7 PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN...
Transcript of 7 PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN...
7 PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
No.10 JANUARY 1979
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES RUE DE LA LOI 200 1049 BRUSSELS
X/2/79-EN
i
EURO-BAROMETER
PUBLIC O P I N I O N I N THE EUROPEAN C 0 M I " I T Y
I N I T I A L Ff.l3SULTS
O F A PUBLIC O P I N I O N POLL I N THE N I N E COMMUNITY
COUNTRIES ON DIRECT ELEXTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN
P A R L I A I " !
. No 10 JANUARY 1979
COI@'IISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
RUE DE LA LOI 200 1049 BRUSSELS
FOREWORD
EXJRO-BAROIVIETER F'UBLIC OPINION POLLS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ON BEHALF OF THE
COMNISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES EACH SPRING AND AUl" S I N C E 1973.
AN IDEXTICAL SET OF QUESTIONS IS PUT TO REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES - D I F ' F ! E ~ N T
EACH TIME - OF THE POF'ULATION AGED F I F " AND OVER I N EACH OF THE N I N E
COUNTRIES. T H I S SURVEY WAS CARRIED OUT BY PROl?ESSIONAL INTERVIEWERS
BcPkEEN 15 AND 21 NOVEMBER 1978 I N THE HOMES OF THE 8 702 SELECTED
RESPONDENTS.
EIGHT NATIONAL INSTITUTES, ALL MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN OMNIBUS SURVEY,
WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING THE POLL. THE NAMES OF THE INSTITUTES
AND FIEL%IJORK S P E C I A L I S T S I N EACH COUNTRY ARE L I S T E D IN THE ANNEX
TOCETHER WITH THE RELEVANT TECHNICAL DETAILS.
X
X X
I N ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL PRACTICE FOR T H I S TYPE OF SURVEY THE COMMISSION
DISCLAIMS ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUESTIONS, RESULTS AND COMMElTARIES.
.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
I. SOCIO-POLTTICAL INDICATORS
1. THE LIFE WE LEAD 2. THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS 3. BASIC ATTITUDES TO SOCIEFY
II.
III.
ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAElLENT
1. PUBLIC INTEFtZST I N COMMUNITY AFFAIRS 2. PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE ELECTION 3. ATTITUDES TO THE ELECTION
3.1 For o r against t h e e lec t ion 3.2 Is it an import ant event? 3.3 At t i tudes t o t h e election: t h e whys and
wherefores
4. PROPENSITY TO VOTE 5. VCYI'ING INTENPIONS
5.1 Allegiance t o a p o l i t i c a l par ty increases propensity t o vot e
5.2 Are candidates' ideas about hkrope more important than t h e i r party al legiance?
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: PASI', PRESENT AND FUTURE
1. EUROPI" UNION
1.1 General emot iona1 ident i f icat ion with
1.2 Progress towards European Union over t he European cause
t h e last t e n years
2. COMMUNITY MEMÍ3E8SHIP
2.1 The Common Market: a good t h ing o r a bad thing: now and i n 10-15 years
2.2 Understanding between member countr ies over t he last twelve months
2.3 Speeding up or slowing down t h e movement towards European Union
2.4 Hopes and f e a r s about t h e Community 2.5 Sol idar i ty : a t t i t u d e expected from member
2.6 Benefit derived compared with other countries
countries
Page
1
2
2 '6
11
15
15 24 31
31 35
39 48 58
58
61
62
62
62
66
69
69
74
79 87
95
102
3. SPANISH I\P;EKBERSHIP OF THE COIEXUNITY
INTRODUCTION
In around f i v e months' time, between 7 and 10 June, some 180 mil l ion men and women throughout the Community w i l l f o r t he first time be cal led upon t o e l e c t t he new 410-member European Parliament d i rec t . Euro-Barometer deals l a rge ly with t he public's views and a t t i t udes concerning t ha t event.
O f course, the e lec t ion campaign i s not yet properly under way, and debate on the subject - though often l i ve ly - i s s t i l l largely confined t o what we might call the "po l i t i c a l circles" i n each country, t ha t i s t o say government, Mps, par ty leaders and a c t i v i s t s , etc. precise ly i n order t o sound out the opinions of t he general public before the campaign opens t ha t the Commission had t h i s survey conducted using a broader s e t of questions than i n previous Euro-Barometers.
This t en th
But it was
The first chapter shows recent t rends i n the usual socio- poli t ical indicators: s a t i s f ac t i on o r d i s s a t i s f ac t i on with the l i f e w e lead and with the way democracy works, and basic attitudes towards society.
Chapter II dea l s primarily with the public's views on the European e 1 ec t i ons.
And f i n a l l y chapter III looks at a t t i t udes t o the Common Market and t o the prospect of i ts fu r the r expansion.
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X x
We have t r i e d t o keep comments t o a s t r i c t minimum and t o pick out the r e s u l t s and analyses which w i l l be of greates t value t o everyone who is going t o be involved i n the campaign f o r the European Parliament e lect ions , whether as a p o l i t i c a l leader o r simply as a voter. t o many other in te rpre ta t ions - some of which w i l l be made i n the coming weeks. f o r consultation, s o t ha t any public o r pr ivate organization, p o l i t i o a l paxty or research body in te res ted w i l l be f r e e t o make i ts own analyses, e i t he r t o t e s t the v a l i d i t y and relevance of our conclusions, or possibly t o consider i n a d i f f e r en t l i g h t some of the aspects of soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e which we have been studying.
The findings are open
In any case, as explained i n the Annex, all the d a t a a re available
I -
I - 2 -
I
SOCIO-POLITICAL INDICATORS
Three general ind ica tors were chosen as being par t i cu la r ly relevant ' :
.
. sa t i s f ac t i on ( o r d i s s a t i s f ac t i on ) with the l i f e we lead;
s a t i s f ac t i on ( o r d i s s a t i s f ac t i on ) with t he way democracy works;
. basic socio- poli t ical options: revolution, reform o r defence against a l l subversive forces.
"On the whole, are YOU very s a t i s f i ed , f a i r l y s a t i s f i e d , not very s a t i s f i ed , o r not at a l l s a t i s f i e d with the l i f e you lead?tt
Once again, as Graph 1 shows, there i s l i t t l e change i n t he l eve l s of s a t i s f ac t i on with l i f e recorded i n each of t he nine countries, the di f ferences between countr ies therefore remaining much the same.
Tables 1 and 2, which juxtapose the r e s u l t s f o r autumn 1977 and autumn 1978, show t h a t t h i s s t a b i l i t y i s common t o all social groups.
'See Euro-Barometer No 9, July 1978, pp. 1-10.
f ' 11 I
f a i t 1 Ver s a t i s f i e d
P l u t ô t sa: t i s f a i t / . f a i r l y sa- t i s f i e d
P l u t ô t pas s a t i s f a i t / N o t v e r y s a t i s f i e d
Pas s a t i s - f a i t du t o u t / Nol
G r a p h i q u e no 1 / Graph 1
LA SATISFACTION DE LA VIE Q U E L'ON MENE / SATISFACTION WITH THE LIFE W E LEAD
T r è s s a t i s -
D K I RL B N L U K
!El
I * * 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
a t a l l sa- t i s f i e d
. . L * 1
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
I
I w
- 4 -
B DK D
% % % %
46 58 20 43 38 65 8 3 12 2 1 1 6
1
100 100 100
3.34 3.53 3.05
1 7 8 3
Table 1
F
11 59 23
2 1
100
2.76
SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED W I T H THE LIFE WE LEAD
%
44 48
5 2
1
100
3.37
2
Very sa t i s f i ed
Fair ly sa t i s f ied
Not very sa t i s f i ed
Not at a l l sa t i s f ied
Don't know
% %
32 22 55 57 8 15 4 5 1 1
100 100
3.16 2.96
6
Total
Index 2
9 54 24 13
100
3.60
Order of counxies
% %
34
49 13 2
. 2
100
3.17
9 5
I RL
%
41
45 8 5 1
100
1.23
4
- __.
- Average weighted by respective populations aged 15 and over.
"not at a l l sat isf ied" = 1; "don't knows" are not included. expressed t o the first decimal place.
I
'Very sa t i s f iedfg = 4, "fair ly sat isf ied" = 3 , "not very sat isf ied" = 2, Percentages
- 5 -
Men
2.95
Table 2
SATISFACTION W I T H LIFE
RELATED TO SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA AUTUMN 1977 AND AUTUMN 1978
Women
2.96
(Community as a whole)
2.89 2.95 2.90 3 .Ol
Total - 3 .O0 3 .O0
2.98 2.99
By age
15-24 25-39 40-54 55 and over
2.96 2.93 2.96 2.97
1 By level of education Elementary Intermediat e Advanced
3 .Ol 3.00 2.94 2.92
2 By family income R- - R-
R+ R+ +
By area of residence Village Small town Large town
Autumn 1977
Women
2.92 3 .O3 3 .O0
1 3.07
3 .Ol 3.00 2.87
v u v w w u v u w w u w
2.90 3 .O4 2.99
7 3.10
2.98 2.99 2.89
'Based on age on completion of full-time education2
2The incomes of interviewees in each country are divided approximately
fifteen years or under, sixteen to nineteen, twenty and over (or still studying).
into quartiles, to facilitate between-country comparisons.
- 6 -
2. Tm WAY DEMICRACY WORKS
"On the whole, a r e you very s a t i s f i e d , fairly s a t i s f i e d , not very s a t i s f i e d o r not at a l l s a t i s f i e d with the way democracy works ( i n your country)?"
The answers t o t h i s question show tha t a t t i t u d e s t o democracy are l e s s constant than a t t i t u d e s t o l i f e i n general. shown i n Graph 2 , while Tables 3 and 4 give a more de ta i l ed breakdown of the r e s u l t s f o r autumn 1977 and autumn 1978.
The trend s ince 1973 i s
Graphique / Graph 2
T r è s s a t i s - f a i t / Ver) s a t i s f i e d
P l u t ô t sa- t i s f a i t / : F a i r l y sa- t i sf i ed
P1 u t b t pas s a t i s f a i t / Not very 2 s a t i sf i ed
LA SATISFACTION DU FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA DEMOCRATlE / - SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS
Pas s a t i s - f a i t du tout /Not a t
1 a l l s a t i s - f i e d 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
*
.
I I
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
I
I 4
Very sa t i s f ied
Fairly sa t i s f ied
Not very sa t i s f ied
Not at a l l sa t i s f ied
Don't know
Tota l
Index
Order of countries
2.
B
% 8 43 18 10 21
100
2.62
7
--
-
L
24 44 20
100
2.95
N UK
% % % 9 8 55 54 26 21
4 6 9 8 4 8
100 100
2.70 2.66
1 5 6
69 16
44 29
2 4
11 11
-
B
% % 4 38 24 13 21
100
2.40
~~~
DK
10 54 24 7 5
100
2.70
7 3
- 8 -
Table 3
SATISFIED OR DISSATISFIED WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS
DK ' IRL I -
% 1 18 45 33
3
EC1
% 6 48 26 13 7
% 10 57 24 6 3
% 12 57 16 6 9
100
2.73 - 100 100
!.89 + 2.48
1 O0
1.87 _I_
1 O0
2.84
3
100
2.51
4 - 9 -
2. AUTUMN 1978 -
D
% _I
9 68 15 2 6
1 O0
! .89
- .__
EC1 -
% 6 43 30 14 7
I I L I N 1 ° K [ 28
- % 4 36 34
- % 10 51 18 11 10
- %
9 44 35 8
Very sa t i s f ied
Fairly sa t i s f ied
Not very sa t i s f ied
N o t at a l l sa t i s f ied
Don't know
46 32 17
9 -- 3/51419 I
100 I100 LOO Tot a l
Index2
Order of countries
Lo; lo; I", 1.88 2.79 2.56 2.49 1.31 12.66 2.42
- c
1 - 81 ~ ~~
'Weighted average. .. ''Very sat isf ied" = 4; "not at a l l satisfied" = 1.
- 9 -
Men
2.51
Table 4
SAT1 SFACTION W I !l?H DEMOCRACY
RELATED TO SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA
AUTUMN 1977 AND AUTUMN 1978
(Community as a whole)
Women
2.52 T o t a l - 2.46 2.50 2.55 2.51
u 1 5-24 25-39 40-54 55 and over
2.43 2.48 2.52 2.60
By level of education
Elementary
Aver age
Advanced
BJ family income
R- - R-
R+
R+ +
1 By leaderrahip rating L-- L-
L+
L+ +
wwwuwwwvwww
2.49 2.57 2.47
2.45 2.46 2.51 2.57
2.53 2.54 2.53 !?:jij; *-"--I
Autumn 1978
Men
2.40
2.29 2.42 2.47 2.39
Women
2.45
2.41 2.41 2.44 2.51
2.43 2.46 2.34
2.47 2.31 2.39 2.53
2.38 2.48 2.47
'See overleaf.
- 1 0-
'(Footnote to Table 4). The leadership rating is produced by combining the answers to two questions, one on frequency of political discussions and the other on capacity to persuade others. See Euro-Barometer No 7, p. 10. Approximate distribution (in numbers and percentages) of the population interviewed by leadership rating is as follows:
Aggregate of Aggregate of Aggregate of Aggregate of polls and polls May and polls April/ polls May and Oct/Nov 1975 Nov 1976 h y and Oct/ Oct/Nov 1978
Nov 1977 % Number % Number % Number % Number
1 eaders ++ 13 2427 14 2514 13 2361 13 2282 + 29 5446 29 5228 31 5547 3 1 5659 - 31 5892 32 5584 34 6171 33 6080
non- leaders -- 27 4995 25 4519 22 3967 23 4254
--_--_ 18 275 --- 100 18-260 ----e- loo --- ------ 12-845 100 -_- 18-046 -_____ loo _ _ _ ------ --- Lotal -----
- 11 -
3. B A S I C ATTITUDES TO SOCIETY
"On t h i s card are three basic kinds of a t t i tudes vis-à-vis the society we l ive in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion.
- The ent i re way our society i s organized must be radical ly changed bx revolutionwy action.
- Onr society must be madually improved by reforme.
- Our present society must be valiantly defended against a l l subversive forces." -
Although t h i s question has sometimes been cr i t ic ized fo r oversimplifying things and forcing interviewees t o choose one of the options, whereas t h e i r r e a l views might l i e somewhere i n between, the resul ta whioh it produces have stood up t o repeated examination. respondents are presented with a limited range of options, but i f they f e l t that a choice was being forced on them, one would expect t o f ind a high proportion of "don't knows", which i s not the case.
It i s t rue that
Each of the suggested al ternat ives corresponds t o a part icular "personal philosophy" (an amalgam of the individual's system of values , po l i t i ca l ideology and reaction t o events) and the answers t o the question can therefore be considered a useful indicator.
Graph 3 shows the trend i n the repl ies given (combined in to an index of a t t i tude) since autumn 1976 and - f o r some countries - since early 1970.
