987 Barredo vs Garcia

7/23/2019 987 Barredo vs Garcia

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-Republic of the Philippines-

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-!""# $ul% !& '()

*AUSTO BARRE+O& petitione,&

s.

SEER/NO GARC/A an0 T/MOTEA ALMAR/O& ,espon0ents.

Cele0onio P. Glo,ia an0 Antonio Ba,,e0o fo, petitione,.

$ose G. A0incula fo, ,espon0ents.

BOCOBO& $.1

This case co2es up f,o2 the Cou,t of Appeals 3hich hel0 the petitione,

he,ein& *austo Ba,,e0o& liable in 0a2a4es fo, the 0eath of *austino Ga,cia

cause0 b% the ne4li4ence of Pe0,o *ontanilla& a ta5i 0,ie, e2plo%e0 b% sai0

*austo Ba,,e0o.

At about half past one in the 2o,nin4 of Ma% 6& '(6#& on the ,oa0 bet3een

Malabon an0 Naotas& P,oince of Ri7al& the,e 3as a hea0-on collision

bet3een a ta5i of the Malate Ta5icab 0,ien b% Pe0,o *ontanilla an0 a

ca,,etela 4ui0e0 b% Pe0,o +i2apalis. The ca,,etela 3as oe,tu,ne0& an0 one

of its passen4e,s& '#-%ea,-ol0 bo% *austino Ga,cia& suffe,e0 in8u,ies f,o23hich he 0ie0 t3o 0a%s late,. A c,i2inal action 3as file0 a4ainst *ontanilla in

the Cou,t of *i,st /nstance of Ri7al& an0 he 3as conicte0 an0 sentence0 to an

in0ete,2inate sentence of one %ea, an0 one 0a% to t3o %ea,s of p,ision

co,,eccional. The cou,t in the c,i2inal case 4,ante0 the petition that the ,i4ht

to b,in4 a sepa,ate ciil action be ,ese,e0. The Cou,t of Appeals affi,2e0 the

sentence of the lo3e, cou,t in the c,i2inal case. See,ino Ga,cia an0 Ti2otea

Al2a,io& pa,ents of the 0ecease0 on Ma,ch 9& '(6(& b,ou4ht an action in the

Cou,t of *i,st /nstance of Manila a4ainst *austo Ba,,e0o as the sole

p,op,ieto, of the Malate Ta5icab an0 e2plo%e, of Pe0,o *ontanilla. On $ul%!& '(6(& the Cou,t of *i,st /nstance of Manila a3a,0e0 0a2a4es in fao, of

the plaintiffs fo, P)&""" plus le4al inte,est f,o2 the 0ate of the co2plaint. This

0ecision 3as 2o0ifie0 b% the Cou,t of Appeals b% ,e0ucin4 the 0a2a4es to

P'&""" 3ith le4al inte,est f,o2 the ti2e the action 3as institute0. /t is

un0ispute0 that *ontanilla :s ne4li4ence 3as the cause of the 2ishap& as he



3as 0,iin4 on the 3,on4 si0e of the ,oa0& an0 at hi4h spee0. As to Ba,,e0o:s

,esponsibilit%& the Cou,t of Appeals foun01

... /t is a02itte0 that 0efen0ant is *ontanilla:s e2plo%e,. The,e is p,oof

that he e5e,cise0 the 0ili4ence of a 4oo0 fathe, of a fa2il% to p,eent

0a2a4e. ;See p. ))& appellant:s b,ief.< /n fact it is sho3n he 3as ca,eless

in e2plo%in4 *ontanilla 3ho ha0 been cau4ht see,al ti2es fo, iolation

of the Auto2obile La3 an0 spee0in4 ;E5hibit A< = iolation 3hich

appea,e0 in the ,eco,0s of the Bu,eau of Public >o,?s aailable to be

public an0 to hi2self. The,efo,e& he 2ust in0e2nif% plaintiffs un0e, the

p,oisions of a,ticle '("6 of the Ciil Co0e.

The 2ain theo,% of the 0efense is that the liabilit% of *austo Ba,,e0o is

4oe,ne0 b% the Reise0 Penal Co0e@ hence& his liabilit% is onl% subsi0ia,%&

an0 as the,e has been no ciil action a4ainst Pe0,o *ontanilla& the pe,sonc,i2inall% liable& Ba,,e0o cannot be hel0 ,esponsible in the case. The

petitione,:s b,ief states on pa4e '"1

... The Cou,t of Appeals hol0s that the petitione, is bein4 sue0 fo, his

failu,e to e5e,cise all the 0ili4ence of a 4oo0 fathe, of a fa2il% in the

selection an0 supe,ision of Pe0,o *ontanilla to p,eent 0a2a4es

suffe,e0 b% the ,espon0ents. /n othe, 3o,0s& The Cou,t of Appeals

insists on appl%in4 in the case a,ticle '("6 of the Ciil Co0e. A,ticle

'("6 of the Ciil Co0e is foun0 in Chapte, //& Title '#& Boo? / of the

Ciil Co0e. This fact 2a?es sai0 a,ticle to a ciil liabilit% a,isin4 f,o2 ac,i2e as in the case at ba, si2pl% because Chapte, // of Title '# of Boo?

/ of the Ciil Co0e& in the p,ecise 3o,0s of a,ticle '("6 of the Ciil

Co0e itself& is applicable onl% to those ;obli4ations< a,isin4 f,o2

3,on4ful o, ne4li4ent acts o, co22ission not punishable b% la3.

