8 Aquinas, Augustine, and the Medieval Scholastic Crisis concerning Charity … · 2019-01-16 ·...

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Aquinas, Augustine, and the Medieval Scholastic Crisis concerning Charity

Michael S. Sherwin, O.P.

Oneofthedangersofapplyingthescholasticmethodofdialecticalques-tioningtothestudyoftheology is thatonemayposeaquestionthatone’sculturedoesnotyetknowhowtoanswer,orat leastnotanswerwell.ThisispreciselywhathappenedwhentheearlyscholasticsofthetwelfthcenturystartedtoposequestionsaboutAugustine’sportrayalofcharity.1Thecrisiswasperhapsinevitable.Thetwelfthcenturywitnessedaremarkableblossomingofinterestinthenatureoflove,especiallyofloveasdesire.2Itwasauniquehis-toricalmoment.WiththemarriageofEleanorofAquitainetoLouisVIIofFrance,troubadourculturefromthesouth,withitstheoriesofcourtlylove(fin’amor),movedtotheheartofFranceandspreadthroughtheworksofthetrouvères.3Atthesametime,thetwelfthcenturysawtheascendanceofnew

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1.RobertWielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amourd’AnselmedeLaonàPierreLombardd’aprèslesimprimésetlesinédits”(Ph.D.diss.,CatholicUniversityofLouvain,1981),xx–xxii.

2. Denis deRougemont famously and controversially affirmed that themodern conceptionofloveasapassionemergesinthetwelfthcentury.LoveintheWesternWorld(Greenwich,CT:Fawcett,1969).

3.EleanorofAquitainewouldlatermarryHenryIIofEnglandandbringtroubadourculturetotheBritishIsles.ForEleanorofAquitaine’s influenceonthespreadoftroubadourculture,seeRitaLejeune, “Rôle littéraire d’Aliénor d’Aquitaine et de sa famille,” Cultura Neolatina 14 (1954): 5–53;MarcusBullandCatherineLéglu,eds.,TheWorldofEleanorofAquitaine:LiteratureandSociety inSouthernFranceBetweentheEleventhandThirteenthCenturies(NewYork:BoydellPress,2005);JohnParsonsandBonnieWheeler,eds.,EleanorofAquitaine:LordandLady(NewYork:PalgraveMacmil-lan,2002).

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monasticorders(theCisterciansandtheCarthusians)—peopledbyadultvo-cations schooled in the ways of secular love—whose members were in theprocessofproducinganabundantmonasticloveliterature.4Afeaturecom-montothe literaturebothofthemonksandofthecourttroubadoursandtrouvèreswasthefocusonloveasdesire.5

It was also during the twelfth century that schools of theology, distinctfromthemonasticschools,begantoemergeandtoapplythedialecticaltoolsof logic and argument to the scriptural and patristic heritage they had re-ceived.Althoughbycentury’sendPariswastheprimarycenterofthistheo-logical reflection, during the first half of the twelfth century the cathedralschoolinthefortifiedcityofLaonstillpredominated.6ScholarsarecurrentlyunabletodeterminetheinfluenceofsecularandmonasticloveliteratureontheschoolmenatLaon.Onething,however,iscertain.Attheverymomentthatthisliteraturewasblossoming,ananonymousscholasticwriterpennedatreatise(titledDecaritate)thatattackedtheverythingtheseliterarytraditions

4.JeanLeclercq,MonksandLoveinTwelfth-CenturyFrance(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1979),8–26,109–36.LeclercqcontraststhetraditionalmedievalBenedictinecommunities,whosemembersweremostlydrawnfromtheranksoftheirchildoblates,andtheCisterciansandCarthusians(aswellasthevariouscommunitiesofcanonsregular),whosecommunitieswereprincipallycomposedofadultvocations.Seeibid.,9–12.

5. On love as desire in the writings of the troubadours, see Michel Zink, Littérature françaiseduMoyenAge(Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance,1992),102–4;MoshéLazar,Amourcourtoiset“fin’amors” dans la littérature du XIIe siècle (Paris: Klincksieck, 1964); and Lazar, “Fin’amour,” in AHandbookoftheTroubadours,eds.F.R.P.AkehurstandJudithM.Davis(Berkeley:UniversityofCali-forniaPress,1995),61–101.Onloveasdesireinmonasticliterature,seeJeanLeclercq,LoveofLearningandtheDesireforGod(NewYork:FordhamUniversityPress,1982),andMonksandLove,99–108.ThetwelfthcenturyalsosawthegrowingpresenceoftheCathars,wholikewisewereconfrontingthena-tureoftruelove.ScholarshaveattemptedtoestablishdirectlinksbetweenthetroubadourandCatharconceptionsoflove.DenisdeRougemontearlyaffirmedthislink,whileRogerBoasehasassertedthat“CourtlyLoveandtheCatharHeresywerebothinspiredbyEros:thesoul’snostalgicandinsatiabledesiretodissolveitselfintheUnitywhenceitsprang”(TheOriginandMeaningofCourtlyLove[Man-chester:Manchester University Press, 1977], 78).TheCathars’ understandingof love, however, re-mainsobscure.TheCatharsfamouslyviewedsexualdesireasanevilplacedinhumansbyanexternalevilprinciple.YetwhatweretheCathars’viewsontruelove?Wasitapurifieddesireordidtheyviewitasfreeofalldesire?TheCathars’notionofthespiritualmarriagebetweenthesoulandSpiritseemstopointtothelatterview,butexistingevidencedoesnotallowscholarstoofferadefinitivejudgmentonthisissue.FormoreontheCathars,seeMichelRoquebert,Lareligioncathare:leBien,leMaletleSalutdansl’hérésiemédiévale(Paris:Perrin,2001);JeanDuvernoy,Lecatharisme:lareligiondescathares(Paris:Privat,1976).Forastudythatnotesthefocusondesirebyboththeliteratureofcourtlyloveandthe“theologians”ofthetwelfthandthirteenthcenturies,seeCharlesBaladier,ÉrosauMoyenÂge:amour,désir,et“delectatiomorosa”(Paris:Cerf,1999).

6.RichardSouthern,ScholasticHumanismandtheUnificationofEurope,vol.1,Foundations(Ox-ford:Blackwell,1995),198–204.

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sharedincommon.Itattackedtheviewthatcharityentailsdesire.Thislittleworkseemstohaveprovokedacrisisinthemedievalscholasticunderstand-ingofcharity.Theissuewasthis:towhatextentdoescharityconsistinthedesireforGodasourbeatitude?Atstakewasthedangerofdefiningcharityintermsofself-love,andthusreducingGodtoameanstowardourownful-fillment.Moreover,ifcharityisdesireforGod,inwhatsensecanGodbesaidtoloveusfromcharity,andhowareweabletoloveourneighborfromchar-ity?Asweshallsee,questionssuchasthese ledAquinas,acentury later,todevelopapsychologyoflovethatintegrateddesiremoresuccessfullyintothedynamicsofloveandtherebyofferedanaccountofcharitymorefaithfultothebiblicalwitness.TounderstandAquinas’sachievementwemustfirstcon-siderthedefinitionofcharityAugustineoffersinOnChristianDoctrine,be-causethecontroversywasshapedbyAugustine’sportrayal.Indeed,insomerespectsthecontroversywasadisputeoverhowtointerpretAugustine.Fromthisperspective,Aquinascanbeviewedas savingAugustine’s insights fromthedistortionsoflaterinterpreters,friendandfoealike.7

Augustine’s Definition of Charity

AugustinestatesintheearlychaptersofOnChristianDoctrinethat“somethingsaretobeenjoyed,otherstobeused,andthereareotherswhicharetobeenjoyedandused.”8Hethenexplains,“Thosethingswhicharetobeenjoyed

7.ScholarshiponthemedievalconceptionsoflovehasbeendeeplyinfluencedbythestudiesofPierre Rousselot and Anders Nygren. These studies, however, present the medieval literature fromwithindichotomousframeworksthatareforeigntoit.Rousselotportraysthemedievalsasdevelopingtwomutuallyopposedconceptionsoflove:aphysicalconceptionandanecstaticconception(PierreRousselot,“Pourl’histoireduproblèmedel’amourauMoyenAge,”BeiträgezurGeschichtederPhi-losophiedesMittelalters,Texte,undUntersuchungen6[1908]:1–104;forarevisedEnglishedition,seePierreRousselot,TheProblemofLoveintheMiddleAges:AHistoricalContribution[Milwaukee:Mar-quetteUniversityPress,2001]).Nygrenpresentsthemedievalliteraturefromwithinalargerdichoto-mybetweenpaganandChristianconceptionsoflove(erosandagape,respectively)andtheinfluenceofwhatNygrenseesasAugustine’sattempttooffera“caritas-synthesis”(AndersNygren,AgapeandEros,trans.PhilipS.Watson[NewYork:Macmillan,1939]).Thediscomfortcausedbythebinaryvi-sionofthesetwoworkshasbeenenormouslyproductive,provokinganumberofscholarstoreadAu-gustine,themedievals,andeventheScriptureswithgreatercare.Anaspectofthismorecarefulread-ingistopresentthemedievaldiscussionsfromwithinthecontextoftheirownquestions.AsRobertWielockxhasshown,thescholasticsatLaonwereaskingtheirquestionsaboutcharityfromwithinthecontextoftheirreadingofAugustine’sdefinitionofit.

8.Dedoctrinachristiana,1.3[3]:“Resergoaliaesunt,quibusfruendumest,aliaequibusutendum,aliaequaefruunturetutuntur.”