Tables 5 and 6 give i n more d e t a i l the r e su l t s fo r autumn 1977 and autumn 1978.
m cz 4 3 O I-
m W
3 I-
I-
n
n
u
k
2 u m u
: f
Ln
- 1 2 -
N N I .
I' I
I I
I
I
\ I . \ \ \ .
I
\
\ ?
'\
. n
- 1 3 -
60
19
Table 5
BASIC ATTITUDE TO SOCIAL CHANGE
1. .AUTUMN 1977
% %
4 3
55
40
"
61
29 6
100
2.27
EC
4 2
43
44
11
100
2.47
L N U K B DK D
% -
2
4 1
50
7
F I RL I
%
8
65
22
5
%
7
54
26
13
%
10
6 1
27
2
%
4
55
28
13
100
2.2E
4
-
-
-
%
4
55
37
4
I O0
!.3E
3
-
-
-
%
6
55
28
11
100
2.25
-
-
%
6
55
l'The e n t i r e way our s o c i e t y i s organized must be r a d i c a l l y changed by rev0 l u t i onary act ion"
IfOur s o c i e t y must be gradual ly improved by ref orms"
"Our p resen t s o c i e t y must be v a l i a n t l y defended aga ins t a l l subversive forces"
Don't know
32
7
100
2.28
100 100 % 100 100 100 100 Total
Index 1 2.52
1 -
-
3.14
9 -
-
2.22
6 -
--
2.17
7 ~
-
-.
I
5 Order of coun t r i es
2. -1978 -
B
% -
6
61
15
18
100 I--
I RL L N UK
% -.
5
63
25
7
100
2.21
_-
EC
%
7
59
27
7
1 O0 -̂
% I % %
12
70
13
5
%
7
6 1
20 12
%
9
63
24 4
%
5
65
22
8
%
6
63
25
6
"The e n t i r e way our s o c i e t y i s organized must be r a d i c a l l y changed by revolut ionary a c t i on"
"Our s o c i e t y must be gradual ly improved by ref orms"
"Our present s o c i e t y must be v a l i a n t l y defended aga ins t al 1 subversive forces"
Don't know
100 1 O0 1 O0
1.15
6
-
-
100
2.11
5
__
-
100
2.21 --
Tot a l
Index 1 2 .23 2.11 2.01
9 __
-.I
2.15
6 -
I-
3 3 8 - -- 2 / I - Order of coun t r i es
'The index i s worked out by applying t h e c o e f f i c i e n t 1 , 2 o r 3 t o the percentages corresponding t o t h e r e p l i e s "revolutionary action", "reforms", and "defence aga ins t subversion" respec t ive ly ; "donf t knows" a r e not included. the re fore a score of 2.00, corresponding t o t h e "cen t r i s tv f option. A lower score i n d i c a t e s a tendency towards t h e "revolutionary" opt ion and higher scores show a " reac t i onar y" 1 e a n i ng.
The half-way mark i s
- 1 4-
:z;m4! 2.23 2.29
Table 6
2.20 2.22 2.36
BASIC ATTITUDE TO SOCIAL, CHANGE
RELATED TO SOCIAL, AND DEDDGRAPHIC CRITERIA
AUTUMN 1977 AND’AUTUMN 1978
(Community as a whole)
Total - &AE
15-24 25-39 40-54 55 and over
By level of education
Elementary
I n t ermedi a t e
Advanced
By family income
R- - R- R+ R+ +
I& leadership rating L-- L- L+ L+ +
Autumn 1977 I
Women --sk+-
2.35 I 2.39
2.29 2.29 2.29 2.26
2.32 2.32 2.27 2.17
Autumn 1978
Men
2.18
Women
2.25
2.27 2.20 !p$
2.25 2.18 2.21 2.21
2.25 2.26 2.21 pTöq ---
- 1 5-
II
ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The main areas of invest igat ion at t h i s latest po l l were public i n t e r e s t i n Community affairs, awareness of the forthcoming e lect ions t o the European Parliament, the public 's a t t i t ude towards t he e lec t ions and t he l i ke ly turnout on voting day.
1. PUBLIC INTEHEST I N COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
'*Are you personally very in teres ted, a l i t t l e in teres ted, o r not at a l l in te res ted i n the problems of t he European Community ( the Common Market)?"
As t h i s question has been included i n several previous po l l s , we can see how public i n t e r e s t has developed over the last f i v e years. The overal l t rend shows a decline i n most countries i n the proportion of people who consider themselves "very interested" i n Community matters.
The proportion taking t h i s view var ies from one i n four i n I taly (24%) t o only one i n t en i n Belgium (10%); f i v e (I@).
the Community average is one i n
(See Table 7).
On c loser examination, t he r e s u l t s show tha t men - pa r t i cu l a r l y t he under f o r t i e s - generally take more of an i n t e r e s t i n t h e Community than women. But far and away the most s ign i f ican t f ac to r determining the l eve l of i n t e r e s t is leadership rat ing.
(See Table 8).
This prompted us t o compare t he r ep l i e s given by leaders and non-leaders at successive polls . The analysis reveals t ha t i n almost every country, between 1973 and 1978 t he l eve l of i n t e r e s t i n Community affairs f e l l most among opinion leaders. greater i n t e r e s t than others.
They nevertheless continue t o show much (See Graph 4 and Table 9) .
- 1 6-
Table 7
PERSONAL INTEREST IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
Belg ium Sept. 1973 &y 1975 Oct./Hov. 1975 Bov. 1976 Oct . /Nov. 1978
C enma r k Sept. 1973 May 1975 Oct. /Nov. 1975 NOV. 1976 oc t . /mv . 1978
Germany Sept. 1973 May 1975 Oct./Nov. 1975 Nov. 1976 O c t ./Wov. 1978
France Sept. 1973 M a y 1975 Oc t ./Nov. 1975 Nov. 1976 Oc t. /Nov. 1978
I r e 1 and Sept. 1973 May 1975 Oct./Nov. 1975 NOV. 1976 o c t ./NOV. 1978
Sept. 1973 May 1975 Oc t. /Nov. 1975 Nov. 1976 Oct./Nov. 1978
I t a l y
Int erested:
very much
10% 9
10 10 10
'1 4;
22 19 25
1.. -3
!? 23 23
I - :i 6i -
@I
;i 4;
20
23 18 --
27 24 28 21 21
21 24 27 21 24
A litt l e
39% 39 38 46 40
51 50 51 53 54
48 48 51 50 53
45 53 54 57 54
44 48 46 48 48
44 46 46
49 48
Not at a l l
46% 47 49 4 1 43
19 24 2c 20 25
16 22 23 24 25
33 19 22 24 30
29 27 25 30 30
29 27 22 29 21
Don't know
5 7: 5 3 3 7
1 4 2 2 2
5 4 3 3 6
2 1. 1 1 2
i 1 1 1
6 3 5 2 6
T o t a l
100% 100 1 O0 100 100
100 100 100 100 100
1 O0 100 100 100 1 O0
1 O0 100 1 O0 1 O0 1 O0
1 O0 100 100 1 O0 100
1 O0 100 1 O0 100 100
- 1 7 -
Table 7 (conta)
Luxembourg Sept. 1973 May 1975 Oct./ETov. 1975 Nov. 1976 oc t . /mv. 1978
Sept. 1973 &y 1975 Qt. /&v. 1975 Nov. 1976 Oct./Xw. 1978
Netherlands
U n i t e d Kingdom Sept. 1973 m y 1975 Oct./I%v. 1975 Nov. 1976 Cct./Iibv. 1978
COMMUN ITY* Sept. 1973 &y 1975 Oct. /mv. 1975 Nov. 1976 Cct. / lbv. 1978
T o t a l Don’ t Interested:
Very A Not at know much l i t t l e a l l
26 54 18 2 1 O0 33 45 16 6 100 28 55 13 4 1 O0 22 50 24 4 100 17 55 26 2 100
23 47 27 3 1 O0 1 6 45 3 1 8 1 O0 18 47 27 8 100 20 57 21 2 100 21 57 19 3 100
43 3 1 3 1 O0 42 19 4 100 45 25 2 1 O0
28 48 23 1 100
4 !Tg: --, 50 29 2 100
24 45 27 4 100 26 47 23 4 100 24 49 24 3 1 O0 22 51 25 2 1 O0 19 5 1 26 4 1 O0
‘Excluding Northern Ireland in 1973. ‘Weight ed average .
Table 8
55+
01 /O
26
48
24
2
100
1133
PERSONAL INTEREST I N COMMUNITY AFFAIRS mLATED TO SOCIAL AND IXEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA
15-24
%
11
55
31
3
100
790
( C o m m u n i t y as a whole, October/November 1978)
01 10
19
51
26
Int erest ed:
Very much
A l i t t l e
N o t at a l l
Don' t know
%
Ig 52
22
To ,al
Base
o.' /O
14
59
24
3
100
I Sex 1 Total 1 % %
14 13
51 40
30 38
5 5
100 100
1214 1038 i 1437
50 54
4 2 -
100 1 100 I loo
8791 ___II__
loo
4220 4571
Men ageds
846
25-39
%
24
57
18
1
100
1213
40-54
%
26
50
21
3
1 O0
1012
- --1 Women aged:
25-39 140-54 i 55+ r
I I
I c. 03
I
td
(D
5 W cr
r O O
cr O O
r O O
Iu 4
W P r M m w m w
I_
N " i? N r m r
r u l o se . O "
03 Iu
W P W W -- Iu P 03 W
O 03
ro cn Iu ul
cr --
O W -4
P m cr
cr P cn cn
cr 03
O
N O ul m
m O ul
N W m O
N 03 W P
el E: c
El 4 c + -.
" N S I o v o 0 ò?
I
I 1
I
Village
Small town
-- -
- _ _ Large town
: lement ary
htermediat t - - - -
Advanced .__._ . - -
S t i l l studying
Mode st
Below average
Above average
Well o f f
._ . - ..
I
Won-
(+>
Leaders
(fl-)
- 6 1 -
Graphique no 4 / Graph 4
S' INTERESSENT "BEAUCOUP"
AUX PROBLEMES DE LA COMMUNAUTE SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP
bU'X
50
40
30
20
10
o
ARE "VERY" INTERESTED I N THE PROBLEMS OF THE COMMUNITY - BY LEADERSHIP INDEX -
.++
+ ---
1X/1973 X1/1976 X- X I / 1 Y78
- 21 -
Table 9
Leaders (+t)
A U t W n i 1973 Autumn 1976 Autumn 1978
Leaders (+) Autumn 1973 Autumn 1976 Autumn 1978
Non- 1 eaders (- ) Autumn 1973 Autumn 1976 Autumn 1978
- Non- leaders ( - - )
Autumn 1973 Autumn 1976 Auturlln 1978
VERY IBTJ3RESTED IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS: C W a BY COUNTRY BET" 1973 AND 1978
BY BADERSHIP RATING
3 8% 34 35
20 11 15
6 8 8
2 3 3
-
DK
54% 54 53
31 32 20
21 22 11
12 5 5
- D
634: 63 52
38 29 22
17 17 12
5 4 3
-
46% 40 33
28 24 14
15 13 11
8 4 3
II
I RL -
52% 45 46
40 31 33
26 21 15
9 9 12
-
I _I
4 7: 39 49
28 29 35
15 16 16
8 6 9
NL i-
55% 16 36
30 21 22
13 14 10
10 6 19
7
UK _c_
54% 56 40
35 41 27
20 23 18
8 9 5
--
- EC' -
53% 48 42
32 29 24
16 17 14
7 6 6
I_
'Weighted average *Not available
- 2 2 -
The extent of in te res t i n Community a f f a i r s is clear ly related t o respcndents' social and po l i t i ca l ideology. But how closely the two a re linked, and even whether the correlation is posit ive or negative d i f f e r s f rom country t o country.
As can be seen from Table 10, which re la tes t o contacts aged over 18 - those e l ig ib le t o vote i n June - people on the l e f t of the po l i t i ca l spectrum are on the whole more interested i n Community affairs (and f o r tha t matter i n other po l i t i ca l issues and p o l i t i c s i n general). tendency i s part icular ly evident i n Denmark, where the far l e f t i s strongly opposed t o membership of the European Community. United Kingdom on the other hand, more in te res t is expressed i n Community affairs by people on the right.
This
I n Ireland and the
This analysis must however be t reated with caution, i n view of the s ize of the samples, the unequal dis t r ibut ion between l e f t and r ight and a lso perhaps the different interpretat ions which are given in the various countries t o the termsIQefiYand "right". Nevertheless, it does at leas t give a first indication of j u s t how complex people's a t t i tudes t o Europe can be: essent ia l s tep towards becoming personally involved i n it?
and a f t e r a l l , isn ' t being interested i n something the first
We w i l l f ind t h i s point cropping up again and again i n the comments concerning d i rec t elections.
- 23 -
B DK D F IR1 I L NL
6.24 5.49 5.94 4.71 6.20 4.33 5.66 5.35
66% 90% 85% 85% 89% 87% 85% 94%
Table 10
VERY INTERESTED I N C0I”ITY AFFAIRS
HELATED TO POSITION ON THE POLITICAL SPl3CTRUM
CONTACTS AmD OVER 18’ ’
UK EC
5.63 5.25
92% 87%
Tot a l
B
10%
Faz l e f t
L e f t
Centre
Right
F a r right
Average
(13)
la 8
15
1 2
16.18
4- 19% 174
- 7 R L I I I L I NL 1 UIT 14% 22% 25% 17% 21% 20%
[;?-rl 24
18 19
24 17
24 23
19
- 5.33 5.84
- EO
19%
El 20
17
20
17
5.22
‘Interviewees were invited t o place t h e i r views on a scale from 1 ( l e f t ) About nine out of ten of those interviewed, though only t o 10 (right).
two out of three Belgians, agreed t o answer t h i s question. shows the percentage who answered i n each country, together w i th national averages on the scale:
The tabTe below
nat iona1 average
Percentage of contacts who agreed t o answer
2Figures i n brackets indicate samples of less than 50 people f o r the category. caution, in view of the s i z e of the sample.
I n addition, the resu l t s f o r Luxembourg should be t reated with
- 24 -
Germany" 33% Denmark 49%
Netherlands 40% Ireland 47% Belgium 4 6%
2.
Questions designed t o f i nd out how much the pub
F'IJBLIC AWARENESS OF THE ELECTION
51% t 1 8
60% +11
48% t 8
48% + 1
49% t 3
i
i c rea
40%
37%
22% 28%
28%
l y knows ab0 t the r e lec t ion of t he European Parliament were first asked i n spr ing 1977 repeated throughout t he Community i n October/November 1978.
and
t 2 2
t 1 2
t 9
t11 t 9
"Have you recen t ly seen o r heard i n t he papers, o r on the r a d i o o r TV, anything about t he European Parliament? This i s t he parliamentary assembly of t he E E C o r Common luIarket?l*
IF YES: "Can you remember what it was tha t you heard then?"
