Controversial science-based technology public attitude formation andregulation in comparative perspective: The state construction of policyalternatives in AsiaChing Ching Leonga, Darryl Jarvisa, Michael Howlettb,*, Andrea MigonebaLee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, 469c Bukit Timah Rd., SingaporebDepartment of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, CanadaabstractPast studies of the success of regulation and other forms of state and private sector activityin areas of new technologies have argued these are dependent on a number of factors, oneof whichisthereactionof publicopiniontotheinnovationconcerned. Most existingtheories of public acceptance of controversial science-based products are based largely onEuropean and North American case studies and are divided between those which focus onpublic and consumer knowledge of the science involved thedecit model - and thosewhich stress either the need for trust in regulatory and private sector actors involved innew product development and regulation, or the signicance of individual cultural normson attitude formation. This paper examines two cases of the introduction of controversialscienceinAsia-wastewaterrecyclinginSingaporeandnanotechnologyregulationinChina inorder toassess the inuence of these factors ineachcase. Basedonthiscomparative research, it is arguedthat models of public acceptance of controversialscience-based products must also take into account the states ability to dene the range ofpublic debate as a key overall parameter of public attitude formation. 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. IntroductionRegulatory policy-making in theeld of new technolo-gies affecting consumer products involves the design andadoption of a set of policies related to product safety whichare expected to receive a high level of public support. Publicattitudes towards the technology in question thus play animportant roleinthedeterminationof thecontent andorientation of technological regulatory regimes.The existing literature on the subject of public attitudeformation towards controversial technologies, however, isderived largely from European and North American expe-riences. Studies of public opiniontowards science andtechnology based on these case studies divides into threemain competing approaches, all of which focus onindividualbehaviouralcharacteristicsfoundtobeassoci-atedwithpublicattitudestowardsthedevelopmentanddeployment of controversial technologies. These are,respectively, on individual levels of knowledge and atten-tivenesstowardsscience, onindividual levelsof trustininstitutional actors and regulatory bodies, and on citizensvalues and ethical considerations related to the deploymentand possible side-effects of the technology in question [76].However it is important to know if this focus on indi-vidual characteristicsisexhaustiveor undulyrestrictivedueto thechoiceofcasestudysubjectsutilizedinmostexistingstudies. Theemphasisfoundinthesemodelsonsocietally-driven opinion formation, for example, mayunderplay the role of the state in framing scienticcontroversies, asubjectwhichisof greatsignicanceinmany countries outside of the North American, Europeanand occasionally Australasian ones commonly examined instudies of the subject. This paper examines two case studies*Corresponding author.E-mail address: howlett@sfu.ca (M. Howlett).Contents lists available at ScienceDirectTechnology in Societyj ournal homepage: www. el sevi er. com/ l ocat e/ t echsoc0160-791X/$ see front matter 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2011.03.007Technology in Society 33 (2011) 128136of publicreceptionof controversial technologiesintwocountries inAsiadSingapore andChinadwhichfeaturestrong states. As these case studies show, models of publicattitude formation should take the role of the state moreseriously in developing models of general applicability onthe subject of opinionandattitude formationtowardscontroversial science-based technologies.1.1. Existing models of regulatory regimes and attitudeformation in areas of scientic and technological controversyHaga and Willard [33] provide a framework helpful tounderstand and explore the sets of government activitiesundertakeninemergingareasof publicpolicybasedonleadingedgescienticandtechnological breakthroughs.They arguethat veregulatorydimensionstonewtech-nology regulation can be identied: research issues, legalissues, economicissues, educationissuesandacceptanceandimplementationissues. Specic issues withwhichregulatoryregimesgrappleincludeintellectual propertyrights, public information, commercialization of retailproducts, safety, health, consumer choice, trade, andresearch investment [70].Different countriesdeal withtheseissuesdifferentlyPaarlberg[48] andunderstandingwhythesevariationsexist is a key unanswered question in the literature on thesubject of regulation and public attitude formation towardscontroversial science-based technologies. Of the vegeneraldimensionsHagaandWillardidentied, four arefairly well developed in the literature on science and publicpolicy. Much is known about the research, legal, economicandeducationissuesinvolvedinregulatoryactivity. Theacceptance and implementation dimension, however,remains a subject of some controversy, and duellingexplanatory models, in the literature [10].Thestartingpointformoststudiesof publicopiniontowards new technology products in the North Americanand European studies which make up by far the largest bulkof existingstudiesisindividuals