The 4ist of the 0ecision of the Cou,t of Appeals is e5p,esse0 thus1

... >e cannot a4,ee to the 0efen0ant:s contention. The liabilit% sou4ht to

be i2pose0 upon hi2 in this action is not a ciil obli4ation a,isin4 f,o2

a felon% o, a 2is0e2eano, ;the c,i2e of Pe0,o *ontanilla&<& but an

obli4ation i2pose0 in a,ticle '("6 of the Ciil Co0e b% ,eason of his

ne4li4ence in the selection o, supe,ision of his se,ant o, e2plo%ee.

The piotal uestion in this case is 3hethe, the plaintiffs 2a% b,in4 this

sepa,ate ciil action a4ainst *austo Ba,,e0o& thus 2a?in4 hi2 p,i2a,il% an0

0i,ectl%& ,esponsible un0e, a,ticle '("6 of the Ciil Co0e as an e2plo%e, of



Pe0,o *ontanilla. The 0efen0ant 2aintains that *ontanilla:s ne4li4ence bein4

punishable b% the Penal Co0e& his ;0efen0ant:s< liabilit% as an e2plo%e, is

onl% subsi0ia,%& acco,0in4 to sai0 Penal co0e& but *ontanilla has not been

sue0 in a ciil action an0 his p,ope,t% has not been e5hauste0. To 0eci0e the

2ain issue& 3e 2ust cut th,ou4h the tan4le that has& in the 2in0s of 2an%

confuse0 an0 8u2ble0 to4ethe, 0elitos an0 cuasi 0elitos& o, c,i2es un0e, the

Penal Co0e an0 fault o, ne4li4ence un0e, a,ticles '(")-'('" of the Ciil Co0e.

This shoul0 be 0one& because 8ustice 2a% be lost in a lab%,inth& unless

p,inciples an0 ,e2e0ies a,e 0istinctl% enisa4e0. *o,tunatel%& 3e a,e ai0e0 in

ou, inui,% b% the lu2inous p,esentation of the pe,ple5in4 sub8ect b% ,eno3n

8u,ists an0 3e a,e li?e3ise 4ui0e0 b% the 0ecisions of this Cou,t in p,eious

cases as 3ell as b% the sole2n cla,it% of the consi0e,ation in see,al sentences

of the Sup,e2e T,ibunal of Spain.

Autho,ities suppo,t the p,oposition that a uasi-0elict o, culpa auiliana isa sepa,ate le4al institution un0e, the Ciil Co0e 3ith a substantiit% all its

o3n& an0 in0ii0ualit% that is enti,el% apa,t an0 in0epen0ent f,o2 0elict o,

c,i2e. Upon this p,inciple an0 on the 3o,0in4 an0 spi,it a,ticle '("6 of the

Ciil Co0e& the p,i2a,% an0 0i,ect ,esponsibilit% of e2plo%e,s 2a% be safel%

ancho,e0.

The pe,tinent p,oisions of the Ciil Co0e an0 Reise0 Penal Co0e a,e as

follo3s1

C//L CO+E

ART. '"!( Obli4ations a,ise f,o2 la3& f,o2 cont,acts an0 uasi-

cont,acts& an0 f,o2 acts an0 o2issions 3hich a,e unla3ful o, in 3hich

an% ?in0 of fault o, ne4li4ence inte,enes.

5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

ART. '"(). Ciil obli4ations a,isin4 f,o2 felonies o, 2is0e2eano,s shall

be 4oe,ne0 b% the p,oisions of the Penal Co0e.

ART. '"(6. Those 3hich a,e 0e,ie0 f,o2 acts o, o2issions in 3hich

fault o, ne4li4ence& not punishable b% la3& inte,enes shall be sub8ect to

the p,oisions of Chapte, //& Title / of this boo?.

5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5



ART '("). An% pe,son 3ho b% an act o, o2ission causes 0a2a4e to

anothe, b% his fault o, ne4li4ence shall be liable fo, the 0a2a4e so 0one.

ART. '("6. The obli4ation i2pose0 b% the ne5t p,ece0in4 a,ticle is

enfo,cible& not onl% fo, pe,sonal acts an0 o2issions& but also fo, those of

pe,sons fo, 3ho2 anothe, is ,esponsible.

The fathe, an0 in& case of his 0eath o, incapacit%& the 2other, are liable

for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.

Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons

subject to their authority and living with them.

Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for

any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the

service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their

duties.

The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special

agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon

whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case

the provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.

inally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages

caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.

The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons

mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good

father of a family to prevent the damage.

!"T. #$%&. !ny person who pays for damage caused by his employees may

recover from the latter what he may have paid.

"'()S'* +'!- O*'

!"T. #%%. ivil liability of a person guilty of felony. / 'very person

criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

!"T. #%#. "ules regarding civil liability in certain cases. / The exemption

from criminal liability established in subdivisions #, 0, 1, 2, and 3 of article



#0 and in subdivision & of article ## of this ode does not include exemption

from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules4

irst. )n cases of subdivision, #, 0 and 1 of article #0 the civil liability for

acts committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under

nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who

has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having such person

under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no

fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his

authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said

insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting

property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second. )n cases falling within subdivision & of article ##, the person for

whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in

proportion to the benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for

which each one shall be liable.

