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IPSDMHOccasional Papers

Changing Securiy Paradigms in omania and Souh Arica afer he Cold War


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OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 10th

Year, 2011, No. 16

CHANGING SECUIY PARDIGMS INOMANIA AND SOUH AFICA AFE

HE COLD WA

Military Publishing House,

Bucharest, 2011


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Cover: Adrian Pandea

Layout: Maria Dumitru

Printing: SEMNE ’94 Printing House


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CONEN

Forward – Dr. Mihail E. Ionescu / 7

Indian Ocean Maritime Security: Strategic Context and Characteristics –Dr. ean Pogieer / 18

From racialism to authoritarianism: South Aica, militarised politics and

the implosion o state legitimacy under apartheid – Dr. Ian Liebenberg / 64

Romanian participation in post conflict/reconstruction missions/operati-

ons afer the end o the Cold War – Carmen îjnoveanu / 94

Te evolution o civil-military relations in Romania afer the Cold War –Dr. Şerban F. Cioculescu / 134


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FORWARD

Dr. MIHAIL E. IONESCU Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense andMilitary History, Bucharest – Project Co-Director

is Occasional Paper brings ogeher conribuions o some ohe members o he gran „Sociey and changing paradigms o naionaland regional securiy: Romania and Souh Aica, a comparaive analysis” ,

a bilaeral projec beween omania and Souh Arica. e opics arear rom being homogenous, in ac each o he represenaives o hewo counries seleced a subjec ha he considered as represenaiveor he naional securiy agenda. is is he reason we did no selec aile or he book. According o decisions aken a he beginning ohe work ,wihin his gran, each o he paricipaing insiuions, he

Insiue or Poliical Sudies o Deense and Miliary Hisory rom Bu-

chares and he Cenre or Miliary Sudies a he Sellenbosch Universiyshould publish a monograph and an occasional paper.

e idea o launching his bilaeral research projec in he field osecuriy and sraegic sudies, beween omania and Souh Arica,emerged on he occasion o he Inernaional Congress o MiliaryHisory, aking place in riese (Ialy), in he summer o 2008. e di-recor o he Insiue or Poliical Sudies o Deense and Miliary His-ory rom omania (IPSDMH/ISPAIM), major general (r) Mihail E.Ionescu and major general (r) Mollo , presiden o he Souh AricanCommission on Miliary Hisory, ook he decision o propose a com-


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IPSDMH – Occasional Papers 16/2011

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mon research projec dedicaed o he sudy o naional and regionalsecuriy rom he Souh Arican and omanian poins o view, wih aspecial emphasis on he pos-Cold War era.

e main reason behind his decision was he ac ha boh coun-ries and socieies had enered afer he end o he Cold War in a pro-cess o socieal ransiion – omania urned ino a democraic regime,leaving behind he oaliarian poliical and economic sysem, and So-

uh Arica rom aparheid regime o a democraic one – and his hasenailed also he securiy field. Or a comparison in his field beweenhe wo ways o solving he issues , in spie o he huge disance be-ween he wo counries , could draw significan conclusions including

„lessons learned „ o be used in similar processes.Following hese exploraory debae, here were some rounds o

bilaeral dialogue and evenually each o he wo insiuions signed aconrac wih he Minisry o Educaion o is counry. e IPSDMHand he Naional Auhoriy or Scienific esearch (ANCS) signed afinancing conrac or execuing projecs in 2008 and also convenedan Acion Plan.

e omanian side has in view o beter comprehend he eaureso he social, poliical and securiy environmen in Souh Arica and

he neighboring area in he conex o rising in economic and poliicalimporance o he Arican coninen and how securiy soluions werecombined wih differen social issues raised by he ransiion period.

Also , i was a neccesiy or omania, as an EU member, o ake parin he regional policy conceived by EU or Sub-Saharian Arica and oincrease he visibiliy o omania in his par o he world. e ohergoal is o explain and disseminae omania’s Armed Forces’ role inenhancing he oreign policy visibiliy and credibiliy o he counry.Bu may be he mos imporan goal is ha omanian researchersrom IPSDMH acquire experize on Arica, a coninen which unor-


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Changing Securiy Paradigms in Romania and Souh Aica afer he Cold War

unaelly is unsufficienly known and sudied by he academic and hesraegic hinkers rom omania.e research gran is aking place beween 2009-2011 and he ou-

come will be workshops, conerences and scienifical rips in Souh Arica, also he publishing o some occasional papers and monogra-phic sudies.

e omanian side is involved wih five reserachers rom he IPS-DMH: major general (r) Mihail E. Ionescu (co-direcor o he pro-

jec), colonel Pere Ou, Carmen âjnoveanu (senior researcher), dlŞerban Cioculescu (senior researcher) and Peer Vlad Szasz (juniorresearcher).

So, why omania and Souh Arica? Firsly, because here is a re-laion based on riendship and cooperaion beween he leadership o

he omanian Commission o Miliary Hisory and he Souh-AricanCommission o Miliary Hisory. And, as we have already menioned,he experience o he pos-communis ransiion o democracy in ourcounry has some poins o similiude wih he ransiion rom he

Aparheid o pluralisic democracy in he Arican parner-counry.irdly and no less imporan, he major sraegic ineres o he

Souh-Aricans, especially o he miliary decision-making srucures,

goes o he Greaer Indian Ocean, which is a huge geopoliical area bordering Eurasia, ha is he Greaer Middle Eas and, a a regionallevel, he Wider Black Sea Area.

According o well-known conemporary sraegic hinker oberaplan, he Greaer Indian Ocean, which is he „cener-sage or he21s cenury”, „encompasses he enire arc o Islam, rom he SaharaDeser o he Indonesian archipelago”, hus being a quasi-synonym orhe already classic Greaer Middle Eas (or more accuraely, he ma-riime room surrounding he Greaer Middle Eas’s erresrial mass),a geopoliical decoupage invened afer he Cold War by American


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sraegiss. In his recen book, Monsoon , aplan defined he regionmore precisely - “easward rom he Horn o Arica pas he ArabianPeninsula, he Iranian plaeau and he Indian subconinen, all he wayo he Indonesian archipelago and beyond.”1

O course, Souh-Arican miliary and civilian expers in regionalsecuriy do no go as ar as aplan, bu i is naural ha hey give heIndian Ocean he neccesary atenion, in he conex o an increasing

compeiion among he world power poles or securiy and wealh.Cerainly, Souh Arica has been and sill is a regional power, domina-ing he sub-regional securiy complex which i’s belonging o. In ac,i is he mos developed and rich Arican counry, aking ino accounhe huge naural resources and he human capial. Some specialiss al-ready are proposing ha Souh Arica should ener in BIC, eiherreplacing ussia or exending he acronym. In ac, sraegiss in Pre-

oria already speak abou BICS. No counry can escape geography,and Souh Arica is a good example. Siuaed a he juncion o wooceans – he Alanic and he Indian ones – i is absoluely normalha is decision-makers conceive he long-run securiy o heir coun-ry being ulfilled especially by he projecion o he mariime powerar rom he naional borders. Even i he uure compeiion or hisnew cenre o graviy will be mainly among US, People’s epublic oChina and India ( and EU as a main player oo ), i is possible or So-uh Arica o play a significan role here: one o he players o powergames, balancer ec. O course, here is much more han naval securiy,as Preoria is acively involved in peace-keeping missions in ailed or

weak saes all around Arica.On he oher hand, omania, according o is geographic locaion,

erriorial and demographic size, is one o he major players in Cen-1 ober aplan, Monsoon: Te Indian Ocean and he Fuure o American Power ,

andom House, 2010.


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ral-Easern Europe, a border-sae or EU and NAO and a providero securiy or he rans-Alanic world in he Easern and Souh-Eas-ern areas. e Wider Black Sea Area is considered as being vial oromania’s naional securiy bu also or he uure o EU and NAOas collecive acors represening he Wes. In order o be able o cope

wih he new risks and hreas arising a he regional and global levels,omania needs perorman and modern armed orces – a process sill

coninuing even afer he NAO membership in 2004 -, able o be de-ployed in all kind o missions: erriorial deense, securiy and sabi-lizaion operaions, collecive securiy operaions under UN, NAOand EU ec. Bu, also very imporan, omania needs a good pool oexperise in securiy sudies and inernaional relaions, because ha-

ving only he maerial elemen o he securiy policy (armed orces,sae agencies ec.) is no enough. A good securiy sraegy, a valid de-

ense concep are absoluely compulsory or any modern sae willingo survive and o develop in he new cenury.

And here is also anoher aspec o he join work developed underhis gran regarding omania. As a EU medium-size power, oma-nia is also ineresed in acquiring experise abou „e Grea IndianOcean”, he new axis o he 21s cenury o compeiion wihin he in-ernaional sysem. I is no only abou compeiion, bu also abou

cooperaion along his new axis, knowing ha a huge par o resourcesand goods are passing along he roues.