knowledgeandunder-standing of these new technologies. The so-calledDecitModel endorsedbymanypractioners, if not empiricalstudies [27,36,67], for example, holds that attitudestowards emergingtechnologies stemlargelyfromindi-vidual ignorance about their actual benets and irrationalfears of potential risks. The chief assumption of this modelis that the public would embrace industry and regulatoryexperts supportforthesetechnologiesifitweresimplymore knowledgeable about the actual benets and risks ofthese technologies.1Public education is thus oftenprescribed as a necessary correlate of promotional policy-making although sensationalist media coverage andoppositionalgroups campaignsareseenasunderminingthese efforts [37,50,52,56,68]. However the empirical basisfor such claims is dubious2and the model often obscuresthe intent of public education measures: to provide a levelof public support required in democratic states forenhanced levels of promotional government activity in thearea concerned.The same is true of a second literature on public supportfor new technologies which focuses on individuals ethicalconcernsandcorevalues[49,69]. Althoughthisliteraturemovesawayfrompurelyindividual orientationstowardsmore collective, cultural, sources of individual opinionformation, this second literature in its emphasis on culturalvalues, like the decit theory which preceded it, is still verysociety-centric andsees theproper roleof thestateassimply responding to accommodating pre-existing culturalpredilections. Key drivers of individual attitudes in this liter-ature include individual religious and moral inclinations, aswell asquasi-spiritual orientationsrelatedtothenaturalorder/protecting nature in areas such a biotechnology.3Thisissomewhatdifferent, butnotentirely, fromthethird major streamof literature developed fromcasestudiesofwesterndemocraticsocieties, thatfocusingontheinstitutional context of scienticresearch, includingindividual levelsof trustinregulatoryactorsandstake-holdersasakeydeterminantofindividual attitudesandactions[16,53,74]. Trustininstitutional actorsisseenasbeing important because in many societies they are a keysource of ofcial information on science and technology.As such, it is argued, scientists and state regulators can playacriticalrolein providing ostensibly neutralor objectiveinformation to the public [20], but when these institutionalactors are not trusted, their claims are likely to fall on deafears, or beconsciouslyrejected[19,38]. Individualswill1As WeldonandLaycock(71) note, at theaggregatelevel, surveyndings provide some evidence to support this interpretation. Study afterstudy has shown that the public isscientically illiterate, lacking evenabasicunderstandingofscience, letaloneknowledgeofsophisticatednew technologies (e.g., [45,46,68]). For example, a1999Eurobarometersurvey that asked ten basic high school-level biology questions, includingseveralaboutgenes andbiotechnology, foundthattheaveragerespon-dentacross17WestEuropeancountriescouldonlyanswer5.2of thequestions correctly [77].Surveys in other advanced industrial democra-cies, includingtheUnitedStatesandCanada, havefoundcomparableresults [78].2Empiricalstudies, particularlyfromthemoregeneralpublicunder-standingofscienceliterature, however, havefoundapositive, butonlyvery weak, correlation between levels of scientic knowledge and levelsof support for new technological advances (see, for example,[11,27,47,67]). Infact, morerecentstudiessuggestthatthiswouldnotnecessarily lead to greater support of new technologies as predicted bythis model. The strongest test of the model probably comes from studyingparticipants in deliberative public forums on specic technologies. Earlyresearch suggests these experiences may actually heighten participantsconcerns about the risks and decrease support for the new technologies.Forexample, arecentstudyof ananotechnologycitizenforumintheUnitedStatesfoundthatbeforedeliberation, 82percent ofparticipantsthoughtthepotentialbenetsofthetechnologyoutweighedtherisks;that number dropped to 66 percent after the deliberation period [30,35].3In a widely cited paper, for example, Sjoberg [64] showed that earlierstudies inattention to moral considerations as bases of technological riskperceptions left muchof thevarianceof perceivedriskunexplained.Whenunnatural andimmoral risk factorswereincorporatedintohisanalysisoftheperceived risk ofnuclearwastes inSweden,hismodelsexplanation of variance increased from 20 percent to 66 percent [64]. Inasecond2005studyof publicandexpert attitudes towards18genetechnologies, Sjobergagainshowedthat publicconcerns about inter-feringwithnature, themoralvalueoftechnology, andtrustinscienceofferedstronger explanatoryforcethanaffectiveandriskassessmentfactors [65]. To Sjoberg, these concerns are rooted in ideological convic-tions, comparable to the worldviews and spiritual orientations anchoringattitudes towards technology in general.C.C. Leong et al. / Technology in Society 33 (2011) 128136 129then look to other sources of information, such as relativesorfriends, social orpolitical organizations, orotherper-ceivedexperts, asaconsciousbasisfortheirjudgments[12]. The empirical basis for this third strand in the litera-tureis quitestrong. As WeldonandLaycock[71] note,previous researchconrms the importance of trust ininstitutional actors for support of new technologies[25,32,53,62]. Astheydiscuss[51], Priest foundthat forexplainingvariations inindividual support for biotech-nology in the United States, trust in