(DO NOT PRESS OR SUGGEST OR PROMFT)
The answers showed t h a t t he l eve l o f awareness had changed very l i t t l e over the eighteen months: approximately half of those interviewed claimed t o have seen o r heard some item about the European Parliament and of t ha t number just under one i n two i n 1977 and j u s t over one i n two i n 1978 was able t o r e c a l l exact ly what i s sue w a s being discussed.
A l l i n a l l a f a i r l y disappointing s e t of r e s u l t s and on c lose examination even worse f o r some countr ies than f o r others.
Disregarding Luxembourg i n view of the s ize of the sample, w e f ind t ha t vague and/or de f in i t e awareness had increased i n only f i v e countries ( G e r m a n y , Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium) between spr ing 1977 and autumn 1978.
(See Tables 11 and 13)
TABLE 11
INCREASE IN LEVEL OF PUBLIC AWMNESS O F DIRECT ELECTIONS BETWEXN SPRING 1971 AND AUTUMN 1978
O f every 100 interviewed
H a d seen o r heard"somethin$' about the European Parliament 7 ,-- ' 1977 I 1978 I A
I I---.-.
Remembered t ha t t he item j w a s about the e lec t ion 1
1977
18%
2 5%
13%
17%
19%
7---
'See,Euro-Ba.rometer No 7, Ju ly 1977, pp. 38-41. 2A W I D survey conducted i n August 1978 ( r e s u l t s not published) showed tha t
70% of interviewees i n Germany, when asked a question r e f e r r i ng spec i f i c a l l y t o t he e lec t ion of t he European Parliament, s t a ted t ha t they had heard something about it. This question was c l ea r ly much more suggestive than the one used i n Euro-Barometer.
c
- 25 -
_I_ -
I t a l y
United Kingdom 1 France
I -
O f every 100 interviewed
H& o r heard\\somethin&f Remembered that the item was about the European about the election
Pal;li ament
1977 1978 A 1977 1978 A 52% 49% - 3 26% 27% + 1
44% -14 20% 18% - 2 58%
57% 57% O 37% 27% -10
I b
It is i n Germany then tha t the level of awareness has r i sen most over the last eighteen months despite the fac t tha t al l the major po l i t i ca l par t ies are i n favour of d i rec t elections, a factor which could have put a damper on the debate. Next behind G e r m a n y comes Denmark, where, by contrast, d i rec t elections are sti l l a burning issue both between and within the Danish po l i t i ca l parties.
There was l i t t l e change i n I ta ly , while i n the United Kingdom and fiance the general level of awareness dropped:
(i) i n the United Kingdom there was a substantial drop i n vague mareness (down 14 points) while def ini te awareness remained more or l e s s s t a t i c ;
i n France the percentage of those who had heard something about the Parliament remained unchanged (57%) but the percentage of those who remembered exactly what dropped by 10 points.
(ii)
(See Tables 12 and 13)
TABLE 12
DECREASE IN LEXEL OF PUBLIC AWARWESS OF DIRECT .ET,ECTIONS BETWEEJ? SPRING 1971 AND AUTUMN 1978
'An IFOP survey conducted i n early September 1978 ( resu l t s not published) showed that 52% of interviewees i n France claimed t o have seen or heard something on the sub ject and 22% remembered without prompting that the subject was direct elections.
- 26 -
Table I A
BelgiUm
spring 1977 autumn 1978
Denmark
spring 1977 autumn 1978
@many
spring 1977 autumn 1978
k.ance
spring 1977 September 1978l Oct ./Nov. 1978 Ireland
spri+@ 1977 autumn 1978
spring 1977 autumn 1978
spring 1977 autumn 1978
spring 1977 autumn 1978
Unit ed Kingdom spring 1977 autumn 1978
s p r h g 1977
I t a l y
Luxembourg
Net herlands
COMMUNITY
autumn 1978
PUBLIC AWARENESS OF DIRECT ELECTIONS
-- Had seen o r he& 'somethingvF about the Europe
T o t a l
(A+B)
46% 49
49 60
33 51
57 52 57
47 48
52 49
62 49
40 48
58 44
49 50 P
i ~ par1 i am, Ment i onec d i rec t election:
( A )
19% 28
25 37
18 40
37 22 !?$
17 28
26
I - J
27
37 30
13 22
ZO 18
24 28
t
Did noi mentior d i r ec t e l ec t i c
( B l
27% 21
24 23
15 11
20 30 30
30 20
26 22
25 19
27 26
38 26
25 22
...-
H a d not seen or he ard anything about the Europe an Parliamen
(C)
45% 43
48 37
47 32
40 46 41
49 49
44 45
29 49
47 48
39 53
43 43
No reply
( D l
9% 8
3 3
20 17
3 2 2
4 3
4 6
9 2
13 4
3 3
9 7 ---
T o t a l
A t B t C t D )
100% 100
100 1 O0
100 100
1 O0
100
100 100
100 1 O0
100 100
1 O0 100 e
x 100 1 O0
100 100
- 27 -
l .
It i s d i f f i c u l t t o explain why as polling d w approaches and the debate i n po l i t i ca l c i rc les hots up a t t rac t ing wide press coverage (part icular ly t rue i n Rance and the United Kingdom), public awareness over the last eighteen months should have increased s o l i t t l e i n some countries and even dropped i n others.
The most plausible hypothesis would seem t o be that the d i rec t elections debate i n both countries i s by i ts very nature producing a negative rather than a positive effect on the general public as the in t r icac ies of the opposing arguments are not immediately clear. We w i l l f ind the same problem ar i s ing i n connection with the answers t o other questions.
A breakdown of the answers t o the question on public awareness of d i rec t elections i s given i n Tables I4 and 15; these can be compared with Tables 24 and 25 i n Euro-Barometer No 7.
In autumn 1978 as i n spring 1977 men turned out t o be much be t te r informed than women i n all countries; similarly, contacts with an advanced education were much more l ike ly t o know about the elections than those who had l e f t school before the age of 16. But the most t e l l i n g factor was leadership ra t ing (leadership being a tendency t o discuss po l i t i c s f a i r l y frequently combined with the ab i l i t y t o persuade others). examination of the resu l t s f o r each country by leadership r a t ing can help t o show us t o what extent information about d i rec t elections i s reaching the public.
A n
Graph
(1)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv>
(4
5 shows f ive d i s t inc t trends i n the information awareness pattern:
i n Denmark, G e r m a n y , Ireland and the Netherlands awareness increased among the public i n general and opinion leaders i n particular ( t h i s is i n fact what we would have expected);
i n Belgium more of the general public knew about the election, .
but, strangely enough, opinion leaders would seem t o have reached saturation point, possibly because they have had other more pressing problems on t h e i r minds (downfall of the Tindemans Government, dissolution of Parliament and elections) ;
i n the United Kingdom it i s only the non-leaders who have reached saturation point ;
i n I t a l y the level of awareness remained constant irrespective of leadership rating;
i n France and apparently i n Luxembourg too there w a s a decline i n the level of awareness of direct elections among leaders and non-leaders alike; find out exactly why.
a more detailed study would be necessary t o
Table 14
B e l g i U m
Denmark
Germany
France
Ire1 and Italy
Luxembourg Nether lands
Uni t ed Ki ngdom
C O M " I T y 2
PUBLIC AWARENESS OF DIRECT EGEXTIONS
RELATED TO SEX AND ADE'
Total
28%
37 40
27
28
27
30
22
18
28
r o t a l
32%
46 50
39
33
37
32
3 1
25
37
15-24
34%
38 39
25
25 3 1
19
28
24
30
Men
75-39
41%
43 50
46 36 44
43
29
19
40
10-54
33% 45
56
42
37
35
35
25
26
40
jg- i
22%
52
50
37
35 22
24
38 27
37
24%
28
3 1
17
23
18 28
1 5
11
20
15-24
2 9%
29
34
12
2 1 22
17
19
10
20
Women
?5-39
24%
3 2 3 1
16
2 8 23
28
11 8
20
40-54
23% 30 32
19 24 1 2 3 6 2 1 17
2 1
55
20%
23
29
18
20 eo
15
2 3 10 11
I
I
19
Percentage of contacts i n each category who have heard "something' about the European Parliament and can recall without prompting that the subject was direct elections.
I
:We i ght ed aver age
I I
Table 15
~-
3vanced
5 2% 49
49 43 4 1
47
45
29
28
PUBLIC AWARENESS OF DIRECT ELECTIONS
RELATED TO INCOME, EDUCATION m ~ D E R S H I P RATING’
L-- L- L+ L++
14% 24% 43% 44%
20 3 1 40 67
15 37 50 8 1
10 23 33 49 18 26 38 42
8 27 35 45
18 24 35 39
9 17 2 1 40
8 17 24 30
I h3 w I
Belgium Denmark
Germany
F r a n c e I r e 1 a n d
I t a ly
Luxembourg Net her lands
U n i t e d Kingdom
C0”TY2
Total
2 8%
37 40
27 28
27
30 22
18
28
R- -
21% 32
32
20 22
19
22
20
11
22
Income
R-
28%
37 39 22 21
29
16
17
21
28
R+
25%
38 48
32 3 1 29
36
20
23
33
R++
39% 45
49
44 44
36
54
3 1
19
37
Elem- ntarN
15% 32
35 20 19
18
24
19
13
22
Education I Leadership rating
nt er- ediatc
28% 40
45
28 34
40
3 1 22
24
32
’ ) %ee footnotes t o Tables 2 and 4.
- 30 -
G r a p h i q u e no 5 / G r a p h 5 L ' INFORMATION DU PUBLIC
SUR L ' E L E C T I O N EUROPEENNE
SELON L E DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP
80
60
4P
20
O
,BELGIQUE/BELGIE
/ -- ................... y -
FRANCE
....................
LUXEMBOURG
*- --- -, ................... 1
V I \ ' 1.977 X- X ! 1978
PUBLIC AWAREZESS O??
,DIRECT ELECTIOmS
BY LEADERSHIP RATING
DANMARK
/ - --* ........
w - . - *
,**..o - a * - ..
1 I
IRELAND
/ . /-' . I .I
/*, .......... ...... VEDERLAND
4? l/--
e.:... ............
L ++
DEUTSCHLAND
..u
I ........ I T A L I A
y-- -..-.- ................... -
1
UNITED KINGDOM
..................... I
L + NL - .-.-- NL -- ............
- 31 -
3. ATTITUDES TO THE EBCTION *
. 3.1 For or against the election
Despite the weak impact that the election would appear t o have had on the public a8 revealed by the rather unsuccessful e f fo r t s t o e l i c i t a glpontaneous reference t o the event -the vast majority are nevertheless i n favour of the basic principle.
T n June of next year the ci t izens of countries belonging t o the Ehropean Community, including (your country), w i l l be asked t o vote t o e lec t members of the Mopean Parliament. en t i t led t o vote. Are you, yourself, for or against t h i s particular e lec t i on?"
Everybody w i l l be
There w a s l i t t l e change here on previous polls with an average of seven i n ten i n favour: Luxembourg and the Netherlands compared with 54% i n Denmark.
80% or more expressed support i n I ta ly ,
Graph 6 shows the trend i n at t i tudes towards d i rec t elections since 1973l
Details for each country are given i n the Annex (Table 1) ; below summarizes the main points.
Table 16
'The index is worked out by applying the coefficients 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively t o the rep l ies "completely for", " t o some extent for", V.o some extent against'? and "completely against".
- 32 -
W O a W
a m cu L & c,
\ r: c, c, O 1 s a s U aJ L W
Lc, c l 0 c, s x c x e- h o w o w a- P u r c w aJ W c , .ec,
- E v , :ro w v, co o s r s
W E co o c , m c, ul w n.,- S L 3 m 3 E m - 0 0 - o m o o m n + Y - n+ ro kuru
- 33 -
34
38
22
25
Table 16
FOR OR AGAINST THE ELEXTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE
2 1
25
2 1
17
ttFortl
Autumn 973 Autumn 975 Autumn 976 Autumn 977 Spring 978 Autumn 1978
-
"Against"
Autumn 1973
Autumn
Autumn
Autumn
Spring
Autumn
97 5 976 977 978 978
ttDont t knowtt
Autumn 1973
Autumn 1975 Autumn 1 976 Autumn 1977
Spring 1978
Autumn 1978
- B
% -
52
53
69
63
64
62
14 9
9
12 14
13
DK
%
36
32
42
54
54
54
43
43
37
29 22
22
22 25
I
24 24
D
%
69
73
76
73
74
70
12
11 10
11 7 7
19
16
14
16
19 23
F
%
. 5 1
69
69
70
67
67
18 13
13
14 12 11
3 1
18 18
16
21 22
-
I RL
% -
45
56
63 74
7 1
75
3 1
23
14
11 10
7
24
2 1
23
15
19 18
-
I
%
64
78
77
79
77
80
12
8 8
9 7 7
24
14
15
12
16 13
-
L
% -
67
75
77
76
82
80
12
7 9
14 11 12
21
18 14
10 7 8
-
_- NL
% -
62
59
74
77
80
82
16
11 11
10 9
8
22
30
15
13
11 10
U K 1
% -.-
33
4 1
57
69
65
63
49
42
22
18 17 2 1
18
17 2 1
13
18 16
- 2
EC
% 1_
54
64
69
72
7 1
70
23
18 14
13 11
11
23 18 17
15
18 19
! - 'Great Rritah only i n 1973 *Weighted average
- 3 4-
It would appear then that the d ie is cast. unlikely that there w i l l be many conversions between now and polling day. The most tha t can be expected is the odd vaci l la t ion between the "completely fortt and *'to some extent for t t camps as the election campaign gains momentum, but l i t t l e more.
I n other words it is highly
In fac t , a t t i tude t o the principle of d i rec t elections i n most of the countries concerned is affected very l i t t l e by the t radi t ional ideological clashes. breakdown i n the a t t i tudes of the over-18s on the basis of t he i r position on the pol i t ica l spectrum.
This i s confirmed by Table 17, which gives a
Table 17
FOR OR AGAINST DIRECT ELEXTIONS
RELATED TO POSITION ON POLITICAL SPECTRUM OVER 18s'
Extreme l e f t For Against Index
L e f t - For Against Index
Centre For Against Index
-
Right For Against Index
Ektreme Right For Against Index
B
x (57) (17)
2.89)
65 16
3.24
64 1 2
3.11
80 13
3.17
73 10
3.18
DK -3-
35 58
2 .O9
48 38
2.64
55 19
2.97
70 16
3.lC
72 12
3.37
D %
(85 1 ( - )
(3.26
53 9
3.16
74 6
3.21
66 11
3 .O5
77 9
3.25
- F %
55 29
2.81
I_
76 11
3.13
72 7
3.18
75 9
I .34
68 5
1.19 -
-- I RL
T
(57) (31 1
2.71
72 14
3.21
78 7
3.38
81 5
3.45
82 2
1.59 -
-- I x
72 14
3.17
83 6
3.38
84 5
3.41
84 9
3.31
(93: ( - ;
3.44 -
L
%
(67: ( - i
3.25)
86 1 2
3.25
85 9
3.26
82 14
3.10
(501 (21;
2.80)
-_ -
NL T
73 21
3 .o9
86 4
3.50
86 5
3.47
84 8
3.39
78 9
3.3E -
-
U K %
37 50
2.22
66 18
3.12
66 20
3 .O3
73 11
3.25
69 26
2.97
Ec
%
63 23
2.92
76 10
3.22
74 10
3.21
73 11
3.22
76 11
3.20
. See footnote t o Table 10. I
0
- 3 5-
While basic a t t i tudes for or against the election are unlikely t o change very much between now and polling day, the same cannot be said of the importance attached t o the election, determination t o vote and, obviously, the actual voting pattern.