Proessor Tean Potgieter , rom he Cenre or Miliary Sudies ahe Sellenbosch Universiy presens an analysis o he mariime securi-y wihin he wider Indian Ocean, ocusing on he role played by he“new byg players” such as India and China, and on he sraegic par-nerships and alliances which are buil in his area. As he auhor warnsus “mariime securiy is a broad, somewha amorphous ocus area, andhe mariime securiy lieraure covers everyhing rom physical saey


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and securiy measures o por securiy, errorism and much more.” Hemenions ha he region includes no less han 51 coasal saes: “26Indian Ocean im (IO) saes, five ed Sea saes, our Persian Gulsaes, Saudi Arabia, France, Briain and 13 landlocked saes.” emain issues discussed are regional conflics (“42% o he conflics inhe world can be associaed wih Indian Ocean counries”) or errio-ries and ideniy building, compeiion or energy resources. e risks

and hreas affecing Indian mariime securiy : inense arms build up,rise o asserive new powers like India, exra-regional naval presence,he need o proec he energy corridors and sea lanes o communicai-on, o figh piracy, errorism, organized crime. Environmenal securiyis also an imporan poin o he analysis, as polluion is increasing and“sea emperaures in he Indian Ocean are rising a a aser rae hanelsewhere”, he illegal fishing is more and more presen. e increasing

role o non-sae acors is underlined, especially when speaking aboupiracy, organized crime, smuggling and errorism. en, he auhorliss he main regional, sub-regional and mulinaional cooperaionrameworks in he Indian Ocean area: Souhern Arican DevelopmenCommuniy (SADC), Eas Arican Communiy (EAC), Indian OceanCommission (COI), e Arab League), e Gul Cooperaion Coun-cil (GCC), e Associaion o Souheas Asian Naions (ASEAN) ec.

e logical conclusion is ha “i is imporan ha Arican saes im-prove heir mariime securiy and paricipae as equal parners in heIndian Ocean securiy debae” and he mos effecive way is hroughregional and sub-regional cooperaion srucures.

Anoher researcher rom he Cenre or Miliary Sudies a heSellenbosch Universiy, dr. Ian Liebenberg , deliveres a paper named“From racialism o auhoriarianism: Souh Arica, miliarized poliicsand he implosion o sae legiimacy under aparheid”. He explainsracialism in Souh Arica as an inheriance o he colonialism and heaparheid regime, and underlines he sraegy o he whie elie who


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held power or a long ime by discriminaing he black and coloredmajoriy. Because o he “miliarizaion” process, Souh Arica beca-me a “ garrison sae , a bunker sae or a praeorian sae.” e neariouseffec has been he violen behaviour o he sae auhoriies againshe black majoriy and he endency o inerere in he affairs o someneighbouring saes. When he Naional Pary won he elecions in1948, is leaders worked hard o ensure he whie supremacy and used

he conex o Cold War wihin he bipolar inernaional sysem o jus-iy heir repressive policies and he miliarisic advenures in oreigncounries. In order o block he black people’s aspiraion or reedom,he aparheid regime drafed a “oal naional sraegy”. e whie lea-ders offered a limied suffrage o coloured and Indians, no o he blackpeople. e racial classificaion o he populaion and he mapping ohe counry in areas allowed or no allowed o black people inensified

he repression mechanisms o he aparheid regime. e auhor alsodescribes he miliary service in Souh Arica, rom an all voluneerorce o a more proessionalized one. Bu he compulsory miliary ser-

vice became unpopular in he las decade o he aparheid regime. Inhe end , he popular revol o black people, he asseriveness o helabour organizaions, he erosion o he regime’s cohesion conribu-ed o he decision o he whie leadership o allow he black majoriy

o ake par in universal and ree elecions. As a conclusion and lessonor he uure, he auhor hinks ha “or a democracy o las, civil so-ciey has o ensure ha he miliary remains under civil conrol andendencies owards influencing poliics are kep in check. Civil socieyalso has o relenlessly check he poliicians who develop an obsessi-on wih sae securiy raher han developmen, proecion o humanrighs, public service delivery wihou corrupion and equaliy o allciizens whaever heir religion, race or class. Civil sociey should bealer o, and remonsrae agains miliary appoinmens o senior saffsimply because o heir poliical linkages wih ruling paries.”


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Carmen îjnoveanu , senior researcher wihin he Insiue orPoliical Sudies o Deense and Miliary Hisory rom Buchares,examines he “omanian paricipaion in pos conflic/reconsruci-on missions/operaions afer he end o he Cold War”. She menionsfirs ha during he communis regime, omania did no paricipaein muli-naional operaions as he naional securiy concep was o-cused exclusively on deending he naional erriory agains oreign

hreas. e miliary docrine called “he War o he Enire People”,envisaged a deensive war ough on omanian erriory agains amore powerul aggressor – be i he Sovie Union (an aggressive andunrusul “broher sae”) or he USA/NAO orces. e end o Cold

War grealy ransormed he world securiy landscape and made iner-sae wars less likely while inra-sae conflics (civil wars, ideniy con-

flics) became he dominan patern. As omania srived o inegrae boh NAO and he EU, a shif rom erriorial deense o projecingsecuriy in remoe areas occurred. us, as par o is new pro-Alan-icis securiy vision, omania has assumed an acive paricipaionin various inernaional peacekeeping and peace-suppor operaions.From a legal poin o view, afer he enering ino orce o he law no.42/2004 i became clear ha he consen o Parliamen was no longer

necessary or he deploymen o roops in inernaional missions asi was agreed ha he inernaional reaies o which omania was apary made provision or roop deploymens direcly applicable. Ac-cording o omania’s Naional Securiy Sraegy he armed orces sho-uld be proessional, modern, effecive, highly flexible and deployable,able no only o deend he naional erriory bu o ulfill heir com-mimens o collecive deence, and o ake par in inernaional ope-raions, in keeping wih he prioriies and requiremens o omania’soreign policy. Afer lising and explaining in deail he muli-naionalpeace-suppor operaion in which omanian Armed Forces were or


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are sill involved – under UN, NAO, EU leading or in a coaliion ohe willing ramework – he auhor concludes ha omania is veryacive in projecing peace and securiy in he neighborhood bu also inremoe heaers like he Middle Eas and Cenral/Souhern Asia.

Şerban F. Cioculescu , senior researcher wihin he Insiue orPoliical Sudies o Deense and Miliary Hisory rom Buchares, is

he auhor o he sudy iled “e evoluion o civil-miliary relai-ons in omania afer he Cold War”. Firs, he passes hrough he wes-ern-cenric heory o civil-miliary relaions, invesigaing he evolv-ing paterns o ineracion beween he officer corps and he socieyduring modern European hisory. en, he goes o pos-communisomania and underlines he ac ha he old securiy concep o ousazimus deense was abandoned as omania began is push or NAO

and EU inegraion. e ae o he armed orces was conroversial ora ime, firs because is represive role in he early sages o he 1989evoluion, hen because reormers and conservaives clashed wi-hin he officers corps in he firs years o reedom. e collapse ohe communis regime has been a crucial even or he hisoric aeo omania, because i pu an end o he geopoliical dependence onhe Sovie sphere o influence and reshaped he general ramework o

he naional securiy paradigm. e firs sep in he way o ensuring aull civilian conrol on he armed orces was made in 1994, when orhe firs ime a civilian was appoined as miniser o Naional Deense.en, he crieria or NAO membership sipulaed by he Member-ship Acion Plan (MAP) since 1999, grealy eased omania’s srive orensuring civilian democraic conrol o he armed orces. e bes gu-aranee o a ull and air civilian conrol on he armed orces is o havepowerul, legiimae and effecive civilian poliical insiuions and hi-ghly proessional miliary which keep heir disance wih he poliicalarena bu do no lack civic spiri.


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** *

While his book draf was ready o be sen o he edior, beween15 and 19 May 2011, a delegaion o omanian researchers rom heIPSDMH (major general (r) Mihail E. Ionescu, colonel (r) Pere Ouand senior researcher Serban F. Cioculescu) wen in Souh Arica in

a planned rip, in order o discuss he pracical seps o move orwardhe bilaeral research program.

anks o he good will o our Souh Arican parners, we had hegrea opporuniy o visi Denel Aviaion corporaion, he bigges pro-ducer o miliary planes and equipmen in Souh Arica. We saw heperorman Oryx PSS, ooivalk and Cheeah helicopers, he Hawk,Mirage and Grippen jes and we were brieed abou he parnership

among Denel and amous French company Mirage and Swedish Grip-pen. ey succesully produce miliary helicopers and jes or saeslike Brasil and Ecuador. We also visied he PALAMA (Academy orManagamen and Public Adminisraion Leadership) in Preoria, hemain sae insiuion preparing public servans or all he minisriesand sae agencies. General Solly Molo is a very ambiious and gifedleader or PALAMA, and as a ormer Army general he brough disci-

pline and rigor in his field. Ohers visi and meeings were wih heleading saff o he Faculy o Miliary Science wihin SellenboschUniversiy (bu locaed on he Alanic Ocean shore a Saldanha) –general L. Yam (commander o he Miliary Academy) and he vice-dean, mrs. Edna Van Hare, he vice-recor o Sellenbosch, mr. Arnold

van Zyl – wih which we discussed he need o enhance our bilaeralscienific relaions, and also we me wih he chie o he Deparmenor Miliary Veerans in Preoria, mr. sepe Moumi. All o hem, be-ginning wih he leading academic pearson o he Souh Arican side,proessor ean Pogieer, were very open-minded, riendly and en-


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couraged urher cooperaion and exchange o reserachers beweenomania and Souh Arica. us, we hink ha his Occasional Papershould also be read in he conex o hese meaningul evens.


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INDIAN OCEAN MARITIME SECURITY: STRATEGIC

CONTEXT AND CHARACTERISTICS

Dr. THEAN POTGIETERCentre for Military Studies

Stellenbosch University

ABSRC

Indian Ocean securiy is no longer only he domain o colonial saes orsuperpowers, bu has become muliaceed and dynamic. New role players

such as India and China have become major powers, while new alliances areconsanly being orged. On he oher hand curren global realiies have inro-duced greaer mariime securiy problems and have made i possible or non-sae acors o influence Indian Ocean securiy direcly and undamenally.is is especially serious as he rich Indian Ocean mariime rade is crucialo he global economy because i involves he ransporaion o much o he world’s energy. Now, i seems ha many o he lessons o cenuries gone by

are again being learned – insead o fighing, navies have o adap, projecpower, play a diplomaic role and mainain good order a sea.

eywords: Indian Ocean,securiy, sraegy, grea powers, piracy

For millennia hose living around he Indian Ocean have benefi-ed rom is rich rade, while he ineracion mariime communicaionmade possible invariably influenced heir lives undamenally. is in-eracion included everyhing rom culural and religious influences oconques and slavery. e radiional paterns o rade and communi-caion ha exised around he Indian Ocean changed drasically afer


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he Poruguese, ollowed by oher European powers, sailed around heCape o Good Hope o esablish rade links and Easern empires.

