8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

1/48

[G.R. No. 156774. March 25, 2003]

CAWALING, JR. vs. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 25 2003.

G.R. No. 156774 (Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v.The Solicitor General, Joseph "Erap" Ejercito Estrada, Jose"Jingoy" Ejercito Estrada.)

This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by Benjamin E. Cawaling Jr. to declare unconstitutional Rep.

Act No. 7080, "An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder."

On 10 December 2002 RTC Judge Boargenes C. Candolea of Sorsogon City dismissed the petitionmotuproprio on the ground that since petitioner was not being indicted for plunder he was bereft of any

personal and substantial interest in the case, hence, he has no legal standing to sue.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied as he failed to satisfy all the requisites fora petition for declaratory relief:(a) there must be an actual controversy; (b) petitioner must have a legal

interest in the controversy affected by the statute; (c) controversy must be ripe for judicialdetermination; and, (d) petition must be filed before there is breach or violation.

The petitioner comes to us on a petition for review urging immediate adjudication of his petition to saveon "tax money which are necessarily spent in administering the very ill-defined crime of 'plunder' through

the continued implementation of a clearly and unequivocally unconstitutional Anti-Plunder Law."Petitioneradvances several noveltheories:

First, the requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are "irreconcilably inconsistent."Since the term"proper party" is synonymous with "aggrieved party," it would be preposterous for an aggrieved partyagainst whom an indictment for plunder has been filed to institute a petition for declaratory relief "beforea breach of the said statute had transpired;"

Second, the Anti-Plunder Law violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it

unreasonably distinguishes between "plunderers who amassed P50 million worth of ill-gotten wealth" andthe ordinary grafters and corrupt offenders."There is no substantial difference between "ill-gotting (of)wealth with a total value of P50 million" and "ill-gotting (of) wealth with a lower value, of say, P49

million;"

Third, the term "P50 million total value of ill-gotten wealth" is inherently ambiguous because the term

includes "non-cash items with no definite cash values like:shares of ownership equity in a businessenterprise where the actual worth of publicly traded stocks fluctuates in the stock market x x x; fixed

assets or real properties whose actual worth depend(s) on their current fair market values x x x; tangibleassets; and intangible benefits with no cash value; and,

Lastly, the Anti-Plunder Law is "somewhat similar in application to an ex post facto law"because "itmakes criminal an act which was not so at the time the action was performed."Owing to "inflationary

economic trend," a public officer who "ill-got P50 to 82.95 million wealth in 2001 cannot be prosecutedfor the crime of 'plunder' because inflation factors had lowered the economic worth of ill-gotten wealth

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

2/48

to P30.14 to 49.99 million (which are totally below the class distinction limit of 50 million) at 1994

constant prices."

The petition must be denied. Primarily, the issue on the constitutionality of the Anti-Plunder Law hasalready been laid to rest by this court in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[1]Moreover, petitioner failed tosatisfy all the prerequisites for a declaratory relief enumerated in the third paragraph hereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of proper showing that the court a quocommitted a

reversible error.

Very truly yours,

http://www.chanrobles.com/scresolutions/resolutions/2003/march/156774.php#_ftn1http://www.chanrobles.com/scresolutions/resolutions/2003/march/156774.php#_ftn1http://www.chanrobles.com/scresolutions/resolutions/2003/march/156774.php#_ftn1http://www.chanrobles.com/scresolutions/resolutions/2003/march/156774.php#_ftn1

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

3/48

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 152259. July 29, 2004]

ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ,petitioner, vs.The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division)and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Repetitive motions to invalidate or summarily terminate a criminal indictment prior to plea and trial,however they may be named or identified -- whether as a motion to quash or motion to dismiss or by anyother nomenclature -- delay the administration of justice and unduly burden the court system. Groundsnot included in the first of such repetitive motions are generally deemed waived and can no longer be

used as bases of similar motions subsequently filed.

Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain presidential relatives whointervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with theGovernment. This provision is not vague or impermissibly broad, because it can easily be understoodwith the use of simple statutory construction. Neither may the constitutionality of a criminal statute suchas this be challenged on the basis of the overbreadth and the void -for-vagueness doctrines, whichapply only to free-speech cases.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1]under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside theNovember 20, 2001[2]and the March 1, 2002[3]Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.13736. The first Resolution disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. The arraignment of the

accused and the pre-trial of the case shall proceed as scheduled.[4]

The second Resolution denied reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:

[The People of the Philippines], through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filedon July 12, 1989 an information before [the anti-graft court] charging the accused [with] violation ofSection 5, Republic Act No. 3019,[5]as amended. The Information reads:

That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in Metro Manila, Philippines,and within the jurisdiction of [the Sandiganbayan], said [petitioner], brother-in-law of Ferdinand E.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn1

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

4/48

Marcos, former President of the Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by affinity within the third

civil degree, did then and there wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose ofpromoting his self-interested [sic] and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract

between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlledcorporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, themajority stocks of which is owned by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold,

transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipmentand facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some ofits equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in itsshipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount ofP5,000,000.00.

