97634068 Absolutory Causes and Mitigating Circumstances

8/11/2019 97634068 Absolutory Causes and Mitigating Circumstances

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ABSOLUTORY CAUSES AND OTHER SPECIALSITUATIONS

Absolutory causes are those where the actcommitted is a crime but for reasons of publicpolicy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.

a. ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION

People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Ting (1931)Facts: Samson was the chief of customs

secret service in Cebu and Natividad was theformer collector of customs. He was instructed tomake sure that the shipment containing opiumshall be unloaded in the country. He went along theplan and then he informed the PhilippineConstabulary of all that had taken place and theydiscussed a plan to capture the opium owners.

Held: The mere fact that the chief ofcustoms secret service pretended to agree to aplan for smuggling illegally imported opiumthrough the customhouse, in order the better toassure the seizure of said opium and the arrest ofits importers, is no bar to the prosecution andconviction of the accused.

Samson did not induce nor instigate theaccused to import the opium but merely pretended

to have an understanding with the collector ofcustoms. There is nothing immoral in this oragainst the public good which should prevent thegovernment from prosecuting and punishing theculprits, for this is not a case where an innocentperson is induced to commit a crime merely toprosecute him, but it is simply a trap set to catch acriminal.

PEOPLE v. LUA CHU AND UY SE TIENG [56 Phil.44 (1931)]

Background of Case:On Nov. 1929, Uy Se Tiengwas the consignee of the Shipments of Opiumcoming from Hongkong, who represented agents othe real Owners of Shipments of Opium containing3,252 tins. He collaborated w/ Samson &Natividad of the Customs by paying them anamount of P6K for the opium to be released safelyfrom Customs.

On Dec. 1929, upon arrival of the Shipment ofOpium in the ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng informedSamson that the former consult the real owners onhow to proceed the payment of P6K & will comeover to Samson house on Dec. 17, 1929 to informthe decision of the owners.

On the same day Samson informed theConstabulary represented by Captain Buencosejo &the Provincial Fiscal requesting a stenographer totake down the conversation between Samson & UySe Teung.

On the night of Dec. 17, 1929, Captain

Buencosejo and a stenographer named Jumapaofrom a law firm and hid themselves behind thecurtains in the house of Samson to witness theconversation between Samson, Uy Se Teung andLua Chu.

Captain Buencosejo & Jumapao noted the ffimportant facts:1. Uy Se Teung informed Samson that Lua Chu

was one of the owners of the Opium.2. Lua Chu informed Samson that aside from him

there were co-owners named Tan and anotherlocated in Amoy.

3. Lua Chu promised to pay the P6,000 upon

delivery of the opium from the warehouse of UySe Tieng.

4. A Customs Collector had a conversation beforewhen Samson was on vacation in Europe, withLua Chu and agreed on the business of shippingthe Opium.

The following morning Uy Se Tieng and companionUy Ay presented papers to Samson & CaptainBuencosejo showed up & caught them in the act &arrested the two Chinese. The Constabulary then


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arrested Lua Chu & confiscated P50K worth ofOpium (3,252 tins).

Facts of Case: An Appeal was made by Uy SeTieng & Lua Chu & made 10 assignments of errorsmade by the TC in its judgment.

Concluding Remarks:Entrapment1. The practice of entrapping persons into crime

for the purpose of instituting criminaprosecutions

2. It is a scheme or technique ensuring theapprehension of the criminals by being in theactual crime scene.

3. The law officers shall not be guilty to the crime

if he have done the following:a. He does not induce a person to commit a

crime for personal gain or is not involved inthe planning of the crime.

b. Does take the necessary steps to seize theinstrument of the crime and to arrest theoffenders before he obtained the profits inmind.

Instigation: This is the involvement of a lawofficer in the crime itself in the following manners:a. He induces a person to commit a crime fo

personal gain

b. Doesnt take the necessary steps to seize theinstrument of the crime & to arrest theoffenders before he obtained the profits inmind.

c. He obtained the profits in mind even throughafterwards does take the necessary steps seizethe instrument of the crime and to arrest theoffenders.

PEOPLE v. DORIA [301 SCRA 668 (1999)]

! Two civilian informants informed the PNP

Narcom that one Jun was engaged in illegadrug activities and the Narcom agents decidedto entrap and arrest Jun in a buy-bustoperation.

! On the day of entrapment, PO3 Manlangithanded Jun the marked bills and Juninstructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him whilehe got the marijuana from his associate.

! When they met up, Jun gave PO3 somethingwrapped in plastic upon which PO3 arrestedJun. They frisked Jun but did not find the


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marked bills on him. Jun revealed that he leftthe money at the house of his associate namedneneth

! They wen to Neneths house. PO3 Manlangitnoticed a carton box under the dinin table andnoticed something wrapped in plastic inside thebox.

! Suspicious, PO3 entered the house and took

hold of the box and found that it ha 10 bricks ofwhat appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.

! Simultaneously, SPO1 Badua recovered themarked bills from Neneth. The policemenarrested Neneth and took both her and Jun,together with the coz, its contents and themarked bill and turned them over to theinvestigator at headquarters,

! Jun was then learned to be Florencio Doria whileNeneth is Violata Gaddao.

! They were both convicted feloniously selling,administering and giving away to another 11plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting

tops, in violation of R.A 6425, as amended byRA 7659

Issue:WON Violeta Gaddao is liable! Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense that

can be raised by an accused & partakes thenature of a confession & avoidance.

! American federal courts and state courts usuallyuse the subjective or origin of intent testlaid down in Sorrells v. U.S. to determinewhether entrapment actually occurred. Thefocus of the inquiry is on the accusedspredisposition to commit the offense is charged,his state of mind and inclination before hisinitial exposure to government agents.

! Another test is the objective test where the testof entrapment is whether the conduct of the lawenforcement agenst was likely to induce anormally law-abiding person, other than onewho is ready and willing, to commit the offense.

! The objective test in buy-bust operationsdemands that the details of the purportedtransaction must be clearly & adequatelyshown. Courts should look at all factors todetermine the predisposition of an accused to

commit an offense in so far as they are relevantto determine the validty of the defense ofinducement.