Iniially Arica was litle affeced by his change, as he Europeanocus was on he rich rade wih he Eas. As ships had o sail aroundhe large Arican coninen, is mos imporan value was o providereuge and provisions along he long and ofen dangerous roue. Eu-

ropean naval power made an early enrance ino he Indian Ocean asormidable warships eradicaed local opposiion and projeced Eu-ropean mariime power o he urhes corners o he Indian Ocean.European naval orces were crucial or he creaion o Easern empiresand he eliminaion o oher European opposiion. rough a processha lased cenuries, and because o heir effecive uilizaion o seapower, he Briish creaed a large Indian Ocean empire. During he

course o he nineeenh cenury European navies also played an im-poran role in mainaining good order a sea, eradicaing piracy, andfighing slavery.

e decolonizaion process afer he Second World War endedBriish hegemony in he Indian Ocean. e Cold War was marked

by superpower rivalry in he region, which enhanced is global srae-

gic value. Afer he end o he Cold War, Indian Ocean counries o acerain exen rediscovered some o he economic, social and culuralaces ha made he ocean he bridge beween Arica, Asia and Aus-ralasia. However, regional ineracion and cohesion sill leaves mucho be desired.

Indian Ocean securiy is no longer only he domain o colonial sa-es or superpowers, bu has become muliaceed and dynamic. Newrole players such as India and China have become major powers, whilenew alliances are consanly being orged. On he oher hand curren


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global realiies have inroduced greaer mariime securiy problemsand have made i possible or non-sae acors o influence IndianOcean securiy direcly and undamenally. is is especially seriousas he rich Indian Ocean mariime rade is crucial o he global eco-nomy because i involves he ransporaion o much o he world’senergy. Now, i seems ha many o he lessons o cenuries gone by areagain being learned – insead o fighing, navies have o adap, projec

power, play a diplomaic role and mainain good order a sea.

Mariime securiy is a broad, somewha amorphous ocus area, andhe mariime securiy lieraure covers everyhing rom physical saeyand securiy measures o por securiy, errorism and much more. Acoheren definiion is hereore difficul o ariculae, bu or he pur-pose o his aricle, mariime securiy is concerned wih prevening

illici aciviies in he mariime domain. I could be direcly linked oa specific counry and is naional securiy effors, or include regionaland inernaional effors o enorce mariime securiy.

is paper is concerned wih mariime securiy in he IndianOcean. e discussion will cenre on he sraegic value o he IndianOcean and he relevan mariime securiy characerisics and hreas.

Brie atenion will finally all on possible soluions as well as he im-porance o inernaional and regional cooperaion.

INDIAN OCEAN: STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND EMINENCE

e Indian Ocean is vas. Is wesern border is coninenal Arica oa longiude o 20° E (sreching souh rom Cape Agulhas), o he norhis coninenal Asia (rom Suez o he Malay Peninsula), o he eas areSouh-Eas Asia and Ausralia (Singapore, he Indonesian Archipelago,


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Ausralia and asmania) o a longiude o 147° E, while in he souh isreches o a laiude o 60° S (as per he Anarcic reay o 1959).

Various crieria could be used in designaing saes as Indian Oceanregion. In his paper he erm will apply o 51 coasal and landlockedsaes: 26 Indian Ocean im (IO) saes, five ed Sea saes, ourPersian Gul saes, Saudi Arabia, France, Briain and 13 landlocked

saes. Many o hese saes are ormer colonies. e landlocked saesincluded are dependen upon he Indian Ocean or rade and commu-nicaions and wih he excepion o Aghanisan, he landlocked saesexclude he Cenral Asian saes. is delimiaion covers an area o101.6 million sq km (he sea area is 68.56 sq km and he land area is33.05 sq km). Wih a oal populaion o 2.6 billion, i represens 39%o he global populaion, represening a vas and diverse poliical, cul-

ural and economic kaleidoscope.1

e Indian Ocean is an area o conflics. Some conflics are inernaland remain local, bu oher local and regional conflics are o globalsignificance and are prone o oreign poliical and miliary inereren-ce. According o a recen analysis o global conflics by he Heidelberg

Insiue or Inernaional Conflic Research , alogeher 42% o he con-

flics in he world can be associaed wih Indian Ocean counries.2 elis is exensive, bu noable conflics are Israel and Palesine, Iraq, Su-dan, Aghanisan, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Pakisan. ough he causeso hese conflics vary, many can be associaed wih he weakness or a-ilure o saes, significan levels o povery, poor insiuions and lack odemocracy, corrupion, compeiion or scarce resources, inererence

by a oreign power, he global war on error and wha can be ermed“urbulence” in he Islamic world. e urgen need or susainable de-

velopmen (boh human and economic) and improved securiy coo-peraion wihin Indian Ocean is hereore obvious.


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e Indian Ocean is rich in energy resources and minerals (inclu-ding gold, in, uranium, cobal, nickel, aluminium and cadmium) andalso conains abundan fishing grounds. e oil and gas moving hro-ugh he Indian Ocean on a daily basis are very imporan o he globaleconomy. ough figures vary, hey could be summarised as ollows:roughly 55% o he known oil reserves and 40% o he gas reserves arepresen in he Indian Ocean. e Gul and Arab saes produce around

21% o he world’s oil, wih daily crude expors o up o 17.262 million barrels (abou 43% o inernaional expors).3

From a shipping poin o view, Indian Ocean pors handle abou30% o he global rade, while hal o he world’s conainer raffic ra-

verses i. However, he Indian Ocean possesses some o he world’smos imporan choke poins, noably he Srais o Hormuz and Ma-

lacca as well as he Bab el Mandeb. As hese choke poins are sraegi-cally imporan or global rade and energy flow, a number o exra-re-gional saes mainain a naval presence in he Indian Ocean.

Besides he vas sraegic imporance o he oil rich counries ohe world, sub-Saharan Arica was sraegically no a high inernaionalprioriy. However, as he compeiion or scarce resources inensifies,

wih specifically China and India becoming major role players on he Arican coninen, major Wesern powers are becoming increasinglyineresed in his region.

In shor, inernaional ineres in he whole Indian Ocean regionis growing. is is due o securiy concerns abou he insabiliy hacharacerizes and desabilizes he region, he vial role oil producionand he movemen o energy shipmens plays, he vas resources andraw maerials Indian Ocean saes possess, he involvemen o exra-regional powers in a number o conflics in he region as well as he


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growing ineres o major powers in he Indian Ocean region and heirabiliy o projec power ino he region.

INDIAN OCEAN MARITIME SECURITY: CHARACTERISTICS AND THREATS

During he Cold War he newly independen Indian Ocean saes

in Asia and Arica became subjec o he compeiion beween he su-perpowers, which guaraneed a specific securiy balance in he region.is disappeared as he Cold War ended, bu he pos Cold War eraranspired o be less sable wih much rivalry, compeiion, suspicionand urmoil.

Moreover, afer he Cold War world order ended he mariime

securiy environmen in he Indian Ocean also underwen ransor-maion. As a resul o weak governmen auhoriy and poor mariimedomain awareness, all ypes o illici aciviies flourished in many parso he Indian Ocean. Mariime securiy challenges in he Indian Oceanare vas and are affeced by key variables such as he miliarizaion ohe region, he ineres and involvemen o major and exra-regionalpowers and non-radiional securiy hreas.

Military aspects

As mariime securiy is concerned wih securiy in he mariimedomain, i is undersandable ha much recen inernaional ateni-on has ocussed on he abiliy o sae, regional and mulinaional roleplayers in Indian Ocean mariime securiy. In analysing he complexIndian Ocean mariime securiy sysem, Don Berlin idenified a num-

ber o principle rends. Firs, he effors by he Unied Saes and osome degree is inernaional parners (reerred o as India, Ausralia,Singapore, Japan, France and Canada) o mainain and expand heir


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auhoriy in he Indian Ocean and achieve key sraegic objecives.ese include effors o hinder or limi he power and influence ooher coninenal counries (perhaps saes such as China, Iran orussia), proec heir secure access o energy sources and couner er-rorism as well as oher securiy hreas. Second are he endeavours ocounries such as China and perhaps even Iran, Pakisan and o someexen ussia, o srenghen heir posiion in he Indian Ocean and

increase heir abiliy o couner poenial hreas he US-aligned saesmigh pose. ird are he litoral Indian Ocean saes ha are mainlyconcerned wih heir naional or regional mariime securiy in relaiono specific rivals wihin heir own sub-regions. e many conflicingmariime boundary dispues and conflicing jurisdicional claims inhe Indian Ocean bear esimony o his. Finally are he effors by IOsaes o manage he large variey o ransnaional and non-radiional

hreas hey ace, hreas such as environmenal challenges, fishing in-ringemens, smuggling and rafficking, piracy as well as he securiy ooffshore insallaions.4

As he Indian Ocean is an area o much goesraegic rivalry bewe-en he big powers, much miliarizaion has aken place and in 2008wo o he op miliary spenders in he world, Saudi Arabia and In-

dia, were IO counries. e armed orces o five saes in he Indi-an Ocean region number more han 4.000 000 (India (1 200 000),Pakisan (610 000), Iran (440 000), Burma (439 000) and Egyp(423 000)) and he miliary expendiure o en saes is above 3% oGDP (Oman (10.7%), Saudi Arabia (9.3%), Burundi (4.9%), Sudan(4.4%), Singapore (4.1%), Djiboui (4.1%), uwai (3,9%), Brunei(3.6%), Bahrain (3.4%) and Pakisan (3.1%)).5 However, hough mi-liary observers will be quick o poin ou ha he size o an armedorce is no necessarily an indicaion o an efficien, highly compeenand well equipped armed orce, many Indian Ocean saes are cerain-ly placing much emphasis on heir miliary preparedness.


