionsoftransport,involveaslowerturnover,“ase.g.capitalsworkinginEnglandfortheEast Indiamarket returnmore slowly than thoseworking fornearer foreignmarkets or for thedomesticmarket.”143Elsewherehewritesabout“[c]ircumstancesthatshortentheaverageturnoverofcommercial capital, such as the development of the means of transport.”144 Moreover, with theexpansionofthemarketundercapitalism,hesuggested,“notonlydoesthemassofcommercialcapitalgrow,butsotoodoesthatofallthecapitalinvestedincirculation,e.g.inshipping,railways,telegraphs,etc.”145

Banking was the other great lubricator of velocity. The link was clearly seen by Marx when heimplied that the “development of the credit system” helped sustain a more rapid turnover ofcommercialcapital.146Thediscountingofbillsofexchangeplayedamajorroleherebecauseitfinancedbothlargervolumesoftradeandagreaterfluidityofcirculation.147Thespeculationinbillsofexchangethat was rampant in the 1840s was at least partly fueled by the decision of the Bank of England’sbankingdepartment toenter thediscountmarket inabigway.Thus,“Bankdiscountsrose from£2million to £12million between the autumn of 1844 and the spring of 1846.”148 J.W.Gilbart’sTheHistory and Principles of Banking (1834) had already forewarned the dangers here. “Trade andspeculation are in some cases so nearly allied,”Gilbartwrote, “that it is impossible to say atwhatprecisepointtradeendsandspeculationbegins...Wherevertherearebanks,capitalismorereadilyobtained,andatacheaperrate.Thecheapnessofcapitalgivesfacilitiestospeculation....”149AsecretcommitteeoftheHouseofLordsthatsattoinvestigatethecausesofthecommercialcrisisof1847laidamajor part of the blame for the crisis on “over-trading” in the East India trade.Themechanisminvolvedherewasdescribedinsomedetailbythecommittee,andareportintheManchesterGuardianquoted by Marx inCapital was clearly privy to this finding years before the report was officiallypublished.AboutthebigfirmsintheIndiatradethenewsreportsaid:

Houses in India, who had credit to pass their bills, were purchasers of sugar, indigo, silk, or cotton—not because the pricesadvisedfromLondonbythelastoverlandmailpromisedaprofitonthepricescurrentinIndia,butbecauseformerdraftsupontheLondonhousewouldsoonfalldue,andmustbeprovidedfor.Whatwaysosimpleastopurchaseacargoofsugar,payforitinbillsupon theLondonhouseat tenmonths’date, transmit the shippingdocumentsby theoverlandmail; and, in less than twomonths,thegoodsonthehighseas,orperhapsnotyetpassedthemouthoftheHoogly,werepawnedinLombardStreet—puttingtheLondonhouseinfundseightmonthsbeforethedraftsagainstthosegoodsfelldue.Andallthiswentonwithoutinterruptionordifficulty, as long as bill-brokers had abundance ofmoney “at call,” to advance on bills of lading and dockwarrants, and to

discount,withoutlimit,thebillsofIndiahousesdrawnupontheeminentfirmsinMincingLane.150

AdvancesagainstbillsofladingbecamecommonpracticeintheAtlanticandEastIndiatradesbythe1840s,andEngelshimselfthoughtthatthekindof“speculation”theyallowedforactuallycontinueduntil theopeningof theSuezCanalandtheexpansionof telegraphnetworksenabled informationtotravelsubstantially faster thangoodsandmade theabuseofcredit involved in theuseof long-datedbillsimpossible.Asbillsofladingbecametradeableitems,“cargoesthemselvesmightpass‘virtually’through many hands between their departure,” say, from New Orleans and their arrival at aLancashiremill.151With steamships and telegraph connections, “[t]he process of buying and sellingcouldberepeatedmanymoretimesinayear.”152Thenewcommercialmethodsthatcameintovogueduringthe1860srevolvedessentiallyaroundamorerapidvelocityofcirculation.“Ralli&Co,”writesMilne, “spent around £1,000 a year on telegraph messages to the East in the mid-1860s” and also“deviseda code forusebyall itsbranchesandagencies, so that theproblemof corruptedmessagescouldbeovercome.”153

In his autobiographyDimitrios Vikelas described the dramatic changes that the new commercialmethodsofthelatenineteenthcenturybroughtaboutinthefortunesoftheGreektradingcommunity.Explaining the decline of most of themajor Greekmerchant houses of London by the end of thenineteenthcentury,hewrote,“themost important reason [for] thedisappearanceof thosemerchanthouseswasthechangethatoccurredintradingitself.Halfacenturybefore[,]theelectrictelegraphandthe telephone [hadnot brought] themost distant countries indirect communication through instantunderstanding.Thegoodswereloadedonsailvesselsandmonthswentbyuntiltheyarrived[at]theportof consumption. In themeantime, theownersof the cargoeshad enough time to speculate, byobservingthefluctuationofthemarket.Atthattimethemerchantsdependedontheirowncapitalandonthe credits of their correspondents; therefore, their transactionswere very limited, but the dangerswerealsofewerthantoday,andmoreoverthemerchantsweremoreconservative.Todaythegrowthofglobaltradehasbroughtanincreaseofthenumberofbanks;thebanksconcentratemaximumcapital,which has to be invested (wherever it can be) . . . That way the turnover of dealings increasedimmensely.”“Todayonecouldsaythatcommerceaimsmainlytothegainofa smallprofit frombigandrapidenterprises,whicharecontinuallyrepeated.Thefewmerchantswhosucceededinapplyingthenewsystemarestilltradinginaprofitableway.TheoldGreektradedoesnotexistanymoreandthoseold merchant houses, where new generations of merchants found work in succession, are nowdissolving,causingnationaldamage.”154

FINALREFLECTIONSThe“longuedurée”ofwholesale tradecaneasilybeconstructedasachainofcompetitivestrugglesthat rangedovermuchof theMediterraneanand, later,of the entireglobe—Venice againstGenoa,PortugalagainstVenice,HollandagainstPortugal,EnglandandFranceagainstHolland,andsoon,andtosomedegreethathistoryhasbeenwritteninthiswayinonechapterofthisbook.Butembeddedwithintheseglobalconflictsweresmaller-scaleconfrontationsorbattlesandnumerousothersortsofcapitalistcompetition.Ofparticularnote,nothighlightedhere,wasavibrantpan-Asiantradingsystemthatbegan as early as theninth century and surviveddown to the endof the sixteenth century andlater.TheDutchwere “astounded by theirGujarati rivals’ capacity for competition” and admitteddefeatinthePersianmarket.155TheEuropeancompanieswereoftenalarmedbythesheervolumeofindigoexportsbyAsianmerchantstoWestAsianmarkets.Gujarati,Armenian,andPersianmerchantsdominated this trade.156 Private British shipping at Calcutta faced “formidable competition” fromAsianshipownersinthetradebetweenBengalandSurat.157TurkishmerchantswerethemainbuyersofYemen’s coffee, and atMocha itself Europeanmerchantswere not themost numerous or activetradersintheeighteenthcentury.158AndAdenhadbeenthehubofavastinternationaltradeca.1400,going by the fact that its customs duties alone, on imports, ran consistently close to or above onemilliondinarsinthefinalyearsofthefourteenthcenturyandveryearlyfifteenth!159Noneofthishasbeenmappedhere,butthefact that ithasn’tshouldn’tobscureourvisionofaninternational tradingsystemthatreachedwellbeyondEurope.WhataboutChina?RoyBinWonghasargued,challengingly,thatincontrasttoEuropetheChinesestatehadnoincentivetopromoteanysortofcapitalism.“[The]oppositiontowhatmighthavebecomea kind of commercial capitalism, had the government needed the merchants more and thus beensupportiveof them,doesnotmeanthatofficialsopposedmarketsandcommercemoregenerally.”160

He also argues that “[i]ndustrial capitalism is not the necessary and obvious development out ofcommercial capitalismunless certainnecessary technological changesoccur.”161 ForEurope itself helists the possible ways in which commercial capitalism “mattered to the formation of industrialcapitalism,”mentioningamongthesethefactthatthedecisiontoshifttofactoryproductionoftextileswas a decisionmade by commercial capitalists, and that commercial capitalism “developedways ofmobilizing capital” whose actual “concentration” was only achieved under industrial capitalism.162

Finally,itwaspossibleforruralindustrytopersistforcenturieswithoutgeneratingthesortof“proto-industrializationdynamic”thatsawwholeindustrialregionsemergeinnorthernEurope.163

I read all this to mean that there is nothing inevitable about capitalism and that its emergencedepends,crucially,notjustonmarketsbutonthestateoratleastaparticularkindofstatethatsetsouttoencourageandbolstercommercialexpansion.Marxhimselfwasquiteclearthatinthelatermiddleages both Venice and Genoa were ruled by powerful merchant interests. He referred to theirmerchantsas“themostprominentpeople in those states”anddescribed themas“subordinating thestate more securely to themselves.”164 In other words, these weremedieval states directly ruled bycapitalist interests. The first modern territorial states, and, with them, the modern monarchies,

emerged in the later fifteenthcentury,165 andEngels in the“Supplement”describesEurope’s tradingcompaniesasnowhaving“greaternations”standingbehindthem.“EvenHollandandPortugal, thesmallest,wereat leastasbigandpowerfulasVenice, the largestandstrongest tradingnationof thepreviousperiod.”166Mehring (rather unlikeMarx) describedmerchant capital as the “revolutionaryforce of the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,” and said, remarkably, “[r]evolutionarymerchant capital not only created modern absolutism but also transformed the medieval classes ofsociety.”167

“Commerciallyorganizedcapitalism”wascharacterizedbythe“sheerdiversityandflexibilityofitsforms of production”168 and by extreme versatility. Pearl fisheries,169 hydraulic silk mills,170

plantations,171shipping,realestate,textiles,taxfarming172—therewaspracticallynosectorortypeofinvestment that itdidnot invade,exploit,ormonopolize.Andas theexampleofDubrovnik shows,merchantsgravitatedtotherichestmarkets,hasteningtheirdevelopmentevenfurther.173Theywereinthe forefront of economic innovations, embodying a modernity which is best described as purelycapitalist.Apartfrombillsofexchangeandtheotherfinancialdevicesandmodernwaysoforganizingbusiness that were innovated in the later middle ages, the chief expression of this mercantilemodernismwasaminuteknowledgeofinternationalmarkets.BranchorganizationwastypicalofthebigItaliantradingfamilies,andamassivevolumeofcommercial informationwastransmittedacrossthosenetworks,goingbytheliterallythousandsortensofthousandsoflettersthatsurviveinvariousmerchantarchives.174TheGreekmerchanthousesofthenineteenthcenturywere,likewise,tight-knitfamily trading networks with high levels of vertical integration and branches throughout theMediterraneanandinEngland.Whatisstrikingintheircaseisthekindoftightintegrationbetweentrade and shipping thatwas orchestrated by shipowners such as theVaglianos andEmbiricos.175 InOdessa theGreekhouses had agents living in the large centerswhere grainwas collected,whereasWesternmerchantspreferredtobuygrainfrommiddlemen(brokers)afteritsarrivalintheport.176Inthe Bombay Presidency, Ralli Brothers began establishing purchasing agencies in the up-countrycottonmarketsasearlyasthe1860s.177InSind,wherenexttoVolkartBrotherstheywerethebiggestexporters of wheat, they had subagencies at the principal centers like Sukkur, Shikarpur, andLarkana.178Inshort,initsownway,GreekmerchantcapitalbelatedlycapturedamajorshareofbothOttomanandBritishtradethankstobusinessmethodsthatwereasefficientasany,intheirownway.Finally,patternsofeconomicdominationboundupwiththeexpansionofcommercialcapitalwereconsiderablywiderthanthoseofimperialcontrolorstraightforwardcolonialism.Infact,imperialismin themodern sense, that is, thedivisionof theworld inHobsbawm’sAgeofEmpire (1880–1914),markedasharpbreak in thepatterndefinedbyBritain’scentrality in financial, trading,andshippingservices.Itreflectednotthe“anarchismofthebourgeoisie,”asHobsbawmcalledtheliberalismofthenineteenthcentury179andtheliberal-cosmopolitanorderthatBritishcommercehadheldinplace,buttherapidemergenceof“nationaleconomies”drivenmorebylarge-scaleindustryand“bigbusiness”thanbytradeperse.180“Imperialism”“wasanoveltermdevisedtodescribeanovelphenomenon.”181

This, ifyoulike, is thepointatwhichtradeseriouslybegantobedrivenbyindustry inthesense in

whichMarxdefinedthisdynamic,thatis,asthe“subordinationofcommercialtoindustrialcapital.”Ifthesizeof theworld’smerchantmarinealmostdoubledbetween1890and1914,whereas ithadonlyrisenfrom10to16milliontons in1840–1870,182duringtheapogeeofBritishcommercialexpansion,the expansion of shipping now reflected the humongous demands of the new industrial capitals(American,German,andFrenchasmuch,ormore,thanBritish).AsEngelsdrewclosertotheendofhislifeinthe1890s(hediedin1895),oil,steel,andchemicals,nottextiles,becamethetypicalfaceoflarge-scaleindustry.InhisaddendatovolumethreeofCapital,Engels’s sense of this new capitalist modernity was reflected in belated references to the surge ofcompetition between “a whole series of competing industrial countries”183 and to “gigantic”concentrationsofcapitalin“cartels”and“trusts.”184Allthiswasnew,anticipatedbutneverwitnessedbyMarx.Butthesenseofcapitalistnoveltywasofcoursealsoreflectedinadmiringreferencestothewaysubmarinetelegraphcables,steamers,andthecompletionoftheSuezCanalhadalldramaticallycompressedoraccelerated the turnoverofworld trade.Between thewritingofCapital andEngels’sadditions to the text a completely new world had emerged, defined by a much sharper sense ofnationality,greateraggressioninworldpolitics,andasenseoflivingatnewvelocities.Theconcentrationofmanufacturingcapitalhadmajorimplicationsformerchants.Itallowedforthesettingupofcompanysalesofficesandcompany-operatedsalesnetworks,andintheUSby1900“themanufacturerwasascendant,theindependentmerchantindecline.”185ItalsobroughtaboutnewformsofretailcapitalintheshapeofhugedepartmentstoresthatemergedinmetropoliseslikeParisfromthe1870s.Again,velocityofcirculationwasthedrivingimperative,withsalesvolumesrunningintomanymillions of francs or dollars and turned over more rapidly thanks to the lower margins that giantretailers were willing to accept.186 In the “Convolutes”Walter Benjamin describes the departmentstores (magasinsdenouveautés) as“temples consecrated to the religious intoxicationofgreat cities,”borrowingpartofthisstrikingexpressionfromBaudelaire.187Advertisingwascommonandextensiveby the 1870s,188 and increasingly linked to revolutionary new forms of energy such as electricity189

whichlighteduptheshoppingarcadesanddepartmentstores.Inthesphereswheretheysurvivedinasubstantial way, speed became an ever more essential part of the way commercial capitals had tooperate.ThusinZola’snovelAuBonheurdesDames(TheLadies’Delight)thecentralcharacterOctaveMouret,ownerofavastdepartmentstoreofthatname,explainedtothebankerBaronHartmannthat“the systemofmodern large-scale trading”and its “hugely increasedpowerof accumulation”werebasedona“continuousandrapidrenewalofcapital,whichhadtobeconvertedintogoodsasoftenaspossibleinasingleyear.”190

Theother thingMarxnever lived to seewas theexpansionofFrenchcapitalism in Indochina, themassive concentration of French economic interests in rice, rubber, banking, and minerals thatculminated in the stranglehold of a handful of banking groups by the 1920s.191 To take an obviousexampleofthis,from1876to1914theBanquedel’Indochine,“thefinancialarmofFrenchimperialisminAsia,”as itshistorianMarcMeuleaudescribed it,192declaredcumulativenetprofitsof107,311,000goldfrancsonapaid-upcapitalof12million.193NoBritishfirminIndiacouldhavematchedthatscale

andlevelofprofitability,letalonethesheerconcentrationofcapitalimpliedinit.Whatwasemerginginthe latenineteenthcenturywasanentirelynewsortofcapitalism,drivenbymodern industrybutalso bound up with more aggressive forms of expansion and unprecedented degrees of verticalintegrationinindustriesliketobacco,194rubber,andoil,whichdramaticallyreducedthedependenceofmanufacturersonmerchantcapital.ThepatternofFrenchdomination in Indochinawasmore advanced than anything to be found inBritain’smercantilecapitalisminthelate-Victoriandecades.TherewasnoBritishcounterpart totheFrench finance capital that dominated entire sectors of Indochina’s economy. British capital’sdependenceoninvisibleearnings,whichwasthehallmarkofthelargelycommercialnatureofBritishcapitalism,wasalsoitscrucialsourceofvulnerabilityoncewardisruptedtheeconomicintegrationofthe capitalist world and the worst crisis capitalism had seen till then deepened the economicfragmentation and sense of chaos. The years from 1913 to 1937 saw a severe decline in Britain’sinvisibleincomeinrealterms.195Attheheightofthedepression“[t]heclassicalTreasurymodeloftheeconomycametumblingdownin1931,”asthegoldstandardandfreetradewereabandonedandCitycosmopolitanismlayinruinsinthe1930s.196

APPENDIX:ISLAMANDCAPITALISM

The titleof this essay is borrowed from the titleof a famousbook that theFrenchArabistMaximeRodinson published in France in 1966.When Rodinson wrote Islam and Capitalism, the traumaticdefeatofNasserandtheArabstatesat thehandsofIsraelwasstill roughlyayearaway.But,asweknow,thatdefeatwasamajorwatershedbothpolitically,precipitatingthedemiseofArabnationalismandthediscreditingof the“secular” leaderships that touted it,and inawidercultural sensebecause“the defeat” (as it came to be called) led to decades of bitter introspection and to the sustained ifgradualexpansionofanewpoliticalforcethroughouttheMuslimworld.WhatIshalldointhisessayisstart fromtheproblematic thatRodinsongrappledwith inhisseminalbook,namely,whether,or,morecorrectly, inwhatsense,wecanspeakofcapitalism in theIslamicworld,and thenexpand thenotionofcapitalismtoincludethecultureofmodernitythatMarxsawascentraltowhat(tohimintheCommunistManifestoatleast)wasstillanewandrevolutionarymodeofproduction.Theessayisthusdividedintotworatherdistinctparts,thelinkbetweenthembeingestablishedbywhatIshallcall“theindigenous formof capitalism” that characterizedmuchof theMiddleEast at least till theeconomicrevolutionthatsweptthroughtheGulfinthe2000s.RodinsonbelongedtoagenerationwhenthelargelyformalistdebatesthatdominatedMarxismfromtheseventieshadobviouslymadenospecialimpact.HistorianslikeSubhiLabib,1HalilInalcik,2‘Abd

al-‘AzizDuri,3RobertMantran,4andBraudel5spokeofcapitalismandcapitalistsintheIslamicworld,sincetheseseemedlikethebestwayofcharacterizingtheactivityandeconomicstructuresconnectedwith large-scale merchants and banking groups who were not discernibly different from theircounterpartsinmedievalItaly.ButthoseofthemwhowerefamiliarwiththeArabicsourcesalsoknewthatanotionof“capital”wasfrequentlydiscussedbothinthevariousschoolsofIslamiclawandbywriterslikeIbnKhaldūn.Al-mālcouldofcoursehavethegenericmeaningsof“wealth,”“property,”“possessions,” and soonbut in the juristic discussions andnumerouspassages elsewhere it had themorecorrectmeaningofacommodityormassofcommodities.Bythetenthcenturythetermmāliyya,derivedfromit,cametomean“commercialexchangevalue,”while thetermmālmutaqawwimwasacommodity whose exchange value was guaranteed by the law “against destruction, damage, orunauthorizedappropriation....”6Thoughmālbyitselfwasoftenshorthandforcapital(thatis,forasumofvalueearmarkedforinvestment),rāsmālwasthepropertermfor“capital”andwasfrequentlyused in the plural tomean several distinct capitals (individual capital inMarx’s sense), aswhen al-WāqidīreportsthattheQurayshimerchantSafwānb.UmayyacomplainedthataslongasMuhammadenforcedhisblockadeofthecoastalroadtoGazaandforcedthesummercaravanstostayputinMecca,“Wearesimplyeatingupourcapitals(na’kuluru’ūsamwālna).”7Sāhibal-mālusuallymeant“ownerofcapital,” andmutamawwilwas later the standard term for a capitalist. (In Ibn Khaldūn Rosenthaltranslatesmutamawwal as “capital accumulation.”) In a study published shortly before Rodinson’sbook appeared Labib could thus suggest that “The concept of ‘capital’ isused inmedieval Islamic

economichistory.IbnKhaldunhasadetaileddiscussionofit,”andhewentontosay,“Weshouldn’tlookforthefirstsignsoftheoriginsofcapitalisminEuropeorEgyptoramonganyspecificgroupofmerchants such as the Italians or the Karimi merchants. Amercantile estate (eine Kaufmannschaft)existedeverywhereandconsequentlysodideconomicenterprisesandprofits.”8

ThequestionthatRodinsonstartedwithwastoknowifIslamconceivedasabodyofdoctrinelaidoutintheQur’anandtheprophetictradition(thehadīth)containedanythingthateitherdiscouragedormilitatedagainstcapitalisteconomicactivity,andhisanswerwasanemphatic“no.”RodinsonsawtheeconomichistoryofMuslim-majoritycountriesascharacterizedbywhathecalled“thedevelopmentofcommercial capital in a clearly capitalistic direction” and argued, “Not only did theMuslimworldknowacapitalisticsector,butthissectorwasapparentlythemostextensiveandhighlydevelopedinhistorybeforethesixteenthcentury.”9Inbothsugarandtextiles,forexample,privatecapitalistscouldbefoundwhoemployedwage-workers,oftenundersupervisionbythestate.10 I’mnotawareofanydetailed study of the textile industry comparable to Mohamed Ouerfelli’s remarkable book on themedievalsugarindustry,11butfromthisitisclearthatRodinsonwaslessinterestedinpursuinganyoftheseargumentsinamoreconcrete,historicalway,andwas,ashehimselfnoted,producingworkofa“theoreticalcharacter.”12ThereasonImakethispointhereisthathemadenoattempttoaskwhothe“privatecapitalists”werewhoinvestedin,say,thesugarrefineriesandtextilefactoriesoftheMamlukperiod(theywere, in fact,overwhelminglymerchants,apart fromthesultan,membersofhis familyandtheMamlukamirswhowerethequintessentialpower-élite),13andhisone-linestatement,“Therewasalsoafairlyextensivecapitalistdomesticindustry,”sawnofurtherelaboration,althoughitwasacrucialandinterestingclaimtoadvance.14