! In the case at bar, Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to giveground for her arrest uner Sec. 5a of Rule 113.She was not committing any crime. Contrary tothe finding of the TC, there was no occasion atall for Gaddao to flee from the policement tojustify her arrest in hot pursuit

! Neither could her arrest ne justified undersecond instance of personal knowledge in Rule113 as this must be based upon probable causewhich means an actual belief or reasonablegrounds for suspicion. Gaddao was arrestedsolely on the basis of the alleged indentificationmade by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangt,however, declared in his direct examination that

appellant Doria named his co-accused inresponse to his query as to where the markedmoney was. Doria did not point to Gaddao as hisassociate in the drug business, but as the personwith whom he lfet the marked bills. Thisidentification does not necessarily lead to theconclusion that Gaddao conspired with Doria inpushing drugs, If there is no showing that theperson who effected the warrantless arrest hadin his own right, knowledge of the actsimplicating the person arrested to theperpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest islegally objectionable.

! Furthermore, the fact that the box containingabout 6 kilos of marijuana was found inGaddaos house does not justify a finding thatshe herself is guilty of the crime charged.

! The prosecution thus had failed to prove thatGaddao conspired with Doria in the sale of thesaid drug. Thus, Gaddao is acquitted

a. EFFECT OF PARDON

RPC, Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offendedparty. A pardon of the offended party does not

extinguish criminal action except as provided inArticle 344 of this Code; but civil liability withregard to the interest of the injured party isextinguished by his express waiver.

R.A. No. 8353. Anti-Rape Law of 1997.Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon - The

subsequent valid marriage between the offenderand the offended party shall extinguish the criminaaction or the penalty imposed.In case it is the legal husband who is the offender,the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the

offended party shall extinguish the criminal actionor the penalty. Provided, That the crime shall beextinguish or the penalty shall not be abated if themarriage is void ab initio.

A pardon by the offended party does not

extinguish criminal action because a crime is anoffense against the State. In criminal cases, theintervention of the aggrieved parties is limited tobeing witnesses for the prosecution.


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Compromise does not extinguish criminal

liability.The offended party in crimes of adultery and

concubinage cannot institute criminal prosecution,if he shall have consented or pardoned theoffenders.

- the pardon here may be implied, as

continued inaction of the offended party afterlearning the offense.

- both offenders must be pardoned by theoffended party.

b. ABSOLUTORY CAUSES

Art. 6(3). - There is an attempt when theoffender commences the commission of a felonydirectly or over acts, and does not perform all theacts of execution which should produce the felonyby reason of some cause or accident other thanthis own spontaneous desistance.

Art. 20.Accessories who are exempt fromcriminal liability. The penalties prescribed foraccessories shall not be imposed upon those whoare such with respect to their spouses, ascendants,descendants, legitimate, natural, and adoptedbrothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity withinthe same degrees, with the single exception ofaccessories falling within the provisions ofparagraph 1 of the next preceding article.

Art. 247. Death or physical injuries

inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person who having surprisedhis spouse in the act of committing sexualintercourse with another person, shall kill any ofthem or both of them in the act or immediatelythereafter, or shall inflict upon them any seriousphysical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

If he shall inflict upon them physical injuriesof any other kind, he shall be exempt frompunishment.

These rules shall be applicable, under thesame circumstances, to parents with respect totheir daughters under eighteen years of age, and

their seducer, while the daughters are living withtheir parents.

Any person who shall promote or facilitatethe prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shallotherwise have consented to the infidelity of theother spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits ofthis article.

Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. Any private person who shall enter the dwelling

of another against the latter's will shall bepunished by arresto mayor and a fine notexceeding 1,000 pesos.If the offense be committed by means of violenceor intimidation, the penalty shall be prisioncorreccional in its medium and maximum periodsand a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

The provisions of this article shall not be

applicable to any person who shall enter another'sdwelling for the purpose of preventing someserious harm to himself, the occupants of thedwelling or a third person, nor shall it be applicableto any person who shall enter a dwelling for thepurpose of rendering some service to humanity orjustice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafestaverns, inn and other public houses, while thesame are open.

Art. 332.Persons exempt from criminalliability. No criminal, but only civil liability, shal

result from the commission of the crime of theft,swindling or malicious mischief committed orcaused mutually by the following persons:

1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, orrelatives by affinity in the same line.

2. The widowed spouse with respect to theproperty which belonged to the deceased spousebefore the same shall have passed into thepossession of another; and

3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-lawand sisters-in-law, if living together.

The exemption established by this articleshall not be applicable to strangers participating in

the commission of the crime.

Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes ofadultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction,rape and acts of lasciviousness. The crimesof adultery and concubinage shall not beprosecuted except upon a complaint filed by theoffended spouse.

The offended party cannot institute criminaprosecution without including both the guiltyparties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, ifhe shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or actsof lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted exceptupon a complaint filed by the offended party or herparents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in anycase, if the offender has been expressly pardonedby the above named persons, as the case may be.

In cases of seduction, abduction, acts oflasciviousness and rape, the marriage of theoffender with the offended party shall extinguishthe criminal action or remit the penalty alreadyimposed upon him. The provisions of thisparagraph shall also be applicable to the co-


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principals, accomplices and accessories after thefact of the above-mentioned crimes.

d. ACTS NOT COVERED BY LAW AND IN CASEOF EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT

Art. 5. Duty of the court in connectionwith acts which should be repressed butwhich are not covered by the law, and incases of excessive penalties. Whenever acourt has knowledge of any act which it may deemproper to repress and which is not punishable bylaw, it shall render the proper decision, and shallreport to the Chief Executive, through theDepartment of Justice, the reasons which inducethe court to believe that said act should be madethe subject of legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit tothe Chief Executive, through the Department ofJustice, such statement as may be deemed proper,

without suspending the execution of the sentence,when a strict enforcement of the provisions of thisCode would result in the imposition of a clearlyexcessive penalty, taking into consideration thedegree of malice and the injury caused by theoffense.

3. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Mitigating circumstances are those which, ifpresent in the commission of the crime, do notentirely free the actor from criminal liability, butserve only to reduce the penalty.

They are based on the diminution of either

freedom of action, intelligence or intent or on thelesser perversity of the offender.

CLASSES OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

1. ORDINARY MITIGATING- Those mentioned in subsections 1 to 10 of

Art. 13.

2. PRIVILEGED MITIGATING

Art. 68.Penalty to be imposed upon a personunder eighteen years of age. When theoffender is a minor under eighteen years and hiscase is one coming under the provisions of theparagraphs next to the last of Article 80 of thisCode, the following rules shall be observed:

1. Upon a person under fifteen but overnine years of age, who is not exempted fromliability by reason of the court having declared thathe acted with discernment, a discretionary penaltyshall be imposed, but always lower by two degreesat least than that prescribed by law for the crimewhich he committed.

2. Upon a person over fifteen and undereighteen years of age the penalty next lower thanthat prescribed by law shall be imposed, butalways in the proper period.

Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when thecrime committed is not wholly excusable. Apenalty lower by one or two degrees than thatprescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed isnot wholly excusable by reason of the lack of someof the conditions required to justify the same or toexempt from criminal liability in the several casesmentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that themajority of such conditions be present. The courtsshall impose the penalty in the period which maybe deemed proper, in view of the number andnature of the conditions of exemption present orlacking.

Privileged mitigating circumstances which

are applicable only to particular crimes:1. Art. 268, par. 3. Voluntary release of theperson illegally detained within 3 days without theoffender attaining his purpose and before theinstitution of criminal action. The penalty is onedegree lower.

2. Art. 333, par. 3. Abandonment withoutjustification of the spouse who committed adulteryThe penalty is one degree lower.

NOTE: Mitigating circumstances only reduce thepenalty but do not change the nature of the crime.

Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. Thefollowing are mitigating circumstances;

1. Those mentioned in the precedingchapter, when all the requisites necessary to justifyor to exempt from criminal liability in therespective cases are not attendant.


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2. That the offender is under eighteen yearof age or over seventy years. In the case of theminor, he shall be proceeded against in accordancewith the provisions of Art. 80.

3. That the offender had no intention tocommit so grave a wrong as that committed.

4. That sufficient provocation or threat onthe part of the offended party immediately

preceded the act.5. That the act was committed in the

immediate vindication of a grave offense to the onecommitting the felony (delito), his spouse,ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the samedegrees.

6. That of having acted upon an impulse sopowerful as naturally to have produced passion orobfuscation.

7. That the offender had voluntarilysurrendered himself to a person in authority or hisagents, or that he had voluntarily confessed hisguilt before the court prior to the presentation ofthe evidence for the prosecution;

8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blindor otherwise suffering some physical defect whichthus restricts his means of action, defense, orcomm4unications with his fellow beings.

9. Such illness of the offender as woulddiminish the exercise of the will-power of theoffender without however depriving him of theconsciousness of his acts.

10. And, finally, any other circumstances ofa similar nature and analogous to those abovementioned.

Par. 1- THOSE MENTIONED IN THEPRECEDING CHAPTER, WHEN ALL THEREQUISITES NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY OR TOEXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN THERESPECTIVE CASES ARE NOT ATTENDANT.

The circumstances of jus tifi ca tion orexemption which may give place to mitigation,because not all the requisites necessary to justifythe act or to exempt from criminal liability in therespective cases are attendant, are the ff:1. Self-defense 7. Minority over 9 and

2. Defense of Relatives under 15 years ofage

3. Defense of Strangers 8. Causing injury bymere

4. State of necessity accident5. Performance of duty 9. Uncontrollable fear6. Obedience to order

of superior

INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

1. Incomplete self-defense, defense ofrelatives, defense of stranger

In these 3 classes of defense, UNLAWFUL

AGGRESSION must always be present. It is anindispensable requisite.

Par. 1 of Art. 13 is applicable only when unlawfu

aggression is present but the other 2 requisites arenot present in any of the cases referred to incircumstances number 1, 2 and 3 or Art. 11. Ex. When the one making defense against

unlawful aggression used unreasonable means toprevent or repel it, he is entitled to a privilegedmitigating circumstance.

2. Incomplete justifying circumstance ofavoidance of greater evil or injury.

REQUISITES under par. 4 of Art. 11:a. That the evil sought to be avoided actually

exists;b. That the injury feared be greater than that

done to avoid it;c. That there be no other practical and less

harmful means of preventing it.

Avoidance of greater evil or injury is a justifying

circumstance if all the three requisites mentionedin par. 4 of Art. 11 are present. But if any of thelast two requisites is lacking, there is only a

mitigating circumstance.

3. Incomplete justifying circumstance ofperformance of duty.

REQUISITES under par. 5 of Art. 11:a. That the accused ac ted in the

performance of a duty or in the lawfuexercise of a right or office; and

b. That the injury caused or offensec o mm i t t e d b e t h e n e c e s s a r yconsequence of the due performance ofsuch duty or the lawful exercise of suchright or office.

In People v. Oanis, the SC considered one othe 2 requisites as constituting the majority. Itseems that there is no ordinary mitigatingcircumstance under Art. 13 par. 1 when thejustifying or exempting circumstance has 2requisites only.


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INCOMPLETE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE

1. Incomplete exempting circumstanceof minority over 9 and under 15 years of age.

REQUISITES under par. 3 of Art. 12:a. That the offender is over 9 and under

15 years old; and

b. That he does not act with discernment.! If the minor over 9 and under 15 years of ageacted with discernment, he is entitled only to amitigating circumstance, because not all therequisites to exempt from criminal liability arepresent.

2. Incomplete exempting circumstanceof accident.

REQUISITES under par. 4 of Art. 12 :a. A person is performing a lawful act;b. With due care;

c. He causes an injury to another by mereaccident; and

d. Without fault or intention of causing it.

! If the 2ndrequisite and 1st part ofthe 4threquisite are absent, the case will fall under Art.365 which punishes reckless imprudence.

! If the 1strequisite and 2nd partof the 4threquisite are absent, it will be an intentional felony.

