95-5 Winning in the Jungle

8/2/2019 95-5 Winning in the Jungle

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HANDBOOK

Winning in the JungleWinning in the Jungle**

Published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned,

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1327, for the

Jungle Operations Training Battalion,

Fort Sherman, APO AA 34005

No. 95-5 MAY 95

for Squad through Battalion Operations*Includes Addendum: B-720 TIPS (DEC 95), 1/7 SFG


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INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

Today the U. S. Army faces the possibility of being deployed to many areas of the world, on very short

notice. Since many potential trouble spots contain jungles, it is important that you understand how to fight

and win in the jungle.

Fighting in the jungle is tough, both physically and mentally. To win you must have organizations thatare sound from the bottom up. Above all, jungle operations test squads and platoons to their limit. Limited

visibility and rugged terrain combine to render communications difficult.

Although a trip to the Jungle Operations Training Battalion (JOTB) would be an excellent way to

prepare units for the jungle, this handbook should be a great help also. A historical precedent exists. In 1941

the Japanese decided to invade Malaya and capture Singapore. For that purpose, they drew units from

Northern Manchuria. The only preparation they had was a booklet titled Read This Alone, and You Can

Win the War. It was a simple form of what we would now call a Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)

manual. It consisted mostly of Battle Drills and common-sense tips on how to stay healthy and survive in the

jungle. Every soldier read it. History shows that it worked.

Any handbook on jungle combat should begin by considering the general characteristics of jungle

terrain. They are:

Dense Vegetation with Limited Visibility

Heavy Cross Compartmentation

Many Streams and Rivers

Hot and Humid

Few Roads

Numerous Footpaths and Tracks

There are certain keys to success to extract from a perusal of history and of numerous after-action

reviews (AARs) at JOTB. They are:

Focused Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

Decentralized Execution

Aggressive, Continuous ReconnaissanceFlexible Plans, both Operations and Logistics

Reliance on Small Unit Leaders

Physically Fit, Well-Trained , and Disciplined Soldiers

Redundant Communications

Foot Mobility

The first section of this handbook deals with battalion and company operations. It is primarily an

expansion of the keys to success in a lessons format, organized by Battlefield Operating System (BOS). The

second section covers platoon and squad operations. A final section consists of Tips of the Trade,

primarily for the individual soldier.

A final introductory note: The Jungle is Neutral. It is not an original idea. It is the title of a famous

work on jungle warfare by F. Spencer Chapman. If you get past the handbook stage, hunt down a copy. It is

worth reading.


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Winning in the JungleWinning in the Jungle

COMBINED ARMS

CENTER

Assistant Deputy Chief of

Staff for Training,

TRADOC

Brigadier General

Joe N. Frazar, III

CENTER FOR ARMY

LESSONS LEARNED

Director

Colonel Orin A. Nagel

Managing Editor

Dr. Lon R. Seglie

Editor plus

Layout and Design

Mary Sue Winneke

Managing Author

MAJ Howard Simkin

Authors

SFC James Popp

SFC Paul RobertsSFC Amond Williams

SFC Kalapu Fasavalu

SSG William Varga

SSG William Craft

SSG Faaaliga Matagi

SSG Saul Velez

Distribution

Sergeant First Class

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I, BATTALION & COMPANY OPERATIONS

Intelligence

Maneuver

Fire Support

Air Defense

Mobility and Survivability

Combat Service Support

Battle Command

PART II, PLATOON & SQUAD OPERATIONS

PART III, TIPS OF THE TRADE

Addendum: B-720 TIPS (DEC 95), 1/7 SFG

PART IV, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, REFERENCES,

& MISCELLANEOUS LITERATURE

NOTE:ANY PUBLICATIONS REFERENCED IN THIS NEWSLETTER (OTHER THAN THE CALL NEWSLETTERS),SUCH AS ARS,FMS,TMS, MUST BE OBTAINED THROUGH YOUR PINPOINT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication

of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public

business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for

printing this publication has been approved by Commander, U. S.

Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine

gender is used, both are intended.

LOCAL REPRODUCTION OF THIS NEWSLETTER IS AUTHORIZED AND ENCOURAGED!


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Part IPart I

Battalion and CompanyBattalion and CompanyOperationsOperations


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Battlefield Operating System (BOS): Intelligence

TOPIC:Intelligence Preparation of the

Battlefield (IPB).

DISCUSSION: For a jungle battlefield,many collection methods relied upon byU.S. forces, such as various forms ofoverhead imagery, are severely restricted.In double and triple canopy jungles,

visibility is severely restricted, and mostlight intensification devices only functionin open areas. Thermal imagers work quitewell. As a result, S2s must rely on otherresources, such as HUMINT and SIGINT,to conduct their IPB. In addition, theheavily cross-compartmented nature of theterrain makes it difficult to moveintelligence collection assets once they arein place. The highest ground may not be

the key or decisive terrain, depending uponthe nature of the enemy and vegetationdensity. When fighting guerrilla forces,waterways, road and trail junctions, andpotential LZs may be the key and decisiveterrain. Also, a heavily vegetated hilltopmay have near zero line of sight, while aless prominent hill may have excellent lineof sight.

LESSON(S):

Since it is difficult to shift ground-

based intelligence collection assets, focus

your IPB effort on a few NAIs.

Make sure you develop clear

indicators for each NAI.

Remember that populated areas are

not obstacles but sources of HUMINT

both for you and the enemy. As such,

they should be on your list of High

Value Targets (HVTs).

Consider the nature of your enemy

before choosing key and decisive terrain.

Double-check your line of sight

computations against vegetation density,

on the ground if possible.

Doctrinal rates of movement are

diminished in the jungle

Restricted terrain for dismounted

troops is virtually nonexistent.

Doctrinal templates usually do not

apply.

Situational templates are heavilydependent on experience.

TOPIC:Intelligence Collection Plans.

DISCUSSION: Due to lack ofunderstanding of the limitations imposedon movement by rugged jungle terrain and

restricted visibility, collection plans areoften ambitious. They frequently overtaskthe units involved, especially scouts.


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The average rate of movement for aninfantry unit conducting a movement tocontact in the jungle is 500m per hour. Ascout element should move even moreslowly. Additionally, the OPTEMPO inthe jungle is generally slow and requirespatience to wait for the enemy. Taking thisinto account, the S2 should rigorouslyevaluate each NAI to establish specificcollection criteria. He should then

prioritize the NAIs. Only then can the S2establish a realistic collection plan.Unfortunately, many commanders and S2sdo not consider this and literally walk theirscouts to exhaustion when they fail tocontact the enemy quickly. Also, S2s usedto relying on overhead imagery often forgetto integrate other assets into theircollection plan.

LESSON(S): helicopter into an LZ. Unfortunately, the

Include the scout platoon leader, the

FSO, and the S3 in developing thecollection plan.

Use a collection plan matrix to

visually track the C/M plan.

Plan for scouts to move no more than

300m per hour if they are patrolling.

Position your scouts where they can

reach several NAIs quickly.

Integrate Low-Level Voice Intercept,

Remotely Emplaced Sensors, Unit

Patrols, and Counter-Mortar Radar inyour collection plan.

Debrief aviators after missions, even

"routine" ones.

Constantly update your collection

plan.

TOPIC: Scout Platoon Operations.

DISCUSSION: Due to the rugged terrainand limited visibility of the jungle, scoutplatoons should not perform securityoperations without a great deal of thought.Otherwise, they will be overtasked. Whenthey are, they inevitably fail. Surveillanceof NAIs and carefully selectedreconnaissance missions suit the scouts

well. Zone reconnaissance tends tocompromise the scouts, as they must movein terrain that favors ambush. Neglecting abackup communications plan, emergencyexfiltration plan, fire support plan, orcasualty evacuation plan in the jungleexponentially increases your chances oflosing the entire element. Since Vietnam,most scout elements infiltrate the jungle by

enemy often watches LZs. In Vietnam,

most scout/LRRP units were compromisedon infiltration. In the jungle, a scout unitleader must have all the skills of a goodhunter. A lack of patience that causes youto move too fast or get too close to anobjective will get you killed, wounded,compromised, or captured. In the jungle,Global Positioning Systems (GPSs)without external antennas often do notwork. At the JOTB, squads that rely on

them have an average 75-percent failurerate on the land navigation course. Units,both scout and infantry, becomemisoriented with remarkable ease.


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As a result, scouts are at extremely highrisk of becoming victims of fratricide.

LESSON(S):

Ensure the S3 and FSO are kept

updated about the scouts operations

and location.

Use scouts for surveillance of NAIs

and TAIs.

Keep ground movement to a

minimum.Remember that you don't have to use

an LZ to get into the jungle. You should

consider overland, boat, and fast rope

infiltration as well.

Always have a backupcommunications plan, an emergency

exfiltration plan, a resupply plan, a fire

support plan, and a casualty evacuation

plan for your scouts before they

infiltrate.