5hen the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately,

or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the

inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been causedwith the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made

in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Third . )n cases falling within subdivisions 2 and 3 of article #0, the persons using

violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there

be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter

that part of their property exempt from execution.

!"T. #%0. Subsidiary civil liability of inn6eepers, tavern 6eepers and

proprietors of establishment . / )n default of persons criminally liable,inn6eepers, tavern 6eepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be

civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where

a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police

regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.



)nn6eepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods ta6en by

robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the

payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in

advance the inn6eeper himself, or the person representing him, of the

deposit of such goods within the inn7 and shall furthermore have followed

the directions which such inn6eeper or his representative may have given

them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. o liability

shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against

or intimidation of persons unless committed by the inn6eeper8s employees.

!"T. #%1. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons . / The subsidiary

liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to

employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any 6ind of

industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, wor6men,

apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

x x x x x x x x x

!"T. 132. )mprudence and negligence. / !ny person who, by rec6less

imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would

constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its

maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period7 if it would

have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its

minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.

!ny person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act

which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of

arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods7 if it would have

constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum

period shall be imposed.9

)t will thus be seen that while the terms of articles #$%0 of the ivil ode seem to

be broad enough to cover the driver8s negligence in the instant case, nevertheless

article #%$1 limits cuasi:delitos to acts or omissions 9not punishable by law.9 ;ut

inasmuch as article 132 of the "evised +enal ode punishes not only rec6less but

even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article #$%0

of the ivil ode has apparently been crowded out. )t is this overlapping that

ma6es the 9confusion worse confounded.9 <owever, a closer study shows that such

a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction

between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi:



delitos or culpa extra:contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may

produce civil liability arising from a crime under article #%% of the "evised +enal

ode, or create an action for cuasi:delito or culpa extra:contractual under articles

#$%0:#$#% of the ivil ode.

The individuality of cuasi:delito or culpa extra:contractual looms clear and

unmista6able. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors

being the -ex !quilia in the "oman -aw. )n fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this

responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The +artidas also contributed

to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the ivil ode7 for

instance, -aw 3, Title #2, of +artida =, says4 9Tenudo es de fa>er emienda, porque,

como quier que el non fi>o a sabiendas en da?o al otro, pero acaescio por su

culpa.9

The distinctive nature of cuasi:delitos survives in the ivil ode. !ccording toarticle #%@$, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi:

delito or culpa extra:contractual 4 9los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier

genero de culpa o negligencia.9 Then article #%$1 provides that this 6ind of

obligation shall be governed by hapter )) of Title A() of ;oo6 )(, meaning

articles #$%0:%$#%. This portion of the ivil ode is exclusively devoted to the

legal institution of culpa aquiliana .

Some of the differences between crimes under the +enal ode and the culpa

aquiliana or cuasi:delito under the ivil ode are4

#. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi:delitos are only of private

concern.

0. That, consequently, the +enal ode punishes or corrects the criminal act, while

the ivil ode, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

1. That delicts are not as broad as quasi:delicts, because the former are punished

only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi:delitos ,

include all acts in which 9any 6ind of fault or negligence intervenes.9 <owever, it

should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws,

infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. BSee olin and apitant,

9urso 'lemental de *erecho ivil,9 (ol. 1, p. [email protected]



-et us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi:

delicts and the employer8s primary and direct liability under article #$%1 of the

ivil ode.

*orado Dontero in his essay on 9"esponsibilidad9 in the 9'nciclopedia Euridica

'spa?ola9 B(ol. AA()), p. &#&C says4

'l concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y

comprende a diferentes personas. !si, existe una responsabilidad civil

propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad

criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que

nace de todo delito o falta.9

The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and

comprises different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly spea6ing, which in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and

another which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of

every felony or misdemeanor.9

Daura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case4 There had

been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to the errocarril

antabrico and the errocarril del orte. !n employee of the latter had been

prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as

subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the

criminal case, and the employer, the errocarril del orte, had also beenexonerated. The question as6ed was whether the errocarril antabrico could still

bring a civil action for damages against the errocarril del orte. Daura8s

opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part BDaura, *ictamenes , (ol. 3, pp. 2##:

2#1C4

Fuedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los

hechos , todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa ju>gada acerca de

la obligacion civil de indemni>ar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por

el choque de los trenes. 'l titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el

resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles

nacidas de delito , siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada

de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas.

-a lesion causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere

restituciones, reparaciones o indemni>aciones, que cual la pena misma

ata?en al orden publico7 por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario,



al Dinisterio iscal7 y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los

quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido

desagravio7 pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la

diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemni>acion.

'stas, para el caso actual Bprescindiendo de culpas contractuales , que no

vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimenC, dimanan, segun el articulo

#$%0 del odigo ivil, de toda accion u omision, causante de da?os o

perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. 's trivial que acciones

semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente,

sin que la Eusticia punitiva tenga que me>clarse en los asuntos. -os

articulos #@ al 0# y #0# al #0@ del odigo +enal, atentos al espiritu y a los

fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de

responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito , en terminos separados del

regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusiona precedentes legislativos del orpus Euris . Seria intempestivo un paralelo

entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemni>ar a titulo de

culpa civil7 pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones

que en el tal paralelo se notarian.