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Afer he end o he Cold War, he US sraegic umbrella in heIndian Ocean widened and, besides is Indian Ocean island base onDiego Garcia, he US Navy also used bases in litoral saes such asBahrain, uwai, Oman, Qaar and Saudi Arabia. As a resul o he USani-errorism campaign ha ollowed in he wake o 9/11 he wholeIndian Ocean region came under US miliary surveillance, and he USNavy was able o ranslae is commanding posiion a sea ino miliary

inervenions. Wih he assisance o US coaliion powers, boh exra-regional as well as Indian Ocean saes, i became possible o consolida-e a naval grip on he enire region.6 In ac, he employmen o highlyadvanced naval orces such as carrier batle groups wih heir varioussurveillance, suppor and logisical capabiliies, made he 2001 inva-sion o Aghanisan possible. is invasion was essenially a mariime

war, as i was dependen on he long mariime reach o he USA.

e Indian Navy is undergoing subsanial expansion as i has 40ships and submarines (including wo nuclear submarines and wo air-craf carriers) on order. Is arge is o have a 165 ship flee by 2022,consising o surace combaans, submarines and hree aircraf carriergroups wih 400 aircraf and helicopers. Cerainly, as some Indian ob-

servers are keen o poin ou, by 2012 wih wo aircraf carriers (equip-ped wih MiG-29s) in operaion, “he balance o power in he IndianOcean will il decisively in India’s avour”.7 Ye, i is emphasized haIndia seeks cooperaion wih Indian Ocean saes and will aim a im-proving sabiliy in he Indian Ocean region.

Mariime securiy in he Indian Ocean is characerised by conside-rable exra-regional naval presence. ough he ocus o hese saesis obviously rade and energy securiy, many counries are providingassisance o he mariime securiy orces o IO saes. Furhermore,


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he scourge o piracy and non-radiional mariime hreas has led omulilaeral exercises and much mariime securiy ineracion bewe-en IO saes and exra-regional powers.

Wih he possible excepion o he saes menioned in Berlin’s firswo caegories (above), many IO saes, specifically in Arica, lackhe resources and budges necessary o properly enorce heir marii-

me sovereigny. In many cases heir navies or coas guards could har-dly even be regarded as “oken navies”. e dilemma is ha sovereignymus be exercised o be recognized, which causes a “double jeopardy”– since i is no possible o effecively police and conrol he mariimedomain and mariime domain awareness is very low, i is possible orillici aciviies o all ypes o flourish. I prevens hese counries romproperly exploiing heir own ocean’s resources and benefi ully rom

he poenial revenue hey migh bring. Due o he urbulence in mucho he Indian Ocean region, ensuring good order a sea poses a daun-ing challenge o he mariime securiy orces available. Many coasalnavies are hereore ocussing more on policing roles and he securiyo litorals.

According o an Arica Union Proocol signed in 2003, an Arica

Sandby Force (ASF) consising o five regional brigades mus be cre-aed and be operaional by he end o 2010. e idea is ha he ASF

would only be uilized as a las resor i diplomacy has ailed. e de-ploymen would hen ake he orm o a peace mission, ocussing onmiliary and civil suppor, pos conflic disarmamen, demobilizaiono he combaans and humaniarian assisance.8

Due o he miliarizaion ha has occurred in and around he In-dian Ocean, he prolieraion o weapons o mass desrucion, incre-ased missile capabiliies, rise in non-radiional hreas as well as he


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ac ha he Indian Ocean is used or he power projecion o oreignmiliaries, he area has no become more peaceul. Insead, he IndianOcean can be regarded as he mos roubled region in he world. Con-siderable scope hereore exiss or greaer regional securiy cooperai-on and effors o enhance regional peace and sabiliy.

Strategic importance o sea lanes o communication

e securiy o shipping and sea lanes o communicaion (SLOs)across he Indian Ocean is a major sraegic concern. I is firsly impor-an o he naional economies o Indian Ocean counries (specificallyo indusrial and commercial secors) as impors and expors providehe main link o global markes. e Indian Ocean is urhermore aransi roue beween he Pacific region and Europe and Arica whichimplies ha vas cargoes pass hrough i. irdly, he Indian Ocean ishe world’s mos imporan energy highway as subsanial oil and gasshipmens raverse i on a daily basis.

Many exra-regional orces operae in he region. is is due hesraegic imporance o he Indian Ocean and he ac ha he reeflow o raffic can easily be inerered wih a he Indian Ocean chokepoins – keeping is SLOCs open is hereore vial o he global eco-nomy. Furhermore, he volaile securiy siuaion and he ension inhe Gul region have simulaed oreign miliary inervenion in con-flics (Iraq and Aghanisan being recen examples), while piracy, heasymmerical hrea and he flow o vial energy resources have alsocaused much anxiey and he deploymen o many navies.

Oil and gas are cenral o he growh and developmen o conem-porary civilisaion. Since he Firs World War oil has become he mossraegic resource in conducing wars, while afer he Second World

War, he USA seems o have placed much emphasis on securing, or i


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possible conrolling, he Persian Gul oil resources. Access o energyand energy securiy is increasingly imporan as here are many energydependen saes in he Indian Ocean, oil is crucial or susaining in-dusrial and economic progress and he energy demands o India andChina are growing.

o India, energy securiy is a he core o is oreign policy approa-

ch and i has apparenly adoped a long-erm sraegy o procure andexpand energy resources o suppor is growing economy. Obainingenergy resources rom all over he world is a high prioriy, while he se-curiy o ships carrying oil and gas, as well as offshore plaorms, mus

be ensured. is places quie a demand on he Indian Navy and i is very aware o is peaceime responsibiliy o saeguard SLOC, coasal

zones, insallaions and shipping.

9

Much emphasis is also placed onhe cooperaion beween he Indian Navy, Coas Guard, mariime po-lice and oher agencies. Economically India encourages domesic andinernaional cooperaion wih oreign energy companies. I accepsha he energy drive and growing mariime hreas posed by non-saeacors increase he securiy responsibiliies o he Indian Navy.10

e evidenial growing compeiion beween China and India isalso visible in he Indian Ocean, and some IO counries have expre-ssed concern abou he increasing Chinese presence in he region. Iseems ha he flow o energy and rade is China’s firs concern, bu in-creased compeiion wih China would cerainly hold implicaions orIndian Ocean counries like India, and ohers whose economic sren-gh are on he increase. China is exering increasingly more poliicaland economic influence over Arica as i invess billions in oil, mining,ranspor, elecriciy, elecommunicaion and inrasrucure. In reurni is securing access o sources o energy and raw maerials crucial o


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he developmen and growh o he Chinese economy. Some considerChina’s effors o secure energy resources and he companies managinghem as he beginning o a new era ha will ocus on he “geopoliicso energy”, which would impac on developmen, imply compeiionand involve conflic. In ac, i could be ermed as a “power sruggle”or energy, which has he poenial o become a defining characerisico his cenury.11

Indian observers ofen emphasize China’s effors o use miliary as-sisance, combined wih economic and sof power, o gain influence inhe region. China is cerainly expanding is mariime power and recennaval building projecs also include an aircraf carrier. Chinese ambii-ons in he Indian Ocean are causing India considerable concern and ismiliary and poliical relaionship wih India’s neighbours is even a i-

mes reerred o as a process o sraegic encirclemen. By paricipaingin ani-piracy operaions off he Horn o Arica, China has demons-raed is capabiliy o susaining ou-o-area operaions. Naval vesselsrom Japan and he epublic o orea were also deployed o he Horno Arica and i may seem ha heir presence was boh a couner oChina as well as an effor o proec heir shipping.12 Divergen viewscerainly exis on he implicaions o Chinese naval expansion and is

impac in he Indian Ocean. e quesion ha mus probably be askedis i capabiliies denoe inen? No necessarily, bu inen can developquickly.

As so much o he shipped energy supplies o he world naviga-e he Indian Ocean, i is obvious ha he region’s securiy problems,

boh ashore and a sea, are ofen he cause o inernaional concern. Asmajor saes are keen o proec heir supplies, naval power is increa-singly being used or he purposes o energy securiy and minimizinghreas o SLOCs.


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Maritime piracy

Mariime piracy, which in his discussion includes hijackings orransom, robbery and criminal violence, is very prevalen in and aroundhe Indian Ocean. ough piracy incidens seem o have decreased inhe wider Indian Ocean since 2003, he 2009 saisics o he Inerna-ional Mariime Bureau indicae ha o he 406 repored pirae atacks

during 2009, 294 were in or adjacen o he Indian Ocean (See able1).13 e large number o pirae atacks and hijackings off he Horno Arica (specifically around Somalia and in he Gul o Aden) are omuch public concern, ofen make inernaional headlines and have ca-used considerable inernaional reacion. A noable success in he fighagains piracy in he Indian Ocean has occurred in he Malacca Srais,

where atacks have dropped significanly because o aggressive parols by he litoral saes and inersae mariime cooperaion.14

abel 1. PIRCY IN HE INDIAN OCEAN EGION: ACUAL AND ATEMPED ATACS15

South East Asia

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Indonesia 121 94 79 50 43 28 15Malacca Strait 28 38 12 11 7 2 2Malaysia 5 9 3 10 9 10 16Myanmar 1 1 1Singapore 2 8 7 5 3 6 9Thailand 2 4 1 1 2 1

Indian Subcontinent

Bangladesh 58 17 21 47 15 12 17India 27 15 15 5 11 10 12Sri Lanka 2 1 4 1


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Africa

Egypt 2Eritrea 1 1Kenya 1 1 4 2 1Madagascar 1 1 1Mozambique 1 3 2South Africa 1Tanzania 5 2 7 9 11 14 5

Horn of Africa

Gulf of Aden * 18 8 10 10 13 92 116Red Sea * 15Somalia 3 2 35 10 31 19 80

Rest of the Indian Ocean

Arabian Sea * 2 2 2 4 1Arabian Gulf 1Gulf of Oman 1

Indian Ocean* 1 1Iran 2 2 2Iraq 1 10 2 2Oman * 3 4Saudi Arabia 1Seychelles 1UAE 2

Year Totals 277 206 222 166 171 200 297

* The attacks in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and Oman, areall attributed to Somali pirates.

