RULINGS OF CASES FOR MIRANDA DOCTRINE

Sec. 12, Article III

1. Source

Miranda vs Arizona

Was a confession an admissible document in a court of law if it was obtained without warnings against self-incrimination and without legal counselrights guaranteed to all persons by the 5th and 6th amendments? With whom does the burden of proof rest for determining whether a defendant has legally waived his or her rights? What is the standard for judging whether voluntary confessions should be deemed admissible? When should an attorney be appointed for a person if he or she cannot afford one?

Miranda Warnings

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.

By a 5-4 margin, the Court voted to overturn Miranda's conviction. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren declared that the burden is upon the State to demonstrate that procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination are followed. The current practice of 'incommunicado' [unable to communicate with the world] interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's most cherished principlesthat the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself.

Warren then summarized the case, measuring it against the fundamental fairness standards the Court had established. [I]t is clear, he wrote, that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner. Without these warnings [his] statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had 'full knowledge' of his 'legal rights' does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.

Turning to the standard for a valid waiver of rights, Warren wrote: [A] valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained. Moreover, any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.

Warren then spelled out the rights of the accused and the responsibilities of the police. Police must warn a suspect prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

The creation of the Miranda Warning put on the shoulders of the police the burden of informing citizens subject to questioning in a criminal investigation of their rights to due process. Ernesto Miranda, retracting his confession, was tried again by the State of Arizona, found guilty, and sent to prison. His retrial, based on a prisoner's successful appeal, did not constitute double jeopardy.

PP vs Mojello

The trial court observed that as to the confession of appellant, he was fully apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and his right to counsel, as contained in such confession.28 Appellant was properly assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio. The extrajudicial confession of appellant was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca, Municipal Judge of Medellin-Daanbantayan and acting Judge of MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan and Madredijos. Judge Jaca declared that he explained to the appellant the contents of the extrajudicial confession and asked if he understood it. He subsequently acknowledged that when appellant subscribed to his statement, Atty. Giduquio, witness Batobalonos and his Clerk of Court were present as well as other people.

The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the rigid requirements of the Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is admissible as evidence. The lower court was correct in giving credence to the extrajudicial confession of the appellant.

On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.

The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress, compulsion or coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. Bare assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption. The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed. In cases where the Miranda warnings have been given, the test of voluntariness should be subsequently applied in order to determine the probative weight of the confession.

Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's confession remains unrebutted by his failure to present independent evidence that the same was coerced.

It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law enforcement officers is to ensure that a suspect has been properly apprised of his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel. It is in the paramount public interest that the foundation of an effective administration of criminal justice relies on the faithful adherence to the Miranda doctrine.

Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional requirements under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in evidence against appellant. It follows that the admission of culpability made therein is admissible. It is therefore not "fruit of the poisonous tree" since the tree itself is not poisonous.

Aquino vs Paiste

It is evident that when petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR on March 27, 1991 to be investigated, she was already under custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed.

However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly pointed out by the CA, that the custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for the crime was either aborted or did not push through as the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with both parties affixing their signatures on it in the presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.

It is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in the person of Atty. Uy. The presumption that Atty. Uy is a competent and independent counsel whose interests are not adverse to petitioner has not been overturned. Petitioner has merely posed before the CA and now this Court that Atty. Uy may not be an independent and competent counsel. Without any shred of evidence to bolster such claim, it cannot be entertained.

Petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uys appointment during the time she was in the NBI and thereafter, when she signed the amicable settlement. Verily, in the instant case, petitioner is deemed to have engaged Atty. Uy when she conferred with him and thereafter signed the amicable settlement with waiver of right to counsel in his presence. We do not see how the answer of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon cross-examination about the petitioners counsel in the NBI, could be evasive when the NBI agent merely stated the fact that an independent counsel, Atty. Uy, was provided petitioner.

When petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly executed the amicable settlement. Verily, she was provided with an independent counsel and such "right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth." An amicable settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or admission but is a contract between the parties within the parameters of their mutually recognized and admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the presence of Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioners rights even if the custodial investigation did not push through and precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or intimidation.

In fine, we agree with the courts a quo that even assuming arguendo that the amicable settlement is not admissible, still the conviction of petitioner would be affirmed as conspiracy was duly proven by other pieces of evidence.