Determination t o vote and voting pattern w i l l be looked at l a t e r i n the report, importance attached t o the election bear out what was said above about the weak impact the event has had on the public.
However, the answers t o the following question on the
3.2 Is it an important event?
The following question has been asked regularly since autumn 1976.
"Which one of these opinions comes closest t o your own on the future elections t o the European Parliament?
. It is an event with important consequences which is cer tain t o make Europe more pol i t ica l ly unified,
. It is an unimportant event because the national governments w i l l not be bound by the votes i n the Ehropean Parliament."
For the past two years the percentage of persons questioned throughout the Community who view the election as an w.rent with important consequences has been consistently around 5076, while approximately 30% consider it an unimportant event and 20% are undecided.
(See Table 18)
Not surprisingly, opinion leaders are generally much more committed and a t t r ibute greater importance t o the event than the general public.
(See Table 19)
But the most interest ing point t o emerge is the d i f fe r ing change i n a t t i tude i n individual countries: s ignif icant increase i n support for the first option since autumn 1976 (up by 11 points). proportion viewing the election as an important event has f a l l en since spring 1977 by 11, 10 and 8 points respectively.
only i n Denmark has there been any
In Luxembourg, the Netherlands and France the
o
- 36 -
B
"It is an event with import ant consequences which is m a i n to make Europe more poli t ical ly unif iedn
Autumn 19'76 53 spring 1977 55 Autumn 1977 49 Spring 1978 46 Autumn 1978 50
"It is an unimportant event because natioml governments w i l l not be bound br votes i n the European P a r l i ament ~2
-
Autumn 1976 19 spring 1977 16 Autumn 1977 20 Spring 1978 24 Autumn 198 20
Don't know
Aut" 1976 28 spring 1977 29 Autumn 197 31 spring 1978 30 Autumn 1978 30
Table 18
DK D F I R L I L PIL U K .Ec1 - -
% % % % % % % % % %
35 47 46 38 56 53 48 41 48 40 41 58 50 62 64 58 51 53 44 46 49 48 59 52 52 47 50 42 44 46 47 58 54 48 44 48 46 40 50 52 63 53 48 50 50
33 35 28 27 19 25 29 3 1 28 25 37 23 28 22 20 28 29 27 3 1 35 27 24 25 28 33 32 30 30 34 30 31 21 3 1 36 34 30 24 35 26 26 19 24 32 30 28
32 18 26 35 25 22 23 28 24 35 22 19 22 16 16 14 20 20 25 19 24 28 16 20 15 21 20 28 22 24 22 2 1 15 16 22 22 30 25 24 22 18 23 20 20 22
IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS
'Weighted avera,ge. 2The wording of th i s question i n November 1976 w a ~ nHeads of State will not be bound *.*e.o'.
- 37 -
Table 12
IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN ELECTIONS
BY LEADERSHIP RATING
Event with important c onse quences
Autumn 1976 Spring 1977 Autumn 1977 Spring 1978 Autumn 1978
Unimport ant event
Autumn 1976 spring 1977 Autumn 1977 Spring 1978 Autumn 1978
Dont t know
Autumn 1 976 SPring 1977 Autumn 1977 Spring 1978 Autumn I978
(Community as a whole)
Non-1 eaders
( - - I
%
36 36
36
35
35
22
26
26
26
27
42
38
38
39 38
( -1
%
46
51
49
48
49
30 29
32
29
27
24
20
19
23 24
Leaders --.-.
(+>
%
55
61 59
54
58
29
27
29
32 28
16
12
12 14
14
(++>
%
56
62 56
56 60
34
29
32
35
3 1
10
9
12 9 9
-
- 38 -
An unimportant event
The tendency t o regard the elections as an important event r i s e s with the level of support,
58
(See Table 20)
Total
Base
However, there is no s ignif icant correlation between the importance interviewees at tach t o the elections and t he i r position on the po l i t i ca l spectrum.
100 100
438 567
(See Table 21)
Table 20
IElPORTANCE ATTACHED TO FUROPEAN ELECTIONS
Bp THE OVER 18s RELATED TO ATTITUDE TO THE
PRINCIPU INVOLVED
(Community as a whole)
I I For every 100 who are:
I against I ag ains t
An event with important come quence s I 18 1 22
Don * t know 1 24
55
I 23
t o some extent
for
%
54
30
16
100
3469
completely for
%
76
15
9
100
2679
d
- 39 -
Table 21
IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO DIRECT ELECTIONS
BY THE OVEXi-18s RELATED TO POSITION ON POLITICAL SPECTRUM'
(Community as a whole)
Regard e lec t ions as:
An event with important consequences
An unimportant event
Don't know
Total
Bas e
'See footnote t o Table 10.
Far l e f t
%
45
37 18
1 O0
I 808
Left
%
55
29 16
100
1664
Centre
%
53
27 20
1 O0
284 1
Right
%
49
32 19
1 O0
1291
3.3 Att i tude t o the e lect ion: the whys and wherefores
F m ri&t
%
55
25 20
100
564
One objective of t h i s pre- election survey was obviously t o explore the ideas and emotions underlying the overal l a t t i t u d e t o d i r e c t e lec t ions . A number of questions asked i n previous opinion p o l l s were repeated with t h i s i n mind: e lec t ion and others with the a t t i t u d e expected of European MPs.
some d e a l t with common arguments f o r and against the
3.3.1
"Here a r e some comments about holding the European Parliamentary e lec t ions next year. Please say, f o r each one, whether you agree with it o r not , and how strongly you f ee l .
. Elections a r e necessary t o give more democratic control over the Community and the o f f i c i a l s i n Brussels.
&guse@s for 2nd- a.g@pslf: &iregt,e&egt&o;s
- 40 -
. Elections a r e necessary t o decide what kind o f Europe we w a n t .
. They would lead t o too much power f o r the European Parliament compared with our own Parliament i n (country)."l
The first point t o emerge i s t ha t t he r ep l i e s have remained remarkably constant , thus confirming the va l i d i t y of our conclusions2 . The most popular argument f o r holding e lec t ions - endorse,d by three quar ters of the sample - i s t h a t they are necessary t o decide what kind of Europe we w a n t . The need f o r increased democratic control over " o f f i c i a l s i n Brussels" was f e l t by only 63% of contacts. The negative argument t ha t e lec t ions would give too much power t o the European Parliament w a s accepted by 35% and re jected by 43% of those interviewed.
There i s l i t t l e var ia t ion between the nine countries. Nevertheless, although "the kind of Europe we want" w a s more popular than "more control over o f f i c i a l s i n Brussels1* i n e ight of the nine countr ies , the Danes gave almost equal backing t o the two arguments. g rea te r control was f a i r l y well supported i n the United Kingdom too, but s t i l l took second place. d i rec t ly- e lec ted European Parliament might encroach on nat ional parliaments showed tha t t h i s f e a r w a s r a ther more widespread i n Denmark, I re land and the United Kingdom than elsewhere.
The argument f o r
Replies t o the negative suggestion t ha t a
(See Table 22)
'See Euro-Barometer No 7 , July 1977, pp. 55-61 . 2The f ac to r determining the v a l i d i t y of the f indings of an opinion p o l l conducted on representa t ive samples i s the s i ze of the sample and not the sampling r a t e ( i .e . the r a t i o between t he number of contacts and the number of persons represented), of time su f f i c i en t l y shor t t o a l l ow the "time" var iable t o be disregarded more or l e s s amounts t o doubling the s i ze of the sample and hence increas ing the va l i d i t y of the r e s u l t s by fi o r j u s t over 40%.
Repeating a question within a period
- 41 -
46 40
6 2
Table 22
AKGUIGNTS FOR AND AGAINST DIRECT ELXCTIONS
33 28 43 42
8 14 3 3
F - B - %
19 29 11
9 32
O0
!.8E
!.9t
-
- -
- DK
- F
% -
15 42 11
5 27
1 o1 2.9:
2.91
-
-
-
-
31 45
6 3
15
D
%
23 34
9 9
25
1 O0
2.95
3.17
-
- - _- 7
22 35
9 10 24
%
23 42 11
5 19
1 O(
3 .o:
-
-
%
29
6 4
13
L O0
1.16
48
-
-
Libopean e lec t ions a re
I I
22 4 1 11
6 20
i n Brussels
Strongly agree Agree t o some extent Disagree somewhat Disagree t o ta l l y Don't know
11 12
1 O0
2.90
w 100 100 100 1 O0 T o t a l
1978 index
1977 index
2
2
2.98 ml 2.79 12.76
3.Ot -
31 42 10 4
13
LOO
3.15
1.23
-
-
-
-
8 23 29 18 22
2.91 1.19 - 3 .O0
I I European elect ions a r e necessary t o decide what kind of Europe we want
Strongly agree Agree t o some extent Disagree somewhat D i sagree t o t a l l y Don't know
34 32
3 3
28
34 45
6 5
10
1 O0
' .ZO
-
-
32 43
8 4
13
34 44
9 5 8
1 O0
3.15
100
2.91
3.09
-
~
-
20 22 18 11 29
100
3.21
3.3
- -
-
13 21 24 13 29
1 O0 Total
1978 index
1977 index
2
2
3.19 3.38 3.21 3.09
3.39 3.20 (3.511 3.28 '.24 3.25 n These elect ions would lead t o too much power f o r the European Parliament compared with our own Parliament (country)
Strongly agree Agree t o some extent Disagree somewhat Disagree t o t a l l y Don't know
Total
1978 index2 2 1977 index
14 19 21 12 34
O0
!.52
- - -
16 30 25 11 18
11 24 26 17 22
1 O0 -
16 22 29 23 10
1 O0 LOO
1-27
1-37
-
- -
1 O0
2.4; -
. O0 1 O0 -
.63
.61 - - -
2.37
2.37
2.34
2.25 1.47 - 2.4: - __
'Weight ed average
2ftStrongly agree" = 4; "Disagree to t a l ly" = 1.
- 4 2-
Opinion leaders were more ready than the r e s t t o answer these r e l a t i ve ly "tricky" questions. I n addi t ion, analys is showed a l ink between leadership ra t ings and one of the three arguments: opinion leaders were l e s s a f ra id than non-leaders t ha t d i r e c t e lec t ions might r e s u l t i n t o o much power f o r the European Parliament.
(See Table 23)
A fu r the r point of i n t e r e s t t o emerge w a s t h a t the three arguments did not a l l weigh equally on a t t i t u d e s t o the pr inciple of d i r e c t e lect ions: the second pos i t ive argument - "deciding what kind of Europe we want" - had more bearing than the first posi t ive argument - "deciding what kind of Europe we wantfP - while the negative argument - "could lead t o too much power f o r the European Parliament" - stood somewhere between the two.
..
(See Table 24)
- 43 -
35 52 13
Table 23
ARGUbEWS FY)R AND AGAINST DIRECT ELECTIONS
BY LKADmSHIP RATING
(Community as a whole)
33 59 8
1. FOR EVERY 100 INTERVIEWED
To give more democratic control over o f f i c i a l s i n Brussels
Agree Don' t agree Don't know
80 20
Total
To decide what kind of Europe we want -
Agree Don' t agree Don't know
74 26
Total
Could lead t o too much power f o r European Parliament
A g r e e Don' t agree Don't know
87 13
Total
82 18
2. FOR EVERY 100 WHO REPLIED
To give more democratic control over o f f i c i a l s i n Brussels
Agree Don' t agree
Total
To decide what kind of Europe we want -
Agree Don't agree
Total
Could lead t o too much power f o r European Parliament
Agree Don't agree
Tot al
Base
~
Non-1 eaders
%
47 14 39
100
60 11 29
1 O0
34 25 41
100
77 23
1 O0
86 14
1 O0
58 42
100
( - 1 %
63 17 20
1 O0
78 10 12
100
36 42 22
100
79 21
100
89 11
100
46 54
100
Leaders
( + I I ( + + I %
71 18 11
100
81 12
7
100 I 100
100 1 100
100 I 100
I
100 I 100 I
- 44 -
Table 24
BEARING OF TKF: THF¿EE ARGUMENTS
ON ATTITUDE FOR OR AGAINST THE P R I N C I P L E OF THE ELECTION
( C o m m u n i t y as a whole)
*
i
Atti tude t o d i r e c t e lec t ions
Zomp 1 e t e 1, ga i ns t
~
To some extent against
%
To some extent f o r
Zo mp 1 e t e l y ror
%
17 54 12 3
14
% % To give more democratic control over o f f i c i a l s i n Brussels
Strongly agree Agree t o some extent Disagree somewhat Disagree t o t a l l y Don* t know
15 21 13 30 21
9 34 23 1 5 19
39 40 10 5 6
1 O0 1 O0 100 Total
Index 1
1 O0
2.28 2.47 2.99 3.21
To decide what kind of Europe we want
Strongly agree Agree t o some extent Disagree somewhat Disagree t o t a l l y Don't know
11 28 14 28 19
15 42 16 13 14
29 56
7 2 6
56 35 4 2 3
100 100 100 ~~
100 Total
Index 1 2.28 3.19 3.51 2.67
Could lead t o too much power f o r European P a r l i ament
Strongly agree Agree t o some extent Disagree somewhat Disagree t o t a l l y Don't know
9 20 3 1 30 10
45 17
5 12 2G
100
23 31 15
8 29 33
9 100 Tot al
3 .20 2.08 1 Index
Base 438 3469 1 2679
l t * ~ t r o n g l y agree" = 4 J "Disagree t o t a l l y" = 1 .
- 45 -
3.302
"Which of the followinp a t t i t u d e s would you expect a member of the European Parliament representing (your country) t o have?
. He should supDort things t h a t a re pood f o r Europe as a wholer even if they a re not always good f o r (your country) at the time.
. He should support the i n t e r e s t s of (your country) a l l the time whether o r not they are Rood f o r Europe as a whole."
This question, in ten t iona l ly provocative, i s an extremely valuable indicator of public a t t i t ude l . The Dutch were again alone i n strongly favouring the "supranational" approach,which w a s re jected by the majority of I r i s h , Danish and Br i t i sh contacts. "nationalists" i n I t a l y , Luxembourg and Germany but did not have an absolute majority, while i n Belgium and France the "nat ional is ts" were j u s t ahead.
