94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

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POLITICAL TREND CHARTS Saudi Arabia Gv08 AM6,5 Gvl5 AM6,4 PC08 6 PCI5 5- Gv = Government Type (2008, 2015) R08 7+ 115 5+ AM = Absolute Monarchy (effectiveness, 0-9; stability, 0-9) PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos. 9 :: maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline,S average) EdlS 7 hl5 6+ IPI5 (). NOTE: All figures apply to Saudi Arabians, not guest workers. The trends from the previ- ous edition were turned around because of a sharp increase in oil prices. This was brought about by growing demand in China and India, not the war in Iraq. That money has bought popUlarity for the House of Saud. as did the monarchy's effective crackdown on al Qaeda violence after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Kuwait GvOS Gvl5 PCOS PCl5 ROS Rl5 EcOS Eel5 IPl5 CMS,S CM5,6 7 5 3 3 7 7 7 ell! = Constitutional Monarchy (a democracy, after a fashion) Oman GvOS Gvl5 PCDS PCI5 ROS RI5 EcOS Eel 5 IPI5 M6,4 M4,3 6 6 7 6 3 4 4+ M = Monarchy United Arab Emirates (UAE) GvOS GvlS PCOS PCI5 ROS RI5 EcOS Eel5 IPl5 M7,4 M6,4 5 5 6 S 7 7 S M = Monarchy (a very investment-oriented monarchy)

Transcript of 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Page 1: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

94 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Saudi Arabia

Gv08 AM6,5

Gvl5 AM6,4

PC08 6

PCI5 5-

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2015)

R08 7+

115 5+

AM = Absolute Monarchy (effectiveness, 0-9; stability, 0-9) PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos. 9 :: maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline,S average)

EdlS 7

hl5 6+

IPI5 ().

NOTE: All figures apply to Saudi Arabians, not guest workers. The trends from the previ­ous edition were turned around because of a sharp increase in oil prices. This was brought about by growing demand in China and India, not the war in Iraq. That money has bought popUlarity for the House of Saud. as did the monarchy's effective crackdown on al Qaeda violence after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Kuwait

GvOS Gvl5 PCOS PCl5 ROS Rl5 EcOS Eel5 IPl5 CMS,S CM5,6 7 5 3 3 7 7 7

ell! = Constitutional Monarchy (a democracy, after a fashion)

Oman

GvOS Gvl5 PCDS PCI5 ROS RI5 EcOS Eel 5 IPI5 M6,4 M4,3 6 6 7 6 3 4 4+

M = Monarchy

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

GvOS GvlS PCOS PCI5 ROS RI5 EcOS Eel5 IPl5 M7,4 M6,4 5 5 6 S 7 7 S

M = Monarchy (a very investment-oriented monarchy)

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Qatar

GvOB M7,5

Gv15 M7,5

M = Monarchy

Yemen

GvOB AD6,5

Gv15 LAD6,5

Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and the 30 Years' War

PCOB 6

PCOB 5

PC15 6

PC15 6

ROB 5

ROB 5

R15 6-

R15 4

EcOB 6+

EcOB 2

Eel5 6

Eel 5 4

95

IP15 5+

IP15 5

AD = A very Authoritarian Democracy (rather more authoritarian than less, but some change from 1995) LAD == Less Authoritarian Democracy (as Yemenis get used to using words, rather than threats and vi01ence, to settle disputes)

Iraq

GvOB RD6,3

Gv15 RD5,3

PeOB 3

PC15 4

RD = Representative Democracy

ROB 8-

R15 7-

EcOB 2+

Ec15 4

IP15 6-

NOTE: [raq has a 2008 economic rating of 2+ because it relies heavily on foreign aid. Yet it is not an economic basket case like a number of other countries with a 2 rating. This is a potentially strong economy damaged by dictatorship and war. Conceivably, the Iraqi econ­omy in 2015 could be a 5-; here's why it rates a 4: Beyond the problem of security lies the problem of rebuilding (and, in many cases, creating) major infrastructure. That is expensive and requires sustained effort. Corruption harms all economic development, but it really plagues major infrastructure projects. Still, Iraq has the same Investment Potential rating as Saudi Arabia-the Iraqis are liberalizing their economy. We shall see in 2015.

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% A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHART

Saudi Arabia and Arabian Peninsula

Power Interest Indicator D+S·

Economic Hislorical Pol~itol Mil~ory Force Abilifylo Interesls Inlerests Inlerest Interesl Generotion Inlervene

Polential Politically

U.S. 8 5 7 7 4 5 UK 6 7 5 5+ 1 4 Fronce 6 6 5 5 1 4 Russia 3 4 4 4 2 3 Iroq 8 9 8 8 1 1 Iron 7 8 8 7 4 7 Jordon 8 9 8 8 2 4 Israel 1 7 8 8 4 1+ Egypl 7 8 8 7 2 7 Soudi 9 9 9 9 2+ 8

(0 = minimum, 9 = maximum)

• FGPs as of D· Day plus 5. i.e., five days from the commencement of hostilities. Excepting local armies and militias (e.g .• Saudi Arabia itself), virtually aU military forces require "lift" or "march time" to bring significant forces into target areas of the Peninsula. U.S. FGP at D+45is8.

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Israel and the Middle East: Babies, Shekels, Ballots, and Bullets 129

in Yassir Arafat's PLO, Fatah provided the original core of the Palestinian government. Secular-nationalist Fatah is perceived by many Palestinians as rife with corruption and infighting.

Hamas ("Islamic Resistance Movement")-Radical Islamic movement. Possibly the most powerful of rejectionist factions that accept no peace or any compromise with Israel. Hamas promoted itself as a clean-hands, no­nonsense choice to Fatah's corruption. Hamas' program includes the Is­lamicization of Palestinian society.

Izzedine al-Qassam Brigade-Hamas' military wing. Palestinian Legislative Council-Set up by the 1993 Oslo Accords. Islamic Jihad-Radical Palestinian-dominated terrorist sect (also ac-

tive in Lebanon and Egypt). Has issued communiques threatening Russian Jews arriving in Israel. Has claimed credit for attacks on Israelis visiting Egypt. Subunits include the AI-Suri Martyr Unit and the Martyrdom Lovers' Battalion.

Fellahin-The Arab peasant farmer. Fedayeen-PLO guerrilla fighters. Third Way Party-The TWP, a centrist faction.

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Israel

GvOB RD7,B

Gvl5 peOB RD7,B 7

pels B

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2015)

ROB S

RIS 4

hOB 7

EelS 7

RD = Representative Democracy (effectiveness, 0-9; stability, 0-9) PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos, 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline, 5 average)

IPIS' 7

• Agriculture and comparatively educated population in cities improve investment poten­tial, despite the lack of stability.

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130

New Palestine

GvOB GvlS peOB AlOjT01,1 * lR02,2 1

A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

pelS 4

ROB B

RIS 7

EcOB 3

ALD = Authoritarian Limited Self-Government (in ~'est Bank) TD = Theological Dictatorship (In Gaza)

EelS 4

IPIS 3+

LRD = Limited Representative Democracy Oimited by (sraeli military veto of Arab political and Islamic radicals)

.. Hamas effectiveness and stability figures are 1. 1; so are Fatah's. The 2015 LRD is a 2, 2 and represents either a tenuous Fatah victory or a severely chastised Hamas in the Palestin­ian Civil War.

Jordan

GvOB ACMS,S

GvlS peOB ACM6,S 5

PC1S 5

ROB 4

ACM = Authoritarian Constitutional Monarchy

Egypt

GvOB M03,3

GvlS PCOB A04,S 4

PC1S 4

AD :: Authoritarian Democracy MD = Military Dictatorship

R08 8

RIS 4

RIS 8

Ec08 4

EclS 4

EcOB EelS 3 4

IPIS 3

IPIS 3

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Israel and the Middle East: Babies, Shekels, Ballots, and Bullets 131

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHARTS

Israel

Economic Hislorical Political Military Force Abilily to Interest/ Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene Abilily to

Po1ential t Politically Ptomote Economic

Development

Palestine 9 9 9 9 7 6 Pal-Rej* 1 9 9 9 O+@ 8+@ 0 U_S_ 5 8 8 7 6 6 7 lordan 8 9 9 9 3 5 4 Syria 3 B 9 9 4" 4 5x Egypt 6 7 9 7 6" 6 5 Iran 3 5 7 6 2+@ 2 1 Hezb 1 9 9 9 2+@ 2 0

(0 = minimum, 9 = maximum)

• Palestinian rejectionist organizations such as Hamas. They exist as a force of political in-tervention. # Israeli force generation potential up to 100 kilometers from its borders is a 9. A Given time for mobilization, Syria needs 8 weeks, Egypt 12 weeks. x Note Syria's rise in interest in Israeli economic development. @ A + for Palestinian Rejectionlsts (Pal-Rej), Hezhollah (Hezh), and Iran due to terror. Growing Iranian arsenal of theater range weapons account for Iranian FGP. Hezbollah could be viewed as additional Syrian and Iranian FGP.

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132 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

New Palestine/West Bank

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interest/ Interests Interests Interest Interesl Generation Intel'lene Ability to

Potential Politically Promote Economic

Development

Israel 8 9 9 9 9 7 9 Jordan 7 8 9 8 4 6 8 Syria 3 4 7 7 3 4 2

NOTE: An economically viable Palestinian state will be key to future Israeli and Jordanian economic health.

Jordan

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interest/ Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene Ability to

Potential Politically Promote Economic

Development

Isroel 5 8 8 8 8+ 5 7 Syrio 3 7 7 7 5 6 5 Iraq 7 7 7 7 2 4 6 Saudi 5 9 8 8 \ 7 8 U.S. 4 7 8 7 4 5 7 Palestine 8 8 8 8 \ 6 4 Iran \ 2 5 6 \. \ 2 Britain 4 7 5 3 \ 2 3

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Israel and the Middle East: Babies, Shekels, Baltots, and Bullets 133

Egypt

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability 10 Interest/ Inleresls Inleresl5 Interest Interest Generalion Intervene Ability to

Polentiol Politically Promote Economic

Development

U.S. 5 7 8 8 6 4 6 Israel 6 8 9 9 6+ 3 5 Libya 3 7 8 9 1 I 2 Russia 1 5 6 6 1 2 1 Islam Rods 2 9 9 8 3 4 1 EU 6 6 7 6 3 3 7

PARTICIPANT STRATEGIES AND GOALS

Israel The basic Israeli goals remain Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist

as a state and the destruction of radical terrorist factions who launch at­tacks on Israelis.

There are the things Israel is good at and will continue to do: hang tough against Arab terrorist groups by continuing reprisal tactics; seek to extend political ties to Jordan, including increasing trade and technical as­sistance for agriculture and industry; punish Lebanese HezboUah guerril­las and Syria when the warfare gets too hot in Lebanon.