-os articulos 0% y 0# del odigo +enal, despues de distribuir a su modo las

responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos

culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los

establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes7 pero con

caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que seanresponsables criminalmente . o coincide en ello el odigo ivil, cuyo

articulo #$%1, dice7 -a obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es

exigible , no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas

personas de quienes se debe responder 7 personas en la enumeracion de las

cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o

empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. +or

esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues

de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su

responsabilidad civil por ra>on del delito, son demandadas y condenadasdirecta y aisladamente , cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales

civiles.

Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando

verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia

punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de



fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder,

habiendose, por a?adidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la

ompa?ia del errocarril antabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones,

parece innegable que la de indemni>acion por los da?os y perjuicios que le

irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Eurado, ni fue

sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 0# de

mar>o. !un cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose

mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues

del proceso7 pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad

dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos

ju>gadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege , y se

patenti>a mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece

incolume, extra?a a la cosa ju>gada .

!s things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seemsless tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil

obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of

the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be

confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime , because there exists

in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating

aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The

injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires

restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, li6e the penalty itself,

affect public order7 for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office

of the prosecuting attorney7 and it is clear that if by this means the losses

and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to see6

another relief7 but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar

nature of civil actions to as6 for indemnity.

Such civil actions in the present case Bwithout referring to contractual faults

which are not pertinent and belong to another scopeC are derived, according

to article #$%0 of the ivil ode, from every act or omission causing losses

and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. )t is unimportant that

such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without the criminalcourts interfering therewith. !rticles #@ to 0# and #0# to #0@ of the +enal

ode, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that

ode, develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a

crime , separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is

6nown as aquiliana , in accordance with legislative precedent of the orpus

Euris . )t would be unwarranted to ma6e a detailed comparison between the



former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account

of civil culpa 7 but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such

differences.

!rticles 0% and 0# of the +enal ode, after distriburing in their own way the

civil responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of

felony or misdemeanor, ma6e such civil responsibilities applicable to

enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render service,

but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of the

+enal ode, in default of those who are criminally responsible . )n this

regard, the ivil ode does not coincide because article #$%1 says4 9The

obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only for

personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another

is responsible.9 !mong the persons enumerated are the subordinates and

employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their functions. )t is for this reason that it

happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or

enterprises, after ta6ing part in the criminal cases because of their

subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and

sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation , before the

civil courts.

Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation

between punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our

judicial system, so that they have different fundamental norms in differentcodes, as well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the

ompa?a del errocarril antabrico has abstained from ta6ing part in the

criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems

undeniable that the action for indemnification for the losses and damages

caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del

Eurado , nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the

decision of Darch 0# was rendered. 'ven if the verdict had not been that of

acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately

reserved till after the criminal prosecution7 but because of the declaration of the non:existence of the felony and the non:existence of the responsibility

arising from the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the

Tribunal del Eurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil

obligation ex lege , and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement

remain intact and is not res judicata .



-aurent, a jurist who has written a monumental wor6 on the rench ivil ode, on

which the Spanish ivil ode is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi:

delito or culpa extra:contractual are similar to those of the Spanish ivil ode,

says, referring to article #1@& of the rench ivil ode which corresponds to

article #$%1, Spanish ivil ode4

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible Bfor

anotherC, without including the author of the act. The action against the

principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a

prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the

sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of

the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action7 the action for

responsibility Bof the employerC is in itself a principal action. B-aurent,

+rinciples of rench ivil -aw, Spanish translation, (ol. 0%, pp. =1&:=12.C

!mandi, in his 9uestionario del odigo ivil "eformado9 B(ol. &, pp. &0$, &1%C,

declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. <e

writes4

uestion #. -a responsabilidad declarada en el articulo #$%1 por las

acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es

subsidiaria es principal +ara contestar a esta pregunta es necesario

saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. 's que realmente

se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena !si parece a primera

vista7 pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maximauniversal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de

aquellas que le son imputables. -a responsabilidad de que tratamos se

impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino

por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del

padre, del tutor, del due?o o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc.

uando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado Bmenores

de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendicesC causan un da?o, la ley

presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de

negligencia para prevenir o evitar el da?o. 'sta falta es la que la leycastiga. o hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la

apariencia7 en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. -a

idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto,

completamente inadmisible.



Fuestion o. #. )s the responsibility declared in article #$%1 for the acts or

omissions of those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or

principal )n order to answer this question it is necessary to 6now, in the

first place, on what the legal provision is based. )s it true that there is a

responsibility for the fault of another person )t seems so at first sight7 but

such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that

all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can

be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion

of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi:

delito , that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian,

proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. 5henever

anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to Bminors,

incapacitated persons, employees, apprenticesC causes any damage, the law

presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of

negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. )t is this fault that iscondemned by the law. )t is, therefore, only apparent that there is a

responsibility for the act of another7 in reality the responsibility exacted is

for one8s own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is,

therefore, completely inadmissible.