PP vs Concepcion

Appellants contention that they were not apprised of their constitutional rights upon their arrest cannot lead to their acquittal. The arresting officers alleged failure to inform them of their Miranda rights or the nature of their arrest should have been raised before arraignment. It is too late in the day for appellants to raise these alleged illegalities after a valid information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered.

In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellants were involved in the buy-bust operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, appellants Alfredo and Henrys participation cannot be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail. Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.

We uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. The presumption remains because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive. The presumption was not overcome as there was no evidence showing that PO2 Sistemio and PO2 Arojado were impelled by improper motive.

The testimony of defense witness Julieta dela Rosa does not convince us. As the wife of appellant Alfredo and sister-in-law of appellant Henry, we find her not to be credible. Her testimony is suspect and unsubstantiated. In her direct testimony, she said her husband, appellant Alfredo, was outside their house with his friends. However, such statement was belied by Alfredo himself who said he was inside his house when he was allegedly arrested by members of the PDEA. Such inconsistency as to where appellant Alfredo was when the alleged unlawful arrest was made, further diminishes the credibility of the defense witnesses.

Undeniably, appellants are guilty of sale and delivery of shabu, a dangerous drug. It was duly established that there was a conspiracy between them to sell and deliver dangerous drugs.

PP vs Reyes

Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded as evidence, as it was procured in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He claims that he was not given freedom to choose his counsel; that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask him during the custodial investigation whether he had a lawyer of his own choice, and whether he could afford to hire a lawyer; and that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga to him.

An extra-judicial confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement by a person under custodial investigation, stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime. In order that an extra-judicial confession may be admitted in evidence, Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the following safeguards be observed.

Thus, we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet in custody. The right of an accused to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. Such right contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed.

The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. The lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be, as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the accused. If the lawyer is one furnished in behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he must be willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. A competent and independent counsel is logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the time the latter answers the first question asked by the investigator until the signing of the confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily, and that the person under investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extra-judicial confession vis-a-vis his constitutional rights.

However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting what he is being coerced to admit although untrue. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. The counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly apprised appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of their own choice during their respective custodial investigations. Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent and independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations.

PP vs Tuniaco

ABAD, J.:This case is about the requirements of a valid extrajudicial confession and the establishment of the existence of corpus delicti in murder cases.

Before anything else, officer Tabucon informed accused Aleman in Cebuano of his constitutional right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel of his own choice and asked him if he was willing to give a statement. Aleman answered in the affirmative. When asked if he had any complaint to make, Aleman said that he had none. When Aleman said that he had no lawyer, Tabucon pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that he was assisting all the suspects in the case. Tabucon warned Aleman that anything he would say may be used against him later in court. Afterwards, the police officer started taking down Alemans statement.

Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing. These requirements were met here. A lawyer, not working with or was not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused Aleman during the custodial investigation. Officer Tabucon testified that he saw accused Aleman, before the taking of his statement, conversing with counsel at the police station. Atty. Besinga did not dispute this claim.

Aleman alleges torture as the reason for the execution of the confession. The appellate court is correct in ruling that such allegation is baseless. It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness. Here, although Aleman claimed that he bore torture marks on his head, he never brought this to the attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who administered his oath.

Further, Aleman asserts that he was lacking in education and so he did not fully realize the consequences of a confession. But as the CA said, no law or jurisprudence requires the police officer to ascertain the educational attainment of the accused. All that is needed is an effective communication between the interrogator and the suspect to the end that the latter is able to understand his rights. This appears to have been done in this case.

Moreover, as the lower court noted, it is improbable that the police fabricated Alemans confession and just forced him to sign it. The confession has details that only the person who committed the crime could have possibly known. What is more, accused Datulaytas confession corroborate that of Aleman in important details. Under the doctrine of interlocking confessions, such corroboration is circumstantial evidence against the person implicated in it.

2. Rights are available only during custodial investigationAny questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way (or in custody interrogation of accused persons).

2.1 Under RA 7438

Custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officers for any violation for any law.

PP vs Tan

ROMERO, J.:May the confession of an accused, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, be admissible in evidence against him?

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. Article III, Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution provides:

x x x x x x x x xSec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

x x x x x x x x x

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible against him.

Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438), approved on May 15, 1992, reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads:

As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law.

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.

Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government.

What remains of the evidence for the prosecution is inadequate to warrant a conviction. Considering the circumstances attendant in the conduct of appellants investigation which fell short of compliance with constitutional safeguards, we are constrained to acquit the appellant.