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makeusblessed.Thosethingswhicharetobeusedhelpand,asitwere,sustainusaswemovetowardblessednessinorderthatwemaygainandclingtothosethingswhichmakeusblessed.”9Augustinethendefineswhathemeansbyen-joymentanduse.“Toenjoysomethingistoclingtoitwithloveforitsownsake.Tousesomething,however,istoemployitinobtainingthatwhichyoulove,providedthatitisworthyoflove.”10HenextinformsthereaderthatGodaloneistobeenjoyed,whileallotherthingsaretobeused.Thisistrue,heex-plains,evenwithregardtotheloveofselfandofourneighbor.Inbothcas-esourloveshouldhavethecharacterofuse:weshoulduseourselvesandourneighborbyorderingourloveforeachtowardtheenjoymentofGod.11

Augustinedoesnotwishtoimplythatweshouldtreatothers inapure-lyutilitarianorexploitativefashion.TheLatinverb“touse”(uti)wasricherthanthis.Itwasastandardwaytodescribefriendlyhumanrelations.12Nev-ertheless,asOliverO’Donovanhasobserved,Augustinehimselfseemedun-comfortablewiththetermandsettlesinsteaduponthenotionthatweshould“enjoyone another inhim.”13This revision is reflected in thedefinitionofcharityAugustinesubsequentlyoffersinalatersectionofOnChristianDoc-trine,adefinitionthatwastobecomepopularamongmedievalauthors.Au-gustineaffirms:“Icall‘charity’thesoul’smotiontowardenjoyingGodforhisownsake,andenjoyingone’sselfandone’sneighborforthesakeofGod.”14


9.Ibid.,1.3[3]:“Illaequibusfruendumest,nosbeatosfaciunt.Istisquibusutendumest,tenden-tisadbeatitudenemadiuvamuretquasiadminiculamur,utadillas,quaenosbeatosfaciunt,pervenireatquehisinhaererepossimus.”

10.Ibid.,1.4[4]:“Fruiestenimamoreinhaererealicuireipropterseipsam.Utiautem,quodinusumvenerit,adid,quodamasobtinendumreferre,sitamenamandumest.”

11.Seeibid.,1.22[20–21].12.OliverO’Donovan,“UsusandFruitioinAugustine,DeDoctrinaChristianaI,”JournalofTheo-

logicalStudies33(1982):365.See,forexample,LewisandShort,whotellusthatuticanmean“toenjoythefriendshipofanyone;tobefamiliarorintimatewith,toassociatewithaperson”(ALatinDiction-aryFoundedonAndrews’sEditionofFreund’sLatinDictionary,rev.CharltonLewis[andCharlesShort][Oxford:ClarendonPress,1991],1947).Hence,Cicerocandescribethemanheintroducestothepro-consulofCiliciaas“quomultosannosutorvaldefamiliariter,”whichtheLoebtranslationrenders,“whohasformanyyearsbeenaveryintimatefriendofmine.”MarcusTulliusCicero,LetterstoHisFriends(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1972–1979),1.3.1.

13.Dedoctrinachristiana,1.32[35]:“nobisetiaminviceminipsoperfruamur.”ThephraseappearstobeinfluencedbytheVulgateofPaul’slettertoPhilemon,wherehestateshisdesireto“enjoyyouintheLord”(te fruarinDomino).SeeJohnRist,Augustine:AncientThoughtBaptized (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1994), 165.SeealsoRaymondCanning’s treatmentof thisquestion inTheUnityofLoveforGodandNeighbourinSt.Augustine(Heverlee-Leuven:AugustinianHistoricalInstitute,1993),79–115.

14.Dedoctrinachristiana,3.10[16]:“caritatemvocomotumanimiadfruendumdeopropterip-sumetseatqueproximopropterdeum.”


Anyanalysisofthisdefinitionhingesonhowoneinterpretsthephrase“forhisownsake”(propteripsum).Onewayofinterpretingitwouldbethatchar-ity’sdesirefindsitsfinalfulfillmentonlyinGod.Inotherwords,theempha-sisisondesire,withthepropteripsumsignifyingthatnothingelseisthefinalobjectofdesire.WedesireGodanddonotreferthatdesiretoanythingelse.Thisinterpretationdoescaptureanaspectofthepassage.Augustineelsewhereaffirmsthat“thewholelifeofagoodChristianisaholydesire.”15Moreover,Augustinedefines love (amor) asanappetiteordesire (appetitus) andholdsthatthisloveischaritywhenitisdirectedtoGod.16ThesepassagesgivetheimpressionthatAugustinereducescharitymerelytoa loveofdesire.Asweshallsee,however,whatAugustinesayselsewhereaboutcharityrevealsarich-erview.Itsuggeststhatwhiledesireisanaspectofcharity,itisnotthewholeofcharity.ItsuggeststhatforAugustinetherhetor,expressionssuchaspropterdeumorpropteripsumaremeanttocoverarangeofmeanings.Theproblem,however,isthatthisrichnessisnoteasilyapparenttothereaderofOnChris-tianDoctrine,especiallyifheisonlyreadingsnippetsofitascontainedinacollectionof sentences.However thismaybe,anumberof twelfth-centuryauthors,amongbothAugustine’sdefendersanddetractors,readAugustineasportrayingcharitysimplyasdesireforGod.

Twelfth-Century Critics and Defenders of Augustinian Charity

RobertWielockxinhismasterfulstudyofthescholasticloveliteratureofthisperiodshowsthattheauthoroftheDecaritatebeginshiscritiqueofAu-gustinebymodifyingtheAugustiniandefinitionofcharityinaseemlyinnoc-uousfashion.17FortheDecaritate,“Charityisthesoul’smotiontowardlov-

15.TractatusinepistolamJoannis,4.6:“TotavitaChristianiboni,sanctumdesideriumest.”16.Dediversisquaestionibus83,35.1:“Nihilenimaliudestamarequampropterseipsamremali-

quamappetere.”Ibid.:“Deindecumamormotusquidamsit,nequeullussitmotusnisiadaliquid;cumquaerimusquidamandumsit,quidsit illudadquodmoverioporteatquaerimus.”Ibid.,35.2:“Amorappetitusquidamest.”

17.Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”179.TheauthorshipoftheDecaritatecan-notbedeterminedwithcertainty.TheDecaritate appears inamanuscript collectionattributed toAnselmofLaonandinacollectionattributedtoWilliamofChampeaux.OdonLottin,whoeditedseveralversionsoftheDecaritate,wasuncertainwhetheritwasaworkofAnselm’sorofWilliam’s(OdinLottin,Psychologieetmoraleaux12et13siècles,vol.5[Gembloux,Belgique:Duculot,1959],62).Wielockxemploys internalevidencetoshowthatneitherauthorcouldhavepennedit. Instead,hesuggeststhatthemostlikelyauthoroftheDecaritatewasGauthierdeMortagne.SeeWielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”142–58.



ingGodforGod’sownsakeandlovingoneselfandone’sneighborforthesakeofGod.”18AsWielockxnotes,theauthorhasremoved“enjoying”(fruendum)fromthedefinitionandreplaceditwiththemoregenericterm“loving”(dili-gendum).19TheDecaritatethenexplainsthattoloveGodforGod’sownsakemeansservinghimwithoutdesiringanyrecompenseorrewardfordoingso.“WeshouldloveGod,notforthesakeofanyrewardwemightexpectfromHim,butforhisownsakealone,thatwemightserveHim.”20Theauthorin-terprets self-love andneighbor love in the sameway: “Thatwe should loveourselvesforGod’ssakemeansthisalone:thatweshouldloveGodandservehim.”21Thus,theinjunctiontoloveourneighborasourselvesmeansonlythis:“justasweloveourselvesthatGodmaybeserved,likewiseshouldweloveourneighborthatGodmaybeserved.”22ThisphraseparallelscloselythefamoustextfromOnChristianDoctrinewhereAugustinestatesthatGod“hasmercyonusthatwemayenjoyHim,andwehavemercyonourneighborsothatwemanyenjoyHim.”23Hereagain,however,theDecaritatehasreplacedtheno-tionofenjoymentwiththatofservice.InallthesepassagestheauthoroftheDecaritateassertsthatthegoalofcharityisnotenjoyment,butservice.24

Theauthorsubsequentlyportraysthosewhoseekenjoymentasmercenar-ies.“SomeserveGodfromfear,andthesearecalledservants;othersservehimbecauseofrewards,andthesearecalledmercenaries;whileothersservehimfromlove,andthesearecalledsons.”25Whilehegrantsthatsomemercenar-iesareatleastseekingeternalrewards,henonethelessaffirmsthat“thosewho


18.Decaritate,1:“CaritasestmotusanimiaddiligendumDeumpropterDeumetseetproximumpropterDeum.”Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”56.ImperfectbutmoreaccessibleeditionsoftheDecaritatecanbefoundinLottin,Psychologieetmorale,vol.5,61–64.

19.Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”179.20.De caritate, 3: “Deumenimdebemusdiligere,nonpropter aliquodpraemiumquod ab eo

expectemus, sedpropter ipsum solum, cuiut serviamus.”Wielockx, “Ladiscussion scolastique surl’amour,”56.

21.Decaritate,8–9:“SeipsumquoquedebetunusquisquediligerepropterDeum,idest:adhoctantum,utDeumdiligateteiserviat.”Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”56.

22. De caritate, 18–19: “Ut sicut se diligit ad serviendum Deo, ad idem diligat proximum.”Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”57.