Plan to get information back to the

battalion in a timely manner.

Be patient; don't crash around the

jungle like a wounded water buffalo.

Don't rely on a GPS in the jungle.If you are going to use a GPS in the

jungle, rig an external antenna.

Have a very simple near and far

identification signal to prevent

fratricide.


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BOS: Maneuver

TOPIC: Overall Effects of the Jungle onManeuver.

DISCUSSION: The jungle battlefield

greatly limits tactical mobility due to thick

vegetation and rugged hills. Most of the

jungle is restricted for vehicular

movements. Road bound units are

tactically useless in the jungle. To attainmaximum tactical mobility, units must strip

down to the most basic combat-essential

items. The effects of overloading soldiers

noted by S.L.A. Marshall in Men Under

Fire, and The Soldier's Load and the

Mobility of the Nation are especially truein the jungle. Heat, humidity, torrential

rains and the psychological effects of

continual limited visibility tend to sap

morale rapidly. They also underminediscipline during extended operations

unless checked by effective small unit

leadership. When discipline erodes,

casualties will mount quickly.

LESSON(S):

Small unit leadership is the key to

jungle operations.

Take time to care for your soldier's

physical and mental needs, especially

when you are tired.

Carry only the minimum essential

combat load.

Ensure everyone understands the

resupply plan so that they have the

confidence to carry only what is

directed.

TOPIC: Use of Helicopters.

DISCUSSION: The quickest means ofdeploying troops in the jungle is viahelicopter. There are two majorconstraints to airmobile and air assaultoperations, other than the number ofhelicopters. One is the availability of LZsand the other is weather. Weather issomething that you can do nothing about,except consider it in the planning process.LZs are a different matter. Many junglesoffer relatively few suitable LZs. Thosethat are suitable for massing troops quicklyare also probably covered by enemy directand indirect fire. Of course, there is

always the option of creating your own, butthat takes time and makes noise. Althoughhelicopters can deliver troops to LZs veryquickly, from then on the troops have tomove at a jungle pace. That means 500meters per hour, on the average. Atechnique to solve the problem is creatingan LZ close to the objective bycatastrophic means (i.e., a large explosivedevice), pinning the enemy on theobjective with fire support, and bringingthe helicopters in right on the heels of theexplosion.

LESSON(S):

Pick your LZs carefully, the largest is

not necessarily the most convenient. It

may also be the deadliest.


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Consider using multiple small LZsclose to the objective to mass forces.

Remember that movement off the LZ

will be at jungle speed.

Consider making your own LZs.

TOPIC: Movement to Contact/Searchand Attack.

DISCUSSION: Due to the difficulty of

finding the enemy in the jungle, the most

frequently employed offensive tactics are

the movement to contact and the search

and attack. Contacts will be sudden and

frequently, unexpected. Once contact is

made, it is difficult to fix the enemy as the

jungle generally offers multiple covered

and concealed withdrawal routes. This

puts a premium on simple, well-rehearsed

hasty attack/react to contact drills. These

drills must be practiced at the squad,

platoon, and company levels. Should the

terrain somehow prevent quickly fixing the

enemy by fire and maneuver, an alternative

way to fix him is by massing fire support.

Due to communications problems caused

by rugged terrain and dense vegetation,

maneuver and fire support are often

unsynchronized. This frequently allows

the enemy to slip away. Also, the slow-gonature of jungle terrain frequently causes

the finish force to arrive too late.

Fratricide is a very real danger due to

limited visibility once the finish force

begins to close with the enemy. The

fleeting nature of most contacts makes it

probable that troops will fire at sound andmovement. All of this combines to make it

difficult to destroy enemy forces unless

they are in fixed defense of terrain, such as

the Japanese in the Pacific during World

War II. When the enemy is a guerrilla, it is

often necessary to grind him down by

attrition.

LESSON(S):

Your finishing force should travelmuch closer to your finding force than

normal; that will compensate to some

degree for the restrictive nature of

jungle terrain.

Units should develop a simple SOP for

both visual and audible identification of

friendly troops.

Simple react to contact/hasty attack

drills are vital at the company, platoon,

and squad levels.

Check your communicationsfrequently, especially your fire control

nets.

As you move, constantly update the

data on the guns supporting you.

There are many ways to fix the enemy.

One method is to look at the high speed

avenues of approach or lines of

communication that compartmentalize

the enemy. If you can control these

(rivers, streams, roads, etc.), you canplace NAIs at points where the S2 and S3

think the enemy may cross and possibly

target these locations to fix the enemy in

an AO or destroy him as he attempts to

cross.


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TOPIC: Hasty Attack. LESSON(S):

DISCUSSION: The hasty attack is themost likely form of engagement in the

jungle. Due to the rugged terrain anddense vegetation, engagement distancesare extremely short. Sometimes thedistances are as short as 10 meters. Thecommander's ability to see the battlefield

and to give orders is severely handicapped.The battalion and company must rely on itssquad and platoon leaders ability toimmediately execute the appropriate battledrill. In addition, the company andbattalion must execute the hasty attackquickly as well. Fire support assets mustbe alert and the data on the guns kept up todate because of the fleeting nature of

jungle contacts. The battalion must be ableto depend upon its junior leaders to

develop the situation and report it. Mostfrequently, things go to pieces when the

junior leaders in contact fail to report theirsituation. Reconnaissance assets should beused to determine if there is a practicalroute to outflank the enemy. If there is, thebattalion should maneuver to take theenemy from the rear. Psychologically,even the best troops are very vulnerable toflanking movements in the jungle unless

they are prepared for it, such as theChindits of World War II. The British,U. S., and Japanese forces that fought inWorld War II and the U. S., NVA, and VietCong Forces in Vietnam were all sensitiveto flanking movements.

Hasty attack drills must be well

rehearsed and understood at all levels.

Hasty attack drills must be rehearsed

in the jungle.

Part of all hasty attack drills should

be an immediate reconnaissance for a

weak spot.

Your FIST Teams and FSO should be

well forward during movement.Always attempt to outflank your

enemy. An ounce of sweat will save a

gallon of blood.

Junior leaders must have the

responsibility to report contacts.

TOPIC: Deliberate Attack.

DISCUSSION: In the jungle, thedeliberate attack most often runs intoproblems during the leader'sreconnaissance. Either the reconnaissanceparty is too large or it attempts to get tooclose to the objective. The result is acompromise and an alerted enemy. Inaddition, the jungle creates problems withdeploying troops. During a hasty attack inthe jungle, troops can at least march to

the sound of the guns. In a deliberateattack, they must make their way stealthilyto as close as possible to the objective.This puts a premium on land navigation toavoid either prematurely alerting theenemy or incidents of fratricide willfrequently have to be adjusted by sound.


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If an artillery preparation is planned, thefire. This generally takes more time thanadjusting fire visually. Depending onenemy tactical doctrine, some concealedpositions and snipers may hold their fireuntil your troops have bypassed them. It isalways disconcerting for troops to take firefrom their rear or flank. It is doublydevastating when they cannot see wherethe fire is coming from. The attack could

rapidly lose momentum as troops go toground, unless you anticipate stay-behindenemy forces. As a result of these factors,the number of things that could go wrongmultiply more rapidly in the jungle thanelsewhere. The effects of the jungleenvironment on consolidation andreorganization will be dealt with as aseparate topic.

LESSON(S):

Always anticipate stay-behind enemyforces.

Do not become overly ambitious on

your reconnaissance of the objective.

Make sure your breaching and

assault forces have proven land

navigators with them.

When planning an artillery

preparation, remember that it will most

likely have to be adjusted by sound.Rehearse the attack in similar terrain

if at all possible.

Make sure your FISTs have the

opportunity to practice adjusting fire by

sound.

TOPIC: Attack of Fortified Positions andStrongpoints.

DISCUSSION: Fortified positions in thejungle can normally be outflanked. Inaddition, the enemy will rarely have thetime or resources to construct and man360-degree defenses. A careful, stealthy

reconnaissance is a key to breachingfortified positions. With the knowledge toHit 'em where they ain't, well-trainedinfantry can infiltrate any gaps. Then theycan take the positions from the rear.However, the tactic that worked best inBurma during World War II (for both theBritish and the Japanese) and in Vietnamwas to bypass fortified positions wheneverpossible. If a fortified position must betackled head on, the jungle poses its ownset of unique problems. First, it is easier toget within small arms range of the enemywithout being detected. This sometimesresults in overconfidence on the part of thereconnaissance element. As a result, itmay be compromised. However, yourreconnaissance must be thorough, topinpoint as many enemy positions aspossible. Thermal imagers, such as theAN-PAS 7, work well in finding occupied

bunkers, even those that are wellcamouflaged. Without such aids, it may bedifficult to pinpoint the enemy even afterhe has opened fire. When attackingfortified positions, smoke and otherobscurants are difficult to use.