Oyuelos, in his 9*igesto4 +rincipios, *octrina y Eurisprudencia, "eferentes al

odigo ivil 'spa?ol,9 says in (ol. ()), p. =&14

's decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su

propia culpa, doctrina del articulo #$%07 mas por excepcion, se responde dela ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o

vinculo, que motiva o ra>ona la responsabilidad. 'sta responsabilidad, es

directa o es subsidiaria 'n el orden penal, el odigo de esta clase

distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la

primera Barticulo #$C y subsidiaria la segunda Barticulos 0% y 0#C7 pero en

el orden civil, en el caso del articulo #$%1, ha de entenderse directa, por el

tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente 9por los

actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder.9

That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is

liable only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article #$%07 but, by

exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a

bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. )s this responsibility direct

or subsidiary )n the order of the penal law, the +enal ode distinguishes

between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other



persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct

Barticle #$C, and for the latter, subsidiary Barticles 0% and 0#C7 but in the

scheme of the civil law, in the case of article #$%1, the responsibility should

be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for precisely

it imposes responsibility 9for the acts of those persons for whom one should

be responsible.9

oming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has

upheld the principles above set forth4 that a quasi:delict or culpa extra:

contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil

responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article

#$%1 of the ivil ode, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of

his employee.

One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 0#, #$#%. )n that case, "amon -afuente died as the result of having been run over by a street

car owned by the 9compa?ia 'lectric Dadrile?a de Traccion.9 The conductor was

prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a

civil action against the street car company, paying for damages in the amount of

#2,%%% pesetas. The lower court awarded damages7 so the company appealed to

the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles #$%0 and #$%1 of the ivil

ode because by final judgment the non:existence of fault or negligence had been

declared. The Supreme ourt of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying4

onsiderando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo , al condonar a la compa?ia 'lectrica

Dadrile?a al pago del da?o causado con la muerte de "amon -a fuente

)>quierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria

deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es

lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as

pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su

competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por

no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo

este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa onegligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo

#$%0 del odigo, y que alcan>an, segun el #$%1, netre otras perosnas, a los

*irectores de establecimientos o empresas por los da?os causados por sus

dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil,

al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la

compa?ia recurrente a la indemni>acion del da?o causado por uno de sus



empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el

articulo ##3 de la -ey de 'njuciamiento riminal, se ha atenido

estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion

propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.

onsidering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mista6en

supposition that the trial court, in sentencing the ompa?ia Dadrile?a to

the payment of the damage caused by the death of "amon -afuente

)>quierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of

acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act,

when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had ta6en cogni>ance of the same

act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within

the limits of its authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony

because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the

only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co:existence of fault ornegligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations

according to article #$%0 of the ivil ode , affecting, in accordance with

article #$%1, among other persons, the managers of establishments or

enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees under certain

conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in ta6ing cogni>ance of

the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant

herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its employees ,

far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article ##3 of the

-aw of riminal +rocedure, strictly followed the same, without invading

attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way

contradicting the decision in that cause . B'mphasis supplied.C

)t will be noted, as to the case just cited4

irst . That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the

street car company. This is precisely what happens in the present case4 the driver,

ontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.

Second . That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but

the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co:existence of

fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under

article #$%0 of the ivil ode. )n the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty

of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility

arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages,

and ;arredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. ;ut the



plaintiffs are directly suing ;arredo, on his primary responsibility because of his

own presumed negligence / which he did not overcome / under article #$%1.

Thus, there were two liabilities of ;arredo4 first, the subsidiary one because of the

civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter8s criminal negligence7 and,

second, ;arredo8s primary liability as an employer under article #$%1. The

plaintiffs were free to choose which course to ta6e, and they preferred the second

remedy. )n so doing, they were acting within their rights. )t might be observed in

passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of

relief, because ontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and

besides, he was probably without property which might be sei>ed in enforcing any

judgment against him for damages.

Third . That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 0#, #$#%, the employer

was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee Bthe

conductorC in a previous criminal case, with greater reason should ;arredo, theemployer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against

him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the

conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver,

ontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while

the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an

indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision

correccional .

B See also Sentence of ebruary #$, #$%0, which is similar to the one above

quoted.C

)n the Sentence of the Supreme ourt of Spain, dated ebruary #&, #$#$, an action

was brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent,

employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently , refused to deliver certain

articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme ourt of Spain held that this action

was properly under article #$%0 of the ivil ode, the court saying4

onsiderando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos

que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito4 #.H, que las expediciones

facturadas por la compa?ia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las

vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las

devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes7 0.H, que llegadas a su

destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por

el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 1.H, que

la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el



demandante le originaron da?os y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante

importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes

por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos

que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases4

onsiderando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro

motivos que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a

que se contrae no contiene accion que na>ca del incumplimiento del

contrato de transporte, toda ve> que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada

de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes

contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 1=# del

odigo de omercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido,

sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los da?os y perjuicios

producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa

del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente

sancionada en el articulo #$%0 del odigo ivil, que obliga por el siguiente

a la ompa?ia demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por

relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.

onsidering that the sentence, in question recogni>es, in virtue of the facts

which it declares, in relation to the evidence in the case4 B#C that the invoice

issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that

the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the

consignors with wines and liquors7 B0C that when the said merchandisereached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the

station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent , and B1C that

the lac6 of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff

caused him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a

wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to reali>e the profits

when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the

receptacles4

onsidering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the fourassignments of error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of

action arising from non:fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because

the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual

relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 1=# of the ode

of ommerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not

applicable7 but it limits to as6ing for reparation for losses and damages



produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and

fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the

plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier8s responsibility is clearly

laid down in article #$%0 of the ivil ode which binds, in virtue of the next

article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected with the

person who caused the damage by relations of economic character and by

administrative hierarchy. B'mphasis supplied.C

The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under

both the +enal ode and the ivil ode. )n that case, the action of the agent was

unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal

action. !nd yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under

article #$%0 of the ivil ode. )t is also to be noted that it was the employer and

not the employee who was being sued.