The Israelis have begun to address the immigration challenge, but jobs remain an issue. The influx ofJews from the former Soviet Union brought more soldiers but tested the economy. Still, in comparison to the rest of the region, Israel's economy generates wealth.

Israelis and Palestinians need a stable, secure relationship, and Israeli economic and security planners know it. The split between Fatah and Hamas gives both a setback (in terms of continuing chaos among Pales­tinians) and an opportunity: essentially, Fatah has become a de facto Israeli

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148 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

Christians, and Arab Sunnis. Hezbollah provides Iran with a long-range terror strike capability that is deniable. It wasn't us, Tehran's mullahs argue; it was Hezbollah. Iran supports Hezbollah politically and financially and provides weapons as well as military training. Iran's secretive Quds Force, which belongs to the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) operates with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

NOTE: Lebanon functions as a collection of fiefdoms-it certainly isn't a fully sovereign nation-state.

"National Lebanon"

Gv08 Gvl5 PC08 PCI5 R08 RIS [c08 [tiS IPIS N(I,I H(3,3 1+ 3 4 4 4 5 S+

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2115) NC = National Coalition (effectiveness. 0-9; stability. 0-9)

PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos, 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index (9 maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline. 5 average)

"Hezbollah-stan"

"Civil War Hezbollah-stan"

Gv08 Gvl5 PCOB pm ROB RI5 EcOB Ecl5 IP TDE5,6 OS(2,2 6+ 2 B 4 3 3- 2

TDE = Theological Dictatorship backed by External power (in this case, Iran) DSC = Damaged Separatist Coalition (This trend chart envisions a Hezbollah-stan either destroyed by the Israelis or co-opted by the other Lebanese factions---either political or military co-optation.)

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Israel and the Middle East: Babies, Shekels, Ballots, and Bullets 149

"Partition Hezbollah-stan"

Gvl5 TDE4,4

PCIS 4

RIS 8

EelS 3-

IP o

TDE = Theological Dictatorship backed by External power (in this case, Iran) (This trend chart envisions a HezboUah-stan created as a result of Potential Outcome 1.)

THE DEVELOPING SITUATION As of 2008, Lebanon is nominally governed by a democratic-nationalist

alliance, the March 14 Coalition (which formed in Beirut during the spring of 2005). It combines various secular political organizations, Druze and Sunni Muslim groups, and Christian political parties (including the Lebanese Forces, the descendants of the Phalange).

Hezbollah operates as a part of the government and as a government unto itself. Armed Palestinian refugee factions continue to present the na­tional government with an internal challenge-another "army within:'

UN Security Council Resolution 1701, passed in August 2006, called for the disarmament of Hezbollah. Hezbollah, however, did not disarm, and UN peacekeepers did not disarm Hezbollah.

The national military, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), lacks the po­litical will and combat power to control Hezbollah. The LAF, however, is rearming and improving. During the summer of 2007 it fought a Palestin­ian Islamist faction (Fatah Islam, a group allegedly allied with al Qaeda) in an extensive three-month-long operation in a Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli. As of 2008, Hezbollah continues to confront the Lebanese army and pro-government Lebanese militias.

Lebanon remains a mosaic of contentious religious and political fief­doms. Violence between Shia and non-Shia Muslim has flared. In 2007, several anti-Syrian Lebanese politicians were assassinated in Lebanon. The fiefdoms all know how to acquire weapons and man their own militia armies. In early 2008, several factions-after pointing out that Hezbollah had yet to be disarmed-began rebuilding their militias, though no faction other than Hezbollah had remilitarized to 1975-1990 levels.

Still, these are indications that renewed civil war in Lebanon is well within the realm of possibility.

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172 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

Hezbollah-uThe Party of God" works for Tehran and is active throughout Shiite communities in Lebanon. Formed in the early 1980s.

Savak-The Shah's old secret police force and intelligence service. Some surviving Savak agents are now allegedly involved in the Middle Eastern drug and weapons trade.

Kuzistan-Iranian province, also called Arabistan, with a significant Arab minority (30 plus percent); has large producing oil fields.

Satellite TV-In 1994, the mullahs attempted to outlaw ownership of dish TV antennas, the type that pluck racy Western TV shows off of geo­synchronous satellites. Western TV undermines the mullahs' vision of so­cial order. Too much sex, violence, and rock and roll.

Hijab-Modest Islamic dress. In Islam, hijab gives a woman dignity, respect, and authority. A chador is a head-to-toe cloak. Many women, es­pecially urbanites with education, having tasted freedom under the Shah, resent the religious restrictions the clerics have reimposed.

Fatwa-Religious proclamation, effective in proportion to the stature of the issuing cleric. In the West, it has come to mean a death warrant.

Refahs-A thousand-shop chain of discount stores that sells goods at prices guaranteed by the Iranian government (a payoff by the mullahs to buy domestic tranquility). Plunging oil revenues have made even these shops less attractive because of shortages. This encourages unrest, as the people get a taste of what they might have more of if the nation's oil wealth were not devoted to buying weapons.

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Iran

GvOB TD4,4

GvlS (04,4

PCOB 4

PCIS 4

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2115)

ROB 7

RIS B

E[OB 4

TD = Theological Dictatorship (actually a coalition of religious radicals) (e[fectiveness, 0-9: stability, 0-9) CD = Coalition Dictatorship (incorporating religious and secular wings)

PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos. 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline, 5 average)

EelS 4·

IPIS S.

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Iran: The Mullahs' Many Wars 173

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHARTS

Strait of Hormuz

NOTE: This is a specific geographic area rather than a nation, but one that is strategically vital. This chart focuses primarily on military capa­bilities. Remember, FGP reflects comparative capabilities in the specific region or country.

Power Interest Indicator D+5 •

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene

Potential Politically

Iran 8 9 9 9 6ft 9 U.S. 7 S 8 6 7" 7 Japan 8 4 7 6 1 S Britain 7 6 6 7 2+ 4 Saudi 8 8 9 7 1+ 7 Russia 2x S 4 S 2· 4 Oman 9 9 8 9 2 7 Iraq 2 S 7 4 0 3 UAE 9 9 9 9 2 8 Turkey 2 S 6 3 I 4 Israel 2 2 8& 6 2- 0

(0 = minimum, 9 = maximum)

• FGP for D-Day+S, i.e., five days from the commencement ofhostilities.lflranians con­duct planned closure of the Straits, Iran's FGP on D-Day is 5. # FGP of 6 applicable for defense on the Iranian side of the Strait; give "revolutionary Iran" an FGP ofS for operations on islands in Strait, FGP of2 for operations against UAE or Oman on mainland. Shah forces would have had a 4+. Oman's FGP of2 applicable to de­fense in Oman. Oman has a FGP 1- for operations against Iranian islands. UAE 1+ applica­ble in UAL and on UAL islands. Until arrival of new frigates, UAL has no ability to operate offensive]y against Iran. A U.S. D+lS strength is B. x Russia's economic interests could increase if Moscow needs new oil sources. Russian oil also becomes more valuable if the Straits are closed. & Large rise in Israeli political interest in this particular conflict over the past 15 years.

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174 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

Iran vs. Turkey

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene

Potential Politically

Iron 7 9 9 9 S+ 8 Turkey 6 8 8 9 7+ 8 Russia S 7 8 8 4 S U.s. 4 6 7 7 7 7 Azeri 8 9 9 9 1+ 3 NATO* 4 S 6 7 4+ 7 Greece 1 S 8 8 1 2 Bulgoria 1 4 7 S 1 1 Iroq 7 9 9 9 3+ S Syria 6 8 8 7 1+ 4 Kurds 7 9 8 8 1 6

NATO other than U.S., Greece. and Turkey.

PARTICIPANT STRATEGIES AND GOALS

Iran The Khomeinists hope radicalizing Shiites in Iraq and the Arabian

Peninsula countries will further weaken Iraqi and Arab power. Revolution­ary Iran's goal is to spread the gospel of Khomeini's Koranic government, or at least their xenophobic version of the Koran, and drive Western influ­ences out of the Islamic world. Iran wants to be the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and in the Islamic world. Iran also has another motive: the war is a populist diversion from the revolutionary excesses of the Islamic republican revolutionaries and the resulting failing economy. The mullahs see the creation of an Islamic republic in Iran as the first move in the es­tablishment of a pan-Islamic federation. Iran is still outraged by the Iran­Iraq War and is worried about a modernizing, post-Saddam Iraq. Getting nukes gives Tehran a chance to get even.

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Balkans: Back to the Balkans 217

"South Slav· divisions and set the stage for the formation of a united Yu­goslav state. Major figures included the Serb Vuk Karadzic and the Slovene poet J ernei Kopitar.

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Albania

Gv08 AD4,S

GvlS AD4,6

PCOB 6

PCIS 6

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2115)

ROB 6

RIS 6

EdlB 2+

AD = Authoritarian Democracy (effectiveness, 0-9; stability 0-9) PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos, 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline. 5 average)

Serbia

IMlB AD4,4

GvlS ADS,S

PC08 S

Look Back: Serbia

PCIS 6

ROB S

RIS 4

EcOB S

EelS 3

EelS S

IPIS 3

IPIS 3

Here's what we had in the 1996 edition for Serbia (federal Serbia and Mon­tenegro, actually):

Gv9S SA6,S

Gv20 AD3,4

PC9S 6

PC20 S

R9S 7

SA = Socialist Authoritarian (albeit a peculiar one) AD = Authoritarian Democracy

R20 S

Ec9S 2+

Ec20 S

2008: Over the six-year period 1995-2000, an authoritarian democracy did take root. Polit­ical cohesion decreased, but more than the edition projected. Repression decreased slightly. Despite losing a war, the economy improved slightly.

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218 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

Montenegro

GvOB RO 4,5

Gvl5 R06}

PCOB 6

pm 7

RD = Representative Democracy

Croatia

GvOB RO 5,6

Slovenia

GvOB RO 7,1

Gvl5 R06}

P(OB 7

Gvl5 P(OB RO 7,7 B

pm 7

pm B

ROB 5

ROB 5

ROB 2

Look Back: Independent Slovenia

Rl5 4

Rl5 4

RIS 2

EeOB 4

EeOB 4

EcOB 6

EelS 5

Eel5 6

EIl5 6

IPl5 4

IPl5 5

IPl5 6

The 1991 edition's "fantasy state" of Independent Slovenia looked like this:

Gv96 R06}

P(96 7

R96 2

Ee96 7-

2008: Slovenia in 1996 may have been the Ex-Yugoslav's economic success, but we over­rated its economic upside. It was, however. a representative democracy that was effective and stable.