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The reasons are the combination of dense physical exhaustion. The debilitatingvegetation, lack of ambient light, and nature of fighting in the jungle, bothunpredictable wind currents. The surest physical and psychological, is rapid andway to emplace smoke as an obscurant is pronounced. It was the major cause of thewith grenades. The M203 is an excellent refusal by the majority of Merrill'smeans for delivering marker smoke. Then Marauders to attack the town of Myitkinaa potent bunker buster, such as the AT-4, in Burma after they had successfully seizedcan do the rest. Unfortunately, the use of the airfield. It was also a major cause ofwire-guided missiles, such as the TOW, is the failure of the Japanese Imphalseverely limited. Offensive. Simply put, the jungle causes

LESSON(S):

Plan to use thermal imagers to spot

bunkers. They stick out like a sore

thumb, even when well camouflaged.

Both the assault and breaching forces

should consider using their 60-mm

mortars in a handheld direct-fire mode.

Task-organize your assault and

breaching forces with the greatest

number of engineer assets possible.

Try to infiltrate first. Hit 'em wherethey ain't.

Your breaching force should carry as

many AT-4s as it can handle.

Don't forget marker smoke for your

M203s.

Make sure your breaching force

assembles its demolition charges to the

maximum extent possible prior to the

assault.

TOPIC: The Culminating Point.

DISCUSSION: In the jungle, theculminating point of an attack is mostfrequently reached when the morale of theattacker cracks. The primary cause is

most soldiers to reach their breaking pointfar faster than almost any otherenvironment. There are two vital factors inpostponing the inevitable. The first is ahigh level of physical fitness on the part ofevery soldier. The second is a realisticappreciation by commanders and theirstaffs of the slow, but steady, pace dictatedby the jungle. A secondary cause isprimarily psychological. It is the feeling ofisolation induced by the dense jungle

vegetation that causes troops to go toground under fire. Once stopped, it isdifficult to get them moving again. This isparticularly true if they fear they may becut off.

LESSON(S):

Physical fitness and personal hygiene

must be rigorously enforced.

Remember that 500 meters per hour

isthe maximum speedfor a movement to

contact through the jungle.All leaders must constantly monitor

their soldiers physical and

psychological states.

Educate your soldiers that the jungle

is neutral; it is not a hostile enemy.


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TOPIC: Consolidation andReorganization.DISCUSSION: The consolidation andreorganization of an objective in the jungleare made difficult by the very nature ofmost jungle terrain. The jungle generallyoffers multiple covered and concealedavenues of approach into almost any

position. Therefore, the probability of anenemy counterattack getting within 100meters of the objective before beingdiscovered is a real possibility. Also, whatappear to be ideal avenues of approachwhen viewed on a map or from theobjective quite often are not ideal at all.This means that you must plan and executea rapid and thorough reconnaissancebefore you set out your OPs, mines, orobstacles. Otherwise, you may neglect themost likely avenues of approach onto theobjective. When attempting to eliminatethe enemy from the objective, do notbecome overly ambitious. Remember thatthe jungle is ideal terrain for ambushes.Set your limit of advance (LOA)accordingly. Small unit leaders must takecare to check every individual position toensure fields of fire interlock, as troopstend to become misoriented in the jungle.

When registering indirect fires, try to do soon an open spot near the objective.Otherwise you will have to register yourguns by sound. Unless the objective canbe used as an LZ, the most difficult part ofreorganization is normally evacuation ofcasualties.

LESSON(S):Do a quick reconnaissance before

emplacing OPs; do not just emplace

them along the enemy's withdrawal

route.

Remember, the enemy knows the

area. He may counterattack from any

direction.

There is no rear in the jungle.

Give careful attention to where you

place your LOA.Check and recheck every soldier's

field of fire.

TOPIC: Follow-and-Support Operations.

DISCUSSION: The relatively longer timeit takes to mass forces is the primary

consideration for follow-and-supportoperations in the jungle. As a result,follow-and-support forces should travel ina relatively compact formation. They willmost likely be far closer than in normalterrain to the force they are supporting aswell. The nature of jungle terrain dictatesthat engineer assets should be wellforward. They can then create roadblocks,clear obstacles, or breach enemy defenseswith a minimum of delay. A follow-and-

support force must be prepared to conducthasty attacks anywhere along its axis ofadvance because the undetected infiltrationof sizeable enemy units is possible in the

jungle.


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The follow-and-support force must also by air along the flanks of his axis ofbe ready to assume the role of a fixing advance. The commander must decideforce while the supported force swings what level of risk he is willing to accept,around the enemy's flank. then proceed vigorously.

LESSON(S): LESSON(S):

Remember that time to mass is Strip down to a fighting load for

significantly slower in the jungle. pursuit operations.

Keep your engineers well forward Use aerial resupply to the maximum

during movement. extent possible.

Maintain 360-degree security Keep unremitting pressure on theduring movement. enemy.

TOPIC: Exploitation and Pursuit.

DISCUSSION: There are two primaryconsiderations that carry a differentweight in the jungle for both exploitationand pursuit. They are speed of movementand security. Unless you are able to usehelicopters or roads to move troops, yougenerally can only travel as fast as theenemy. This means that to maintainmomentum, you must strip down to aminimum fighting load. It also meansthat you will have to depend on aerialresupply or captured enemy supplies.Only troops that are in better physicalshape than the enemy can stand the rigors

of a pursuit in the jungle. Security isdifficult to maintain in the jungle,particularly flank security. However,rapid movement and aggressivelypressing the enemy tend to generatesecurity. If at all possible, thecommander should have REMS emplaced

TOPIC: Defensive Tactics.

DISCUSSION: Infiltration betweendefending units is relatively easy in the

jungle. Due to limited visibility andrugged terrain, it is difficult to establish acontinuous line. The gaps between unitsmust be covered with obstacles, mines,sensors, and patrols. Be careful whenemplacing obstacles and mines. Markthem in a manner that friendly troops canrecognize easily. Otherwise, fratricideswill be the inevitable result.Units must prepare 360-degree defenses,paying particular attention to covered andconcealed routes of approach. A

thorough reconnaissance of the areaaround the defensive position is vital toidentify such approaches. This will allowfor well-rehearsed counterattack plans todeal with the most likely avenues ofapproach.


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Also, care must be taken to preparetroops psychologically for fighting from aperimeter. In Malaya and Burma, duringWorld War II, Japanese forces oftendefeated larger British forces just bysurrounding them. Unless troopsunderstand that such fighting is normalfor the jungle and is not a last-ditcheffort, they will tend to becomedemoralized.

LESSON(S): maintaining contact with a small portionNothing in the jungle is impassible to of his forces, he can then outflank the

a determined enemy. Therefore, always unit conducting a retrograde, establish aconstruct 360-degree defenses. roadblock in its rear, and force a decisive

Have a simple SOP for marking engagement. This tactic was used withmines and boobytraps, and use it. great success by all forces that fought in

Maximize the use of sensors, mines, the Pacific during World War II. As longand obstacles to cover gaps between as aerial resupply is available, this tacticdefending units. Use patrols to check loses much of its effectiveness. Due toout sensor reports or, if the jungle is the nature of jungle terrain, the most

uninhabited, use fire support. favorable means of conducting a delay isAlways have a rehearsed using narrow sectors. Withdrawals are

counterattack plan to deal with aided by the limited visibility of theinfiltration. jungle. Prior to the actual withdrawal,

Leaders should emphasize to the simple handrails made of 550 cord cantroops that there is no rear in the be laid down from the forward positionsconventional sense. The jungle is rarely to assembly areas in the rear. Cross-a linear battlefield. country movement at night is normally

Arrange your defenses in depth; the very difficult in the jungle. However, thejungle in particular demands it. battalion can withdraw relatively rapidly

TOPIC: Retrograde Operations.

DISCUSSION: Retrograde Operationsare very difficult in the jungle for forcesthat are heavily dependent on roads forresupply. Continuous lines are nearlyimpossible to establish. Infiltration bylarge-scale enemy units is relatively easy.The greatest danger to road-bound unitsis that the enemy will travel light to gain

cross-country mobility. While

during the hours of darkness. By the timethe enemy is able to pursue, the battalioncan gain enough distance to be secure.


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LESSON(S): TOPIC: Massing of Forces.Maximize the use of aerial resupply.

Travel light to maximize cross-

country mobility.

When planning a delay, consider

using narrow sectors as its basis.

Withdraw during periods of limited

visibility whenever possible.

TOPIC: Battle Drills.

DISCUSSION: Due to the limitationsimposed by jungle terrain, unitsfrequently do not fire and maneuvereffectively once contact is made with theenemy. When battle drills and actions oncontact are not well-rehearsed, leaderslose effective control. This results in aloss of fire discipline. The volume of fireas well as the accuracy of fire drops offdrastically. In addition, the dense

vegetation causes a feeling of isolation.Soldiers tend to either freeze in place orthey become misoriented. In short, youhave all of the ingredients for fratricide.

LESSON(S):

Battle drills must be tailored to the

jungle to take into account the rugged

terrain and dense vegetation.