ElsewhereRodinsonwrote,“ItisclearthattheKoraninnowaysetouttomodifytheeconomicrulesoperating in the society in which it surfaced.” “The Koran contains very few purely economicinjunctions.”15Hewent togreat lengths to show that the sole exception to this, namely, thebanonusury, was widely circumvented both in the actual schools of law through the use of so-called“devices” and of course in practice. For example, interest-bearing loans were considered normalpractice in theOttoman Empire, and fatwas could always be obtained to give sanction to interest-bearingsavingsaccounts.Intheeleventhcentury,thelegalscholaral-Tartūšīwasalarmedthatcreditplayed suchamajor role in thecommercial transactions inAlexandria.16ButRodinsonwent furtherand implied that the rationalism of the Qur’an and the “very special importance” ascribed byMuhammadtotheindividual17werebothfeaturesthatmadeIslamespeciallyreceptivetothepursuitandneedsofbusiness.ItisstrikingthatcontractsofcommercialexchangewerethesoleareaofIslamiclawwherethehierarchiesofsex,age,religion,andlegalstatusgavewaybeforeanoverridingequalitygrounded in “the capacity to reason soundly.”Baber Johansenquotes Sarakhsī as saying, “In thesecontracts(thatis,contractsofcommercialexchange)allareequal.”Tijāra (trading activity) was essentially a means of valorizing capital. Sarakhsī was a leadingexponent of theHanafī schoolwhichwas by far themost pragmatic and flexible in its approach toissuesofbusiness.Forexample,theIslamicequivalentofthecommendacontract,calledmudāraba,was

justified by him in terms of its actual economic function. “Because people have a need for thiscontract,”hewrites.“Fortheownerofcapitalmaynotfindhiswaytoprofitabletradingactivity,andthe person who can find his way to such activity may not have the capital. And profit cannot beobtainedexceptbymeansofbothof these, that is,capitaland tradingactivity.”18Theagent in suchcontractshadnearlyunrestrictedflexibilityinHanafī law,possiblyreflectingcommercialpracticesinIraqwhereAbuHanīfa,thefoundingjuristofthisschool,hadbeenaclothmerchant.Since,asZubaidasays,“thetradingmiddleclassesoftheMuslim[world]werealsothemajorbearersofIslamicreligiouslearning[and]itwasfromtheirranksthattheulemaandQadiswererecruited,”itwasalwayspossibleforthelawtobeshapedtoaccommodatetheneedsofmerchants.Zubaidagoessofarastoclaimthat“inthescripturesandtraditionsofIslamtradeisconceivedofasadesirableandvirtuousactivity,”andtherearecertainlyenoughproof-textsintheQur’antosupportthisview.19Commercewasoneoffourformsof“earning”(al-kasb),hencecoveredbytheverse(2:267)Sarakhsīcitedinconnectionwithit,“Spend[giveincharity]outofthegoodthingsyouhaveearned”(anfiqūmintayyibātimā kasabtum).Shaybānī, another jurist of the Hanafī school, starts his treatise Kitāb al-Kasb with the assertion:“seekingtoearnisanobligationforeveryMuslim,justasseekingknowledgeisanobligation.”20Theexpression“piousbourgeoisie”whichZubaidausestocharacterizethisurbanmilieuwithitscloselinksbetweenthemerchantsandthereligiousscholarscapturesanimportantaspectofthewayanearlyformofcapitalismwaslegitimizedinthewiderreachesofIslam’scivilsociety.The political economy that framesmuch of this history can be described as a symbiosis betweentributary Muslim states and commercial capital. Ibn Khaldūn saw this very clearly when in theMuqaddimah he wrote: “wealth as a rule comes from their business and commercial activities,”referringtopoliticalregimesthroughoutthehistoryofIslamdowntohistime.Thekindofcommercehehadinmindwassubstantial,large-scale,capitalisttrade.HesaysintheMuqaddimah, “Commercemeans theattempt toearna livingbyexpandingyourcapital (bi tanmīyatal-mal)and theextentbywhich capital is increased is called profit.” Labor, hewrote, “is the essential basis of all profit andaccumulation of capital.” Taking both ideas together it followed that the most prosperous ordeveloped states were those with abundant supplies of labor available to those who could makecommercial use of it. “A large civilization yields large profits because of the large amount of(available)labor,whichisthecauseof(profit).”21LacosteisthereforenotfaroffthemarkinregardingIbnKhaldūnasaforerunnerofhistoricalmaterialism.22Indeed,hesawhimselfchoosinga“remarkableandoriginalmethod” inwritinghisworkanddescribedhistoryas“informationabouthumansocialorganization.”23To him themost developed states (inEurope, theFarEast, and Islam)were thosewhere capitalhadaccess to large reservesof labor andwhich, crucially,didnot treat theownersofcapitalunjustly.Whentheydid,theytriggeredadynamicthatusuallyledtotheirowndownfall.IbnKhaldūn notes in passing that state officials and rulers were usually jealous of the capitalists (al-mutamawwil),24implyingthattherewasalwaysastrongtemptationtoovertaxthecommercialsectororeven move in and monopolize some leading sector, as the Mamluk Sultan Barsbay did with theEgyptiansugarindustry.25

WithinthecountriesofIslam,large-scalecommercewasdrivenbytheconcentrationofdemandinmajormetropolitanmarkets that also happened to be the seat of government and the base of somemajor ruling dynasty. In the Abbāsid period Baghdad epitomized a market of this sort and wasunrivaledanywhereintheworldforthesheerconcentrationofwealthandcommercialactivity.Theestimateofonecontemporary,Hilālal-Sābi,thatBaghdadinthelaterninthcenturyhadanupperclass(al-khassa)ofsomefifty thousand individuals isaroughmeasureof thescaleofdomesticdemand.26

ThefragmentationofthecaliphatethatcamewiththedeclineoftheAbbāsidsserved,ifanything,tosustainthevibrancyofmetropolitanmarketsbydispersingpoliticalpoweracrossawiderswatheoftheIslamicworld, so that capitals likeCórdoba, Fez,Tunis,Kairouan,Cairo, and so on replicated thepatternofsubstantialconcentrationsofmarketdemandonalessoutsizedbutstillimportantscale.FezandTunisbothhadmorethan100,000inhabitants,Cairowasconsiderablybigger(200,000to250,000in 1348 when Paris and London were 80,000 and 60,000 respectively),27 and Istanbul with 700,000inhabitantsinthesixteenthcenturywasonBraudel’sdescription“byfarthelargestEuropeancity”atthe time.28 Ibn Khaldūn who traveled extensively between most of these major centers saw themdrivingthebusinesslifeoftheIslamicworld.Butthegreatgeographiesthatwerewrittenbetweentheninth and early thirteenth centuries show that the true heart of the system lay at a lower level, insmaller, commercially active centers like Basra, Nishapur, Bahnasā, Mahdia, Sfax, Palermo, andAlmeríaandthevibrantnetworks theyformed.Theywere the truebackboneof theeconomy.Bothstate andprivate capital investedmajorly in the commercial infrastructuresknownas funduqs (morecorrectly,fanādiq),khans,qaysariyyas,orwikālas,solidstonebuildingsthatweresquareoroblongandopenedontothestreet“bymeansofasingle,oftenmonumentalgate”29or(inthecaseofqaysariyyas)asmanyassixtoeightgates.Cities likeCairointhesixteenthcenturyweredenseconcentrationsofcommercial capital,30 and thewikālas andkhanswerewhere the bulk ofwholesale trade took place,commercialestablishmentsthatLabibcouldevendescribeas“virtualstockexchanges.”31AccordingtoEvliya Çelebi, Bulaq, the city’s port area, had over seventy khans ca.1672.32 One of the moresubstantial establishments of this sort in Basra was a reconverted seventh-century palace built byZubayrb.al-‘Awwam,oneoftheCompanionsoftheProphet.Whenal-Mas‘ūdīvisitedBasrain943,this structure teemed with merchants, bankers (arbāb al-amwāl), and maritime businesses.33 In theSafarnama,writtenacenturylater,NasirKhusrawclaimsthatmerchantsresidingtemporarilyinBasrawoulduseonlybankers’bills(khattsiraf).34InNishapur,amajortextilecenter,IbnHauqalstatesthatthetraderswith“largemassesofcommoditiesandsubstantialcapitals”(ahlal-badā’i‘ al-kibārwaal-amwālal-ghizār)dominatedthebiggerfunduqsandkhans, leaving themoremodestones toa smallerscale of business.Here, in the less opulent commercial complexes therewas no separation betweentradeandproduction,sinceherefersto“shopscrammedwithartisans.”35InBahnasāinMiddleEgypt,another major textile town, al-Idrīsī tells us that no woolen or cotton fabrics were manufacturedwithoutprintingthenameofthefactory(tiraz)onthem.36Mahdia, intheSahel,manufacturedfinelyworkedtextilesthatsaid“MadeinMahdia”whichwerewidelyexportedsincetheworkmanshipwasofsuchahighstandard.37TheportitselfattractedmerchantshippingfromallpartsoftheMediterranean.

InAlmería,accordingtoal-Idrīsī,whentheAlmoravidsstillcontrolledthosepartsofSpain,ahigh-quality silk industrycontainedeighthundred looms (turuz, a term that ishabituallymistranslatedas“workshops”whenitreferstosilk)38andit’sworthcomparingthatfigurewiththetwelvehundredtotwothousandsilkloomsthatVenicewasknowntohaveattheendofthefifteenthcenturyandintheearlysixteenth.39ExamplesanddescriptionsofthissortcouldbemultipliedalmostindefinitelyifoneconsultedawiderrangeofsourcesthanIhave,buttheyseemquiteenoughtometosuggestthattheIslamic world had its own forms of commercial capitalism throughout the centuries that saw theemergenceandexpansionofcapitalisminVenice,Genoa,andFlorence.Sowhydidthislargelycommercial,pre-modernormedievalformofcapitalismthatformedsuchalargepartof the structureof the traditional economy throughout theMiddleEastdown to the finalyearsoftheOttomanEmpire(andinIran,evenlater)notevolveintoamoderncapitalisteconomy?Assuming it makes sense to frame historical questions in this teleological way, of the variousexplanationsadvanced,twoseemparticularlyappealing.MaliseRuthvenhasarguedthattheabsenceof the Roman-law concept of “legal personality,” itself bound up with “the uncompromisingindividualismoftheShari’a,”preventedanywidercorporatesolidarityfromemerginginthemerchantclasses.“Islamiclawdidnotrecognizecitiesassuch,nordiditadmitcorporatebodies.”Bycontrast,“intheWesttheChurch,the‘mysticalbody’ofChristwhichaloneguaranteedsalvation,becamethearchetype in law of awhole raft of secular corporations that succeeded it during the earlymodernperiod.ThemysticqualitiesoffictionalpersonhoodoriginatingintheBodyofChristwereeventuallydevolved to joint stock companies and public corporationswith tradable shares.”40Translating thisintomy terms, thenon-developmentofcapitalismwas lessabouta failure toemerge thanabout thefailuretoacquireamorecollective,corporateformthatcouldexpressandcontributetothesolidarityof a class. Capitalists certainly existed in the Muslim world, but they failed to form the kind ofcollectivesolidarityimpliedinthenotionofa“class.”InvolumethreeofCapitalMarxhaddescribedVeniceandGenoaasurbanrepublicswhere themerchants“subordinated thestatemoresecurely tothemselves,” and implicit in some combination of Ruthven’s argumentwithmy own is the furthercrucial thesis that this singularly failed tohappenanywhere in theIslamicworld.This ties inwithasecond,and,tomymind,evenmoreself-evident,explanation,whichistheoneMielantsproposesinhisbook,namely,thatthefailureofcommercialcapitalismintheIslamicworldwasessentiallyafailureofmercantilism.41ItisastrikingfactthattherewasneveranyIslamiccounterpartoftheWest’sviolentmercantilistexpansion.Again,thedecisivefactorhereistheverydifferentwaysinwhichcommercialcapital and the statewere bound to each other.The powerful state backing thatEnglishmerchantsreceivedfromthemonarchy,whatBrennercallsthe“Crown-companypartnership,”42hadabsolutelynoequivalentamongthenumerousdynastiesthat,liketheOttomans,werewillingtoencouragetradebut unwilling (or incapable) of the kind of aggressive expansion that the Portuguese monarchyunleashed in the opening years of the sixteenth century. Of course, once the European powersembarkedon their expansion intoAsianmarkets, Islamic commercial networkswere a prime targetacross the whole region. The violence with which the Portuguese attacked and dismantled those

networkswaslucidlydocumentedbytheKeralahistorianZainuddininalate-sixteenthcenturyhistorycalledTuhfatal-Mujāhidīn.If,asBraudelclaims,“Capitalismonlytriumphswhenitbecomesidentifiedwiththestate,whenitisthe state,”43 then the externality of the state to capital remained the chief limitation on Islamiccapitalismanditstransformativepotential.SeenagainstthebackgroundofEurope’sexpansionanditsownconvulsivecapitalist transformation, the senseof stagnation thisbegan togeneratewasevidentwellbeforetheSyrianjournalist‘Abdal-Rahmanal-KawākibiwroteTheNatureofDespotism(Tabā’ī‘al-istibdād)attheendofthenineteenthcentury,shortlybeforehewasmurderedbypoisoningattheageof forty-seven.Asearlyas1867,Khayral-Dinal-Tunisihadpublisheda tract calledStraightestPathtoKnowtheConditionofStatesinwhichhevoicedstrongoppositiontotheideathat“allactsandinstitutions of non-Muslims should be avoided.”44 Indeed, Kurzman has even claimed, “Support ofcapitalism was the dominant economic theme in the modernist Islamic movement. Khayr al-Dinpraised societies in which “the circulation of capital is expanded, profits increase accordingly, andwealthisput intothehandsofthemostproficient . . . Themodernistmovementwasbankrolled inpart by industrialists and traders promoting international economic linkages.”45 But added to thisentirely progressive sense of having to catch up with the West was the more profound sense ofresentment that flowed from the forced marginalization of indigenous capital in those parts of theOttomanworldwhere,asinEgypt,“thecommercialsectorwaswrestedfromindigenoushands”46byacombinationofFrenchandSyrian-Christiancommercialinterests,andFrenchcapitalbegantolobbyforaninvasionofEgypttowardtheendoftheeighteenthcentury.TosaynothingofthedeepersenseofdegradationthatwasboundupwiththecolonizationoftheArabMiddleEast,startingwithFrance’sinvasionofAlgeriaanditslarge-scaledispossessionsoftriballand,influxofsettlers,banningofArabicingovernmentschools,andsoon.“TheIslamiceconomicsystemshouldbesuchthathe[thecapitalist]isnotpermittedtoaccumulatewealth.”SosaidAliShari‘atiinalittleknowntractcalledIslam’sClassBias,publishedposthumouslyin1980andapparentlyhislastwork.47Shari‘ati,ofcourse,wasseenbymostsectorsoftheIranianLeftas the true ideologueof therevolutionthat toppledMuhammadRezaShah in1979,eventhoughhisownanti-clericalismconflictedsharplywiththetheocracythatKhomeinisuccessfullyinstituted.ButifShari‘ati’sAlaviShi’ismwasanideologyradicallyopposedtocapitalism,forallsectorsofthereligiousRightinIslamiccountries,fromMawdudi48totheMuslimBrotherhood49toKhomeini,50thedefenseofprivatepropertywasanessentialaspectofQur’anicorthodoxy,sothattheclaimsofsocialjusticehadto be reconciledwith an economic order based on inequalities. This, in any case, was the heart oftradition,of theclergy’sorganicrelationshipwith thepropertiedclasses, inGramsci’s termstheblocbetween the ulama and the devout bourgeoisie which to Shari‘ati had destroyed Islam’s classradicalism.Shari‘ati’sreadingofIslamasrivenbyitsdualitybetweenthe“Islamofthecaliphate,ofthepalace,andoftherulers”andthe“Islamofthepeople,oftheexploited,andofthepoor”51wassharplycontested by Khomeini’s chief intellectual emissary among Iran’s middle-class youth, MortezaMotahhari, who simply “reject[ed] the notion that early Islam belonged to the oppressed” and

“[upheld] theQur’anicprinciplethateventhemostdepravedhavethepossibilityofsalvation.”“ToMutahhariclassharmonywasvital...Tohismindinjusticecamenotfromawealthierclassbutfromimperialism,secularismandPahlavioppression.”52Thegradientof thetraditionalformofcapitalismthatsurvivedintothetwentiethcenturywasonethatranfrommerchantcapital’sentrenchedeconomicpositioninIranandtheGulfcountriestoitsenforcedcolonialmarginalizationinEgyptanditsnon-existenceornear-extinctioninFrench-controlledAlgeria.InIranthebazaariswereadecisivepartofthe social and financial base of the Revolution, and the post-Revolution economy has even beencharacterizedbywriterslikeAliAnsariasa“mercantilebourgeoisrepublic.”53AbrahamianhasshownhowprofoundlyconcernedKhomeiniwastoretainthesupportofthemoreaffluentmerchantsevenasheunrelentinglyattackedthesectorsofcapitallinkedtothemonarchy.InAliKhameini’sdescription,thebazaarwas the “bastion supporting the Republic,”54 so that in this sense these forms of capitalplayedapoliticallydecisiverole.Butifso,nothingwasfurtherremovedfromthisthanthepatternthatevolvedintheGulfwhere,asJillCrystalargued,“themerchantswereboughtoffcollectivelybythestate,” that is, depoliticized or politically marginalized in exchange for “a sizable portion of oilrevenues”throughrealestatespeculation,agenciesforforeignfirms,governmentcontracts,andsoon.“Oil transformed political life by freeing the rulers from their historical dependence on themerchants.”55 In fact, it didmuchmore than that, because theGulf, asAdamHanieh shows in hisseminal study, was the only sector of the Arab world where the 2000s saw a major watershed,completely transforming the nature of capitalism in the Gulf countries both by integrating capitalacross the region to create what he calls “Khaleeji capital” and by allowing for its rapid globalintegration,sothatbytheendof2007theGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC)stateandprivatecapitalbetweenthemownedanestimated$2.2trillionormoreinforeignassets,morethanthetotalheldbyChina’scentralbankinthesameyear!Thescaleofdevelopmenthasbeen“prodigious,”andarguablytheGulfistheonlypartofthecontemporaryIslamicworldwhereamodernbourgeoisiehasemerged,structuredaroundlargedomesticconglomeratesandqualitativelydistinctfromthemerchantelitesthatstraddledthemainpartofthetwentiethcentury.56

Yetthisiswheretheparadoxorseemingparadoxlies.Ifadvancedformsofcapitalismhappilycoexistwith political and religious authoritarianisms, what do wemake ofMarx’s vision in theManifesto,wherecapitalbothinternationalizesandstripsawayall inheritedtraditionalobsoleteformsoflife?IfnoneofthestatesintheMiddleEastarereligiousinanystrictsense(andthisincludesIran),noneofthem (with the exception ofTurkey) can be described as secular either.57 For example, in Egypt aconstitutionalamendmentof1980madeshari‘atheprincipalsourceoflegislation,creatingadualityinthecountry’slegalsystem.Moreover,“secular”leadershave,almostwithoutexception,manipulatedIslamfor theirownpurposesandevenencouragedIslamist forces. InAlgeriaChadliBendjedid, thearmymanwhosucceededBoumediène,“quietlyencouragedtheIslamistsasameansofreducingtheLeft.”58InEgyptSadat“gavestrongmoralandmaterialsupporttoIslamistsinthemid-1970s... Atthe height of the bloody confrontations between the Egyptian state and the active Islamistorganizations, the state used the mass media to promote a steadily increasing diet of religious

programs.”59AndofcourseinPakistanandSudanmilitaryrulers“triedtobuttresstheirlegitimacy...bydeclaringtheapplicationoftheshari‘aintheirlegalsystems.”60ThesehavealsoallbeenrepressiveregimeswithstaggeringlevelsofcensorshipevenundersocialistleaderslikeNasser.61

InthefinalprefacetoAllThatIsSolidMeltsintoAirBermanreferstothe“stillunfoldinghistoryofradicalauthoritarianism,”withapassingmentionofKhomeini.62In2004theLebanesejournalistSamirKassirarguedthattheendemiclackofdemocracyintheArabworldandthecivicpowerlessnessboundupwith it were themain reasons why religion could emerge “to channel people’s frustrations andexpresstheirdemandsforchange.”63By“religion”hemeanttheupsurgeofIslamismthatdominatedthelastquarterofthetwentiethcentury.KassirhimselfwasassassinatedinJune2005,most likelyatthehandsoftheSyriansecurityapparatus.Islamismisnotfaithbutthemanipulationoffaiththroughschematic doctrinal constructions based on fictional continuities with the past, literalist readings ofscripture(whatAbuZaydcallsthe“authoritarianismofthetext”),anaggressiveculturalxenophobia,andapuritanicalsocialconservatismthatseekstostaveofftheemancipationofwomenandyouth.Ittransforms Islam into a political ideology whose aim is to create an ostensibly Islamic state byenforcing the shari‘aand peddling the illusion that a shari‘a-based government will finally embodyGod’s sovereignty on earth. It presupposes and exploits a culture of mass religiosity and, as AliRahnema has shown in a brilliant book, in Iran, under Ahmadinejad and his close aide AyatollahMesbahYazdi,wascapableofcalculatedlyencouragingsuperstitionasameansofshort-termpoliticalmanipulation.64

But, and it is essential to conclude by saying this, the ubiquitous presence of an Islamist politicalsector and its inroads into the public spheremight engender the illusion thatArab/Muslim culturalmodernity is a dead letter today.Tome it seems that nothing is further from the truth.As the lateSyrianphilosopherandMarxistSadiqJalalal-AzmnotedinavibrantessayontheRushdieaffair,noneof Rushdie’s Western defenders “came anywhere near regarding him as a Muslim dissident”comparable,say, todissidentwriters in the thenSovietbloc.This,al-Azmsuggests, isbecause theirownorientalistassumptionsabout thecontemporaryMiddleEast interiorized the Islamists’viewsoftheir societies as bastions or backwaters of conservatism. In truth, however, “intellectual life andculturalactivityintheMuslimworld...isnotasIslamicallyconformist,religiouslyunquestioningandspiritually stagnant as one is led to believe from the countless accounts, interpretations andexplanationsgivenbyWesterncommentators,critics,journalists,specialists,politicians,andthemediaingeneralàproposoftheRushdieaffair.”Moreover,al-Azmtellsus,“withintheentirerealmofIslamthe Arab world produced the strongest and most vocal defense of Rushdie on the part ofintellectuals.”65Thistraditionof“subversiveintellectualism,”asI’dliketocallit,hasfordecadesbeenthetruebackboneofArabculturalmodernity.Reiteratingal-Kawākibi’sscathingcritiqueofdespotismin a more contemporary world, it preserved the legacy of the nahda as what it clearly saw as anunfinishedagenda.ThemodernArabicnovelseetheswithsubversion.Fromthisvibrantandcomplextradition of fiction (saturated with critiques of authoritarianism) to SaadallahWannous’s essays inQadāyā wa Shahādāt66 to iconoclastic pleas for a sexually open and liberated Arab society such as

Muhammad Kamal al-Labwani’s Love and Sex in Fundamentalism and Imperialism (1994)67 to thenumerousreligiousmodernistswhohaveemergedbothintheArabworldandinIran,68itisultimatelytheconsolidationandfurtherexpansionofthiscritical,anti-authoritarian,politicallysubversivestrandofMiddleEasternculturethatwillgivetheemergingstrugglesfordemocracytheintellectualweaponstheyneedtocombatwhatal-Labwanicalls“thecultureofoldextinctclassesdressedupinthegarboftrueandauthenticIslam.”