23.Dedoctrinachristiana,1.30[33]:“Illenostrimiseretur,utseperfruamur,nosveroinvicemnos-trimiseremur,utilloperfruamur.”

24.Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”180–81.25.Decaritate(Triasuntgenera,1–4):“AliienimDeoserviuntproquocumquetimoreethidicun-

turservi;aliipromercedeethidicunturmercenarii;aliiproamoreethidicunturfilii.”Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”63.OntheTriasuntgeneraastheoriginalintroductiontotheDecaritate,seeWielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”61–79.


seeketernalrewardsdesiretoseeChristandtobeinheavenforthesakeoftheir own enjoyment.”26He thus concludes cuttingly that “thosewho seekwhatistheirown[namelytheirownenjoyment]donotseekwhatisChrist’s,andconsequentlyneitherwilltheyattainChrist.”27

WielockxconvincinglytracestheeffectoftheDecaritateontheschool-menatLaonbypresentinganimpressivecollectionofscholastictextsfromtheperiodthatreactdirectlyagainstit.ThiscollectionshowsthatmanyofthedefenderswentfarbeyondtheletterofAugustine’stextstoaffirmunabash-edlythatcharityisthedesiretoenjoyGod.SeveralexamplesfromWielockx’scollectionsufficetorevealthecharacterofthesereactions.First,thereisacol-lectionofsentencestitledPrincipiumetcausa.Whentheauthorofthisworkdefinescharity,heaffirmsthatthedefinitioncomesfromAugustine.Hetoo,however,modifiesthetext,changingtwokeyphrases:“Charityisthesoul’sdesiretohaveGodforhisownsake;itistheloveofGodforhisownsakeandtheloveofneighborforthesakeofGod.”28Theauthorofasimilarwork,theDeconditione,offersananalogousreformulation:“AugustinedefinescharityinOnChristianDoctrineasfollows:‘charityisthesoul’sdesiretoenjoyGodand to loveoneself andone’sneighbor for the sakeofGod.’”29Both thesetextshavereplacedAugustine’sneutral“motusanimi”with“appetitusanimi.”Also,thefirsttextreferstocharityasadesire“tohaveGod,”notjustenjoyHim,whilethelaterportraysitasadesiretoenjoyGodwithoutthemodify-ingclause“forhisownsake”(propteripsum).Anothercontemporaryauthortakesthebolderstepofredefiningservice(theheartoftheDecaritate’sviewofcharity)intermsofenjoymentasourreward(theverythingtheDecaritatedenies):“DivineserviceistoplaceGodbeforeeverythingelse,toloveHimmorethaneverythingelseandforHimself,thatwemighthaveHimasour

26.Decaritate(Triasuntgenera,6–8):“Quiveroquaeruntaeternum,hisuntquipropterpropri-amdelectationemChristumvideredesiderantet inparadiseesseoptant.”Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”63.

27.Decaritate(Triasuntgenera,8–9):“Hiergoquaeruntquaesuasunt,nonquaeJeusuChristi.Proptereanecilludhabebunt.”Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”63.

28.Principiumetcausa:“CaritasestappetitusanimiadhabendumDeumpropterseipsum,idestamorDeipropteripsum,etamorestproximipropterDeum”;FranzBliemetzrieder,AnselmsvonLaonsystematischeSentenzen,BeiträgezurGeschichtederPhilosophiedesMittelalters18(Münster:Aschen-dorff,1919),81.Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”185.

29. De Conditione: “Caritatem vero definit Augustinus in libro De doctrina christiana dicens:‘CaritasestappetitusanimaeadfruendumDeoetsediligendumetproximumpropterDeum’”(Y.Lefèvre,“LeDeconditioneangelicaethumanaetlesSententiaeAnselmi,”Archivesd’HistoireDoctrinaleetLittéraireduMoyenAge26[1959]:273).Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”186.



reward.”30Perhapsmostradically,oneflorilegiacollectioncontainstheasser-tionthatourloveforGodisbasedonself-love:“Thereisaloveaboutwhichnopreceptismade,namely,theloveofself,anditisthecauseofourloveforGodandneighbor.”31ThisauthorthendescribesloveforGodandneighborasanalogoustothewayweloveourhandsoranyotherbodypart.Weloveourmembersbecausewedonotwanttolosethem.WearesimilarlyattachedtoGodandneighbor,notwantingtolosethemeither.32

IfwemovefromLaontoParis,wefindasimilarreactionintheworkofHughofSaint-Victor.Hedefinesloveinthefollowingterms:“whatdoesitmeanto loveexcepttodesireandtowill tohaveandpossessandenjoy?”33Elsewhere,hestatesthismoresuccinctly:“whatisittoloveexcepttowilltohave?”34WithouthesitationHughappliesthisdefinitiontocharity’sloveforGod:“WhatisittoloveGod?ItistowilltohaveHim.WhatdoesitmeantoloveGodforhisownsake?ItistolovesothatyoumighthaveHim.”35HughalsoattacksdirectlytheviewsexpressedintheDecaritate:

Certain fools say: ‘we love God and serve Him, but we do not seek any reward. We are not mercenaries. Nor do we seek Him. . . . We cast out of hand any payment so that we don’t seek the one we love. For we love with a pure, gratuitous and filial love, not seek-ing anything. We love Him without seeking anything, not even seeking the one we love.’ Those who say these things do not understand the character of love.36


30.Deusestsineprincipio:“DivinaservitusestDeumcunctisrebuspraeponere,plusomnibusdil-igere,ethocpropteripsum,utipsehabeaturinpraemio”;KlagenfurtUniversitätsbibliothek(Studien-bibliothek)Parchment34,folio20r.Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”186.

31.Florilegium(Lottin,no.216):“Estunadilectiodequanonfitpreceptio,scilicetdilectiosui,etipsaestcausadilectionisDeietproximi”;Paris,Bibliothèquenationale,MSSLatin12999,folio56va.Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”188.Lottin,Psychologieetmorale,vol.5,138.

32.Florilegium(Lottin,no.216):“Diligititemsehomoquinonvultamitteremanumvelpedemvelaliquidaliorummembrorum.Quiaitaverosediligit,diligitetipsumcreatoremquieitampul-chramembraquenonvultperdurededit”;Paris,Bibliothèquenationale,MSSLatin12999,folio56va.Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”188.Lottin,Psychologieetmorale,vol.5,138.

33.HughofSaint-Victor,Desacramentis(PL176:534):“Quidestdiligerenisiconcupiscere,etha-berevelleetpossidereetfrui?”Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”190.

34.HughofSaint-Victor,Desacramentis(PL176:534):“Quidestenimdiligerenisiipsumvellehabere?”Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”190.

35.HughofSaint-Victor,De sacramentis (PL 176: 528–529): “Quid estDeumdiligere?Haberevelle.QuidestDeumdiligerepropterseipsum?Ideodiligere,uthabeasipsum.”Wielockx,“Ladiscus-sionscolastiquesurl’amour,”191.

36.HughofSaint-Victor,De sacramentis (PL 176: 534): “Dicunt...stultiquidam...:Diligi-musDeumet servimus illi, sednonquaerimuspraemium,nemercenarii simus: etiam ipsumnonquaerimus....Intantumenimexcutimusmanusabomnimunere,utetiamipsumnonquaeramusquemdiligimus.Puraenimetgratuitaetfilialidilectionediligimus,nihilquaerimus....Diligimusipsumsednonquaerimusaliquid,etiamipsumnonquaerimusquemdiligimus....Quihocdicuntvirtutemdilectionisnonintelligent.”Wielockx,“Ladiscussionscolastiquesurl’amour,”194–95.


WithHughofSaint-Victorthebattlelinesareclearlydrawn.Onesidepor-trayscharityasserviceofGodwithoutinvolvingthedesiretoattainorenjoyHimasourfulfillment.TheothersidepicturescharitysimplyasthedesiretopossesandenjoyGod.Whileonthesurfacethedefendersofdesiremightap-pearcloser toAugustine, theirexclusiveemphasisondesiredistortsAugus-tine’sfullerview.MedievalreadersofAugustine,however,arenotaloneinin-terpretingAugustineinthisway.ThetwentiethcenturysawavenerablelineofcriticswhoreadAugustineinasimilarmanner,butwhodidsotocritiquehim.TheysawAugustineasforginganunholyalliancewithdesireinhispor-trayalofcharity.OneneedonlythinkofAndersNygren’sclassicstudy.37

Augustine’s Richer View

A number of scholars have responded to Nygren and his colleagues byshowingthatAugustinehasafulleraccountofcharity.38Anextendedexplora-tionofthemanyfacetsofAugustine’stheologyofcharityisbeyondthescopeofthisbriefessay.Severalfeaturesofit,however,deservetobenoted.First,Augustine’stheologyofcharityasenjoymentbecomesintelligibleonlywith-inthecontextofAugustine’sconfrontationwithPlatonism.Second,Augus-tineportraystheenjoymentpropertocharityasdrawingtheChristianintothedynamicsofGod’sloveforhiscreaturesandultimatelyintothedynamicsoftheTrinity’sloveforitself.Thus,themotionofthesoultowardenjoyingGodforHimselfisnotultimatelyself-regardingbutother-regarding.Inotherwords,theselffindsitsdesiredfulfillmentinanother-regardinglove.Asweshallsee,forAugustine,thedelightpropertocharityisrootedintheworshipofGodandtheserviceofourneighbor.Third,Augustinesketchesapsychol-ogyoflovethatportrayslove’sactasentailingmorethansimplydesire.