(See Table 25)
"Supranationalists" a l so were s t i l l more numerous than
I n a l l countries the "supranational" option found more favour among leaders than non-leaders. However, even leaders proved more than "supranational" i n Denmark and Ireland , but not i n the United Kingdom . These f indings a re i l l u s t r a t e d i n Graph 7 , where each pa i r of columns corresponds t o a given leadership r a t i ng (NL--, HL-, L+, L + + ) ; each p a i r the column t o the l e f t represents the "supranational" option and the column t o the r i gh t the "national" option. The l i n e s jo ining the tops of the left-hand columns and the right-hand columns show whether and t o what extent the corresponding option gains o r loses support according t o leadership rat ing. The d i s t r i bu t i on of r e p l i e s f o r Denmark and Ireland var ies s ign i f ican t ly f r o m t ha t observed elsewhere, i n the Netherlands i n par t i cu la r .
within
'The more a person supports d i r ec t e lect ions , the more he/she i s l i ke ly ra ther than "national" i n t o expect European MPs t o be
out look
ATTITUDE EXPECTED OF EUROPEAN MPs RELATED TO ATTITUDE TO DIRECT ELECTIONS
(Community as a whole)
Att i tude expected of European MPs:
Attitude t o d i r e c t e lect ions Completely To some To s ~ m e Completely extent extent ai ns t
%
Promotion of Community interests Promotionof national i n t e r e s t s
Don't know Tot al 1 O0 100 100 Base 567 3469 2679
- 46 -
Table 25
ATTITUDE EXPECTED.OF EUROPEAN WS: PROMXION OF COMMUNITY OR NATIONAL INTERESTS
" m o r t th ings t h a t a r e fiood f o r Europe asewhole , even i f they a r e not a l w q s good f o r (your country) at the time"
Spring 1977 Autumn 1977 Spring 1978 Autumn 1978
a r e good f o r Europe as a who 1 e '*
Spring 1977 Autumn 1977 Spring 1978 Autumn 1978
Don't know
Spring 1977 Autumn 1977 Apring 1978 Autumn 1978
T o t a l
'Weighted average.
- B
% -
3! 3! 3' 3!
4! 41 4: 41
It 2c 2c 2c
1 oc - -
DK
%
32 36 34 26
46 52 50 55
22 12 16 19
100 -
-
D
% -
41 49 44 41
40 36 33 38
19 15 29 21
1 O0 -
-
- F
%
48 48 45 41
41 40 41 48
11 12 14 11
LOO --
-
- I R l
% -
35 35 3c 2s
56 58 65 65
5 7 5 6
O0 -
-
- I
%
46 54 44 49
47 39 43 42
7 7
13 9
.o0 -
- L -
%
49 48 46 46
45 43 48 41
6 9 6
13
O0 -
-
- N
% -
62 65 60 64
29 27 31 26
9 8 9
10
LOO -
- UK
% -
41 42 35 37
53 52 57 55
6 6 8 8
.o0 -
EC1
%
44 48 43 42
45 41 43 45
11 11 14 13
LOO
- 47 -
Graphique n o 7 / Graph 7
e3
60
40
20
O0
L ' A T T I T U D E ATTENDUE - ATTITUDE EXPECTED-
D 'UN PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEEN OF EUROPEAN MPs
- SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP' BY LEADERSHIP RATING'
BELGIQUE/BELGIE
FRANCE
LUXEMBOURG
' . ! ! I : * . * . Q
--
3A NMA R K
IRELAND
NEDERLAND
DEUTSCHLAND
I T A L I A
UNITED KINGDOM
Pour chaque degré de leadersh ip , l a colonne de gauche correspond à l ' o p t i o n "supranat ionale" e t l a colonne d.e d r o i t e à l ' o p t i o n "na t iona le" / For each degree of l eadersh ip , the column t o the l e f t corresponds t o the "supranational" option a n d the column t o t he r i g h t t o the "na t iona l" op t ion .
-1
- 48 -
4. m0PENs1TYTovm
An indicator of the probable turnout on election day i s clear ly of part icular interest . Two questions - one which has been featured regularly since spring 1977, and one new one - deal t with t h i s point:
"How l ike ly i s i t tha t you w i l l go and vote? Certainly, probably, probably not o r cer tainly not?"l
When the European Parliamentary elections are held, w i l l you be personally interested t o know the strengths of the different par t ies i n the new European Parliament?"
I n the Community as a whole, more than three-quarters of contacts who w i l l be e l ig ib le t o vote, i.e. those would "certainlyt1 (52%) or *1probably"~25$) turn out on polling day.
ed over eighteen, said tha t they
These percentages have remained much the same since spring 1977. Changes within each country have been m i n i m a l two countries where determination t o vote i s clear ly below the Community average: the turnout, since voting i s compulsory; and Germany, where the electorate seems as yet undecided3 .
; but there are s t i l l
Belgium, where there cannot be much doubt about
These findings are summarized i n Table 26, while Table 27 gives the details.
' In the two countries where voting i s compulsory (Belgium and Luxembourg) t h phrase "even i f voting were not compulsory...n w a s added.
The drop i n the percentage of probable voters i n the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg t h i s time round may be due t o a freak sample. Taldng the r e su l t s of the four consecutive pol ls would give an average of around 74$.
3According t o an ENNID survey *( resul t s not published) conducted i n August 1978 on a sample of Germans aged fourteen and over, 81% claimed they would vote e i ther ltcertainly" (3%) o r llprobablyll (43%); these r e su l t s and ours, it may be pointed out tha t i n each case the percentage of "probable" voters i s higher than tha t of ltdefinitell voters, which would indicate a degree of indecision. Germany w a s the only Community country where t h i s occurred.
Another pol l carried out i n October 1978 by the Kehrmann-Institute (Hamburg) fo r the weekly magazine Quick found tha t 57$ of G e r m a n s aged over eighteen would vote, as against 2% who would not vote and 23% undecided.
without attempting t o explain away the discrepancy between
- 4 9-
Table 26
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Franc e
Ireland
I t a l y
Luxembourg
1
Netherlands
United Kingdom 2
Great Bri ta in
Noy4îhe-m Ireland
C0MMuNI:TY
CERTAIN OR PROBABLE VOTERS OVER 18s
Spring 1977
58%
63
65
78
82
87
80
83
75
75
72
75
'See footnote 3 on page 48.
~~
Autumn 1977
58%
73
72
78
85
88
75
82
75
75
76
77
Spring 1978
61%
70
74
81
83
89
78
86
74
73
74
78
Autumn 1978
56%
73
67
83
85
90
62
84
73
73
78
77
*A Gallup pol l at the end of July 1978 gave 7% fo r people aged eighteen and over i n B r i t d n : 42% "certain" and 2% "probable".
C
- 5 0 -
~
NL
61 64 70 66
22 18 16 18
5 4 3 4
5
.o0
Table 27
DETERMINATION TO VOTE: I N DIRECT ELECTIONS
CONTACTS AGED EIGHTEEN AND OVER
~~
U K
% %
48 49 46 46
27 26 28 27
11 11 11
, 10
4 a 8 9 5 8
11
6 3 4 2 5 4 5 2
2 3 2 3 1 3 2 4
100 -. ~
W i l l cer ta inly go and vote Spring 1977 Autumn 1977 Spring 1978 Autumn 1978
3 3 2 4 4 2 2 4
W i l l probably PO and vote Spring 1977 Aut& 1977 Spring 1978 Autumn 1978
W i l l probably not vote Spring 1977 Autumn 1977 Spring 1978 Autumn 1978
W i l l cer ta inly not vote
Autumn 1977 Spring 1978 Autumn 1978
Spring 1977
Depends Spring 1977 Autumn 1977 Spring 1978 Autumn 1978
2 Total
- B
%
38 36 37 36
-
20 22 24 20
11 9 a a
19 2 1 20 23
6 6 6 5
6 6 5 8
1 O0 - -
- DK
%
44 55 50 53
-
19 18 20 20
7 8 7 7
10 11
9 a
10 5 7 5
10 3 7 7
. o0 - -
D
%
28 35 35 31
-
37 37 39 36
11 10 10
9
5 6 4 5
4 3 2 2
15 9
10 1 7
1 O0 -
-
- F -
%
52 61 62 65
26 17 19 18
5 4 3 3
5 9 6 6
6 3 4 5
6 6 6 3
LOO --
-
- I RL
%
55 57 53 60
-
27 28 30 25
7 6 5 6
6 4 4 3
2 3 6 3
3 2 2 3
1 O0 -
-
- I
%
67 67 67 69
-
20 21 22 21
5 5 4 2
2 2 1 2
3 3 2 4
- L
o/n
45 49 52 32
35 26 26 30
8 9 9
16
3 7 7 16
6 5 4 2
100 1100
c
- EC
%
48 52 52 52
-A2_
27 25 26 25
8 8 7 6
6 7 6 7
4 3 3 3
7 5 6 7
o0
-
* --
-
'Weighted average.
*Total at each poll.
- 51 -
Before we take a c loser look at which sec tors of t he public are most or l e a s t committed t o voting ( o r not voting), it i s worth stopping t o consider how r e l i a b l e these r e s u l t s are.
A s we pointed aut when we first asked t h i s question, t h e persons interviewed a r e merely s t a t i n g an intent ion, and there i s ob-qiously no way of measuring their degree of commitment: it would be rash,
"sf" f o r instance, t a apply a coeff ic ient o f probabi l i ty t o t h e percent replying t h a t they would llcortainlyll o r "probably" turn out t o vote
I n order t o throw more l i g h t on t h i s aspect, a second question was aimed at discovering i nd i r ec t l y how far respondents f e l t themselves t o be personally involved i n t h e election2.
Eight out of t en vo t e r s i n t he Community indicated t ha t they would have some i n t e r e s t at l e a s t i n t he e lect ion r e su l t s , but l e s s than th ree i n t en (2%) would be very in teres ted: t he same f o r most countries, t he only s ign i f ican t var ia t ions being found i n t h e Netherlands (38$) , Germany (21%) and Belgium (1%).
t he l a t t e r figure was
(See Table 28)
'See Euro-Barometz No 7 , Ju ly 1977, pp. 73-74.
2This question i s regularly used i n the United Kingdom t o predic t turnout a t elections,
- 52 -
Table 28
NL
INTEREST I N RESULTS OF ELECTION OVER 18s
UK
Very interested
Quite interested
Only a l i t t l e interested
I - -. :19; -- 26
16
29 Rot at. a l l
Don l t know
34
24
18
1 6
Total
2 Index
interested
B I DK
10 1 8
D
%
Z$ 34
25
11
9 - 1 O0 - !.71
- F - %
3 0
33
19
1 4
4
. O0 - ? .83
- IRLI I
%
33
28
2 1
15
3
%
3 1
3 1
18
15
5
-1- 100 I l 0 0 + Z.81 2.80 I
- L - %
30
34
2 1
11
4
1 O0 - 1.87
%
íz!! 29
18
13
2
%
1 O0
- I 1 O0
-I-- 2.92 2.70
-
-. .- . .
Elol - %
28
32
20
15
5 -
. O0 -_
? .76
'Weighted average.
'IIVery interested" = 4; "not at a l l interested" = 1.
"
- 53 -
We can probably produce a more r e l i a b l e ind ica tor of propensity t o vote by c o l k t i n g the r ep l i e s t o both questions - on in ten t ion t o vote and i n t e r e s t i n the r e s u l t s - ra ther than by considering them separately.
Analysis shows t ha t th i le t he vast majority of those determined t o vote w i l l be in te res ted t o h o w the r e s u l t s of the e lect ion (72$), a s izeable minority (26$,) a r e not at a l l o r only a l i t t l e in te res ted i n the outcome;
W i l l vote W i l l not vote
A f i t t1 ,e or not at a l l in te res ted 26$ 81% In te res ted 72 14 Don' t know 2 5
Tot al - The index of i n t e r e s t , which as we have seen i s 2.76 f o r the whole sample (over 16s) var ies with determination t o vote, as shown below:
W i l l c e r ta in ly go and vote 3.23 W i l l probably go and vote 2.55 Depends 2.08 Don't know 1.98 W i l l probably not vote 1.88 W i l l c e r ta in ly not vote 1.42
These findings allow us t o place those who rep l ied t o both questions (7 500) on a voting sca le ranging from Y."ikelytl (scoring 1) t o "certain" (scoring 8) :
Att i tude t o results:
Not at a l l in te res ted
Only a l i t t l e in te res ted
Qui te in te res ted
Very in te res ted
Don' t know
Total
~
Determination t o vote
1 ' 2 ' 3 5
383 172 81 1 4233 289
.
3 4 5 -7 487
?- - -7 -3- 7'- 85 74 921 1414
-¿!--- 83 238 87 629
35
d
-. _I
23 5 11 14 7 208 Po&- I
28 24 22 77 63
552 530 278 2068 4286
I Don't Total know I -t- _I_-
2308
216 430
553 8267
- .-- - ---- ~-
L__
- 5 4-
I R L
14
18
68
100
For the Community as a whole the percentages of the t o t a l electorate corresponding t o each score a re shown below:
I
I L1
$ $ $
11 30
20 17
69 53
100 100
o ............. 9.3
NL
13
16
71
100
............. 21.3% probable abstainers 1 4.6 1 2 ............. 3.1
GB
$ %
25
16
59
100 b
3 ............. 4.3 j ............. 5*2 17.3% doubtful voters 4 5 ............. 12.1 ) ............. 61.@ probable voters 6 17.2 ) 7 ............. 19.6 ) 8 ) ............. 24.6 )
A tentat ive breakdown can be given for each country, but purely as a working hypothesis, since allowance would have t o be made fo r national e lectoral l a w s and voting patterns before r isking a firin forecast . (See Table 29)
Table 29
HYPOTHETICAL VOTING PATTERN I N DIRECT ELK?I'IONS
BY COUNTRY
Probable .abstainers
Doubt ful voters
Probabl e vot e r s
Total
~
59 53
100 100 1
N . I r l .
%
21
27
52
100
EC2
$
21
17
62
100
'In fact a turnout of close on 10% is guaranteed i n Belgium
2Weighted average. and Luxembourg, where voting is compulsory.
- 55 -
This gives us f o r each cauntry a percentage of 'lprobable voters" which i s lower than t he t o t a l number of contacts who indicated t h a t they would "certainlyft o r "probablyf1 go and vote. Belgium and Luxembourg - where vot ing i s compulsory - these percentages a r e t h e most r e l i a b l e estimates t ha t can be produced at present of t he actual turnout i n Junel.
With t h e exception of
These projections of t he s i z e of t he ba l l o t a r e undeniably low. Leaving as ide Belgium and Luxembourg where turnout i s - of necess i ty - high (between 90 and 95$ of those on t he register), t he figures fo r llprobable votersf1 a r e much lower than t he normal averages i n the countries concerned: more than 9% i n I ta ly and Germany, just under 9% i n Denmark and t he Netherlands, near ly 85% i n France (second round), more than 75% i n I re land and about t he same i n t h e United Kingdom.