Bosnia

GvOB 1.02,2

Gvl5 1.03,3

PCOB 2-

P(15 3

ROB 6

Rl5 6

EeOB 2-

EllS 3

IPl5 2

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Macedonia

Gv08 RD4,4

GvlS RD4,S

PC08 4

Balkans: Back to the Balkans

PC1S 5

R08 S

R1S 4

Look Back: Independent Kosovo

Ec08 3

EllS 4

219

IP1S 3+

The 1996 edition figures for an Independent Kosovo of year 2000 (separate Albanian state from capital of Pristina south and west to Albanian border):

Gv20 MAl,2

PC20 6

R20 8

MA = Military Authoritarian

E!20 1

2008: Actual 2000 government was UN (international military government was not a gov­ernment category we considered, but events have shown it is a type of government). Cohe­sion was a 2, Repression a 6, Economy a 2 {from foreign aid}.

Theoretical "Greater Serbia"

This fantasy state includes Montenegro, Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, 70 percent of Bosnia, Serb areas in Croatia, and northern Macedonia:

GvlS NDS,4

PC1S 4

R1S 8

ND = Nationalist Dictatorship

EllS 2-

Theoretical "Greater Albania"

Albania plus Kosovo, ethnic Albanian areas of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia:

GvlS MD3,2

PC1S 2

R1S 8

MD = Military Dictatorship

EllS 2-

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220 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHARTS

The Albanian War

Albania Serbia K01OVO

ANA SerbMii Mont uoutio Bulgaria Greece Mocedonia Turkey Russia U_S_ NATO-A EU

Economic Inlerests

9 8 9 9 9 8 7 4 4 8 1 3 1 4 5

Historical Interests

9 9 9 9+ 9+ 9 7 7 8 9 8 5 3 5 5

(0 = minimum, 9 = maximum)

Political Military Force Ability to Interest Interest Generation Intervene

Potential PolitilOlly (off/def)**

9 9 3/6' 8 9 9 6/8 8 9 9 2/3 7 9+ 9+ 1 2 9+ 9+ 1 1 9 9 1/2& 5 8 4 1/6 4 7 7 1+ 5 7 8 2/8+ 5 9 9 1/4- 6+ 4 3 3 4 7 3 4* 9-7 4 7 7 7 6 4+ 7-7 5 ]x 8

ANA = Albanian National Army and its various guises. including Albanian criminal organ­izations. FGP available only in politically controlled Albanian areas (Albania, Kosovo). SerbMil = Ethnic Serbian militias, including Serb criminal organizations.

·"Separate defense factors represent defense of own territory. '" Russian FGP is non-nuclear. A Russian declaration to use nukes to defend Serbia. # Albanian offensive factor for operations in Kosovo, Macedonia, Greece, and Montenegro. A NATO minus. FGPs for NATO expeditionary corps from NATO nations not listed. x FGP for EU without EU NATO nations (in this scenario, NATO- and EU combined have 5+ FGPs). & In 2007. Montenegrin army had 2.400 personnel.

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Balkans: Back to the Balkans 221

The Next Bosnian War

Economic Historical Politicol Military Force Ability 10 Inlerests Inlerests Interest Interesl Generolion Intervene

Polential Politically (oil/den

Serbia 9 9 9 9 5/8 9 BasSerbs 9 9 9 9 1/2 6 Mont 8 9 9 B 1/4 4 (roalia 9 9 9 9 4/6 B Bas(ro 9 9 9 9 1-/1 3 BosniaGv* 9 9 9 9 0/1- I B~Mus 9 9 9 9 2/2+ 6 Slovenia 9 9 9 9 1-/4 3 Hungary 5 B B B 2+ 5 Maced B 9 B B 1/2 5 Albania 7 B 9 9 2/1 1 KalOvo 5 7 B 9 0+/3 1 Turkey 2 8 7 5 2 1-Russia 3 8 7 6 4 4 U_S_ 2 4 5 5 7 6 NATO- 5 6 7+ 7 5 6-Austria 7 B 8 7 2- 5 Italy 7 B B 7 3 6 EU 7 5 6 6 5 8

• Bosnian federal entity that emerged from Dayton Accords,

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242 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

The Iron Guard-Fascist movement, active in Romania prior to and during World War II; headquarters was the notorious "Green House" in Bucharest.

Snake Island (Serpilor Island)-A border dispute between Romania and Ukraine that involves their Black Sea maritime boundary. Minor? Yes, but the USSR forced Romania to cede the island after World War 11.

Russia-See "Local Politics" section in Russia chapter.

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Romania

GvOB AD 6,6

Gv15 PeOB AD7,6 6

PC15 7

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2015)

ROB 4

R15 4

EcOB EelS 4 S

AD = Authoritarian Democracy (effectiveness, 0-9: stability, 0-9) PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos. 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline, 5 average)

Moldova

GvOB AD3,3

Gv15 PCOB AD4,5 3

PC15 4

Independent Transdniestr

GvOB AC2,3

Gv15 PCOB CSC4,5 3

AC = Authoritarian Coalition

PC1S 5

ROB 7

ROB 7

esc = Crime Syndicate Authoritarian Coalition

R15 7

R1S 8

Ec08 EelS ~ 3

EcOB Eel5 1+ 3

NOTE: For Russia, see chapter 7. "Russia: The Empire Struggles Back:'

IP15 5

IP1S 3

IP15 1-

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Balkans: Back to the Balkans

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHART

The Moldovan Crisis

Economic Historical Palitical Military Force Ability to Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene

Potential Politically (off/del) /I

Russia 6 8 9 8 7 9+' Romania 7 9 9 9 4 7 Ukraine 7 8 9 8 3 6 Mold 9 9 9 9 2/3- 9 TransD 9 9 9 9 1-/1 8 RussPk 9 2-RussCrim 7 0 6 2 1 5 8ulgaria 5 8 8 8 1 4 U_S_ 2 3 8 7 4 5 EU" 6 8 8 9 3- 8 Poland 4 8 9 7 1- 3

(0 = minimum. 9 ;:: maximum)

RussPk;:: Russian peacekeeping forces in Transdniestr RussCrim ;:: Russian and associated criminal syndicates TransD = Transdniestr (separatist region in 2(08)

243

• The It +" reflects the energy supply dimension. Russian policy is the key political factor in the Moldovan Crisis # FGPs in this scenario are for armed conflict in Moldova~Transdniestr and immediate bor­der areas. f\ More accurately, EU plus NATO nations not included in chart. Large political interven­tion capability.

NOTE: The chart's speculative FGP ratings suggest the Russian peacekeeping force (as con­stituted in 2(07), Transdniestr's forces. and criminal syndicates could fight and win a war with Moldova_

Page 21: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Balkans: Back to the Balkans

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Greece

GvOB RDS,S

GvlS PCOB RDS,6 7+

pm B

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2115)

ROB 4

RIS 3

EcOB 4

EelS 6-*

IPIS 6

RD = Representative Democracy, but with very authoritarian aspects, especially if PASOK (Greek Socialist Party) is in power (effectiveness, 0-9; stability 0-9)

PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos, 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline. 5 average)

251

.. Assumes no war and government pursues competition-oriented economic policies and gets control of inflation.

"Greater Greece"

"Hellenic Greece" -this is your ultra-Greek nationalist fantasy state_ It in­cludes all of Thrace, Constantinople, parts of Ionia around Smyrna and north to the Dardanelles, Cyprus, and all of the Aegean islands_ Likelihood of this state existing in 2015 is virtually nil_ The dream, however, exists, and the dream is not a j oke_

GvlS ED4,3

pelS 3-

RIS 7*

EelS 2-1/

ED = Ethnic Dictatorship (nominal democracy for Greeks, dictatorship for Turks)

.. ' Repression inside former Turkish mainland territory would be an 8+. # Economy would be beggared by war and military expenditures. Might be a 1 +.

Bulgaria

GvOB RD,4,S

GvlS peOB RD4,S 6

pelS 6

ROB S

RIS S

EcOB 3

RD ::: Representative Democracy (with authoritarian traits)

EelS 4+

IPIS S

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252 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

"Greater Bulgaria" (Bulgaria plus Macedonia)

Gvl5 A04,3

PCl5 3-

Rl5 8

AD = Authoritarian Oligarchy

Eel5 3-

LOOK BACK: Yugoslavia 1991

The following editorial, written by author Austin Bay, appeared in the Dal­las Morning News on November 21,1991. Note that the European Union (EU) is referred to as the EEC (European Economic Community), which was its moniker at the time this column appeared_ The essay is a look back at a moment when it may still have been possible to curb the fighting in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia_ Was the October to December 1991 time frame the moment combined European political and military action could have pre­vented the Bosnian War?

Yugoslavia is dead_ Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and the other tribes once lumped inside Yugoslav borders might ask themselves if indeed the nation ever existed as anything more than a fragile political convenience_ Patched from the political fragments of World War I, briefly cemented by fascist threat, Nazi invasion and then the personality and secret police ofJosip Broz TIto, with the end of the Cold War the figment of "Yugoslav unity" has dis­appeared as the old Balkan strifes and troubles return like so many Draculas_ Yugoslav disintegration has become a bloodbath that cannot be ignored, for the crisis involves much more than drawing new borders between peoples who have fought one another for centuries_ Yugoslav breakdown is an ag­gressive microcosm of the troubles which haunt post-Cold War European (and for that matter, world) geopolitics: heterogeneous populations split by ethnic and historical disputes dating back several hundred years, intense re­ligious divisions, and territorial recidivism borne of simple-minded de­mands for a "Greater Serbia" or "Greater Albania" or "Greater Etcetera;' mythical nations that existed in some protean golden age_

Thus Yugoslavia's breakdown has become a political laboratory for Eu­rope and the UN, each bloody day asking The Question: "How do we deal with the historical fragmentation resulting from the end of the Cold War?"

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Russia: The Empire Struggles Back 267

once more, but so far a majority of the population is determined to hang on to independence.

Moldova Formerly Bessarabia, it was first annexed by Russia in 1815 but has

long been claimed by Romania (and reverted to that nation after World War I). With a population of some 4.5 million and 65 percent of the popu­lation ethnically related to Romanians, the independence is tenuous. Some 27 percent of the population are Ukrainian and Russian (split 50/50), and neither of these groups is keen to live under Moldovian/Romanian domi­nation. (See chapter 6, "Balkans;' for more on Moldova.)

Central Asian Nations Five new Central Asian nations emerged out of the wreckage of the

Soviet Union. None had ever been a nation before. While they share many common characteristics and problems, each has some unique items to dis­tinguish it from the others.