Practice your battle drills in the

jungle until you are proficient.Units tend to bunch up and also to

envelope forces with very narrow

envelopements. Realize that it will take

time to envelope the enemy in a

meeting engagement and to have

enough patience to conduct it.

DISCUSSION: The time required to

mass forces in the jungle is often

underestimated. There are few roads,

trails, and LZs. Combined with the

rugged terrain and dense vegetation of

the jungle, commanders are unable to

mass combat power at the decisive point

to finish the enemy.

LESSON(S):Units should operate close enough to

one another for mutual support.

Consider positioning the TF reserve

as a finishing force.

TOPIC: Task Organization.

DISCUSSION: Jungle combatoperations dictate that the battalion

commander task-organize his forces to

find, fix, and finish the enemy in a

somewhat different manner than normal.

Aggressive reconnaissance is critical to

defeating any enemy force in the jungle,

particularly guerrilla forces. Usually the

TAIs and NAIs will far outnumber the

scout elements that can maintain

surveillance on them. Due to thecompartmented nature of jungle terrain

and dense vegetation, company

commanders must often be given the

means to conduct independent operations

within their sector.


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LESSON(S):

Rifle squads may be used for reconnaissance as well as scout teams.

Consider placing the battalion reserve near an PZ/LZ or have it follow the main

effort closely.

Consider task-organizing your engineers and other CS and CSS assets down to

company level.


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BOS:Fire Support

TOPIC: Deployment of Field Artilleryand Mortars. DISCUSSION: Shoot and Scoot tactics

DISCUSSION: Due to the dense jungle jungle. There are simply too few firingvegetation, naturally occurring firing positions. Most often, artillery will firepositions for field artillery and mortars are from relatively few positions. This makesrelatively few. The commander must them vulnerable to counter battery fire.decide whether he wants to use only Mortars are vulnerable as well, but they

naturally occurring firing positions or if he can use the Shoot and Hide method.wants to create his own. Normally, the Once mortars receive end of mission, theyslower the OPTEMPO, the easier it is to should displace 50 - 75 meters away,rely on naturally occurring firing positions. leaving the baseplate and aiming stakes inDuring an exploitation or pursuit, naturally place. However, a lack of firing positionsoccurring firing positions would most makes the job of locating concentrations oflikely be insufficient. Due to the ease of enemy indirect fire assets relatively easy.infiltration through the jungle, all artillery Due to space limitations, mortar platoonsand mortar positions must be organized for will often fire as a section. For the sameperimeter defense. Your indirect fire reason, mortar tubes may be much closer

assets are a high value target to the enemy. than the doctrinal distance. Single gunsTherefore, the gunners must be ready at sited to fire at a single target are muchany time to defend the battery area. more difficult to locate without the aid of

LESSON(S):

Organize all firing positions for

perimeter defense.

Everyone must have a role in

defending the perimeter.

If it is critical to your success, then it

is probably a high payoff target for the

enemy.

Use detection devices and command-

detonated mines.

TOPIC: Employment of Field Artilleryand Mortars.

are difficult to employ for artillery in the

some form of counterbattery radar.Unobserved fires are frequently used,particularly against an enemy vulnerable toharassment and interdiction (H&I) fires.

LESSON(S):

Dig in whenever you can; your

location is a prime counterbattery target

for the enemy.

Target all known open areas as

potential counterbattery targets.

Be prepared to deliver unobserved

fires.


19/81

TOPIC: Adjusting Fire. TOPIC: Coordination of Fires.

DISCUSSION: The most frequent manner DISCUSSION: The fire support officerof adjusting fire in the jungle by ground- (FSO) must work closely with the S3 inbased observers is by sound. It is a skill tracking friendly locations. The S2 shouldthat requires a good deal of practice. keep both the S3 and FSO updated onAttempting to adjust fire from the smoke of known or suspected enemy locations. Allan impacting round can be deceiving. Due location reports should be plotted as soonto the density of the foliage, the smoke may as they are available. However, the

drift as much as 100 to 200 meters before clearing of fires should be decentralized toemerging from the jungle canopy. the commanders responsible for theHowever, using a white phosphorous (WP) sector/AO into which the fires will beround in the first round of adjustment will delivered. Those commanders have agive the observer a general direction to better appreciation of the situation in theirfocus his attention. In almost all cases, an sectors. However, the FSO must track theaerial observer is superior to a ground- battle and involve himself in the fire-based observer for quickly adjusting fire. clearing process. This is particularlyThe most obvious exception is when critical when reconnaissance or counter-combat is within danger close range. Then reconnaissance operations are taking placefire will be adjusted in small increments in the battalion's AO.

(the creeping method).

LESSON(S):

Use aerial observers whenever you

can.

Use WP as the initial round for

adjustment.

Use the creeping method to adjust

fire by sound.

LESSON(S):

The S3, S2, and FSO must maintain

continuous communication on friendly

and enemy locations.

The commander on the ground

should clear fires in his sector, but the

FSO must stay involved in the process.

Fires across unit boundaries must be

cleared through the FSO.


20/81

TOPIC: Fire Control Measures.

DISCUSSION: The effects of jungleterrain on communications and visibilitynormally dictates the employment ofrestrictive fire control measures. Graphic,linear fire control measures must belocated on or follow easily identifiableterrain to prevent confusion. No fire areasare an excellent means of avoiding

fratricide or accidentally engaging civiliantargets during defensive operations.During search-and-attack operations, it iscritical that the commander designatesector boundaries as restricted fire lines(RFLs) to avoid fratricide. The FSO mustcontinuously monitor operations andadvise the commander on updating firecontrol measures.

LESSON(S):

Locate graphic, linear fire controlmeasures along easily identifiable

terrain features.

Designate unit boundaries as RFLs.

Keep all fire control measures

updated.

TOPIC: Effects of Indirect Fire.

DISCUSSION: The thick jungle canopyseverely limits shell-fuse combinations. Itdegrades the effectiveness of highexplosive quick (HEQ) and variable time

(VT) fuzes against anything butunprotected troops. Their detonation inthe jungle canopy will cause splintering ofbranches which will enhancefragmentation effects. Proximity fuseswill normally detonate over the canopy,with no effect. High explosive delay(HED) will normally be the preferred shell-fuse combination for troops in preparedpositions. It can penetrate the jungle

canopy and overhead cover. When itexplodes, it will also cause splintering oftrees for enhanced fragmentation. DualPurpose-Improved ConventionalMunitions (DPICMs), ImprovedConventional Munitions (ICMs), and theFamily of Artillery Scatterable Mines(FASCAM) have limited uses in the jungle.The jungle canopy canopy tends either todetonate them early or cause unpredictabledispersion patterns. Illumination rounds

produce bizzare effects in the jungle. Asthe round descends (if it penetrates thecanopy), it causes shadows to shift sorapidly as to create the illusion ofmovement without illuminating any onespot long enough to be useful. Smoketends to be unpredictable as well, due tocross currents beneath the canopy.

LESSON(S):

For unprotected troops, use HEQ orVT.

Use HED for troops in prepared

positions.


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TOPIC: Synchronization with ManeuverForces.

DISCUSSION: In the jungle,communications are often difficult tomaintain. Due to the inherent difficulty of

jungle navigation, units may becomemisoriented as to their location or thelocation of the nearest friendly unit. As aresult, fire support and maneuver forces

become unsynchronized. The S3, FSO,and S2 must work closely together with thecommanders of subordinate units to keepall forces synchronized.

LESSON(S):

Test your fire support net constantly.

The S3, S2, and FSO must maintain

continuous communications.

Develop a communications plan that

includes CP locations/terrain elevation

and the use of ground-based and

airborne retransmission.

TOPIC: Close Air Support (CAS).

DISCUSSION: The nature of the junglecanopy makes target acquisition andidentification by CAS aircraft difficult.

Most USAF aircraft travel at such speedsas to give them only fleeting glimpses ofthe target. As a result, precision strikes inthe jungle are difficult without guidancefrom a Forward Air Controller. Certainprominent terrain features, such as hills,

open areas, tree lines, and stream beds, aresomewhat easier for CAS aircraft toacquire and identify. If you are usingpreplanned CAS, it is often best to targetsuch features. The use of smoke toidentify friendly positions is a usefultechnique, if the canopy is not too thick.M203 smoke rounds can be used to markenemy positions. However, you may haveto fire several to produce a signature that

the CAS aircraft can acquire.If available, a beacon is an excellentway of providing a reference point for fast-moving CAS aircraft. Unfortunately, thedense jungle foliage greatly restricts theuse of laser designators. When CAS isbeing used, suppression of enemy airdefenses (SEAD) must be afforded highpriority. Most CAS pilots don't believe inthe big sky - little bullet theory. Beprepared for a short lull in fire support

where the artillery stops firing and the CASaircraft helicopters begin their attack runs.Ideally, it should be no more than a fewseconds. However, few things are ideal inwar. During the Vietnam War, some VietCong and NVA units would use the lulland attempt to get within danger closedistances to U. S. units. They would risksmall arms fire, rather than be exposed to aCAS strike.