X X X
Both t he propensity t o vote and i n t e r e s t i n t he r e s u l t s of t he e lect ion a r e dependent on sex, age and - i n par t i cu la r - leadership rating, but seem l i t t l e af fected by p o l i t i c a l ideology.
(See Tables 30 and 31)
'A revised estimate w i l l appear i n Euro-Barometer No 11, i n ear ly April 1979.
- 56 -
Table 30
D E " 4 I N A T I O N TO VOTE I N DIRECT ELECTIONS
R E U T E D TO SOCIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC AND CUL?uRAL CRITERIA E
( C o m m u n i t y as a whole)
Totall
Sex and age
Men- agecl: 18-20
21-24 25-39 40-54 55 and over
!!%en- a@: 18-20
21-24 25-39 39-54 55 and over
Leadership rating L-- L- L t L t t
Positien on -the pol i t ica l s p e c t r u m F w lef: Left Centre
Far rfsht
[Y I
57 44 48 56 60 62
47 41 41 50 47 47
--------
--------
33 42
8 56 59 54 47 57
bobabl;
25%
23 27 27 25 22 20
27 28 30 30 29 21
- - - - - - - - I
--------.
19 30 30 18
17 26 25 30 25
W i l l voti?
Probably not
6%
5 9 5 5 5 5
7 7 8 6 8 8
--------
- - - - - - - - a
15 11 5 5
9 4 7 6 4
>ertain12 not
7%
7 6 9 7 7 5
7 12 7 5 6 8
.-------.
23 II 16 5
7 4 6 6 6
D o n w t know
7%
4 4 5 8 6
.,
'Over 18s.
- 5 7 -
---_--- T w i n - --I-- W t e i i l - Chlya Not at all teloested ‘ terested l i t t l e in- intePested
+:pvp&a
Total’ 28% 3 2% 20% 15% - Sex and age -
34 33 17 12 aged 15-24 25 37 19 14
25-39 35 34 17 12 40-54 36 32 18 11 55 and over 37 29 16 13
21 31 23 18 WO”
aged: 15-24 18 30 26 20 25-39 24 34 22 14 40-54 22 33 23 17 55 and over 21 25 22 22
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Men ----
__--_----_---_------___________L________------------ c-----
Leadershlp rating L-- 11 20 25 32 L- 22 33 24 16
39 16 8 Lt L++ & 28 8 4
Posi%lon on the political spectrum
F W l e f t 39 24 17 16 Left 33 37 17 11 C@?Itl?”E! 26 33 21 15
c Righ 1- 26 35 20 14 FELT r i g h t 38 30 18 11
Table 31
----
Don’t know
5% -_I_
4 5 2 3 5
7 6 6 5
10
12 5 3
4 2 5 5 3
INTEREST I N RESULTS OF ELECTCON
RELATED TO SOCIAL, DEMOGFfAPHIC AND CULTUF2AL C R I T E R I A
(Community as a whole)
Entire sample.
- 58 -
D F IRL I
% % % % 10 8 12 19
21 20 25 27
30 4 1 20 30
33 28 36 22 6 3 7 2
100 100 100 100
5 VOTI NG INTENTI ONS
L
%
8 24
28 36
4
100
..,
A s we have jus t seen, the re i s s t i l l some uncertainty - and it may well continue until t he actual po l l ing day - as t o jsst how many voters w i l l turn oat t o e lec t t he European Parliament.
NL
14 28
43 13
LOO
One thing which does seem c l ea r i s t ha t determination t o vote increases with a l legiance t o a p o l i t i c a l party, whichever one i t happens t o be. But on the other hand, a majority of interviewees apparently consider candidates' ideas about Europe t o be more important than t h e i r p o l i t i c a l party.
! N.Ir1
% % %
11 4 29 19
28 23 31 51
2 1 3
100 100
These and other fac tors help t o cloud the p ic tu re of ac tual voting in ten t ions , t ha t i s t o say t he f i n a l choice of voters faced w i t h a l is t of candidates standing f o r d i f f e r en t p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s and - even when bearing t he same par ty t a g - f o r d i f fe ren t concepts of Europe.
Merely a sympathizer Close t o no pa r t i cu l a r par ty Don t know Total
5.1 A.11eaiance t o a p o l i t i c a l parts increases determination t o vote
27 28 34 35
9 3
100 100
"DO you consider yourself t o be close t o any p a r t i c u l a r partx? If so, do you fee l yourself t o be very c lose t o t h i s party, fairly close or merels a s.vmpathizsr?"
I n t he Corrmunity as a whole, 36$ of those interviewed considered themselves t o be c lose t o a p o l i t i c a l party; " f a i r l y close". t he Netherlands (42$) and i n Great B r i t a in (4076): i n Northern I re land (23%) and France (2%).
1% "very close" and 24$, Party a l legiance i s par t i cu la r ly strong i n I t a l y (46$),
it i s noticeably weaker
(See Table 32)
Table 32
ALLEGIANCE TO A POLITICAL PARTY
FOR EVERY 100 PERSONS INTERVIEMED
Very c lose
Fa i r l y c lose
%
12 24
32 28
4
100 - -
- 59 -
I - l '
Our findings show tha t the re i s a strong cor re la t ion between determination t o vote and a l legiance t o a p o l i t i c a l party.
Ea r l i e r on we concluded t h a t t h e actual turnout i n each country ( leaving as ide Belgium and Luxembourg where voting i s compulsory) w i l l l i e somewhere between t he percentage of those claiming at present t ha t they w i l l "certainly go and vote and t h e percentage of contacts replying t h a t they w i l l e i t he r "certainly" o r "probably" turn out t o vote. It i s therefore of i n t e r e s t t o obtain a country-by-country breakdown of these two groups of voters according t o t h e i r declared p o l i t i c a l allegiance: t he first group representing a fair ly sa fe minimum f igure , and the second an upper l i m i t which is unlikely t o be reached.
Table 33 shows t ha t there i s a c loser l i n k between a de f in i t e vote and a l legiance t o a p o l i t i c a l par ty i n Germany and ( t o a l e s s e r extent) i n Great Br i ta in , than i n Denmark o r Francel.
'This can also be expressed as the r a t i o between the respective percentages of de f in i t e voters who a re very c lose t o a p o l i t i c a l pa r ty and those with no pa r t i cu l a r allegiance.
Denmark FrEUlce Italy Netherlands I re land Great Br i t a in Germany
W i l l c e r ta in ly go and vote
Very c lose t o ä party (a>
66% 77 85 79 81 74 64
Close t o no par t i cu la r
Party (b)
45% 50 50 45 40 25 18
I
0.68 O .65 0.59 0.57 O .49 O .34 O .28
Table 33
'RL
% %
81
10
91%
69
25
94%
58
30
88%
40
26
66%
DETERMINATION TO VOTE IN DIRECT ELECTIONS BY ALLEIANCE TO A POLITICAL PARTY
I
85
5
90%
68
22
904
66
22
88%
50
25
75%
Very close t o a part icular party:
- w i l l cer tainly go and vote
- w i l l probably go and vote
% %
Total A
%
Fair ly close t o a part icular party:
- w i l l certainly go and vote
- will probably go and vote
74
12
86%
56.
26
Total B
76
13 ) 69
- (69%) 89%
) 58
26 1 86
- w i l l certainly go and vote
,- w i l l probably go and vote
82%
45
26
71% Total C
86% 84%
) 53 1 83 ) 25
83% 78%
Close t o no part icular party:
- w i l l cer tainly go and vote - w i l l robably go a d vote
Total D
- B -
%
63
14
7 7% - -
47
26
73% -
36
26
62% - .__
23
17
40% -
-
DK
% -
66
19
85%
59
21
80% -
50
23
73% -
45
16
61%
- D
% -
64
28
92% -
37
42
79% -
31
40
71% -
18
29
47%
7
F
% -
77
10
87' - -
68
16
841 - -
68
16
841 -
50
22
72: - -
L
66%
- NL
% -
79
9
.88: .__
-
73
16
894 - -
61
21
82% -
45
18
63% - 57% 67% 602 E J. Weighted average.
- 61 -
5.2 Are candidates' ideas about Europe more important than t h e i r par ty al legiance?
When the time comes f o r you t o choose your representative i n the European Parliament, which of these would be the more important i n your choice? Their p o l i t i c a l par ty o r t h e i r ideas about Europe?"
Although we have no way of t e s t i n g the s i nce r i t y of answers t o t h i s question and thus of assessing t h e i r value i n predicting behaviour, our r e s u l t s show tha t i n each of the nine countries the majority view w a s t ha t candidatest ideas about Europe were more important than t h e i r par ty al legiance.
(See Table 34)
Table 34 RELATIVE IIPORTANCE OF CANDIDATES' IDEAS ABOUT EUROPE
AND THEIR PARTY ALLEGIANCE __
B
% -
1 7
55 28
100 -_ I_
24
76
1 O0 --
-I__
DK - F - I RL
% I_
26
53 21
II
I -
%
29
57 14
- NL -
UK 1 EC
% _L
22
59 19
D
% -
21
5 1 28
%
18
5 1 31
%
18
64
18
100 I_
_I
22
78
1 O0 -
-
%
20
68 12
1 O0 --
---
23
77
1 O0 _---.
---
%
21
68
11
100 I---_-
- --
23
77
1 00 ---
1. FOR EVERY 100 PERSOlE I ~ R V I E ~ E D
P a r t y a l 1 egiance
Ideas about E
Don't know
TOTAL
2. FOR EVERY 100
DPe
3
100 1 O0 1 O0 100 100
23
73
100
" L I E D
Party al legiance 29
7 1
1 O0 -
33
67
100 -
-
34
66 Ideas about Europe
1 O0 -
TOTAL r
'Weighted average .
- 62 -
III
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
Although Euro-Barometer No 10 was la rge ly devoted t o d i r e c t e lec t ions , a number of questions were a l s o asked t o gauge general react ions t o European unif icat ion and the Community i t se l f : some of these appear regular ly i n the six-monthly European opinion po l l s and others were geared specifically t o i s sues l i k e l y t o crop up i n the course of the e lec t ion campaign.
1. EUROPEAN UNION
Two general questions were asked on the un i f ica t ion of Western Europe:
(a) one very i n t e r e s t i ng one which enables a comparison t o be made of rlforv' and %gainst" t rends i n several countr ies over more than twenty-five years;
a new question designed t o assess whether the public f e e l s t ha t European un i f ica t ion has made progress o r l o s t ground over t he last
(b )
ten years 1 . 1.1 General emotional i den t i f i c a t i on with the European cause
"In general , a r e you f o r o r against e f fo r t s being made t o unif;r Western Europe? If FOR: are you very much f o r t h i s , o r only t o some extent? If AGAINST: are you only t o some extent against o r very much against?"
I n s p i t e of being so general t h i s question i s pa r t i cu l a r l y i n t e r e s t i ng because i t i s one of the very few f o r which, i n four countr ies a t least, we have answers going back more than twenty-five years.
Graph 8 shows the trend i n favourable a t t i t u d e s f o r Germany, f iance, I t a l y and Great Br i t a in since 1952*,
'See page 82 f o r the question on short-term trends: "over the last twelve months".
s
4
'See Annex (Table 2 ) f o r relevant f igures. For the trend up t o 1975 see the book by Ronald Inglehar t : The S i l e n t Revolution (Princeton University Press, 1977) pp. 344-348.
i
100'
50
cl
G r a p h i q u e no 8 / G r a p h 8
L ' E V O L U T I O I I S U R LONGUE P E R I O D E D E S A T T I T U D E S F A V O R A E L E S I A L ' U N I F I C A T I O N DE L ' E U R O F E O C C ! D E m E ( C E i i T S C H L A : I D , F R A N C E , I T A L I A , G R L A T B T T A I N ) / -_-
LONG- TERM E V O L U T I O N O F F A V O U R A S L E A T T I T U D E S TOWARDS T H E U N I F I C A T I O N O F \!ESTERN E U R O P t ( D E U T S C H L A N D , F R A N C E , I T A L I A , G R E A T B R I T A I N )
1 I L e . b . b . 1 b . 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1352 1954 1956
D e u t s c h l a n d - France -- G . B . / U K -. -. I t a l i a ........ .
I 0. w
I
- 64 -
men t h i s question was first asked, support w a s expressed by TWO of contacts i n Germany, 6% i n fiance, 5% i n Great Britain and 57% i n I ta ly . 1958 and the b i r th of the European Economic Community the fluctuations i n rep l ies followed a f a i r l y constant pattern i n a l l four countries and were probably determined by events sirch as the Korean war and the founding of the European Coal and Stee l Community (1952), the fa i lure of the European Defence Community (1954), the Soviet intervention i n Hungary and the Suez c r i s i s (1956) and s o on.
Up t o
But from 1958 the s i tuat ion changed with public opinion i n Great Britain going off at a tangent. The curves f o r the other three countries meet at the top end of the scale with public support i n I t a l y and F'rance catching up with and even overtaking the level recorded in Germany (around 1970 and 1975 respectively).
By autumn 1978 more than three i n four of those interviewed were i n favour: 8% i n I t a l y and the Netherlands, 8 q o i n fiance and TWO i n Germany. But elsewhere the picture was l e s s rosy with only 69% i n Ireland and Belgium, 63$ i n the United Kingdom and 48% i n Denmark. (See Table 35)
Graph 9, which car r ies op from where Graph 8 leaves of f , shows the r e su l t s fo r 1970 t o 1978 .
Table 35 FOR OR AGAINST THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE
Very imrch f o r To some extent f o r To-seme extent agains
Very a c h against
Don% know
T o t a l .--- c
'For the exact wording and the relevant figures see Les Europdens e t l 'unification de l'Europe (Brussels, June 1972) pp. 71-72 and Euro-Barwter No 4 (December 1975) pp. 54-56.
2Weighted average.
IC_
EC2 - x 30 45 6 4
15
1 O0 -_..-
- 65 -
I & 1 1
FRANCE
<- -
L I . . LUXEf4BOURG
n
Graphique no 9 / Graph9
L'EVOLUTION DEPUIS 1970 DES ATTITUDES kAVORA B L t S 1 L ' U N I F I C A T I O N DE L'EUIOPE OCCIDENTALE /
I
100%
ELG I QUE/ BELG I E
.. - 5 0 1 O L
1970 1973 1975 1978
EVOLUTION SINCE 1970 - TOWARDS THE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE
I-
MNMA R K
. 1 . RELAND
. . IEDERLAND
4
L . L I
IEUTSCHLAND - .
ITALIA
. . 1 I
JNITED KINGDOM (1)
I 1973: GREAT BRITAIN.
- 66 -
1.2 Progress towmds European Union over the last ten years
"In your opinion, has the unif icat ion of Europe made some progress o r l o s t ground over the last ten years? ground:
If progressed o r l o s t t o a considerable extent o r only a l i t t l e ? "
On average s i x out of ten f e l t t ha t unif icat ion had made progress over the last ten years. Netherlands, and I re land than elsewhere.