Contrary to law.

On December 27, 1996, the accused filed his first MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENTclaiming that no valid preliminary investigation was conducted in the instant case. He asserts that if a

preliminary investigation could be said to have been conducted, the same was null and void having beenundertaken by a biased and partial investigative body.

On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan], through the First Division, issued an order giving the accusedfifteen days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.

[Petitioner] questioned said order before the Supreme Court via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition

with prayer for temporary restraining order. On January 21, 1998, the Supreme Court dismissed thepetition for failure to show that [the Sandiganbayan] committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing theassailed order.

On November 9, 1998, the [petitioner] filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a Motion to Quash.

On September 22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Victorio U. Tabanguil, manifested

that the prosecution had already concluded the reinvestigation of the case. He recommended thedismissal of the instant case. Both the Deputy Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutor approvedthe recommendation. However, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disagreed and directed the prosecutors

to let the [petitioner] present his evidence in Court.

Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second MOTION TO QUASH AND TO DEFERARRAIGNMENT.

On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan] denied the motion for lack of merit.

On June 19, 2001, [the] accused filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION TO DISMISS. On June29, 2001, the [Sandiganbayan] admitted the motion and admitted the attached (third) Motion to Dismiss.

The [Motion to Dismiss] raise[d] the following grounds:

I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW OF [PETITIONER] WAS VIOLATEDDURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION STAGE IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:

A. NO VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN THE INSTANT CASE; AND

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

5/48

B. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED BY A BIASED AND PARTIAL

INVESTIGATOR

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF [PETITIONER] TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSEOF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS VIOLATED

III. PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17 OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, [PETITIONER] ISIMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

IV. THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY HAS BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY PRESCRIPTION[6]

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan explained that all the grounds invoked by petitioner, except the third one, hadalready been raised by him and passed upon in its previous Resolutions.[7]In resolving the third ground,the anti-graft court pointed out that Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution became effective only in 1981

when the basic law was amended. Since his alleged illegal intervention had been committed on or about1975, the amended provision was inapplicable to him.[8]

In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan passed upon theother grounds he had raised. It ruled that his right to a preliminary investigation was not violated,because he had been granted a reinvestigation.[9]It further held that his right to be informed of thenature and cause of the accusation was not trampled upon, either, inasmuch as the Information had setforth the essential elements of the offense charged.[10]

Hence, this Petition.[11]

The Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner assigns the following errors for our consideration:

Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred and gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack

of, or in excess of jurisdiction

I. In not dismissing and/or quashing Criminal Case No. 13736 despite clear andincontrovertible evidence that:

A. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because its vaguenessviolates the due process right of an individual to be informed of the nature andthe cause of the accusation against him;

B. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because it violates the dueprocess right of an individual to be presumed innocent until the contrary isproved;

C. The constitutional right of petitioner x x x to be informed of the nature and the

cause of the accusation against him was violated;

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn6

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

6/48

D. The constitutional right to due process of law of petitioner x x x was violated

during the preliminary investigation stage in the following ways:

[i] No valid preliminary investigation was con-ducted for Criminal Case No.13736; and

[ii] The preliminary investigation was conducted by a biased and partialinvestigator.

E. The criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription; and

F. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution, petitioner x x x isimmune from criminal prosecution.

And

II. In light of the foregoing, in denying petitioner[s] x x x right to equal protection of thelaws.[12]

Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether Section 5 of Republic Act 3019 isunconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is vague; (3) whether there was a valid preliminaryinvestigation; (4) whether the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription; and (5)whether petitioner is immune from criminal prosecution under then Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973Constitution.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:Constitutionality of Section 5,

Republic Act 3019

Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 5 of RA 3019 for the first time in theSandiganbayan through a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Attached to his December 7, 2001 Motion forReconsideration of the Order denying his Motion to Dismiss was this Supplemental Motion which was, ineffect, his third motion to quash.[13]We note that the Petition for Certiorari before us challenges the

denial of his original, not his Supplemental, Motion to Dismiss.