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

IamdeeplygratefultotheDepartmentofDevelopmentStudies,SOAS,forrenewingmyassociationwith themovera spanofmanyyearsandenablingme tosustainaccess to thebrilliantcollectionoflibrariesinLondon.GilbertAchcar,AdamHanieh,JensLerche,AlessandraMezzadri,andSubirSinhahavebeenamongmymost intellectuallyinvigoratingfriends.Thesameistrue,toat leastasgreatadegree,ofHenryBernsteinandBarbaraHarriss-White,whomI’vehadtheextremegoodfortuneofknowing for themost productivedecadesofmy life. I absolutelymust thank thekind and efficientlibrarians of theBritishLibrary, SOAS,LSE, SenateHouse, andUCL.Shaku, as always, has beengenerous,lovingandsupportiveduringtheyearsIresearchedthisbook.Andlastbutnotleast,I’dliketothanktheteamatHaymarket(NishaBolsey,MayaMarshall,andDuncanThomas)forthepatientand carefulway inwhich they helped to get it ready, and to JamieKerry for thewonderful coverdesign.

NOTES

ChapterOne1.RobertS.LopezandIrvingW.Raymond,MedievalTradeintheMediterraneanWorld(NewYork,1955),176–77.2.LopezandRaymond,MedievalTrade,38–41.3.VictorBrants,Esquissedesthéorieséconomiquesdesxiiieetxivesiècles(Louvain,1895),134,note1,citingapassagewheremoney(pecunia)issaidtohave“quandamseminalemrationemlucrosi,quemcommunitercapitalevocamus.”

4.CitedDaleKent,TheRiseoftheMedici:FactioninFlorence,1426–1434(Oxford,1978),142.5.VitorinoMagalhãesGodinho,L’économiedel’EmpireportugaisauxXVeetXVIesiècles(Paris,1969),645.6.FernandBraudel,TheMediterraneanandtheMediterraneanWorldintheAgeofPhilipII,2vols.,trans.SiânReynolds(LondonandNewYork,1972),465,whichcitesan“expertoftheBancodiRialto.”

7.IrfanHabib,“MerchantCommunitiesinPrecolonialIndia,”inTheRiseofMerchantEmpires:StatePowerandWorldTrade,1350–1750,ed.JamesD.Tracy(Cambridge,1990),386–387.

8.AndreasTietze,Mustafa‘Ali’sCounselforSultansof1581,2vols.(Vienna,1982),vol.2,36,38;GiancarloCasale,TheOttomanAgeofExploration(Oxford,2010),184–185.

9.GigliolaPaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchantsinSeventeenth-CenturyItaly,trans.StephenParkin(Cambridge,1997),12,citingLeonardoDonà.

10.LewisRoberts,TheMerchantsMapofCommerce,fourthedition(London,1700),295.11.Anne-Robert-JacquesTurgot,“ReflectionsontheFormationandtheDistributionofWealth,”inCommerce,Culture,&Liberty:

ReadingsonCapitalismBeforeAdamSmith,ed.HenryC.Clark(Indianapolis,2003),518–563,at538–539,T.’sdescriptionofthe“useofcapitaladvancesinindustrialenterprises.”

12.P.J.Marshall,“PrivateBritishTradeintheIndianOceanbefore1800,”inIndiaandtheIndianOcean,1500–1800,eds.AshinDasGuptaandM.N.Pearson,(NewDelhi,1987),291.

13.RalphDavis,TheRiseoftheEnglishShippingIndustry(London:Macmillan,1962),383–384.14.CharlesFrançoisDuPérierDumouriez,ÉtatPrésentduRoyaumedePortugalenl’AnnéeMDCCLXVI(Lausanne:ChezFrancoisGrasset&co.,1775),citedStephenFisher,“LisbonasaPortTownintheEighteenthCentury,”inIporticomeimpresaeconomica,ed.S.Cavaciocchi(Florence:LeMonnier,1988),723–24.

15.KarlMarx,Grundrisse(PelicanBooks,1973),684–685,note.16.Marx,Grundrisse,460–461.17.JohnBarber,SovietHistoriansinCrisis,1928–1932(London:MacmillanPress,1981),62.“Merchantcapitalism”alsofiguresinRubin’slecturesonthehistoryofeconomicthought,wherehearguesthat“aclosealliancewasformed(inEurope)betweenthestateandthecommercialbourgeoisie”duringwhathecallsthe“ageofmerchantcapitalism”;seeIsaacIlyichRubin,AHistoryofEconomicThought,trans.DonaldFiltzer(London,1979),25–26.Thelecturesweredeliveredinthelate1920s.

18.MauriceDobb,StudiesintheDevelopmentofCapitalism(London,1963),17–18,withtheimportantfootnoteat17.19.Dobb,Studies,151.20.Dobb,Studies,157.21.MauriceDobb,“AReply,”inTheTransitionfromFeudalismtoCapitalism,ed.RodneyHilton(London,1976),62.22.M.N.Pokrovsky,BriefHistoryofRussia,2vols.,trans.D.S.Mirsky(London,1933),vol.1,282(fromtheAppendix).23.R.H.Tawney,“AHistoryofCapitalism,”EconomicHistoryReview,2ndseries,2(1950),307–316,at310–311;italicsmine.24.Barber,SovietHistorians,57.25.DavidOrmrod,TheRiseofCommercialEmpires:EnglandandtheNetherlandsintheAgeofMercantilism,1650–1770(Cambridge,2003),3.

26.R.H.Tawney,ReligionandtheRiseofCapitalism(PelicanBooks,1938),194.27.Tawney,Religion,232–233.28.Tawney,Religion,141;italicsmine.29.Tawney,Religion,180.30.R.H.Tawney,BusinessandPoliticsUnderJamesI(Cambridge,1958),77.31.EricWilliams,CapitalismandSlavery(ChapelHillandLondon,1994;orig.1944),210.32.GeoffreyIngham,CapitalismDivided?TheCityandIndustryinBritishSocialDevelopment(Macmillan,1984).33.JohnBrewer,TheSinewsofPower:War,MoneyandtheEnglishState,1688–1783(London,1989).34.P.J.CainandA.G.Hopkins,BritishImperialism,1688–2000,2ndedition(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2002).

35.Ingham,CapitalismDivided?,97,150–151.36.CainandHopkins,BritishImperialism,281.37.CainandHopkins,BritishImperialism,88.38.P.Vilar,“ProblemsoftheFormationofCapitalism,”PastandPresent,10(Nov.,1956),15–38,at26.39.Braudel,Mediterranean,443–444,430ff.40.Braudel,Mediterranean,441.41.FernandBraudel,“Lalonguedurée,”inÉcritssurl’histoire(Paris,1969),53–54,65.42.RolandMousnier,LesXVIeetXVIIesiècles,fifthedition(Paris,1967;orig.1953),84–85,98.ItissignificantthatinherlongdiscussionofMousnier’sworktheSoviethistorianLublinskayanowhereobjectedtothecategoryitself,seeA.D.Lublinskaya,FrenchAbsolutism:TheCrucialPhase1620–1629,trans.BrianPearce(Cambridge,1968),chapter1,e.g.,“Mousnierdiscussesinfairdetailtheeconomicsituationinthesixteenthcentury,describingthisprimarilyintermsofthetempestuousdevelopmentofcommercialcapitalism”(p.7).

43.ManuelNunesDias,Ocapitalismomonárquicoportuguês(1415–1549),2volumes(Coimbra,1963).44.CharlesCarrière,NégociantsmarseillaisauXVIIIesiècle,2vols.(Marseilles,1973);C.Carrière,M.Courdurié,M.Gutsatz,andR.Squarzoni,Banqueetcapitalismecommercial.LalettredechangeauXVIIIesiècle(Marseilles,1976).

45.CatharinaLisandHugoSoly,PovertyandCapitalisminPre-IndustrialEurope(AtlanticHighlands,NJ,1979).46.BéatriceVeyssarat,Négociantsetfabricantsdansl’industriecotonnièresuisse,1760–1840(Lausanne,1982).47.PeterKriedte,Peasants,LandlordsandMerchantCapitalists:EuropeandtheWorldEconomy,1500–1800(LeamingtonSpa,1983),withaGermanoriginalfrom1980.

48.DavidOrmrod,EnglishGrainExportsandtheStructureofAgrarianCapitalism,1700–1760(Hull,1985).49.RobertW.Shenton,TheDevelopmentofCapitalisminNorthernNigeria(London,1986).50.JosephC.Miller,WayofDeath:MerchantCapitalismandtheAngolanSlaveTrade,1730–1830(London,1988).51.RoyBinWong,ChinaTransformed:HistoricalChangeandtheLimitsofEuropeanExperience(Ithaca,1997).52.LeoNoordegraaf,“TheNewDraperiesintheNorthernNetherlands,1500–1800,”inTheNewDraperiesintheLowCountriesand

England,1300–1800,ed.N.B.Harte,(Oxford,1997),173–195.53.SergioTognetti,Un’industriadilussoalserviziodelgrandecommercio(Florence,2002).54.ScottP.Marler,TheMerchants’Capital:NewOrleansandthePoliticalEconomyoftheNineteenth-CenturySouth(Cambridge,2013).55.Someexamplesofthis:HermannKellenbenz,“Autourde1600:lecommercedupoivredesFuggeretlemarchéinternationaldupoivre,”AnnalesESC,11(1956),1–28,“l’espritducapitalismecommercial”(atp.27);J.V.Polišenský,TheThirtyYearsWar,trans.RobertEvans(London,1971),26,“theforcesofcommercialandfinancialcapitalism”;T.H.Lloyd,TheEnglishWoolTradeintheMiddleAges(Cambridge,1977),251,“TheLondonexporters(ofwool)weredominatedbyasmallgroupofmerchantcapitalists”;BarrySupple,“TheNatureofEnterprise,”inTheEconomicOrganizationofEarlyModernEurope,eds.E.E.RichandC.H.Wilson,(CEHE,5)(Cambridge,1977),435,“Inthegenerationofsuccessfulheavyindustry,mercantilecapitalandcapitalistswereofsupremesignificance”;“commercialcapitalists”;AndreGunderFrank,CapitalismandUnderdevelopmentinLatinAmerica(PelicanBooks,1971),59,“thespreadanddevelopmentofmercantilecapitalismintheworldingeneralandinChileandLatinAmericainparticular”;LeroyVailandLandegWhite,CapitalismandColonialisminMozambique(London,1980),2,“mercantilecapitalism’smostrapaciousagents,theslavetraders”;D.A.Washbrook,“Law,StateandAgrarianSocietyinColonialIndia,”ModernAsianStudies,15(1981),649–721,“thecommercialcapitalismencouragedbythegrowthofthecolonialexporttrades”(at679),“urban-basedmercantilecapitalists”(at688–9);JonathanI.Israel,DutchPrimacyinWorldTrade,1585–1740(Oxford,1989),18,“Europe’sgreatmerchantcapitalists”;StanleyD.Chapman,MerchantEnterpriseinBritainfromtheIndustrialRevolutiontoWorldWarI(Cambridge,1992),13,“Britishmercantilecapitalism”;ElenaFrangakis-Syrett,TheCommerceofSmyrnaintheEighteenthCentury(Athens,1992),8,“mercantilecapitalism”;RajnarayanChandavarkar,TheOriginsofIndustrialCapitalisminIndia(Cambridge,1994),46,“WesternIndia,andinparticulartheGujaratregion,wasthesceneofanactivemercantilecapitalismbeforetheadventofcolonialrule”;R.Étienne,Y.Makaroun,F.Mayet,UngrandcomplexeindustrielàTróia(Portugal)(Paris,1994),166,“toutpermetdecaractériseruncapitalismemarchand,quisous-tendaussil’industriecéramique”(aboutthesaltedfishindustryofsouthernPortugalinRomantimes);MichelBalard,“Leshommesd’affairesoccidentauxont-ilsasphyxiél’économiebyzantine?,”inEuropamedievaleemondobizantino,eds.G.ArnaldiandG.Cavallo(Rome,1997),255–265,“capitalismecommercialetfinancierdumondemoderne”(aboutthefourteenthandfifteenthcenturies);AnthonyWebster,TheRichestEastIndiaMerchant:TheLifeandBusinessofJohnPalmerofCalcutta(Woodbridge,2007),110,“thesystemofmercantilecapitalismwhichhadoperatedsincethe1780s”;JohnDarwin,AfterTamerlane:TheRiseandFallofGlobalEmpires,1400–2000(NewYork,2008),149,“adistinctivetypeofmercantilecapitalism”(abouttextilesintheCoromandel).

56.CitedinE.H.Carr,TheBolshevikRevolution1917–1923,Volume2(PelicanBooks,1966),98.57.Jean-PaulSartre,Critiquedelaraisondialectique(Paris,1960),236(“lesstructuresducapitalismemercantile”).58.Jean-PaulSartre,Questionsdeméthode(Paris,1960),60(“leconflitséculairedescapitalismesmercantiles”).

59.Ormrod,RiseofCommercialEmpires,16.60.KarlMarx,Capital,Volume3,trans.DavidFernbach(London,1981),379–380.61.Marx,Capital,Volume3,442.62.Marx,Capital,Volume3,445.63.Marx,Capital,Volume3,446–447.64.KarlMarx,Capital,Volume2,trans.DavidFernbach(London,1978),318–319.65.FrederickEngels,“SupplementandAddendumtoVolume3ofCapital,”inMarx,Capital,Volume3,1027–47,at1043.66.Marx,Capital,Volume3,452.67.Marx,Capital,Volume3,452;italicsmine.68.SeeChapter5below.69.Marx,Capital,Volume3,453.70.Marx,Capital,Volume3,453–454;saidhereabouttheItalianluxuryindustriesofthefifteenthcenturyandtakenfromhisnotesonAdamSmith,cf.Marx,Grundrisse,858.

71.KarlMarx,TheoriesofSurplus-Value,PartIII(Moscow,1971),469–470;italicsmine.72.SeeDavidOrmrod,“R.H.TawneyandtheOriginsofCapitalism,”HistoryWorkshopJournal,18(1984),138–159.73.Dobb,Studies,145.74.ThecrucialpassageisatDobb,Studies,143.75.GeorgesLefebvre,“SomeObservations,”inTransition,ed.Sweezyetal.,122–127,at125–126.76.SvenBeckert,EmpireofCotton:ANewHistoryofGlobalCapitalism(AllenLane,2014),138–148.77.A.V.Chayanov,TheTheoryofPeasantEconomy,editedbyDanielThorner,BasileKerblay,andR.E.F.Smith(Homewood,Illinois,1966),49.

78.Chayanov,TheoryofPeasantEconomy,257;Chayanov’sitalics.79.Chayanov,TheoryofPeasantEconomy,257;Ihavealtered“tradingundertakings”to“commercialundertakings.”80.Chayanov,TheoryofPeasantEconomy,257–258.81.Chayanov,TheoryofPeasantEconomy,261–262.82.Chayanov,TheoryofPeasantEconomy,262.

ChapterTwo1.RayTurrell,Scrap-Book1809–1922(EnglefieldGreen,1987),183.2.A.C.Wood,AHistoryoftheLevantCompany(London,1935),235.3.ZhuYucitedJohnChaffee,“DiasporicIdentitiesintheHistoricalDevelopmentoftheMaritimeMuslimCommunitiesofSong-YuanChina,”JournaloftheEconomicandSocialHistoryoftheOrient,49(2006),395–420,at404.

4.Al-Maqrizi,Khitat,i,174citedSubhiY.Labib,HandelsgeschichteÄgyptensimSpätmittelalter(1171-1517)(Wiesbaden,1965),30.5.J.vonGhistele,VoyageenÉgypte,citedMohamedTaharMansouri,“Lescommunautésmarchandesoccidentalesdansl’espacemamlouk,”inColoniserauMoyenÂge,eds.MichelBalardandAlainDucellier(Paris,2000),89–114,at91.

6.DonaldM.Nicol,ByzantiumandVenice:AStudyinDiplomaticandCulturalRelations(Cambridge,1988),96–99,whoalsonotesthatAlexiosKomnenos’schrysobullof1082had“envisagedapermanentcolonyofresidentVenetiantradersontheGoldenHornintheheartofConstantinople”(p.61).MichaelHendy,StudiesintheByzantineMonetaryEconomy,ca.300–1450(Cambridge,1985),593–594,estimatesthenumberofthosedetainedatthreethousand,againstthe(unlikely)figureof“10,000”givenintheHistoriaDucumVeneticorum.

7.EnnioConcina,Fondaci(Venice,1997),68–69.8.ReinholdC.Mueller,TheVenetianMoneyMarket(BaltimoreandLondon,1997),314.9.MichelBalard,“LatinsintheAegeanandtheBalkans(1300–1400),”inTheCambridgeHistoryoftheByzantineEmpire,500–1492,ed.JonathanShepard(Cambridge,2009),834–851,at842.

10.DavidAbulafia,TheGreatSea(London,2012),325–326.11.Concina,Fondaci,82–83.12.HenriBresc,“PalermointheFourteenth–FifteenthCentury:UrbanEconomyandTrade,”inACompaniontoMedievalPalermo,ed.AnnlieseNef(LeidenandBoston,2013),235–268,at258;TheTravelsofIbnJubayr,trans.R.J.C.Broadhurst(London,1952),348.

13.Jean-Léonl’Africain,Descriptiondel’Afrique,trans.A.Épaulard,2vols.(Paris,1956),vol.2,382.14.PaulMelon,DePalermeàTunisparMalte,Tripolietlacôte(Paris,1885),175ff.15.MéropiAnastassiadou,LesGrecsd’IstanbulauXIXesiècle(LeidenandBoston,2012),154,367.16.Braudel,Mediterranean,vol.2,809,817(Botero’sfigureof“160,000”lacksallcredibility).17.Roberts,Map,268.

18.Wood,History,239.19.CitedLéonKontente,Smyrneetl’Occident(Montigny,2005),347–348.20.PhilipMansel,Levant:SplendourandCatastropheontheMediterranean(London,2010),24.21.G.Doria,“Conoscenzadelmercatoesistemainformativo:ilknow-howdeimercanti-finanzierigenovesineisecoliXVIeXVII,”in

LarepubblicainternazionaledeldenarotraXVeXVIIsecolo,eds.AldoDeMaddalenaandHermannKellenbenz(Bologna,1986),57–121,at103–4.

22.Fisher,“LisbonasaPortTown,”722ff.23.VassilisKardasis,DiasporaMerchantsintheBlackSea:TheGreeksinSouthernRussia,1775–1861(LexingtonBooks,2001),87.24.Kardasis,DiasporaMerchants,86(quotingalocalofficial);GelinaHarlaftis,AHistoryofGreek-OwnedShipping(London,1996),42.25.J.C.Wilkinson,“Suhar(Sohar)intheEarlyIslamicPeriod:TheWrittenEvidence,”inSouthAsianArchaeology1977(Naples,1979),887–907,at889.

26.Wilkinson,“Suhar,”892.27.JeanAubin,“LaruinedeSîrâfetlesroutesduGolfePersiqueauxXIeetXIIesiècles,”Cahiersdecivilisationmédiévale,2(1959),295–301,at295.

28.Wilkinson,“Suhar,”899.29.Wilkinson,“Suhar,”894.30.Niebuhr,TravelsthroughArabiaandOtherCountriesoftheEast,citedCalvinH.AllenJr.,“TheIndianMerchantCommunityofMasqat,”BulletinoftheSchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies,44(1981),39–53,at41.

31.Allen,“Masqat,”43–45.32.Allen,“Masqat,”48.33.A1393lettershowsthecity’sbiggestforeignmerchantswritingtotheRasulidsultanAshrafIIseekingtheruler’spermissiontoinvokehisnameintheirkhutbah,seeSebastianR.Prange,MonsoonIslam:TradeandFaithontheMedievalMalabarCoast(Cambridge,2018),263–265.

34.JoãodeBarros,DaAsia,citedM.N.Pearson,“BrokersinWesternIndianPortCities,”ModernAsianStudies,22(1988),455–472,at464.

35.ManselLongworthDames(trans.),TheBookofDuarteBarbosa,2vols.(NewDelhi,1989),vol.2,75–77.36.ArmandoCortesão(trans.),TheSumaOrientalofToméPires,2vols.(HaklyutSociety,1944),vol.1,78.37.AlbertGray(trans.),TheVoyageofFrançoisPyrarddeLaval,vol.1(London,1887),404.38.Dames,TheBookofDuarteBarbosa,vol.2,175.39.LuisFilipeF.R.Thomaz,“Malakaetsescommunautésmarchandesautournantdu16esiècle,”inMarchandsethommesd’affaires

asiatiquesdansl’OcéanindienetlaMerdeChine13e–20esiècles,eds.DenysLombardandJeanAubin(Paris,1988),31–48,at33.40.PaulWheatley,TheGoldenKhersonese(KualaLumpur,1961),312.41.Thomaz,“Malaka,”36–37.42.Thomaz,“Malaka,”42–43.43.[SebastiãoManrique],TravelsofFraySebastienManrique,1629–43,trans.C.E.Luard,vol.2(Oxford,1927),355.44.Manrique,Travels,vol.2,360–361.45.NiccolaoManucci,StoriadoMogor,orMogulIndia1653–1708,trans.WilliamIrvine,vol.2(London,1907),186.46.HusamMuhammadAbdulMu‘ti,“TheFezMerchantsinEighteenth-CenturyCairo,”inSocietyandEconomyinEgyptandtheEastern

Mediterranean,1600–1900,eds.NellyHannaandRaoufAbbas(Cairo,2005).47.R.H.Hewsen(trans.),TheGeographyofAnaniasofŠirak(Ašxarhac‘oyc’)(Wiesbaden,1992),74A*.48.IbnHauqal,Configurationdelaterre(Kitabsuratal-‘ard),trans.J.H.KramersandG.Wiet,2vols.(Beirut,1964),vol.2,331.49.Al-Muqaddasi,TheBestDivisionsforKnowledgeoftheRegions,trans.BasilCollins(Reading,2001),171(“thefinestqualityflaxisgrowninBusir”).