PP vs Ordono

PER CURIAM:COURTS are confronted, repeatedly, with the difficult task of scrutinizing the sufficiency of extrajudicial confessions as basis for convicting the accused. The drive to apprehend the culprits at any cost, particularly in crimes characterized by brutality and savagery, not too infrequently tempts law enforcement agencies to take unwarranted shortcuts and disregard constitutional and legal constraints that are intended to ensure that only the guilty are punished. In the delicate process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, courts play a crucial role in assuring that the evidence gathered by government agents scrupulously meets the exacting constitutional standards which if not met impose a strict exclusionary rule, i.e., "any confession or admission obtained in violation of Art. II, Sec. 12 (1), shall be inadmissible in evidence."

Review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's testimony reveals that the interview was conducted free from any influence or intimidation from police officers and was done willingly by the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority ordered or forced the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it may be expected that police officers were around since the interview was held in the police station, there was no showing that they were within hearing distance nor within the vicinity where the interview was being conducted. At most, the participation of the police authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct an interview.

The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made by herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was not in the nature of an investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or any other investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio announcer, they did not talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional rights.

Sections 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions of the two (2) accused to the radio announcer. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.

The admissions of the accused before the radio announcer and duly tape-recorded are further bolstered and substantiated by the findings of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in the Autopsy Report/Post Mortem Findings.

PP vs Lugod

Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, the accused-appellants act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-appellants rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the same vein, the accused-appellants act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the accused-appellants right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree.

As can be seen from the testimony of the Vice-Mayor, accused-appellant merely responded to the ambiguous questions that the Vice-Mayor propounded to him. He did not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and killed Nairube. In fact, the Vice-Mayor admitted that the accused-appellant did not tell him that he raped and killed Nairube. In addition, we note the contradiction between the testimony of the Vice-Mayor who stated that he was alone when he spoke to the accused-appellant and that of SPO2 Gallardo who claimed that he was present when accused-appellant confessed to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor.

PP vs Pasudag

After the interrogation, SPO3 Fajarito prepared a confiscation report, which was part of the investigation. Accused-Appellant signed the confiscation report. In both the interrogation and the signing of the confiscation receipt, no counsel assisted accused-appellant. He was the only civilian present in the Office of the Chief of Police.

We do not agree with the Solicitor General that accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when he signed the confiscation receipt. It has been held repeatedly that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. Obviously, accused-appellant was a suspect from the moment the police team went to his house and ordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants in his backyard garden.

"The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more that mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee." Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence.

PP vs Reyes, supra

Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He insists that his written extra-judicial confession was elicited through force, torture and without the assistance of a lawyer. He avers that he was not assisted by any lawyer from the time he was arrested until he was coerced to sign the purported confession; that he was forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the beatings he suffered at the hands of the PAOCTF agents; and that he never met or knew Atty. Rous who, according to the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the custodial investigation.

The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. The lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be, as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the accused. If the lawyer is one furnished in behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he must be willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. A competent and independent counsel is logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the time the latter answers the first question asked by the investigator until the signing of the confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily, and that the person under investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extra-judicial confession vis-a-vis his constitutional rights.

However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting what he is being coerced to admit although untrue. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. The counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly apprised appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of their own choice during their respective custodial investigations. Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent and independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations.

PP vs Lauga

Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a Bantay Bayan Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan, the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.

This Court needs to ascertain whether or not a bantay bayan may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.

It may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level. The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community. This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence. Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