Upon the denial of his original Motion to Quash on February 9, 2000, petitioner could have filed amotion for reconsideration of the denial. Had reconsideration been turned down, the next proper remedywould have been either (1) a petition for certiorari[14]-- if there was grave abuse of discretion -- whichshould be filed within 60 days from notice of the assailed order;[15]or (2) to proceed to trial without

prejudice to his right, if final judgment is rendered against him, to raise the same questions before theproper appellate court.[16]But instead of availing himself of these remedies, he filed a Motion to Dismiss

on June 19, 2001.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn12

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

7/48

Impropriety of

Repetitive Motions

There is no substantial distinction between a motion to quash and a motion to dismiss. Both

pray for an identical relief, which is the dismissal of the case. Such motions are employed to raise

preliminary objections, so as to avoid the necessity of proceeding to trial. A motion to quash is generallyused in criminal proceedings to annul a defective indictment. A motion to dismiss, the nomenclature

ordinarily used in civil proceedings, is aimed at summarily defeating a complaint. Thus, our Rules ofCourt use the termmotion to quash in criminal,[17]and motion to dismiss in civil, proceedings.[18]

In the present case, however, both the Motion to Quash and the Motion to Dismiss are anchoredon basically the same grounds and pray for the same relief. The hairsplitting distinction posited bypetitioner does not really make a difference.

By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a prohibited second motion to quash. Aparty is not permitted to raise issues, whether similar or different, by installment. The Rules abhor

repetitive motions. Otherwise, there would be no end to preliminary objections, and trial would nevercommence. A second motion to quash delays the administration of justice and unduly burdens thecourts. Moreover, Rule 117 provides that grounds not raised in the first motion to quash are generally

deemed waived.[19]Petitioners Motion to Dismiss violates this rule.

Constitutionality of

the Challenged Provision

If only for the foregoing procedural lapses, the Petition deserves to be dismissed outright. However,

given the importance of this case in curtailing graft and corruption, the Court will nevertheless addressthe other issues on their merit. Petitioner challenges the validity of Section 5 of Republic Act 3019, a

penal statute, on the ground that the act constituting the offense is allegedly vague and impermissiblybroad.

It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth[20]and the vagueness[21]doctrines have specialapplication only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penalstatutes. Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza explained the reason as follows:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroadbecause ofpossible chilling effect upon protected speech. The theory is that [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe

speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in asingle prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression isdeemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person makingthe attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrowspecificity. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is

outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived

grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terroremeffectresulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may

well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, thelaw cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

x x x x x x x x x

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn17

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

8/48

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for

testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, FirstAmendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With

respect to such statute, the established rule is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutionalwill not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying toother persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. As has been pointed

out, vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically producefacial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only]as applied to a particular defendant.[22](underscoring supplied)

To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of

ambiguity.[23]While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to finddirect application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,[24] the Bookkeeping Act was foundunconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v.Comelec[25]decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally,Santiago v.Comelec[26]held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation oflegislative powers, not because of vagueness.

Indeed, an on-its-face invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties

whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure fromthe usual requirement of actual case and controversy and permit decisions to be made in a sterileabstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris,this evil was aptly pointed out bythe U.S. Supreme Court in these words:[27]

[T]he task of analyzinga proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of thesedeficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. Thecombination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of therelief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis ofdetailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding

constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as amanifestly strong medicine to be employed sparingly and only as a last resort. In determining theconstitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examinedin the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged.[28]

As conduct -- not speech -- is its object, the challenged provision must be examined only asapplied to the defendant, herein petitioner, and should not be declared unconstitutional for overbreadthor vagueness.

The questioned provision reads as follows:

Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives.It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, byconsanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives,to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with theGovernment: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption ofoffice of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Governmentalong the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing orpending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval

of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/mar1997/127325.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/mar1997/127325.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/mar1997/127325.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/mar1997/127325.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/mar1997/127325.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn22

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

9/48

compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act

lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.

Petitioner also claims that the phrase to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,contract or application with the Government is vague and violates his right to be informed of the causeand nature of the accusation against him.[29]He further complains that the provision does not specify

what acts are punishable under the term intervene, and thus transgresses his right to be presumedinnocent.[30]We disagree.

Every statute is presumed valid.[31]On the party challenging its validity weighs heavily the oneroustask of rebutting this presumption.[32]Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should beresolved in favor of its constitutionality.[33]To doubt is to sustain, as tersely put by Justice George

Malcolm. In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,[34]the rationale for the presumption of constitutionality wasexplained by this Court thus:

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of thepolitical departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. Todoubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoinsupon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as

the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied anddetermined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[35]

In the instant case, petitioner has miserably failed to overcome such presumption. This Court haspreviously laid down the test for determining whether a statute is vague, as follows:

x x x [A] statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness thatpersons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be

invoked against that species of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e.,that which cannot beclarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common

intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, thestatute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accordpersons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law

enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of theGovernment muscle.[36]But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched inimprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to thosethat are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be savedby proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directedagainst such activities.[37]With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute isclear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the languageconveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common

understanding and practice.[38]It must be stressed, however, that the vagueness doctrine merelyrequires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision ormathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, ispermissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be heldinvalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions,especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details inadvance as in all other statutes.[39]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn29

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

10/48

A simpler test was decreed in Dans v. People,[40]in which the Court said that there was nothing

vague about a penal law that adequately answered the basic query What is the violation?[41]Anythingbeyond -- the hows and the whys -- are evidentiary matters that the law itself cannot possibly disclose, in

view of the uniqueness of every case.[42]

The question What is the violation? is sufficiently answered by Section 5 of RA 3019, as follows:

1. The offender is a spouse or any relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civildegree of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President

of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and

2. The offender intervened directly or indirectly in any business, transaction, contract or

application with the government.