50.IbnHauqal,Configuration,vol.2,436(basingthisonmerchants’testimony).51.Idrisi,Lapremièregéographiedel’Occident,trans.JaubertandAnnlieseNef(Paris,1999),192–193.52.Al-Muqaddasi,BestDivisions,198.53.Tenthcentury:E.LeviProvençal,“La‘Descriptiondel’Espagne’d’Ahmadal-Razi,”Al-Andalus,18(1953),51–108,at93;fourteenthcentury:MichelBalard,LaRomanieGénoise(XIIe-debutduXVesiècle),2vols.(Rome,1978),846,“legrandportd’exportationdel’huiled’olive.”

54.Idrisi,Lapremièregéographie,248–249.55.Idrisi,Lapremièregéographie,192.56.Doria,“Conoscenzadelmercato,”81–82.57.DamienCoulon,Barceloneetlegrandcommerced’OrientauMoyenÂge(Madrid,2004),380.

58.Labib,Handelsgeschichte,316.59.A.L.Udovitch,“InternationalTradeandtheMedievalEgyptianCountryside,”inAgricultureinEgyptfromPharaonictoModern

Times,eds.AlanK.BowmanandEugeneRogan(TheBritishAcademy,1999),267–285,at270–271.60.Abulafia,GreatSea,264,basedonGenizahsources.61.Mueller,VenetianMoneyMarket,304(whichsays,“perhaps”).62.Mueller,VenetianMoneyMarket,354.63.MaureenF.Mazzaoui,TheItalianCottonIndustryintheLaterMiddleAges,1100–1600(Cambridge,1981),46.64.MagalhãesGodinho,L’économiedel’Empireportugais,722.65.RichardEhrenberg,CapitalandFinanceintheAgeoftheRenaissance,trans.H.M.Lucas(London,1928),280.66.Braudel,Mediterranean,197.67.PaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,124–125.68.PatrickBoulanger,Marseille,marchéinternationaldel’huiled’olive([Marseilles],1996),57.69.C.H.Kauffman,TheDictionaryofMerchandize,fourthedition(London,1815),244.70.Kauffman,Dictionary,245.71.Boulanger,Marseille,56.72.Wood,History,164.73.AlexanderHamilton,ANewAccountoftheEastIndies,ed.SirWilliamFoster,2vols.(London,1930),vol.1,31–2.74.NancyUm,TheMerchantHousesofMocha:TradeandArchitectureinanIndianOceanPort(Seattle,2009),43.75.PatriciaRisso,OmanandMuscat:AnEarlyModernHistory(London,1986),77;Um,MerchantHouses,43–44.76.Um,MerchantHouses,45.77.AndréRaymond,“UnefamilledegrandsnégociantsencaféauCairedanslapremièremoitiéduXVIIIesiècle:lesSharaybi,”inLe

commerceducaféavantl’èredesplantationscolonials,ed.M.Tuchscherer(Cairo,2001),111–124,at111.78.Raymond,“Sharaybi,”116.79.Mu‘ti,“Fezmerchants,”133–135.80.E.M.Herzig,“TheRiseoftheJulfaMerchantsintheLateSixteenthCentury,”inSafavidPersia,ed.CharlesMelville(London,1996),305–322,at315–318.

81.H.W.VanSanten,DeVerenigdeOoost-IndischeCompagnieinGujaratenHindustan,1620–1660(LeidenUniversityPhD,1982),211.82.GhulamA.Nadri,ThePoliticalEconomyofIndigoinIndia,1580–1930(Leiden,2016),67,94.83.P.J.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes:TheBritishinBengalintheEighteenthCentury(Oxford,1976),221.84.C.A.Bayly,Rulers,TownsmenandBazaars:NorthIndianSocietyintheAgeofBritishExpansion,1770–1870(Cambridge,1983),229.85.Bayly,Rulers,234.86.Kauffman,DictionaryofMerchandize,251.87.Kauffman,DictionaryofMerchandize,363.88.T.M.Devine,TheTobaccoLords:AStudyoftheTobaccoMerchantsofGlasgowandtheirTradingActivities,ca.1740–1790(Edinburgh,1975),64ff.

89.TrevorBurnard,Planters,Merchants,andSlaves:PlantationSocietiesinBritishAmerica,1650–1820(Chicago,2015),203.90.Miller,WayofDeath,177.91.Burnard,Planters,205.Burnardestimatesthat“[p]erhaps£200,000perannumpassedthroughthehandsofKingstonmerchants”(p.203).

92.G.S.P.Freeman-Grenville,TheFrenchatKilwaIsland(Oxford,1965),92–93.93.Marler,Merchants’Capital,16,22,36.94.Marler,Merchants’Capital,16.95.WalterJohnson,RiverofDarkDreams:SlaveryandEmpireintheCottonKingdom(Cambridge,MA,2013),84.96.DavidKynaston,TheCityofLondon,Volume1:AWorldofItsOwn,1815–1890(London,1994),167.97.MartinLynn,CommerceandEconomicChangeinWestAfrica:ThePalmOilTradeintheNineteenthCentury(Cambridge,1997),84.98.GraemeJ.Milne,TradeandTradersinMid-VictorianLiverpool:MercantileBusinessandtheMakingofaWorldPort(Liverpool,2000),50.

99.EvridikiSifneos,“‘Cosmopolitanism’asaFeatureoftheGreekCommercialDiaspora,”HistoryandAnthropology,16(2005),97–111,at105–6.

100.Kardasis,DiasporaMerchants,28,wherehesaysthatinthe1850s“Jewishmerchantscomprised53percentofthetotalcommercialcommunityinOdessa.”

101.PatriciaHerlihy,Odessa:AHistory,1794–1914(Cambridge,MA,1986),93.102.ClaudeMalon,LeHavrecolonialde1880à1960(LeHavre,2006),66,109,113ff.

103.Malon,LeHavrecolonial,65,quotingRenéGodez.104.JamesR.Scobie,RevolutiononthePampas:ASocialHistoryofArgentineWheat,1860–1910(Austin,1964),102.105.Scobie,RevolutiononthePampas,93,103.106.Yen-p‘ingHao,TheCommercialRevolutioninNineteenth-CenturyChina:TheRiseofSino-WesternMercantileCapitalism(Berkeley,1986),144;italicsmine.

107.Hao,CommercialRevolution,145.108.Hao,CommercialRevolution,154.109.H.E.W.Braund,CallingtoMind(Oxford,1975),39.110.InduBanga,“KarachiandItsHinterlandunderColonialRule,”inPortsandTheirHinterlandsinIndia,1700–1950,ed.InduBanga(NewDelhi,1992),337–358,at342–343.

111.RobertIlbert,Alexandrie1830–1930.Histoired’unecommunautécitadine,2vols.(Cairo,1996).112.KaisFirro,“SilkandAgrarianChangesinLebanon,1860–1914,”InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies,22(1990),151–169.113.Marx,Capital,Volume3,673.114.Marx,Capital,Volume3,655–656.115.Cf.RudolfHilferding,FinanceCapital:AStudyoftheLatestPhaseofCapitalistDevelopment,trans.MorrisWatnickandSamGordon(London,1981),210:“Thegreaterpartofcommercialcapitalconsistsofcredit.”

116.Mueller,VenetianMoneyMarket,chapter8.117.Mueller,VenetianMoneyMarket,314–317.118.KateFleet,EuropeanandIslamicTradeintheEarlyOttomanState(Cambridge,1999),19,note36.119.Mueller,VenetianMoneyMarket,316.120.Ehrenberg,CapitalandFinance,322.121.Mueller,VenetianMoneyMarket,313,cf.“assetskeptinconstantcirculation”(at312).122.Braudel,Mediterranean,507–508.123.Marx,Capital,Volume3,653.124.SevketPamuk,AMonetaryHistoryoftheOttomanEmpire(Cambridge,1999),84.125.LakshmiSubramanian,IndigenousCapitalandImperialExpansion:Bombay,SuratandtheWestCoast(Delhi,1996),55–56.126.VioletBarbour,CapitalisminAmsterdamintheSeventeenthCentury(AnnArbor,1950),53.127.Carrière,Banqueetcapitalismecommercial,71.128.Carrière,Banqueetcapitalismecommercial,180.129.Carrière,Banqueetcapitalismecommercial,193.130.R.C.Nash,“TheOrganizationofTradeandFinanceintheBritishAtlanticEconomy,1600–1800,”inTheAtlanticEconomyduring

theSeventeenthandEighteenthCenturies,ed.PeterA.Coclanis,(Charleston,SC,2005),95–151,at98.131.Nash,“OrganizationofTrade,”99;cf.R.B.Sheridan,“TheCommercialandFinancialOrganizationoftheBritishSlaveTrade,1750–1807,”EconomicHistoryReview,2ndser.,11(1958),249–63,whonotesthatbythelateeighteenthcentury“slaveremittancesgenerallytooktheformofbillsofexchange”(p.253),sothat“LondonwasasdeeplyinvolvedintheslavetradeasthemuchmalignedLiverpool”(p.263).

132.Nash,“OrganizationofTrade,”101–2.133.P.Machado,OceanofTrade:SouthAsianMerchants,AfricaandtheIndianOcean,ca.1750–1850(Cambridge,2014),66.134.Subramanian,IndigenousCapital,147–148.135.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes,222.136.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes,223–224.137.NicholasMayhew,Sterling:TheRiseandFallofaCurrency(AllenLane,1999),108.138.Kynaston,CityofLondon,Volume1,331.139.SeeHamishMcRaeandFrancesCairncross,CapitalCity:LondonasaFinancialCentre(Methuen,1985),6–7;DavidKynaston,The

CityofLondon,Volume2:GoldenYears,1890–1914(London,1995),8–10;PaulFerris,TheCity(London,1960),60;Ingham,CapitalismDivided?,43–45.

140.G.A.Fletcher,TheDiscountHousesinLondon(London,1976),12.141.Kynaston,CityofLondon,Volume1,87.142.Mayhew,Sterling,180,citingLordOverstone(SamuelJonesLoyd).143.Nash,“OrganizationofTrade,”129–130,133.

ChapterThree1.Braudel,Mediterranean,348.

2.PaulMagdalino,“MedievalConstantinople,”inTheEconomicHistoryofByzantiumfromtheSevenththroughtheFifteenthCentury,ed.AngelikiE.Laiou,3vols.(Washington,2002),vol.2,529–537,at536.

3.PaulMagdalino,TheEmpireofManuelIKomnenos,1143–1180(Cambridge,1993),120.4.Marie-FranceAuzépy,“StateofEmergency(700–850),”inCambridgeHistoryoftheByzantineEmpire,ed.Shepard,251–291,at259.5.Cf.AngelikiE.Laiou,“TheByzantineCity:ParasiticorProductive?”inEconomicThoughtandEconomicLifeinByzantium,eds.CécileMorrissonandRowanDorin(Aldershot,2013),no.12,10,“theinternalmarketexpandedtremendouslyintheperiodfromtheninththroughthetwelfthcentury.”

6.PaulMagdalino,“TheMaritimeNeighborhoodsofConstantinople:CommercialandResidentialFunctions,SixthtoTwelfthCenturies,”DumbartonOaksPapers,54(2000),209–226,at218–219,wherehenotes:“TheGoldenHornisnotflushedoutbycurrentsorwaves.”

7.PaulMagdalino,Constantinoplemédiévale.Étudessurl’évolutiondesstructuresurbaines(Paris,1996),25.8.Magdalino,“MaritimeNeighborhoods,”212–214.9.Magdalino,“MaritimeNeighborhoods,”219–221.10.Magdalino,“MedievalConstantinople,”534.11.Magdalino,“MedievalConstantinople,”534(fires).12.SperosVryonisJr.,“ByzantinedemokratiaandtheGuildsintheEleventhCentury,”DumbartonOaksPapers,17(1963),289–314,at291–292,note9.

13.A.P.KazhdanandAnnWhartonEpstein,ChangeinByzantineCultureintheEleventhandTwelfthCenturies(LosAngeles,1985),176.14.BenjaminofTudela,Komroff’stranslationofthepassage,citedLouiseBuengerRobbert,“RialtoBusinessmenandConstantinople,1204–61,”DumbartonOaksPapers,49(1995),43–58,at44,note5.Thestandardtranslationofthispassageimpliesthatthiswastheannualintake,whichwouldmakeitimpossiblylow.

15.SodescribedbyGinoLuzzatto,StoriaeconomicadiVeneziadall’XIalXVIsecolo(Venice,1961),21.16.NicolasOikonomidès,Hommesd’affairesgrecsetlatinsàConstaninople

(XIIIe-XVesiècles)(Montreal,1979),24.17.AngelikiE.Laiou,“ByzantineTradewithChristiansandMuslimsandtheCrusades,”inTheCrusadesfromthePerspectiveof

ByzantiumandtheMuslimWorld,eds.AngelikiE.LaiouandRoyParvizMottahedeh(Washington,2001),157–192,at159.18.NicolasOikonomidès,“TheEconomicRegionofConstantinople,”inSocialandEconomicLifeinByzantium,ed.ElizabethZachariadou(Aldershot,2004),no.13,235.

19.CharlesDiehl,Byzantium:GreatnessandDecline,trans.NaomiWalford(NewBrunswick,N.J.,1957),191–2;alsoinDiehl,“TheEconomicDecayofByzantium,”inTheEconomicDeclineofEmpires,ed.CarloM.Cipolla(London,1970),94–95.

20.PeterCharanis,“SocialStructureandEconomicPoliciesintheByzantineEmpire,”inTheDeclineofEmpires,ed.S.N.Eisenstadt(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ,1967),93.

21.Charanis,“SocialStructure,”93.22.E.Malamut,“Byzancecolonisée:politiqueetcommercesouslerègned’AndronicII(1282–1328),”inLeséchangesenMéditerranée

médiévale,eds.E.MalamutandMohamedOuerfelli(Aix-en-Provence,2012),121–152,at123–126.23.AngelikiE.Laiou,“TheByzantineEconomyintheMedievalTradeSystem,”DumbartonOaksPapers,34-35(1980-81),177–222,at210,“theByzantinesrarelywereabletogainaccesstotheWesternandItalianmarkets”;AngelikiE.Laiou,“ThePalaiologoiandtheWorldAroundThem(1261–1400),”inCambridgeHistoryoftheByzantineEmpire,ed.Shepard,803–833,at821,“ThemarketsofItalywerealmostclosedtothem.”

24.Oikonomidès,Hommesd’affaires,85.25.Laiou,“Palaiologoi,”820–821,“WhattheByzantinemerchantscouldnotdowastoengageinlong-distancetrade.”26.Oikonomidès,Hommesd’affaires,24–35placesconsiderableemphasisonthis.27.Oikonomidès,Hommesd’affaires,31.28.Oikonomidès,Hommesd’affaires,31–32,contrastingItalianattitudeswiththosedisplayedlaterbytheTurks.29.NiketasChoniatescitedDiehl,Byzantium,192;Diehl,“EconomicDecay,”96.Cf.OCityofByzantium,AnnalsofNiketasChoniates,trans.HarryJ.Magoulias(Detroit,1984),97,wherethetranslationreads,“TheyamassedgreatwealthandbecamesoarrogantandimpudentthatnotonlydidtheybehavebelligerentlytotheRomansbuttheyalsoignoredimperialthreatsandcommands.”

30.NicolasSvoronos,“Sociétéetorganisationintérieuredansl’empirebyzantinauXIesiècle,”inÉtudessurl’organisationintérieure,lasociétéetl’économiedel’EmpireByzantin,ed.NicolasSvoronos,(London,1973),no.9,at8–10(essentialremarks);PaulLemerle,CinqÉtudessurleXIesièclebyzantin(Paris,1977),esp.287ff.

31.Lemerle,CinqÉtudes,285–286.32.NicolasOikonomides,“Entrepreneurs,”inTheByzantines,ed.GuglielmoCavallo(Chicago,1997),144–171,at163.33.Lemerle,CinqÉtudes,307,“véritablecapitulationéconomique.”

34.VenetiansdidmuchoftheirbusinessthroughGreekwholesalers.Weknowthisbecausethelatterwereexemptedfromthe10percentdutyorkommerkiononlyin1126aftertheVenetiansprotestedandJohnIIforbadeofficialsfromexactinganydutyonthosetransactions,cf.MarcoPozzaandGiorgioRavegnani,ItrattaticonBisanzio,992–1198(Venice,1993),51ff.,at54–5.

35.SeeRobbert,“Rialtobusinessmen.”36.Fleet,EuropeanandIslamicTradeintheEarlyOttomanState.37.Balard,LaRomaniegénoise,t.2,869.38.GeorgesPachymérès,Relationshistoriques,t.2,livresIV-VI,ed.AlbertFailler,trans.VitalienLaurent(Paris,1984),534.ThetranslationisfromLopezandRaymond,MedievalTradeintheMediterraneanWorld,127–28.Theymistakenlysuggestthat“narrowwaters”referstotheBlackSea,butaccesstothelatterwastightlycontrolledatthistimeandoflittleinteresttotheVenetianstillmuchlater,seeMichelBalard,“IlMarNero,Veneziael’Occidenteintornoal1200,”inVenedigunddieWeltwirtschaftum1200,ed.WolfgangvonStromer(Stuttgart,1999),191–201.Theroundbracketsaremyinsertions.

39.SilvanoBorsari,VeneziaeBisanzionelXIIsecolo.Irapportieconomici(Venice,1988),99referstothe“massivepresenceoftheVenetianaristocracyinthetradewithByzantium”intheearlytwelfthcentury.GerhardRösch,DervenezianischeAdelbiszurSchließungdesGroßenRats(Sigmaringen,1989)isthebeststudyontheVenetianside.Bythethirteenthcenturyacircleoftwenty-fourfamiliesdominatedthepoliticalandcommerciallifeofVenice,controllingclosetohalfthemembershipoftheMaggiorConsiglioandalltheleadingofficesinthecity’snewfoundcolonialempire.Themostimportantofthese,thatofthepodestàofConstantinople,wasfilledfromtheirrankssixteenoutoftheseventeentimesknowntous(p.135).

40.Balard,LaRomaniegénoise,t.2,524.41.ElisabethMalamut,Lesilesdel’empirebyzantinVIIIe-XIIesiècles,2vols.(Paris,1988),t.2,441.42.Hendy,Studies,593–596.43.Balard,LaRomaniegénoise,t.2,876–877.44.DavidJacoby,“TheVenetianQuarterofConstantinoplefrom1082to1261,”inDavidJacoby,CommercialExchangeAcrossthe

Mediterranean(Aldershot,2005),no.3,163.45.Jacoby,“VenetianQuarter,”154.46.Balard,LaRomaniegénoise,t.1,118.47.Balard,LaRomaniegénoise,t.2,682.48.Balard,“LatinsintheAegean,”834,whoreferstoboth“colonialwars”and“carve-up.”49.Oikonomidès,Hommesd’affaires,35;Oikonomidès,“Entrepreneurs,”166–167.50.Oikonomidès,“Entrepreneurs,”167.51.Laiou,“Palaiologoi,”821.52.SeeJohnW.Barker,“LateByzantineThessalonike:ASecondCity’sChallengesandResponses,”DumbartonOaksPapers,57(2003),5–33,at18.

53.Laiou,“Palaiologoi,”823.54.Oikonomidès,Hommesd’affaires,121–22.55.NicolasOikonomides,“ByzantiumbetweenEastandWest(XIII-XVcent.),”ByzantinischeForschungen,13(1988),319–332,at329.56.MarioDelTreppoandAlfonsoLeone,Amalfimedioevale(Naples,1977),121ff.57.MichelBalard,“AmalfietByzance(Xe-XIIesiècles),”TravauxetMemoires,6(1976),85–95.58.PeterSchreiner,“Bilanciopubblico,agricolturaecommercioaBisanzionellasecondametàdelXIIsecolo,”invonStromer,Venedig

unddieWeltwirtschaft,177–189,at184.ThecontrastiswithAsiaMinorandtheBalkans.59.DavidJacoby,“SilkinWesternByzantiumbeforetheFourthCrusade,”ByzantinischeZeitschrift,84,nos.1-2(1991-1992),452–500,at475ff.

60.M.Martin,“TheVenetiansintheByzantineEmpirebefore1204,”inByzantiumandtheWest,c.850–c.1200,ed.J.D.Howard-Johnston(Amsterdam,1988),201–214,at212.

61.MichelBalard,“LatinSourcesandByzantineProsopography:Genoa,Venice,PisaandBarcelona,”inByzantinesandCrusadersinNon-GreekSources,1025–1204,ed.MaryWhitby(Oxford,2007),39–58,at45;Nicol,ByzantiumandVenice,105.

62.Fleet,EuropeanandIslamicTrade,102.63.Fleet,EuropeanandIslamicTrade,97.64.Balard,LaRomaniegénoise,t.2,738ff.65.Al-Jazari’sChronicleofDamascuscitedMansouri,“Communautésmarchandesoccidentales,”100.66.“Rapidgrowth,etc.”fromPrange,MonsoonIslam,108.67.Mazzaoui,ItalianCottonIndustry,46,51.68.MohamedOuerfelli,Lesucre.Production,commercialisationetusagesdansleMéditerranéemédiévale(Leiden,2008),46.69.GinoLuzzatto,Studidistoriaeconomicaveneziana(Padua,1954),118ff.;Ouerfelli,Sucre,115ff.

70.TravelsofIbnJubayr,61.71.Abulafia,GreatSea,297.72.SeeChapter2,n.4.73.DavidJacoby,“TheEconomicFunctionoftheCrusaderStatesoftheLevant,”inDavidJacoby,MedievalTradeintheEastern

MediterraneanandBeyond(Routledge,2018),no.4,119.74.Ouerfelli,Sucre,355.75.AngelikiE.Laiou,“UnnotairevénitienàConstantinople:AntonioBrescianoetlecommerceinternationalen1350,”inLesItaliensà

Byzance,eds.MichelBalard,AngelikiE.LaiouandCatherineOtten-Froux(Paris,1987),79–151,at79(“l’importationmassivedesétoffesdel’ItalieetdelaFlandre”).