LESSON(S):

Request a Forward Air Controller to

control CAS employment.


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Consider using prominent terrainfeatures as preplanned CAS targets.

Use M203 smoke rounds to mark

enemy positions.

Use a beacon to provide a reference

point.

Focus on SEAD as a priority during

CAS employment.

Be prepared for an enemy assault

during the lull in fire support just prior

to CAS employment.

TOPIC: Attack Helicopters.

DISCUSSION: Attack helicopters are amost useful fire support asset in the jungle.Their mobility, loiter time, and armamentmake them a formidable opponent to any

enemy. Helicopters can keep station at ahide site near a target for much longer thanmost USAF aircraft can loiter in an area.Since they move at slower speeds, visualacquisition and identification of targets isfar easier. Although they are slower thanUSAF aircraft, they can achieve a muchhigher sortie rate through the use of aFAARP. Vulnerability of the helicopter toground fire is their chief employmentlimitation. This can be reduced byPop

up-and-Fire tactics. If attack helicoptersare being used, SEAD must be affordedhigh priority. Most helicopters have a verylimited number of active countermeasuresavailable to them. Also, like USAF CASpilots, most attack helicopter pilots don'tbelieve in the big sky - little bullet

theory. Be prepared for a short lull in firesupport where the artillery stops firing andthe attack helicopters begin their attackruns.

LESSON(S):

A FAARP is an HPT; protect it.

Switch to SEAD as a top priority

when attack helicopters are supporting

your unit.

Be prepared for an enemy assaultduring the lull in fire support just prior

to CAS employment.

TOPIC: The Q36 Counter Mortar Radar.

DISCUSSION: The Q36 is an excellentsystem. However, it does have somelimitations on its use in the jungle. Therugged jungle terrain limits theeffectiveness of the Q36 considerably,often masking the radar. A limitation in itssoftware does not allow it to identifyrounds that are travelling away from theradar. Normally, that makes sense. Onlinear battlefields, the Q36 is employedfrom behind the front lines. Incoming fireis hostile, while outgoing fire is friendly.The jungle is often nonlinear. The enemy

can infiltrate and fire on friendly troopsfrom any direction. In addition, the meantime between equipment failures shortensconsiderably in the jungle environment dueto constant heat and high humidity.Finally, because of a lack of roads andcleared spaces, there are few places where


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the Q36 can be set up and functioneffectively. As a result, it narrows thenumber of places that the enemy has tolook for the radar. The radar site cannot be

administrative. It must be organized fordefense.

LESSONS(S):

Remember that the jungle is often a

nonlinear battlefield.

Bring your PLL and keep it with theradar.

Remember that the Q36 is an HPT

for the enemy.

The Q36 also has difficulty detecting

single volleys with good confirmation. It

was designed to detect batteries firing

multiple rounds. Expect many false

alarms when it detects small arms,

birds, helicopters, etc. In the first 18

hours of Q36 operations in Somalia,

there were more than 100 false alarms.

TOPIC: Environmental Effects onMortar Ammunition.

DISCUSSION: Mortar ammunitionrequires careful handling and storage in the

jungle. Prolonged exposure to heat andhumidity occasionally saturates thedesiccant. This allows the increments to

get wet, degrading the accuracy of theammunition.

LESSON(S):

When stacking mortar ammunition,

make sure you place some sort of

dunnage under it.

Inspect all ammunition for signs of

water damage before firing.

Only unpack the ammunition that

you need.


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BOS:Air Defense

TOPIC: Employment of Air DefenseAssets.

DISCUSSION: Since World War II, theU. S. has not fought an enemy with asignificant offensive air capability.However, certain lessons can be gleanedfrom the experience of our opponents in

the Vietnam War. The most lucrativetargets in the jungle are command andcontrol nodes, logistical bases, and firesupport sites. Individual units arerelatively more difficult to acquire andidentify than fixed sites. Air defenseassets, such as missiles and guns, shouldbe used to protect fixed sites. At any rate,the rugged jungle terrain makes it nearlyimpossible to transport missiles and guns

through the jungle. MANPADS and smallarms fire should be used to protectmaneuver units when passive air defensemeasures fail. The success of the NVAand Viet Cong in bringing down U. S. CASaircraft and helicopters is instructive.During movement, MANPADS should bepositioned where they can best cover theunit. Due to the dense jungle vegetation,that may entail moving along a ridge lineon the flank of the axis of advance,

travelling down a waterway, or hoppingfrom LZ to LZ.

LESSON(S):

Protect critical assets with missiles

and guns; use MANPADS for maneuver

units.

Maneuver your MANPADS where

they provide maximum coverage.

Don't neglect passive air defense

measures, such as camouflage and going

to ground, when aircraft are in the

vicinity.

MANPADS and small arms fire can

bring down enemy aircraft.

TOPIC: Jungle Air Defense Techniques.

DISCUSSION: Each unit should have areact-to-air-attack drill that is tailored tothe jungle. The Vietnam War proved thatSmall Arms for Air Defense (SAFAD)works in the jungle. It also proved that

passive air defense methods work as well.Reviews of historical data show that manytimes NVA and Viet Cong units of up toregimental size were able to maneuverfreely through the jungle without beingdetected. Superb route selection, marchdiscipline, and effective camouflage werethe keys. Most NVA and Viet Cong unitsthat were badly mauled by CAS were eitherin contact with U. S. ground forces, were

crossing a danger area, or were using aroad or trail. However, they almostinvariably extracted a toll of downed CASaircraft and helicopters using acombination of passive air defense andSAFAD techniques.


25/81

LESSON(S):Your first line of air defense is

passive measures.

Select routes that maximize

concealment from aerial observation.

Avoid trails and open areas to themaximum extent possible.

When all else fails, use SAFAD to

make the enemy account for the cost of

attacking.


26/81

BOS: Mobility and Survivability

TOPIC: Employment of Engineers.

DISCUSSION: Due to the restrictivenature of jungle terrain, engineers shouldbe well forward during a movement tocontact or search-and-attack operation.When possible, an engineer squad shouldtravel with the lead platoon. Then if an

obstacle or a minefield is encountered, itcan be cleared quickly. Otherwise, the unitcould face a lengthy delay as the engineerswork their way forward. During adeliberate attack or an attack on a fortifiedposition, engineers should be employed inmuch the same manner as in any otherenvironment. Keep in mind that combatengineers can only bring man-portableequipment. They are not mules.

Concertina, chain saws, bangaloretorpedoes, cratering charges, and otherheavy items must be air lifted to and from awork site. Your engineers shouldconcentrate on carrying demolitions (C-4blocks are best) and mine detectors,remembering that they have to live out oftheir rucksack. On occasion, combatengineers are employed as infantry.However, keep in mind that combatengineers do not possess the firepower of

infantry, nor are they nearly as well trainedin infantry skills. If they must be employedas infantry, it should be in a defensive role.

LESSON(S):

Remember the load limitations of

your engineers.

Demolitions and mine detectors are

the minimum essential tools that the

engineers must carry.

During movement to contact/search

and attack, have your engineers well

forward.

Make sure your engineers are

included in your hasty attack battle

drills.

Avoid employing engineers as

infantry.

TOPIC: Mobility Tasks.

DISCUSSION: During offensiveoperations, mobility is the focus of

engineering efforts. Although combatengineer units possess engineeringexpertise, they lack significant amounts ofconstruction equipment. In the jungle,most of their equipment is limited to whatthey can carry in their rucksacks. For

jungle operations, the LZ/PZ clearing is themost important activity. An engineerplatoon can create a rough one-ship LZ/PZusing demolitions and organic equipment.

Then, chain saws and other equipmentcould be lifted in to allow furtherexpansion of the LZ/PZ. Mines andboobytraps are easy to conceal in the thick

jungle foliage. As a result, clearingminefields and boobytraps is probably themost common combat engineer task in the

jungle.


27/81

The expertise provided by engineers is a movement of personnel at checkpoints orreal life saver, provided they are far roadblocks during population and resourceenough forward to reach the mines and/or control operations. During the defense,boobytraps quickly. The jungle abounds in the engineers can emplace obstacles andnatural barrier material. Also depending minefields to protect battle positions andupon the enemy, breaching obstacles can key installations. Although concertina is abe a common activity. Although combat very effective type of wire for obstacles,engineer units possess basic engineer barbed wire in rolls can be man-packedskills, they lack the skills and equipment through the jungle, while concertinafor extensive road construction projects. cannot. If you rely on concertina, the

However, combat engineers do have the engineers will have to wait for it to beskills to construct foot bridges across the delivered. When time is critical, barbednumerous streams and small rivers wire in rolls is the solution. In anyencountered in the jungle. In addition, countermobility task, the best way to speedthey are capable of simple roadway repair work is to use the engineers as supervisors.and maintenance. Anything greater willrequire the employment of specializedengineer units.