Applicability ofStatutory Construction

As to petitioners claim that the termintervene is vague, this Court agrees with the Office of theSolicitor General that the word can easily be understood through simple statutory construction. Theabsence of a statutory definition of a term used in a statute will not render the law void for vagueness,if the meaning can be determined through the judicial function of construction.[43]Elementary is theprinciple that words should be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning.

x x x. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, orbecause of the employment of terms without defining them;[44] much less do we have to define everyword we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislatureto define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression ofits will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in thevagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from

the whole act x x x.

x x x [I]t is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted intheir natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[45] unless it is evident that the legislature

intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[46]The intention of the lawmakers - whoare, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner

is always presumed.[47]

The term interveneshould therefore be understood in its ordinary acceptation, which is to to come

between.[48]Criminally liable is anyone covered in the enumeration of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- anyperson who intervenes in any manner in any business, transaction, contract or application with the

government. As we have explained, it is impossible for the law to provide in advance details of how suchacts of intervention could be performed. But the courts may pass upon those details once trial isconcluded. Thus, the alleged vagueness of intervene is not a ground to quash the information prior to

the commencement of the trial.

In sum, the Court holds that the challenged provision is not vague, and that in any event, the

overbreath and void for vagueness doctrines are not applicable to this case.

Second Issue:Allegedly Vague Information

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn42http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn42http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn42http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn45http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn45http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn45http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn46http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn46http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn46http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn47http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn47http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn47http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn48http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn48http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn48http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn48http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn47http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn46http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn45http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn42http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn40

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

11/48

Other than arguing on the alleged intrinsic vagueness of intervene, petitioner further contends that

the Information itself is also unconstitutionally vague, because it does not specify the acts of interventionthat he supposedly performed.[49]Again, we disagree.

When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not amotion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.[50] The pertinent provision in the Rules of Court isSection 9 of Rule 116, which we quote:

Section 9. Bill of particulars.-- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars toenable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of thecomplaint or information and the details desired.

The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity as toapprise the accused of what they are being charged with and to enable the court to pronounce

judgment.[51]The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately knowwhat is meant by the information.[52]

While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in theinformation,[53]matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the

offense -- need not be averred.

[54]

Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are tobe determined by reference to the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes.[55]

In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the elements of a violation ofSection 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently. Likewise, the allegations describe the offensecommitted by petitioner with such particularity as to enable him to prepare an intelligent defense. Detailsof the acts he committed are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the Information.

Third Issue:Preliminary Investigation

Clearly, petitioner already brought the issue of lack of preliminary investigation when he questionedbefore this Court in GR No. 128317 the Sandiganbayans Order giving him 15 days to file a Motion for

Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.[56]Citing Cojuangco v. Presidential Commissionon Good Government,[57]he undauntedly averred that he was deprived of his right to a preliminaryinvestigation, because the PCGG acted both as complainant and as investigator.[58]

In the case cited above, this Court declared that while PCGG had the power to conduct a preliminaryinvestigation, the latter could not do so with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge in cases in which itwas the agency that had gathered evidence and subsequently filed the complaint.[59]On that basis, thisCourt nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by PCGG and directed the transmittal of therecords to the Ombudsman for appropriate action.

It is readily apparent that Cojuangcodoes not support the quashal of the Information against hereinpetitioner. True, the PCGG initiated the present Complaint against him; hence, it could not properly

conduct the preliminary investigation. However, he was accorded his rights -- the Sandiganbayansuspended the trial and afforded him a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman. The procedure outlinedin Cojuangcowas thus followed.

The Sandiganbayans actions are in accord also withRaro v. Sandiganbayan,[60]which held that thefailure to conduct a valid preliminary investigation would not warrant the quashal of an information. Ifthe information has already been filed, the proper procedure is for the Sandiganbayan to hold the trial inabeyance while the preliminary investigation is being conducted or completed.[61]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn49http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn49http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn49http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn50http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn50http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn50http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn51http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn51http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn53http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn53http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn53http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn54http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn54http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn54http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn55http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn55http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn55http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn56http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn56http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn56http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn57http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn57http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn57http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn58http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn58http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn58http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn59http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn59http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn59http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn60http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn60http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn60http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn61http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn61http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn61http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn61http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn60http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn59http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn58http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn57http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn56http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn55http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn54http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn53http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn51http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn50http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn49

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

12/48

Fourth Issue:

Prescription

The issue of prescription was the principal basis of the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner with the

Sandiganbayan on October 8, 1999.[62]Such issue should be disregarded at this stage, since he failed to

challenge its ruling debunking his Motion within the 60-day period for the filing of a petition forcertiorari. A party may not circumvent this rule by filing a subsequent motion that raises the same issue

and the same arguments.