76.Coulon,Barceloneetlegrandcommerced’Orient,304–305,citingAshtor’sdata.77.Braudel,Mediterranean,387.78.JohnDay,“TheLevantTradeintheMiddleAges,”inEconomicHistoryofByzantium,vol.2,ed.Laiou,807–814,at811(tenmerchantgalleys).

79.Day,“LevantTrade,”808.80.Prange,MonsoonIslam,50.81.GenevièveBouchon,“LesmusulmansduKeralaàl’époquedeladécouverteportugaise,”MareLuso-Indicum,2(1973),3–59,at26–27.

82.MarkHorton,Shanga:TheArchaeologyofaMuslimTradingCommunityontheCoastofEastAfrica(London,1996),419.83.MichaelPearson,TheIndianOcean(London,2003),78.84.Pearson,IndianOcean,76.85.Prange,MonsoonIslam,264–265.86.Dames,TheBookofDuarteBarbosa,vol.2,76.87.Prange,MonsoonIslam,193–194.88.LuísFilipeThomaz,“LePortugaletl’AfriqueauXVesiècle:lesdebutsdel’expansion,”ArquivosdoCentroCulturalPortuguês,26(1989),161–256.

89.Thomaz,“Portugaletl’Afrique,”225,187.90.Thomaz,“Portugaletl’Afrique,”169–70.91.CharlesVerlinden,LesoriginesdelacivilisationatlantiquedelaRenaissanceàl’ÂgedesLumières(Neuchatel,1966),12.92.LuísFilipeThomaz,“PortugueseSourcesonSixteenthCenturyIndianEconomicHistory,”inIndo-PortugueseHistory:Sourcesand

Problems,ed.JohnCorreia-Afonso(Bombay,1981),99–113,at104.93.T.F.EarleandJohnVilliers,eds.,AlbuquerqueCaesaroftheEast(Warminster,1990),6.94.EarleandVilliers,Albuquerque,81.95.EarleandVilliers,Albuquerque,83.96.TheexpressionisfromJ.H.Parry,TheAgeofReconnaissance(NewYork,1964),264.97.TheItineraryofLudovicodiVarthemaofBolognafrom1502to1508,trans.JohnWinterJones(London,1928),71.98.MagalhãesGodinho,L’économiedel’Empireportugais,652.99.EarleandVilliers,Albuquerque,113(letterdatedApril1,1511).100.PiusMalekandathil,PortugueseCochinandtheMaritimeTradeofIndia,1500–1663(NewDelhi,2001),48.101.Malekandathil,PortugueseCochin,152–153.102.Malekandathil,PortugueseCochin,152.103.Cf.NunesDias,Ocapitalismomonárquicoportuguês.104.SanjaySubrahmanyam,ThePortugueseEmpireinAsia,1500–1700(London,1992),275,“acuriouscombinationofmercantilismandmessianism.”

105.Malekandathil,PortugueseCochin,121.106.Tohfat-ul-Mujahideen:AnHistoricalWorkintheArabicLanguage,trans.M.J.Rowlandson(London,1833),111–2.107.Tohfat-ul-Mujahideen,152.108.Tohfat-ul-Mujahideen,152–153.109.Prange,MonsoonIslam,146.110.MagalhãesGodinho,L’économiedel’Empireportugais,630.111.JanKieniewicz,“PepperGardensandMarketinPrecolonialMalabar,”MoyenOrient&OcéanIndien,3(1986),1–36,at7(Costa’sestimate);Malekandathil,PortugueseCochin,114(1520s).

112.Malekandathil,PortugueseCochin,202.113.Thomaz,“PortugueseSources,”101.

114.Kieniewicz,“PepperGardens,”11.115.Malekandathil,PortugueseCochin,49.116.Malekandathil,PortugueseCochin,154.117.Kieniewicz,“PepperGardens,”21–23.118.MagalhãesGodinho,L’économiedel’Empireportugais,638–39;Malekandathil,PortugueseCochin,201.119.Braudel,Mediterranean,543–570.120.SanjaySubrahmanyamandLuísFilipeF.R.Thomaz,“EvolutionofEmpire:thePortugueseintheIndianOceanduringtheSixteenthCentury,”inThePoliticalEconomyofMerchantEmpires,ed.JamesD.Tracy(Cambridge,1991),298–331,at303.

121.RichardA.Goldthwaite,TheEconomyofRenaissanceFlorence(Baltimore,2009),159.122.Goldthwaite,Economy,45.123.Goldthwaite,Economy,46.124.Malekandathil,PortugueseCochin,217.125.Malekandathil,PortugueseCochin,207.126.Malekandathil,PortugueseCochin,132.JamesC.Boyajian,PortugueseTradeinAsiaundertheHabsburgs,1580–1640(Baltimore,1993)upscalestheextentofprivatecapitalinvolvementinthePortuguesetradewithAsiaandarguesthattowardtheendofthesixteenthcenturyasubstantialpartoftheinvestmentinbothtradesectors(carrieraand“countrytrade”)camefromwealthyNewChristianmerchantfamilieswhosenetworksstraddledLisbon,Goa,Cochin,etc.,aswellastheentireregionfromBengaltoMacao.“[F]romthe1580sreturncargoworth5millioncruzadosandmorereachedLisbonannually”(168).

127.Malekandathil,PortugueseCochin,203–206,256.128.Prange,MonsoonIslam,223.129.Casale,OttomanAge,115.130.Casale,OttomanAge,115–6;allitalicsmine.131.SotooCasale,OttomanAge,116.132.MagalhãesGodinho,L’économiedel’Empireportugais,729–730.133.MagalhãesGodinho,L’économiedel’Empireportugais,728–729,referringtoa“deepcommercialdepression.”134.MagalhãesGodinho,L’économiedel’Empireportugais,727,729.135.FernandBraudel,OutofItaly,1450–1650,trans.SiânReynolds(Paris,1991),117.136.Braudel,Mediterranean,552.137.HermannKellenbenz,“LecommercedupoivredesFuggeretlemarchéinternationaldupoivre,”AnnalesESC,firstser.,11(1956),1–28,at5.

138.LucaMolà,TheSilkIndustryofRenaissanceVenice(Baltimore,2000),62.139.PaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,22.140.H.R.Trevor-Roper,“TheReformationandEconomicChange,”inCapitalismandtheReformation,ed.M.J.Kitch(London,1967),24–36,at32.

141.Israel,DutchPrimacyinWorldTrade,70–71.142.GeoffreyParker,SpainandtheNetherlands,1559–1659(Fontana/Collins,1979),192.143.Israel,DutchPrimacy,42.144.Israel,DutchPrimacy,Chapter6.145.Israel,DutchPrimacy,68.146.Wood,History,106.147.Israel,DutchPrimacy,346ff.148.Israel,DutchPrimacy,335.149.ThebestcharacterizationcanbefoundinLouisDermigny,“LefonctionnementdescompagniesdesIndesI:L’organisationetlerôledescompagnies,”inSociétésetcompagniesdecommerceenOrientetdansl’Océanindien,ed.M.Mollat(Paris,1970),443–451.

150.DavidHume,Essays,editedbyE.F.Miller,revisededition(Indianapolis,1987),88,fromtheessay“OfCivilLiberty,”87ff.151.SeeIstvanHont,JealousyofTrade:InternationalCompetitionandtheNation-StateinHistoricalPerspective(Cambridge,MA,2005).152.Hont,JealousyofTrade,54,citingAdamSmith,WealthofNations,IV.iii.2.13;italicsmine.153.Hume,Essays,327–328.154.GustavvonSchmoller,TheMercantileSystemandItsHistoricalSignificance(NewYork,1896),64.155.K.N.Chaudhuri,TheTradingWorldofAsiaandtheEnglishEastIndiaCompany,1660–1760(Cambridge,1978),5.156.SirWilliamTemple,ObservationsUpontheUnitedProvincesoftheNetherlands,editedbySirGeorgeClark(Oxford,1972).157.Israel,DutchPrimacy,16;italicsmine.158.Israel,DutchPrimacy,71–72.

159.Israel,DutchPrimacy,160.160.Webster,RichestEastIndiaMerchant,24.161.Israel,DutchPrimacy,77,withSavarydesBruslons’sestimate.162.Israel,DutchPrimacy,260ff.163.Israel,DutchPrimacy,356ff.164.Israel,DutchPrimacy,256(“Inthescaleoftheirinter-Asiantrade,theDutchhadnorivals”).165.Israel,DutchPrimacy,186–187(“TheDutchCompanyconnectedthevarioustradezonesofAsiainwaysthattheEnglishCompanycouldnotdoandneverdid”).

166.Israel,DutchPrimacy,176–178.167.Israel,DutchPrimacy,16.168.Israel,DutchPrimacy,67.169.Israel,DutchPrimacy,175.170.RalphDavis,EnglishMerchantShippingandAnglo-DutchRivalryintheSeventeenthCentury(London,1975),10.171.Chaudhuri,TradingWorld,215.172.OmPrakash,TheDutchEastIndiaCompanyandtheEconomyofBengal,1630–1720(Princeton,1985),12.173.Chaudhuri,TradingWorld,94.174.Israel,DutchPrimacy,124–25.175.Israel,DutchPrimacy,130.176.RichardvonGlahn,FountofFortune:MoneyandMonetaryPolicyinChina,1000–1700(Oakland,CA,1996),226–227.177.Glahn,FountofFortune,226,228.178.Meilink-RoelofzcitedPrakash,DutchEastIndiaCompany,15,note21.179.Prakash,DutchEastIndiaCompany,118;italicsmine.180.Israel,DutchPrimacy,176–77.181.Prakash,DutchEastIndiaCompany,16.182.Israel,DutchPrimacy,247.183.Israel,DutchPrimacy,257.184.Temple,Observations,117.185.Israel,DutchPrimacy,203,260–261.186.Israel,DutchPrimacy,204.187.Davis,EnglishMerchantShipping,31.188.Davis,EnglishMerchantShipping,32.189.DavidOrmrod,“TheDemiseofRegulatedTradinginEngland,”inMerchantsandIndustrialistswithintheOrbitoftheDutchStaple

Market,eds.LeoNoordegraafandC.Lesger(TheHague,1995),253–268,at255.190.Israel,DutchPrimacy,296,285.191.Israel,DutchPrimacy,311.192.Kontente,Smyrne,294.193.Israel,DutchPrimacy,203.194.Kontente,Smyrne,328.195.Israel,DutchPrimacy,382.196.NicolasMesnager’smémoiretotheCouncilofCommerce(December1700),citedC.W.Cole,FrenchMercantilism,1683–1700(NewYork,1971;orig.1943),238.

197.Israel,DutchPrimacy,383.198.Israel,DutchPrimacy,384–389.199.Israel,DutchPrimacy,390–391.200.Israel,DutchPrimacy,379.201.ChristopherHill,TheCenturyofRevolution,1603–1714(Edinburgh,1961),141.202.RobertBrenner,MerchantsandRevolution(Cambridge,1993),4ff.203.Brenner,MerchantsandRevolution,16ff.204.Brenner,MerchantsandRevolution,21.205.Brenner,MerchantsandRevolution,22.206.Brenner,MerchantsandRevolution,30;italicsmine.207.Brenner,MerchantsandRevolution,41.

208.PaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,177.209.RalphDavis,“EnglishForeignTrade,1660–1700,”EconomicHistoryReview,2ndser.,7(1954),150–66,at150;B.Dietz,“OverseasTradeandMetropolitanGrowth,”inLondon1500–1700:TheMakingoftheMetropolis,eds.A.L.BeierandRogerFinlay(London,1986),130.

210.Hill,CenturyofRevolution,186.211.Davis,RiseoftheEnglishShippingIndustry,15(tonnageexpandsfrom115,000to340,000in1629–1686);Davis,EnglishMerchant

Shipping,1-2(shippingindustrynearlydoublesinsizein1660–1689).212.K.G.Davies,TheRoyalAfricanCompany(London,1957),57.213.NualaZahedieh,TheCapitalandtheColonies:LondonandtheAtlanticColonies,1660–1700(Cambridge,2010),138.214.Dietz,“OverseasTrade,”123.215.Zahedieh,CapitalandtheColonies,57.216.Zahedieh,CapitalandtheColonies,58,table3.2.217.Zahedieh,CapitalandtheColonies,64.218.Zahedieh,CapitalandtheColonies,7.219.Davis,“EnglishForeignTrade,”153,whoreferstothe“newmassmarkets”createdbythe“cheapnessofthesupply”drawnfromtheEnglishsettlementsandtradingcentersoutsideEurope.

220.Dunn,SugarandSlaves,48.221.Zahedieh,CapitalandtheColonies,62.222.Brenner,MerchantsandRevolution,65,71–72.223.Brenner,MerchantsandRevolution,73.224.Brenner,MerchantsandRevolution,78.225.Brenner,MerchantsandRevolution,79ff.226.“Middlingstratum”:Brenner,MerchantsandRevolution,160.227.Brenner,MerchantsandRevolution,75,withtable2.1at76.228.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,42ff.229.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,64.230.PaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,122.231.PaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,118.232.PaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,123.233.ThomasMun,ADiscourseofTradefromEnglanduntotheEast-Indies(1621),citedWood,History,43.234.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,43.235.CitedBrenner,MerchantsandRevolution,68.236.PaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,70,referringto“aremarkableincreaseinthecharteringofEnglishshipsintheMediterraneanasawholeandinItalyinparticular,”fromthe1670sonward.

237.PaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,129–32.238.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,21.239.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,215–216.240.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,125.241.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,127.242.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,102ff.,105.243.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,106ff.,119,120.244.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,140ff.ontheCompany’sdecline.245.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,128.246.CitedWood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,127.247.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,152.248.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,151.249.Wood,HistoryoftheLevantCompany,155–56.250.RogerOwen,TheMiddleEastintheWorldEconomy,1800–1914(London,1993),83.TheFrenchdominatedthewesterntradewithIstanbulintheeighteenthcentury,andGalatahadthelargestFrenchcommunityintheLevantby1769,cf.FaribaZarinebaf,MediterraneanEncounters:TradeandPluralisminEarlyModernGalata(Oakland,CA,2018),194,“Bythemid-eighteenthcentury,FrenchtradeinIstanbulwastwo-thirdsofallWesterntradewiththecapital.”

251.Ormrod,RiseofCommercialEmpires,41.252.Nash,“OrganizationofTrade,”123.

253.S.D.Smith,Slavery,Family,andGentryCapitalismintheBritishAtlantic:TheWorldoftheLascelles,1648–1834(Cambridge,2006),141.

254.Smith,GentryCapitalism,182.255.Smith,GentryCapitalism,156–57.256.Nash,“OrganizationofTrade,”124.257.JamesOakes,SlaveryandFreedom:AnInterpretationoftheOldSouth(NewYork,1990),55.258.Nash,“OrganizationofTrade,”95.259.Webster,RichestEastIndiaMerchant,7.260.Brewer,SinewsofPower,xv.261.Hill,CenturyofRevolution,188;cf.K.N.Chaudhuri,TheEnglishEastIndiaCompany(London,1965),30,“thepromotersoftheCompanyincludedsomeoftherichestandmostpowerfulCitymerchantswhohadahandinpracticallyeverybranchofEnglishoverseastrade,”andhisfurtherassertion“managerialcontroloftheCompany’saffairsremainedfirmlyinthehandsoftheCitymerchants”(p.21).

262.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,61.263.CainandHopkins,BritishImperialism,90.264.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,165,170ff.265.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,45.266.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,131ff.267.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,282.268.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,258;italicsmine.269.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,71.270.Forexample,Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,253.271.CitedChaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,148.272.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,143.273.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,145,citingJohnDeane’sstatementtotheBengalPublicConsultationsofJuly1731.274.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,307.275.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,308.276.SeeHameedaHossain,TheCompanyWeaversofBengal:TheEastIndiaCompanyandtheOrganizationofTextileProductionin

Bengal,1750–1813(NewDelhi,1988).277.Hossain,CompanyWeaversofBengal,165,175.278.KanakalathaMukund,TheTradingWorldoftheTamilMerchant:EvolutionofMerchantCapitalismintheCoromandel(Chennai,1999),72.

279.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,66.280.WolfgangvonStromer,“Uneclédusuccèsdesmaisonsdecommerced’AllemagneduSud:legrandcommerceassociéauVerlagssystem,”RevueHistorique,285(1991),29–49.

281.Foracasestudy,seeMukund,TradingWorldoftheTamilMerchant.282.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,355–356.283.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,357.284.Marshall,“PrivateBritishTrade,”279.285.CosmopolitanandlargelyMuslim-dominated,seeArasaratnam’sessayinSinnapahArasaratnamandAniruddhaRay,Masulipatnam

andCambay:AHistoryofTwoPort-Towns,1500–1800(NewDelhi,1994).286.Chaudhuri,TradingWorldofAsia,210.287.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes,78.288.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes,78(“hadbeenreducedtoatrickle”).289.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes,20.290.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes,152;Hossain,CompanyWeaversofBengal,75.291.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes,248.292.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes,255.293.P.J.Marshall,“EconomicandPoliticalExpansion:TheCaseofOudh,”ModernAsianStudies,9(1975),465–482,at476–477.294.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes,24.295.Davis,RiseoftheEnglishShippingIndustry,15.296.Webster,RichestEastIndiaMerchant,27–28.297.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes,48.

ChapterFour1.PaulNizan,Aden,Arabie,trans.JoanPinkham,forewordbyJean-PaulSartre(Boston,1970),112.2.Nizan,Aden,Arabie,112–3.3.Nizan,Aden,Arabie,112;allitalicsmine.4.Nizan,Aden,Arabie,113.5.Nizan,Aden,Arabie,111.6.Nizan,Aden,Arabie,116.7.Nizan,Aden,Arabie,102.8.Nizan,Aden,Arabie,102.9.Owen,MiddleEastintheWorldEconomy,156,table27;thebulkofthisinMountLebanon.10.E.R.J.Owen,CottonandtheEgyptianEconomy,1820–1914(Oxford,1969),89.11.Harlaftis,HistoryofGreek-OwnedShipping,67.12.Harlaftis,History,35,“wildcompetition.”13.GeoffreyJones,MerchantstoMultinationals:BritishTradingCompaniesintheNineteenthandTwentiethCenturies(Oxford,2000),39.14.RobertBlake,JardineMatheson:TradersoftheFarEast(London,1999),248.15.Owen,MiddleEastintheWorldEconomy,103.16.Owen,MiddleEastintheWorldEconomy,126.17.RoyalCommissiononOpium,MinutesofEvidenceTakenbeforetheRoyalCommissiononOpium(London,1894),vol.2,448(fromS.Laing’sbudgetstatementdatedApril16,1862).

18.Kynaston,CityofLondon,Volume1,220.19.Jones,MerchantstoMultinationals,40.20.Kynaston,CityofLondon,Volume1,239.21.Webster,RichestEastIndiaMerchant,40,42.22.Webster,RichestEastIndiaMerchant,59.23.Webster,RichestEastIndiaMerchant,117.24.Webster,RichestEastIndiaMerchant,123,130.25.Webster,RichestEastIndiaMerchant,112,citingJohnCrawfurd’sanalysis.26.BenoyChowdhury,GrowthofCommercialAgricultureinBengal(1757–1900)(Calcutta,1964),83;MichaelGreenberg,BritishTrade

andtheOpeningofChina,1800–42(NewYork,1979;orig.1951),165.27.Greenberg,BritishTrade,34.28.Webster,RichestEastIndiaMerchant,121–22.29.Webster,RichestEastIndiaMerchant,110;italicsmine.30.Blake,JardineMatheson,59;mostrecently,AlainLePichon,ChinaTradeandEmpire:Jardine,Matheson&Co.andtheOriginsof

BritishRuleinHongKong,1827–1843(Oxford,2006),withthedescriptionofJardineMatheson&Co.asa“fully-fledgedcapitalistenterprise”by1843(at35).

31.Greenberg,BritishTrade,113.Fortythousandchestswereequivalenttoca.4.8millionpoundsofopium(!),LePichon,ChinaTradeandEmpire,20.

32.Blake,JardineMatheson,37ff.33.Blake,JardineMatheson,60(Company’sconduct),78(Whigs),106(lobbying).34.Greenberg,BritishTrade,164;LePichon,ChinaTradeandEmpire,33.35.Blake,JardineMatheson,82.36.Blake,JardineMatheson,90ff.37.Blake,JardineMatheson,108.38.J.Y.Wong,DeadlyDreams:Opium,Imperialism,andtheArrowWar(1856–1860)(Cambridge,1998),210,311.39.EdwardLeFevour,WesternEnterpriseinLateChi’ingChina:ASelectiveSurveyofJardine,MathesonandCompany’sOperations,1842–

1895(Cambridge,MA,1968),19.40.LeFevour,WesternEnterprise,20.41.LeFevour,WesternEnterprise,25–26.42.LeFevour,WesternEnterprise,27–28.43.LeFevour,WesternEnterprise,28.44.LeFevour,WesternEnterprise,28–29.45.Chapman,MerchantEnterpriseinBritain,237–239.

46.Chapman,MerchantEnterpriseinBritain,115,withnote18.47.AmiyaKumarBagchi,PrivateInvestmentinIndia,1900–1939(Cambridge,1972),163.48.Chapman,MerchantEnterpriseinBritain,291,table10.1.49.P.Pugh,GreatEnterprise:AHistoryofHarrisons&Crosfield,editedbyG.Nickall(Harrisons&Crosfield,1990),76.50.Hilferding,FinanceCapital,119.51.Jones,MerchantstoMultinationals,289.52.Chapman,MerchantEnterpriseinBritain,125;itisthereforepuzzlingthathealsostates(at237)“Yulescontrolledassetsinexcessof£1.2m(in1899),buttheiractualcapitalwasevidentlymuchless.”

53.MichaelKidron,ForeignInvestmentsinIndia(London,1965),6.54.Kidron,ForeignInvestments,11.55.Bagchi,PrivateInvestmentinIndia,176.56.Bagchi,PrivateInvestmentinIndia,262–263.57.Pugh,GreatEnterprise,38–42.58.NicholasJ.White,BritishBusinessinPost-ColonialMalaysia,1957–70(LondonandNewYork,2004),4.59.AndrewYule&Co.,AndrewYule&Co.Ltd.,1863–1963(printedforprivatecirculation,1963),12.60.Chapman,MerchantEnterpriseinBritain,212.61.Chapman,MerchantEnterpriseinBritain,213.62.Bagchi,PrivateInvestmentinIndia,162.63.Banga,“Karachi,”356.64.Braund,CallingtoMind,74.65.Braund,CallingtoMind,24.66.Braund,CallingtoMind,40–41.67.Bagchi,PrivateInvestmentinIndia,180.68.MariaMisra,Business,Race,andPoliticsinBritishIndia,c.1850–1960(Oxford,1999)isalucidstudyofthecultureoftheBritishmanagingagencyhousesandtheirgradualdeclineaftertheFirstWorldWar,thanksinparttotheirself-defeatingisolation.Gradual—theBritishmanagingagenciesstillcontrolledthebulkoflistedcompaniesin1947.However,fromthe1940salotoftheagenciesweretakenoverbyIndiancapital.