(See Table 36)
This conviction w a s more widespread i n Germany, the
There i s a d i r e c t conelation between the answers t o t h i s question m d t o the previous one: contacts who f e l t t ha t European unif icat ion had made progress over the last ten years were a l s o much more i n favour of e f f o r t s towards unif icat ion and supported d i r e c t e lect ions .
(See Table 37)
f.
- 6 7 -
B
14 40
54
11
Table 36
DK
% %
18 34
52
8
PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS
IRL
22 44
66
7
10
24
100
(561
Feel that unificatiol has progressed:
considerably
a l i t t l e
Tota l ( a )
Feel that unificatiol has l o s t ground:
a l i t t l e
considerably
Total (b )
Don t know
Total
Di f fe rence ( a ) - (b)
I L
% % %
14 17 41 46
55 63
13 16 3 1 3
14 19
31 18
100 100
41 44
D
% -
21 49
70 - -
7 2
9
21
1 O0 - - 1611 I_
F
%
9 47
56 - -
17 2
19
25
100
27
- - -
-
NL
x
7 61
68
10 3
13
19
100
UK
% -
8 43 - 51 -
17 9
26
22
1 O0
25
- __c
-----c
1 EC
% -
13 45
58 -
13 4
17
25
I O0
41
- - -
-
'Weighted average.
- 68 -
Tery iuch or
58q 35 25 9
Table 31
To soml extent
f o r
31% 55 45 27
ATTITUDES TO EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND DImCT ELJETIONS
RELATED TO EEELINGS AS TO THE PROGRESS OF UNIFICATION
OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS
(Community as a whole)
100 100
3.01 2.14
47% 36 30 19
41% 46 39 18
3.28 2.06 2.27
3991 1106 330
F o r o r against unification of Western Europe - Base
-
1177 3991 1106 330
c_
Tota .1 Index 'O some 3xtent w
4% 4 16 17
Very much w
3% 1 4 33
Don't know
4% 5 10 14
For every 100 contacts who f e l t tha t the unification of Western Europe has: progressed coneiderably progressed a l i t t l e
l o s t ground a l i t t l e
l o s t ground considerabl;
100 100
.3.51 3.30
For or against d i rec t elections
:omplr ? te ly igains
L'o 3ome ?xtent gainsi
3% 5
12 17
Don't know Total
-
100% 100 100 100
I
.For every 100 contacts who f e l t that the unification of Western Europe has :
progressed considerably
progressed a l i t t l e
l o s t ground a l i t t l e
l o s t ground considerabl;
7% 10 13 13
3.41 1177 2% 3 6 33
t
I "Very much f o r " = 4; "Very much against" = 1.
- 69 -
Autumn 1973
t' 1975 '' 1976 " 1977
Spring 1978 Autumn 1978
" 1374
2. COMMUNITY MEMBEBHIP
B DK 3 F IRL I I L /NL U 2 EC4
57; 42s 63% 61% 56$ 69$ 67$ 63% 40$ TG:
59 41 61 67 67 75 73 67 50 63 '
66 29 57 52 50 68 77 74 39 55 60 37 59 57 59 70 73 74 35 56 53 34 58 54 54 65 73 78 29 53 66 36 63 59 63 73 63 83 39 60
60 33 62 63 50 82 73 70 36 GO -
i
. In addition t o the usual question on Community membership Euro-Barometer
No 10 included a question on understanding between member countries i n
recent months and two questions on future prospects: how w i l l the
s i tuat ion evolve over the next ten or f i f t een years and should the
movement towards European union be speeded up or slowed down?
Then t o round things off a bat tery of questions designed t o investigate
the public's hopes and fears with regard t o the Community, the feel ing
of so l idar i ty among Member S ta tes and the a t t i tude t o enlargement, with
par t icular reference t o Spain.
2.1 The Common Market: "a good thing" or "a bad thin6"z
now and i n ten t o f i f teen years
"Generally speaking, do you think tha t (your country's) membership of
the Common Market i s a good thing, a bad thing, or nei ther good nor bad? - "And do you think tha t membership of the Common Market is a good
thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad thing i n the l igh t
of (your country's) future i n the next ten o r f i f t een years?"
Everywhere except Luxembourg' sxpport f o r the Common Market has increased
since spring 1978, but the long-term trend since 1973 (i.e. before the
economic c r i s i s ) i s towards s t a b i l i t y rather than change.
Table 38 sums up the trend, which i s traced i n de ta i l i n Graph 10 . 2
- 7 0 -
Graphique no 10 / G r a p h 10
100%
50
LE MARCHE COMMUN EST UNE BOIiNE CHOSE / -I----
THE COtlrlON MARKET I S AIGOOD THING"
IELGIQUE/BELGIE
'RANC E
.UXEMBOURG
O I , . . . . . . .
(1973-1978)
DANYARK
I RELAND
NEDERLAND
/
DEUTSCHLAND
w
I T A L I A
JN ITED KINGDOM
73 74 75 76 77 78
- 71 -
Autumn 1977 Autumn 1978
c
19 17
A s i n previous p o l l s , introduction of t he time element made l i t t l e d i f ference t o the r ep l i e s , except i n t h e United Kingdom, where the Community is viewed more posi t ively a8 a long-term proposition.
(See Table 39).
Table 39
OPINION ON COMMUNITY MEREERSHIP
I. As th ings Etand at present "A good thing"
Autumn 1977 Autumn 1978
"A bad thing"
Autumn 1977 Autumn 1978
--- B
% _I
60 66
5 3
2. I n t e n t o f i f t e e n yearst time L 'IA good t h i n g "
Autumn 1977 59 Autumn 1918 61
"A bad thing"
t'f\leit!ier good nor 'bad''
Autumn i977 17 Autumn 1978 17
DK
% -
37 36
33 25
24 30 _1
34 29
30 20
13 15
- D
% -
59 63
7 4
24 21 -
58 60
7 2
21 ia
- F
% -
57 59
9 7
28 26
58 57
6 5
22 ia
I .--
I RL
% -
59 63
19 12
19 20 --
64 61
15 8
12 13
--- - I -
%
70 73
5 3
18 16 __I
72 68
5 3
16 13
%
73 63
3 14
17 15
---
73 53
4 16
11 19
-----
_I_
NL
I
74 83
5 2
16 12
..-_
75 76
4
2
15
15
.a-._
- U K
% --
:35 ' I
39:
37 31
23 25 I_
1 26 21
14 18
Ec1
%
56 60
14 10
23 22 ---
59 58
1 1 7
i a 17
'Weighted average. %onft knowd'and t o t a l ( I O q ) a r e not shown.
~ - 7 2 -
There i s a very strong l i n k between t h e answers t o these two questions, pa r t i cu l a r l y t h e first, and basic a t t i t u d e t o Ehrope, but what we have termed general emotional i den t i f i c a t i on with European unification' is much more widespread than support f o r t he European Community as such. every hundred interviewees i n t he Community as a whole, 75 were i n favour o f European Union and 60 f e l t t h a t Community membership was good thing0.
(See Table 40)
For
ATTITUDES TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND
TO THE UNIFICATION O F WESTERN EUROPE
(Community as a whole)
.
Atti tude t o t he European Community:
"A good thing" l'A bad thing"
Norr-csnmittal or don't know
Total
k t t i tude t o t h e un i f ica t ion o f Western Europe
55 3
17
7 5% .-
Against
2 5
3
10%
Don't know
3 2
10
15%
Tota l
60% 10%
30%
100%
'See page 62.
- 73 -
D F
% %
78
63
15
The di f ference between t he amount of support f o r Ehropean union ( i n general terms) and f o r the Community as such va r i e s considerably from country t o country: p r ac t i c a l l y non-existent i n the Netherlands, Belgium, and I re land, it i s most marked i n the United Kingdom.
79
59
20
(See Table 41)
IRL
70
63
7
Table 41
I L
% % %
83 74
73 63
10 11
SUPPORT FOR l'HE UNIFICATION OF WESTERN EUROPE
AND SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COEB'mTITY
BY COUNTRY
Support f o r t he un i f i ca t ion of Western Europe
Support for t h e European Community
Difference
6
%
69
66
_L
3 c_
DK
%
48
36
12 -
NL -
%
83
83
O -
UK
% 63
39
(241 -
%
75
60
15
c 'Weight ed average
- 7 4-
2.2 Understanding bet ween member countries over t h e last twelve months
"Over t h e last trP:eIve months, would you say, i n your opinion, t ha t t h e understanding between t he countr ies of the European Community 3 t h e Common Market ) has, generally speaking, progressed, l o s t ground, o r has staged t h e same?"
This i s a t yp i ca l oTln.~r;;~l-te~;.t.dngq.a:isitiorr, t h e answers t o which a r e l a rge ly dependent on t h e current mood, whether optimist ic o r pessimistic, created by t h e media. B a t t h i s does not make them any less i n t e r e s t i ng as they could very well have an impaot on a t t i t u d e and behaviour, including e lec tora l turnout anc! voting patt ern.
I n t h i s l a t e s t pol l , as i n autumn 1977, around 2077 of those interviewed did not reply and near ly 40% could not say whether understanding had progressed o r l o s t groundl. a l t e rna t ive , i n both 1977 and 1978 more f e l t t ha t t h e move was towards progress than towards a l o s s of ground: 1977 and 28% against 12% i n 1978. r e f l e c t i ng press repor t s s ince t h e ear ly summer of a &ropean monetary system, was pa r t i cu l a r l y prevalent i n I re land and I ta ly . . There was even optimism i n t h e Netherlands, where t he pessimists were s t i l l on t op i n 1977. Although the pessimistic view s t i l l held sway i n Denmark, it had l o s t a good deal of ground.
(See Graph 11 and Table 42)
of those who opted f o r one or other
28% against 19% i n This opt imis t ic view, no doubt
'The wording used i n 1977 was "has increased o r decreased". The change was intended t o make t h e question c l ea r e r but it does not seem t o have a f fec ted t h e answers.
- 75 -
100%
50
O
Graphique no 11 / Graph 11
L I EVOLUTION DE L I ENTENTE ENTRE LES PAYS DE L A COMMUNAUTE /
EVOLUTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE COFIMJNITY
BELG IQUE/BELG I E
FRANCE
--- -* I I
LUXE?IBOURG
ANHARK
I l
RELAND
~~~
ED E RL A ND
tEUTSCHLAND
T A L I A
.-.I,-- -. I I
IN ITED KINGDOM
I I
1977 1978
"S'est plutôt renforcée / Progresse+
"S'est plutôt affaiblie / L o s t -- gr ou nd"
- 76 -
Table 42
F
24 23
16 11
46 A - - r i ,
14 20
100
PATTERN OF U ~ ~ S T A N D I N G BETTWEN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
(IVER THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS
IRL
% %
42 46
9 9
38 31
11 14
100
Peel that underst anding:
I
%
35 33
18 10
22 25
25 32
100
Has progressed
L
%
28 27
19 10
41 53
12 10
100
Autumn 1977 Autumn 1978
Has l o s t ground
Autumn 1977 Autumn 1978
Has stayed the same
Autumn 1977 Autumn 1978
Don't know Autumn 1977 Autumn 1978
Total
- B
% -
21 27
18 8
34 35
27 30
- 100 -
- DK
% -
19 16
3 1 19
40 4.3
10 22
- LOO -
D -
%
26 33
24 9
36 37
14 21
- LOO -
N L
% -
14 13
24 11
48 54
14 22
.o0 -
UK
% -
32 27
17 17
42 43
9 13
.o0 -
- =i
% -
28 28
19 12
38 38
15 22
O0 -
' Weight ed average.
- 7 7 -
Because t h i s i s an opinion- testing question - t h e answers t o it providing a f a i r l y accurate r e f l ec t i on of t he mood of t h e moment - it is a worthwhile exercise t o examine t h e breakdown and pat tern of r ep l i e s with reference t o leadership rat ing.
The following points emerge.
(i) In 1978 o,)inion leaders generally were s l i g h t l y more optimist ic than non-leaders, t he tendency being par t i cu la r ly marked i n Germany and Belgium;
(ii) Opinion leaders, who tend t o be more exposed t o t h e media than t h e public at large, a r e generally more sens i t ive t o t h e mood of t h e moment and optimism was more c l ea r ly evident i n autumn 1978 than twelve months before.
(See Table 43)
To sum up, although t h e answers t o t h i s question a r e conditioned by basic a t t i t u d e s t o Europe, they a r e a l s o influenced by t h e psychological and socia l mood of t h e moment, i .e . t h e "climate" created by t h e press through i t s coverage of European Affairs. This question i s t o be repeated i n Ehro-Barometer No 11 i n April and t h e answers w i l l provide valuable information i n t h e run-up t o d i rect elections.
I -
- 78 -
Table 43
VIEWS OW PATTERN OF U?!lD~3I'JpBNDZNG BY LEADERSHIP RATINC'
Belgium
Progressed Lost ground
D e m r k
Progressed Lost ground
oermsrny Progressed Lost ground
France Progres sed Lost ground
I rel and Progressed Lost ground
I taly Progressed Lost ground
Luxembourg Progress ed Lost ground
Netherlands Progress ed Lost ground
Uni ted K i ngdom Progressed Lost ground
C0ME"ITY2
Progress ed Lost ground
- 197;
124 12
17 28
17 19
21 10
34 9
23 12
23 15
13 25
25 15 -
21 14
?lon- 1 e a d e r s (-4 -
1978
18 6
9 16
14 10
13 15
39 6
20 8
22 2
8 12
17 16
16 12
- 1977
18% 21
22 30
26 20
23 14
40 7
35 18
31 16
13 19
30 18
28 ia -
- 1978 - 26 9
17 19
31 9
28 9
46 9
31 8
28 13
13 8
29 19 - 29 11 -
1977
27% 21 '*
19 33
30 29
30 19
56 9
39 18
27 19
16 22
38 17
32 22
3 Leaders (++> -
1978
35 12
18 18
41 10
23 11
55 9
40 10
29 9
14 11
32 13
33 11
- 1977 - 37% 21
17 34
32 26
20 26
44 15
46 29
30 30
12 37
44 20 - 33 26
1978
19 31
45 20
45 18
31 18
34 15
'For every 100 interviewed.
'Height ed average.
"Stayed t h e same" and t*donft knows" a r e not inc 1 ude d .
- 79 -
2.3 Speeding up or slowing down the movement towards European Union
"Some people consider the Common &.rket as being a first s tep towards a closer union between the Member States. think the movement towards the unification of Europe should be speeded UE, slowed down. or continued as it is at present?
And, i n your opinion, what i s the present a t t i tude of (your country's) government towards the unification of Europe?'*
Personally, do you yourself
For the Community as a whole, there has been l i t t l e change from previous po l l s with nearly 40% of interviewees voting i n favour of speeding up and s l ight ly l e s s i n favour of continuing as at present, while l e s s than one person i n t en wishes t o see a slowinedown.