Furthermore, it is easy to see why this argument being raised by petitioner is utterly

unmeritorious. He points out that according to the Information, the offense was committed during theperiod from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975. He argues that when the Information was filed on July 12,1989,[63]prescription had already set in, because the prescriptive period for a violation of Republic ActNo. 3019 is only ten (10) years from the time the offense was allegedly committed. The increase of thisprescriptive period to fifteen (15) years took effect only on March 16, 1982, upon the enactment of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 195.[64]

Act No. 3326, as amended,[65]governs the prescription of offenses penalized by special laws. Itspertinent provision reads:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,

and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicialproceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shallbegin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Consistent with the provision quoted above, this Court has previously reckoned the prescriptive

period of cases involving RA 3019 (committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution) fromthe discoveryof the violation.[66]In Republic v. Desierto, the Court explained:

This issue confronted this Court anew, albeit in a larger scale, inPresidential Ad Hoc Fact-FindingCommittee on Behest Loans v. Desierto. In the said recent case, the Board of Directors of the Philippine

Seeds, Inc. and Development Bank of the Philippines were charged with violation of paragraphs (e) and(g) of Section 3 of RA No. 3019, by the PresidentialAd HocFact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,created by then President Fidel V. Ramos to investigate and to recover the so-called Behest

Loans,where the Philippine Government guaranteed several foreign loans to corporations and entitiesconnected with the former President Marcos. x x x In holding that the case had not yet prescribed, thisCourt ruled that:

In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the

violations of RA No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, thepublic officials concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree with

the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from theday of such commission.

x x x x x x x x x

People v. Duque is more in point, and what was stated there stands reiteration: In the nature of things,acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this

reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not known at the time,

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn62http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn62http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn62http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn63http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn63http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn63http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn64http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn64http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn64http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn65http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn65http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn65http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn66http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn66http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn66http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn66http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn65http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn64http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn63http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn62

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

13/48

the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of

the constitutive act or acts. (Italics supplied)

There are striking parallelisms between the said Behest Loans Case and the present one which lead usto apply the ruling of the former to the latter. First, both cases arose out of seemingly innocent businesstransactions; second, both were discovered only after the government created bodies to investigate

these anomalous transactions; third, both involve prosecutions for violations of RA No. 3019;and, fourth, in both cases, it was sufficiently raised in the pleadings that the respondents conspired and

connived with one another in order to keep the alleged violations hidden from public scrutiny.

This Courts pronouncementin the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan is quite relevant and instructive

as to the date when the discovery of the offense should be reckoned, thus:

In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party, to have knownthe violations committed at the time the questioned transactions were made because both parties to the

transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetuate fraud against the government. The allegedanomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one ofthe original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to said date, no

person would have dared to question the legality or propriety of those transactions. Hence, the countingof the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of the offense, which could havebeen between February 1986 after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint

was filed.[67]

The above pronouncement is squarely applicable to the present case. The general rule thatprescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the crime cannot apply to the presentcase. It is not legally prudent to charge the State, the aggrieved party, with knowledge of the violation

of RA 3019 at the time the alleged intervention was made. The accused is the late President FerdinandE. Marcos brother-in-law. He was charged with intervening in a sale involving a private corporation, the

majority stocks of which was allegedly owned by President Marcos.

Prior to February 1986, no person was expected to have seriously dared question the legality of the

sale or would even have thought of investigating petitioners alleged involvement in the transaction. Itwas only after the creation[68]of PCGG[69]and its exhaustive investigations that the alleged crime wasdiscovered. This led to the initiation on November 29, 1988 of a Complaint against former PresidentMarcos and petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, the filing ofthe Information on July 12, 1989 was well within the prescriptive period of ten years fromthe discoveryof the offense.

Fifth IssueImmunity from Prosecution

Petitioner argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a high-ranking

naval officer -- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp -- of former President Marcos.[70]He relies on Section17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which we quote:

The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie forofficial acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.

x x x x x x x x x

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn67http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn67http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn67http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn68http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn68http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn69http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn69http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn70http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn70http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn70http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn70http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn69http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn68http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn67

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

14/48

As the Sandiganbayan aptly pointed out, the above provision is not applicable to petitioner because

the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime happened in 1975.