69.KarlMarxandFrederickEngels,“ManifestooftheCommunistParty,”inKarlMarx,TheRevolutionsof1848,trans.DavidFernbach(Harmondsworth,1973),71.

70.S.D.Chapman,“TheInternationalHouses:theContinentalContributiontoBritishCommerce,1800–1860,”JournalofEuropeanEconomicHistory,6(1977),5–48,at19.

71.Chapman,“InternationalHouses,”39.72.CharlesIssawi,“BritishTradeandtheRiseofBeirut,1830–1860,”InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies,8(1977),91–101,at96.73.Issawi,“BritishTrade,”97.74.Issawi,“BritishTrade,”98.75.Chapman,“InternationalHouses,”41;Chapman,MerchantEnterpriseinBritain,158.76.StanleyJackson,TheSassoons(London,1968),35.77.Jackson,TheSassoons,45.78.Jackson,TheSassoons,59.79.Kardasis,DiasporaMerchants,160.80.GoingbythetableinChapman,MerchantEnterpriseinBritain,291.81.CainandHopkins,BritishImperialism,152,154.82.Kynaston,CityofLondon,Volume1,167.83.Chapman,“InternationalHouses,”42(table).84.Chapman,“InternationalHouses,”42–43.85.Lynn,Commerce,31.86.Lynn,Commerce,44.87.Owen,CottonandtheEgyptianEconomy,161(table21),198(table38).88.JohnF.Richards,“TheOpiumIndustryinBritishIndia,”TheIndianEconomicandSocialHistoryReview,3(2002),149–80,at155,163;CarlA.Trocki,Opium,EmpireandtheGlobalPoliticalEconomy(Routledge,1999),94,citingCrawfurd’sestimateforca.1836.

89.R.Graham,BritainandtheOnsetofModernizationinBrazil,1850–1914(Cambridge,1968),25.90.AnthonyWebster,GentlemenCapitalists:BritishImperialisminSouthEastAsia,1770–1890(London,1998),213(exportsofBombayBurmahTradingCorporation).

91.W.P.McGreevey,AnEconomicHistoryofColombia,1845–1930(Cambridge,1971),196.92.CharlesRobequain,TheEconomicDevelopmentofFrenchIndo-China,trans.IsabelA.Ward(London,1944),220,table17.93.Webster,GentlemenCapitalists,230.94.G.B.Kay,ThePoliticalEconomyofColonialisminGhana:ACollectionofDocumentsandStatistics,1900–1960(Cambridge,1972),334,table21a.

95.HubertBonin,CFAO(1887–2007).Laréinventionpermanenteducommerceoutre-mer(Paris,2007),293.96.H.A.Antrobus,AHistoryoftheAssamCompany1839–1953(Edinburgh,1957),95.97.Bagchi,PrivateInvestmentinIndia,268.98.W.K.M.Langley,CenturyinMalabar:TheHistoryofPeirceLeslie&Co.Ltd.,1862–1962(Madras,1962),51.99.FrederickJohnsonPedler,TheLionandtheUnicorninAfrica:AHistoryoftheOriginsoftheUnitedAfricaCompany,1787–1931(London,1974),165.

100.Harlaftis,HistoryofGreek-OwnedShipping,24–25.101.CainandHopkins,BritishImperialism,248.102.CainandHopkins,BritishImperialism,289.103.Banga,“Karachi,”340.104.Graham,Brazil,76.105.R.H.Macaulay,HistoryoftheBombayBurmahTradingCorporation,Ltd.1864–1910(London,1934),26.106.Wong,DeadlyDreams,408–409(includingtable16.12).107.CainandHopkins,BritishImperialism,157,201.108.CainandHopkins,BritishImperialism,165,table5.8.109.CainandHopkins,BritishImperialism,158ff.110.SeetheseminalanalysisinE.H.H.Green,“TheInfluenceoftheCityoverBritishEconomicPolicyca.1880–1960,”inFinanceand

FinanciersinEuropeanHistory,1880–1960,ed.YoussefCassis(CambridgeandParis,1992),193–218,at208–209.111.CainandHopkins,BritishImperialism,383.112.Wong,DeadlyDreams,218ff.,310ff.113.J.Y.Wong,“BritishAnnexationofSindin1843:AnEconomicPerspective,”ModernAsianStudies,31(1997),225–244;Wong,

DeadlyDreams,419ff.114.Webster,GentlemenCapitalists,227;Macaulay,HistoryoftheBombayBurmahTradingCorporation,14ff.115.Webster,GentlemenCapitalists,225,227.116.W.S.Blunt,SecretHistoryoftheEnglishOccupationofEgypt(London,1922;orig.1907),139.117.Blunt,SecretHistory,98.118.Kynaston,CityofLondon,Volume1,339.119.Mansel,Levant,117.120.Kynaston,CityofLondon,Volume1,338.121.Mansel,Levant,122.122.RogerOwen,“EgyptandEurope:fromFrenchExpeditiontoBritishOccupation,”inStudiesintheTheoryofImperialism,eds.RogerOwenandBobSutcliffe,195–209,at203,205.Theoccupationhadstrongsupportintheexpatupperclasses,cf.AlexanderKitroeff,TheGreeksandtheMakingofModernEgypt(CairoandNewYork,2019),55,“Almostayearafterthebombardmenttookplace,2,600wealthyEuropeaninhabitantsofAlexandriaandothertownssignedapetitionaskingthattheoccupationbecomepermanent.”

123.E.Frangakis-Syrett,TheCommerceofSmyrnaintheEighteenthCentury(1700–1820)(Athens,1992),85.124.Owen,MiddleEastintheWorldEconomy,83.125.GelinaHarlaftis,“The‘EasternInvasion’:GreeksinMediterraneanTradeandShippingintheEighteenthandNineteenthCenturies,”inTradeandCulturalExchangeintheEarlyModernMediterranean:Braudel’sMaritimeLegacy,eds.MariaFusaro,ColinHeywood,Mohamed-SalahOmri(London,2010),223–252,at244.

126.Harlaftis,“‘EasternInvasion,’”244.127.Harlaftis,“‘EasternInvasion,’”245–246.128.Frangakis-Syrett,CommerceofSmyrna,109–11.129.Kardasis,DiasporaMerchants,84.130.Kardasis,DiasporaMerchants,151.131.Kardasis,DiasporaMerchants,149–50.132.Kardasis,DiasporaMerchants,145,note82.133.DavidS.Landes,BankersandPashas:InternationalFinanceandEconomicImperialisminEgypt(London,1958),26.

134.H.Holland,TravelsintheIonianIsles,Albania,Thessaly,Macedonia,etc.duringtheYears1812and1813,citedLandes,BankersandPashas,26.

135.Harlaftis,HistoryofGreek-OwnedShipping,50–1,citesafigureof“500”!136.RoderickBeaton,AnIntroductiontoModernGreekLiterature(Oxford,1994),338.137.“Caractèredesgensdupays,leurcommerce,”ca.1750,Paris,AN,AffairesÉtrangères,citedEdhemEldem,“Istanbul:FromImperialtoPeripheralizedCapital,”inTheOttomanCitybetweenEastandWest:Aleppo,Izmir,andIstanbul,eds.EdhemEldem,DanielGoffman,andBruceMasters(Cambridge,1999),159.

138.Anastassiadou,LesGrecsd’Istanbul,158–60.139.Harlaftis,History,40ff.140.Kardasis,DiasporaMerchants,154,table7.4.141.Chapman,MerchantEnterpriseinBritain,158–159;italicsmine.142.Harlaftis,History,41.143.Anastassiadou,LesGrecsd’Istanbul,168ff.;Mihail-DimitriSturdza,Dictionnairehistoriqueetgénéalogiquedesgrandesfamillesde

Grèce,d’AlbanieetdeConstantinople(Paris,1983),224–225.144.Sturdza,DictionnairehistoriqueetgénéalogiquedesgrandesfamillesdeGrèce,152.145.OnVikelas’saccountoftheGreekbusinessdiaspora,seeAriadniMoutafidou,“GreekMerchantFamiliesPerceivingtheWorld:TheCaseofDemetriusVikelas,”MediterraneanHistoricalReview,23(2008),143–64.

146.Mansel,Levant,103.147.Mansel,Levant,192,citingacentenarybookletofC.Whittall&Co.148.HenkDriessen,“MediterraneanPortCities:CosmopolitanismReconsidered,”HistoryandAnthropology,16(2005),129–41,at133;Mansel,Levant,170;bothcitingtheAustrianconsul-generalCharlesdeScherzer.

149.Mansel,Levant,169.150.FawwazTraboulsi,AHistoryofModernLebanon,secondedition(London,2012),116ff.,withIssawi,“BritishTrade,”98.151.ThomasPhilipp,Acre:TheRiseandFallofaPalestinianCity,1730–1831(NewYork,2001),132.152.RobertIlbert,Alexandrie1830–1930.Histoired’unecommunautécitadine,2vols.(Cairo,1996),245.153.RobertMabro,“Alexandria1860–1960:TheCosmopolitanIdentity,”inAlexandriaRealandImagined,eds.A.HirstandM.S.Silk(Aldershot,2004),247–262,at254ff.,basedonthecensusdata.

154.Mabro,“Alexandria.”155.ElizabethM.Holt,FictitiousCapital:Silk,Cotton,andtheRiseoftheArabicNovel(NewYork,2017),41.156.Mansel,Levant,107.157.Ilbert,Alexandrie,129.158.Beckert,EmpireofCotton,233.159.Mansel,Levant,69–70.160.Beckert,EmpireofCotton,293.161.Mansel,Levant,137.162.MichaelHaag,Alexandria:CityofMemory(NewHaven,2004),10.163.Owen,CottonandtheEgytpianEconomy,357.164.Ilbert,Alexandrie,257.165.AlexanderKitroeff,TheGreeksinEgypt1919–1937:EthnicityandClass(London,1989),80.Kitroeff,TheGreeksandtheMakingof

ModernEgypt,102,notesthat“ThroughouttheinterwarperiodthetwogreatGreek-ownedfirms,Choremi,BenachiCottonCompanyandC.M.SalvagoCompany,remainedthebiggestexporters.”

166.Haag,Alexandria,71.167.Kitroeff,GreeksinEgypt,79.168.Kitroeff,GreeksinEgypt,80–81.169.Ilbert,Alexandrie,266–267.170.Ilbert,Alexandrie,270.171.WhatfollowsisbasedonKaterinaTrimi,“LafamilleBenakis:unparadigmedelabourgeoisiegrecalexandrine,”inFigures

anonymes,figuresd’élite,eds.M.AnastassiadouandB.Heyberger(Istanbul,1999),83–102.172.Mansel,Levant,139,“persuadedbyhisfriendthecharismaticGreekpoliticianEmmanuelVenizelos.”173.Kitroeff,GreeksinEgypt,80,followedbyHaag,Alexandria,72–73.174.SamiZubaida,“CosmopolitanismandtheMiddleEast,”inCosmopolitanism,IdentityandAuthenticityintheMiddleEast,ed.RoelMeijer(Richmond,1999),15–33,at26;Mansel,Levant,139.

175.Trimi,“LafamilleBenakis,”102.

176.Mansel,Levant,138.177.RobertIlbertandIliosYannakakis,Alexandrie,1860–1960(Paris,1992),29.178.Mansel,Levant,139.179.ArnoldWright,TwentiethCenturyImpressionsofEgypt(London,1909),429,alsoinHaag,Alexandria,15.InJustineDurrellhasDarleysay,“Nottocareaboutgain,thatiswhatAlexandriarecognizesasmadness,”LawrenceDurrell,TheAlexandriaQuartet(London:Faber&Faber,1969),30.

180.Haag,Alexandria,64.181.From“TheCity,”inC.P.Cavafy,CollectedPoems,trans.EdmundKeeleyandPhilipSherrard(London,1984),22.

ChapterFive1.Hilferding,FinanceCapital,208–209.2.Marx,TheoriesofSurplus-Value,PartIII,527.3.DuncanBythell,TheSweatedTrades:OutworkinNineteenth-centuryBritain(London,1978),13.4.Bythell,SweatedTrades,35.5.Bythell,SweatedTrades,36.6.Bythell,SweatedTrades,66.7.Bythell,SweatedTrades,72.8.Bythell,SweatedTrades,146.9.CarloPoni,“Proto-industrialization,RuralandUrban,”Review(FernandBraudelCenter),9(1985),305–314,at306;italicsmine.10.SotooJürgenSchlumbohm,“RelationsofProduction–ProductiveForces–CrisesinProtoindustrialization,”inIndustrialization

BeforeIndustrialization:RuralIndustryintheGenesisofCapitalism,eds.PeterKriedte,HansMedick,JürgenSchlumbohm,trans.BeateSchempp(Cambridge,1981),94–125,at104;“...capitalistproductionwhichbeganwithintheputting-outsystem.”

11.KarlMarx,Capital,Volume1,trans.BenFowkes(London,1976),358.12.Marx,Capital,Volume1,425.13.TessieP.Liu,TheWeaver’sKnot:TheContradictionsofClassStruggleandFamilySolidarityinWesternFrance,1750–1914(Ithaca,1994),166,171.

14.LisandSoly,PovertyandCapitalism,105.15.Schlumbohm,“RelationsofProduction,”101.Onproto-industryseetheessaysinIndustrializationBeforeIndustrialization,eds.Kriedte,Medick,andSchlumbohm.

16.LisandSoly,PovertyandCapitalism,150.TheexpressionwasusedbyHansMedickinaseminalessay,“TheProto-IndustrialFamilyEconomy,”SocialHistory1(1976),291–315,whichpointedtothehigheraveragehouseholdsizeamongruralcottageworkers(becauseofthelowageatmarriageandofchildrenstayinglongerwiththeirparents)andtothecentralityofwomen’slabortothe“proto-industrial”family.

17.PierreGoubert,BeauvaisetleBeauvaisisde1600à1730(Paris,1960).18.Poni,“Proto-industrialization,”312–313.19.BrunoDini,“Lavoratoridell’ArtedellaLanaaFirenzenelXIVeXVsecolo,”inArtigianiesalariati.Ilmondodellavoronell’Italiadei

secoliXII-XV(Pistoia,1984),27–68,at31.20.EleanoraCarus-Wilson,“TheWoollenIndustry,”inCambridgeEconomicHistoryofEurope,Volume2:TradeandIndustryinthe

MiddleAges,eds.M.PostanandE.E.Rich(Cambridge,1952),355–428,at386.21.Marx,Grundrisse,510–511,wheretheterm“manufacture”seemstoincludetheactivityofputters-out.22.Bythell,SweatedTrades,15.23.Bythell,SweatedTrades,15–16.24.Bythell,SweatedTrades,16.25.Bythell,SweatedTrades,46,18,67.26.Bythell,SweatedTrades,17.27.Liu,Weaver’sKnot,66.28.Liu,Weaver’sKnot,69.29.RaymonddeRoover,“LabourConditionsinFlorencearound1400,”inFlorentineStudies:PoliticsandSocietyinRenaissanceFlorence,ed.NicolaiRubinstein(London,1968),277–313,at298.

30.Tognetti,Un’industriadilussoalserviziodelgrandecommercio,26–38.31.Goldthwaite,Economy,306.32.FernandBraudel,“EuropeanExpansionandCapitalism:1450–1650,”inChaptersinWesternCivilization,Volume1,thirdedition(NewYork,1961),245–288,at265–266.

33.Goldthwaite,Economy,339.34.Goldthwaite,Economy,303.35.Tognetti,Un’industriadilusso,85.36.FromtheextractoftheChronicletranslatedinLopezandRaymond,MedievalTradeintheMediterraneanWorld,71–74,at72.37.RaymonddeRoover,“AFlorentineFirmofClothManufacturers:ManagementandOrganizationofaSixteenth-CenturyBusiness,”inBusiness,BankingandEconomicThoughtinLateMedievalandEarlyModernEurope,ed.JuliusKirshner(Chicago,1974),85–113,at86–91;Goldthwaite,Economy,299–300.

38.Tognetti,Un’industriadilusso,26;alsocalled“laclassemercantile-bancaria”at23.39.AlfredDoren,DieFlorentinerWollentuchindustrievomvierzehntenbiszumsechzehntenJahrhundert.EinBeitragzurGeschichtedes

modernenKapitalismus(Stuttgart,1901).40.GeneA.Brucker,“TheCiompiRevolution,”inFlorentineStudies,ed.Rubinstein,314–356,at320,322.41.Brucker,“CiompiRevolution,”319,322.42.StevenA.Epstein,WageLaborandGuildsinMedievalEurope(ChapelHill,191),252.43.DeRoover,“LabourConditions,”300.44.FrederickAntal,FlorentinePaintinganditsSocialBackground(Cambridge,MA,1986),24,“theciompi,thelowestgroup,consistingofsome9,000woolworkers.”

45.Aboutthisextraordinaryworkers’revolt,usuallycalledthe“Ciompirevolution,”StevenEpsteincommented,“WhentheCiompihadaguildforacoupleofmonths,theystoodthedefinitionofaguildonitshead.Farfromrevealingthemselvestobeinthethrallofculturalhegemonyaboutguildsorincapableofformulatinganideologicalprogramoftheirown,theCiompibroughtthevisionofcorporatesocietytoitslogicalconclusion—aguildforeveryone,ashortstepawayfromthestate”(Epstein,WageLaborandGuilds,253).

46.DeRoover,“FlorentineFirm,”96–97.47.DeRoover,“FlorentineFirm,”98;DeRoover,“LabourConditions,”301.48.AlessandroStella,“‘Labottegaeilavoranti’:approchedesconditionsdetravaildesCiompi,”AnnalesESC,44(1989),529–551,calculatesanaverageworkshopsizeofforty-sevenemployeesfortheStrozziwoolenenterprise,ofwhomtwenty-ninewereworkers(lavoranti)(p.543).

49.DeRoover,“LabourConditions,”301,“asfarasweknow,theydidnotplayaconspicuouspartintheCiompiRevolt.”50.Gayot,LesdrapsdeSedan,citedWilliamH.SewellJr.,“TheEmpireofFashionandtheRiseofCapitalisminEighteenth-CenturyFrance,”PastandPresent,no.206(2010),81–120,at112–3.

51.ThisisarguedbydeRoover,“FlorentineFirm,”93,102.52.FederigoMelis,Aspettidellavitaeconomicamedievale(Studinell’ArchivioDatinidiPrato)(Siena,1962),511,adetailnotedbyRudolfHolbach,FrühformenvonVerlagundGrossbetriebindergewerblichenProduktion(13.–16.Jahrhundert)(Stuttgart,1994),149.

53.Goldthwaite,Economy,301–302.54.DeRoover,“LabourConditions,”297.55.DeRoover,“LabourConditions,”300;italicsmine.56.Goldthwaite,Economy,290–291.57.Goldthwaite,Economy,284.58.Goldthwaite,Economy,291–293;PaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,136–38,whereitiscalleda“commercialstrategy.”59.PaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,137.60.PaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,138.61.PaganodeDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,138–41.62.JustinGodart,L’ouvrierensoie.MonographiedutisseurLyonnais(Paris,1899),90–91.63.CarloPoni,“FashionasFlexibleProduction:theStrategiesoftheLyonsSilkMerchantsintheEighteenthCentury,”inWorldof

Possibilities:FlexibilityandMassProductioninWesternIndustrialization,eds.CharlesF.SabelandJonathanZeitlin(Cambridge,1977),37–74,at47–48.

64.Sewell,“EmpireofFashion,”94.65.Sewell,“EmpireofFashion,”94–95.66.Sewell,“EmpireofFashion,”97.67.Sewell,“EmpireofFashion,”87–88;italicsmine.68.Sewell,“EmpireofFashion,”90.69.Poni,“LyonsSilkMerchants,”49–50.70.Poni,“LyonsSilkMerchants,”41.71.Sewell,“EmpireofFashion,”93.

72.Sewell,“EmpireofFashion,”94.73.Poni,“LyonsSilkMerchants,”64–65.74.Sewell,“EmpireofFashion,”92.75.Poni,“LyonsSilkMerchants,”42.76.Sewell,“EmpireofFashion,”86.77.Poni,“LyonsSilkMerchants,”67.78.Bythell,SweatedTrades,47.79.Sewell,“EmpireofFashion,”100–101.80.ThisandthetwofollowingparagraphsarebasedentirelyonWynn’sremarkablehistoryofthecompany,AntonyWynn,Three

CamelstoSmyrna:TheStoryoftheOrientalCarpetManufacturersCompany(London,2008).WynnwastheOCMbuyerinHamadanin1972–76.

81.Wynn,Smyrna,25–26.82.Wynn,Smyrna,24.83.Wynn,Smyrna,30.84.“Levantine”isusedhereinthestrictsensedefinedbyOliverJensSchmitt,Levantiner.LebensweltenundIdentitäteneiner

ethnokonfessionellenGruppeimosmanischenReichim“langen19.Jahrhundert”(Munich,2005),thatis,tomeanChristians(mainlyCatholics)ofwesternEuropeanoriginpermanentlyresidentinthemainOttomanurbancenterswhoweredistinctbothfromtheotherChristianminorities(Greeks,Armenians,etc.)aswellasfrommorerecentEuropeanimmigrants.Inthelatenineteenthcentury,Levantine-controlledbusinessesheldupbetterinSmyrnathantheydidinIstanbul(pp.239–40).

85.Wynn,Smyrna,31.86.Wynn,Smyrna,48.87.Wynn,Smyrna,78.88.Wynn,Smyrna,39.89.Wynn,Smyrna,39.90.Wynn,Smyrna,39.91.Wynn,Smyrna,45.92.Wynn,Smyrna,212,citingBryanHuffner’sdiaryofhistravelsthroughIraninthelate1940s.93.Wynn,Smyrna,49(Tabrizimonopoly),56(Americans).94.Wynn,Smyrna,55.95.Wynn,Smyrna,61.96.Wynn,Smyrna,159(A.C.EdwardstoJimBaker).97.Wynn,Smyrna,54.98.InKerman,wheremostofthecarpetfactoriesworkedundercontracttovariousEuropeanfirms,aBritishconsularreportfortheyear1913notesthat“theconditionsofthetradearenotoriouslyscandalousandhighlyinjurioustothehealthandwell-beingoftheworkers,whoarelargelychildren,”citedWynn,Smyrna,91–92;italicsmine.