agricultural, biotech-nology, andfoodretailcorporationswasmoreimportantthanknowledgeaboutgeneticorgenomicsciencewhileBarnett et al. [9] found that levels of trust in governmentrules and regulatory bodies in Great Britain are also muchstronger predictorsof support for genetherapy, humancloning, and genetic databases than attentiveness togenetics and education [14].4All of these models, however, including the public trustone, donotsystematicallyassesstheroleplayedbythestate in framing debates and opinions concerning contro-versial technologies.5Rather states are seen largely to be atthe mercy of public opinion. While this may be the case insome European or North American countries, however, thestateplaysamuchlargerroleinmany countriesthaninwestern-European or Anglo-American liberal democraciesanditremainsanopenquestion whetherpublicopiniontowards controversial scienceinsuchcountries followsNorthAmericanorEuropeanliberaldemocraticpatternsofindividualattitudeformationandbehaviour. Althoughparticipation ofthe publicandstakeholder groups in thetechnology-drivenpolicy process is a subject that hasreceivedagreat deal of attentioninmorerecent years([29,33,34,61]), theunderlyingmicro-motivesof individ-uals faced with choices about whether to buy or supporttheintroductionof productsbasedonnewtechnologiesremain uncertain [63].Inwhat follows below, the introduction and deploymentof two controversial technologiesdrecycled water useand nanotechnologiesdare studied in two countries in Asiawithstrong, active, states, SingaporeandChina, respec-tively. As the discussion will show, framing effects under-taken by state actorsdin the one case related to thepromotion of the view of a lack of alternatives towards thetechnology used and, in the other, the close association ofthe technology with national development plans andgoalsdare shownto be crucial determinants of publicopinionandattitudes towards thesetechnologies, whichareperceived much more favourably in these two jurisdictionsthan they are in Europe, North America or Australasia.2. Case studies of controversial science-basedtechnology deployment in Asia2.1. Singapore NEWaterSince independence in 1965, Singapore has beendependent on its neighbour Malaysia for much of its water,with two long-termwater agreements ensuring watersupply. Over the past four decades, the two countries haveexperienced periods of cordial as well as icy bilateral rela-tions. In 1997,Singapore, precipitatedby difcultieswithMalaysia over establishment of the price of raw water, withthe Malaysians threatening to increase prices by at least sixtimes and with no set formula upon which to peg to futureincreases, publicly stated that it was looking at alternativesources of water [40].Shortlythereafter, in1998, Singaporebeganstudyingwastewater as a source of raw water. The water would gothrough a purication and treatment process usingmembraneandultraviolet technologiesand, threeyearslater, the reused water would be ready for non-potable usesuchas wafer fabricationapplications inmanufacturingprocesses, as well as for air-conditioning cooling towers incommercial buildings. In2003, thereusedwater, namedNEWater, was introduced into water reservoirs. The amountmade up about 1% of total daily water consumption in 2009and was increased progressively to about 2.5% of total dailywater consumption by 2011 [40].2.2. Early water reuse in SingaporeSingapore is one of the fewcountries in the world whichhas beenabletoovercomethe yuck factor inimple-menting recycled water for drinking. The few studies thathavedocumentedthis casepoint tothecareful useofframing by the government [39] that included stress on theideathatSingaporehadnoalternativesourcesof water,despite the fact that options suchas desalinizationorimporting water from neighbours at higher costs, existed.Since the early 1960s, with increasing industrializationanda larger population, the government startedto reviewitswater sources andconsiderednonconventional options suchas the reuse of sewage and desalination. By the 1960s, twolarge sewage treatment plants had been built and by 1971,some 36industrial premises were using industrial water. Butits use was limited because of poor quality. In early 1970,there was also a small experiment to use industrial water fortoilet ushing. Buthomeownerswereunhappywiththesmell and the dirty water and foaming which resulted. Pipesandpumps alsocorrodedmore quickly thenexpected.Despite this, the government continued its efforts. In 1974, itcommissionedanS$1.3millionWastewater ReclamationDemonstration Plant to determine feasibility of reclaimingwastewater. Theplant produceddrinking waterthatfullymetandinsomeinstancesexceededWHOInternationalDrinkingWaterStandards. However, atS$1.10perm3ofwater, theplant wasnot cost efcient andwasdecom-missioned in late 1975. But it had proven that it was possibleto reclaim water of good quality from treated wastewater,and moreover, that reclaiming water from wastewater wascheaper than desalination.4In fact,whencontrolling fortrust factors,Weldon andLaycock [71]found that attentiveness and education have been negatively correlatedwith support for these modern technologies [9]. Looking more closely atfeelingsoftrusttowardscompetingregulatory andsocialgroupactors,they found Priest et al. [53] to have argued compellingly that individualsoftentrustthesetwoactorsatmarkedlydifferinglevels, andthatthetrust gap is the most decisive factor in explaining variation in individualattitudes towards biotechnologies.5Although still society-centric