Population and Land Area of the New Central Asian Nations

Population Area (sq krn)

Kazakhstan 16,000,000 2,7l7,300 Kyrgyzstan 5,500,000 198,500 Tajildstan 7,500,000 143,100 Turkmenistan 5,100,000 488,100 Uzbekistan 27,000,000 447,400

Kazakhstan-Kazakhstan is a Central Asian region conquered in the late 1800s. Only 60 percent of the population is Kazakh (a Turkic people, whose ancestors comprised the Mongol Golden Horde). Another 30 percent are European (80 percent Russian, the rest Ukrainian and German). The re­maining 10 percent are various other Asian groups. Kazakhstan is the most "Russified" of the Central Asian "republics" (as these quasi-autonomous areas were called by the Soviets). The large European minority was needed, as they comprised most of the educated and technically trained people. But the non-Kazakhs were made to feel unwelcome after 1991, and about half of them left. This is the only one of the Central Asian states to be left with nu­clear weapons when the USSR dissolved. One of the conditions of the USSR

Page 24: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Russia: The Empire Struggles Back 269

former Communist politicians managed to get themselves elected, there being few other politicians in the country to oppose them. Those who did organize opposition parties have had to deal with Communist-style op­pression from the new "democratically elected" leadership.

The Caucasus As bad as things are in Central Asia, they are much worse in the Cau­

casus. Long a crossroads for ethnic migrations and armies on the march, this mountainous region has always been divided by quite different, and mutually hostile, populations. Some are Christian, some are Muslim. Some are Slav, some are Turk, and some are from ethnic origins lost in the mists of time. There are three new nations in the Caucasus: Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

Population and Land Area of the Caucasus Nations

Population Area (sq km)

Armenia 3,600,000 29,800 Georgia 5,000,000 69,700 Azerbaijan 8,800,000 86,600

Armenia-Armenia is the most ethnically unified of these nations, with nearly 95 percent of the population being Armenian. All would be well were it not for a dispute over an Armenian-populated region (Nagorno-Karabakh) within Azerbaijan. The two nations have been fight­ing over this issue since 1991, with the Azeris getting the worst of it. The war has wrecked Armenia's economy but not their resolve to press on. The damage has actually been worse to Azerbaijan, whose population is about 85 percent Azeri (a Turkic people). Despite considerable oil wealth and a larger population, internal political disputes and the war with Armenia have ruined the economy and left the nation in a state of civil disorder. The Muslim Azeris get diplomatic and some economic aid from Iran and Turkey, while the Christian Armenians call upon the Russians and West­ern nations. Physical and psychological exhaustion will eventually bring peace, but not until more damage is done to both nations. (See "Quick Look: Armenia and Azerbaijan:')

Georgia-Georgia's population is 70 percent Georgian, an ancient Caucasus people, but 8 percent of the population are Armenian, 6 percent

Page 25: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Russia: The Empire Struggles Back 285

Communist states) was lined up against NATO. That ended in 1990. In 2007, Russia arranged a treaty of cooperation between the CSTO (Collec­tive Security Treaty Organization) and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization). This joins Russia, China, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzs­tan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus-in other words, most of the components of the former Soviet Union, plus China.

As a practical matter, the treaty doesn't amount to much. It's mainly about military cooperation in the form of exchanging information and making it easier for Russian defense firms to sell weapons to member states. Most of the members were parts of the Soviet Union that were heavily subsidized by Russia. Now, Russia is offering gifts in return for some token allegiance and help in security matters. Same deal with China. While China is still a Communist police state, it recognizes that the Russ­ian democracy has turned into an oligarchy, with Vladimir Putin maneu­vering himself into the position of president for life, or at least for as long as he can hold on to power.

CSTO was formed in the 199Os, mainly to foster economic coopera­tion among components of the former Soviet Union. The SCO is a re­gional security forum founded in Shanghai in 2001 by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and China. The main purpose of the sca is fighting Islamic terrorism.

POLITICAL TREND CHART

Russia

GvOB Gvl5 ARD5,5 ARD6,6

PCOB 7

PCl5 7

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2015)

ROB 7

Rl5 6

EcOB 5

EllS 6

IPl5 6*

ARD = Authoritarian Representative Democracy-an authoritarian representative democracy with extensive cronyism

PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos. 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential

" Would be higher, except corruption undermines economic confidence.

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286 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHART

War in the Near Abroad ("Russia Makes a Move on Its Neighbors")

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interest/ Intere5ts Interests Intere5t Intere5t Generation Intervene Ability to

Potential Politically Promote Economic

Development

Russia 9 9 9 9 9- 8 9 Ukraine 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 Belarus 9 9 9 9 2 2 2 Baltic SI. 9 9 9 9 1 2 5 Caucasus 9 9 9 9 3+ 3 2-CAR 9 9 9 9 4 3 2 U.s_ 5 8 8 9 6 6 4 Germany 8 9 9 9 5 5 5 Poland 8 9 9 9 2 3 3 Hungary 7 8 9 9 1 2 2 Chino 3 5 8 9 6 4 1-Japan 6 6 7 8 3 3 5 EU 6 8 8 9 2 5 4 Turkey 7 9 8 9 3+ 2 I Iran 3 5 6 7 1+ 1+ 0

(0 =:: minimum, 9 = maximum)

CAR = Central Asian Republics Caucasus =:: Caucasus republics Baltic St. = Baltic states

PARTICIPANT STRATEGIES AND GOALS Russian free marketers-Get a market economy functioning in Russia

that works_ The free marketers have to overcome three major obstacles_ First, most Russians have only a vague idea of what a free market is, and few appreciate the more arcane details (long-term investment, commodity futures, distribution, etc.). The people must be educated.

But this runs into the second problem: the gangsters and the govern-

Page 27: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Russia: The Empire Struggles Back 301

weapons are still tightly guarded, and most have been disassembled since the Cold War, with their nuclear material converted to fuel for nu­clear power plants.

QUICK LOOK: The Red Army Turns White

It didn't take long for the pride of the Soviet Union, the mighty Red Army, to fall apart. In five years, from its peak strength in 1989 to 1994, the Red Army turned white from loss of strength and the disappearance of its Marxist core. The term "Red" Army arose during the Russian civil war (1917-1922). Red was the color of revolution; the royalist Russian troops were called "Whites." The Reds won, the Whites lost, and Russia became a Communist state for the next 60 or so years. The Whites lost because the czar and his nobles were corrupt and out of touch with the people. The Reds lost 60 years later for the same reason.

But the Red Army is another matter. All of the Communist-era institu­tions survived, to one degree or another, the collapse of the Soviet Union. This includes the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (as the Red Army is now called), which emerged with many of its Communist-era symbols, traditions, and customs intact (e.g., the red star still appears on equipment and uniforms). But in one important respect, the Red Army changed dramatically:

Decline in Strength of the Red Army

1989 1994 Divisions 214 79 Troops (millions) 3.8 1.7 AFV 132,000 56,000 Aircraft 11,500 5,200

By 2008, manpower had declined to about a million troops, with fewer than 10,000 AFV (armored fighting vehicles, i.e., tanks and other armored vehicles) and about 3,000 operational aircraft.

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314 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL}-Still strong, despite commu­nism's collapse globally.

Other Greek Cypriot parties-Cypriot Democratic Party (DIKO); Cypriot Socialist Party (EDEK); Socialist Democratic Renewal Party (ADIS0K).

Cypriot National Guard-Greek Cypriot army; 11,000 troops, with an­other 2,000 regulars.

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus National Unity Party (UBP}-Major Turk Cypriot party. Other Turk Cypriot parties-Republican Turkish Party (CTP); Com­

munal Liberation Party; New Cyprus Party. Turkish army-Turkey has two infantry divisions and an armored regi­

ment in northern Cyprus (approximately 25,()()() soldiers}.

NOTE: Money laundering, smuggling, and the brokering of all sorts of illegal deals (gunrunning, drug deals, and espionage) has become a big business on Cyprus. While there is no popular support for terrorists in ei­ther part of Cyprus, the island's position relative to the Balkans, North Africa, and the Middle East (Lebanon is a ferry ride away) has made it a way station for terrorists, spies, smugglers, and thieves. No one wants to talk about this, but the government of Greek Cyprus has permitted it.

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Turkey

Gv08 AD7,6

GvlS AD7,6

PC08 6+*

PC1S 7

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2015)

R08 6

R1S S-

Ec08 4+

AD = Authoritarian Democracy (effectiveness, 0-9; stability 0-9) PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos, 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline, S average)

• PC excluding Kurdish problem = 7

EllS 5+

IP15 5+

Page 29: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Russia: The Empire Struggles Back

"Independent Cyprus" (combining Greek and Turk halves)

GvlS RDS,3

PC1S 3

R1S 4

EelS 6-

315

RD = Representative Democracy. but a curious one; Thrks would have to have extensive political guarantees to keep from being politically victimized by Greek majority

"Turkish Republic of Cyprus"

GvlS FM6,6

PC1S 8

R15 7

EelS 2-

FM = Foreign Military. in this case Turk

"Independent Kurdistan" (carved from Turkey and Iraq)

GvlS AC3,2

PC15 4

R1S 7

AC = Authoritarian Coalition

EelS 7*

• Independent Kurdistan would have 25 to 50 billion barrels of oil.

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316 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHARTS

Cyprus

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interest/ Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene Ability to

Potential Polilical~ Promote Economic

Development

Turkey 3 8 9 8 9 8 7 Greece 2 8 9 6 3 8 7 UK 1 7 7 6 3 4 6 U.S. 1 S 7 6 6 7 4 Israel 2 6 6 7 2 1 4 Syria 2 7 3 6 1 2 0 UN 7 8 8 1 7 GrkCy 9 9 9 9 2 6 9 TurkCy 9 9 9 9 I- S 9

(0 = minimum, 9 = maximum)

Kurd War

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interest/ Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene Ability to

Potential Politically Promote Economic

Development

Tu,key 7 9 9 8 8 8 6 Iron 6 8 7 6 3+ 7 6 Iraq 7 8 B 7 1 4 2 Russia 2 6 6 S 2 S 1 U.S. 1 S 2 2 1 4 4 Syria 2 6 6 6 I- S 1

Page 31: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Korea: The Strange Kingdom 345

North Korea's economy and ideology. When North Korea developed long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons over the last decade, Japan became alarmed. Now Japan is building up its defenses against North Korean missiles and taking a harder line in negotiations. South Korea is already a valued neighbor. Despite the centuries-old animosity between Japanese and Koreans, the "Pax Americana" has provided both nations with an atmosphere in which they could learn to get along. No one seems unhappy with this development. In the 1990s, Japan ap­proached North Korea with an offer of diplomatic recognition and gen­erous economic aid (actually a polite way of giving North Korea the same monetary reparations earlier given to South Korea). North Korea was willing to take the money but not give anything in return. Japan has grown tired of North Korea's unpredictable behavior.

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

South Korea

GvOB AD6,5

Gv15 RD7,S

P(OB 7

PC1S 7

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2115)

ROB S

R15 5+

AD ;:: Authoritarian Democracy (effectiveness. stability) RD ;:: Representative Democracy

PC ;:: Political Cohesiveness (0 ;:: chaos. 9 ;:: maximum) R ;:: Repression Index (9 ;:: maximum) Ec ;:: Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP ;:: Investment Potential (2008 baseline, 5 average)

EcOB II-

EelS B

IP1S 8*

• South Korea's IP rating of 8 is exceptionally high, but South Korea continues to push edu­cation and high-tech manufacturing. These estimates are, of course, best guesses, but South Korea could be a 8+ or 9-, The country is a powerhouse.