Statistics vary and some statistics indicate that as many as 166 attacks in various

geographic locations could be ascribed to Somali pirates.

Atacks in Souh Eas Asia and around he Indian subconinenusually occur a anchorages or in approaches. As hese atacks are o-en conduced by hieves armed wih handguns, knives or machees,many atacks are unrepored. Somalia is differen – he piraes are wellarmed and use a variey o weapons (including auomaic weapons,handguns and rocke-propelled grenades). Atacks ake place while


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ships are underway, mosly, bu no exclusively, in he Gul o Aden oroff he coas o Somalia. Piraes ofen use moher ships o enable hemo conduc operaions ar rom heir bases and atacks have also akenplace off he coass o enya, anzania and he Seychelles. Ships will

be boarded, or piraes will induce ships o slow down by firing a hem.I a vessel is boarded and capured, i will be sailed o he Somali coasand he piraes will hen demand a ransom or he ship and crew.16

Piracy and he lack o mariime securiy around he Horn o Aricacause a grea deal o inernaional concern as hey no only hreaenfinance and commerce, bu also peace and regional sabiliy, inerna-ional rade and inernaional energy flows. e piraes ofen operaerom Somalia’s semi-auonomous Punland province and specific parso souhern Somalia as governmen auhoriy is lacking and laws are

no enorced. Hijacking ships or ransom is he mos common orm opiracy as he piraes usually have an economic moive.

Piracy around he Horn o Arica has increased alarmingly sincehe lae 1990s. By 2005 Somalia was a piracy hospo wih 35 recor-ded atacks and 15 hijackings, while by April 2006 his had risen o 45atemped and 19 successul hijackings since he beginning o 2005.17

Piracy was declared a crime afer he Union o Islamic Cours (UIC)seized Mogadishu in he middle o 2006. In an effor o re-esablishregular rade hey capured pirae cenres and pors which resuled ina dramaic decrease in piracy during he later hal o 2006.18 However,afer Ehiopian and Somali roops oused he UIC a he end o 2006,he siuaion deerioraed rapidly.

During 2007 pirae atacks off Somalia more han doubled and hijackings rose o a high o 31, while 111 repored atacks and 42 suc-cessul hijackings were atribued o Somali piraes in 2008 – nearly


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40% o he 293 atacks repored inernaionally. Discrepancies exis beween he various sources reporing piracy saisics and some sour-ces even indicae ha Somali piraes were involved in as many as 166atacks in 2008. However, he reporing o he Inernaional Cham-

ber o Commerce Inernaional Mariime Bureau (ICC IMB) could be regarded as “reliable”.19 Nowihsanding he inernaional navalpresence around he Horn o Arica during 2009, 217 incidens were

atribued o he Somali piraes who managed o hijack 47 vessels andook 867 crew members hosage. Somalia accouns or more han halo he 406 inernaional incidens o piracy and armed robbery ha

were repored during 2009.

ough he number o incidens repored in 2009 is almos doublehe 2008 figure, he number o successul hijackings was proporiona-

ely less. is could be ascribed o a variey o measures, such as gre-aer vigilance and evasive acics by ships, he conribuion o privaesecuriy companies, conrolled sailings as well as he acive ani-piracyparols by he large coningen o inernaional naval vessels. On heoher hand his resuled in he piraes changing heir approach: ships

were more indiscriminaely fired a o orce hem o sop or reducespeed so ha hey could be boarded, while he piraes also exended

heir operaions o areas where hey would be less prone o he scru-iny o naval vessels and ou o he Inernaionally ecognised ran-si Corridor (a well-policed ransi roue hrough he Gul o Aden).

Atacks occurred urher ou o sea (even off he coass o anzania,Seychelles, Madagascar and Oman), in he souhern ed Sea, Bab ElMandeb, or he Arabian Sea.20

During 2010 Somali piraes have inensified atacks away romheir coas. As a resul o he monsoon season, operaions wih smallskiffs are difficul in open waers during he middle six monhs o he


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year and a ull picure o he 2010 incidens will only become availablein 2011. By he end o he hird quarer o 2010 i was esimaed hapiraes linked o Somalia were responsible or 44% o he 289 globalmariime piracy incidens and ha hey also carried ou 35 o he 39

worldwide ship hijackings in his period.21

Globally, January o Sepember 2010 saw a decrease in he number

o pirae atacks compared o 2009 (down rom 306 o 289). is iso a large exen atribued o he inernaional naval presence and heongoing ani-piracy operaions in he Gul o Aden, while, due o ani-piracy measures, 70 atacks were hwared. Despie he decline in heGul o Aden, he indicaions are ha piracy in he Souh China Sea isgrowing as well as in oher pars o he Indian Ocean such as Chita-gong in Bangladesh, where hieves specifically arge ships a anchor

or approaching he anchorage. 22

As open SLOCs across he Indian Ocean are sraegically impor-an or inernaional shipping and he flow or energy shipmens,much concern exiss because o he large number o atacks on energy

vessels. e capure o he MV Sirius Sar on 15 November 2008 wassignifican because o he locaion (450 nauical miles souh-eas o

enya) and he ac ha i was carrying wo million barrels o oil (aquarer o Saudi Arabia’s daily oupu) worh US$100 million. I washough ha a capured Nigerian ug aced as he pirae moher ship,and hough i was he bigges ship hijacked, he ully-loaded ship waslow in he waer and probably easy o board.23

Port security

Despie he immense wealh in resources o he Indian Ocean re-gion, economically he region is noed or is insecuriy and some sa-es in he region are “aid dependen”. In 2005 he larges recipiens o


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official developmen assisance were Aghanisan, Indonesia, Pakisanand Vienam, while several Arican saes received official develop-men assisance in excess o 40% o he oal value o impors.24

As healhy ship-borne rade in he Indian Ocean can conribuemuch owards he economic developmen o he region, harbours arecrucial, as a sae and well-uncioning por inrasrucure will aciliae

rade and developmen. However, securiy is a problem as pors andshipping are atracive arges because o he value o cargoes, he con-cenraion o so much merchandise in one locaion and challenges lin-ked o ensuring conainer securiy. e geographic and physical layouo pors ofen inhibis securiy, while ships alongside or anchored wihunarmed crews (in he case o merchanmen) are vulnerable arges,an aspec which organized crime as well as hose wishing o conduc

error atacks can exploi. Ships can also be high profile arges wih apoenially high poliical and propaganda value. e atack on he USSCole in Aden has shown ha even highly sophisicaed warships aresignificanly hreaened by low-ech atacks.

e IO is endowed wih many good, albei ofen negleced, pors. Ye hese pors pose massive securiy problems as hey are ofen prone

o a large variey o illici aciviies and some IO counries lack effi-cien cusoms and excise conrols. Arican counries suffer subsaniallosses as a resul o hese problems, as he poenial or securiy brea-ches exis in almos all aspecs o he shipping indusry.

Furhermore, he majoriy o piracy incidens repored in he Indi-an Ocean region occurred while ships were in anchorages, roadseadsor alongside. ese atacks were opporunisic as ships were boardedor hef. For example in 2009 he our acual atacks and one atemp-ed atack in anzania ook place on anchored ships, he 12 repored


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atacks in India were all on ships alongside or a anchor, while Malay-sia had 16 repored atacks, o which wo occurred on berhed vesselsand six on anchored ships.25 Worldwide 14 pors repored more hanhree incidens in 2009. O hese he ollowing pors or anchorages

were in he Indian Ocean or adjacen o i: Bangladesh (Chitagong wih 17 is he highes in he world), India (hree incidens each in a-kinda and ochin), Indonesia (hree incidens each in Balongan and

Belawan), Malaysia (our incidens in Sandakan) and anzania (wihfive incidens in Dar es Salaam).26 I mus be noed ha many incidensin pors and anchorages go unrepored as masers and shipping com-panies are ofen relucan o ge involved in poenially lenghy anduile prosecuion processes.