3. Incomplete exempting circumstanceof uncontrollable fear.

REQUISITES under par. 6 of Art. 12:a. That the threat which caused the fear was of

an evil greater than, or at least equal to, thatwhich he was required to commit;

b. That it promised an evil of such gravity andimminence that an ordinary person would havesuccumbed to it.

!If only one of these requisites is present,there is only a mitigating circumstance.

People vs. Jaurigue

Facts: A girl by the name of Avelina was beingcourted and harassed by one Amado. The youngman, whom the girl flatly refused, neverthelesspersisted in his endeavors by going to the girlshouse at midnight, surreptitiously entering herroom, putting his hand on her forehead (evidentlywith the intention of abusing her) and therebycausing the girl to scream for help. Her parentsarrived but the father of the girl allowed Amado to

go home. Avelina is purported to have receivednews of Amado falsely boasting of having takenliberties with her person. In church one daybrightly-lit and filled with other people, Amadowent to sit with Avelina and without saying a word,placed his hand on the upper right thigh of the girl.Avelina then pulled out her fan knife with theintention of punishing the offenders hand. Amado

seized the girls right-hand which held the weapon,however, Avelina was able to quickly grab the knifewith her left-hand and at once stabbed Amadoonce at the base of the left side of the neck,inflicting a mortal wound. When asked by thosearound her why she did it, she replied by sayingthat she couldnt take it anymore and that shehoped that she would be taken care of.

Issues: WON Avelina can invoke self-defense.

Held/Ratio: No. The attempt to rape a womanconstitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put

her in a state of legitimate defense which will thusexempt her from criminal liability if, as the onlymeans to protect her honor, she wounds or kills theoffender. However, in the present case, there couldbe no possibility of her being raped. And the meansemployed by her in defense of her honor, resultingin the death of Amado, was clearly excessive. Shecannot be legally declared completely exempt fromcriminal liability. However three mitigatingcircumstances such as: provocation producingpassion/obfuscation, inflicting only one woundintended to punish the offenders hand, and thefact that she immediately surrendered herself tothe authorities, will work in her favor to lessen thedegree of punishment.

People v. Narvaez

Facts: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted ofmurder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischerand Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaezshot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the twowere constructing a fence that would preventNarvaez from getting into his house and rice millThe defendant was taking a nap when he heard

sounds of construction and found fence beingmade. He addressed the group and asked them tostop destroying his house and asking if they couldtalk things over. Fleischer responded with "No,gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgunHe also shot Rubia who was running towards thejeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior tothe shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company ofFleischer's family) was involved in a legal battlewith the defendant and other land settlers of


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Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At thetime of the shooting, the civil case was stillpending for annulment (settlers wanted granting ofproperty to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). Attime of the shooting, defendant had leased hisproperty from Fleisher (though case pending andownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25,defendant received letter terminating contract

because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given6 months to remove his house from the land.Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.Defendant claims he killed in defense of his personand property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty.Agg r ava t i ng c i r c ums tances o f ev i den tpremedi ta t ion o f fset by the mit iga t ingcircumstance of voluntary surrender. For bothmurders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua,to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moraldamages.

Issues:

(1) WON the aggression on the property ofNarvaez was lawful or unlawful.(2) WON self-defense can be claimed by Narvaez inshooting those who would

Held/Ratio:(1) Yes. The assault on the property constitutedunlawful aggression on the part of the deceasedwho had no right to destroy or cause damage toNarvaezs house, nor to close his accessibility tothe highway while he was pleading with them tostop and talk things over with him.

(2) No. Although aggression is established as thefirst element in self-defense and there was noprovocation on the part of Narvaez (therebymeeting the third element), the second element,being reasonableness of resistance, was not metwhen, in killing the two victims, such resistancewas disproportionate to the attack. Hence, the actof killing the deceased was not justifiable since notall elements for justification are present.

Gutierrez, Dissenting: Defense of property canonly be invoked when coupled with form of attack

on person defending property. In the case at bar,this was not so. Appellant should then besentenced to prision mayor. However, since he hasserved more than that, he should be released.

Par. 2 THAT THE OFFENDER IS UNDER 18YEARS OF AGE OR OVER 70 YEARS. IN THECASE OF THE MINOR, HE SHALL BEPROCEEDED AGAINST IN ACCORDANCE WITHTHE PROVISIONS OF ART. 80.

Par. 2 contemplates the ff:1. An offender over 9 but under 15 of age who

acted with discernment.2. An offender fifteen or over but under 18

years of age.3. An offender over 70 years old.

Art. 80. Suspension of sentence ofminor delinquents. Whenever a minor ofeither sex, under sixteen years of age at the dateof the commission of a grave or less grave felonyis accused thereof, the court, after hearing theevidence in the proper proceedings, instead ofpronouncing judgment of conviction, shall suspendall further proceedings and shall commit suchminor to the custody or care of a public or private,benevolent or charitable institution, establishedunder the law of the care, correction or educationof orphaned, homeless, defective, and delinquentchildren, or to the custody or care of any otherresponsible person in any other place subject tovisitation and supervision by the Director of PublicWelfare or any of his agents or representatives, ifthere be any, or otherwise by the superintendent ofpublic schools or his representatives, subject tosuch conditions as are prescribed herein belowuntil such minor shall have reached his majorityage or for such less period as the court may deemproper.

The court, in committing said minor asprovided above, shall take into consideration thereligion of such minor, his parents or next of kin, in

order to avoid his commitment to any privateinstitution not under the control and supervision ofthe religious sect or denomination to which theybelong.

The Director of Public Welfare or his dulyauthorized representatives or agents, thesuperintendent of public schools or hisrepresentatives, or the person to whose custody orcare the minor has been committed, shall submitto the court every four months and as often asrequired in special cases, a written report on thegood or bad conduct of said minor and the moraand intellectual progress made by him.

The suspension of the proceedings against aminor may be extended or shortened by the courton the recommendation of the Director of PublicWelfare or his authorized representative or agentsor the superintendent of public schools or hisrepresentatives, according as to whether theconduct of such minor has been good or not andwhether he has complied with the conditionsimposed upon him, or not. The provisions of thefirst paragraph of this article shall not, however, beaffected by those contained herein.