-et us now examine the cases previously decided by this ourt.

)n the leading case of "a6es vs. !tlantic Gulf and +acific o. B= +hil., 12$, 130:

132 Iyear #$%=JC, the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the

defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in

consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and

caught the plaintiff whose leg was bro6en. This ourt held4

)t is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the

necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuriesthrough negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official

criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held

only subsidiarily to him. !ccording to this theory the plaintiff should have

procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not

repairing the trac6, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been

imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.

This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this

subject. !rticle #%$1 of the ivil ode ma6es obligations arising from faults

or negligence not punished by the law , subject to the provisions of hapter

)) of Title A(). Section #$%0 of that chapter reads4

9! person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when

there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so

done.



9S'. #$%1. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is

demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for

those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.

9The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for

the damages caused by the minors who live with them.

x x x x x x x x x

9Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally

liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the

branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance

of their duties.

x x x x x x x x x

9The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons

mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a

good father of a family to avoid the damage.9

!s an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be

sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer

penali>ed for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his

wor6men. <is obligation therefore is one 8not punished by the laws8 and falls

under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. ;ut the answer may be abroader one. 5e should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a

forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the

defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out

litigants against their will from the civil courts, would ma6e the assertion of

their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper

criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules

of proof prevailing in criminal actions. 'ven if these articles had always

stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is

thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the -aw of riminal

+rocedure of Spain B -ey de 'njuiciamiento riminal C, which, though neverin actual force in these )slands, was formerly given a suppletory or

explanatory effect. Knder article ### of this law, both classes of action, civil

and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal

action was pending the civil was suspended. !ccording to article ##0, the

penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith,

unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by



him for civil proceedings for the future. )f the civil action alone was

prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private

complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These

provisions are in harmony with those of articles 01 and #11 of our +enal

ode on the same subject.

!n examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation

of these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to

be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as

expressly provided in the law. 5here an individual is civilly liable for a

negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should

see6 out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a

condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.

Knder article 0% of the +enal ode the responsibility of an employer may beregarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees

only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine

the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his

obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not

barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. )nasmuch as no

criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in

question, the provisions of the +enal ode can not affect this action. This

construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this

subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully

regulated it or has been abrogated by the !merican civil and criminal procedure now in force in the +hilippines.

The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case

appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of

the words of article #%$1, 9fault or negligence not punished by law,9 as

applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 23@ and 2$%

of the +enal ode. )t has been shown that the liability of an employer

arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be

regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law, within themeaning of articles #$%0 and #%$1. Dore than this, however, it cannot be

said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence

of which are regulated by articles #$%0 and #$%1 of the ivil ode. The acts

to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not

growing out of pre:existing duties of the parties to one another. ;ut where

relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract



or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles ##%#,

##%1, and ##%& of the same code. ! typical application of this distinction

may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective

machinery supplied by the employer. <is liability to his employee would

arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the

contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in

the negligent act itself.

)n Dan>anares vs. Doreta , 1@ +hil., @0# Byear #$#@C, the mother of the @ of $:

year:old child Salvador ;ona brought a civil action against Doreta to recover

damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an

automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered

judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of +#,%%% as

indemnity4 This ourt in affirming the judgment, said in part4

)f it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana

Street, had to stop his auto before crossing "eal Street, because he had met

vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the

opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he

again started to run his auto across said "eal Street and to continue its way

along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the

auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed "eal Street and had

completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. ;ut, as the child was run

over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident

could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing "eal Street and

entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child

in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewal6 on the right to that

on the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the

automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child8s body had

already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a

distance of about 0 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the

automobile entered Solana Street from "eal Street, at a high speed without

the defendant having blown the horn. )f these precautions had been ta6en bythe defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child

would not have occurred.

)t will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted

in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was

punishable by the +enal ode. <ere is therefore a clear instance of the same act of



negligence being a proper subject:matter either of a criminal action with its

consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and

independent civil action for fault or negligence under article #$%0 of the ivil

ode. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi:delito or culpa

aquiliana under the ivil ode has been fully and clearly recogni>ed, even with

regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and

convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have

been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

Lears later Bin #$1%C this ourt had another occasion to apply the same doctrine.

)n ;ernal and 'nverso vs. <ouse and Tacloban 'lectric M )ce +lant, -td. , 2& +hil.,

10=, the parents of the five:year:old child, +urificacion ;ernal, brought a civil

action to recover damages for the child8s death as a result of burns caused by the

fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of !pril #%, #$02, the Good

riday procession was held in Tacloban, -eyte. ortunata 'nverso with herdaughter +urificacion ;ernal had come from another municipality to attend the

same. !fter the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were

passing along Gran apitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban 'lectric

M )ce +lant, -td., owned by defendants E. (. <ouse, when an automobile appeared

from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was

so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell

into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child

died that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because

of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. ;ut this ourt held, on appeal, that

there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents +#,%%% in damages

from E. (. <ouse who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the

franchise for the electric plant. This ourt said in part4

!lthough the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he

nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the

contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. )t is from this point that a majority

of the court depart from the stand ta6en by the trial judge. The mother and

her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, -eyte,

on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothingabnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the

mother. o one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing

and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot

water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of "a6es vs.