99.Wynn,Smyrna,85(“insistenceonrigorousqualitycontrolateverylevelofproduction”).100.Wynn,Smyrna,175.101.Wynn,Smyrna,255.102.Wynn,Smyrna,77.103.Wynn,Smyrna,173.104.Wynn,Smyrna,173.105.Wynn,Smyrna,232.106.Wynn,Smyrna,234.107.InternationalTradingDivisionoftheBowaterOrganisation,HistoryandActivitiesoftheRalliTradingGroup,[nopagenumbers]sectionon“Carpets”;allitalicsmine.

108.Wynn,Smyrna,270–272.

ChapterSix1.Bayly,Rulers,Townsmen,293.2.Chaudhuri,TradingWorld,148.3.ThebigGermanmetaltradersofthelatenineteenthcenturyareagoodexample,seeSusanBecker,“TheGermanMetalTradersbefore1914,”inTheMultinationalTraders,ed.GeoffreyG.Jones(London,1998),66–85.

4.Langley,CenturyinMalabar,35.

5.TheodoreK.Rabb,EnterpriseandEmpire:MerchantandGentryInvestmentintheExpansionofEngland,1575–1630(Cambridge,MA,1967),53,table3.

6.StefanoAngeli,Proprietari,commerciantiefilandieriaMilanonelprimoOttocento.Ilmercatodellesete(Milan,1982),112–13.7.Molà,SilkIndustry,303.8.PaganodiDivitiis,EnglishMerchants,169ff.9.GiorgioCracco,SocietàestatonelMedioevoveneziano(secolixii-xiv)(Florence,1967),195.10.IbnHajaral-‘AsqalanicitedÉricVallet,L’Arabiemarchande.ÉtatetcommercesouslessultansrasûlidesduYémen(Paris,2010),513–514.

11.Vallet,L’Arabiemarchande,527.12.Doria,“Conoscenzadelmercato,”73–74;Braudel,Mediterranean,507,“aboutsixtybankers.”13.Nash,“OrganizationofTrade,”133.14.K.G.Davies,“TheOriginsoftheCommissionSystemintheWestIndiaTrade,”TransactionsoftheRoyalHistoricalSociety,fifthser.,2(1952),89–107,at104–5.

15.GordonJackson,HullintheEighteenthCentury(Oxford,1972),96.16.PatrickChorley,Oil,SilkandEnlightenment(Naples,1965),39.17.Greenberg,BritishTrade,30.18.Blake,JardineMatheson,143.19.Lynn,Commerce,101.20.RobertGreenhill,“TheBrazilianCoffeeTrade,”inBusinessImperialism,1840–1930,ed.D.C.M.Platt(Oxford,1977),198–230,at207–8.

21.Owen,MiddleEastintheWorldEconomy,252.22.Scobie,RevolutiononthePampas,93,106.ThetoptwowereBungeyBornandDreyfus.23.DorabjeeB.Contractor,AHandbookofIndianCottonforMerchants,Shippers,Mills,Factory-Owners,andOthersInterestedintheCotton

Trade,secondedition(Bombay,1928),38–39.24.D.K.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapitalandEconomicDecolonization:TheUnitedAfricaCompany,1929–1987(Oxford,1994),9.25.CatherineBoone,MerchantCapitalandtheRootsofStatePowerinSenegal,1930–1985(Cambridge,1992),44.26.PierreBrocheuxandDanielHémery,Indochina:AnAmbiguousColonization,1858–1954(Berkeley,2009),169.27.Braund,CallingtoMind,41.28.Shenton,DevelopmentofCapitalism,97.29.Shenton,DevelopmentofCapitalism,16;italicsmine.30.Shenton,DevelopmentofCapitalism,17.31.FrederickPedler,TheLionandtheUnicorninAfrica:TheUnitedAfricaCompany1787–1931(London,1974),183;Shenton,

DevelopmentofCapitalism,83.32.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,112.33.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,426.34.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,438.35.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,444.36.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,426.37.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,443–444;italicsmine.38.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,119.39.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,121.40.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,148,summarizingJan-GeorgDeutsch,“EducatingtheMiddlemen,”(SOASPhD1990).41.Bonin,CFAO,297,note65(annualreportdatedMay30,1938).42.ChengSiok-Hwa,TheRiceIndustryofBurma,1852–1940(KualaLumpurandSingapore,1968),64–68.43.LaurenceMarfaing,EvolutionducommerceauSénégal,1820–1930(Paris,1991),218–222.44.Marfaing,CommerceauSénégal,234.45.Marfaing,CommerceauSénégal,211.46.Braudel,Mediterranean,548.47.ItineraryofLudovicodiVarthema,67.48.Chaudhuri,TradingWorld,308.49.Chaudhuri,TradingWorld,147.50.Lynn,Commerce,67.51.Lynn,Commerce,71.

52.Lynn,Commerce,80.53.RalliBrothers,CalcuttaHandbook(1888),citedChapman,MerchantEnterpriseinBritain,128.54.ChristofDejung,DieFädendesglobalenMarktes.EineSozial-undKulturgeschichtedesWelthandelsamBeispielderHandelsfirma

GebrüderVolkart,1851–1999(Cologne,2013),105–112.55.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,444,note92.56.Shenton,DevelopmentofCapitalism,88–89.57.Shenton,DevelopmentofCapitalism,87–88.58.Shenton,DevelopmentofCapitalism,94.59.Cf.Shenton,DevelopmentofCapitalism,15:“TheseAfricanmerchantsperformedausefulservicetocapitalbuttheyalsoappropriatedashareofsurplusvalueandprofit.”

60.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,111.61.Langley,CenturyinMalabar,45–46;italicsmine.VolkartmanagersdescribedtheIndianbrokerasthe“centralfigure”aroundwhombusinesswastransacted,the“connectinglinkbetweentheEuropeanfirmandthedealers”,cf.Dejung,GebrüderVolkart,108.ThebestdescriptionofIndiancommercialorganizationintheearlytwentiethcenturyisRajatKantaRay’spaperinTheIndianEconomicandSocialHistoryReview,25(1988),263–318.

62.Blake,JardineMatheson,136.63.Subramanian,IndigenousCapitalandImperialExpansion;PrasannanParthasarathi,“MerchantsandtheRiseofColonialism,”in

InstitutionsandEconomicChangeinSouthAsia,eds.BurtonSteinandSanjaySubrahmanyam(Delhi,1996),85–104.64.Greenhill,“BrazilianCoffee,”213.65.Firro,“SilkandAgrarianChanges,”160–161.66.Kitroeff,GreeksinEgypt,85.67.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,120.68.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,121;italicsmine.69.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,115–116.70.Chaudhuri,TradingWorld,257;italicsmine.71.KarlMarx,ZurKritikderpolitischenOekonomie,inMarx-EngelsGesamtausgabe,II/2(Berlin,1980),201,note1;KarlMarx,A

ContributiontotheCritiqueofPoliticalEconomy(Moscow,1970),140,“Ofcoursecapital,too,isadvancedintheformofmoneyanditispossiblethatthemoneyadvancediscapitaladvanced.”

72.J.F.Richards,“TheIndianEmpireandPeasantProductionofOpiumintheNineteenthCentury,”ModernAsianStudies,15(1981),59–82,at72–73.

73.RoyalCommissiononOpium,MinutesofEvidenceTakenbeforetheRoyalCommissiononOpium(London,1894),vol.3,27(fromtheevidenceofRevdPremChand).

74.RoyalCommissiononOpium,MinutesofEvidenceTakenbeforetheRoyalCommission(London,1894),vol.3,138(evidenceofSyedKalkHusein).

75.Johnson,RiverofDarkDreams,257.76.Johnson,RiverofDarkDreams,257–258.77.Johnson,RiverofDarkDreams,259.78.Johnson,RiverofDarkDreams,260.79.PhilipS.Foner,Business&Slavery:TheNewYorkMerchants&theIrrepressibleConflict(ChapelHill,1941).80.SamuelSmith,TheCottonTradeofIndia(London,1863),20–22.81.Smith,CottonTrade,22.82.Smith,CottonTrade,34.83.MarikaVicziany,“BombayMerchantsandStructuralChangesintheExportCommunity,1850to1880,”inEconomyandSociety:

EssaysinIndianEconomicandSocialHistory,eds.K.N.ChaudhuriandCliveJ.Dewey(Delhi,1979),163–96.84.Chowdhury,GrowthofCommercialAgricultureinBengal,122.85.ColinM.Fisher,“PlantersandPeasants:TheEcologicalContextofAgrarianUnrestontheIndigoPlantationsofNorthBihar,1820–1920,”inTheImperialImpact,eds.DeweyandHopkins,114–131,at114.

86.AsiyaSiddiqi,AgrarianChangeinaNorthernIndianState:UttarPradesh1819–1833(Oxford,1973),145.87.ElizabethWhitcombe,AgrarianConditionsinNorthernIndia,Volume1:TheUnitedProvincesunderBritishRule,1860–1900(NewDelhi,1971),171–72.

88.JohnPhipps,ASeriesofTreatisesonthePrincipalProductsofBengal,No.1Indigo,citedSiddiqi,AgrarianChange,147.89.BinayBhushanChaudhuri,“GrowthofCommercialAgricultureinBengal—1859–1885,”IndianEconomicandSocialHistoryReview,7(1970),211–251,at219,contrastingthesystemsknownrespectivelyasryotiorassamiwarandzerat.

90.Chowdhury,GrowthofCommercialAgriculture,130.91.IndigoCommissionBengal,ReportoftheIndigoCommissionAppointedunderActXIof1860(Calcutta,1860),37(evidenceofJ.Cockburn).

92.IndigoCommissionBengal,Report,16,whereitissaid,“Theplantersallurgethatstrictsupervisionovereachsuccessiveagriculturaloperationis...necessary.”

93.CitedChowdhury,GrowthofCommercialAgriculture,162;italicsmine.94.Fisher,“PlantersandPeasants,”119(growth),130(capitalrepatriation).95.OmkarGoswami,Industry,Trade,andPeasantSociety:TheJuteEconomyofEasternIndia,1900–1947(Delhi,1991),41–51.96.Bagchi,PrivateInvestmentinIndia,262–263.97.Bagchi,PrivateInvestmentinIndia,264–266.98.SaugataMukherji,“AgrarianClassFormationinModernBengal,1931–51,”EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,21/4(January25)(1986),PE-11–27,at12.

99.KrishnaBharadwaj,ProductionConditionsinIndianAgriculture:AStudyBasedonFarmManagementSurveys(Cambridge,1974),69.100.RoyalCommissiononAgricultureinIndia,VolumeIV:EvidenceTakenintheBengalPresidency(London,HMSO,1927),291(§21753)(fromtheoralevidenceofG.Morgan).

101.RoyalCommission,EvidenceinBengal,276(§21482).102.Thirty-sevenofthoseinBengal—RoyalCommission,EvidenceTakeninBengal,279(§21527).103.RoyalCommission,EvidenceinBengal,276(§21484).104.RoyalCommission,EvidenceinBengal,276–277(§§21485–21488),283(§21626).

105.Goswami,JuteEconomy,50.106.RoyalCommission,EvidenceinBengal,284(§21633),“Ishouldsaythejutebrokeristhemanwhopricesthejuteintheimportshedsofthebalers.”

107.RoyalCommission,EvidenceinBengal,280(§21549).108.RoyalCommission,EvidenceinBengal,284(§21631,throughthebroker),(§21638,“throughtheirownoffices”).109.RoyalCommission,EvidenceinBengal,284(§§21636–21637).110.RoyalCommission,EvidenceinBengal,282(§§21594–21596).111.GordonT.Stewart,JuteandEmpire:theCalcuttaJuteWallahsandtheLandscapesofEmpire(Manchester,1998),43–44.112.Stewart,JuteandEmpire,44.113.SeeMukherji,“AgrarianClassFormationinModernBengal.”114.ThefiguresarefromYvesPégourier,Lemarchédurizd’Indochine(Paris,1937),3.115.Pégourier,Marchéduriz,52.116.BrocheuxandHémery,Indochina,122.117.VirginiaThompson,FrenchIndo-China(London,1937),169.118.MartinJ.Murray,TheDevelopmentofCapitalisminColonialIndochina(1870–1940)(Berkeley,1980),449–451.119.PierreBrocheux,TheMekongDelta:Ecology,Economy,andRevolution,1860–1960(Madison,1995),69.120.Cheng,RiceIndustryofBurma.121.Pégourier,Marchéduriz,54.122.Pégourier,Marchéduriz,63.123.BrocheuxandHémery,Indochina,122;Banquedel’IndochinefinancedoverhalfofSaigon’sriceexports(p.147).124.BrocheuxandHémery,Indochina,122.125.MaxineBerg,PatHudson,andMichaelSonenscher,“ManufactureinTownandCountrybeforetheFactory,”inManufacturein

TownandCountrybeforetheFactory,eds.MaxineBerg,PatHudson,andMichaelSonenscher(Cambridge,1983),1–32,at8.126.Berg,Hudson,andSonenscher,“Manufacture,”12.127.Turgot,“Reflections,”542.128.CitedZahedieh,CapitalandtheColonies,72.129.MiljavanTielhof,The“MotherofAllTrades”:TheBalticGrainTradeinAmsterdamfromtheLateSixteenthtotheEarlyNineteenth

Century(Leiden,etc.,2002),119.130.Balard,LaRomaniegénoise,t.2,871.131.Braudel,OutofItaly,37.132.FredericC.Lane,“FleetsandFairs:theFunctionsoftheVenetianmuda,”inStudiinonorediArmandoSapori,2vols.(Milan,1957),vol.1,649–663,at656.

133.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes,36.

134.Hossain,CompanyWeavers,51.135.Devine,TobaccoLords,68.136.Devine,TobaccoLords,58(turnaroundtime).137.Devine,TobaccoLords,58(bulksales),64(Frenchbuyers).138.Fieldhouse,MerchantCapital,121.139.J.AspinallTobincitedC.W.Newbury,“CreditinEarlyNineteenthCenturyWestAfricanTrade,”JournalofAfricanHistory,13(1972),81–95,at91.

140.SeetheexcerptsfromP.I.LyashchenkotranslatedinCommercializationandAgricultureinLateImperialRussia,ed.HariVasudevan(Calcutta,1998),esp.63,86–91.

141.EngelsinMarx,Capital,Volume3,620,note8.142.EngelsinMarx,Capital,Volume3,164.Velocitiescouldincreasedramatically:theSecretarytotheChiefCommissioneroftheCentralProvincesclaimedthat“Merchandise,insteadoftakingtwomonthsintransitbetweenNagpurandBombay,isnowconveyedinthreetofourdays,”CharlesGrant,TheGazetteeroftheCentralProvincesofIndia,2ndedn.(Nagpur,1870),338.Thereferenceherewastorailwayexpansioninthe1860s.

143.Marx,Grundrisse,685.144.Marx,Capital,Volume3,425.145.Marx,Capital,Volume3,426.146.Marx,Capital,Volume3,418,“...astheturnoverofcommercialcapitalaccelerates(andthisisalsowherethefunctionofmoneyasmeansofpaymentpredominates,withthedevelopmentofthecreditsystem).”

147.Nash,“OrganizationofTrade,”128–131.148.Mayhew,Sterling,164.149.CitedMarx,Capital,Volume3,532.150.ManchesterGuardian,November24,1847,citedMarx,Capital,Volume3,536–537;clearlybasedonBritishParliamentaryPapers,

SecondReportfromtheSecretCommitteeofCommercialDistress;withtheMinutesofEvidence,August8,1848,118,§7823:“Isnotthisthepracticeofhousesingoodcredit,thattheypurchasegoods,andpayforthembytheirowndrafts:theyselltheirbillsuponLondon,and,bythesaleoftheirbillsuponLondon,drawingupontheirhousesinLondonattenmonths’date,areinaconditiontopurchasegoodswiththeproduceofthosebills:thosegoodsareimmediatelyshippedfromCalcutta;andthebillsofladingaretransmittedoverlandbythesamemailbywhichtheirowndraftsupontheirhousesinLondonaresent:thebillsofladingareinthepossessionofthehousehere;andfromthetimeofacceptingthebills,thebillshaveprobablyeightmonthstorunaftertheirarrivalhere;theyhavethenthebillsofladingintheirpossession;andtheyhavenottopaythebillsrepresentingtheproduceforeightmonthsafterthatperiod;areyouawarethatthathasbeenthesystemcarriedontoagreatextent,andthatthosebillsofladinghavebeenimmediatelyhandedovertoproducebrokers,andthatbillsofexchangehavebeendrawnagainstthosebillsoflading,andthatthosebillsofexchangehavebeendiscountedinLombard-street,andtherebyanenormousamountofcapitalhasbeenraised;andthatmerchantsconnectedwithIndia,andcarryingontradebymeansofthoselong-datedbills,couldgoonforagreatnumberofyears,furnishingthemselveswithanenormousamountofcapitaltotransactbusiness,whentheyhad,infact,norealcapital,providedtheyhadonlycreditinCalcutta”;italicsmine.

151.Milne,TradeandTraders,114.152.Milne,TradeandTraders,129.153.Milne,TradeandTraders,130.154.Vikelas,MyLife(inGreek),pt.2(writtenover1901–7),citedMoutafidou,“DemetriusVikelas,”149–150;italicsmine.155.H.W.vanSanten,“TradebetweenMughalIndiaandtheMiddleEast,andMughalMonetaryPolicy,ca.1600–1660,”inAsianTrade

Routes,ed.KarlReinholdHaellquist(London,1991),87–95,at88–89.156.Nadri,PoliticalEconomyofIndigo,93.157.Marshall,EastIndianFortunes,78.158.Um,MerchantHousesofMocha,44–45.159.PaulLunde,“ArabicSourcesfortheMingVoyages,”inNaturalResourcesandCulturalConnectionsoftheRedSea,eds.J.Starkey,P.Starkey,andT.Wilkinson(Oxford,2007),229–246,at234,citingal-Khazraji’shistoryoftheRasulids.

160.Wong,ChinaTransformed,146–147.161.Wong,ChinaTransformed,53.162.Wong,ChinaTransformed,57–58.163.Wong,ChinaTransformed,39–40.164.Marx,Capital,Volume3,736–737.165.Braudel,OutofItaly,37–38.

166.EngelsinMarx,Capital,Volume3,1040–1041.167.FranzMehring,AbsolutismandRevolutioninGermany,1525–1848(London,1975),1,3;italicsmine.168.Sewell,“EmpireofFashion,”116.169.RonaldLatham,trans.,TheTravelsofMarcoPolo(PenguinBooks,1958),260–261;JillCrystal,OilandPoliticsintheGulf:Rulers

andMerchantsinKuwaitandQatar(Cambridge,1990),37–38.170.CarloPoni,“All’originedelsistemadifabbrica.Tecnologiaeorganizzazioneproduttivadeimulinidasetanell’Italiasettentrionale(sec.xvii–xviii),”RivistaStoricaItaliana,88(1976),444–497.

171.K.M.Stahl,TheMetropolitanOrganizationofBritishColonialTrade(London,1951),chapter4(plantationinterestsofBritishmerchanthousesintheMalayanrubberindustry—fourhundredsterlingcompaniescontrollingestatesmanagedbytheleadingagencyhouses).

172.Fleet,EuropeanandIslamicTrade,136–139;Sturdza,Dictionnairehistoriqueetgénéalogique,224–225(Baltazzi).173.ZdenkoZlatar,Dubrovnik’sMerchantsandCapitalintheOttomanEmpire(1520–1620)(Istanbul,2010),21–24(massiveconcentrationonBelgrade).

174.Doria,“Conoscenzadelmercato,”76–78.175.Harlaftis,HistoryofGreek-OwnedShipping,89–102;GelinaHarlaftis,GreekShipownersandtheState,1945–1975(London,1993);andGelinaHarlaftis,“FromDiasporaTraderstoShippingTycoons:TheVaglianoBros,”BusinessHistoryReview,81(2007),237–68,esp.251–66.

176.Kardasis,DiasporaMerchants,82.177.Vicziany,“BombayMerchants,”185.178.RoyalCommissiononAgricultureinIndia,Volume4:EvidenceTakeninSind(London,HMSO,1927),148.179.EricHobsbawm,TheAgeofEmpire,1875–1914(NewYork,1989),40.180.Hobsbawm,AgeofEmpire,39–42.181.Hobsbawm,AgeofEmpire,60.182.Hobsbawm,AgeofEmpire,50,62.183.EngelsinMarx,Capital,Volume3,620,note8.184.EngelsinMarx,Capital,Volume3,1046–1047.185.G.PorterandH.C.Livesay,MerchantsandManufacturers:StudiesintheChangingStructureofNineteenth-CenturyMarketing(Baltimore,1971),137–144,147.

186.MichaelB.Miller,TheBonMarché:BourgeoisCultureandtheDepartmentStore,1869–1920(London,1981),26–29.187.WalterBenjamin,TheArcadesProject,trans.HowardEilandandKevinMcLaughlin(HarvardUniversityPress,2002),61.188.Miller,BonMarché,26.189.OilandelectricityaresodescribedbyHobsbawm,AgeofEmpire,44.190.ÉmileZola,AuBonheurdesDames(TheLadies’Delight),trans.RobinBuss(PenguinBooks,2001),73–75.ThenoveldepictsthecapitalismofthegrandsmagasinsoftheSecondEmpirewithgreatexuberance,doubtlessbecauseZolabasedhiswritingofiton“extensiveresearchonthedepartmentstoresthemselvesandinformationsuppliedbyexpertwitnesses”(p.xxi,translator’sintroduction).

191.ThebestdescriptionoftheseisPatrickMorlat,“LesréseauxpatronauxfrançaisenIndochine(1918–1928),”inL’espritéconomiqueimpérial(1830–1970),eds.H.Bonin,C.Hodeir,andJ.F.Klein(Paris,2008),615–629.