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If the minor has been committed to thecustody or care of any of the institutionsmentioned in the first paragraph of this article,with the approval of the Director of Public Welfareand subject to such conditions as this official inaccordance with law may deem proper to impose,such minor may be allowed to stay elsewhereunder the care of a responsible person.

If the minor has behaved properly and hascomplied with the conditions imposed upon himduring his confinement, in accordance with theprovisions of this article, he shall be returned tothe court in order that the same may order his finalrelease.

In case the minor fails to behave properly orto comply with the regulations of the institution towhich he has been committed or with theconditions imposed upon him when he wascommitted to the care of a responsible person, orin case he should be found incorrigible or hiscontinued stay in such institution should beinadvisable, he shall be returned to the court inorder that the same may render the judgmentcorresponding to the crime committed by him.

The expenses for the maintenance of aminor delinquent confined in the institution towhich he has been committed, shall be bornetotally or partially by his parents or relatives orthose persons liable to support him, if they areable to do so, in the discretion of the court;Provided, That in case his parents or relatives orthose persons liable to support him have not beenordered to pay said expenses or are found indigent

and cannot pay said expenses, the municipality inwhich the offense was committed shall pay one-third of said expenses; the province to which themunicipality belongs shall pay one-third; and theremaining one-third shall be borne by the NationalGovernment: Provided, however, That wheneverthe Secretary of Finance certifies that amunicipality is not able to pay its share in theexpenses above mentioned, such share which isnot paid by said municipality shall be borne by theNational Government. Chartered cities shall paytwo-thirds of said expenses; and in case achartered city cannot pay said expenses, the

internal revenue allotments which may be due tosaid city shall be withheld and applied insettlement of said indebtedness in accordance withsection five hundred and eighty-eight of theAdministrative Code.

LEGAL EFFECTS OF VARIOUS AGES OFOFFENDER:1. Under 9 years of age, an exempting

circumstance. (Art. 12, par. 2)

2. Over 9 and under 15 years of age, also anexempting circumstance, unless he acted withdiscernment (Art. 12, par. 3)

3. Minor delinquent under 18 years of age, thesentence may be suspended. (Art. 192, PDNo. 603 as amended by PD 1179)

4. Under 18 years of age, privileged mitigatingcircumstance (Art. 68)

5. 18 years or over, full criminal responsibility.

Par. 3 THAT THE OFFENDER HAD NOINTENTION TO COMMIT SO GR A WRONG ASTHAT COMMITTED.

This circumstance can be taken into

account only when the facts proven show thatthere is a notable and evident disproportionbetween the means employed to execute thecriminal act and its consequences.

The intention, as an internal act, isjudged not only by the proportion of the meansemployed by him to the evil produced by his act,but also by the fact that the blow was or was notaimed at a vital part of the body.

Intention must be judged by considering

the weapon used, the injury inflicted and hisattitude of the mind when the accused attackedthe deceased.

This mitigating circumstance is not

applicable when the offender employed bruteforce.

Lack of intent to commit so grave a

wrong is not appreciated where the offensecommitted is characterized by treachery.

In crimes against persons who do not die

as a result of the assault, the absence of the intentto kill reduces the felony to mere physical injuries,but it does not constitute a mitigatingcircumstance under Art. 13 par 3.

It is not applicable to felonies by

negligence because in these kinds of felonies,there is no intent on the part of the offender which

may be considered diminished. Par. 3 is only applicable to offense

resulting in physical injuries or material harm. It isnot applicable to defamation or slander.

PEOPLE v. URAL [56 SCRA 138 (1974)]

Facts: Ural was convicted of murder by theZamboanga CFI sentencing him to reclusionperpetua, and orderinh im to indemnify the heirs of


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the appellants by the deceased, those twomitigating circumstances cannot be considered astwo distinct and separate circumstances but shouldbe treated as one.

Secondly, the circumstance of passion andobfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime whichis planned and calmly meditated before itsexecution, as in the case at bar.

Third, the maltreatment that appellants claim thevictim to have committed against them occurredmuch earlier than the date of the commission ofthe crime. Provocation in order to be mitigatingmust be sufficient and immediately preceding theact.

Thus, where the accused killed his wife during aquarrel, because he, who had no work, resentedher suggestion to join her brother in the businessof cutting logs, the 2 mitigating circumstances ofprovocation & obfuscation cannot be considering infavor of the accused.

Par. 5. THAT THE ACT WAS COMMITTED INTHE IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVEOFFENSE TO THE ONE COMMITTING THEF E L O N Y ( D E L I T O ) , H I S S P O U S E ,ASCENDANTS, DESCENDANTS, LEGITIMATE,NATURAL OR ADOPTED BROTHERS ORSISTERS, OR RELATIVES BY AFFINITYWITHIN THE SAME DEGREE.

REQUISITES:a. That there be a grave offense done to the

one committing the felony, his spouse,

ascendants, descendants, legitimate, naturalor adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives byaffinity within the same degree.

b. That the felony is committed in vindication ofsuch grave offense. A lapse of timeis allowedbetween the vindication and the doing of thegrave offense.

Basis to determine the gravity of offense invindication

The question whether or not a certainpersonal offense is grave must be decided by thecourt, having in mind the social standing of theperson, theplaceand the timewhen the insult wasmade. Vindication of a grave offense and passion or

obfuscation cannot be counted separately andindependently.