InEstrada v. Desierto,[71]this Court exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in order to

determine the extent of its applicability. We explained therein that executive immunity applied onlyduring the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President fromprosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner must

therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, thefelonious acts of public officials and their close relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer whoacts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.

In sum, petitioner utterly fails to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion inissuing the assailed Resolutions.[72]On the contrary, it acted prudently, in accordance with law andjurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned Resolutions of the

SandiganbayanAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., andAzcuna,

JJ., concur.Puno, Ynares-Santiago, andSandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., in the result.

Corona, J.,on leave.Tinga, J., in the result. Please see separate opinion.Chico-Nazario, J., no part. Ponente of assailed SB Resolutions.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/146710_15.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/146710_15.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn71http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn71http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn71http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn72http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn72http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn72http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn72http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jul2004/152259.htm#_ftn71http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/mar2001/146710_15.htm

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

15/48

FIRST DIVISION

VENANCIO R. NAVA, G.R. No. 160211Petitioner,

Present:

PANGANIBAN, CJ, Chairperson,- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJThe Honorable JusticesRODOLFO G. PALATTAO,GREGORY S. ONG, andMA. CRISTINA G. CORTEZ-ESTRADA as Members of theSandiganbayans Fourth Division, andthe PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondents. August 28, 2006x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

A meticulous review of the records and the evidence establishes the guilt of the accused beyond

reasonable doubt. Clearly, the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime

charged. Hence, the conviction of petitioner is inevitable.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1]under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 2,

2003Decision[2]and September 29, 2003 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23627.

The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered convicting

accused VENANCIO NAVA Y RODRIGUEZ of the crime of violation of the Anti-Graft andCorrupt Practices Act particularly Section 3(g) thereof, or entering on behalf ofgovernment in any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn1

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

16/48

same whether or not the pubic officer profited or will profit thereby. In the absence of

any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years, and

one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day as maximum and to sufferperpetual disqualification from public office. Accused Nava is further ordered to pay thegovernment the amount of P380,013.60 which it suffered by way of damages because of

the unlawful act or omission committed by the herein accused Venancio Nava.

From the narration of facts, there hardly appears any circumstance that wouldsuggest the existence of conspiracy among the other accused in the commission of thecrime.

Thus in the absence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime complained ofand as the herein other accused only acted upon the orders of accused Venancio Nava,in the absence of any criminal intent on their part to violate the law, the acts of theremaining accused are not considered corrupt practices committed in the performance oftheir duties as public officers and consequently, accused AJATIL JAIRAL Y PONGCA,ROSALINDA MERKA Y GUANZON & JOSEPH VENTURA Y ABAD are hereby consideredinnocent of the crime charged and are hereby acquitted.[3]

The assailed Resolution dated September 29, 2003, denied reconsideration.

The Facts

The Sandiganbayan narrated the facts of this case as follows:

The complaint involving the herein accused was initiated by the COA, RegionXI, Davao City, which resulted from an audit conducted by a team which was created bythe COA Regional Office per COA Regional Assignment Order No. 91-74 dated January 8,1991. The objective of the team [was] to conduct an audit of the 9.36 million allotmentwhich was released in 1990 by the DECS, Region XI to its Division Offices.

In the Audit Report, the amount of P603,265.00 was shown to have been

released to the DECS Division of Davao del Sur for distribution to the newly nationalizedhigh schools located within the region. Through the initiative of accused Venancio Nava,a meeting was called among his seven (7) schools division superintendents whom hepersuaded to use the money or allotment for the purchase of Science Laboratory Tools

and Devices (SLTD). In other words, instead of referring the allotment to the onehundred fifty-five (155) heads of the nationalized high schools for the improvement oftheir facilities, accused Nava succeeded in persuading his seven (7) schools division

superintendents to use the allotment for the purchase of science education facilities forthe calendar year 1990.

In the purchase of the school materials, the law provides that the same shall bedone through a public bidding pursuant to Circular No. 85-55, series of 1985. But in theinstant case, evidence shows that accused Nava persuaded his seven (7) schools division

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn3

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

17/48

superintendents to ignore the circular as allegedly time was of the essence in making the

purchases and if not done before the calendar year 1990, the funds allotted will revertback to the general fund.

In the hurried purchase of SLTDs, the provision on the conduct of a publicbidding was not followed. Instead the purchase was done through negotiation. Evidence

shows that the items were purchased from Jovens Trading, a business establishmentwith principal address at Tayug, Pangasinan; D[I]mplacable Enterprise with principalbusiness address at 115 West Capitol Drive, Pasig, Metro Manila and from EvelynMiranda of 1242 Oroqueta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. As disclosed by the audit report, theprices of the [SLTDs] as purchased from the above-named sellers exceeded theprevailing market price ranging from 56% to 1,175% based on the mathematicalcomputation done by the COA audit team. The report concluded that the governmentlost P380,013.60. That the injury to the government as quantified was the result of thenon-observance by the accused of the COA rules on public bidding and DECS Order No.100 suspending the purchases of [SLTDs].[4]

The Commission on Audit (COA) Report recommended the filing of criminal and administrative

charges against the persons liable, including petitioner, before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.