2.2 Police Line-Up (not yet shifted from the investigatory to accusatory stage)PP vs AmestuzoThe guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he was presented for identification by the complainants because the same was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that during his identification by the complainants, the police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confession from accused-appellant. In fact, records show that the police did not at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented before the complainants. The alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extra-judicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction. In the present case, there is no such confession or extra-judicial admission.Accused-appellant also makes much ado about the manner in which he was presented to the complainants for identification. It is alleged that the identification was irregular as he was not placed in a police line-up and instead, made to stand before the complainants alone.Again, the contention has no merit. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. The fact that he was brought out of the detention cell alone and was made to stand before the accused by himself and unaccompanied by any other suspects or persons does not detract from the validity of the identification process.PP vs PiedadThe claim by the defense that Niels pre-trial identification was suggestive due to the absence of a police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed out that even before the incident, Luz Lactawan knew the accused. Fidel, on the other hand, knew Niel because they played basketball together. Hence, the witnesses were not identifying persons whom they were unfamiliar with, where arguably, improper suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused were presented before the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones responsible for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused simply because they were the only ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses were certain they recognized the perpetrators of the crime. Besides, there is no law which requires a police lineup before a suspect can be identified as the culprit of a crime. What is important is that the prosecution witnesses positively identify the persons charged as the malefactors. Neither is the lack of counsel during the pre-trial identification process of the accused-appellants fatal.The right to counsel accrues only after an investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and commences an interrogation aimed at a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then propound questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. The presence of counsel during such investigation is intended to prevent the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. What is thus sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. In the case at bar, however, accused-appellants did not make any extrajudicial confession or admission with regard to the crime charged. While Niel and Lito may have been suspects, they were certainly not interrogated by the police authorities, much less forced to confess to the crime imputed against them. Accused-appellants were not under custodial investigation. In fact, Niel averred during cross-examination that the police never allowed them to say anything at the police station on the day they voluntarily presented themselves to the authorities.Likewise, Lito testified that he did not talk to any of the police officers nor sign any written statement at the police station when he was invited. Moreover, the rights accorded an accused under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined, as was done in this case - presented to the witnesses to be identified. Accused-appellants were not thus denied their right to counsel.PP vs EscordialAccused-appellant invokes Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained from him during such interrogation for violation of accused-appellant's rights under this provision.While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with which he was charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-appellant which should have been excluded as evidence against him.Of greater significance is the fact that accused-appellant was never assisted by counsel, whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the time of his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his continued detention at the Bacolod police station. Although accused-appellant made no statement during this time, this fact remains important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant by the prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Mark Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega.As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police.An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him.Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on January 3, 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'"Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the "fruits of the poisonous tree." This in-court identification was what formed the basis of the trial court's conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof, it is admissible as evidence against him. However, whether or not such prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.