PEOPLE v. BENITOFACTS:

Alberto Benito was a former clerk of theCivil Service Commission but was suspended forDishonesty and was later charged with QualifiedTheft, Malversation of Public Funds, Estafa andFalsification of Documents and administrativelycharged for Dishonesty leading to his dismissal in1966. In 1969 he went to the CSC to seek helpfrom Pedro Moncayo Jr., the victim who was a CPAand Asst. Chief of the Personnel Transactions Div

and Acting Chief, Admin. Div. of the Comm.Moncayo was the one who reported to the CSCCommissioner about Benitos malversation whichhe confessed to him. Benito alleged that afterasking for help, he was insulted by Moncayo twice,on Dec. 11 and Dec. 12, the latter in front of a lotof people. At 5:25 on Dec. 12 armed with anunlicensed Cal. 22 revolver Benito waited outsidethe CSC for Moncayo and shot him 8 times in thehead and other body parts when the victim wasinside his car which was stopped due to heavytraffic. After 5 hours the incident his swornstatement was taken wherein he admitted to

shooting Moncayo. Benito was sentenced to deathby the Circuit Crim. Court of Manila and it wasaffirmed by the SC.

In his MFR Benito contends that Benitosremark that a thief was loitering in the premises ofthe CSC was tantamount to kicking a man alreadydown or rubbing salt into a raw wound and that itwas made in a loud voice, exposing him to ridiculein the presence of his officemates. The SolGenargues that the defamatory remark cannot giverise to a mitigating circumstance of immediate


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vindication since it was not specifically directed toBenito and that this was uttered at 11 am whileMoncayo was killed at 5 pm, and Benito still sawMoncayo at 2 pm.

ISSUE: WON Benito is entitled to the mitigatingcircumstance of immediate vindication of a graveoffense? NO.

HELD:Even if Mocayos remark was directed at

Benito this mitigating circumstance would still notbe appreciated. The 6 hrs interval between thealleged grave offense committed by Moncayo andthe assassination was more than sufficient toenable Benito to recover his serenity. Instead ofusing the time to recover his composure he used itto plan Moncayos death. Benito ambushedMoncayo just a few minutes after the victim left theoffice. He acted with treachery and evidentpremeditation in perpetrating the coldblooded

murder.Benito assassinated Moncayo not for the

defamatory remark but for his refusal to change hisreport as to favor Benito. He did not act tovindicate an alleged grave offense but mainly tochastise Moncayo for having exposed the allegedanomalies or defraudation committed by Benitoand for obstinately refusing to change his report.

BACABAC v. PEOPLEFACTS:

Dec. 23, 1990 Hernani Quidato, the victimwas at a dance hall with Eduardo andMelchor Selibio. And so were JonathanBacabac and Edzel Talnquines

Jonathan and Edzel left for home andencountered Quidatos group and had amisunderstanding.

Jesus Rosadio witnessed the commotion andsaw Melchor assault Edzel. He warned themthat Edzel was a councilors son but wasthreatened in return. He left and reportedthe incident to the councilor while bothEdzel and Jonathan managed to flee.

Quidato and his companion went home but

encountered RicardoBacabac (petitioner) together with Edzeland Jonathan, and Edzels father Jose andother relatives carrying armed weapons.

Jesus pointed out to them as the peoplewho manhandled Jonathan and Edzel.Hernani apologized, saying it was just acase of mistaken identity. But after Jesusberated them for being bullies, Bacabacfired into the air while Jose fired at Hernaniand Eduard even hitting Jonathan. Eduard

fell while Hernani in a kneeling positionraising his hand in surrender was again shotby Jose. Melchor escaped. Hernani, Eduardoand Jonathan were brought to the hospital,Hernani was DOA while Eduardo died 2hours later.

2 informations for murder where filed at theRTC Iloilo against Jose, Edzel, Jonathan and

Bacabac which were tried jointly. The RTCfound the presence of conspiracy amongpetitioner and his co-accused, convictingthem of murder qualified by treachery.CAaffirmed this decision.

Petitioner assails CAs decision.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can invoke themitigating circumstance of immediate vindicationof a grave offense? NO.

HELD:

For such mitigating circumstance to becredited, the act should be, following Article 13paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, committedin the immediate vindication of a grave offense tothe one committing the felony (delito), hisspouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,natural or adopted brothers or sisters, orrelatives by affinity within the same degree.The offense committed on Edzel was hitting hisear with a stick (according to Jesus), a bamboopole (according to Edzel). By Edzels ownclarification, [he] was hit at [his] ear, not on [his]head. That act would certainly not be classified asgrave offense. And Edzel is petitioners nephewhence, not a relative by affinity within the samedegree contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 5 ofthe Revised Penal Code.

Par. 6. THAT OF HAVING ACTED UPON ANIMPULSE SO POWERFUL AS NATURALLY TOHAVE PRODUCED PASSION OR OBFUSCATION.

REQUISITES:a. The accused acted upon an impulse.b. The impulse must be so powerful that it

naturally produce passion or obfuscation inhim.

Passion or obfuscation may constitute as a

mitigating circumstance only when the same arosefrom LAWFUL SENTIMENTS. It is not applicablewhen:

a . The ac t commit ted in a sp i r i t o fLAWLESSNESS.b. the act is committed in a spirit of REVENGE.


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The crime committed must be the result of a

sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury.

The accused who raped a woman is not entitled

to the mitigating circumstance of having actedupon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have

produced passion just because he finds himself ina secluded place with that young ravishing woman,almost naked and therefore, liable to succumb tothe uncontrollable passion of his bestial instinct.

The mitigating circumstance of obfuscation

arising from jealousy cannot be invoked in favor ofthe accused whose relationship with the womanwas illegitimate.

Passion and obfuscation may lawfully arise from

causes existing only in the honest belief of the

offender.

US v. HICKS (1909)Facts: For about 5 years, Hicks and Sola

lived illicitly in the manner of husband and wifebut they separated. A few days later, Solacontracted new relations with another negronamed Wallace. Hicks went to Wallaces house andasked the latter to go out. They talked for awhileand then Hicks shot Wallace

Held: Even if it is true that the accusedacted with obfuscation because of jealousy, themitigating circumstance cannot be considered inhis favor because the causes which mitigatecriminal responsibility for the loss of self-controare such which originate from legitimate feelingsand not those which arise from vicious, unworthyand immoral passions. The cause of the passion ofthe accused was his vexation engendered by therefusal of the woman to continue to live in illicitrelations with him, which she had a perfect right todo.