Environmental and ocean resource security

Insufficien emphasis is placed on environmenal securiy, specifi-cally as he degradaion o he environmen, climae change, and heover-exploiaion o ocean resources are hreaening he ineress anduure o all he counries and peoples in he Indian Ocean region. Seaemperaures in he Indian Ocean are rising a a aser rae han el-sewhere, while changing and more severe weaher paterns and rising

sea levels will probably have adverse effecs on naural sysems and so-cieies. ey will increase he likelihood o flooding wih he resulanloss o lie and damage o propery as recen sunamis and cycloneshave illusraed. is will severely hreaen he exisence o commu-niies on low-lying islands such as he Maldives. Arica is also likelyo be adversely affeced by climae change due o he risks i poses inerms o ood producion and access o resh waer. As close o 40% ohe roughly our billion inhabians o Asia live wihin 100km o hecoas, climae change is likely o adversely affec heir qualiy o livingand human securiy.27


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e qualiy o coasal marine sysems and ocean waer in he In-dian Ocean is deerioraing. Much o his is due o land-based pol-luion (sewage, drainage and discharge) and marine-based polluion(shipping, spilling, ballas waer, drilling and mining). Illegal wasedumping is also a serious concern, specifically as litle is known ohe exen hereo. e waer off Somalia has paricularly been arge-ed as i is easy o reach, public awareness is low and influenial locals

have allowed oxic wase dumping o occur (usually in exchange ororeign currency). Afer he Asian sunami, broken hazardous waseconainers washed ashore and according o he UN EnvironmenalProgramme, Somalia has been a dumping ground or hazardous wasesince he early 1990s. I was much cheaper or European companies odispose o wase here (as low as $2.50 compared o $250 a on) andspecifically organized crime in Ialy was linked o his.28 I is uncerain

i illegal wase dumping coninues, bu a UN repor (daed February2005) warned ha i can have serious healh implicaions as he ypeo wase migh include uranium and radioacive wase, leads, heavymeals like cadmium and mercury as well as indusrial, hospial andchemical wases. Due o he scarciy o available inormaion abou heexen o such dumping, he exac impac canno be calculaed.29

Due o he growh in global prosperiy and echnological advances,compeiion or resources in and under he ocean, specifically sourceso energy and proein, is inensiying. World energy consumpion isgrowing significanly, paricularly he demand rom Asia and he Mi-ddle Eas. e as-growing Indian and Chinese economies are ore-cased o be he key world energy consumers in he uure. As naionaleffors o conrol energy sources and secure energy shipmens are in-creasing, some observers conend ha energy compeiion could implyconflic, while he obverse is ha i is raher in he common ineres ohe powers concerned o mainain a sable rading environmen.30


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Illegal, unrepored and unregulaed fishing is a major inernaionalproblem as i is esimaed ha 75% o global fishing socks are alreadyully or over-exploied. e culpris are ofen “seasoned and sophis-icaed oreign-flagged operaors” ha decimae offshore resourcesand also venure ino coasal waers where hey compee or depleedresources wih local subsisence fishermen.31 Foreigners are no heonly problem as local fishermen ofen under- or misrepor caches, use

illegal fishing gear or employ mehods such as dynamie or poison fis-hing because i is more lucraive han radiional mehods. As Aricancounries ofen lack he abiliy o mainain good order a sea in heirown waers hey are he wors affeced and i causes serious economiclosses as well as proein shorages.

Fishing is imporan o Arica: annual caches are more han sevenmillion ons, he expor value is abou $2.7 billion (USD), i provi-des income o roughly 10 million people and i is an imporan, ofencheap, source o animal proein (22% on average in Arica and in somecases as high as 70%).32 In he SADC, he income generaed by fis-heries is he highes in Souh Arica and Namibia, mosly due o heabundan species o be ound in he cold waers o he Benguela cur-

ren. Also, wih a conribuion o beween 5 and 10% o GDP, fishingis more imporan as a source o income o Namibia han o any oherSADC counry (See able 2).

una fishing is very imporan in he Wesern Indian Ocean andcaches are more han hree imes hose o he Easern Indian Ocean.e processed value o caches in he Wesern Indian Ocean is esi-maed a beween wo and hree billion Euros per year. e EEZso all he SADC counries on he IO overlap wih he una fishingarea and many French and Spanish vessels fish here under negoi-aed access righs in accordance wih agreemens beween he EU


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Although data is from the most recent FAO Fishery Country Proles, in some

cases it is outdated

and he specific saes. e scale and impac o illegal fishing differsacross he region, bu in he Souhwes Indian Ocean and SouhernOceans sophisicaed operaors have decimaed Paagonian oo-hfish socks or more han a decade.34 is can largely be ascribed oinsufficien parolling. Alhough regional and inernaional fisheries

governance bodies exis, he need o srenghen he capaciy o hese bodies, enorce measures and enhance cooperaion is inernaional-ly recognised.

Mariime securiy is closely linked o illegal fishing aciviies, noonly as i has a serious impac on environmenal securiy, bu illegalfishing vessels are ofen used or rafficking (humans, arms and drugs)and oher illici aciviies. As large amouns o money could be invol-

ved, hese operaors are sophisicaed in lying abou caches, alsiyingcusoms declaraions, circumvening por conrol measures and heycan even be well armed.

Table 2. VALUE OF THE FISHERIES AND CONTRIBUTIONTO GDP IN SADC33


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Smuggling and human trafficking Organized crime, rafficking and smuggling are increasingly ied o

global paterns o violence. Illegal drug and arms smuggling are riein much o he Indian Ocean region. e sea is used by inernaionalcrime syndicaes and unscrupulous raders and non-sae acors ordisribuing heir wares, or providing belligerens wih highly sophis-icaed weapons. Due o he prevalence o conflics and insurgencies,arms smugglers find a ready marke in areas such as he Horn o Arica,

Aghanisan, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. I is also esimaed ha as muchas 95% o he “hard” drug producion occurs in conflic zones. Agha-nisan is he source o much heroin and cannabis producion, bu so-urces indicae ha his migh be dropping. Organized crime is alsoengaged in much o he counerei rade, which includes everyhing

rom cigaretes o amous brand name ashions and medicine. I is es-imaed ha as much as 50% o all drugs sold in Arica and Asia migh be counerei pharmaceuicals.35

Inernaional migraion is an imporan issue, and i is simulaed by poliical insabiliy, povery and he lack o order in many develo-ping counries. Human cargo consanly moves around as he develo-

ped world provides more lucraive opions o skilled labour. However,more ofen han no, human rafficking explois he vulnerable anddesperae. According o UN esimaes, here are currenly more han12 million people in orced labour, bondage, orced child labour andsexual serviude. Large inernaional neworks operae across he In-dian Ocean and, afer arms and drugs, rafficking in human beings ishe bes source o income o organized crime. Shockingly, i appearsha people are saring o replace drugs as he second larges source oincome, as “bodies can be replaced”.36 No counries are immune o i,as counries could eiher be source counries, ransi counries, desi-


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naion counries, or all hree. ese issues require much more seriousinernaional atenion han hey currenly receive.

Smugglers can use everyhing rom pleasure boas o small fishing vessels and conainers. A major source o concern is conainer raffic. As more han seven million large and small conainers are moving aro-und he world every day, he abiliy o por and cusoms officials o

check heir conen is very limied. ecen experience has indicaedha conainers can be used o smuggle everyhing rom Al Qaeda ope-raives and armamens, o illegal wase. is cerainly affecs mariimesecuriy and calls or more effecive law enorcemen and he maine-nance o order in he mariime domain.37

Te non-state and asymmetrical threat

ecenly he number o non-sae acors affecing securiy hasgrown subsanially. I also appears ha greaer links are being orged beween global crime syndicaes, insurgens and erroris groups. Dueo weak governmens, poor border conrol and he lack o mariimedomain awareness, such groups can ofen operae unimpeded. adicalIslamis groups influence securiy in a large par o he IO. Analyss,or example, sugges ha groups linked o or affiliaed wih Al Qaeda

seem o be a leas presen in Aghanisan, Egyp, Indonesia, Iraq, Pa-kisan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Yemen.38 ough he aciviies ohese groups have mosly occurred ashore, alarming prospecs exis

wihin he mariime domain.

Atacks could be launched rom he sea or vessels could be usedor he purpose o infilraion or gunrunning. e so-called “26/11”

error atack in Mumbai (November 2008) was a seaborne atack. eatackers came by boa and i is also known ha he explosive maerialused or a error atack in March 1993 was also landed in Mumbai. oIndia, his highlighed he vulnerabiliy o heir coasal access and he


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urgen need o upgrade and coordinae coasal and mariime securiy.e resul is ha he Indian Navy received overall responsibiliy orcoasal securiy in coordinaion wih oher agencies.39

e Achille Lauro inciden in Ocober 1985 (hijacking o an Ialiancruise ship by members o he Palesine Liberaion Fron and he kil-ling o a hosage) indicaed ha mariime errorism is a real hrea andsaes need o consider poenial responses. e wors such atack asea occurred in Manila Bay on 27 February 2004 when a bomb, osen-sibly planed by Abu Sayya, resuled in he burning and desrucionhe passenger erry SuperFerry 14 and he deah o 116 people. is

was also he wors error atack in Philippine hisory.40

e Gul o Aden has been he scene o a number o incidens. An Al Qaeda atemp o ram a boa loaded wih explosives ino he USSSullivan in Yemen ailed in January 2000 as he boa sank under he

weigh o is lehal payload.41 eir nex atemp was successul. On 12Ocober 2000, he USS Cole, an Arleigh Burke-class desroyer, equip-ped wih he Aegis sysem, was alongside in Aden during a brie reuel-ling sop. wo men wih a small boa packed wih explosives rammedhe ship. e explosion lef a gaping hole o 40 ee in he ship’s side,caused 17 aaliies and an esimaed $100 million (USD) o dama-ge. e atack highlighed he exisence o a capaciy or meiculousplanning as well as a rained capabiliy o handle explosives.42 Afer heatack on he USS Cole por securiy was emphasized, however, aferhe 9/11 atacks he ocus quickly cenred on air ranspor.

Soon afer he USS Cole atack, on 6 Ocober 2002, he poenialdanger an asymmeric atack a sea posed was dramaically illusraed

when he French super anker Limburg was rammed amidships by anexplosive-laden dinghy in he Gul o Aden, a ew miles off Yemen. eship burned fiercely and much o her cargo spilled ino he sea. e oil


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price immediaely increased, and Yemen los millions in por revenuesas inernaional shipping decreased.43

O significance is he ac ha vessels, even merchan vessels, can be used as weapons o war and no even warships are exemp rompossible harm. Furhermore, i is obvious ha a very effecive way odisruping he global economy is by atacking oil supplies, or supply

roues. In his respec, shipping around Somalia and in he Gul o Aden is especially vulnerable.