North Korea

GvOB ST5,]

Gv15 m,]

P(08 7

pm 3

ROB 9

ST;:: Socialist Totalitarian (effectiveness, stability)

R15 9

Ec08 1+

EelS 1·

IP15 0+

Page 32: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

346

"United Korea"

Gv15 PC15 ROS,4 S

R1S S

A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

EelS 4

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHART

Second Korean War

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene

Potential Politicolly

N. Korea 9 9 9 9 8+ 7 S. Korea 9 9 9 9 8 8 u.s. 5 8 8 8 7 7 Russia 3 7 6 8 5 6 China 6 8 9 8+ 7 7 Japan 7 8 9 9 3 S

(0 = minimum, 9 = maximum)

NOTE: A united Korea would be the third strongest (economically and militarily) nation in the region (after China and Japan). Note that a united Korea would have about the same population as Vietnam but more than 10 times the economic power.

POTENTIAL OUTCOMES Since Kim II Sung died in 1994 and the new regime under Kim Jong II

needed time to establish a track record, our analysis had to account for and explore several different strategic options. We concluded that during the 1995-1996 time frame, the new regime was simply getting its feet wet. We used a lO-year (1995-2004) window for the analysis in this chapter.

1. 30 percent chance through 2015: Peaceful reunification of the Koreas. It's East and West Germany all over again. Here's why: By 2015, too many North Koreans will be aware of the fact that they have been screwed by the Communists and will just stop tolerating it. Twenty years ago, this was considered nuts. Then came 1989 in Eastern Eu-

Page 33: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

366 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

when the head of Taiwan's Nationalist Party visited mainland China. The Nationalists were driven from China to Taiwan in 1949 and have, until re­cently, insisted they are still the true government of China. The National­ists arrived on Taiwan as an ethnic minority, outnumbered by the native Taiwanese. The Nationalists ruled by force for many years, but democracy overtook them in the 1990s, and since 2000 a Taiwanese party has ruled the country. The Taiwanese favor independence, while many in the Na­tionalist Party still favor unification with China. By making official peace with the Nationalist Party, China gains an ally in Taiwan. This, however, also splits the Nationalists, because many party members don't want any­thing to do with the Communists.

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

China

GvOB CC07,7

Gv15 CC06,6

PCOB 7

PC15 7

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2015)

ROB 7

R15 6+

EIOB 7-

EIl5 7-

ceo :::: Communist-Capitalist Dictatorship (a most Wlusual government) (effectiveness, 0-9; stability, 0-9)

PC :::: Political Cohesiveness (0 :::: chaos, 9 :::: maximum) R = Repression Index (9 :::: maximum) Ec :::: Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline, 5 average)

Look Back: China

IP15 7+

Our trend chart from the 1996 edition saw a Nationalist-Military Dictator­ship by 2000. We were wrong, sort of. China has a unique form of socialist dictatorship that relies on promoting capitalist economic progress, secur­ing nationalist goals, and exerting police power to operate. Note we now see a dictatorship of some type through 2015. But as for 2025? The 2015 to 2025 decade will be critical. Some form of authoritarian democracy will ei­ther emerge or China risks a debilitating civil war.

Gv95 Gv20 S17,7 NM07,5

PC95 6+

ST :::: Socialist Totalitarian

PC20 6

R95 7+

NMD :::: Nationalist-:Military Dictatorship

R20 7·

E!95 6+

EI20 7·

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392 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

By other comparative measures, however, the Indian Common Market has done poorly. In 1950, India accounted for 2 percent of total world ex­ports and 6 percent of exports generated by Third World countries. In 1980, its share in each category had shrunk to .4 percent and 1.4 percent. In 1955, India was the world's 10th-ranked industrial power; in 1975 it ranked 20th. China, even hobbled by Maoism, produced a 5.2 percent growth in real GNP per person between 1965 and 1987. India's real per capita GNP growth during the same time frame was 1.8 percent. Why? The New Delhi-led bureaucracy that ran the whole show. Inefficiency percolates through the system. India is an economic "success" partially be­cause it has avoided doing as badly as many experts expected.

All this changed in 1991, when a capitalist-minded prime minister took power. By 1995, India had an economic growth rate of 5.5 percent a year, and in the next decade that grew to 9 percent. The savings rate, at over 20 percent, was the same as in the highly successful Asian nations of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Exports increased, and it was all done without the government taking on billions in foreign debt. The giant of South Asia is stirring, and foreign investment is flowing in. This is perhaps the most convincing evidence to support India's presumption that it will soon be a superpower in every sense of the world. That may be too optimistic for the moment, but in a generation or two, who knows?

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

India

GvOB R06,7

GvlS R07,7

peOB 7·

pm 7

Gv = Government Type (2008, 20(5)

ROB 3

RIS 3

EeOB 6-

EelS 7-

RD = Representative Democracy. albeit an authoritarian representative democracy trappings (effectiveness, 0-9; stability, 0-9).

PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 ::: chaos, 9 ::: maximum) R = Repression index (9 = maximum) Ee = Comparative Economic Status IP ::: Investment Potential (2008 baseline,S average)

IPIS 7

Page 35: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

South Asia: India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan 393

Pakistan

GvOB AD3,3

Gvl5 peOB AD3,4 4--

AD = Authoritarian Democracy

Nepal

pel5 4-

ROB 7

GvOB Gvl5 peOB pel5 ROB RI5 RvN3,3 RD6,5 5 6 6 5

RvN = Revolutionary Nationalist RD = Representative Democracy

Sri Lanka

GvOB RD6,7

Gvl5 peUB RD7,6 6

Mghanistan

GvOB RD2,2

Gvl5 peU8 RD3,4 3

pel5 7

pm 3+

RUB 7

RU8 3

RI5 6

RI5 3

RI5 3

EcOB 4

Eel 5 4

IPI5 2+

EcOB Eel5 IPOB IPI5 3 4 4 2

EcOB 6

Ec08 2-

Eel5 7-

Eel5 3

IPI5 6-

IPI5 4-

Page 36: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

394 A Q uick and Dirty Guide to War

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHART

India as Regional Superpower (Comparative Power Generation in South Asia)

Economic Historical Politicol Military Force Ability to Interest/ Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene Ability to

Potential Politicolly Promote Economic

Development

India 9 9 9 9 9· 8 9 Pakistan 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 Afghan 9 9 9 9 2 2 2 Nepal 9 9 9 9 1 2 5 Bangladesh 9 9 9 9 3+ 3 2· Iron 9 9 9 9 4 3 2 U.S. 5 8 8 9 6 6 4 Russia 8 9 9 9 5 5 5 Sri lanka 8 9 9 9 2 3 3 Chino 3 5 8 9 6 4 I· Britain 6 6 7 B 3 3 5 EU 6 8 8 9 2 5 4 Myanmar 7 9 8 9 3+ 2 1

(0 = minimum, 9 = maximum)

PARTICIPANT STRATEGIES AND GOALS

India India wants everyone to agree that it is the regional superpower. Most

of the neighbors have no problem with that, except Pakistan. Although Bangladesh is also a Muslim neighbor, there is much less hostility with India. But to be a proper superpower, India has to keep its revived econ· omy moving forward. This requires reforms in education (where corrup­tion keeps most of the poor illiterate) and government (where corruption and sloth cause all manner of problems). India makes a big deal about China moving in (economically and with naval forces), but that will not be

Page 37: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

422 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

that many Lendu refugees were given sanctuary in Uganda when they fled attacks by the Hema and other militias operating in Ituri. The Gegere, Bira, and Ngiti tribal groups have also deployed tribal forces that are nominally militia groups.

POLITICAL TREND CHART

Congo

GvoB KADI,I

GvlS KAD2,3

PCoB I

PCIS 1+

Gv = Government Type (200S, 2015)

ROB S*

RIS S*

EtoB 0+

EelS I

KAD = Kleptocratic Authoritarian Democracy (effectiveness. 0-9; stability 0- 9) PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos, 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index. (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline, 5 average)

• This is very tough to estimate. Chaos might be considered a form of repression.

IPIS I

Page 38: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Congo: Heart of Darkness 423

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHART

"Congo Disintegration"

CongoGv S. Africa UN U.S. France Belgium Angola Rwanda Uganda MilitiaB Mai·Mai

Economic Historical Political Interests Interests Interest

9 9 9 8 7 7 4 9 7 7 4 6 6 7 7 6 7 5 3 2 4 3 4 9 8 5 9 9 0 3 7 0 0

(0.: minimum. 9 = maximum)

Military Force Interest Generation

Potentiol

9 3 8* 3 3 2 3 5

311 7 211 1+ 6 4+A 9 4A 9 4A 3 1·x 0 0+

Ability to Intervene Politicolly

6 6 7 5 7 3 2 4 4 0 0

Interest/ Ability to Promote Economic

Development

5 5 3 4 6 5

2+ 1 1+ o o

MilitiaB = Militia backed by outside agency (neighboring government. mining corporation, intelligence agency, etc), Mai-Mai = Bandit-type militias. Remember, there are potentially hundreds of these types of militias. They are in it for the money, beer, and women .

• South Africa has provided forces for UN operations in Congo. # France and Belgiwn prefer to act as part of EU or UN. In EU operations, they provide the core of EUFOR peacekeepers. A FGPs for Angola, Rwanda. and Uganda are in their border areas with Congo, Rwanda did demonstrate that it could exert military power in western Congo. So this ballpark estimate: Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda have a 2- throughout Congo. x Militia forces' FGPs are for their immediate tribal areas only. A militia trained by or backed by international mercenaries or a militarily adept neighboring country might have an FGP of lor even 1+, depending on quality of weapons. In 2007, Nkunda's ethnic Tutsi militia arguably had a 1 + FGP for operations in North Kivu province.

Page 39: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

The Grand Sahel, Sudan, and Darfur 465

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Mauritania

Gv08 Gv15 H08 pm R08 RIS h08 Ec15 11'15 MAS,3 MM,2 5 6 4 4 1 1 1+

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2015) MA = Military Authoritarian (effectiveness, 0-9; stability, 0-9)

PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos, 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline, 5 average)

Senegal

Gv08 Gvl5 1'(08 1'(15 R08 RI5 Ec08 EelS 11'15 R06,4 R06,S 6 6 6 5 3 3+ 2+

RD = Representative Democracy

Niger

Gv08 Gvl5 1'(08 1'(15 R08 RI5 Ec08 EelS 11'15 MM,4* MAS,S 4 5 5 5 2 3- 1+

• A curious military government, however. The legacy of Seyni Kountche lives on.