Petitioner was subsequently charged in an Information[5]filed on April 8, 1997, worded as follows:

That on or about the period between November to December 1990, and forsometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Digos, Davao Del Sur and/or Davao City,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Venancio R.

Nava (DECS-Region XI Director) and Ajatil Jairal (Division Superintendent, DECS, Davaodel Sur), both high[-]ranking officials and Rosalinda Merka, and Teodora Indin

(Administrative Officer and Assistant Division Superintendent, respectively of DECS-Division of Davao Del Sur), all low ranking officials, while in the discharge of theirrespective official functions, committing the offense in relation to their office and withgrave abuse [of] authority, conniving and confederating with one another, did then andthere willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, on behalf of the government, intotransactions with DImplacable Enterprise and Jovens Trading, respectively, representedby accused Antonio S. Tan and Evelyn Miranda and Joseph Ventura for the purchase ofScience Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD) intended for use by the public high schoolsin the area amounting to [P603,265.00], Philippine currency, without the requisite publicbidding and in violation of DECS Order No. 100, Series of 1990, which transactioninvolved an overprice in the amount of P380,013.60 and thus, is manifestly and grossly

disadvantageous to the government.[6]

Special Prosecution Officer II Evelyn T. Lucero-Agcaoili recommended the dismissal of the

foregoing Information on the ground, among others, that there was no probable cause. She argued that

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn4

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

18/48

only estimates were made to show the discrepancy of prices instead of a comparative listing on an item

to item basis.[7] The recommendation was disapproved, however, by then Ombudsman Aniano A.

Desierto.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

After due trial, only petitioner was convicted, while all the other accused were acquitted.[8]

Petitioner was found guilty of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, or

entering on behalf of the government any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous

to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or would profit thereby.

The Sandiganbayan (SBN) said that, in the purchase of the Science Laboratory Tools and Devices

(SLTDs), petitioner had not conducted a public bidding in accordance with COA Circular No. 85-55A. As a

result, the prices of the SLTDs, as purchased, exceeded the prevailing market price from 56 percent to

1,175 percent, based on the mathematical computations of the COA team.[9] In his defense, petitioner

had argued that the said COA Circular was merely directory, not mandatory. Further, the purchases in

question had been done in the interest of public service.[10]

The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the foregoing defenses raised by petitioner. On the

contrary, it found the evidence adduced by petitioners co-accused, Superintendent Ajatil Jairal, to be

enlightening, manifesting an intricate web of deceit spun by petitioner and involving all the other

superintendents in the process.[11]

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn7

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

19/48

The graft court did not accept the claim of petitioner that he signed the checks only after the

other signatories had already signed them. The evidence showed that blank Philippine National Bank

(PNB) checks had been received by Nila E. Chavez, a clerk in the regional office, for petitioners

signature. The Sandiganbayan opined that the evidence amply supported Jairals testimony that the

questioned transactions had emanated from the regional office, as in fact, all the documents pertinent to

the transaction had already been prepared and signed by petitioner when the meeting with the

superintendents was called sometime in August 1990.[12]

In that meeting, the superintendents were given prepared documents like the Purchase Orders

and vouchers, together with the justification.[13] This circumstance prompted Jairal to conduct his own

canvass. The Sandiganbayan held that this act was suggestive of the good faith of Jairal, thereby

negating any claim of conspiracy with the other co-accused and, in particular, petitioner.

In its assailed Resolution, the SBN denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It held that the series of

acts culminating in the questioned transactions constituted violations of Department of Education, Culture and

Sports (DECS) Order No. 100; and COA Circular No. 85-55A. Those acts, ruled the SBN, sufficiently established

that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Hence, this Petition.[14]

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

I. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting toa lack of or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the findings of the Special AuditTeam that irregularly conducted the audit beyond the authorized period andwhich team falsified the Special Audit Report.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn12

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

20/48

II. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting toa lack of or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the findings in the special audit

report where the Special Audit Team egregiously failed to comply with theminimum standards set by the Supreme Court and adopted by the Commission onAudit in violation of petitioners right to due process, and which report suppressed

evidence favorable to the petitioner.

III. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting toa lack of or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the findings in the Special AuditReport considering that none of the allegedly overpriced items were canvassed orpurchased by the Special Audit Team such that there is no competent evidencefrom which to determine that there was an overprice and that the transaction wasmanifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

IV. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting toa lack of or excess of jurisdiction in finding that there was an overprice wherenone of the prices of the questioned items exceeded the amount set by theDepartment of Budget and Management.

V. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting toa lack of or excess of jurisdiction in selectively considering the findings in the

decision in Administrative Case No. XI-91-088 and failing to consider the findingsthereon that petitioner was justified in undertaking a negotiated purchase andthat there was no overpricing.

VI. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in selectively considering the findings of XI-91-088 and failing to consider the findings thereon that petitioner was justified inundertaking a negotiated purchase, there was no overpricing, and that the

purchases did not violate DECS Order No. 100.

VII. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting toa lack of or excess of jurisdiction in failing to absolve the petitioner whereconspiracy was not proven and the suppliers who benefited from the alleged

overpricing were acquitted.

VIII. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting toa lack of or excess of jurisdiction in admitting in evidence and giving probativevalue to Exhibit 8 the existence and contents of which are fictitious.

IX. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting toa lack of or excess of jurisdiction in giving credence to the self-serving andperjurious testimony of co-accused Ajatil Jairal that the questioned transactions

emanated from the regional office [in spite] of the documentary evidence and thetestimony of the accused supplier which prove that the transaction emanatedfrom the division office of Digos headed by co-accused Ajatil Jairal.

X. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting toa lack of or excess of jurisdiction in finding that the petitioner entered into atransaction that was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government

where the evidence clearly established that the questioned transactions wereentered into by the division office of Digos through co-accused Ajatil Jairal.

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

21/48

XI. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting toa lack of or excess of jurisdiction in convicting the petitioner in the absence of

proof beyond reasonable doubt.[15]

All these issues basically refer to the question of whether the Sandiganbayan committed

reversible errors (not grave abuse of discretion) in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

violation of Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 3019.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Procedural Issue:Propriety of Certiorari

At the outset, it must be stressed that to contest the Sandiganbayans Decision and Resolution

on June 2, 2003and September 29, 2003, respectively, petitioner should have filed a petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45, not the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Section 7 of

Presidential Decree No. 1606,[16]as amended by Republic Act No. 8249,[17]provides that [d]ecisions and

final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on

certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court likewise provides that [a] party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a

judgment or final order or resolution of the x x x Sandiganbayan x x x whenever authorized by law, may

file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only

questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn15

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

22/48

Basic is the principle that when Rule 45 is available, recourse under Rule 65 cannot be allowed

either as an add-on or as a substitute for appeal.[18] The special civil action for certiorari is not and

cannot be a substitute for an appeal, when the latter remedy is available.[19]

This Court has consistently ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there

is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20]A remedy

is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects

of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency or as in this case, the

Sandiganbayan.[21] Since the assailed Decision and Resolution were dispositions on the merits, and the

Sandiganbayan had no remaining issue to resolve, an appeal would have been the plain, speedy and

adequate remedy for petitioner.

To be sure, the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or

successive.[22]For this procedural lapse, the Petition should have been dismissed outright. Nonetheless,

inasmuch as it was filed within the 15-day period provided under Rule 45, the Court treated it as a

petition for review (not certiorari) under Rule 45 in order to accord substantial justice to the

parties. Thus, it was given due course and the Court required the parties to file their Memoranda.

Main Issue:Sufficiency of Evidence

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him, because the pieces of evidence

to support the charges were not convincing. Specifically, he submits the following detailed argumentation:

1. the Special Audit Report was fraudulent, incomplete, irregular, inaccurate, illicit andsuppressed evidence in favor of the Petitioner;

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/160211.htm#_ftn18

8/13/2019 7080 3019 cases

23/48

2. there was no competent evidence to determine the overprice as none of the

samples secured by the audit team from the Division of Davao del Sur werecanvassed or purchased by the audit team;

3. the allegedly overpriced items did not exceed the amount set by the Department ofBudget and Management;

4. the decision in an administrative investigation were selectively lifted out of context;

5. the administrative findings that Petitioner was justified in undertaking a negotiatedpurchase, that there was no overpricing, and that the purchases did not violateDECS Order No. 100 were disregarded;

6. Exhibit 8, the contents of which are fictitious, was admitted in evidence and givenprobative value;

7. The suppliers who benefited from the transactions were acquitted, along with theother accused who directly participated in the questioned transactions; and

8. The self-serving and perjury-ridden statements of co-accused Jairal were givencredence despite documentary and testimonial evidence to the contrary.[23]

Petitioner further avers that the findings of fact in the Decision dated October 21, 1996 in DECS

Administrative Case No. XI-91-088[24]denied any overpricing and justified the negotiated purchases in

lieu of a public bidding.[25]Since there was no overpricing and since he was justified in undertaking the

negotiated purchase, petitioner submits that he cannot be convicted of violating Section 3(g) of Republic

Act No. 3019.

Validit