PP vs CasimiroWith respect to the receipt of property seized from accused-appellant, the lower court declared:The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the police which was signed by the accused does not affect the liability of the accused. The receipt of property seized was issued by the police in accordance with their standard operating procedure in a buy bust operation to show what property was seized. The receipt should not be treated as an admission or confession.Indeed, the receipt could not be considered evidence against accused-appellant because it was signed by him without the assistance of counsel.24 Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution.The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the suspect to a poseur buyer and signed by accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as "suspect/ owner." In effect, accused-appellant admitted that he delivered a prohibited drug to another, which is an offense under the law. Having been made without the assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in evidence.The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that, if accused-appellant could not afford counsel, one would be assigned to him. The warning was perfunctory, made without any effort to find out if he understood it. It was merely ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting meaningful information to the suspect. We cannot say that, in signing the receipt without a lawyer, accused-appellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely. What is more, the police investigators did not pause long enough and wait for accused-appellant to say whether he was willing to answer their questions even without the assistance of counsel or whether he was waiving his right to remain silent at all.PP vs SayabocBeginning with the admissibility of Sayabocs extrajudicial confession, we hold that such cannot be used in evidence in this case.Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accuseds rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel. We understand the difficulty and frustration of police investigators in obtaining evidence to bring criminals to justice. But even the hardest of criminals have rights that cannot be interfered with. Those tasked with the enforcement of the law and who accuse those who violate it carry the burden of ensuring that all evidence obtained by them in the course of the performance of their duties are untainted with constitutional infirmity. The purpose of the stringent requirements of the law is to protect all persons, especially the innocent and the weak, against possible indiscriminate use of the powers of the government. Any deviation cannot be tolerated, and any fruit of such deviation shall be excluded from evidence.For these reasons, the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc cannot be used in evidence against him. We hold, however, that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving his guilt for the crime of homicide.PP vs BagnateThe failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable penalty of the crimes he was to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellants extrajudicial confession. There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption arise that the counsel is incompetent or not independent just because he failed to apprise the accused that the imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt in the commission of a crime.As previously stated, Atty. Brotamonte ably assisted appellant during the entire procedure from the time appellant signified his intention to give his extrajudicial confession up to the time he signed the same. Besides, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant was not aware of the consequences of his admissions as Judge Base explained it to appellant when he appeared before the latter to swear to the veracity of his confession.Appellant failed to substantiate his bare claim that when he was brought to the Tabaco police station, the police officers boxed and kicked him, telling him to confess to the crimes. As the records show, like Atty. Brotamonte, Judge Base also asked him if he was forced to confess but Bagnate said that he was not. If it were true that he was forced to confess to the crime, then appellant should have complained of such abuse to Atty. Brotamonte or Judge Base as he had the opportunity to do so when the two conferred with him on separate occasions.Where the appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions.To consider appellants allegation of maltreatment as true is to facilitate the retraction of solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever.The taking of appellants confession has conformed to the safeguards of the Constitution. It constitutes evidence of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.PP vs GanihThe Court entertains no doubt that Ganih and the others with him kidnapped Mrs. Lee to trade her freedom for a price. Ganih initially demanded P15 million for her but he reduced his demand when Mr. Lee could raise only P1.2 million. The kidnappers actually received this ransom as evidenced by the fact that they immediately released Mrs. Lee after the last negotiation.Significantly, Ganih offered nothing but his bare denial and unsubstantiated alibi to counter the overwhelming evidence that the prosecution adduced against him. His other contention is that the police made Mrs. Lee identify him, not in a proper police line-up but in a mere show-up after giving her some improper suggestions.But the manner in which Mrs. Lee identified Ganih was substantially the same as in any proper police line-up except that this one took place outside the police station on account of Mrs. Lees desire not to be seen while making the identification. The police did not show Ganih alone to Mrs. Lee, which would suggest that he was their suspect. They made three other men stand with Ganih in front of the police station while Mrs. Lee gazed on them behind the tinted windows of her vehicle.What the Court condemns are prior or contemporaneous improper suggestions that point out the suspect to the witness as the perpetrator to be identified. Besides, granting that the out-of-court identification was irregular, Mrs. Lees court testimony clearly shows that she positively identified Ganih independently of the previous identification she made in front of the police station. Mrs. Lee could not have made a mistake in identifying him since she had ample opportunities to study the faces and peculiar body movements of her kidnappers in her almost four months of ordeal with them. Indeed, she was candid and direct in her recollection, narrating events as she saw them take place. Her testimony, including her identification of the appellant, was positive, straightforward, and categorical.3. The guarantee does not apply to spontaneous statement/res gestaePP vs BaloloyWe shall first address the issue of admissibility of JUANITOs extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza.It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was asked by Ceniza to tell her everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense.Moreover, JUANITO did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which could have compelled her to testify falsely against him. Where there is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the said testimony is trustworthy.However, there is merit in JUANITOs claim that his constitutional rights during custodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to have started. At any rate, while it is true that JUANITOs extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon was made without the advice and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in evidence, it could however be treated as a verbal admission of the accused, which could be established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused.PP vs ArondainThe statement of accused-appellant immediately after his arrest that he shot the victim because the latter refused his demand for money, which statement is allegedly