Chad

Gv08 GvlS Pe08 1'(15 R08 R15 Ec08 EclS 11'15 MA3,2 MA4,4 1- 3 6 6 1+ 2- I

Central African Republic

Gv08 Gvl5 1'(08 1'(15 R08 RIS Ec08 EclS 11'15 MA 1,1 MA2,2 I 2 6 6 I- I 1-

Page 40: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

466

Sudan

Gv08 MA3,6

GvlS MA4,S

PC08 2

A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

PCIS 3

R08 8

RIS 7

Ec08 2-

EelS 3-

IPIS 2+

NOTE: This is a "national Sudan" with Khartoum as the capital. The line for a separate North Sudan would be the same, except the Political Cohesion rating would be a 4 for 2008 and 2015.

Look Back: "Independent South Sudan"

From the 1996 edition:

Gv20 MA3,S

PC20 6

R20 S+

Ec20 I

Evolving Independent South Sudan (a fully independent GOSS sometime after 2011)

GvlS ADS,4

PCIS 6

RIS S

EelS 2*

IPIS 3*

AD = Authoritarian Democracy. tribally based

• The economic and investment potential ratings are based on GOSS receiving oil revenues.

"Independent Darfur"

GvlS MD2,1

PCIS I

RIS 6

EelS o

IPIS o

Page 41: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

The Grand Sahel, Sudan, and Darfur 467

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHARTS

Sudan-North South War

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interest/ Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene Ability to

Potential Politically Promote Economic

Development

NorlhSud 9 9 9 9 7 8 8 SouthSud 9 9 9 9 6 8 7 UN 2 5 6 5 2 7 5 DorfurReb 5 4 5 9 1- 3 0 Uganda 7 7 7 7 2- 3 1 Kenya 6 7 7 6 1- 4 1 Egypt 7 9 7 8 4 4 2 Saudi 1 3 5 2 1- 6 7 Ethiop 2 5 6 6 3 2 I Eritrea 2 4 7 4 1- 5 1 Iran 2 2 6 2 1- 1 1

(0 = minimum. 9 == maximum)

Page 42: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

468 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

Sudan-Darfur War

Etonomic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Intere51/ Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene Ability to

Potential Politically Promote Economic

Development

UN 2 3 6 3 211 7 5 AU 1 4 6 2 1 7 1 SudanGv 7 7 9 7 5 7 5 Chad 1 7 7 7 2 3 1 CAR 0 2 7 6 0 0 0 DarfurReb 9 9 9 9 3 8 3 China 5 1 4 2 1 7 5 EUjU.S. 2 1 2 1 51 4 6 Hollywood' 0 1 7 0 0 4 1-AIQaeda 0 5 7 7 1 5 0 • "Hollywood" is shorthand for international human rights activists. # EU/U.S. and UN FGPs based on lBO-day buildup.

Chad Wars

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interest/ Interests Interests Intere51 Interest Generation Intervene Ability to

Potential Politically "'omote Economic

Development

ChadGv 9 9 9 9 5 7 4 Chad-abs 7 8 9 9 4 7 2 Sudan 2 6 7 8 2 7 3 France 6 7 7 6 411 7 7 UN 2 2 5 5 1 5 3 libya 7 8 9 7 2+/4' 6 2 Nigeria/AU 2 3 5 6 2+' 2 1 EU/U.S. 2 3 3 3 511 4 6 CAR 3 3 6 6 I- I 0 • Inside Chad/inside Auzou Strip and Libya. A togistically weak and poorly ted army. but 4 FGP is there. # French, EU/U.S., UN, and Nigerian FGPs based on 18O-day buildup.

Page 43: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

The Grand Sahel, Sudan, and Darfur 469

Mauritania-Senegal

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interest/ Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene Ability to

Potential Political~ Promote Economic

Development

Mauritania 9 9 9 9 1 6 2 Senegal 8 8 9 9 2 7 1 France 4 6 5 4 4' 8 5 U.S. 2 2 3 3 4* 5 3 Algeria 0 5 2 4 1 3 2 UN 1 2 2 1 1 8 3

• The individual U.S. and French FGPs are overwhelming when compared to other FGPs. These are rapid-intervention forces (speciaJ ops, airborne, marines, etc.). The French forces would likely provide the bulk of a UN force, with some other Western European NATO ele-ments-supported by U.S. and NATO airlift.

PARTICIPANT STRATEGIES AND GOALS

Chad Central government-With more than 100 distinct (different customs

and language) ethnic groups, it's a major goal just to maintain some form of national unity in Chad. The central government will continue to rely on French and Western support as a prop against rebel forces.

Chad rebel groups-Trying to take N'Djamena, which would lead to control of oil export profits.

France-France keeps track of the rebel groups and deals with the rebels who take control of N'Djamena. The political situation in France seems to favor a continued military involvement in Chad, especially with international concern for events in Sudan's neighboring Darfur region. There is also the issue of securing the safe delivery of Chad's oil, which is pumped westward to Atlantic Ocean ports in West Africa.

United Nations-Trying to maintain supply routes to refugee camps in eastern Chad.

Page 44: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Wars of the Hom: Somalia, Ethopia, and Eritrea 497

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Ethiopia

GvOB Gvl5 peOB pel5 ROB Rl5 EcOB Eel5 IPl5 AD3.3 AD4.3 3 4 B 6 2 2 3-

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2115) AD = Authoritarian Democracy (effectiveness, 0-9; stability 0-9)

PC = Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos, 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline, 5 average)

Eritrea

GvOB Gvl5 PCOB PCI5 R08 RI5 EcOB Ecl5 IPl5 MA3,3 MA4,3 3 4 8 6 2 2 2-

MA = Military Authoritarian (effectiveness. a-9; stability 0-9)

Somalia

Gv08 Gvl5 peoB pel5 ROB RI5 EcoB Eel5 IPI5 MAI.I AD2.2 I 3 7 7 I 2 I

Djibouti

Gv08 GvlS PC08 pm ROB RIS Ec08 Eel5 IPIS AD6,4' AD6.6 4 6- 4 4 3- 4 3-

• French Foreign Legion helps keep the peace and also keeps out of Somalia, though Dji­bouti Afars and Somalis are set for a civil war.

Page 45: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

498 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHARTS

Economic H~toricol Political Military Force Abililyto Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene

Potential Polilically

Ethiopia 9 9 9 9 7- 6 Eritrea 9 9 9 9 5 6 SomGvt 8 9 9 9 I I SSomOan 7 8 8 7 3 4 IslmOs 5 5 9 9 2 4 AIQaeda 1 7 7 7 1- 1+ D~bouti 9 9 9 9 2 4 o LF 9 9 9 9 1 4 UN-AU 1 5 7 3 2 6 SomPirat 9 I 1 1 I 0 SomaLnd 9 9 9 9 I- I-PuntLnd 9 9 9 9 I- I-EritRebel 4 9 9 9 I- I U_S_ 5 5 7 7 7 5 Fronce 6 7 7 7 2 5 SaudiAr 4 8 8 3 I- S Kenya 8 8 9 8 1 S

SornGvt = Somali Government SSomClan - Southern Somali clans (fragmented power groups - think of them as as group the government and former government would like to influence) IslmCts = Islamic Courts Union (former government) ONLF = Ogaden Nat! Liberation Front (in its various guises) UN-AU = UN and African Union sponsored peacekeeping operations (without significant NATO or Russian participation) SomPirat = Somali pirates and smugglers operating in region SomaLnd = Somaliland Republica PuntLnd = Puntland EritRebel = Eritrean rebel organizations (most influenced by Ethiopia) SaudiAr = Saudi Arabia and other Arab Muslim nations

(0 = minimum. 9 = maximum)

Note: We omitted the column ranking interest/ability to promote economic development from this chart because economic prospects for the entire region are very low and we don't want to put negathe values in the charts.

Page 46: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

532 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Peru

Gv08 AD6,6

Gvl5 AD7,6

PC08 6

PCI5 7

Gv = Government Type (2008. 2015) AD = Authoritarian Democracy

R08 6

PC= Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos, 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0--9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline,S average)

Ecuador

Gv08 GvlS PC08 PCI5 R08 AD5,5 AD6,6 6 7 5

AD = Authoritarian Democracy

Colombia

Gv08 Gvl5 Pe08 PCI5 ROB RD5,5 RD6,6 4 6 7

RD = Representative Democracy

Venezuela

GvOB GvlS PCOB PCI5 R08 A06,4 MD3,4 6 7 7

RI5 6

RI5 5

RI5 6

RI5 6+

Ec08 4+

Ec08 3+

Ec08 S

EcOB 5

AO = Authoritarian Oligarchy (masked as an Authoritarian Democracy)

EIl5 5

EIl5 4·

Eel5 5

EelS 4-

IPI5 S

IPI5 3

IPIS 6

IPIS 3

Page 47: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

South America's Arc of Fire: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela 533

Bolivia

GvDB AD4,3

Gvl5 PCDB MD4,3 5·

MD = Military Dictatorship

PCI5 4-

ROB 6

RI5 7

EcOB 1+

Eel 5 1+

IPI5 2

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHART

Cocaine Wars: Sendero Luminoso

Economic Historicol Political Military Force Ability to Interests InteresB Interest Interest Generation Intervene

Potential Politically

Peru 9 9 9 9 5 6 Sendero 9 9 9 9 1+ I DrugCrtis 9 I B 6 2 5 U.S. 5 5 7 2 4 4 Ecuador 6 6 B B I 5

(0 = minimum, 9 = maximum)

Page 48: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

534 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

Cocaine Wars: La Violencia (Colombian Civil War)

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene

Potential Politically

Colombia 9 9 9 9 7 7 FARC/ELN 7 9 9 9 2 2 DrugCrtls 9 4 8 9 I 5 Venezuela 6 8 8 9 3-' 4 DEAl 2 3 6 8 1 3 U.S. Milt 2 3 5 8 5 3 Ecuador 4 7 7 7 I 5 RtWingMii 6 2 2 3 I- I BolivFARC 8 9 9 9 5- 5

Rt~'ingMil = Remnant right-wing militias (now bandits). BolivFARC = A theoretical revived FARC supported by Venezuela and drug cartels. This international. regional. and national collective would return Colombia to the ntid-l990s .

• Venezuelan FGP for immediate border region and Atlantic Coast. 1+ for whole of Colombia. # Reflects divided U.S. counterdrug efforts. Combine FGPs for potential total.

Bolivarian War: Colombia-Venezuelan Border War

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene

Potential Politically

Colombia 8 9 9 9 4 9 Venezuela 7 8 8 8 4 9 U.S. 5 3 7 3 6 8 Drug Crlls 5 2 3 2 1 4 Brazil 4 6 7 5 2 7 Holland 3 6 5 6 1 5

Page 49: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

South America's Arc of Fire: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela 535

Bolivarian War: The Caribbean War ("Caribbean Falklands")

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene

Potential Politically

Colombia 8 9 9 9 2-41 5 Venezuela 7 8 8 8 4+" 9 U.S. 5 3 7 3 8+ 8 Holland 7 8 7 7 3+* 5 Guyana B B B 9 1-* 2 Cuba 1 4 5 2 1- 3

. Defensive FGPs. Give Holland a 1 FGP for offensive action along South American coast-line. # FGP for Colombia-Venezuela border area, offensive and defensive. A FGP assumes a long-term arms buildup. If you believe the BoJivarian militias add power, give Venezuela a 5+ defensive FGP.