Outsourcing security

Non-sae acors, such as securiy companies, are increasingly beingused o enhance securiy in he Indian Ocean region, boh on landand offshore. Concern exiss, specifically in Arica, as privae securiyis usually insufficienly regulaed and no coheren policy rameworkregarding he impor and expor o privae securiy is in place. Manyoreign securiy companies operae in Arica and Aricans are ofenrecruied o perorm securiy relaed duies in volaile siuaions suchas Iraq and Aghanisan. Securiy companies also assis wih reormsin pos-conflic siuaions.44

e securiy indusry has he poenial o have a major impac onsecuriy in Arica, i i is no properly conrolled and undersood. Pri-

vae securiy companies are playing an increasingly cenral role in se-curiy and could impac on a sae’s capaciy o conrol insrumens o

violence. As securiy companies employ large numbers o ormer sol-diers and policemen hey possess high levels o skills and knowledge,

which could cause vulnerabiliy in he sae secor and hey may even become a orce uno hemselves i no properly conrolled and regu-laed.45 Arica mus hereore engage securiy companies careully anddevelop rameworks or proper accounabiliy, as securiy companies


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should make an imporan conribuion o enhancing he securiy ohe peoples o Arica, nohing more.

Many privae securiy companies are involved in combaing piracy.eir suppor o he shipping indusry includes a large variey o e-chniques and services, ranging rom he raining o bridge officers oevasive manoeuvres, physical securiy measures and securiy guards. A

large variey o non-lehal ani-piracy measures can be used o deer pi-raes, such as he use o high-ech sonic cannons, elecrified handrails,placing exra crew on wach, drenching approaching boas wih oamsprayers or high pressure fire hoses, while decks could be sprayed omake hem very slippery.46 Mos shipping companies do no arm heirships and crews as many expers, insurers, he IMB and he IMO dono endorse arming merchan vessels, arguing ha his could increase

he levels o violence.

How effecive is privae securiy? I cerainly is a deerren, buofen securiy guards on ships are no armed. ough an armed de-erren would obviously be beter, he argumen, as saed, is ha icould unnecessarily endanger crews. Blackwaer, a privae securiyconcern, availed a vessel o escor ships hrough he Gul o Aden, bu

by February 2009 i had no been used and shipping companies haveinsead appealed or more naval suppor. Securiy guards have a mi- xed record regarding piracy deerrence. When (in he Gul o Aden,November 2008) five piraes approached he Singaporean chemicalanker Biscaglia in a small open speedboa, hey succeeded in boardingand hijacking i despie he presence o hree unarmed securiy guards(ex-oyal Marines) working or a Briish securiy firm. e securiyguards promply leap overboard, were rescued by a German naval he-licoper and were aken o a French rigae.47 In anoher inciden in

April 2009, when piraes atacked he cruise ship Melody , securiy gu-ards on board exchanged gunfire wih he piraes and used a fire hose


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o bea off he pirae atack.48

In essence hough, a variey o privaesecuriy companies are operaing around he Horn o Arica and areproviding various services, rom armed guards o parol boas or hireo escor vessels.

Privae securiy companies have also provided a conenious service o shipping companies and piraes. Ship owners would negoiae,

someimes or monhs, beore paying ransom (ofen amouning omillions o dollars) o he piraes. ansoms were iniially paid hroughhe “hawala”, a sysem o inormal money-ransers ha uilized So-malis abroad as conacs. As he amouns grew and ransoms becamemore regular, ship owners conraced privae securiy companies odeliver he cash by speedboa or drop i rom helicopers or aircraf.49

Privae securiy companies are no welcome in all cases wherecounries experience mariime securiy problems. Coasal saes inhe IO wih exensive coaslines such as Indonesia and Malaysia areserious abou he proecion o heir declared sovereigny and heirconrol over ocean resources. As a resul hey have aken ull poliicalresponsibiliy or conrolling piracy. Indonesia, or example, will noallow oher counries or privae securiy companies o guard inerna-

ional shipping passing hrough is side o he Malacca Srai and havemade i clear ha hey will srongly objec o “any securiy guard es-coring ships in is waers”.50

SOME POTENTIAL RESPONSES

ough he purpose o his aricle is no o analyse responses omariime securiy problems in he Indian Ocean, a ew incomplee re-marks will noneheless be made peraining o he role o naval orces


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and coas guards, he inernaional reacion o piracy and he poenialconribuion o regional cooperaion o enhancing securiy in he In-dian Ocean.

Navies are redefining heir roles as he ormer emphasis on heconvenional responsibiliies has shifed. e complexiy o mariimehreas, specifically rom non-sae acors and he curren naure o

mariime violence have creaed a new patern wih regards o naval res-ponses, causing he radiional disincion beween he convenionaland consabulary roles o navies o wiher. Warships o many naionsare presen in he Indian Ocean and hey are being used or a varieyo asks which range rom war-fighing o escor duies.51 Besides navalparicipaion in conflics such as Iraq and Aghanisan, heir recen res-

ponsibiliies have cenred on diplomaic roles and mainaining goodorder a sea. As naval diplomacy includes mariime coercion, alliance building and inernaional mariime assisance such as raining andcapaciy building, navies could conribue much owards inernaio-nal or regional sabiliy. Furhermore, navies are very versaile insru-mens capable o providing valuable assisance in mainaining goodorder a sea. is can range rom he proecion o a naion’s mariime

resources o consabulary roles a sea.

A high degree o naval aciviy in he Indian Ocean is noable asmany counries are paricipaing in mariime securiy operaions.

Warships deployed in he Indian Ocean have he responsibiliy o pro-ec he mariime securiy objecives o heir saes or groups o saes.ough unilaeral acions by saes are very common, naval cooperai-on is a eaure o he inernaional involvemen in he Indian Ocean ona scale never seen beore in hisory. An ineresing eaure, however, ishe ac ha naval cooperaion is more visible han naval coercion.


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e mos obvious inernaional cooperaion in he Indian Oceanis in he sphere o couner-piracy, bu due o he vas quaniy o com-mercial raffic raversing he Horn o Arica, i is a difficul ask. eIMB has commended inernaional navies or he par hey play in pre-

vening many atacks off he Horn o Arica. As his is a vas area i isdifficul or navies o realisically cover i, however, he naval conribu-ion is specifically valued as “increased inelligence gahering coupled

wih sraegic placemen o naval asses has resuled in he argeing osuspeced Pirae Acion Groups beore hey became operaional”.52 Inhe Gul o Aden atacks beween January and Sepember 2010 weresubsanially lower han during he corresponding period he previous

year wih 44 atacks compared o a 100.53 However, i seems (as wasexplained above) ha due o he large naval presence in his area, pira-es have chosen o exend heir area o operaions and many hijackings

have aken place urher off he coas o Somalia.

Anoher eaure o he inernaional concern over energy shipmensand he deficiencies in he inernaional legal ramework is he ac hai resuled in a series o UN Securiy Council esoluions agains whi-ch naval operaions are se. esoluion 1814 (15 May 2008) requesedsaes and regional organizaions o provide naval proecion o ves-

sels o he World Food Programme. esoluion 1816 (2 June 2008),auhorized saes cooperaing wih he Somalia ransiional FederalGovernmen (FG) o ener he erriorial waers o Somalia and use“all necessary means” in ani-piracy operaions in a manner “consisen

wih he relevan provisions o inernaional law”.54 is clearly ack-nowledged he ac ha Somalia does no have he mariime securiycapaciy o enorce law and order in is own waers. Securiy Councilesoluion 1838 (7 Ocober 2008) suppored he earlier esolui-on and urgenly requesed saes o paricipae acively in he fighagains piracy off Somalia “by deploying naval vessels and miliary


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aircraf”55

, o cooperae wih he FG and o coninue wih he pro-ecion o ships o he World Food Programme. Wih he adopion oesoluion 1846 (2 December 2008), he inernaional communiy’smandae was exended or anoher 12 monhs.56 In esoluion 1851(21 December 2008), he Securiy Council invied saes and regionalorganizaions paricipaing in he ani-piracy operaions o concludeso-called “ship rider agreemens” wih saes willing o prosecue piraes

and o assis wih he process.57 Saes were also encouraged o coope-rae and esablish inernaional cooperaive mechanisms regarding hefigh agains piracy and a Conac Group on Piracy was esablished ashe principle conac poin beween saes and regional organizaions.

e inernaional naval and mariime securiy response compriseswo main cooperaive groups: he European Union Operaion AA-

LANA which includes ships rom France, Germany, Greece, Ialy,Neherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and he Unied ingdom, andhe US-led CF 151, wih ships represening he US, Unied ing-dom, urkey, Denmark, Singapore and Souh orea wih oher sa-es paricipaing a imes. In addiion, independen naval vessels romChina, India, Malaysia, Japan, ussia, Iran and Saudi Arabia, o name aew, were also conducing operaions in he area. Mos o hese vessels

operaed in he Gul o Aden and much goodwill and a cooperaiveatiude exiss beween he various navies. Some navies provide escor

vessels or even place special orces on board merchan vessels (usuallyo heir own flag) or shipborne securiy.