Inbook8ofTheCityofGod,Augustinedepictsclassicalmoralphilosophyasseekingthe“highestgood,”whichhedescribesasthegoodthatmakesus

37.AndersNygren,AgapeandEros,trans.PhilipS.Watson(NewYork:Macmillan,1939);seealsoKarlHoll,GesammelteAufsätzezurKirchengeschichte,vol.3(Tübingen:Mohr,1928–1932),54–116.ForstudiesofProtestantandCatholicreactionsandappropriationsofNygren’sthesis,seeGeneOutka,Agape:AnEthicalAnalysis(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1972).SeealsoTimothyP.Jack-son, The Priority of Love: Christian Charity and Social Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress,2003),andLoveDisconsoled:MeditationsonChristianCharity(Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-sityPress,1999).

38.SeeespeciallyRaymondCanning,TheUnityofLoveforGodandNeighbourinSt.Augustine(Heverlee-Leuven: Augustinian Historical Institute, 1993); and Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem ofSelf-LoveinSt.Augustine(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1982).



blessedwhenweseekit“foritselfandnotforanythingelse.”39Hethenprais-esthePlatonistsfordiscoveringthatwebecomeblessednotbyenjoyingthebodyorthemind,butbyenjoyingGod.Augustineevencreditsthemwithdiscerningsomethingofthecharacterofthisenjoyment.WebecomeblessednotbyenjoyingGod“asthesouldoesthebodyoritself,orasonefrienden-joys another, but as the eye enjoys light.”40 Augustine subsequently revealsthatthisdepictionofenjoymentofGodcomesfromPlotinus,whodiscov-eredthatthesourceofbothhumanandangelichappinessis“acertainintel-ligiblelight.”41Thislight“illuminesthemthattheymaybepenetratedwithlightandenjoyperfecthappinessintheparticipationofGod.”42ThecontextofthePlotinianteachingtowhichAugustinealludeshereissignificant.Plo-tinusprefaceshisportrayalofthismysticalvisionbyconsideringtherelation-shipbetweenenjoymentandthegood.Wouldwestillpursuethegoodevenifitwasnotenjoyable?43ThequestionleadsPlotinustodepictenjoymentassomethingthataccompaniesthegood.Wedesirethegoodbecauseofitsob-jectivecharacter.Eventhoughasoulthatisunitedtothegoodcannothelpbutenjoy it, the souldesires thegoodbecauseofwhat thegoodobjective-lyis.44Theanalogywiththeeye’senjoymentoflightisaptpreciselybecausesightfocusesontheobjectseenandnotonitself.Aristotle,therefore,inapas-sagetowhichPlotinusseemstoallude,describessightasoneoftheactivitiesthatwewouldengageinevenifitdidnotbringuspleasure.45Farfrombe-inganegocentricpossessionofthegood,therefore,Plotinus’smysticalunionwiththedivinelightdrawsthesouloutofitselfintotherealitythatunderlies

��0 t h e m e d i e va l s c h o l a s t i c c r i s i s

39.DecivitateDei,8.8:“Ubiquaeriturdesummobono,quoreferentesomniaquaeagimus,etquodnonpropteraliud,sedpropterseipsumadpetentesidqueadipiscentesnihil,quobeatisimus,ulteriusrequiramus.”

40.Ibid.:“Nonsicutcorporevelseipsoanimusautsicutamicoamicus,sedsicutluceoculus.”41.Ibid.,10.2:“Quodamlumineintellegibili.”42.Ibid.:“Aquoinlustrantur,utclareantatqueeius[Dei]participationeperfectibeatiquesubsis-

tant.”43.Plotinus,EnneadsVI,7[38]24.5–18:“Doesthegoodholdthatnatureandnamebecausesome

outsidethingfindsitdesirable?Mayweputitthatathingdesirabletooneisgoodtothatoneandthatwhatisdesirabletoallistoberecognizedasthegood?...Thequestioncomestothis:Isgood-nessintheappropriateorinsomethingapart,andisthegoodgoodasregardsitselfalsoorgoodonlyaspossessed?”SeealsoEnneadsVI,7[38]27.28and29.1.

44. Plotinus, Enneads VI, 7 [38] 25.16: “The good must, no doubt, be a thing pursued, not,however,goodbecause it ispursued,butpursuedbecause it isgood.”EnneadsVI7,[38]30.9,24–25: “Itwould followmerely that intellect is thegoodand thatwe feelhappy inpossessionof thatgood....Thisstateproducesthemostenjoymentandshouldbechosenaboveall:forlackofanaccu-rateexpression,wehearitdescribedas‘intellectinconjunctionwithenjoyment.’”

45.Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics,10.3(1174a4–10).SeePierreHadot,introduction,inLesécritsdePlotin:traité38(VI,7)(Paris:ÉditionsduCerf,1999),64–66.


allgood.46Thiscontemplativeunionissoabsorbingthat“theselfisputoutofmindinthecontemplationofthesupreme.”47Moreover,Plotinusaffirmsthatthis“commerce”withGodinclinesthesoultoward“justice”and“moralgood,”because“thesoulispregnantwiththesewhenithasbeenfilledwithGod.”48Indeed,theenjoymentofGodcanpushthesoulto“reporttoothersthiscommunion.”PlotinusofferstheexampleofMinos,whose“contactwiththedivineinspiredhimtolegislate.”Beinga“friendofZeus,”hesharedwithothersthepatternofthisdivinecommunionbycraftinglawsthatwere“theimageofit.”49

Plotinus,however,viewsgenerositytowardothersasonlyanoptionalcon-sequenceofone’sloveforGod.50ItisatthispointthatAugustinebeginshiscritiqueofthePlotinianperspective.ThePlatonistsdiscoveredsomethingofthenatureofGod,butdidnotloveHimasHedeserved.TheloveofGod,Augustineexplains,entailsthetrueservicethatisworship(latreia).51Hede-scribesthisworshipasasacrificeofhumilityandpraiseofferedtoGodbythefireofourcharity.52This lovemovesustoconsecrateandofferourselvestoGod.53Moreover,byclingingtoGodinthisway,wearepurifiedfromsin54andreceivethevirtuesthatmoveustoworkforourneighbor’ssalvation.

It is by spiritually embracing Him that the intellectual soul is filled and impregnated with true virtues. We are enjoined to love this good with all our heart, with all our soul, with all our strength. To this good we ought to be led by those who love us, and to lead those we love.55

46.Plotinus,EnneadsVI,9[9]11:“Itwasagoingforthfromtheself,asimplifying,arenunciation,areachtowardcontactandatthesametimearepose,ameditationtowardadjustment.Thisistheonlyseeingofwhatlieswithintheholies.”JohnRistdescribesthisaspectofPlatonicdesireaspertainingtowhathecallsan“ethicsofinspiration”wherethemorallybeautiful(kalos)leadstoaself-forgetfulloveofGodandserviceofothersthatnonethelessfulfillsus.SeeRist,Augustine:AncientThoughtBaptized,153.

47.Plotinus,EnneadsVI,9[9]7. 48.Ibid.,9.49.Ibid.,7.17–28.50.Ibid.,7.28.SeeDominicO’Meara,Plotinus:AnIntroductiontothe“Enneads”(Oxford:Clar-

endonPress,1993),109.51.DecivitateDei,10.3:“Huicnosservitutem,quaelatreíaGraecedicitur,siveinquibusquesacra-

mentissiveinnobisipsisdebemus...eumsuavissimoadolemusincenso,cumineiusconspectupiosanctoqueamoreflagramus.”

52.Ibid.:“Eisacrificamushostiamhumilitatisetlaudisinaracordisignefervidamcaritatis.”53.Ibid.:“Eidonaeiusinnobisnosqueipsosuouemusetreddimus.”54.Ibid.:“Adhuncvidendum,sicutvideripoterit,eiquecohaerendumabomnipeccatorumetcu-

piditatummalarumlabemundamureteiusnomineconsecramur.Ipseenimfonsnostraebeatitudinis,ipseomnisappetitionisestfinis.”

55.Ibid.:“Illicohaerere,cuiusuniusanimaintellectualisincorporeo,sidicipotest,amplexuverisimpleturfecundaturquevirtutibus.Hocbonumdiligereintotocorde,intotaanimaetintotavirtutepraecipimur;adhocbonumdebemusetaquibusdiligimurduci,etquosdiligimusducere.”



Augustinefurtherrevealsthecharacterofcharity’senjoymentofGodbyde-scribingwhatitwouldmeanforanangeltoloveus:“hemustwillforustobecomeblessedbysubmittingourselvestoHim,insubmissiontowhomhehimselfisblessed.”56EnjoymentofGod,therefore,entailsapioussubmissionofourheartsandmindstoGod.

AugustinefurthercriticizesthePlatonistsforthinkingthattheycanattainhappinessbytheirownunaidedefforts.57Forourpurposes,however,thein-terestingaspectofAugustine’saccountisthatheacceptsPlotinus’sportrayalofenjoymentasanattainmentthatleadsusoutofourselvestowardthecon-templationofGod.Thesoul isperfected inanenjoymentthat isa typeofself-forgetfulness.Ultimately,thisloveisaparticipationintheTrinity’sownloveforitself,whichimpliesneitherneednorunfulfilleddesire.58Inthislife,ourparticipationinGod’sTrinitarianlovealsoimpliesimitatingChrist’slove,even to the point of dying on the cross for love of the Father and of ourneighbor.59

Inseveralplaces,Augustinealsooffers therudimentsofapsychologyoflove.Forexample,inbook14oftheCityofGod,Augustineprefaceshisargu-mentthattwoloveshavebuilttwocities(theearthlyandtheheavenly),byshowing that theScriptures employ amor anddilectio inbothpositive andnegativesenses.Whenthesetermssignifyagoodlove,theyareinterchange-ablewithcaritas,whichhedescribesasthelovebywhich“amanseekstoloveGodnotaccordingtomanbutaccordingtoGod,andtolovehisneighborashimself.”60Augustineisattemptingtoestablishagenericnotionoflovesothathecansubsequentlypresentthespecificcontrastbetweenthegoodandevil loves that build the two cities: there is well-ordered love that loves allthingsasorderedtotheloveofGod,andthereisdisorderedlovethatlovesallthingstowardtheloveofself.Hethenoffersafurtherclarification.