in its focus on individuals as key shapersof public attitudes, unlike the decit and cultural models, the institutionaltrustanalysisdoesbegintohintatamuchmoresignicantrolebeingplayed in opinion formation by state institutions.C.C. Leong et al. / Technology in Society 33 (2011) 128136 1302.3. Drinking reused water: NEWaterSometwodecadesaftertheWastewaterReclamationDemonstration Plant closing, the government returned totheideaof reusingwastewater. It sent ateamtostudywater reclamation projects in California and West Virginiaand on return, built its second Water ReclamationDemonstration Plant. The S$7 million plant was completedby May 2000. It used a dual membrane (microltration andreverse osmosis) and ultraviolet light disinfection process.This method followed the recommendations of the UnitedStates National Research Council in its report on the use ofreclaimed water to supplement water supplies.At the same time, the government also put together anExpert Panel comprising local and foreign experts in engi-neering, communityhealth, analytics, andwaterquality.TheyprovidedindependentadvicetothePublicUtilitiesBoard (PUB) and the Ministry ofthe Environment on thenewly renamed NEWater study. NEWater was alsotestedmore than 20,000 analyses and tests, evaluating 191parameters, were carried out. At the end, the Expert PanelconcludedNEWaterwassafeforpotableuseandrecom-mended Singapore consider using it for indirect potable useby blending it with reservoir water. Rather than pumping itdirectlyintothewater supply, NEWater would rst bepumpedintoreservoirs, andthensubmittedtoconven-tional water treatment. This not only provides an additionalsafetymarginandbut was expectedtogarner greaterpublicacceptancebytransformingthereusedwaterintoanatural product. TheExpertPanel alsorecommendedthat the PUB put in place a rigorous monitoring and testingprogram as long as NEWater has indirect potable use, withwaterqualitytestresultsreviewedbylocal andinterna-tional experts from academia and industry [41].2.4. High science, low acceptance: buy in from the peopleFromthe PUBs point of view, the main goal was to garnerpublic condence andacceptance. The introduction of a newsourceof watersupplywasunprecedentedforthesmallisland state of Singapore, which has relied ontwo traditionalsources of waterdfromlocal catchments andimportedwater fromtheMalaysianmainlanddsinceits independence40 years ago. It was considered critical to ensure that theintroduction of NEWater did not meet with any signicantpublic opposition. The main aimwas to attain the same levelof trust that the population had in PUB water to NEWater.Theprocessesoutlinedaboveddual membranetech-nology and ultraviolet light disinfection as well as processindirect potable usedwere new to the general public, butgenerally well known in scientic circles. As a senior PUBofcial said: The most difcult, yet critical of them all, wastogetthepublictoovercometheirpsychologicalbarriertowards drinkingrecycledwater andconvincethemtoembrace NEWater as a source of drinking water. To over-come this barrier, a deliberate attempt was made to shifttheattentionawayfromthesourcebyfocussingonthetreatmentprocess, which involves usingadvanced, state-of-the-art membranetechnology. ThePUBtackledtheterminologyby consciouslyrenamingtheterms thathada negative connotation with terms that would better reectthe process or value as a resource. They did not use inter-nationally recognized terms such as wastewater orsewage becausethesehadanegativeconnotationbutrather settledon: a termwhichpromiseda newandimproved product NEWater [40].ThePUBofcial said: Wealsowantedthepublictounderstand that this water is technically not wastewater tobe thrown away but water that can be used and reused overandover again, similar tohowwater recycles itself innature. The plants were renamed fromsewerage treatmentplants to water reclamation plants as they were not merelytreating the sewage, but part of the process that reclaimsthe used water for reuse. [40].2.5. State-led re-framing of recycled waterThePUBbriefedthemediaandsubsequentlybroughtreporters toplaces intheUnitedStates suchas OrangeCountyin California and Scottsdale in Arizona to demonstrate thatwater recycling is not a new phenomenon, and that it hasactually been a way of life for people for many years. The PUBalsoexplainedthedifferencebetweenunplannedindirectpotable use which has been practised by cities in Europe forcenturiesdtreated used water is channelled backinto therivers for use by the next citydownstreamandre-channelledbacktothesameriver for usebyyet thenext citydownstreamof it, and this goes on and ondand planned indirect potableuse, which Singapore is practisingdwhere the PUB puriesthe treated used water to high standards and mixesa percentage of it with raw reservoir water before treating itfor the drinking water supply. The PUB also bottled NEWaterin attractive packaging so that the public could sample forthemselveshowpureitis, andtheseweredistributedatgrassroots andnational events. Topgovernment ofcialsbecame NEWater ambassadors and champions when theywere seen drinking NEWater publicly [40].During the 2002 National Day, some 60,000 Singapor-eans toastedNEWater, demonstrating the support andcondence they had in it. The PUB also set up the NEWaterVisitorCentretobolsterthepubliceducationcampaignwhich was opened by then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tongin 2003 [41].However, despitetheexpert panel andadherencetointernational standards, the issue of public