LESSON(S):

Engineers can enhance your mobility

in the jungle by creating or improvingLZ/PZs.

Combat engineers lack the equipment

and expertise to undertake major

bridging or road repair projects.

TOPIC: Countermobility Tasks.

DISCUSSION: Engineers perform

countermobility tasks both duringoffensive and defensive operations.Engineers can emplace obstacles to denythe enemy the use of small waterways.Subsurface wire entanglements areparticularly effective. They can alsoconstruct obstacles to channel the

LESSON(S):

Use subsurface wire entanglements to

block small waterways.

Use barbed wire in rolls for hasty

countermobility tasks.

You can't hump concertina through

the jungle. It is both too bulky and too

heavy.

Use your engineers as supervisors

during countermobility tasks; it speeds

up the work.

TOPIC: Mines and Boobytraps.

DISCUSSION: Due to the densevegetation of the jungle, it is very easy for

troops to become misoriented and blunder

into their own minefield.


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This is a problem that surfaces duringoffensive as well as defensive operations.

It is imperative that the engineers record,

report, and recover mines and boobytraps.

In essence, the engineer element leader can

be the clearing house for such information.

Also, the engineers should employ a simple

method of marking mines and boobytraps.

The marking system should be by the

supported unit's SOP. If the supported unit

does not have one, the engineers shoulddevise one. It should then be disseminated

through the supported unit's chain of

command. A single strand or barbed wire

around the minefield is very effective as a

marker. It also allows the engineers to lay

out dummy minefields as part of the

obstacle plan. Additionally, it speeds

recovery of the mines by delineating the

minefield.

LESSON(S):Engineers should record, report, and

recover mines and boobytraps.

The engineer element leader can serve

as the point of contact for information

about minefields in the unit AO.

Minefields must be marked by a

simple method to prevent fratricide.

A single strand of barbed wire aroundthe minefield aids in recovering the

mines.

TOPIC: Survivability Tasks.

DISCUSSION: Survivability tasks aremost commonly performed during

defensive operations. Through the use ofcratering charges, demolitions, chain saws,and locally available materials, engineerscan quickly construct formidable bunkers.Additionally, they can supervise theclearing of fields of fire and theconstruction of trenches, fightingpositions, gun emplacements, and wireobstacles. However, the design andconstruction of complex structures aregenerally beyond their capabilities.

LESSON(S):

Use engineers to supervise the

execution of survivability tasks.

Plan to supplement the engineers

with pioneer tools and cratering charges

to speed construction efforts.


29/81

BOS: Combat Service Support

TOPIC: Casualty Evacuation.

DISCUSSION: The jungle generallyrenders overland casualty evacuationextremely difficult. The only quick way LESSON(S):out of the jungle is via helicopter. Using a

jungle penetrator or rigid litter, casualtiescan be lifted out of areas where there is no

PZ/LZ. Ground evacuation routes andcasualty collection points (CCPs) shouldbe planned only after a thorough study ofthe trail networks. Busting brush with acasualty is generally not a good idea. Therugged nature of most jungle terrain callsfor the establishment of a larger-than-normal number of CCPs. As a rule ofthumb, CCPs should be no more than 200meters away from the objective/unit

position. Whenever possible, CCPs shouldbe as close to a PZ/LZ as possible. Shouldweather or enemy activity prohibit casualtyevacuation by helicopter, then troops mustbe trained in the construction of fieldexpedient litters. A four-man litter partycan normally cover no more than 300meters in an hour without exhaustingthemselves very quickly. If enough troopsare available, a litter party should consistof eight men. Switching off every 20minutes will allow them to proceed at 500meters per hour. It also provides securityfor the litter party. A final means ofcasualty evacuation is by water, depending

on the availability of boats. Riverine craftor locally commandeered boats can serveas a rapid way to evacuate casualties.

Use aerial evacuation whenever

possible.

Study and make use of trail networks

for ground evacuation.Train troops in the use of the jungle

penetrator, rigid litter, and field

expedient litter.

Ensure CCPs are as close as possible

to the objective/unit position.

Use eight-man litter parties when

possible.

Consider evacuation by water.

Remember CCPs often become the

place where the casualties are delivered.Consider echeloning Advanced

Trauma Life Support (ATLS) teams.

Infantry battalions have a capability of

fielding two teams, each headed by

either the PA or Surgeon. Support the

main effort by attaching an ATLS team.

Provide the treatment to the CCP to

save lives until they can be evacuated.

Distribute the Class VIII load among

soldiers other than medical personnel.


30/81

TOPIC: Other Medical Considerations.

DISCUSSION: Jungle warfare has asignificantly higher rate of disease andnonbattle injury (DNBI) than otheroperational environments. It has been saidthat everything in the jungle either has avenomous sting, a nasty bite, or will makeyou sick. Fortunately, that is anexaggeration. Planning for jungle

operations does require that the battalionmedical platoon leader and Physician'sAssistant (PA) study endemic diseases andother hazards. They must ensure thatbattalion medics and combat life saversreceive training to cope with diseases andother hazards prior to deployment. The PAshould take a personal interest in tailoringthe medical supplies and even the aid bagsfor the jungle environment. Many junglesin the world still have Malaria, Dengue

Fever, and other tropical illnesses. Anefficient system to distribute the rightprophylaxis is vital. Anti-venom and beesting kits should be available to all medicalpersonnel. Due to the slowness ofmovement through the jungle, prophylaxis,anti-venom, and bee sting kits should bepushed forward.

LESSON(S):

Study endemic diseases and hazards.Train to treat those diseases and

hazards.

Tailor medical supplies to those

diseases and hazards.

Push supplies, such as prophylaxis,anti-venom, and bee sting kits, to the

lowest possible level.

TOPIC: The Soldier's Load.

DISCUSSION: During World War II andVietnam, the U. S. soldier was frequently

overburdened when he fought in thejungle. Although he had superior strategicmobility, his tactical mobility was poor. Inboth conflicts, units learned to strip downto a combat-essential load to outmaneuverthe enemy. A good rule of thumb is that atotal of 50 pounds is all that a soldiershould carry. This 50 pounds shouldinclude his LBE, water, helmet andrucksack. In most cases, less is better.Otherwise, the heat, humidity, and ruggedterrain will quickly wear the soldier out.The three top priorities should be water,ammunition, and batteries. Every soldiershould have a butt pack to carry hisminimum survival requirements. Leadersat all levels must inspect soldiers loadsand rigorously dispose of any nonmission-essential items.

LESSON(S):

Don't overload your troops.Leaders must inspect soldiers loads

to weed out nonessential items.


31/81

TOPIC: Resupply Operations.

DISCUSSION: The jungle environmentputs a premium on proactive planning forresupply operations during the offense andthe defense. Battalions have difficultyresupplying companies and platoons usingthe supply point distribution system.Normally, platoons are too far away fromthe supply point to obtain supplies without

significantly weakening their front linestrength. The S4 must be proactive intracking the battle. He should push pre- LESSON(S):packed supplies forward to units incontact. A technique to accomplish themovement of the supplies is the creation oflog squads. The purpose of the logsquad is to carry supplies forward andcasualties rearward. The log squad carriesonly enough firepower to protect itself in achance contact. Another possibility is the

hiring of native porters and animals totransport supplies. During World War II,U. S. forces in the Pacific were extremelysuccessful with this technique. If sufficientair assets are available, supplies can bepre-packed in duffel bags and lowered byrappel ropes. Make sure that the duffelbags are man-portable. A 300-poundduffel bag is useless. Consider usingponcho parachutes if light aircraft are

available, but helicopters are not.

The S4 must be a proactive planner.

Push pre-packaged supplies forward.

Create log squads with battalion

assets or local labor.

Consider duffel bag drops.

Ship all supplies in man-portable

containers or packages.


32/81

TOPIC: Water Supply. DISCUSSION: Due to the effects of the

DISCUSSION: Water consumption rates remains, it is imperative that deceased

are very high in the jungle. However, personnel be either evacuated or interred.

treating local sources will yield potable Failure to do so may have a catastrophic

water. Procuring water locally will prevent effect on morale. Log squads or any other

having water humped through the jungle. form of transportation should be used to

This will ease the logistical system's water backhaul the deceased personnel to pre-

distribution problem. Most jungles have established collection points. The

abundant water during their rainy season. battalion S4 should aggressively track the

There is a potential for water shortages movement. He must ensure that theduring the dry season, particularly in any remains are backhauled to brigade as

highlands. Therefore, always be prepared rapidly as possible. If field interment is

to push water forward. In case of a called for, then the unit responsible must

shortage, it must be a priority item. mark the location and report it to the S4.

LESSON(S):

Procure water locally, when possible.

Treat all drinking water.

Be prepared to push water forward as

a priority item.