U.S. v. DELA CRUZ [22 Phil. 429 (1912)]

Facts: The accused, in the heat of passion, killedhis common-law wife upon discovering her inflagrante in carnal communication with a commonacquaintance.Held: In this a case, the accused was entitled tothe mitigating circumstance of passion or obfus-cation. The facts in this case must be distinguishedfrom the case of U.S. vs. Hicks where it was foundthat the accused, deliberately and after duereflection resolved to kill the woman who had left

him for another man. With a clean and well-prepared weapon, he enetered the house,disguising his intention and calming her by hisapparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in orderto successfully accomplish his criminal design. Inthis case, the cause of the alleged passion andobfuscation of the accused was his vexation, disap-pointment and anger engendered by the refusal ofthe woman to continue to live in illicit relations withhim, which she had a perfect right to do. In thepresent case, however, the impulse was caused bythe sudden revelation that she was untrue to him,and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of

another.Judgment: Modified by a finding that thecommission of the crime was marked with theextenuating circumstance of passion andobfuscation, penalty is reduced from 14 yrs 8 mosand 1 day of reclusion temporal to 12 yrs and 1day of reclusion temporal.


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PEOPLE v. GELAVERFACTS:

Eduardo Gelaver was married to VictoriaPacinabao, with whom he begot four children. Theylived together at their conjugal home until July 3,1987 when she abandoned her family to live withher paramour.

Gelaver testified that on March 24, 1988,

after he was informed by his daughter where hiswife and paramour were living and immediatelyrepaired to that place. Upon entering the house, hesaw his wife lying on her back and her paramouron top of her, having sexual intercourse.

Appellant's version of the killing was thatwhen his wife saw him, she pushed her paramouraside. Her paramour immediately stood up, took aknife placed on top of the bedside table andattacked appellant. The latter was able to wrestpossession of the knife and then used it against theparamour, who evaded the thrusts of the appellantby hiding behind the victim. Thus, it was the victim

who received the stab intended for the paramour.As to why he continued to stab his wife,

appellant said that his mind had been "dimmed" oroverpowered by passion and obfuscation by thesight of his wife having carnal act with herparamour.

Randy Mamon, testified that at 7:00 a.m. ofMarch 24, 1988, he heard shouts coming from thehouse of Tessie Lampedario. He saw the Gelaverand a woman having a heated argument,thereafter, appellant held the neck of the victim,dragged her and with a knife on his right hand,stabbed the latter three times on the breast andthen fled.

Gelaver was found guilty of Parricide by theRTC and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: WON the RTC was correct in finding thepresence of the mitigating circumstance of passionor obfuscation?

HELD:The trial court erred in finding the presence

of the mitigating circumstance of passion orobfuscation "as a result of his (appellant's) wife

leaving their home and their children." Before thiscircumstance may be taken into consideration, it isnecessary to establish the existence of an unlawfulact sufficient to produce such a condition of mind.The act producing the obfuscation must not be farremoved from the commission of the crime by aconsiderable length of time, during which theaccused might have recovered his equanimity. Thecrime was committed almost a year after the victimhad abandoned the conjugal dwelling.

Par. 7. THAT THE OFFENDER HADVOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED HIMSELF TO APERSON IN AUTHORITY OR HIS AGENTS, ORTHAT HE HAD VOLUNTARILY CONFESSED HISGUILT BEFORE THE COURT PRIOR TO THEPRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THEPROSECUTION.

2 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER THISPARAGRAPH:

1. Voluntary surrender to a person in authorityor his agents;

2. Voluntary confession of guilt before the courtprior to the presentation of evidence for theprosecution.

REQUISITES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER:a. That the offender had not been actually

arrested.b. That the offender surrendered himself to a

person in authority or to the latters agent.c. That the surrender was voluntary.

Merely requesting a policeman to accompany the

accused to the police HQ is not equivalent tovoluntary surrender.

Other examples:

a. The warrant of arrest showed that theaccused was in fact arrested.

b. The accused surrendered only after the

warrant of arrest was served.c. The accused went into hiding andsurrendered only when they realized that theforces of the law were closing in on them.

Surrender must be SPONTANEOUS. He

surrendered 1) because he acknowledges his guiltyor 2) because he wishes to save them the troubleand expenses necessarily incurred in his searchand capture.

The surrender must be by reason of the

commission of the crime for which he isprosecuted.

PEOPLE v. AMAGUIN [229 SCRA 166 (1994)]

Facts: Celso and Gildo Amaguin, together withothers, attacked Pacifico and Diosdado OrosDuring the fray, Gildo was armed with a knife andan Indian target. And just as they were about tofinish off the Oro brothers, Willie, the eldest of theAmaguins, appeared with a revolver and delivered


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the coup de grace. They invoke the mitigatingcircumstance of voluntary surrender.Held:SC agrees with the accused-appellants viewthat voluntary surrender should be appreciated intheir favor. While it may have taken both Willie andGildo a week before turning themselves in, the factit, they voluntarily surrendered to the police beforearrest could be effected. For voluntary surrender to

be appreciated, the following must be present: (a)offender has not been actually arrested; (b)offender surrendered himself to a person inauthority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary.All these requisites appear to have attended theirsurrender.

PEOPLE v. DELA CRUZFACTS:

On May 30, 1936 Francisco Dela Cruz,Fernando Legaspi and 3 other personsconfederated and helped one another to attack andassault Yu Wan inflicting upon him physical injuries

requiring medical attendance preventing him fromworking for some days and stealing his personalproperty of P26. Dela Cruz was alleged to be ahabitual delinquent under the RPC, since he waspreviously convicted once for theft and twice forestafa with final judgment. The accused pleadednot guilty. During the trial, after 2 witnesses for theprosecution had testified, Dela Cruz withdrew theirplea of not guilty and pleaded guilty instead. DelaCruz was sentenced for 6 mos. 1 day prisioncorrectional but as a habitual delinquent there wasaddl penalty of 6 yrs 1 day prision mayor. Legaspiwas sentenced to 10 mos. Dela Cruz is appealingthe sentence.