56.Ibid.:“Eiuultessesubditos,utbeatisimus,cuietipsasubditabeataest.”57. See Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s “City of God”: A Reader’s Guide (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1999),199.58.DeTrinitate,15.31–32:“Sanctusitaquespiritusdequodeditnobisfacitnosindeomanereet

ipsuminnobis.Hocautemfacitdilectio.Ipseestigiturdeusdilectio....Ipseergosignificaturubile-gitur:‘Deusdilectioest.’Deusigiturspiritussanctusquiproceditexdeocumdatusfuerithominiac-cenditeumindilectionemdeietproximi,etipsedilectioest.Nonenimhabethomoundedeumdi-ligatnisiexdeo....Dilectioigiturquaeexdeoestetdeusestpropriespiritussanctusestperquemdiffunditurincordibusnostrisdeicaritasperquamnostotainhabitettrinitas.”

59.TractatusinevangeliumIoannis,64.4(PL35.1807);81.4(PL35.1846–1847);84.2(PL35.1848).SeeRaymondCanning,UnityofLoveforGodandNeighbourinSt.Augustine,72–73.

60.DecivitateDei,14.7:“NamcuiuspropositumestamareDeumetnonsecundumhominem,sedsecundumDeumamareproximum,sicutetiamseipsum.”


A righteous will, then, is a good love; and a perverted will is an evil love. Therefore, love yearning to possess what it loves is desire; love possessing and enjoying what it loves is joy; love fleeing what is adverse to it is fear; and love undergoing such adversity when it occurs is grief. Accordingly, these reactions are bad if the love is bad, and good if it is good.61

Thereare three things tonotice in thispassage.First,Augustine introducesthenotionofvoluntasassignifyingagoodorbadlovedependingonwhetherthewillis“recta”or“perversa.”Second,heassertsthatdesireandjoy(laetitia)aretwodifferentformsoflove.Lastly,heholdsthatdesireandjoyaregoodorbaddependingonthelovethatunderliesthem.Thismini-psychologyofloveestablishesthefollowingprogressioninthemotionoflove:will,desire,joy.Moreover,althoughAugustinestylesbothdesireandjoyasformsoflove,as“lovedesiring”andas“loveenjoying,”heseemstoreserveloveproperlysocalledtovoluntas.62Goodloveisvoluntasrecta,evilloveisvoluntasperversa.Whatarethecharacteristicsof loveasvoluntas?DoesAugustinewishtoaf-firmthatvoluntashastwoacts:desireandenjoyment,ordoesheseevoluntasassomethingmoregeneral,as,forexample,theprinciplethatunderliesbothdesireandenjoyment?

ThenatureofwillinAugustineisalargeandcontroversialquestionthatcannotbepursuedinthesepages.IwishonlytosuggestthatforAugustine,althoughdesireandenjoymentarebothformsofvoluntas,voluntasisnotre-ducibletothem.Infact,Augustine,inseveralworks,attemptstoexplainthewill’slovebyappealingnottodesirebuttogoodwill(benevolentia).Forex-ample,inhiscommentaryon1John,Augustineassertsthat“alllovecontainsanelementofgoodwilltowardthosewhoareitsobject.”63Hedistinguishesthelovewehaveforthingssuchasfoodorclothingfromthelovepropertopersonsbygroundingthe latter intheexperienceof friendship:“friendshipentails a certaingoodwill, aswhenwedo things for thosewhomwe love.

61.Ibid.:“Rectaitaquevoluntasestbonusamoretvoluntasperversamalusamor.Amorergoin-hianshaberequodamatur,cupiditasest,idautemhabenseoquefruenslaetitia;fugiensquodeiadu-ersatur, timorest, idquesiacciderit sentienstristitiaest.Proindemalasunt ista, simalusamorest;bona,sibonus.”

62.See, forexample, the followingquotation fromtheDeTrinitate,whereheequatesvoluntaswithamoranddilectio.DeTrinitate15.41:“Despirituautemsanctonihilinhocaenigmatequodeisimilevidereturostendinisivoluntatemnostram,velamoremseudilectionemquaevalentiorestvol-untas,quoniamvoluntasnostraquaenobisnaturaliter inest sicut ei res adiacuerint veloccurrerintquibusallicimurautoffendimuritavariasaffectioneshabet.”

63.InepistolamIoannis,tr.8.5(PL35.2038):“Omnisdilectio,fraterscharissimi,utiquebenevolen-tiamquamdamhabetergaeosquidiliguntur.”



Evenifwecannotdothingsforthem,thegoodwillalonesufficesforthelov-er.”64Inoneofhislatersermons,Augustineexplicitlyconsiderswhatthisim-pliesinrelationtoGod.

Let your charity principally be displayed as a love of friendship, which should be gratu-itous. You should not have or love a friend in order to receive something from him. If you love him because he gives you money or some other temporal commodity, you love not him, but the goods he gives you. A friend should be loved gratuitously, for himself, and not for anything else. If the rule of friendship encourages you to love man gratu-itously, how much more gratuitously should you love God, who commands that man be loved? Nothing is more delightful than God. . . . You do not worship him gratuitously if you do so in order to receive something from him. Worship him gratuitously and you will receive him.65

Itwould seem, therefore, thatwhenAugustinedefines charity as the soul’smotiontowardenjoyingGod“forhisownsake[propteripsum],”66the“prop-teripsum”ismeanttoconveythatthisenjoymentlovesGodgratuitously.OurenjoymentofGodconsistsinlovingHimforHimselfandnotforanyrewardwemightreceivefromHim,notevenfortheenjoymentthatcomesfromlov-ingHiminthisway.Inotherwords,inOnChristianDoctrine,Augustineat-temptstoexpressthroughtherichPlotiniannotionofenjoymentthesametruthhewillpreachinasermonbymeansofthemoreprosaicAristotelianunderstandingoffriendship:charitylovesGodforHimself.67

When we read these passages from Augustine in light of the twelfth-centuryscholasticcontroversiesonlove,theyallsuggestthatAugustine’sdefi-nitionofcharitywasmeanttoconveyaricherconceptionofcharitythanei-therhistwelfth-centurydefendersordetractorswereabletograsp.Aswehaveseen,theissuecenteredontheroleofdesireincharity.Theextremepositions


64.Ibid.:“Amicitiaquaedambenevolentiaeest,utaliquandopraestemuseisquosamamus.Quid,sinonsitquodpraestemus?Solabenevolentiasufficitamanti.”

65.Sermo385.3.4(PL39.1692):“Videatenimcaritasvestraprimumamicitiaeamorqualiterdebeatessegratuitus.nonenimproptereadebeshabereamicumvelamareutaliquidtibipraestet.siprop-tereaillumamasutpraestettibivelpecuniamvelaliquodcommodumtemporalenonillumamassedilludquodpraestat.amicusgratisamandusestproptersesenonpropteraliud.sihominemtehortaturamicitiaeregulautgratisdiligas,quamgratisamandusestdeusquijubetuthominemdiligas?NihildelectabiliusDeo...colisnongratis,utaliquidabipsoaccipias.gratiscole,etipsumaccipies.”

66.Dedoctrinachristiana,3.10[16].67.GeraldSchlabach,inreviewingRaymondCanning’sstudyofAugustine’stheoryoflove,has

notedtheimportanceofthedifferentcontextsinwhichAugustineconsiderscharity.SeeGeraldW.Schlabach,reviewofTheUnityofLoveforGodandNeighbourinSt.Augustine,byRaymondCanning,AugustinianStudies26(1995):157.


advancedduringthistwelfth-centurydebatefailedtosee1)thatAugustine’scharitywasmeanttoshiftthefocusfromtheself(andone’sownfulfillment)toGod;2)thatitcontainedanelementofaffectiveappreciationthatdidnotimplydesire; and3) that it alsohadanaspectofbenevolence,wherebywewishgoodtothebeloved,eventhoughAugustinewasnotexactlysurewhatthiscouldmean in relation toour love forGod.Asweshall see,Aquinas’smatureconceptionofcharityenableshimtopreserveAugustine’sinsightsbygroundingtheminamoreadequatepsychologyoflove.