acceptancecontinuedtodogattemptsbygovernmentstointroducereused water. In Singapores case, however, the introductionof NEWater was greatly helped by the government gener-ating a sense of crisis over the 1997 Malaysian governmentdecision to revise the price of water piped to the city state.This was a major plank in a concerted and strong effort fromtheSingapore government to market NeWater tothepublic [40].Overall, the government made all these arrangements inorder to blow down the yuck factor and concentrate onissues of strategic survival andeconomic viability. Thisstrategyof legitimationdidthis inthreesteps. First, itworkedoncompanies rst introducingNEWater as asubstituteformunicipal supplyinindustry(eginsemi-conductor wafer fabrication plants and in air-conditioningcooling towers). Second, it held a massive grassrootscampaign to frame the issue in such a way that showed thatC.C. Leong et al. / Technology in Society 33 (2011) 128136 131the science was relatively uncontroversial, and in any case,there was no alternative. Third, it also introduced the waterindirectly by pumping it into reservoirs [40].In just ve years NEWater has augmented Singaporeswater supplyby302000m3/dor about 15%of waterconsumption. ThefourexistingNEWaterplantscannowmeet more than 15% of Singapores water demand - wellaheadof the2010target date. Constructionof the fth227 000 m3/d NEWater factory at Changi and expansion oftheexistingplantshasbeenadvancedtomeet growingdemand. By2011, therstinwhichtherstof thetwowater agreements with Malaysia expires, theve NEWaterplants will have a combined capacity to meet 30% of Sin-gapores water needs.2.6. ConclusionAs Dolnicar and Hurlimann [22] concluded in their studyof Australian water use attitudes, Singapore providesevidence that key factors involved in the acceptance of thiscontroversial science product includes cost- whencomparedtomoreorlessequallyunpalatablealternativesandtheconsequences of a perceived lack of palatable alternatives.However in the Singaporean case a key role was played bygovernmentsintransmittingthisknowledgeandframingthe discussion in such a way as to portray the unpalatablealternative in as favourable a light as possible. In Singapore,the argument about a lack of alternatives proved particu-larly strong since the country is dependent on its neighbourfortwothirdsofitswatersupply andtheissuecouldbeframed as one of national survival. A comparison of Singa-porescase withthatofQueenslandAustralia, whichalsotried to implement water reuse in its drinking water supply,showed that the discourse in Singapores case was markedlydifferentinitstone[23]. Mediareportsshowedahigherdegree of neutrality and focused on the practical implica-tions, rather than the physiological aspects of water reuse[39].3. Nanotechnology in ChinaTheabilitytoarrangeatomsliesatthefoundationofmany technologies [26]. It is merely variation in thearrangement of atoms that differentiates sand fromcomputer chips, cancer from healthytissue, or gold frombauxite. Nanotechnology involves a series of technologiesthat begin to change the molecular structure of biologicalentities, proteins, DNA, and the building blocks thatgenerate and controlbiologicaloutcomes.These technol-ogies are able to engineer molecular and atomic variationin the composition of compounds to produce newmaterialswith new properties and characteristics. DNA engineering,forexample, canbuildprecise, million-atomframeworkswhereengineered proteins can bind to precise locationson these frameworks, and where proteins can bind othercomponents that are electrically or chemically active suchthat these proteins and the biological structures on whichthey are attached serve as construction machinery [26].Nanotechnology is thus a diverse collection of academicspecialisms centred around engineering and manipulatingmolecular and atomic structures and, in the process,creating biological and non-biological nanomaterialswhose characteristics can be made to order. It deals withstructures sized between 1 and 100 nmin dimension j 1 nmbeing equal to one billionth of a meter [42,55]. This holdsvast prospects for technological innovations in areas suchaselectronicsthroughthedevelopmentofnanocircuitry,molecular level semiconductors, nanotubes, new materialsdevelopment inceramics, polymers, glass ceramics andcomposites, andinmedicine withthe development ofnanoelectronic biosensors andnanoscale drug particlesanddeliverysystemstoimprovetheaccuracyandef-ciency of drug toxicity to harmful tissue and disease amongmany others.Nanomaterials are currently present in over 1200commonlyconsumedproducts rangingfromcosmetics,clothing, personal care and hygiene items, sporting goods,sunscreen, and in household ltration systems andconstructionmaterials. ThepaperringthatholdsaMac-Donalds hamburger together is glued with a nano basedresin;woundsarenowoftendressedwithanActicoatdressing or appliedAcnel lotion for dry skin, each withnanomaterials incorporated into their production [54]. TheUS National Science Foundation estimates that $70 Billionworthof nanocontainingitems aresoldintheUnitedStates each year while the global market for manufacturedgoods containingnanotechnologyis estimatedtoreach$2.6trillion by 2014[4,44]. The rate of development andincorporation of nanotechnologies into all facets ofconsumer, industrial, andmedical applicationsisantici-pated to double every two years [24].While the United States has led global investment intoresearch and development in nanotechnology, China is fastemerging as a global player. By 