ISSUE: WON there was the mit igat ingcircumstance of voluntary plea of guilt? NO

HELD:The appellants plea of guilty does not

constitute a mitigating circumstance under Article13 (7) of the RPC which requires that this plea bespontaneous and that it be made prior to thepresentation of evidence by the prosecution. Theconfession of guilt constitutes a cause for the

mitigating of the penalty because as an act ofrepentance and respect for the law, it indicates amoral disposition of in the accused favorable to hisreform. At the case at bar, the accused does notdeserve this benefit for the reason that his plea ofguilt was given only after the prosecution hasstarted its presentation of evidence. It was notspontaneous or made with a sincere desire torepent but merely speculative and is most likelymade on the belief that the trial will result in hisconviction.

Par. 8. THAT THE OFFENDER IS DEAF ANDDUMB, BLIND OR OTHERWISE SUFFERINGFROM SOME PHYSICAL DEFECT WHICH THUSRESTRICTS HIS MEANS OF ACTION, DEFENSE,OR COMMUNICATION WITH HIS FELLOWBEINGS.

This paragraph does not distinguish between

educated and uneducated deaf-mute or blindpersons. Physical defect referred to in this paragraph is

such as being armless, cripple, or a stutterer,whereby his means to act, defend himself orcommunicate with his fellow beings are limited.

Par. 9. SUCH ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER ASWOULD DIMINISH THE EXERCISE OF THEWILL-POWER OF THE OFFENDER WITHOUTHOWEVER DEPRIVING HIM OFCONSCIOUSNESS OF HIS ACTS.

REQUISITES:a. That the illness of the offender must

diminish the exercise of his will-power.b. That such illness should not deprive the

offender of consciousness of his acts.

When the offender completely lost the exercise

of wil l-power, it may be an exempt ingcircumstance.

It is said that this paragraph refers only to

diseases of pathological state that trouble theconscience or will. Ex. A mother who, under the influence of a

puerperal fever, killed her child the day followingher delivery.

PEOPLE v. FORMIGONES [87 Phil. 658 (1950)]

Nature: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of

Camarines Sur finding Abelardo Formigones guiltyof parricide & sentencing him to reclusionperpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased inthe amount of P2K, and to pay costs.

Facts: In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo wasliving on his farm in Camarines Sur w/ his wife, JuliaAgricola & their 5 children. From there theytransferred in the house of his half-brother, ZacariasFormigones in the same municipality to findemployment as harvesters of palay. After a month


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Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of thehouse when Abelardo, w/o previous quarrel orprovocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wallof the house & stabbed his wife Julia, in the back,the blade penetrating the right lung & causing asevere hemorrhage resulting in her death. Abelardothen took his dead wife & laid her on the floor of theliving room & then lay down beside her. In this

position, he was found by the people who came inresponse to the shouts made by his eldest daughter,Irene Formigones.

The motive was admittedly that of jealousybecause according to his statement, he used tohave quarrels with his wife for reason that he oftensaw her in the company of his brother, Zacarias;that he suspected the 2 were maintaining illicitrelations because he noticed that his wife hadbecome indifferent to him. During the preliminaryinvestigation, the accused pleaded guilty. At thecase in the CFI, he also pleaded guilty but didnttestify. His counsel presented the testimony of 2

guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo wasconfined to the effect that his conduct was ratherstrange & that he behaved like an insane person,at times he would remain silent, walk around starknaked, refuse to take a bath & wash his clothesetc... The appeal is based merely on the theorythat the appellant is an IMBECILE & thereforeexempt from criminal liability under RPC A12.

Issue:WON Abelardo is an imbecile at the time ofthe commission of the crime, thus exempted fromcriminal liability

Held: No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr.Francisco Gomes, although he was feebleminded,he is not an imbecile as he could still distinguishbetween right & wrong & even feel remorse. Inorder that a person could be regarded as animbecile w/in the meaning of RPC A12 so as to beexempt from criminal liability, he must be deprivedcompletely of reason or discernment & freedom ofwill at the time of committing the crime. (Note thatdefinition is same as insanity)

As to the strange behavior of the accused duringhis confinement, assuming it was not feigned to

stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to hisbeing feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbidmental condition produced by remorse at havingkilled his wife. A man who could feel the pangs ofjealousy & take violent measures to the extent ofkilling his wife who he suspected of being unfaithfulto him, in the belief that in doing so, he wasvindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded asan imbecile. WON the suspicions were justified, is oflittle or no importance. The fact is that he believedher faithless. Furthermore, in his written statement,

he readily admitted that he killed his wife, & at thetrial he made no effort to deny of repudiate saidwritten statements, thus saving the government althe trouble & expense of catching him & securinghis conviction.

But 2 mitigating circumstances are present:passion or obfuscation (having killed his wife in ajealous rage) & feeblemindedness.

Judgment:In conclusion, appellant is found guiltyof parricide & the lower courts judgment is herebyaffirmed w/ the modification that appellant will becredited with half of any preventive imprisonmenthe has undergone (because of the 2 mitigatingcircumstances)

Par. 10. AND FINALLY, ANY OTHERCIRCUMSTANCE OF A SIMILAR NATURE ANDANALOGOUS OF THOSE ABOVEMENTIONED.

Over 60 years old with failing sight, similar to

over 70 years of age mentioned in paragraph 2. Voluntary restitution of the property stolen by

the accused or immediately reimbursing theamount malversed is a mitigating circumstance asanalogous to voluntary surrender.Not resisting arrest is not analogous to voluntary

surrender. Testifying for the prosecution is analogous to

plea of guilty.

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE NEITHEREXEMPTING NOR MITIGATING

1. Mistake in the blow or aberratio ictus, forunder Art. 48, there is a complex crimecommitted. The penalty is even higher.

2. Mistake in the identity of the victim, forunder Art. 4, par. 1, the accused iscriminally liable even if the wrong done isdifferent from that which is intended.

3. Entrapment of the accused.4. The accused is over 18 years of age. If the

offender is over 18 years old, his age isneither exempting nor mitigating.

5. Performance of righteous action.

97634068 Absolutory Causes and Mitigating Circumstances

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Transcript of 97634068 Absolutory Causes and Mitigating Circumstances