Aquinas’s Solution

Thepresentstateofscholarshipdoesnotpermitustoidentifywithcerti-tudetheinfluenceoftwelfth-centurycontroversiesonSt.Thomas’stheologyoflove.TowhatextentweretheauthorsatLaonknowntoAquinas?TowhatextentdidheknowtheworkofHughofSaint-Victor?NothinginthetextsofAquinasenablesustoestablishthatheknewanyoftheseauthors.Aqui-nas,however,wasconfrontedwithananalogouschallenge.Hewasconfront-edwiththetaskofofferingacoherentconceptionofcharityinlightofthebiblicalandAugustinianheritagehehadreceived.WhenwestudyAquinas’stheologyofcharityfromthecontextofthetwelfth-centurycontroversiescon-cerningthenatureofcharity,wediscoverthatAquinasintroducesfiveinno-vationsthatgroundcharityinamoreadequatepsychologyoflove.First,heportraysloveproperlysocalledastheprincipleofeveryappetitivepower,un-derlyingbothdesireandenjoyment.Inotherwords,althoughdesirepresup-poseslove,loveisnotreducibletodesire.Second,hepresentsthisprincipleasanaffectiveaffinityforthelovedobject:acomplacentia.Third,hepresentsthiscomplacentiaashavingatwofoldtendency:towardthebeloved(amoramici-tiae)andtowardthegoodwewillforthebeloved(amorconcupiscentiae).Tolove,heexplains,isalwaystowillsomegoodforthebelovedfromaunionofaffections.Thomasthenexplainshowcharityelevatesthispsychology.Char-ity’scomplacentiahasthecharacterof friendship(amicitia).Godcommuni-cateshis life tousanduponthis communicatio aunionofaffectionsandamutualwell-wishing,whichareessential tofriendship,areestablished.Thisishisfourthinnovation:heportraysthevirtueofcharityasatypeoffriend-ship.Lastly,AquinasholdsthatproperlyspeakingthedesireforGodbelongstothetheologicalvirtueofhope,wherebywedesireGod’seternalbeatitudeasourfulfillment.Inotherwords,whilehope’sactisaconcupisciblelove(amor



concupiscentiae),charity’sactisa lovepropertofriendship(amoramicitiae).WhenweloveGodfromcharitywewillhisgoodinthesensethatwecele-bratehisgoodness.Intheremainingsectionsofthisessay,weshallconsidereachofthesefeatures.

Love as Complacentia boniAquinasintroduceshismaturepsychologyofloveinhisstudyofthepas-

sions. This is appropriate because in Aquinas’s view we know the spiritualthroughthephysical.68Inthecaseoflove,thebodilytransmutationspropertothepassionoflovearemoreevidenttousthanthespiritualactspropertoloveinthewill.69Aquinasthusdescribesspirituallovebyanalogywithemo-tionallove.70AquinasbeginshisanalysisoflovebyquotingtheexactpassagefromTheCityofGod citedearlier: “Augustine says thatall thepassionsarecausedbylove:since‘loveyearningtopossesswhatitlovesisdesire;lovepos-sessingandenjoyingwhatitlovesisjoy.’”71DrawingontheAristoteliananal-ysisofmotion,Aquinasthenexplainswhatthismeans.

Good has the aspect of an end. . . . Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, first has an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; second, it is moved to that end; third, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good [complacentia boni]; while movement toward good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.72

AquinassubsequentlyaddsthatwhenAugustinedescribesdesireandjoyaslove,hedoessobecauseloveistheircause.73Aquinasthusmakesexplicitwhat


68.STI,q.84,a.7,ad3.69.SeeSTI,q.85,a.1;STI,q.87,aa.1–3.70.ST I,q.82,a. 5, ad 1: “Amor,concupiscentia,ethuiusmodi,dupliciteraccipiuntur.Quan-

doquequidemsecundumquodsuntquaedampassiones,cumquadamscilicetconcitationeanimipro-venientes.Etsiccommuniteraccipiuntur,ethocmodosuntsoluminappetitusensitivo.Aliomodosignificantsimplicemaffectum,absquepassionevelanimiconcitatione.”

71.STI-II,q.25,a.2,s.c.:“Augustinusdicit,inxivdeCiv.Dei,quodomnespassionesexamorecausantur,‘amoreniminhianshaberequodamatur,cupiditasest;idautemhabens,eoquefruens,la-etitiaest.’”

72. ST I-II, q. 25, a. 2: “Bonum autem habet rationem finis....Manifestum est autem quodomnequodtenditadfinemaliquem,primoquidemhabetaptitudinemseuproportionemadfinem,nihilenimtenditinfinemnonproportionatum;secundo,moveturadfinem;tertio,quiescitinfineposteiusconsecutionem.Ipsaautemaptitudosiveproportioappetitusadbonumestamor,quinihilaliudestquamcomplacentiaboni;motusautemadbonumestdesideriumvelconcupiscentia;quiesauteminbonoestgaudiumveldelectatio.”

73.STI-II,q.26,a.1,ad2:“Amordicituressetimor,gaudium,cupiditasettristitia,nonquidemessentialiter,sedcausaliter.”


is only implicit inAugustine: love is thefirst change in the appetite, fromwhichdesireandjoyspring.Forsomethingtobethegoalofanagent’saction,thatagentmustsomehowalreadybeaptorproportionedforattainingthatgoal.Thisaptitudeislove.

But why employ the word complacentia to describe this aptitude? Onepossiblereasonisthatthetermcanconnotebothaffectandapproval.OnceAquinashaddefinedloveastheprincipleunderlyingdesireandenjoyment,hehadtofinda termthatcouldexpress theway inwhichthisprinciple ispresentinbothofthem.Moreover,sinceloveistheprincipleofanappetite,thetermhadinsomewaytoexpresstheaffectiveelementessentialtolove.74Aquinasapparentlyjudgedthatcomplacentia,asawordthatliterallysignifies“withpleasingassent”(cum+placentia),couldconveythesemeanings.Whenwedesire andenjoy,wedo so fromanunderlyingplacentia that ispresentthroughout.

There is perhaps another reason this term seemed appropriate to Aqui-nas.IntheVulgateofMatthew’sGospel,GodtheFatheremploystheverbalformofcomplacentiatoexpresshisattitudetowardtheSon.BothduringJe-sus’baptismandhistransfiguration,thevoicefromheavenreferstoJesusas“mybelovedSoninwhomIamwellpleased.”Thetermusedineachcaseiscomplacui(t).75Weshouldalsonotethatcomplacentiaisherelinkedtodilectio.ThebelovedSon(dilectus)ispleasingtotheFather.ImplicitinthisaccountistheaffirmationthattheFather’sloveentailsacertaincomplacentiaintheFa-ther’swill.Aquinas,therefore,seemstodrawonthebiblicalaccountoftheFather’slovefortheSonandonAristotle’stheoryofcausalitytogroundAu-gustine’spsychologyofloveonafirmerfoundation.

Love’s Act as Willing Good to AnotherAswehave seen, afterdescribing love as theprincipleunderlyingdesire

andenjoyment,St.Thomasdistinguishesintellectualfromsensuallove.Intel-lectualloveisthelovepropertothewill.Henextoffersafurtherrefinementnotpresent inAugustine.Hedistinguishesamor, a general termapplicableeventobruteanimalsorinanimateobjects,fromdilectio,which,heexplains,

74.On“affectus”or“affectio”asanessentialelementofloveinthewill,seeSTII-II,q.27,a.2:“indilectione,secundumquodestactuscaritatis,includiturquidembenevolentia,seddilectiosiveamoradditunionemaffectus”;Decaritate,2:“amorestprincipiumomniumvoluntariarumaffectionum”;STI-II,q.56,a.3,ad1:“VerbumAugustiniintelligendumestdevirtutesimpliciterdictanonquodomnistalisvirtussitsimpliciteramor;sedquiadependetaliqualiterabamore,inquantumdependetavoluntate,cuiusprimaaffectioestamor.”

75.“HicestFiliusmeusdilectusinquomihicomplacui(t).”Mt3:17;Mt17:5;seealso2Pt1:17.



isaloveproperonlytointellectualorrationalcreatures,andistheresultoftheagent’sfreechoice:“becausedilectioimplies,inadditiontolove,apreced-ingchoice[electionempraecedentem],astheworditselfdenotes.”76

Butwhat is thenatureoftheactsofwill thatflowfromthis freelycho-sencomplacencyinthegood?Inotherwords,whatisthenatureofthewill’sdesire?DrawingonAristotle,Aquinasaffirmsthat“toloveistowillgoodtosomeone.”77Assuch,“lovehasa twofoldtendency: towardthegoodthatapersonwishestosomeone(tohimselfortoanother)andtowardtheonetowhomhewishessomegood.”78Loveisessentiallyloveforsomeone.79Toex-plain this dynamic Aquinas employs a distinction developed earlier in thethirteenth century, during controversies over whether angels naturally loveGodmorethanthemselves.Itisthedistinctionbetweenamorconcupiscentiaeandamoramicitiae,whichcanbestbetranslatedas“thelovepropertodesire”and“thelovepropertofriendship,”respectively.AsGuyMansinihasshown,Aquinasappropriatesthisdistinctiontoexplainthetwofolddynamicpresentinspirituallove.80Thelovepropertofriendship(amoramicitiae)istheactofwillinggoodtothebeloved.Thiswilling,however,mustalsobeorientedto-wardthegoodwewillforourfriendand,thus,entailsasanintegralcompo-nentanamorconcupiscentiaeforthegoodwewillforhim.This,inAquinas’sview,istheessenceoftheloveoffriendship.Whenweloveapersonwearealwaysaffirmingsomegoodforthatperson.Thesearenottwoseparateloves.Rather,humanlovealwayshastwocomponents,oneofwhichissubordinat-edtotheother.81Loveofconcupiscenceiscontainedwithinthedynamismof


76.STI-II,q.26,a.3:“Additenimdilectiosupraamorem,electionempraecedentem,utipsumnomensonat.”