2005, China ranked secondonly to the US in nanotechnology investment, rankedsecond again in terms of the number of nano-related peerreviewed research publicationsproducing 15% of all globalnano-relatedresearchpapers -andhademergedas theglobal leaderincarbonnanotubetechnologyandmanu-facture, aswell asaleaderinthemanufactureof nano-coatings, anti-corrosive nano paints used in shipconstruction and oil tanks, odor eating nano-coatings andplastics for refrigerators, nano lters for air conditioners, aswell asaseriesof nanomaterialsusedinopticstolterglare and in the production of nano textiles and clothing toenhance antimicrobial properties [43,60].6Chinaspushtobecomeaglobal leaderinnanotech-nologyreectsanational strategyaimedatleapfroggingthe developmental cycle. While development of the exportsector has facilitated rapideconomic growthprimarilythroughspecializationinlowto mediumvalue-addingmanufacturing, sustainedgrowthwill becontingent onmoving up the value chain. Leading Chinese policy makers,economic planners and inuential economists all recognizetheneedtoaddressChinas dependenceonlowvalue-6Carbon nanotubes (fullerenes) are derived from graphene, rolled intosheetsandthentubes. Theyhavealengthtodiameterratioof upto132,000,000 to 1, a magnitude much greater than conventional materialswhich endow them with unique strength, and properties such as thermalandelectrical conductivity, makingthemideal for incorporationintoelectronics and optics. See [5,21].C.C. Leong et al. / Technology in Society 33 (2011) 128136 132addedexport-ledgrowth. As theVicePresident of theChina National Academy of Nanotechnology and Engi-neering (CNANE) notes,China must break away from themode of technology dependence and transform into inde-pendent technology innovation . It is very clear that [inChina]theleadingpowerisinthetightgraspofforeignenterprises (as quoted in [5]).Chinas science and technology policy is thus informedby asingularrationale:economicgrowthsituatedinthecontext of developingindigenous scienticandtechno-logical capacity to reduce reliance on technology transfer,export-ledgrowth, andlowendmanufacturing. Impor-tantly, China sees its science andtechnologypolicyasacentralpillarin itsefforts tobecome agloballeader ininnovation; a net exporter of ideas, innovative technologiesand commercial applications.3.1. State-led development of nanoscience andnanotechnology in ChinaChinasscienceandtechnologyprogramsaresituatedaroundacentral policyarchitectureannouncedbyDengXiaoping in 1986, the National High Technology Researchand Development Program, known as the863 program.The 863 program has been implemented through succes-sive ve year plans and is aimed at promoting thedevelopment of key novel materials and advancedmanufacturing technologiesforraisingindustry competi-tivenessincludingnanomaterials[5]. Between1990and2002the863Planfundedover1000nanotechprojectswith a total investment of USD 27 Million [8]. The programis managed by an expert responsibility system, witheld-sector-specic expert committees and panels comprised ofthe nations top scientists who supervise, advise and assessprojects [2].Therst nano-specic project under the 863 programwas the Climbing Project on Nanomaterial Science instigatedbetween 1990 and 1999 and overseen by the State ScienceandTechnologyCommission(SSTC), thepredecessor tothecurrentMinistryof ScienceandTechnology(MOST).BecauseoftheProgramssuccessthegovernmentsubse-quently renewed its commitment to funding basic researchonnanomaterialsandnanostructures(i.e. carbonnano-tubes) with the initiation of Chinas National Basic ResearchProgram (973 Program) in 1997. Since 2006, ten nanotech-nology research projects have received a combined USD 30Million (USD three million each) under the Program [1].Inadditiontothe 863program, the 10thFive-YearPlan (20012005) also addressed priorities for thecommercializationanddevelopment of nanotechnology.Thegovernmentdisaggregatednanotechnologydevelop-ment between short (development of nanomaterials),medium(developmentofbio-nanotechnologyandnano-medical technology), and long-termprojects (developmentof nano-electronics and nano-chips). The Five-YearPlan prioritized bridging the gap between nanotech-nologyresearchandmarketdemandtoformacompletenational innovationsystem[2]. The11thFive-Year Plan(20072012) in turn places emphasis on innovative tech-nologies, including the development of new materials forinformation, biological and aerospace industries andindustrializing the technology for 90-nm and smaller inte-grated circuits [75].Under the medium and longer term master plan (MLP),nanotechnology development has beengivenprioritystatusand isformally recognizedas one of fourmegaprojectscentral to Chinas science and technological developmentanddesignedtoreshape fundamentallyChinas R&Dcapacity [17].To realize these ambitions, the governmenthas set an ambitious target for national R&D spending of2.5% of GDP (USD4.3 Trillion) by 2020 (World DevelopmentIndicators; Medium to Long-term Plan for Development ofScience and Technology), targeting R & D in nanomaterialsand devices, nanoscale complementary metal-oxide semi-conductor devices, nano-drug carriers, and nanomaterials(MediumtoLong-termPlanfor Development of Science andTechnology). Between 2006 and 2008, the MLP funded 29nanotechnologyprojectsin22universitiesandresearchinstitutes across the country, totaling USD 38.2 million [6].3.2. Chinese public perceptions of nanotechnology and nano-risksWhile the full impact of Chinas push for leadership