Many observers have called or merchanmen o be armed, as heyconsider a visual deerren such as a powerul machine gun as suffici-en. However, he IMO and IMB have consisenly warned agains ar-ming merchanmen, as hey ear i would increase he levels o violen-ce. Individual ships have adoped many differen onboard deerrens,


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ranging rom rudimenary measures such as fire hoses and deck parolso a non-lehal elecric screen wih loudspeakers emiting a high-pi-ched noise. In an unconvenional approach, Chinese sailors have evenused Moloov cockails o figh off piraes who atacked heir vessel.58

As privae securiy companies also operae in he figh agains piracy,shipping companies wishing o spend more on proecion can hire pri-

vae securiy companies or added proecion.

e pracical, logisical and financial challenges o fighing piracyremain subsanial. I seems ha much o he hrea has moved romhe Gul o Aden o he Eas Coas o Somalia or even much urherrom he coas. As he area is vas, he elemen o surprise ress wihhe piraes and as heir skiffs are difficul o deec, coordinaion be-ween he inernaional orces needs o be improved and consan con-

ac wih merchanmen is necessary.59

e inernaional communiy’s shor-erm response o piracy offhe Horn o Arica was mulinaional naval parols, diplomaic efforsand privae securiy effors. However, in he long erm, piracy can only

be addressed by srenghening regional securiy capabiliies, impro- ving inelligence gahering and sharing, effecive law enorcemen and

enhanced mulinaional cooperaion on land and a sea. In essence,hough, he problem will remain as long as piraes find sancuary inSomalia. e soluion is hereore o resore governmen auhoriyand he basic enorcemen o law and order a sea and ashore.

Por securiy can be improved hrough beter siuaional aware-ness (gained hrough sensors, inelligence, parolling, ec) and heimprovemen o physical securiy. I is imporan ha all role playerscooperae and ha por auhoriies adhere o he inernaional regu-laions applicable o por securiy. ough much mus sill be done o


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improve por securiy in he IO, in a number o cases por securiyhas been enhanced wih inernaional assisance and he conribuiono specialis privae securiy companies. enya has, or example, aci-

vely enhanced he securiy o is coasline and harbours. Afer he poro Mombassa was described as a sof arge by American and enyansurveys,60 por securiy was improved wih measures ha includedhe insallaion o elecronic surveillance sysems, physical securiy

and a higher police and securiy presence. e USA donaed securiyequipmen and six speedboas o he enyan Navy, and also provi-ded raining assisance. e speedboas will improve effors o policeenya’s erriorial waers, and personnel underwen inensive rainingin Mombassa and coasal parols were sepped up.61

Regional, sub-regional and multinational cooperation

Much can be gained rom a cooperaive regional approach bewe-en saes ha emphasize and promoe consulaion no conronaion,reassurance no deerrence, ransparency no secrecy, prevenion nocorrecion, and inerdependence no unilaeralism. When regional co-operaion exiss, navies can conribue much owards enhancing ma-riime securiy, managing disasers, providing humaniarian assisanceand aid in limiing environmenal securiy challenges. egional coo-peraion can hereore be a “orce muliplier” and is cerainly desirablein he vas, relaively unpoliced Indian Ocean.

e Indian Ocean region is noed or is complex sub-regionalgeopoliical and geosraegic associaions, each wih is own vesedconcerns. Cooperaion is mosly in he spheres o economy and rade,raher han in securiy, and i is o a large exen hampered by disrusand lack o ineracion. On sub-regional level cooperaion exiss in hePersian Gul, Souh-Asia, Souh-Eas Asia, Eas Arica, Horn o Arica,Souhern Arica, Souh-Wes Indian Ocean Islands, wih overlapping


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regional sysems in he Greaer Middle Eas, Arican and he Asia Pa-cific. e ollowing are he mos perinen examples o regional andsub-regional cooperaion:62

• Souhern Arican Developmen Communiy (SADC). e So-uhern Arican Developmen Co-ordinaing Conerence (SADCCcreaed in 1981) became he Souhern Arican Developmen Com-muniy (SADC) in 1992. Member counries signed he SADC reay

on 17 Augus 1992 (in Windhoek), which was pu ino orce on 30Sepember 1993. e SADC has 14 member saes o which Souh

Arica, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauriius and anzania are alsoIO-AC members. e SADC Sanding Mariime Commitee aimso promoe regional peace and prosperiy hrough mariime miliarycooperaion and has hree main objecives: muual mariime securiyo ensure he reedom o sea lanes o communicaion, o develop and

mainain mariime capabiliies in he region and o develop a quickresponse mariime capaciy.

• Eas Arican Communiy (EAC). e EAC is a regional iner-governmenal organizaion wih is headquarers in Arusha anzania,

wih enya, Uganda, anzania, wanda and Burundi as members. I wishes o improve poliical, economic and social developmen, wiha Poliical Federaion o he Eas Arican Saes as is ulimae aim. In

mariime erms he emphasis is on economic and saey issues raherhan securiy.63

• Indian Ocean Commission (COI). e COI (he Commissionde l’Océan Indien in French) is an inergovernmenal organizaion ha

was creaed in 1984 wih he Comoros, Madagascar, Mauriius, Franceand he Seychelles as members. Is objecives cenre on cooperaionand developmen in diplomaic, economic, commercial, agriculuraland aquaculural, culural, scienific, judicial and educaional fields.e COI has unded various projecs ocussing on conservaion andalernaive livelihoods projecs.64


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• e Arab League or League o Arabian Saes. e League wasormed in Cairo in March 1945 and is he regional organizaion o Arabsaes in he Middle Eas and Norh Arica. Is curren membership is22 and is main aim is o improve relaions and collaboraion bewe-en members, saeguard independence and sovereigny, and deliberaeaffairs in he Arab world. I signed an agreemen on Join Deence andEconomic Cooperaion in April 1950 ha commited members o co-

ordinae deence relaed maters. Mariime cooperaion is he respon-sibiliy o he subordinae regional economic communiies.

• e Organizaion o he Islamic Conerence (OIC). e OIC was ounded beween 1969 and 1972 wih 30 member saes. Is aimscenre on he promoion o Islamic solidariy and cooperaion in heeconomic, social, culural and scienific fields.

• e Gul Cooperaion Council (GCC). e GCC was esabli-

shed in 1981 in response o he oubreak o he Iran-Iraq war. I aimso srenghen cooperaion in agriculure, rade, indusry, invesmenand securiy among is six member saes. ough he GCC supporsregional and inernaional couner-errorism effors, i places empha-sis on he disincion beween errorism and he legiimae righ o hepeople o sruggle agains occupaion. As ar as miliary and mariimecooperaion is concerned GCC members aim o creae a GCC deen-

ce orce and hey have signed a Join GCC Deence Pac (raified on31 December 2000). e pac was he resul o much miliary coope-raion and is objecive is o proec he ineress o member saes andcooperae on land, air and mariime deence. Member saes currenlycooperae on army, air orce, naval and inelligence level and have san-dardized much docrine and raining.

• e Souh Asian Associaion or egional Cooperaion (SA- AC). e SAAC was esablished in December 1985. I is an agre-emen beween Bangladesh, Bhuan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakisanand Sri Lanka o creae an amosphere o rus and riendship, and


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work owards economic and social developmen. Mariime coopera-ion is no par o he agreemen.• e Associaion o Souheas Asian Naions (ASEAN). ASEAN

was already esablished in 1967 wih a woold purpose: economicgrowh and social progress as well as regional peace and sabiliy wihan emphasis on rule o law in accordance wih he principles o heUN Charer. ASEAN leaders resolved in 2003 ha communiy sho-

uld sand on hree pillars, he primary one being an ASEAN SecuriyCommuniy, ollowed by Economic and Socio-Culural Communii-es. Mariime cooperaion is no a core uncion, bu has developed aspar o he ASEAN egional Forum (see below).

• Te ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Te ARF comprises 27counries, including en ASEAN members, plus a number o “parnersaes”. e AF is he principal orum or securiy discourse beween

Asian saes and provides he opporuniy o discuss regional securiyissues and develop cooperaive measures o enhance peace and secu-riy in he region. On a securiy level he various saes appear o havesrong, bu diverse objecives. However, cooperaion wih regards ocouner-errorism has improved since Sepember 2001 and he Bali

bombings o Ocober 2002. Mariime securiy cooperaion is high onhe agenda and an exercise involving 22 Wesern Pacific navies was

held in May 2005. Securiy cooperaion wihin he AF has cerainly been enhanced and indicaions are ha mariime securiy issues could be ackled ogeher.

• Te Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). Te FPDA isa deence relaionship based on a series o bilaeral agreemens be-ween he Unied ingdom, New Zealand, Ausralia, Malaysia, andSingapore daing rom 1971. e FPDA makes provision or deencecooperaion and replaces some o he ormer deence commimens ohe U. An Inegraed Air Deence Sysem (IADS) or Malaysia andSingapore is based in Malaysia, a which aircraf and personnel rom


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all five counries are roaed. e firs annual land and naval exerciseook place in 1981, and exercises currenly ocus on air, land and navalcooperaion.

• e Indian Ocean im Associaion or egional Co-operaion(IO-AC). Wih he ransormaion o he global securiy environ-men, he opporuniy or co-operaion and ineracion beween IOsaes has increased. Afer iniial preparaory meeings, IO-AC was

ormed in Mauriius on 6-7 March 1997 and a Charer was adoped. Icomprises 18 member saes: Ausralia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia,Iran, enya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauriius, Mozambique, Oman,Singapore, Souh Arica, Sri Lanka, anzania, ailand, he Unied

Arab Emiraes and Yemen. e Seychelles announced is wihdrawalrom he Associaion in July 2003, while China, Egyp, France, Japan,and he Unied ingdom are dialogue parners. e idea was o “open”

he region and i had our major componens: rade liberalizaion, ra-de and invesmen aciliaion, economic and echnical cooperaion,and rade and invesmen dialogue. I did no address deence and se-curiy cooperaion direcly, as he idea o “open and ree rade” impliesmariime securiy. Unorunaely, because o numerous difficulies,he IO-AC is no really uncioning.

• Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). IONS is a consulai-

ve and cooperaive effor o find commonaliy regarding he growingasymmeric hrea. e Indian Navy aced as aciliaor and invied na-

val chies or he heads o mar

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