Make sure iodine bottles remainsealed until needed. They are susceptible LESSON(S):to the humidity once they are opened. A Evacuate the remains of deceased

technique is to have squad bottles instead personnel as soon as possible.

of open bottles for each soldier. If unable to evacuate, inter the

TOPIC: Handling of DeceasedPersonnel.

jungle's heat and humidity on human

Particular care must be taken in both

establishing the location and in marking

the site. The jungle often makes precise

navigation difficult, while the rapid growth

of vegetation can cover a freshly dug

interment site in as little as a month.

remains.

Mark the interment site clearly. If

possible, locate it on a prominent terrain

feature to make it easy to locate.

Report locations to the S4 by SOP.


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BOS: Battle Command

TOPIC: Communications.

DISCUSSION: Radio communications inthe jungle are difficult. The thick junglecanopy and rugged terrain combine to playhavoc with VHF/FM radiocommunications. The S2 analysis of theterrain is vital to the CESO to identify

optimum communications sites. Signals aremasked by the terrain and absorbed by thedense vegetation. Use of high ground andretransmission sites help to maintaincommunications. Field-expedient jungleantennas can also help. Lower frequencies(30 - 60 MHZ) tend to have a better groundwave/line of sight. Due to the high watertables, grounding is not usually a problem.Ground all radios and antennas whenever

possible. Backup and even tertiary plansshould be developed in casecommunications is lost. Contact pointsshould be included on graphic overlays.Plans should be developed for elements tomeet face to face at these contact points ifno contact is made within a specifiedamount of time. Particular attention shouldbe paid to units that habitually operateindependently such as scouts, engineers,REMBASS, and GSR.

LESSON(S):

The S2 should ensure he provides the

CESO a copy of the terrain analysis.

Always plan retransmission sites.

Locate antennas on high ground.

Use remote antennas whenever

possible.

Use lower frequencies (30-60 MHz)

when possible.

Ground all radios and antennas.

Develop contingency plans for lost

communications, especially for units

operating independently.

TOPIC: Visualizing the Battlefield.

DISCUSSION: Due to the problems ofradio communication in the jungle, it isoften difficult for the commander tovisualize the battlefield. In most otherenvironments, a battalion commander can

see a significant portion of the battlefieldand acquire a feel for the battle. Not so inthe jungle, where his field of vision may be150 meters. As a result, the commandermust be constantly in touch with theforward units to understand the battle.This will entail a lot of brush popping onthe part of the battalion commander. Heshould have at least one soldier detailed asa bodyguard. Otherwise his ability to make

the observations and decisions necessarywill be hampered by the needs of selfpreservation. In addition, he will have totravel light with a small jump TOC. Mostlikely it would consist of the S3 and an S2representative.


34/81

In Operation JUST CAUSE, most sound can be heard. Also, increasedbattalions kept their FSO at the main CP to dispersion causes the number of troopsallow the commander to travel rapidly. It securing the CP to multiply geometrically.also allowed the FSO to keep the fire Each separate node must have 360-degreesupport net functional nearly all of the protection. A closely arrayed CP istime. generally the best configuration.

LESSON(S): LESSON(S):

Keep in touch with your forward Locate command posts near good

units, particularly the main effort. terrain for communications, but not on

Consider using bodyguard(s) to it.provide security. Remote your antennas.

Keep your jump TOC small. CPs should be closely arrayed.

Allow the FSO to work out of the Provide continual 360-degree

main CP. This will keep your fire security.

support nets up and available to the Keep your radios tuned to the lowest

companies at all times. possible volume, with the squelch off.

TOPIC: Command Posts.

DISCUSSION: Selecting a CP location inthe jungle is far more difficult than in mostenvironments. Good communications sitesare few. The enemy will know most goodcommunication sites. As a result, he islikely to focus patrolling efforts in thosevicinities. The dense jungle foliage allowsthe enemy to infiltrate close to most siteswithout being detected. To counter this,

dispersed CP sites seem attractive becauseof the concealment afforded by the jungle.While it is easier to conceal a CP in the

jungle, the sound of radios breakingsquelch carries a remarkable distance.Dispersing a CP into separate nodesgreatly increases the area in which the

Do not locate CPs along natural lines

of drift.

TOPIC: Plans and Orders.

DISCUSSION: Due to thecommunications problems inherent to the

jungle, the commander's intent must beabsolutely clear. All plans and ordersshould recognize several salient facts aboutthe jungle. The first is that jungle warfareis a squad and platoon leaders war.

Decentralized execution of all plans andorders is an absolute must. The second isthe need for simplicity. Simple plans workin the jungle; complex plans invariably fail.The third is the need for contingency plansthat rely on unit SOP for the majority oftheir content.


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The contingency plans should be identified maintaining visual contact beyond thewhile wargaming. The final point is that boundaries of a fire team must besimple, well-rehearsed unit SOPs are vital. experienced to sink in. This effect holdsDuring the 1941-42 Malaya and Burma true through battalion level.Campaigns, the Japanese Army used asingle well-rehearsed battle drill to hustlethe British out of Malaya and Burma. Allorders should provide adequate time forrehearsals in the jungle. As in allenvironments, rehearsals are one of the

keys to success. However, the junglepenalizes all units who fail to conductrehearsals. The dense vegetation andrugged terrain will confound evenseasoned troops if they have not rehearsedtheir actions in jungle terrain. The primaryreason is that the jungle is entirely alien tomost U. S. troops. The difficulties of

LESSON(S):

A clear, concise commander's intent

is half the battle.

Decentralized execution is the norm

in the jungle.

Use the K.I.S.S (keep it simple,stupid) principle.

Unit SOPs should be simple and well

rehearsed.

Conduct rehearsals in the jungle, not

in an open field.


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Part II

Platoon and Squad

Operations


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This section is organized differently from the first. The topics are focused at theplatoon and squad levels. The discussion is usually short, followed by a series of lessonbullets that are offered for consideration.

TOPIC: Raids.

DISCUSSION: The jungle terrainprovides excellent concealment and goodcover. It also reduces visibility and makes

movement slow and noisy.

LESSON(S):

Be patient on the leader's

reconnaissance. It will take longer due

to the dense jungle foliage and the need

for precise navigation.

Support and assault elements will

normally be combined due to a lack of

suitable areas for support positions.

Consider using flechette (buckshot)rounds for the M203.

Consider employing your 60-mm

mortars in the hand-held, direct fire

mode.

The leader's reconnaissance should

be small, no more than five men. A

suggested composition is: platoon leader,

assault team leader, weapons squad

leader, and the two M60 assistant

gunners. They can remain on site as areconnaissance and surveillance

element. When the M60s move forward,

the AGs can point out sectors of fire.

Be prepared to conduct a hasty

attack in case of compromise.

Limit your reconnaissance movement

to a minimum to avoid compromise.

Most leaders reconnaissances are

compromised when they attempt to get

too close to the objective or move too

quickly.

The ORP should be a maximum of

200 meters away.

Night raids are generally not

practical.

M60s are great for initiating raids.

The security teams should leap-frog

off the objective with the special teams

to avoid losing contact.The reconnaissance and surveillance

elements should carry pre-rigged

claymores to cover their withdrawal.

Consider taping a baggie filled with

powdered CS to the claymore. This

technique discourages pursuit.

Because of the difficulty of adjusting

fire quickly, use indirect fire to cover

your withdrawal and high speed avenues

of approach.


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TOPIC: Ambush.

DISCUSSION: Ambushes are a favoredtactic in the jungle. The dense vegetationand relatively few roads and trails makethem very effective.

LESSON(S):Local security must be alert because the

enemy can come from any direction,

forcing you to re-orient your ambush.

Always take your camouflage from the

area in which you have set up the ambush.

Remember that the trees and foliage

reduce the effective range of your weapons.

Most of the time, your assault element

will be closer to the kill zone than normal.

Check each individual soldier's field of

fire closely.

Consider using flechette (buckshot)

rounds for your M203s.

Consider emplacing claymores in the

trees above the trail. However, make surethey are secured to sturdy branches that do

not sway in the wind.

Do not use insect repellant, scented soap,

Avon Skin So Soft, and other nonorganic

smelling substances when on ambush. The

enemy can smell you before he hits the kill

zone.

To repel insects, take garlic pills or eat

garlic for a week prior to going on an

ambush in the jungle.

To provide further security, try to eatindigenous rations for one week prior to

going on ambush. This will keep from

alerting the enemy by your smell.

Minimize movement in the ambush

area, especially at night. The dense

vegetation and lack of ambient light cancause you to make a lot of noise.

- Have each soldier make field expedient

aiming stakes for the ambush site. This

will keep the distribution of fire even

throughout the kill zone.

Lay a handrailof 550 cord from theassault line to the ORP. Use it to speed

movement away from the ambush site. The

platoon sergeant can police it up as the

platoon withdraws.

Reconnoiter your ambush site and, iftime allows, set your troops in during

daylight hours.

Use the maximum number of NODs

possible. Ambushes normally take place

along trails where there is enough ambient

light to use them.