admissible as part of the res gestae.Based on applicable jurisprudence, we find that the trial court erred in finding accused-appelant guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. The confession made by the accused-appellant admitting the crime of frustrated robbery cannot be admitted as part of res gastae. It must be stressed that said statement, if it was at all made by accused-appellant, was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Said confession was given after he was arrested and without the assistance of counsel. He was not informed of his right to remain silent or right to counsel. From time he was arrested and deprived of his freedom, all the questions propounded on him by the police authorities for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information came within the ambit of a custodial investigation. As such, he was entitled to the rights enshrined under Article III, Section 12, of the Constitution. Failing to observe this constitutional mandate, the alleged confession of accused-appellant cannot be admitted as evidence against him.4. The guarantee does not apply to statements given in administrative investigationsNavallo vs SandiganbayanAccused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," which we have since defined as any "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own testimony.Office of the Court Administrator vs SumilangROMERO, J.: With reluctance, the Court once again has to wield its power of imposing disciplinary measures on members of the Bench and employees of the judiciary for failure to live up to the obligations incident to their status as officers of the Court.Malla claims that her constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution were violated when she was "pressured" to sign an affidavit dated September 14, 1994 before the Office of the Court Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed. Thus, she concludes that the affidavit is inadmissible in evidence.During the investigation, Malla repeated what she basically stated in her affidavit i.e., that she used a substantial amount of the P240,00.00 for her personal needs. This effectively refutes whatever pressure and coercion she claims was employed against her. By repeating her confession in open court, Malla thereby converted it into a judicial confession. In People v. Loveria, however, we ruled that the aforementioned constitutional provision may be invoked only during "custodial investigation" or as in "custody investigation" which has been defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The investigation is defined as an "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigation conducted by the Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement authority contemplated in the constitutional provision. At any rate, Malla admitted during her testimony that she received the said check from Villarica covering the amount of P240,000.00 payable to Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit it with the Municipal Treasurer, the latter refused because there was no order from Judge Sumilang. Consequently, Villarica entrusted said check to her. It was at this juncture that she used the money for personal purposes. Remolona vs Civil Service CommissionThe main issue posed for resolution is whether a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service for an offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty. He claims that the extra-judicial admission allegedly signed by him is inadmissible because he was merely made to sign a blank form. The submission of Remolona that his alleged extra-judicial confession is inadmissible because he was not assisted by counsel during the investigation as required under Section 12 paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution deserves scant consideration.The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of a criminal prosecution.In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the investigation conducted by the CSC field office. The investigation was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the facts and whether there is a prima facie evidence sufficient to form a belief that an offense cognizable by the CSC has been committed and that Remolona is probably guilty thereof and should be administratively charged. Perforce, the admissions made by Remolona during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal.PP vs Ting Lan UyAppellant claims that he should be acquitted since his conviction was based on his sworn statement, transcript of stenographic notes from which the sworn statement was taken and the NBI Report, which are incompetent evidence. He contends that his sworn statement was taken without the benefit of counsel, in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The investigation under the above-quoted provision refers to a custodial investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody and the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accused-appellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture. The protective mantle of the constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or confessions made to a private individual, or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the investigation, or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity Thus, the flaw in appellants argument in this regard becomes immediately apparent vis--vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his statement was taken during the administrative investigation of NPCs audit team and before he was taken into custody. As such, the inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no specific suspect. Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody because he was confined at the time at the Philippine Heart Center and he gave this statement to NPC personnel, not to police authorities. Appellant can hardly claim that, under the prevailing circumstances at the time, whatever degree of compulsion may have existed went beyond the borders of the unobjectionable where impermissible levels of duress would force him into making false and incriminating declarations against his interest. While he may have been persuaded into doing so, he cannot feign that he was intimidated in such a way as to bring his statements within the ambit of the exclusionary constitutional provision. The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at the time the sworn statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his predicament. The essence of the constitutional safeguard is protection from coercion. The interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted by NPC personnel for the NPCs administrative investigation. Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate, distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter. PP vs SalongaWe reject accused-appellants argument that his "so-called extra-judicial confession/admission" taken on January 27, 1987 marked as Exhibit "B" is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that the waiver of his right to counsel was made without the assistance of counsel in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which mandates that "x x x (a)ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. x x x Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."Clearly, the constitutional right to counsel as may be invoked only by a person under custodial investigation for an offense. Accused-appellants extra-judicial confession was properly admitted and considered by the trial court considering that when accused-appellant gave his statement he was not under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is "the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements." Indeed, custodial investigation refers to "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.In this case, when Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group discovered that there was a discrepancy in the proof sheet brought about by the issuance of a cashiers check numbered 013702 made payable to Firebrake Sales and Services in the amount of