innanotechnologyandnanomaterialsisyettoberealized,policy planning, regulation and management of the sectorreveals much about Chinese public attitudes towardsnanotechnology, and, in turn, howthe discourse andmanagement of possible nano-risks are framed andapproached by public agencies and regulators. Whilenanotechnology holds enormous potential for commercialgain, cutting edge technological innovation and the devel-opment of aninnovativeknowledgeeconomy, therisksassociatedwithnanotechnologiesandnanomaterialsonhuman health and the environment remain largelyunknown. Recent laboratory experiments on carbon nano-tubes suggest that they could be as dangerous as asbestosbres [3,28,58,66]. More importantly, nanotoxicity isthoughttodisplayaninverserelationshiptoparticulatesize; that is the smaller is the particulate matter the moretoxic such particulates tend to be [54]. The precise dimen-sions of these risks, however, especially with longer termexposure or exposure through nanomaterials engineered inchemical composites and utilised in industrial and chemicalapplications areyet tobedetermined. For this reason,nanotech-specic safety regulations, toxicity and exposurelevelshave not been formalised or acommonly acceptedinternational safety regulatory framework established [13].Inmany countriessciencehashistorically approachednew technologies by invoking the precautionary principle.Broadly stated, the precautionary principle assumes that ifatechnologyorpolicyhasasuspectedriskof harm(toindividuals,the publicor the environment) absentscien-ticconsensusabouttheextentandmagnitudeoftheserisks the burden of proof that the technology or policy isnot harmful falls to its proponents. In China and the case ofnanotechnology, however, the extent to which theprecautionary principle guides the adoption of nanotech-nologies and the use of nanomaterials is problematic.Several interrelated factors contribute to this.First, thediscourseframingChinas pursuit of nano-technology is tied intimately to a national political agenda.C.C. Leong et al. / Technology in Society 33 (2011) 128136 133Asoneof four science-basedmegaprojects,nanotech-nology occupies an iconic policy space that is highly politi-cised. Far froma science-basedinitiative, nanotechnology inChina has thus to be appreciated in relation to centralisedcommand and control economic planning and state-leddevelopment. Nanotechnology research and developmentthus operates under the burdens of expectednationaleconomic transformation, the delivery of substantialcommercial outcomes, thedevelopmentof aknowledgebased economy, a reduction in Chinas technology depen-dence, andisoneoftheagshipprogrammesofChinasambition to assume global leadership in science and tech-nology. Public perceptions of nanotechnology products andprocesses thus tendtobe receivedandunderstoodby publicregulators in relation to sustaining and increasing nationaleconomic well being, the prospective assumption of globalleadershipincuttingedgetechnologiesandscience, andimprovingthequalityof lifeforChinesecitizens;notasa health & safety risk prevention issue.The framing of nanotechnology in such an overtlynationalist andaspirational contexts diminishes the politicalspacefordissent or for thepublictoraisequestionsorconcernsaboutsafetyissues, orrisksassociatedwiththeimpact of nanotechnology on human health and the envi-ronment. Rather, public perceptions of nanotechnology tendtobecelebratedinconcertwitharisingChinaandasevidence of Chinas destiny to assume a global leadershiprole. The command and control style approach to nationaleconomic planning andthe development of nanotechnologycreates elite, technocratic processes, limiting the spaces forwiderconsultationorpublicparticipationabouttherole,desirability, potential applications, and impact of nanotech-nology. In a sense, the public is shut out of the policy spacesaround which science and technology policy is determined,or where risks andquestions about potential harmfromsuchtechnologies canbe assessed. As the head of Chinas NationalSteeringCommitteeforNanoscienceandNanotechnology(NSCNN), thepeakbodyoverseeingnanotechnologyinChinaobserved, nanotechnology is highly technical, requiresspecialist knowledge, and since the public doesnt have thetechnical capacities or knowledge to understand the tech-nologies or assess potentialrisks, its views can belargelyignored(interview, January162010). Indeed, itwassug-gested that excluding the public or civil society groups fromparticipationinreviews anddebates was advantageous,since they might react inappropriately or form mispercep-tions about potential nano-risks duetotechnical decienciesandapoorgroundinginnanotechnologies. Involvingthepublic or wider non-science-based communities in discus-sions was thus seen as possibly undermining national goals,notasasubjectforpubliceducationasinmanywesterncountries (see also [57]).This knowledge decit problem, which in othernational contextsseesthesciencecommunityengageinoutreach and education activities to raise evidenced basedknowledge about newtechnologies, in China and thenanotechnology sector tends to lead to the provision of lessinformation. This derives both from a hierarchical techno-cratic systemwhere there is a collusion of interestsbetweencentral plannersandthenano-sciencecommu-nityandbecausepublicperceptionstowardscienceandscientists are deferential, with scientists highly respectedandreveredfor their contributions toChinas nationaleconomicadvances. Suchperceptionsthustendtorein-forcetherelativeautonomygrantedbythestatetothenano-science