!tlantic Gulf and +acific o. BI#$%=JC, = +hil., 12$C, still rule. !rticle #$%0

of the ivil ode must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the



child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its

strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.

)t is most significant that in the case just cited, this ourt specifically applied

article #$%0 of the ivil ode. )t is thus that although E. (. <ouse could have been

criminally prosecuted for rec6less or simple negligence and not only punished but

also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this ourt

awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under

article #$%0 of the ivil ode.

)n ;ahia vs. -itonjua and -eynes B1% +hil., 30& Iyear #$#2C, the action was for

damages for the death of the plaintiff8s daughter alleged to have been caused by

the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. )t appeared

that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant

-eynes had rented the automobile from the )nternational Garage of Danila, to beused by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, ;atangas. -eynes was

ordered by the lower court to pay +#,%%% as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal

this ourt reversed the judgment as to -eynes on the ground that he had shown

that the exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the

presumption of negligence under article #$%1. This ourt said4

!s to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care

and diligence of a good father of a family. <e obtained the machine from a

reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The

wor6men were li6ewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensedby the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly

competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident

occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice,

either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.

The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this ourt thus4

!rticle #$%1 of the ivil ode not only establishes liability in cases of

negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease. )t says4

9The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons

mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a

good father of a family to avoid the damage.9

rom this article two things are apparent4 B#C That when an injury is caused

by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a



presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or

employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision

over him after the selection, or both7 and B0C that presumption is juris

tantum and not juris et de jure , and consequently, may be rebutted. )t follows

necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in

selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good

father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from

liability.

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own

negligence and not on that of his servant.

The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this ourt in erf vs. Dedel B11

+hil., 1= Iyear #$#2JC. )n the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant8s

servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struc6 and damaged the plaintiff8s

motorcycle. This ourt, applying article #$%1 and following the rule in ;ahia vs.

-itonjua and -eynes , said in part Bp. &#C that4

The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the

owner or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are

committed while the servant is engaged in his master8s employment as such

owner.

!nother case which followed the decision in ;ahia vs. -itonjua and -eynes wasuison vs. orton M <arrison o., 22 +hil., #@ Byear #$1%C. The latter case was

an action for damages brought by uison for the death of his seven:year:old son

Doises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister Darciana. Some

large pieces of lumber fell from a truc6 and pinned the boy underneath, instantly

6illing him. Two youths, Telesforo ;inoya and rancisco ;autista, who were

wor6ing for Ora, an employee of defendant orton M <arrison o., pleaded guilty

to the crime of homicide through rec6less negligence and were sentenced

accordingly. This ourt, applying articles #$%0 and #$%1, held4

The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship

of pater familias . This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on

his own negligence and not on that of his servant. B;ahia vs. -itonjua and

-eynes I#$#2J, 1% +hil., 30&7 angco vs. Danila "ailroad o. I#$#@J, 1@

+hil., [email protected]



)n 5alter !. Smith M o. vs. adwallader Gibson -umber o., 22 +hil., 2#= Byear

#$1%C the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf,

which had been struc6 by the steamer <elen belonging to the defendant. This

ourt held Bp. 203C4

The evidence shows that aptain -asa at the time the plaintiff8s wharf

collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authori>ed to navigate and direct a

vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because

of his reputation as a captain, according to . . adwallader. This being

so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the

defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a

good father of a family in selecting aptain -asa, in accordance with the

doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant

is therefore absolved from all liability.

)t is, therefore, seen that the defendant8s theory about his secondary liability is

negatived by the six cases above set forth. <e is, on the authority of these cases,

primarily and directly responsible in damages under article #$%1, in relation to

article #$%0, of the ivil ode.

-et us now ta6e up the +hilippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. 5e study

first, ity of Danila vs. Danila 'lectric o. , 20 +hil., 2@3 Byear #$0@C. ! collision

between a truc6 of the ity of Danila and a street car of the Danila 'lectric o.

too6 place on Eune @, #$02. The truc6 was damaged in the amount of +#,=@@.0=.

Sixto 'ustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through rec6less imprudence. <e was found guilty and

sentenced to pay a fine of +$%%, to indemnify the ity of Danila for +#,=@@.0=,

with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Knable to collect the

indemnity from 'ustaquio, the ity of Danila filed an action against the Danila

'lectric ompany to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily

liable. The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a

good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment

in favor of the plaintiff. This ourt held, in part, that this case was governed by the

+enal ode, saying4

5ith this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the

conclusion that the provisions of the +enal ode govern. The +enal ode in

easily understandable language authori>es the determination of subsidiary

liability. The ivil ode negatives its application by providing that civil

obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the



provisions of the +enal ode. The conviction of the motorman was a

misdemeanor falling under article 3%& of the +enal ode. The act of the

motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable

by law. !ccordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the +enal ode

and not with article #$%1 of the ivil ode. )n other words, the +enal ode

affirms its jurisdiction while the ivil ode negatives its jurisdiction. This is

a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a

case of civil negligence.

x x x x x x x x x

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the +enal ode and not

to the ivil ode. )ndeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different

ruling would permit the master to escape scot:free by simply alleging and

proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection andtraining of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense

to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as

a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. B;y way

of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here made are

offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect

that article %$%0 of the ivil ode should be disregarded and codal articles

#%$1 and #$%1 applied.C

)t is not clear how the above case could support the defendant8s proposition,

because the ourt of !ppeals based its decision in the present case on thedefendant8s primary responsibility under article #$%1 of the ivil ode and not on

his subsidiary liability arising from ontanilla8s criminal negligence. )n other

words, the case of ity of Danila vs. Danila 'lectric o., supra, is predicated on

an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising

from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the

ourt of !ppeals in the present case is the employer8s primary liability under

article #$%1 of the ivil ode. 5e have already seen that this is a proper and

independent remedy.