Thirty Six Thousand, Four Hundred Eighty pesos and Thirty centavos (P36,480.30), accused-appellant was summoned to appear before Valentino Elevado, Assistant Accountant, Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank for questioning. It bears stressing that Elevado is not a police officer or law enforcer but a private person who was a bank officer. In the course of the interview, accused-appellant admitted having issued the subject cashiers check without any legitimate transaction, to his co-accused Amiel Garcia who was then encountering financial difficulties. He also admitted that out of the amount of the check, P8,500.00 went to his personal benefit. His admissions were reduced into writing and offered as Exhibit "B" by the prosecution. It is well-settled that the legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to those extra-judicial confessions obtained during custodial investigation.BPI vs Casa MontessoriThe voluntary admission of Yabut did not violate his constitutional rights (1) on custodial investigation, and (2) against self-incrimination.In the first place, he was not under custodial investigation. His Affidavit was executed in private and before private individuals. The mantle of protection under Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution covers only the period "from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not yet in custody."Therefore, to fall within the ambit of Section 12, quoted above, there must be an arrest or a deprivation of freedom, with "questions propounded on him by the police authorities for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information." The said constitutional provision does "not apply to spontaneous statements made in a voluntary manner" whereby an individual orally admits to authorship of a crime. "What the Constitution proscribes is the compulsory or coercive disclosure of incriminating facts."If in these government proceedings waiver is allowed, all the more is it so in private investigations. It is of no moment that no criminal case has yet been filed against Yabut. The filing thereof is entirely up to the appropriate authorities or to the private individuals upon whom damage has been caused. As we shall also explain later, it is not mandatory for CASA -- the plaintiff below -- to implead Yabut in the civil case before the lower court.Under these two constitutional provisions, "[t]he Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State." Moreover, the Bill of Rights "is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the [S]tate." These rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest coercion by the State that may lead the accused "to admit something false, not prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth."Yabut is not an accused here. Besides, his mere invocation of the aforesaid rights "does not automatically entitle him to the constitutional protection." When he freely and voluntarily executed his Affidavit, the State was not even involved. Such Affidavit may therefore be admitted without violating his constitutional rights while under custodial investigation and against self-incrimination.Astudillo vs PeopleThe Court of Appeals did not thus err in pronouncing that petitioners were not under custodial investigation to call for the presence of counsel of their own choice, hence, their written incriminatory statements are admissible in evidence.The extra-judicial confession before the police of Flormarie (who, as earlier stated, has remained at large) in which she incriminated petitioners bears a different complexion, however, as it was made under custodial investigation. When she gave the statement, the investigation was no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a particular suspect. The records show that Camilo had priorly reported the thievery to the same police authorities and identified Flormarie and Benitez as initial suspects.It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to in-custody questioning, the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The presumption of regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Hence, in the absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with these constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial investigation are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of a case. In other words, confessions and admissions in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant and more so against third persons. This is so even if such statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given.Petitioners at all events argue that their written statements were obtained through deceit, promise, trickery and scheme, they claiming that Lily dictated to them their contents. There is nothing on record, however, buttressing petitioners claim other than their self-serving assertion. The presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience such that it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved thus stands.The circumstances surrounding the execution of the written admissions likewise militate against petitioners bare claim. Petitioners admittedly wrote their respective letters during office hours in Lilys office which was located in the same open booth or counter occupied by the cashier and credit card in-charge. And this Court takes note of the observation of the trial court that petitioners written notes were "neatly written in Tagalog, and not in broken Tagalog as spoken by Lily Ong".5. The right guaranteed by this provision refer to testimonial compulsionPP vs PaynorHe argues that there was a violation of the Miranda rights of an accused when he was identified by the witness while he was seated on a bench of the investigation room. The manner employed by the investigators in obtaining his T-shirt, pants, towel, slippers, and hat, according to appellant, was a further violation of his rights as these items were taken from him in the absence of his counsel.Appellant then asseverates that there was a violation of his rights while under custodial investigation, in light of the Miranda doctrine, when allegedly the police investigators unceremoniously stripped him of his clothing and personal items, and the same were later introduced as evidence during the trial. The Court is not persuaded. The protection of the accused under custodial investigation, which is invoked by appellant, refers to testimonial compulsion. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution provides that such accused shall the right to be informed of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the right to waive the right to counsel in the presence of counsel, and that any confession or admission obtained in violation of his rights shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. As held in People vs. Gamboa, this constitutional right applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion. The desperate ploy of appellant that the evidence against him was purely circumstantial does not even warrant refutation. It was definitely established by the prosecution that appellant was actually the one who treacherously attacked the victim. Eyewitness Magaway unequivocally stated and lucidly described how she saw appellant actually stabbing Mrs. Aguinaldo, and even demonstrated during the ocular inspection the specific part of the room where the crime was committed and where she herself was when she witnessed the dastardly deed. As already explained, the defense failed to show that the witness had ill motives in testifying against appellant and there is no doubt in the mind of this Court that the witness really had personal ill feelings against him. The conclusion that irresistibly emerges, therefore, is that the witness was just honestly relating what she really saw on September 18, 1991, and that she so testified because of her desire for justice and redress for the terrible wrong against her teacher.6. The rights under the Miranda Doctrine which a person under custodial investigation is entitled:6.1 To remain silent6.2 To competent and independent counselPP