77.STI-II,q.26,a.4:“Amareestvellealicuibonum.”78.Ibid.:“Sicergomotusamorisinduotendit,scilicetinbonumquodquisvultalicui,velsibivel

alii;etinilludcuivultbonum.”79.STI,q.20,a.2,ad3:“Amicitianonpotesthaberinisiadrationalescreaturas,inquibuscon-

tingitesseredamationem,etcommunicationeminoperibusvitae,etquibuscontingitbeneevenirevelmale,secundumfortunametfelicitatem,sicutetadeaspropriebenevolentiaest.”

80.GuyMansini,“DuplexamorandtheStructureofLoveinAquinas,”inRecherchesdeThéolo-gie Ancienne et Médiévale, supplementa, vol. 1,Thomistica, ed. E. Manning (Leuven: Peters, 1995),137–96.

81.STI-II,q.26,a.4:“haecautemdivisioestsecundumpriusetposterius.namidquodamaturamoreamicitiae,simpliciteretperseamatur,quodautemamaturamoreconcupiscentiae,nonsim-pliciteretsecundumseamatur,sedamaturalteri.sicutenimenssimpliciterestquodhabetesse,ensautemsecundumquidquodestinalio;itabonum,quodconvertiturcumente,simpliciterquidemestquodipsumhabetbonitatem;quodautemestbonumalterius,estbonumsecundumquid.etperconsequensamorquoamaturaliquiduteisitbonum,estamorsimpliciter,amorautemquoamaturaliquidutsitbonumalterius,estamorsecundumquid.”STII-II,q.25,a.3:“Peramicitiamautem


ourloveoffriendshipforourselvesorforsomeoneelse.82Mostfundamental-ly,thegoodwewillforthebelovedissimplythegoodofexistence.“Thefirstthingthatonewillsforafriendisthathebeandlive.”83Onlysubsequentlydowethenwillparticulargoodthingsforourbelovedanddirectouractionsaccordingly.84InrelationtoGod,charity’sproperactistoloveGodforHim-self,whichmeanstocelebratehisexistenceandgoodness.85

Aquinasconcludeshisanalysisoflovebyunderliningthatloveistheprin-cipleofallthattheagentsubsequentlydoes.“Everyagentactsforanend,asstatedabove.Nowtheendisthegooddesiredandlovedbyeachone.Thus,itisevidentthateveryagent,whateveritbe,doeseveryactionfromsomekindoflove.”86Ouractions,therefore,flowfromourfreelychosenlove:fromourloveforthegoodsweaffirmandfromourloveforthosetowhomweaffirmthem.Inotherwords,beforeloveisaprincipleofaction,loveisaresponsetogoodness.ItisaresponsetoGod’sgoodness,torationalcreatures’fellowshipinthisgoodness,andtothegoodnesspropertonon-rationalcreaturesintheirorderedrelationshiptoGodandourfellowshipwithHim.

Charity as Amicitia hominis ad DeumSt.Thomasbeginshisanalysisofcharitybydefiningcharityasatypeof

friendshipwithGod.“Charityisacertainfriendship[amicitia]ofthehumanpersontowardGod.”87Thomas’sdefinitionofcharityasanamicitiamarksthe

amaturunoquidemmodo,amicusadquemamicitiahabetur;etaliomodo,bonaquaeamicooptan-tur.”SeealsoSTII-II,q.25,a.2.

82.Sincefriendshipisfoundedonunion,notunity,wedonothavefriendship(amicitia)forour-selves,butsomethingmorethanfriendship(STII-II,q.25,a.4).Nevertheless,thelovewehaveforourselvesisthetypeoflovethatispropertofriendship(STI-II,q.28,a.1,ad2).

83.STII-II,q.25,a.7:“Unusquisqueenimamicusprimoquidemvultsuumamicumesseetvi-vere.”

84.Weseethisprogressiondescribedwhenwereadtheabove-citedsentencefromSTII-II,q.25,a.7,initslargercontext:“unusquisqueenimamicusprimoquidemvultsuumamicumesseetvivere;secundo,vulteibona;tertio,operaturbonaadipsum;quarto,conviviteidelectabiliter;quinto,con-cordatcumipso,quasiiniisdemdelectatusetcontristatus.”SeealsoSTI,q.20,a.2:“Amornoster,quobonumalicuivolumus,nonestcausabonitatisipsius,sedeconversobonitaseius,velveravelaes-timata,provocatamorem,quoeivolumusetbonumconservariquodhabet,etaddiquodnonhabet,etadhocoperamur.”

85.STII-II,q.31,a.1,ad1:“Nostrumnonestdeobenefacere,sedeumhonorare,noseisubiici-endo,eiusautemestexsuadilectionenobisbenefacere.”

86.STI-II,q.28,a.6:“Omneagensagitpropterfinemaliquem,utsupradictumest.finisautemestbonumdesideratumetamatumunicuique.undemanifestumestquodomneagens,quodcumquesit,agitquamcumqueactionemexaliquoamore.”

87.STII-II,q.23,a.1:“CaritasamicitiaquaedamesthominisadDeum.”



culminationofoverahundredyearsofscholasticreflectiononthenatureofcharity.88TheScripturesdescribetheloveexistingbetweenGodandhispeo-pleinvariousways,amongwhichisthethemeoffriendship.“Inolongercallyouservants,butfriends”(Jn15:15).89St.Thomasappearstochoosefriend-shipashispreferreddescriptionofcharitybecauseofthelightAristotle’sanal-ysisoffriendshipcanshedonourrelationshipwithGodwhenthisanalysisis applied tocharity.90 Inessence,Aquinas seems to intuit thatAristotelianamicitiaoffersapowerfulanalogyforunderstandingtheuniquecomplacen-tiathatischarity.ThomasemploysAristotle’streatmentoffriendshipintheNicomacheanEthicstoaffirmthatfriendshiphasthefollowingcharacteristics.First,friendshipentailsmutualbenevolence.Friendshipismorethanmerelyasolitaryexpressionofthelovethatexistsinfriendship.Friendshiprequiresat least twowho loveeachotherwith this love,whereby theywillgood toeachother.91Thomasaddsthatincharitythisactalsoentailsaunionofaffec-tions,forsimplewell-wishingisnotenoughforfriendship.92

Aquinasemphasizes,however,thatthefoundationofthismutuallybenev-olentaffectionisacertaincommunioninthegood(communicatioinbono).Onthenaturalhumanlevel,communicatioinbonosignifiesforAquinasbothanactivesharingofgoodsandamorebasicparticipationinthesamequali-ties,circumstances,ororigins.93ForAquinas,thefirstmeaningofcommuni-catio in bono—the active exchangeof goods and services—is rooted in thesecondmorebasicmeaning.Thesecondmeaningrefers tosomefellowshipin goodness.Two people share at least the goodness of their common hu-manity,buttheycanalsobefromthesamecountryortown,havethesame

88.SeeGuyMansini,“Similitudo,Communicatio,andtheFriendshipofCharityinAquinas,”inManning,Thomistica,1–26;JosephBobik,“AquinasonFriendshipWithGod,”NewScholasticism60(1986):257–71.

89.STII-II,q.23,a.1,s.c.:“Ioan.xvdicitur,‘iamnondicamvosservos,sedamicosmeos.’sedhocnondicebatureisnisirationecaritatis.ergocaritasestamicitia.”

90.SeeA.Stévaux,“LaDoctrinedelaCharitédanslescommentairesdesSentencesdesaintAl-bert,desaintBonaventure,etdesaintThomas,”EphemeridesTheologicaeLovanienses24(1948):86–87;AnthonyKeaty,“Thomas’sAuthorityforIdentifyingCharityasFriendship:AristotleorJohn15?”Thomist62(1998):594.

91. ST II-II, q. 23, a. 1.: “Sed nec benevolentia sufficit ad rationem amicitiae, sed requiriturquaedammutuaamatio,quiaamicusestamicoamicus.”

92.STII-II,q.27,a.2:“Indilectione,secundumquodestactuscaritatis,includiturquidembe-nevolentia,seddilectiosiveamoradditunionemaffectus.”

93.SeeJosephBobik,“AquinasonCommunicatio, theFoundationofFriendship,andCaritas,”ModernSchoolman64(1988):1–18;andMansini,“Similitudo,Communicatio,andtheFriendshipofCharityinAquinas,”1–26.

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profession,belongtothesamefamily,orhavedevelopedasimilarlyvirtuouscharacter.Eachofthesesharedgoodsisacommunicatiovitaeorcommunica-tio inbonouponwhich thosewho share thisgoodcan founda friendship:“allfriendshipisfoundedonsomefellowshipinlife[communicatiovitae].”94Aquinasbelievesthatthesecharacteristicsofhumanfriendshipareanalogous-lypresentincharity.ThefoundationoftheanalogyrestsonAquinas’sunder-standingofgraceasatypeofdivine“communicatio,”wherebyGodbeginstoshare(communicare)hislifewithus.

Since there is a communicatio between humans and God, inasmuch as God com-municates his beatitude to us, some kind of friendship must be based upon this communicatio. . . . The love that is based on this communicatio is charity. Hence it is clear that charity is the friendship of the human person for God.95

Afterestablishingthisanalogybetweencharityandhumanfriendship,Aqui-nasemploysAristotle’sanalysisoffriendshiptoilluminatetheveryaspectofcharity thatAugustinehadstruggled toexplain: theobjectandorderof itslove.96Forourpurposes,however,themoreinterestingfeatureishowAqui-nasusestheanalogyoffriendshiptodistinguishcharityfromthetheologicalvirtueofhope.