192.MarcMeuleau,DespionniersenExtrême-Orient.HistoiredelaBanquedel’Indochine(1875–1975)(Paris,1990),155.193.BrocheuxandHémery,Indochina,171;basedonthecalculationsofYasuoGonjo,cf.appendix9,397–98.194.HowardCox,TheGlobalCigarette:OriginsandEvolutionofBritishAmericanTobacco,1880–1945(Oxford,2000),57.195.CainandHopkins,BritishImperialism,435.196.Green,“InfluenceoftheCity,”210;CainandHopkins,BritishImperialism,460–463.MichaelB.Miller,EuropeandtheMaritime

World:ATwentieth-CenturyHistory(Cambridge,2012)pointsoutthat“Britishshippingneverfullyrecoveredfromabandonednetworksandmarketsduringthewar”(p.249).“Asaseafaringnation,Britainneverrecoveredfromthiswartimeexperience”(237).Ontheotherhand,thewarhadanevenmoredevastatingeffectonGermanmerchantshipping,withhalfofGermany’smerchantmarinedisappearing.German(andDutchandotherContinental)tradingfirmsfigureprominentlyinMiller’sfascinatingaccountofthewayports,andshippingandtradingcompanies,builtnetworksthatwereessentially“Eurocentricintheirconstructionbutjoinedineveryseawithindigenousshippingandtradingcircles”(209).Crucially,thewar“couldnoteradicateallthecosmopolitanconnectionsestablishedoverprecedingdecades”(235),and“globalization,viewedfromamaritimeperspective,remaineddeeplyentrenchedthroughoutthe(twentieth)century”(11;italicsmine).

Appendix

1.SubhiLabib,“CapitalisminMedievalIslam,”JournaloftheEconomicandSocialHistoryoftheOrient,29(1969),79–96.2.HilalInalcik,“CapitalFormationintheOttomanEmpire,”JournalofEconomicHistory,29(1969),97–140.3.AbdelazizDuri,ArabischeWirtschaftsgeschichte,trans.J.Jacobi(Zurich,1979).4.RobertMantran,IstanbuldanslasecondemoitiéduXVIIsiècle:essaid’histoireinstitutionelle,économiqueetsociale(Paris,1962),428,“lesélémentscapitalistessusceptiblesdeprocéderàdesachatsengrandesquantités,”onwholesalersinwheatandlivestockproducts.

5.E.g.,FernandBraudel,TheMediterraneanandtheMediterraneanWorldintheAgeofPhilipII,2vols.(London,1975),vol.1,548–549.6.BaberJohansen,“CommercialExchangeandSocialOrderinHanafiteLaw,”inLawandtheIslamicWorld:PastandPresent,eds.ChristopherTollandJakobSkovgaard-Petersen(Copenhagen,1995),81–95,at90.

7.TheKitābal-Maghāzīofal-Wāqidī,ed.MarsdenJones,vol.1(London,1966),197.8.SubhiLabib,HandelsgeschichteÄgyptensimSpatmittelalter(1171–1517)(Wiesbaden,1965),120.9.MaximeRodinson,IslamandCapitalism,trans.BrianPearce(PenguinBooks,1977),34,56.10.Rodinson,IslamandCapitalism,51–52.11.MohamedOuerfelli,Lesucre.Production,commercialisationetusagesdansleMéditerrannéemédiévale(Leiden,2008).ThroughoutthismonographOuerfellirefersto“entrepreneurs,”“businessmen”(hommesd’affaires),“industrialenterprises,”“substantialsumsofcapital”(importantscapitaux),and“capitalinvestments”butavoidstheterm“capitalism”andomitsanydiscussionofthetheoreticalissueraisedbyRodinson’sbook.

12.Rodinson,IslamandCapitalism,x,“Mybookis,then,ofatheoreticalcharacter.”13.Ouerfelli,Sucre,56,73–74,79,84,89ff.,98.14.Rodinson,IslamandCapitalism,53.15.MaximeRodinson,MarxismandtheMuslimWorld,trans.MichaelPallis(NewYork,1981),151.16.Labib,HandelsgeschichteÄgyptens,280.17.MaximeRodinson,Muhammad,trans.AnneCarter(London,2002),98,146(“arecognitionofthevalueoftheindividualpersonality”).

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Shahrur(Leiden,etc.,2009),andMahmoudSadriandAhmadSadri,eds.,Reason,FreedomandDemocracyinIslam:EssentialWritingsofAbdolkarimSoroush(NewYork,2000).

INDEX

‘Abdal-‘AzizDuri,125‘Abdal-Rahmanal-Kawākibi,133,138Abrahamian,Ervand,135AbuHanīfa,128AbuZayd,137Abulafia,David,21Acre,16,38Aden,65,66,100,119advances,57,60,61,69,97,103,104,107,109,115Aegean,dividedup,31,35Agencyhouses,63,64,66,67–68,70,110AhmadZaynal-Din/Zainuddin,41–42,133Albuquerque,Afonsode,40,41,42Alexandria,15–16,21,25,81–84,104,127bombarded,78Greekeconomicdominance,82–83Jewishquarter,83QuartierGrec,83AlexandriaGeneralProduceAssociation,82Algeria,135,136AliAnsari,135AliRahnema,137AliShari‘ati,134Almería,130,131Almoravids,131Amalfi,30,36–37Amsterdam,26,47,49,114Anastassiadou,Méropi,80Anatolia,carpetsfrom,37,96Anderson,Perry,8AndrewYuleandCompany,70,71Angeli,Stefano,100Antwerp,21,26,47Arabculturalmodernity,137–138aratdars(wholesalebrokers),112Argentinewheat,24,101aristocracy,involvementintrade,34Armenians,19,22–23Assamtea,75Atlantic,24,26–27,39–40,46,64Atlantictrades,10,55,63,101England’sstakein,54–55,58–59Aydhab,38Bagchi,Amiya,72Baghdad,29,130Bahnasātextiles,131Balard,Michel,114BalmerLawrie,71–72

Baltazzi,80Balticgraintrade,114baniacastes,2BankofEngland,116banks,116,118bankers’bills,131Banquedel’Indochine,113,123Barbadosplanters,27,55Barbosa,Duarte,18,39Barda‘,rawsilkfrom,20barter,50,56,57Basra,17,18,45,130,131Baudelaire,Charles,123Baytal-Faqih,coffeemarket,22Beckert,Sven12Beirut25,81,101,106Benachi,Emmanuel,82–83Benares,23Bengal,dadanmerchants,61Bengaljutetrade,organizationof,111–112Benjamin,Walter,123BenjaminofTudela,30Berg,Maxine,113Berman,Marshall,136Bernstein,Henry,44Bharadwaj,Krishna,111Bhattias,18billsofexchange25–28,109speculationin,116–117billsoflading,117BirdandHeilgers,70BlackSea,24,32–33,34,35,37,75Blunt,Wilfrid,77Bombay,3,66,69,73,79,101,109BombayBurmahTradingCorporation,66–67,76,77botteghe,90branchorganization,79,82–83,96,121Braudel,Fernand,7,38–39,46,89,104,114,125,133Brazilcoffee,75,76,101,106Brenner,Robert,53,55,133Brewer,John6,59Britishmercantilecapitalism,72,76,124commercialfirms,74imperialaggression,77invisibleincome,124privatecapital,62–63“Treasurymodel”,76–77,124brokers,41,60,61,102–107Bruges,25BuenosAires24,74Bulaq,131Bohn,Frédéric,104

BullingerPool,103–104Burmateak/rice,75,76,101,103,113Burma,annexationof,77buyingpools,103–104Bythell,Duncan,88Byzantines,oppressionbyItalians,31–32Byzantiumeconomiccapitulation,32–33Genoesedominance,33–34last2½centuriesof,33reactionunderKomnenoi,32Cain,P.J.,6Cairo,18,19–20,22,29,40,104,130,131,Calcutta,27,63,64,67,69,71,79,98,110,112,119calicoes,55,60Calicut18–19,39,40,41,104Calvinism,7Candia,38capital,notionsof,1–3,126capitalistdomesticindustries,85Carrière,Charles,7,26Carus-Wilson,Eleanor,88casadosofCochin,44Cavafy,CP.,84Ceuta,20Chapman,Stanley,70Chayanov,A.V.12–13,99Chaudhuri,K.N.,59Child,Josiah,48–49childlabor,97China,66,119–120Cholonpaddymerchants,112–113Choremi,BenachiandCompany,82Chowdhury,Benoy,110Ciompirevolt,91circulationofcapital,15,108circulatingcapital,92Clapham,John,85“classesofcapital”,44–45,55Cochin,41,44Cochinchina,ricetrade,112–113Coen,J.P.,51coffee20,22,24,51,75,99,119Colbert,Jean-Baptiste,47,52combinedaccumulation,105–106commercialcapitaldominationofagriculture,12statebackingfor,40,48,120,133subordinationtoindustrialcapital,28,122,124versatility,120–121commercialinformation,massivevolumeof,121commercialinterests,conglomerationof,108–109,112

commissionagents,28,58,71,101commissionsystem,26–27,63CommunistManifesto,125,136Compagniefrançaised’Afriqueoccidentale(CFAO),101,103,104competition,43,48,92,95,100,103,107,119,122Dutch/English,47,48,52,53French/Dutch,52French/English,58Ottoman/Portuguese,45Portugal/Venice,46Venice/Genoa,33,34,35,37concentrationofcapital,54,56,93,100–101concentrationofmanufacturingcapital,implicationsof,122–123Constantinople/Istanbul,25,29–30,79,80,130carpetmerchants,97SpanishJewsin,17Tabrizimerchantsin,96VenetianQuarter,16contractors,103coral,internationaltradein,20Coromandel,Dutchexportsfrom,51,62cosmopolitanism,19,72–74,77,82,83124“country”trade,51,62Cracco,Giorgio,100Crete,Venetiansin,16Crystal,Jill,135Cyprus,38Damascus,2Danzig,21Datini,FrancescodiMarco,91Davis,Ralph,50DentandCompany,101departmentstores,123designers,94–95Dias,ManuelNunes,7diversification,100Dobb,Maurice3–5,11Doren,Alfred,90,92Dubrovnik,121Dundee,112Dutchcapital,strengthof,49Dutchcommercialstrategy,49,51DutchEastIndiaCompany(VOC),9,49,51–52largestAsiantrader,51startingcapital,47strongernexuswithstate,49–50E.HillandCompany,97–98economiesofscale,104Edwards,Cecil,97Egypt,66,75,134,136cotton,82–83occupationof,77–78

Embiricos,121Engels,Frederick,10,73,115,120,122England,outworkin,88Englishcommerceimporttrades,54interlockingstructure,53–54re-exports,54–55surpluson“invisibles”,57,76–77textiles,100EnglishEastIndiaCompany,2–3,27,54,55,59–61,64,114Bengalbrokers,104riskbornebyIndianmerchants,60Suratfactory,107exports,gearedtoimports,54factory,15,40,59Farrukhabad,110FesserandCompany,73Fez,20,130Fieldhouse,David,103,106,107,115fixedcapital,92Florence,21,87,89–92silkindustry,92–93Foochow,24,ForbesandForbes,71force,useof,41–42FrancedominationofLevant,53,57,58,78subjectionofAlgeria,134Frenchfinancecapital,66,124funduq,15–16,130Fuggers,26,43,46,62Gallipoli,21–22Gayot,Gérard,91Genoa/Genoese,16,20,26,31,33,35,37,120Genoesebankers,100–101Gilbart,J.W.,116Gladstone,WilliamEwart,78Glasgowtobaccotrade,114–115Godart,Justin,93GoldCoastcocoa,75,115GoldenHorn,30Goldie,SirGeorge,102Goldthwaite,Richard,89,92Gramsci,Antonio,134Greekdiaspora,79,82Greekmerchants/merchanthouses,17,30–31,73,78–84,121Chianorigin,79–80declineof,118Greekmiddlemen,106–107Guangzhou(Canton),15,27,68Guicciardini,Francesco,46Gujarat,27

Gujaratimerchants,119Gulfcapitalism,135–136GulfCooperationCouncil(GCC),foreignassets,135Hanafīschooloflaw,128Hanieh,Adam,135HarrisonsandCrosfield(H&C),70,71Hilālal-Sābi,130Hilferding,Rudolf,70,85Hobsbawm,Eric,121–122HongKong,68Hopkins,A.G.,6Hormuz,45,46Hull,101Hume,David,48Hume,Alexander,61hundis,26,27IbnBattuta,39IbnHauqal,131IbnJubayr,16,38IbnKhaldūn,126,129,130al-Idrīsī,20,131Ilbert,Robert,82imperialism,121–122,123Inalcik,Halil,125India,competitivemarkets,62India,exports,75indigenousmerchantcapitals,106marginalized,134indigo,20,22–23,63,67Asiandominancein,119productionof,110IndochinaChinesetradinghouses,112–113Frenchinterestsin,123industrialcapital,122,123–124Ingham,Geoffrey,6Iran,22,97,135Isfahan,19Islamandcapitalism,125–138andmodernism,133expansioninIndianOcean,39politicalmanipulationof,136–137Islamiclaw,128,132Islamism,137Islamists,136Israel,Jonathan,47,53Italiancapital,crisisof,46Jamaicanestates,58JamesFinlayandCompany,69–70,71Jardine,William,68JardineMathesonandCompany,68–69,106

Jardine,SkinnerandCompany,69Jardines,66,69al-Jazari,37“jealousyoftrade”,48Jedda22,Jeejeebhoy,Jamsetjee,68Jefferson,Thomas,59Jewishmerchants,17,24,58,104Johansen,Baber,128JohnTzetzes,30jointstockcompanies,48jute,71jutebrokers,111,112Kabir,2Kabul,20Kano,103,105Karachi,25,75,76Karimimerchants,100,126Kasimbazar,61,62Kassir,Samir,136–137khan,130–131Khayral-Dinal-Tunisi,133Khomeini,Ruhollah,134,136merchantsasbase,135Kidron,Michael,70–71Kilwa,23,39,41Kingston,23,Kitroeff,Alexander,73Kriedte,Peter,7Kynaston,David,78Labib,Subhi,125,126,131Lacoste,Yves,129Lahore,19Laiou,Angeliki,36Lascelles,59Lebanesebrokers,106Lebanesefirms,73Lefebvre,Georges,11LeFevour,Edward,69LeHavre,24Leiden,52Lemerle,Paul,33Lenin,V.I.,8LevantCompany,54,55,56decimationin18thcentury,57–58Lever,William,102LeverBrothers,102liberalism,122Lis,Catharina,7Lisbon,2,17,21,44Liu,Tessie,88Liverpool,23–24,75,101

Livorno,56localmerchantcapitalists,62London,17,80,86,97Acceptancehouses,27,28colonialmerchants,55Greekmerchanthousesin,17moneymarket,27–28tobaccotrade,101Londonhouses,speculationby,117Louisiana,108Luanda,23Lyashchenko,P.I.,115Lynn,Martin,104–105Lyonssilkindustry,10–11,93–95Macaulay,ThomasBabington,111Mahdia,131al-mal,1,126Malabarcoast,38,39,100Malacca,19,40–41Mamlukrulers,100,127managingagencies,66,67,69–72amonglargestcorporategroupsinIndia,70andCityfirms,71Manchester,73Mansel,Philip,83Mantran,Robert,125Manucci,Niccolao,19Mappilas,44Marler,Scott,8Marseilles,17,26,58,78MartinBurn,70Marx,Karl,3,8–11,25,28,72,85,86,88,100,107,116,122,123,125,132,136Masqat,18massproductionincountryside,87al-Maqrizi,38al-Mas‘ūdī,131Masulipatnam,62Mawdudi,134Mazara,21Mehring,Franz,120Melis,Federigo,91mercantileestate,widespreadinIslamicworld,126mercantilemodernism,121mercantilism,52–53,132–133merchantmanufacturing,89–98integrationofcontrol,86–87,91merchantshippingAsian,119Dutch,50English,54expansionin1890–1914,122Greek-owned,78,121

merchant’scapital,gradientacrossMiddleEast,135mergers,95,102Meuleau,Marc,123middlemen,24,60,90,99,102,103,104,105,106,112,115Mielants,Eric,132Milan,100Miller,Joseph,7Milne,Graeme,118Mirzapur,23,97–98Mississippi,108Mocha,22,119modernity,121Molà,Luca,100monopoly,drivefor,42Morgan,WalkerandCompany,111MortezaMotahhari,134–135MountLebanon,81Mousnier,Roland,7Muhammad(Prophet),126,128MuhammadAli,Greekfriendsof,81Mun,Thomas,56MuslimBrotherhood,134Muslimworld,failureofmoderncapitalism,132–133Mustafa‘Ali,2Nagasaki,51Naples,21–22,36,101NasirKhusraw,131Nasser,GamalAbdel,125,137NavigationActs,47,52,54networks,15,17–18,39,41,47,62,78,80,95,103,121newcapitalistmodernity,122NewOrleans,23,108NewYork,66,79,96,97,98,108Niebuhr,Carsten,18NigerCompany,102Nigeriangroundnuts,105nineteenth-centurytradeexpansion,23,74–75Nishapur,130,131Nizan,Paul,65,66,83Noordegraaf,Leo,7Odessa,24,78–79,80,121Oikonomidès,Nicolas,32,36oliveoil,20,21–22,37,101opium,66,68–69,75,76,101,107–108OpiumWars,59,68,77OrientalCarpetManufacturers(OCM),95–98Ormrod,David,7Ottomanempire,26,80Ottomans,offeroffreetradeagreement,45Ouerfelli,Mohamed,127outwork,85–86,87,88,95over-trading,116–117

Pachymeres,George,33–34Palermo,16,130palmoiltrade,23,75,101,103,104Palmer,John,67–68Palmerston,Lord,74,77Parisfashionmarket,94–95Patras,22peasantdispossession,111,112peasantfarms,12pepper,2,38,41,43capitalistinvolvementin,44noPortuguesemonopoly,42–43PeirceLeslieandCompany,99,106Pera,16–17,30,35,37,79,80Peruzzi,Florentinebankers,1–2Phanariots,79PhippsBrothersandCompany,76Pires,Tomé,18,19planters,debttomerchants,59Pokrovsky,M.N.,3,4,5,8Poni,Carlo,86,87,93,95Portuguesecommerce,39–46expansion,39–41self-financingmodel,42targetingofMuslimnetworks,41–42,133Portuguese,fearofcompetition,45preciousmetals,50pricedomination,43producetrades,102chainsin,107–113productdifferentiation,94–95“proto-industry”,87,120putting-outsystem,4,10,11,85–89qaysariyya,130Rabb,Theodore,100Raccah,Saul,105racism,83Rallis/RalliBrothers,24,74,78,79,80,81,98,105,112,118,121Rallis,Theodore,82Rangoon,24–25Richelieu,Cardinalde,53Roberts,Lewis,2–3,17,56Rodinson,Maxime,125,126–128Rodocanachi,78,80Roover,Raymondde,89,92Rosario,24Rothschild,N.M.,73rubber,71,75,101rulers,jealousofcapitalists,129–130Rushdie,Salman,defenseofinArabworld,137Russia,9,12Ruthven,Malise,132

SaadallahWannous,138SadiqJalalal-Azm,137–138Saigon,riceexports,75,113Salonica/Thessaloniki,17,23,36,79Santos,106al-Sarakhsī,128Sartre,J.-P.,8Sassoons,66,69,73–74,101scale,andflexibility,99SchilizziandCompany,80Schmoller,Gustavvon,48Senegalgroundnuts,75,104Seville,20Sewell,WilliamH.,93–94shari‘a,136,137Sharaybifamily,22al-Shaybānī,128–129Shenton,Robert,7,8,102,105Sind,17,77,121Singapore,71slavelabor,109slavemarkets,23slavery,6,9,59slaves,23,27,108Smith,Adam,48Smith,Samuel,109Smyrna(Izmir),17,52–53,79,80–81,95Sohar,17–18Soly,Hugo,7SpartaliandCompany,73Stalin,Joseph,4state,&capital,48–49statepower,useofforcommercialends,53SteelBrothersandCompany,72,112Strozzi,89SouthCarolina,27SouthernCalabria,rawsilkfrom,37SuezCanal,67,115,117,122sugar,27,38,51,55,58–59,73,127,129–130Sumatra,camphorfrom,20Suratbankers,27Syria,silkproduction,66Tabarcacoralmarket,20Tabriz,96Tawney,R.H.,4–6,7telegraph,66,118,122Temple,SirWilliam,49,52Thomaz,LuísFilipe,40,43al-Tifashi,21tiraz/turuz,131tobacco,23,54–55,101,114–115,124Tognetti,Sergio,7–8,89,90

tradingcolonies,15–20transport,115–116Trimi,Katerina,83Tunis,16,130Turgot,Anne-Robert-Jacques,3,113–114Turkishmerchants,22,119turnoverofcommercialcapital,116Unilever,102UnitedAfricaCompany(UAC),101,102,103,105,107,115USSouth,chainincotton,108–109unpaidfamilylabor,94,110use-value,roleof,116VaglianoBrothers,66,121VascodaGama,39velocityofcapitalcirculation,99,113–118,123Venetianmude,114Venetianspicemonopoly,breakingof,46Venetians,16,25,31,34,37,56,100,104Venice,2,21,25–26,120,131Levanttradeof,38–39,46Verlagnetworks,62Verlagsystem,7verticalcapitalistconcentration,12–13verticalintegration,49,69,99,102,121Veyssarat,Beatrice,7Vikelas,Dimitrios,80,118Vilar,Pierre,7Villani,Giovanni,90VolkartBrothers,99,105,121WallaceandCompany,66–67,77weavers,10,11,96drivetocontrol,61,93inFlorence,91WestAfrica,101,102,104brokers,104–105WestIndies,27,55,101westernIndia,chainincotton,109wholesalemarkets,20–25Williams,Eric,6,Wong,J.Y.,76Wong,RoyBin,7,119–120woolenindustry,89–92Wynn,Antony,97Zahedieh,Nuala,55Zarifi,80Zola,Émile,123Zubaida,Sami,128,129

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ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

Jairus Banaji spent most of his academic life at Oxford. He has been a research associate in theDepartmentofDevelopmentStudies,SOAS,UniversityofLondon,forthepastseveralyears.HeistheauthorofAgrarianChange inLateAntiquity,TheoryasHistory—forwhichhewon the IsaacandTamaraDeutscherMemorialPrize—andnumerousothervolumesandarticles.

Contents

1. ReinstatingCommercialCapitalism2. TheInfrastructureofCommercialCapitalism3. TheCompetitionofCapitals:StrugglesforCommercialDominancefromthe

TwelfthtoEighteenthCenturies4. BritishMercantileCapitalismandtheCosmopolitanismoftheNineteenth

Century5. CommercialPractices:Putting-OutortheCapitalistDomesticIndustries6. TheCirculationofCommercialCapitalism:Competition,Velocity,

Verticality7. Appendix:IslamandCapitalism8. Acknowledgments9. notes10. SelectBibliography