vs SuelaAn effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically [requires] that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent."True, counsel does not necessarily have to dissuade the person under investigation from confessing. But his bounden duty is to properly and fully advise his clients on the nature and consequences of an extrajudicial confession.The modifier competent and independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.With respect Edgardo Batocan, we hold that his extrajudicial confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. This appellant did not finish first year high school. Yet Atty. Rous, who is touted by the prosecution as a competent and independent counsel, interviewed Batocan -- before the latter gave his confession -- for only around "five minutes." After this initial interview, Atty. Rous just listened nonchalantly to the questions propounded by the police and to the answers given by Batocan. Counsel was not even sure that he had explained to appellant the consequences of his extrajudicial confession. Furthermore, Atty. Rous' attention was divided while attending the custodial investigation as he was also looking over another paper work on his desk.Evidently, Atty. Sansano, the counsel of Suela, did not understand the exact nature of appellants' rights to counsel and to remain silent during their custodial investigations. He viewed a refusal to answer as an obstruction in the investigation. This shows that he was incapable or unwilling to advise appellants that remaining silent was a right they could freely exercise without fear of any untoward consequence. As counsel, he could have stopped his clients from answering the propounded questions and advised them of their right to remain silent, if they preferred to do so. That the process of investigation could have been "obstructed" should not have concerned him because his duty was to his clients and not to the prosecution or to the police investigators.The extrajudicial confessions of all three appellants are thus inadmissible in evidence.PP vs MorialThe Court finds Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation.Atty. Tobias Aguilar arrived at about 8:00 that morning of January 9, 1996. After being introduced to Leonardo Morial, Atty. Aguilar had a short conference with him. He asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions that may be propounded by the police investigator. Atty. Aguilar warned him that the statements that he may give might be used in evidence against him. Leonardo said he was willing to answer the questions voluntarily. Midway into the investigation, after the police investigator had asked "all the material points," Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator that he be given leave as he had a very important engagement. The investigator agreed to the lawyer's request. Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions in his absence. He also instructed the police that, after the written confession had been prepared, the accused and the document containing the confession should be brought to his office for "further examination." Atty. Aguilar was in the police station for less than thirty minutes from the start of the interrogation.If it were true that Atty. Tobias had to attend to matters so pressing that he had to abandon a client undergoing custodial investigation, he could have terminated the same to be continued only until as soon as his schedule permitted, advising the suspect in the meantime to remain silent. This he failed to do. Appallingly, he even asked his client whether he was willing to answer questions during the lawyer's absence. The records also disclose that Atty. Tobias never informed appellant of his right to remain silent, not even before the custodial investigation started.Atty. Tobias Aguilar, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain silent, by his "coming and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt departure before the termination of the proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the framers of the 1987 Constitution contemplated when it added the modifier "competent" to the word "counsel." Neither can he be described as the "vigilant and effective" counsel that jurisprudence requires. Precisely, it is Atty. Tobias' nonchalant behavior during the custodial investigation that the Constitution abhors and which this Court condemns. Even granting that appellant consented to Atty. Aguilar's departure during the investigation and to answer questions during the lawyer's absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12 (3), Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of counsel. No such written and counseled waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.As appellant Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during custodial investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him.PP vs BandulaFrom the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations. What is most upsetting however is the allegation of the four (4) accused that they were mauled into owning the crime. Based on the records, we are strongly drawn to the belief that violence indeed attended the extraction of statements from the accused.For, why did the investigators not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them? Why did the investigators not advise the accused that if they could not afford the services of counsel they could be provided with counsel free of charge before conducting any investigation? Why did the investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical assistance? How did accused Sedigo get his "black eye" which evenat. Baldejera admitted? How and why did accused-appellant Bandula suffer a fractured rib?We cannot close our eyes to these unanswered questions. This Court is greatly disturbed with the way the accused were treated or maltreated. In fine, we cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and use the same against them or any of them. Where there is doubt as to their voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.

PP vs VelardePANGANIBAN, J.: A municipal mayor cannot be considered a competent and independent counsel qualified to assist a person under custodial investigation. Hence, the extrajudicial confession taken from the accused with His Honor as counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Without this confession, the remaining evidence, which is circumstantial, fails the test of moral certainty. Hence, acquittal is inevitable.Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as an independent counsel. He was the mayor of Malolos at the time. As such, he exercised "operational supervision and control" over the PNP unit in that municipality. His powers included the utilization of the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal offenders and the bringing of offenders to justice.As mayor of Malolos, his duties were inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to appellant, who was already incarcerated and tagged as the main suspect in the rape-slay case. Serving as counsel of appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of "operational supervision and control" over the police. "What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client's defense without any intervening conflict of interest." Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor of the place where the investigation was taken, could not act as counsel, independent or otherwise, of appellant.Furthermore, the right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not just the mere presence of a lawyer beside the accused. The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present "at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview. The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired."During the investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to act as the independent and competent counsel envisioned by the Constitution. He failed to give any meaningful advice to protect the rights of appellant. The former did not even bother to inform th