Bollvarian War: Peru-Ecuador-Colombia Border War

Economic Historicol Political Military Force Ability to Interests Interesn Interest Interest Generation Intervene

Potential Politically

Peru 5 7 7 7 6+ 9 Ecuador 8 9 8 8 4 8 Colombia 4 6 6 3 2 5 Chile 2 2 5 3 5 5 Brazil 3 6 B 6 5 7 Bolivia 1 1 2 1 0 2 Venezuela 2 4 5 5 1 5 U.S. 4 3 7 1 5 B Sendero 5 1 5 3 1 1 DrugCrtls 7 0 7 8 1- 3

Page 50: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

576 A Quick and Dirty Guide to ""ar

The Merida Initiative-The unofficial name of the U.S.-Mexico coun­ternarcotics, counterterror, and anticrime program. When the new $1.4 billion, three-year program was announced in 2007, commentators dubbed it "Plan Mexico" (a reference to the U.S.-Colombia counterdrug and counterterror program, "Plan Colombia"). The Mexican government bridled at the nickname and pointed out that Mexico would not have U.S. soldiers operating on its soil. Subsequently, the U.S. government assured Mexico that it would not send U.S. troops or private security personnel into Mexico. Still, Mexican reaction to the nickname is indicative of wor­ries about U.S. infringement on Mexico sovereignty.

POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Mexico

GvOB ADS,S

Gv1S PCDB ADS,6 5

PC1S 6

Gv = Government Type (2008, 2015) AD = Authoritarian Democracy

ROB 5+

R1S 5·

PC= Political Cohesiveness (0 = chaos, 9 = maximum) R = Repression Index (9 = maximum) Ec = Comparative Economic Status (0-9) IP = Investment Potential (2008 baseline, 5 average)

EeDB 5·

EelS 6

IP1S* 6+

" Mexico has the Russian problem. IP would be higher, except corruption undermines eco# nomic confidence and performance. Mexico has NAFTA as an economic and legal "struc­turing mechanism- and Russia does not, which is why Mexico's figure is higher.

u.s.

Gv08 RD8,9

Gv1S PC08 RDB,9 9

PC1S 9

RD = Representative Democracy

ROB 1·

R1S 1·

EtOB B

Et1S B·

IP1S 9

Page 51: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Canada

GvOB ROB,]

GvlS PeOB RDB,B 7

Mexico: Calderon in the Cauldron

P(15 ROB R15 EcOB EelS B 1+ 1+ 7 B

RD = Representative Democracy

IP1S 9

577

REGIONAL POWERS AND POWER INTEREST INDICATOR CHART

The Cartel War (Drug War and War Against Corruption)

E[onomi[ Histori[al Politirol Military Fone Ability to Interest/ Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene Ability to

Potential Paliti[ally Promote E[anomi[

Development

U.S. 7 7 B B B+ 5 7 MexKo B 5 9 6 6 7 4 Gulf (rti 9 0 2 0 1· 1 1 Sinaloa (rtl 9 0 2 0 1· 1 1 Tijuana (rtl 9 0 1 0 1 1 1 Other (rtls 9 0 1- 0 1- 0 0 Venez, Cuba 1 3 5 2 1 3 0

(0 = minimum. 9 = maximum)

Page 52: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

578 A Quick and Dirty Guide to War

The EPR War (Leftist Guerrilla War)

Ewnomic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interest/ Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene Ability to

Potential Politically Promote Economic

Development

U.S. 7 7 8 8 9 8 7 Mexico 8 5 8 3 7 5 2 EPI! 1 9 9 9 1+ 2· 0 PEMEX 9 6 9 9 1 6 8 Venez,Cuba 2 7 7 3 1· 4 0

War of Chiapas (The Mayan War)

Economic Historical Political Military Force Ability to Interest/ Interests Interests Interest Interest Generation Intervene Ability to

Potential Politically Promote Economic Development

MexicoGvt 4 4 8 2 8 8+ 8 EZLN 9 6 9 9 0+ 5 1 Maya 9 9 9 9 3 4 2 U.S. 2 2 6 2 8+ 7 8 Guat 6 6 7 5 1+ 3 2

Mexican Civil War (Mexican Internal Breakdown)

NOTE: This analysis chart is organized differently than others in this book. Various potential factions in a civil conflict are rated for political, military, economic, and propaganda (information) power. Ratings are based on a 0 minimum-lOO maximum scale. The rating for the Mexican army zonal commands is for an "average" command. The MexArmyFed rating is for forces protecting the Federal District and selected elite army strike forces. Each state has a state police (judiciales) as well as assigned jederales. Baja California (Norte) and Chihuahua are included as exam-

Page 53: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

I> lexico: Calderon in the Cauldron 579

pies of economically strong northern states. They have high propaganda values because of proximity to the United States. The combined Drug Cartel rating is very notional-the cartels cooperate; then they wage war on one another. The rating is based on a synergistic alliance. Note the Mexican Army Federal District (defense agencies and elite units, etc.) has a propaganda rating higher than the PRI. It also has an overwhelming military edge (a 98 rating), unless one could combine at least 11 "average" Mexican military zones (for a rating of 99). Organizing those forces into an effective force to combat the elite brigades would be next to impossi­ble, but forcing the elite brigades to deal with 11 small military rebellions would weaken them.

CentMexiloGvt PRJ PAN PRD MexArmyFedOist EZlN (Maya only) EZlN·Manos BIIjaNorte Chihuahuo Yaqui MoyonChiopos MoyonYulOton PEMEX Federales (Iombined) MexArmyZone (eo zone) JudilialB5 (eo stote) • Drug Cartels

Politilal

48 30 52 47 20 1 4 13 12 2 7 8 24 20 4 2 20

• In this case, state police and security units.

Mililary

15 13 10 15 98 J

1 2 2 5 7 3 17 24 9 1 11

PARTICIPANT STRATEGIES

ElOnomil

75 40 60 47 18 o 1

22 20 4 4 7 60 5 5 1 25

Propaganda

45 32 60 61 35 2 14 45 40 3 16 5

38 10 4 3 10

PAN and other center-to-right opposition elements-The PAN has been behind economic liberalization and expansion from the beginning. Ultimately, this may be Mexico's only path to peaceful change. It will be difficult. Attacking Mexican corruption is PAN's strongest card, and Calderon's anticorruption campaign has attracted support throughout

Page 54: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Economic Prof'tle Military Capability

CTY RNK CPL TFQ TP GOP AMM MB BIM AFV AC LOR EQ EX SP MOB TR

SOUTH ASIA India 1 2,290 35% 1200 1300 1288 30000 $23 5600 650 7 5 7 5 4 7 Pakistan 2 699 24% 169 150 619 4600 $7 3200 380 6 4 6 4 3 7 Myanmar 3 202 12% 48 38 405 6000 $15 600 120 5 3 5 3 1 4 Sri Lanka 4 1% 25% 21 33 160 1300 $8 330 35 7 5 8 3 3 1 Bangladesh 5 92 19% 150 70 150 1000 $7 370 75 5 4 5 3 3 4 Nepal 6 61 10% 29 11 69 160 $2 80 0 6 2 7 2 1 8 Afghanistan 7 27 8% 31 11 51 200 $4 200 0 5 2 6 3 1 5

MIODLEEAST Israel 1 2,098 61% 6.4 170 550 9500 $17 10500 500 9 8 9 3 3 8 Egypt 2 532 26% 80 130 468 3400 $7 7000 630 6 5 5 3 3 5 Iran 3 453 25% 65 290 545 7200 $13 2900 350 5 4 7 4 4 6 Saudi Arabia 4 311 45% 27 400 223 35000 $157 3500 300 6 8 5 3 2 5 Syria 5 230 19% 19 41 293 1500 $5 7100 600 5 4 5 3 3 4 Iraq 6 1% 15% 27 60 500 8000 $16 500 0 4 3 6 4 3 4 Algeria 7 177 27% 33 135 147 3700 $25 2700 170 6 5 7 3 2 5 Jordan 8 109 23% 6 16 100 1600 $16 2500 120 6 5 5 2 1 6 Morocco 9 96 11% 34 72 196 2500 $13 1500 100 5 3 4 2 1 5 Sudan 10 66 13% 42 48 110 600 $5 1100 70 5 3 6 2 2 5 United Arab Emir. 11 41 19% 2.6 200 51 11000 $216 1800 220 5 5 5 3 1 1 Uzbekistan 12 39 17% 28 21 67 100 $1 900 160 5 5 3 2 2 2 Oman 13 32 28% 3.2 40 42 3400 $81 480 60 5 6 5 2 1 5 Yemen 14 32 18% 22 22 66 950 $14 1600 85 4 4 6 2 1 5 Libya 15 30 10% 6 60 76 800 $11 2500 320 4 3 5 2 2 1

Page 55: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Kazakstan Lebanon Azerbia;an Turkmenistan Kuwait Tunisia Qatar Bahrain Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Mauritania

EUROPE

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Russia 1 United Kingdom 2 Turkey 3 Germany 4 France 5 Italy 6 Switzerland 7 Spain 8 Poland 9 Greece 10 Ukraine 11 Finland 12 Netherlands 13 Austria 14 Sweden 15 Rumania 16 Denmark 17 Bulgaria 18

29 25 22 18 17 13 10 9 6 4 3

1,726 1,037

972 614 585 312 292 251 244 205 129 91 90 59 59 56 48 47

996 1896 11% 1396 2696 1696 2496 2296

996 1396

796

4196 7996 3396 6496 6096 4396 3796 4396 3196 2696 1996 4396 4896 39% 39% 20% 3996 1396