community as the professionals most able tomanageandassesstherisksofnanotechnology(seealso[15]).Suchattitudestend to moot vocal opposition, limitpotential avenues for engagement betweenthesciencecommunity and public/civil society groups, and lessen theincentivesforscientiststodisseminateevidencedbasedknowledge to the public.Thesestate-ledandsanctionedpolitical-social hierar-chiestendtobeself-reinforcing. Absentexternal, publicbasedscrutiny, or theabilityof civil societytoengagecritically with evidenced based risk assessments ofnanotechnologies, concerns about thepotential risks ofnanotechnologies or exposuretonanomaterials arelefttothesciencecommunitytoexplore. Thepatronclientrelationshipthatoperatesbetweencentral plannersandthenano-sciencecommunity, however, createsdisincen-tives to designresearchprograms focusedonthe riskimpactsofnanotechnologies. Indeed, twoseniorChinesenanoscientistswheninterviewedaboutpossibleconictsof interest admitted that younger scientists are incentivisedto under-report or downplay possible negative impacts ofnanotechnologies. As they explained,funding streams forR & D are predominantly driven by the prospectsforcommercialization. Apartfromestablishingstandardsfor nanotoxicity, researchers were incentivisedtoopennano-research avenues and not close them down throughhighlighting potential risks or downsides (interview,January 16 2010).3.3. ConclusionPublicattitudestowardnanotechnologyinChinaarermlycolouredandinformedbytheir associationwithChinas economic ambition to catapult itself into the fore-front of global science and technology research anddevelopment. Fewcountries in the world have sucha deeply entwined economic and political agenda meshedwithin a national science project [72]. China, in this sense,displays a situation where public attitudes towards nano-technology are largely celebratorywith nanotechnologiesrevered for their potential contributions to nationaleconomic transformation. The celebrated historicalachievementsofChineseleadershipinscienceandtech-nology, and the deferential attitudes of the public towardsscience and scientists, lead to nanotechnologies beinggreeted not with any innate suspicion, but to be welcomedandperceivedtobeadvantageous, bringingwiththempotential economic and social advancement.InChinathereis, obviously, adecitin publicknowl-edge, participation and consultation concerning nano-technologies. Aspects of state structure and behaviour suchas commandandcontrol decisionmaking, thepatronclient relationship that exists between the state and nano-science community, and the funding mechanisms thatenable R &Dinto nanotechnologies, all contribute todiscrete and relatively narrow spaces for public knowledgeandengagementonnanotechnologyissues. TheresultisC.C. Leong et al. / Technology in Society 33 (2011) 128136 134a relatively positive or, at worst, benign set of public atti-tudes toward nanotechnologies.4. ConclusionThe notion that new technologies are a growing area ofpolicy concern is reected in the increasing use ofprocessessuchasDanish-styleconsensusconferencesincountries like Norway, the Netherlands, France, Japan,SouthKorea, NewZealand, theUnitedKingdom, andtheUnited States [59]. The reception of controversial technol-ogies like biotechnology in general [18,36,73], in themedicaleld [7,10,31], and of genetically modied foods inparticular [26], has highlighted the need to better under-stand public opinion and attitude formation amongconsumers and observers of new products and processes.However the models which currently exist to explain publicattitude formation towards controversial technologies areoverly behavioural and societally-centric and fail toadequately address the ability of state actors inmanycountries to successfully articulate or direct public opinion.A key under-explored factor in existing studies based onwestern democratic countries concerns the role played bygovernments in both creating and managing public opinionthrough publicity and public information campaignsframing technologies inpositive waysdsuchas being linkedtonational survival or prosperity. Studies todatehavefocused mainly on developed liberaldemocratic stateswhich feature less active governments; however in manycountries states play much more active and central roles inopinion formation both towards traditional subjects of stateinterest and towards novel innovative technologies.As the two case studies presented here of activegovernments in Asia revealed, both in Singapore in the caseof NEWater and in China in the case of nanotechnologiesstates playeda muchmore signicant role inopinionformation on controversial technologies than has hithertobeen highlighted in the literature. Although with some verydistinctdifferencesgiventheir differentlevelsofdemoc-racy andthe nature of their scientic andtechnologyresearch and regulatory institutions, in both countries thestate was able to frame a controversial technology as a keyfactorinnational survival and/ornational development.Thisframingwasabletosuccessfullyovercomeoravoidpopular concerns with the technology and allow the stateto pursue a much more promotional regulatory approach tothe technology than would otherwise have been the case.Successfully convincing a large enough part ofthe publicthat littlealternative exists toadoptinga controversialtechnology thus appears to go a long way to overcomingcognitive, affective and attitudinal reservations to itsgeneralization and use. 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