Use thermal imagers, such as the AN-

PAS 7, whenever possible. They work well

anywhere in the jungle.

Allocate NODs in the following priority:

M60s, SAWs, platoon leader, left and rightsecurity.

When clearing the kill zone at night,

drop chemlites by KIAs/WIAs. Use

different colored chemlites for different

halves of the kill zone. An example would

be left side green, right side blue.

Use TA1s for control of security

elements.

To avoid carrying bulky items through

the jungle, have the special teams work the

kill zone with empty rucksacks.Pyrotechnics, such as star clusters and

parachute flares, generally do not work

well in the jungle. Ground flares are

better.


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TOPIC: Reconnaissance.

DISCUSSION: These techniques, unlessotherwise noted, apply to both the scoutplatoon and regular combat patrols.

LESSON(S):

Reconnaissance teams should be

small, three -four men maximum.

Travel light. Reconnaissance patrols

should carry a butt pack only. Scoutplatoon teams will require a rucksack.

However, resist the temptation to pack it

with 100 pounds of lightweight gear.

Do not wear helmets; they degrade

your hearing and reduce your

peripheral vision.

Travel in a series of short, deliberate

movements. Your maximum cross-

country speed should be 200 - 300

meters per hour.

Take listening halts for at least 15

minutes every hour.

Patrolling more than 500 meters in

front of the unit should be handled by

the scouts.

Pattern reconnaissance techniques

are difficult to execute in the jungle. Use

them sparingly because they require a

lot of time.

Each four-man team should have two

radios. One should be pre-set to the firecontrol net's frequency. Always have a

pre-cut jungle antenna.

Always have a contingency plan inthe event of the loss of communications.

Do not use insect repellant, scented

soap, Avon Skin So Soft, and other

nonorganic smelling substances when on

reconnaissance. The enemy can smell

you before you reach the objective.

To repel insects, take garlic pills or

eat garlic for a week prior to going on a

reconnaissance in the jungle.

To provide further security, try to eatindigenous rations for one week prior to

going on reconnaissance. This will keep

from alerting the enemy by your smell.

Pre-rig your claymores with an M-60

fuze igniter and time fuze to provide a

means of breaking contact.

Carry an HC white smoke grenade

and a CS grenade. When thrown

together, the HC disguises the CS until

the enemy is in the cloud. It also tendsto suspend the CS in the air for a longer

period. This action will slow up enemy

pursuit. Also, he will tend to avoid

white smoke clouds from then on.

Carry pursuit denial munitions

(PDMs) whenever you can. Put them in

a claymore bag sewn to the top of your

rucksack.

You can never carry enough

grenades. You can use them without

giving your position away.

Carry 1:25,000 maps whenever you

can. Update them as you go.


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Avoid trails and natural lines of drift Carry your basic load of ammunition.whenever possible. If you must move on Expend it liberally to break contact.

a trail, travel slowly. Use a mix of tracers and ball to alert

Do not carry maps marked with you when your magazine is almost

graphics and complete SOIs. Employ empty.

minimal graphics and use SOI extracts. Use a simple near and far

Carry at least four quarts of water identification system.

and two bottles of iodine tablets. Check Always remember that you are the

the iodine tablets before you move out. Indians,not the cavalry.


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TOPIC: Hasty Attack/React to Contact.

DISCUSSION: Due to the limitedvisibility of the jungle, the hasty attack isthe most likely scenario.

LESSON(S):

React quickly with every weapon that

you can bring to bear as soon as you

contact the enemy. Gain immediate fire

superiority and keep it.Do not wait for a clear visual target to

open fire. Fire at smoke, muzzle flashes,

or by sound. Otherwise, the enemy will

gain fire superiority.

Use grenades immediately, both

smoke and fragmentation.

Develop a battle drill for the hasty

attack. It should be simple, wellrehearsed, and tailored to the jungle. If

you can only rehearse one battle drill,

this is it.

The key element for a hasty attack in

the jungle is the fire team.

The key leader for a hasty attack in

the jungle is the squad leader. Use your

initiative. The platoon leader and

platoon sergeant will be busy with

reporting, calling for fire support, andcontrolling CASEVAC.

Assault with shallow fire team wedges.

They are easiest to control in the jungle

while providing firepower to the front.

Drop rucksacks by fire team on line of

deployment or when decisively engaged.


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TOPIC: Deliberate Attack.

DISCUSSION: Deliberate attacks have thesame considerations as the raid, minus thewithdrawal. Instead, you substituteconsolidation and reorganization. Keep inmind that most successful counterattackstake place within 15-20 minutes of theenemy leaving the objective.

LESSON(S):Deliberate attacks are difficult to

synchronize.

Pay special attention to land

navigation.

Establish your limit of advance (LOA)

after careful consideration of the terrain.

If at all possible, establish it along a

easily discernible terrain feature.

Task-organize to provide 360-degree

security on the objective as you sweep to

the LOA.

Reconnoiter the near side of the

objective first. Do a far side

reconnaissance of the objective after you

have cleared between the LOA and the

objective. This will dramatically reduce

your chances of compromise during the

leader's reconnaissance.

Consider using an indirect fire

preparation of the objective.

When you arrive at the LOA, set outyour LPs/OPs immediately. Make sure

they have claymores to cover their

withdrawal if necessary.

Register your indirect fire assets as

soon as you arrive at the LOA.

Use the engineers to emplace a hasty

protective minefield as soon as you havecleared the objective.

If you use a reserve, consider tasking

the reserve for your special teams.

Accomplish all of the above in under

15 minutes.

Be aware of stay-behind snipers as

you approach the objective.

TOPIC: Jungle Bounding Technique.

DISCUSSION: The jungle boundingtechnique was developed at the JungleOperations Training Battalion. It is atechnique that maintains a steady pacewithout tiring the soldiers. At any giventime, two thirds of the troops are stationarywhile the other one third is moving. Using550 cord will allow units to move at nightwithout losing control.

LESSON(S):

The lead squad in the order of march

moves forward 100-200 meters and halts.

It will become the new trail squad for the

next bound. While moving, it laid out a

line of 550 cord to the middle squad in

the order of march.

Once signalled that the lead squad has

halted, the middle squad hands the 550cord handrailto the trail squad.

The middle squad then moves forward to

become the new lead squad.


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Once the trail squad is signalled that The easiest method is what the Britishthe middle squad has halted, the trail call the bum stick. Although it is not

squad moves forward, rolling up the 550 the most efficient method of getting

cord. It now assumes the position of intravenous fluids into a casualty, it is

middle squad for the next bound, extremely successful when nearly all

handing the 550 cord to the lead squad. other veins have collapsed.

Each squad should rest in a cigar- Limited visibility firing techniques

shaped perimeter. must be practiced to proficiency. The

Place M60s and SAWs at the 12 and 6 use of aiming stakes and firing at sound

o'clock position. must be impressed on the soldier. One of

TOPIC: Individual Soldier Skills.

DISCUSSION: The jungle makesextraordinary demands of every soldier. Inparticular, it tests the fire team, squad, andplatoon leaders. Certain skills must beacquired or honed prior to operating in the

jungle.

LESSON(S):

Exercising initiative is a must in the

jungle. The limited visibility and

difficulties in communication require

that the fire team and squad leaders act

quickly without waiting for orders.

Quick fire techniques must be second

nature to every soldier. Engagement

distances are usually so short that known

distance firing techniques are noteffective. In short, he who shoots first

wins.

Every soldier must be proficient in the

treatment of heat injuries, use of bee

sting kits, and in giving IVs.

the worst things that can happen in afirefight is for a soldier to hit the dirt and

cease firing because he cannot see a

target clearly.

The number of water obstacles

requires that you drown-proof your

soldiers. Every weak swimmer should be

identified.

Practice waterproofing equipment,

especially radios.

Practice land navigation without usingthe GPS. Learn to rely on azimuth and

pace count. Most maps of the jungle

haven't been field checked in 20 years.

In addition, visibility is generally poor.

As a result, terrain association can be

tricky.

Every soldier must practice using

water purification tablets. This sounds

ridiculous, but experience shows that

soldiers will botch this task unless they

have done it correctly at least once.

Reinforce lessons about camouflage.

In particular, remind the soldier to

change his personal camouflage to match

the surrounding vegetation. Nothing

sticks out like swamp vegetation on a

hillside.


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Follow simple rules of personalhygiene. Do not wear underdrawers,

wash daily if you can with nonscented

soap, and take care of your feet.

Cross-train your soldiers in all

squad and platoon weapons systems.

The slowness of the replacement

system in the jungle requires it.

Brush up on tracking skills. Find

out who the experienced hunters are in

your unit, and use them to train others.

SKILL LEVEL 2 and 3

Know your nine-line MEDEVAC

format from memory. Know the

capabilities and how to use a jungle

penetrator and a rigid litter.

Understand the technique of

adjusting indire

95-5 Winning in the Jungle

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