Charity and HopeIn relation to hope, St. Thomas first employs the analogy of friendship

toexplaincharity’sdependenceonboth faithandhope.SincecommunionwithGodinthegoodisaprerequisiteforfriendshipwithHim,unlesswebe-lievethatsuchacommunionispossibleandunlesswehopeforthisgoodassomethingattainablebyusthroughGod’sassistance,wecouldneverlivethefriendshipthatischarity.97Thus,charitydependsforitsexistenceonfaithin

94.STII-II,q.25,a.3:“Omnisamicitiafundatursuperaliquacommunicationevitae.”SeealsoDeRegno,1.11:“Omnisautemamicitiasuperaliquacommunionefirmatur.eosenimquiconveniunt,velpernaturaeoriginem,velpermorumsimilitudinem,velpercuiuscumquesocietatiscommunio-nem,videmusamicitiaconiungi.”

95.STII-II,q.23,a.1:“Cumigitursitaliquacommunicatiohominisaddeumsecundumquodnobis suam beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiamfundari....Amorautemsuperhaccommunicationefundatusestcaritas.undemanifestumestquodcaritasamicitiaquaedamesthominisaddeum.”

96.STII-II,qq.25and26.SeeStephenJ.Pope,TheEvolutionofAltruismandtheOrderingofLove(Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversityPress,1994).

97.STI-II,q.65,a.5:“Caritasnonsolumsignificatamoremdei,sedetiamamicitiamquandamadipsum;quaequidemsuperamoremadditmutuamredamationemcumquadammutuacommuni-catione,utdiciturinVIIIEthic.Etquodhocadcaritatempertineat,patetperidquoddicitur1Ioan.

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theintellectandhopeinthewill.Charity,however,ismoreperfectthanhopebecausecharityrespondstoGodasa friendwho ispresent,whilehopere-spondstoHimasanarduousabsentgood.

Love and hope differ in this way: love implies a certain union between lover and be-loved, while hope implies a certain motion or tending of the appetite toward an ardu-ous good. Union, however, is with something distinct, and therefore love is directly able to consider the other, with whom we are united by love, regarding him as we regard ourselves. Motion, however, is always toward a terminus properly proportioned to the moved object, and thus hope directly considers one’s own good, and not that which per-tains to another.98

Aquinassubsequentlyappealstothedistinctionbetweenamoramicitiaeandamor concupiscentiae toexplainhowcharitybothanimatesbutdiffers fromhope.“Hopepresupposesloveofhimwhomonehopestoattain,whichloveisaloveofconcupiscence,bywhichonemorelovesoneself,desiringagood,thanwillingagoodtoanother.Charity,however,entailsaloveoffriendship,towardwhichhopeflows.”99Incharitywesaytothebeloved,“It’sgoodthatyou exist.”100 As noted above, when we love God, we are merely affirmingorcelebratingthegoodnessthatisinHim.Ontheotherhand,inAquinas’sview,thedesireforGodasourfulfillmentisnotproperlyanactofcharity,butofhope.Aquinasrecognizesthatwecandesirethisfulfillmentfromchar-ity,becauseitisaccordingtoGod’sloveforus:Godalsodesiresthatwebe

IV,quimanetincaritate,indeomanet,etdeusineo.Etad1Cor.Idicitur,fidelisdeus,perquemvo-catiestisinsocietatemfiliieius.Haecautemsocietashominisaddeum,quaeestquaedamfamiliarisconversatiocumipso,inchoaturquidemhicinpraesentipergratiam,perficieturauteminfuturopergloriam,quorumutrumquefideetspetenetur.Undesicutaliquisnonpossetcumaliquoamicitiamhabere,sidiscrederetveldesperaretsepossehaberealiquamsocietatemvelfamiliaremconversationemcumipso;itaaliquisnonpotesthabereamicitiamaddeum,quaeestcaritas,nisifidemhabeat,perquamcredathuiusmodisocietatemetconversationemhominiscumdeo,etsperetseadhancsocieta-tempertinere.Etsiccaritassinefideetspenullomodoessepotest.”

98.STII-II,q.17,a.3:“Amoretspesinhocdifferuntquodamorimportatquandamunionemamantisadamatum;spesautemimportatquendammotumsiveprotensionemappetitusinaliquodbonumarduum.Unioautemestaliquorumdistinctorum,etideoamordirectepotestrespicerealium,quemsibialiquisunitperamorem,habenseumsicutseipsum.Motusautemsemperestadpropriumterminumproportionatummobili,etideospesdirecterespicitpropriumbonum,nonautemidquodadaliumpertinet.”

99.STII-II,q.66,a.6,ad2:“Spespraesupponitamoremeiusquodquisadipiscisesperat,quiestamorconcupiscentiae,quoquidemamoremagisseamatquiconcupiscitbonum,quamaliquidaliud.Caritasautemimportatamoremamicitiae,adquamperveniturspe,utsupradictumest.”

100. Josef Pieper, About Love, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (Chicago: Franciscan HeraldPress,1972),22.

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unitedtoHimasourfulfillment.101Nevertheless,strictlyspeaking,theloveofdesirebywhichwedesiretoenjoyGodisthelovepropertohope.Aquinasfurtherdescribesthiscontrastintermsofperfectandimperfectlove.

Perfect love is that by which someone is loved for himself, as when one wills him good, the way a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is that by which one loves something not for itself, but because of the good that comes to the lover from it, as when a man loves something he desires. The first love of God pertains to charity, by which we cling to God for Himself, while hope pertains to the second love, because one who hopes intends to obtain something for himself.102

ThelovebywhichwedesireGodasourperfection, therefore,properlybe-longstohope.Althoughcharitybothanimatesthisdesireandenablesittoat-tainthedesiredend,properlyspeakingcharitylovesGodforHimself,willingandcelebratingGod’sgoodness.

ThesequotationsfromAquinasplaceAugustine’stextsinanewlight.TheysuggestthatAugustine’stheologyofloveisprimarilyatheologyofhope.Thismight seemparadoxical sinceAugustinehimself says little abouthope andwhat he does say often merely paraphrases the Scriptures.103 Nevertheless,whenAugustineinOnChristianDoctrinedefinescharityasamotiontowardenjoyingGodinsteadofassimplytheenjoymentofGod,heunderlinesanaspectofcharitythatexistsonlyinthislife.HeisdefiningcharityintermsoftheimperfectandtemporalactoflovingGodasanabsentgood.Inoth-erwords,fromtheperspectiveofAquinas,Augustine’stheologyofloveem-phasizesthecomponentoftemporalcharitythatproperlybelongstohope.104This isunderstandable in lightofAugustine’s concern to show thatperfecthappiness (andthusalso theperfectenjoymentofGod) ispossibleonly inheaven.Asaconsequence,however,Augustineunderemphasizescharity’soth-eraspects,especiallyitsproperactofbenevolentwell-wishing.Howeverthismaybe,oneimplicationofAquinas’spsychologyof love is thatAugustine’s

101.SeeSTII-II,q.25,a.4.102.STII-II,q.17,a.8:“Perfectusquidemamorestquoaliquissecundumseamatur,utputacui

aliquisvultbonum,sicuthomoamatamicum.Imperfectusamorestquoquisamataliquidnonse-cundumipsum,sedutilludbonumsibiipsiproveniat,sicuthomoamatremquamconcupiscit.Pri-musautemamordeipertinetadcaritatem,quaeinhaeretdeosecundumseipsum,sedspespertinetadsecundumamorem,quiaillequisperataliquidsibiobtinereintendit.”

103.ForabriefpresentationofAugustine’stheologyofhopethatnotestheinfluenceofAugus-tine’sconceptionofcharityonhistheologyofhope,seeFrancescoRusso,“Espérance,”inEncyclopédiesaintAugustin,ed.AllanD.Fitzgerald(Paris:EditionsduCerf,2005),538–41.

104.SeeSTII-II,q.28,a.1,ad3.

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confrontationwithclassicalculturecanbefruitfullyreinterpretedfromwith-inatheologyofhope.Thedeepestdesiresofthehumanheartandofhumansocietiesarenotnecessarilyinvain.Whenhealedandelevatedinthegraceofconversiontheycanattaintheirgoal.Nevertheless,evenwhenthesedesiresarewelldirected, theyare lived inhope.105Thedesiresof thehumanheartfindperfect fulfillmentonly inheaven in theeternalkingdom. In this life,therefore,anaspectofcharity’slovewillalwaysbelivedinhope.

Conclusion

Earlyinthetwelfthcentury,scholasticauthorsatbothLaonandParisbe-gantoquestionthebiblicalandpatristicheritagetheyhadreceived.Theybe-ganespeciallytoquestiontheAugustinianaccountofcharity.AlthoughtheextenttowhichThomasAquinaswasawareofthisquestioningremainsun-certain,hewasclearlyawareofthedifficultiesposedbytheAugustinianheri-tage.EmployingtoolsdrawnfromAristotleandhisreadingoftheScriptures,Aquinasdevelopedapsychologyofloveandadefinitionofcharitythaten-abledhimbothtopreserveAugustine’sdeepestinsightsandtoremainmorefaithfultothebiblicalwitness.Inthisway,AquinaswasabletosaveAugus-tinefromtheextremeviewsofsometwelfth-centuryAugustinians.

105.DecivitateDei19.20:“Quamtamenquicumquesichabet,uteiususumreferatadilliusfi-nem,quamdiligitardentissimeacfidelissimesperat,nonabsurdedicietiamnuncbeatuspotest,speillapotiusquamreista.”SeealsoDecivitateDei19.4.

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