!rambulo vs. Danila 'lectric o. B22 +hil., =2C, is another case invo6ed by the

defendant. ! motorman in the employ of the Danila 'lectric ompany had been

convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to

pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of +#,%%%. !n action was then brought to

enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the +enal ode.

The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good



father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from

civil liability. ;ut this ourt held4

)n view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, B#C

that the exemption from civil liability established in article #$%1 of the ivil

ode for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family,

is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 0% of the

+enal ode.

The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant

case, because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the

defendant8s subsidiary liability under the +enal ode, while in the case at bar, the

plaintiff8s cause of action is based on the defendant8s primary and direct

responsibility under article #$%1 of the ivil ode. )n fact, the above case destroys

the defendant8s contention because that decision illustrates the principle that theemployer8s primary responsibility under article #$%1 of the ivil ode is different

in character from his subsidiary liability under the +enal ode.

)n trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has

failed to recogni>e the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime,

which is governed by the +enal ode, and the responsibility for cuasi:delito or

culpa aquiliana under the ivil ode, and has li6ewise failed to give the

importance to the latter type of civil action.

The defendant:petitioner also cites rancisco vs. Onrubia B&3 +hil., 10=C. Thatcase need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil

liability arising from a crime. <ence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above

discussed.

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi:

delitos or culpa aquiliana under the ivil ode. Specifically they show that there

is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence Bgoverned

by the +enal odeC and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles #$%0

to #$#% of the ivil ode, and that the same negligent act may produce either a

civil liability arising from a crime under the +enal ode, or a separate

responsibility for fault or negligence under articles #$%0 to #$#% of the ivil ode.

Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude

that the employer / in this case the defendant:petitioner / is primarily and

directly liable under article #$%1 of the ivil ode.



The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invo6ed should ordinarily be

sufficient to dispose of this case. ;ut inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines

that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to

indicate their foundations.

irstly, the "evised +enal ode in article 132 punishes not only rec6less but also

simple negligence. )f we were to hold that articles #$%0 to #$#% of the ivil ode

refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal

import of article #%$1 of the ivil ode, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana

would have very little scope and application in actual life. *eath or injury to

persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence / even the

slightest / would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil

liability arising from a crime. )n such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain

for cuasi:delito or culpa aquiliana 5e are loath to impute to the lawma6er any

intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. or are we, in theinterpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that 6illeth rather than the

spirit that giveth life. 5e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and

render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full:grown

development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi:delito , which is conserved and made

enduring in articles #$%0 to #$#% of the Spanish ivil ode.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond

reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is

sufficient to ma6e the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of

criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. )n such cases, the defendant can and

should be made responsible in a civil action under articles #$%0 to #$#% of the

ivil ode. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil

wrongs. Kbi jus ibi remedium .

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to ma6e defendant8s liability effective,

and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his Bthe latter8sC property first, would be

tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method

of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also amore expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of

the defendant under article #$%1 of the ivil ode. Our view of the law is more

li6ely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the

defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common

6nowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually

do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. 5hy, then, should the



plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and

probably useless procedure )n construing the laws, courts have endeavored to

shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

!t this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of

employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect

society. 5or6men and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in

order to avoid injury to the public. )t is the masters or employers who principally

reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. )t is

but right that they should guarantee the latter8s careful conduct for the personnel

and patrimonial safety of others. !s Theilhard has said, 9they should reproach

themselves, at least, some for their wea6ness, others for their poor selection and

all for their negligence.9 !nd according to Danresa, 9)t is much more equitable

and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who

could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee

because of his confidence in the principal or director.9 B(ol. #0, p. 300, 0nd 'd.C

Dany jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle

of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the wor6

already cited B(ol. =, p. =&=C that before third persons the employer and employee

9vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente

en la de quien le emplea y utili>a.9 B9become as one personality by the merging of

the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utili>es him.9C !ll these

observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor

accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of

owners of motor vehicles.

ourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the +enal ode and

the ivil ode on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or

concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lac6 of understanding of the

character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana , there has grown up a

common practice to see6 damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising

from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invo6ing articles

#$%0:#$#% of the ivil ode. !lthough this habitual method is allowed by ourlaws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more

expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra:

contractual . )n the present case, we are as6ed to help perpetuate this usual course.

;ut we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and

to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles #$%0

et seq . of the ivil ode to its full rigor. )t is high time we caused the stream of



quasi:delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its

waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the +enal ode. This

will, it is believed, ma6e for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re:

establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an

independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a

criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is

more li6ely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.

)n view of the foregoing, the judgment of the ourt of !ppeals should be and is

hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant:petitioner.

Lulo, .E., Doran, O>aeta and +aras, EE., concur.

The -awphil +roject : !rellano -aw oundation

987 Barredo vs Garcia

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Transcript of 987 Barredo vs Garcia