15 3.9 8.1 5.1 2.5 10 0.9 0.7 5.2

7 3.2

141 60 71 83 61 58 7.5 40 39

10.7 46 5.2

16.6 8.2

9 22 5.5 7.4

100 22 28 14

120 36 70 19

3.7 3.3

4

2100 2900 560

3600 2700 2300 420

1500 440 380 125 255 820 390 460 170 330

40

49 1200 56 640 66 1000 22 190 15 11000 35 510 12 2400 8 550

10 42 9 90

15 19

1000 80000 180 66000 510 11000 245 30000 255 52000 186 18000 240 3800 149 HOOO 127 7800 156 5600 130 2000

29 3200 46 8000 40 2300 24 7300 74 3200 30 4400 41 880

$24 $11 $15

$9 $733

$15 $200 $69 $4

$10 $1

$80 $367 $22

$122 $204 $97 $16 574 $61 $36 $15

$110 $174 $58

$304 $43

$147 $21

2900 1600 800

2100 1000 450 370 470 520 80

130

18000 4100 8600 6600 7700 2400 1800 2700 3400 4200 7700 880 940 800

1500 1500 740

2800

200 5

60 100 60 26 30 55 60 4 o

2300 530 470 492 320 360

90 220 180 390 400 62

145 42

130 70 50

100

5 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4

6 9 7 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 5 8 6 6 6 5 6 6

3 4 3 4 7 4 6 6 3 4 3

6 8 5 7 7 6 6 6 5 5 4 6 7 6 6 4 6 3

3 6 5 3 5 4 5 5 3 3 4

6 8 6 6 7 5 5 5 5 5 4 6 5 5 5 4 5 5

2 3 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 1

5 8 4 8 8 7 5 6 5 3 4 5 5 5 6 3 5 2

2 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1

6 7 3 8 7 6 3 6 5 4 3 4 6 3 4 4 5 3

2 3 2 2 1 5 1 1 2 2 1

5 9 9 8 6 5 6 6 5 4 4 8 5 7 5 5 5 5

Page 56: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

CTY

Hungary Belgium Portugal Belarus Armenia Czech Rep. Norway Serbia Croatia Slovakia Georgia Lithuania Ireland Albania Macedonia Bosnia Latvia Slovenia Moldova Estonia

AMERICAS United States Colombia Brazil Canada

Economic Profile

RNK CPL TFQ TP GDP AMM MB

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

43 28% 10 150 40 37% 10.3 470 35 28% 10.7 230 35 11% 9.8 45 34 17% 3 9.5 30 26% 10.2 190 30 39% 4.6 430 26 19% 10 40 12 13% 4.5 55 12 14% 5.4 80 11 12% 4.5 10 7 14% 3.6 38 6 22% 4.1 260 6 12% 3.6 12 4 7% 2 7 3 10% 4.5 14.5 2 14% 2.3 27 2 14% 2 46 29%4.35 2 14% 1.4 22

32 1800 40 4000 42 2700 73 530 42 300 23 2800 16 5800 24 1100 18 900 17 1200 21 600 14 490 10 1000 11 210 11 170 9 150

5.7 480 6 800

6.7 200 4.1 400

1 10,000 93% 302 14000 1500 580000 2 435 26% 44 190 255 5200 3 400 33% 190 1400 365 22000 4 166 47% 33.5 1600 64 18000

BIM AFV

$56 $100

$64 $7 $7

$122 $363

$46 $50 $71 $29 $35

$100 $19 $15 $17 $84

$133 $30 $98

860 350 610

3900 340 680 510 550 370 720 270 200 110 160 320 650

3 160 350

50

$387 34000 $20 360 $60 1600

$281 1600

Military Capability

AC LDR EQ

40 72 25

220 24 50 52 50 15 65 10 o o o

10 16 o

10 o o

5800 145 350 110

6 5 5 4 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 4 4 5

9 8 6 7

5 6 5 3 4 5 6 4 4 4 3 4 5 3 3 3 4 4 3 4

9 5 6 6

EX SP

5 5 5 4 6 4 5 6 3 3 5 3 4 5 4 6 3 3 4 3

8 7 4 7

4 5 5 3 2 5 6 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 4 2 2

9 3 5 6

MOB TR

4 4 3 3 2 4 5 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 3 2 1 3

9 3 5 6

5 5 5 2 3 3 4 3 2 2 3 2 5 4 1 2 2 1 2 2

7 3 2 7

Page 57: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Mexico 5 Peru 6 Argentina 7 Chile 8 Venezuela 9 Cuba 10 Bolivia 11 Dominican Rep 12 Ecuador 13 Uruguay 14 Nicaragua 15 El Salvador 16 Honduras 17 Guatemala 18 Paraguay 19 Pananrra 20 Costa Rica 21 Janrraica 22 Haiti 23

AFRICA Ethiopia 1 Eritrea 2 South Africa 3 Angola 4 Nigeria 5 Dem Rep Congo 6 Uganda 7 Rwanda 8 Kenya 9 Chad 10

130 1696 109 890 97 1896 28.8 115 97 2896 40 250 72 2596 16.2 180 65 2096 26 250 31 1696 11.3 40 19 1296 9.1 13 16 1196 9.4 43 14 1196 13.8 48 10 1296 3.5 24 10 1496 5.7 5.7 7 1396 7 21 6 1496 8.8 11 5 796 12.8 43 5 1296 6.7 12 4 1196 3.2 20 3 1196 4.2 23 1 1496 2.7 11 o 1196 8.7 6.5

141 1696 77 18 124 796 5 1.5 96 2796 44 290 73 1096 13 55 56 1596 135 160 35 1096 65 10 24 1096 30 12 24 1296 10 3.5 20 1696 37 27 13 11% 10.3 8

249 4000 114 3800

76 2100 65 2700

115 2600 49 1600 46 170 .. 9 270 57 950 25 270 14 680 16 115 12 80 16 165 11 550 12 200

9.8 135 2.8 110 o 0

140 350 200 200

62 3900 lOB 2400 80 1000

135 200 40 400 33 60 24 360 26 80

$16 1100 $33 670 $28 900 $42 1100 $23 690 $33 1400 $4 190 $6 16

$17 210 $11 170 $49 170 $7 50 $7 60

$10 60 $50 50 $17 0 $14 0 $39 4 $0 0

$3 700 $1 400

$63 2300 $22 1300 $13 1200

$1 280 $10 280 $2 149

$15 220 $3 250

110 75

150 100 110

35 50 o

75 21 15 15 17 11 12 o o o o

70 18 65

110 80 9

20 5

50 6

5 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3

6 6 6 6 5 4 6 6 6 5

4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4

3 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3

4 6 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 6 5 4 4 4 4 5 4

7 6 6 6 5 5 6 6 5 6

4 3 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1

4 1 5 2 4 3 1 2 3 2

3 2 5 4 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 1 5 1 3 1 2 3 1 1

1 3 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 1

6 4 7 2 5 1 1 2 3 3

Page 58: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Economic Profile

CTY RNK CPL TFQ TP GDP AMM MB

Tanzania 11 11 10% 38 16 27 210 Burundi 12 11 5% 8.4 1 23 45 Ivory Coast 13 7 13% 18 21 17 300 Senegal 14 7 15% 12.5 14 14 180 Mozambique 15 7 9% 20 8.5 11 60 Ghana 16 6 10% 23 16 13.5 1300 Cameroon 17 6 9% 18 22 14 330 Zambia 18 6 8% 11.5 11.5 15 240 Madagascar 19 5 10% 19 9 13 390 Burkina Faso 20 4 12% 14.4 7.5 11 100 Zimbabwe 21 4 6% 10 2 29 25 Djibouti 22 4 10% 0.6 0.9 11 20 Botswana 23 4 11% 1.7 13 9 290 Nambia 24 4 14% 2 7.5 9 250 Guinea 25 4 7% 10 5 12 250 Gambia 26 3 13% 1.7 0.9 8 15 lI!ali 27 3 9% 12 7.5 7 170 Sierra Leone 28 3 12% 6 1.8 10 25 Togo 29 3 7% 5.7 2.7 8 44 Congo 30 3 10% 3.8 11 10 100 Gabon 31 3 12% 1.6 12 4.7 100 Guinea-Bisseau 32 2 6% 1.5 0.4 9 17 Niger 33 2 9% 13 4.5 5 50 Benin 34 2 12% 8 6 4.7 58 Malawi 35 2 7% 13.6 2.5 5 22 Swaziland 36 1 11% 1.1 0.5 3 20

BIM AFV

$8 $2

$18 $13

$5 $96 $24 $16 $30

$9 $1 $2

$32 $28 $21 $2

$24 $3 $6

$10 $21

$2 $10 $12 $4 $7

120 100 100 90

380 70

110 140 110

85 200

30 210 70

120 o

120 o

120 140 110

90 140 40 40 o

Military Capability

AC LDR EQ

18 4

10 8 5

12 22 25 o 7

50 o

30 o 8 o

14 o

15 2

22 3 o o o o

5 6 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5

3 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 2 3 4 3 4

EX SP

5 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 6 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1

MOB TR

1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 3 3 4 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1

Page 59: 94 POLITICAL TREND CHARTS

Lesotho 37 Liberia 38 Equatorial Guinea 39 Central Afr. Rep. 40 Somalia 41

EAST ASIA China 1 Korea, South 2 Korea, North 3 Japan 4 Taiwan 5 Vietnam 6 Indonesia 7 Australia 8 Thailand 9 Singapore 10 Malaysia 11 Philippines 12 Cambodia 13 New Zealand 14 Laos 15 Mongolia 16 Brunei 17 Fiji 18 Papua New Guinea19

Totals-

1 13% 2.2 1.7 1

12 1.7

1

1 10% 3.2 1 13% 0.55 o 11% 4.3 o 6% 10

2,757 920 688 523 449 327 199 172 156 142 112 100 39 14 11 6 2 2 1

32% 1300 3500 39% 49 990 19% 23 12 73% 127 4700 41% 24 390 22% 85 75 16% 235 450 52% 20.5 1100 12% 65 250 40% 4.5 160 25% 26 201 20% 92 160 12% 14.5 35 39% 4.2 140

6% 6.7 5 10% 3 3.5 19% 0.39 14 12% 0.9 3 13% 5.8 5.4

2 2.4 1.3

3 1

35 16 21 18 5

2100 55000 680 28000

1100 900 240 48000 290 10000 450 3700 300 4000

51 20000 300 3400 72 7500

109 4000 107 1200 122 9000

9 2100 28 15

8.5 22 7 530

3.5 85 3.2 95

34,265 6,617 5:',566 20,6241,349,159

$18 S7

$16 $6 $5

20 o

15 40 o

$26 13000 $41 6700

$1 5500 $200 1850 $34 2900 $8 2600

$13 930 $392 1200

$11 1800 $104 2100

$37 1600 $11 520 $74 430

$233 290 $1 55 $3 900

$76 55 $24 0 $30 0

251,622

o o o o o

2600 620 600 440 480 230 95

140 170 110 70 55 20 6

24 10 5 o o

26,119

5 4 5 3 5

6 6 5 6 6 5 5 8 5 7 6 6 4 6 5 5 4 6 5

4 3 4 4 2

5 6 4 8 6 4 3 7 3 7 5 4 3 6 2 3 6 4 4

4 6 4 4 6

5 6 3 6 6 5 6 7 5 6 5 7 5 6 5 5 4 5 5

2 2 2 1 2

6 5 3 8 6 4 4 5 2 4 3 3 3 5 2 I I 1 2

1 1 1 1 1

4 4 5 8 5 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 1 3 1 2 1 1 1

2 1 2 1 1

6 5 4 7 5 6 5

3 3 4 4 4 6 2 3 1 1 1