A country-by-country analysis reveals that only i n I t a l y i s there more support fo r "speeding up" than f o r "continuing as at present". the second option ("continuing as at present") proves the most popular i n Denmark, the United Kingdom, Ireland and even i n the Netherlands.
By contrast
(See Graph 12 and Table 44)
Everywhere except Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom opinion leaders are more i n favour of speeding up European union than non-leaders and i n the Community as a whole, even i n the Netherlands, t h i s w a s the option which gained most of t h e i r votes.
(See Graph 13)
- 80 -
BELGIQUE/BELGIE
1 - - -: \ e FRANCE
Graphique no 12 / Graph 12
i
DANMARK DEUTSCHLAND
?-. \*-,0*-- - - L
I RELAND I TAL IA
_I
ACCELERER, CONTINUER COFlFilE FIAINTENANT O-U-RÄLËÑTI R L E 11 OUVE~~ENT--D~Ü~~ ÏF-ITÄT ÏÕN
.'C-
".-.-.Y -2 b-
- 1 - 0- ./o - - b - - - d
LUX EHBOU RG NEDERLAND UNITED KINGDOM
_I--
"OPE / SPEED UP, CONTINUE AS AT PRESENT OR SLOW DOWN THEMOVE~IEÑTOWARDS
-
100%
50
O 73 74 75 76 77 78
~ ~~
Accélérer / T o be speeded up-
Continuer / T o be continued ---
- 81 -
Bel g i m A u t u m n A u t u m n Spring A u t u m n Spring A u t u m n <
D e n m a r k Au tum Autumn Spring
Spring AU t u m n
AU Inn
Ger- A u t u m n A u t u m n Spring A u t u m n , Spring A u t u m n
F r a n c e AUtuVn A u t u m n Spring A u t u m n Spring A u b u n n
I rel and Qu t min A u t u m n Spring A u t u n n Spring Autumn
Table 4
SHOULD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION BE S E m D U P ,
CONTINUED A S AT PRESENT OR SLONED DOWN
1973 1975 1976
1977 1978
I I
1973 1975 1976
1977 1978
II
1973 1975 1976
1977 1978
II
1973 1975 1976
1977 1978
Il
1973 1975 1976
1977 1978
Il
Spe e ded UP
33% 39 40 40 38 37
12 13 13 14 12 12
49 47 39 41 38 38
36 45 43 42 45 40
25 35 3 1 33 33 29
Cont hued as at
present
43% 28 32 37 4 1 35
44 33 33 38 39 4 1
34 36 34 37 35 34
40 36 37 35 37 37
45 40 40 40 44 47
Slowed down
3% 3 5 5 5 2
36 37 32 30 30 27
4 6
10 9 9 7
3 6 7
10 7 5
12 12 14 10 14 8
Dont t know
2 1% 30 23 18 16 26
8 17 22 18 19 20
13 11 17 13 18 21
21 13 13 13 11 18
18 13 15 17
9 16
T o t a l
100% 1 O0 100 1 O0 100 100
1 O0 100 100 100 100 1 O0
1 O0 100 100 1 O0 100 1 O0
100 100 100 100 1 O0 1 O0
100 1 O0 1 O0 100 100 1 O0
- 82 -
Table 44 (conta)
I t a l y Au tunn Autumn Spring Au tunn Spring Autumn
Luxembourg Au tunn Autumn Spring Autumn Spring A u tumn
Netherlands Autvnn Autumn Spring Autu.nn Spring A utumnc
United K i ngdom AUtUlnn Autumn Spring Au tunn Spring Autumn
COMMUNZTY~ Autumn Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn
1973 1975 1976
1977 1978
I I
1973 1975 1976
1977 1978
II
1973 1975 1976
1977 1978
1973 ' 1975 1976
1977 1978
I I
II
1973 1975 1976
1977 1978
I I
Speeded UP
55% 61 58 65 66 59
56 52 55 55 60 40
32 33 43 41 37 37
17 24 23 26 24 23
-
38 43 40 42 42 39
Cont hued as at
pr e se nt
18% 17 16 14 17 20
29 33 20 26 22 39
47 38 37 42 51 46
40 45 42 46 43 52
34 34 33 34 34 36
Slowed down
2% 4 4 5 5 3
1 4 9 6 7
13
24 17 24 17 23 15
9 8
11 11 11 8
Don' t h o w
25% 18 22 16 12 18
14 11 16 13 11 8
15 25 13 11 8
13
19 14 11 11 10 10
19 15 16 13 13 17
E
Tota l
100% 1 O0 1 O0 1 O0 100 100
1 O0 1 O0 100 100 1 O0 1 O0
1 O0 1 O0 1 O0 100 1 O0 1 O0
1 O0 1 O0 1 O0 1 O0 100 1 O0
100 100 1 O0 100 100 1 O0
9.
'Northern Ireland was not included in 1973. *Weight ed average .
- 83 -
ACCELERER, CONTINUER COMME MAINTENANT OU RALENT IR L E MOUVEMENT D ' U N I F I C A T I O N b E L 'EUROPE SELON L E DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP /
100
50
C
:LG IQUE/BELG I E
RANCE
UXEMBOURG
SPEED UP, CONTINUE AS A T PRESENT ÖR SLOW DOWN THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNIFICATION BY ~AJ&ISBIP. RATING
iANFlARK
[RELAND
Y ED E RL A N D
I I I I
~~
EUTSCHLAND
T A L I A
IN ITED KINGDOM
'.
I I l I
A c c é l é r e r /
C o n t i n u e r / To be speeded up - T o be continued ---
1
- 8 4-
The second par t of t he question required contacts t o s t a t e what they considered t h e i r government's posi t ion t o be,
The majority view of those answering i n Luxembourg, I t a l y , Germany and Belgium w a s t ha t t h e i r governments were i n favour of speeding up the movement towards Ehropean unif icat ion. The French were divided i n t o two equal camps, The majority i n t he Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom f e l t t ha t t h e i r governments wanted the movement t o "continue as at present" . The r e s u l t s a re given i n Table 45, alongside those fo r autumn 1976, The only s ign i f ican t change w a s i n I t a l y and the Netherlands:
- i n I t a l y there w a s a p p o i n t increase i n the number of contacts who considered the government t o be i n favour of speeding up the movement ;
- i n the Netherlands support fo r t h i s view f e l l by 10 points, while there w a s an increase i n the number of contacts who were undecided (or i nd i f f e r en t ) ,
It is worth noting t ha t i n both po l l s , despi te the two-year gap, the proportion of Frenchmen who consider tha t t h e i r government wishes t o speed up the movement exactly matched those who consider t ha t it wishes t o continue as at present ,
I n a question such as t h i s , t o which on average nearly 30% of contacts could not or would not reply, it is of pa r t i cu la r i n t e r e s t t o analyse the answers of t he opinion leaders.
Nearly everywhere, except the United Kingdom, opinion leaders were more incl ined than the general public t o hold the view t h a t t h e i r government wishes t o speed up t he movement towards European unif icat ion.
(See Table 46)
- 85 -
Table
-.
POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO NATIONAL GOVER NI!^
Autumn 1976
Speed up (4 (b 1
Slow down (4 Continue as at pre sent
Don't know
Total
Autumn 1978
Speed up (a) (b 1 C ntinue
at presents Slow down (4
Don't know
Total
Difference (4-(b 1
B
36 25
4 35
- 100 -
11
-
30 23
5 42
- 100 -
7
-
DK
23 35 21 22
100
-12
26 39
8 27
100
-13
- D
44 37
5 14
- 100 -
7
-
40 3 1
4 25
- 100 -
9
-
- F -
35 35
7 23
- 100 -
O
-
33 33
7 27
- 1 O0 -
O
-
I RL
23 34 8
35
100
-11
24 38
7
3 1
100 - -14
--
I-
I -
27 26
10 37
- 1 O0 --
1
-
36 24
6 34
- 1 O0 --
12
-
-- L -
47 25
6 22
- 1 O0 -
22
-
45 3 1
9 15
- 1 O0 -
14
-
- NL
37 28
5 30
- 100 -
9
-
27 30
5 38
- 1 O0 -
-3
-
-.
UK -
2 1 39 12 28
- 100
-18
-
18 43 12 27
- 1 O0 - -25
-
-I
EC' -
32 34
8 26
1 O0
- 2
-
3 1 33
7 29
1 O0
-2
-
'Weight ed average
- 86 -
Table 42
POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO NATIONAL GOVEFNMEXl7
BY OPIMON LEAJBRS'
- D - F
- I
-. L
- EC2
- U K
%
27 41 17 15
-- 100
14
163
-
I RL
%
56 21 5 18
%
31 37 25 7
%
48 35 10 7
- 1 O0
13
130
-
7
-
60 30 3 7
%
47 33 13 7
%
36 34 13 17
%
34 28 14 24
%
62 16 7 15
%
50 29 7 14
%
40 33 13 14
Autumn 1976
Speed up Continue as at present Slow down
Don't know
1 O0
35
111
- - -
48 20 5
27
100
14 - 100
46 -
100
21 - . O0
7 - Total
Difference
Base (4-(b 1
1 O0
-6
100
2
91
27 42 6 25
1 O0
6
192
-
45 33 11 11
1 O0
12 -
225 --
38 35 10 17
143 -
37 8 29 26
3 56 -
40 34 10 16
145
44 36 11 9
Autumn 1978
Speed up Continue s at present Slow down
Don't know
15 44 20 21
109
28 - !O0
30 -
1 O0
3 - 1 O0
16 -
100
29 - 1 GO
-29 -.
O0
14 - Total
Difference
Base (a)-(b)
100
8
i O0
-15
79 -
67 -
178 -
(44) 182 -
16 5 117 135 69 132
'Leaders ++. *Weighted average.
- a7 -
2.4 a "Here are some things tha t are sometimes said about the membership of (your country) i n the European Community ( the Common Market), Could you t e l l me, i n each case, i f you personally agree completely, a+rr ee t o some extent, d i s a p e e t o some extent, o r disagree completely with the statement ?
- The fact tha t we are part of the Common Market is the best marantee f o r (our country) of pol i t ica l and economic s tabi l i ty
- In the European Community (the Common Market), a country l ike ours runs a r i s k of losing its own culture and individualitx
- The member countries of the Eharopean Community including (ours), should go much further than they have so far towards economic and p o l i t i c a l union i n Europe
- Whatever agreements o r all iances that (our country) has with other countries, national independence should be the over-riding considerat ion .*'
The complexity and ambiguity of a t t i tudes towards the Community show up i n the repl ies t o these questions.
A majority i n a l l countries:
- fee ls that nationdl independence should be the over-riding consideration,
- (exoept i n Denmark) wishes t o see member countries go much further towards economic and pol i t ica l union i n Europe, and
- considers tha t membership of the Community is the best guarantee of pol i t ica l and economic s tabi l i ty .
Opinion i s more divided on the r i s k of losing national culture and individuality: t h i s suggestion is firmly rejected i n I ta ly , Belgium, France and Germany, as it is - though only just - i n Luxembourg; it meets with general agreement i n the three nev; member countries, where nevertheless one i n three takes the opposite view.
&ereas
(See Table 47) a
- 88 -
I R L
%
32
Table 47
HOPES IWD FFNlS ABOUT THE COMMUNITY
- I L
% #
28 30
The fact t h a t we are part of the Common Market is the best marantee of
48 9
11
p o l i t ica1 and economic st abi 1 i t y
48 12
4 1 9
Agree completely Agree t o some extent Disagree t o some extent Disagree completely D a l t know
Tot a l
Index 1
,In the Common Market, a country l i ke oure runs a. r i s k of losing its own cul ture and individuality
Agree completely Agree t o some extent Disagree t o some extent Disagree completely Don't know
Tot al
Index The member courrtries of the.EEC should go much fur ther than they have so far t owads -economic and p o l i t i c a l - union i n Europe
Agree completely Agree t o some extent Disagree t o some extent Disagree completely Don't know
Tot al
Index
- B
% -
26 34 7 3
30
1 oc 1.18
- - -
7 17 24 24 28
1 O0
. .83 --
-
26 30 8 4 32
1 O0
.15
- - -
I_
OK
% -
17 29 17 19 18
100
.53
-
-
28 26 16 15 15
100
.78 - I_
9 16 17 28 30
100 I-
. oa -
- 0
% -
25 42 12 6
15
100
3 .Ol - -
7 20 32 26 15
1 O0
2 .O9
- - -
32 38 10 5
15
1 O0 -
1.16 -
- F
% -
17 45 13 6 19
100
!.89
- - -
6 16 30 36 12
100
.91
- - -
21 37 13 5 24
100 - - . 98 -
40 12 5
1 1
100
3.13
- - -
23 37 23 10 7
1 O0
2.79
- - 7
25 31 18 4 22
1 O0
3.00
- __.
-
-- 1 O0
3.11 - -
4 13 23 47 13
1 O0
.70
-- - -
35 42 7 3 13
100
.25
- - -
-- 1 O0
3.17 7
-
11 34 23 19 13
100
2.43
- II
-
24 46 13 2 15
100 - - 3 .oa -
NL
'x -
27 36 15 8 14
. O0
.95
- - -
15 19 28 31 7
O0
.19
- - -
30 29 16 14 11
O0
.85
-
- .__
- UK
x -
16 36 21 18 9
. O0
.56
- - -
27 30 18 18 7
O0
.71
- - -
18 35 16 13 18
O0
.70
- -
-
z
- EC' -
% -
22 42 14 8 14
O0
.90
- - -
12 19 26 31 12
O0
.14
- - -
26 37 12 7
18
O0
.Ol
-L
-
-
-
- 89 -
I R L
4 8 33 6 3 10
l -
I I
% %
33 29 17 10 1'1
r- mat ever -a reement s or all iance:; f ! . .) with other - count r i e s ,- nat ional independ- a c e - rhogl_d_ be the o v e r r i d i n g cbns i de rat i on - ___I_--
Agree completely Agree t o some extent Disagree t o some extent DisaKree completely Don't know
Tot a l
Index 2
- DK
% -
51 19 7 4 19
100
3.48
- - -
- D
% -
23 34 19 10 14
100 -
2.8:
- F
%
44 27 11
4 14
100
3.28 -
-----
I-
3.411 2.97
'Weighted average. '**Agree completely" = 4; W.sagree completely" = 1.
L
% -
32 30 22 4
12
100
3 .Oi - -
- -_- . NL
% --
56 18 12 9 5
100
3.28 -
- UK
x
43 28 12
6 11
100 -
3.2; -
--- EC I LI
N
37 29 14
7 13
100
3.10 -
- 9 0 -
Nationali ty i s c l ea r ly a very powerful determining factor . leadership r a t i n g can a l s o play a part:
But
1.
2.
3.
4.
Support f o r t h e view tha t membership of t h e Common Market i s t h e best guarantee of s t a b i l i t y tends t o fa l l i n Denmark as leadership r a t i n g increases; t h e opposite i s t r u e i n Germany.
I n Denmark t he r e is a l s o an inverse re la t ionsh ip between leadership rating and t h e feeling tha t member countr ies should go much fu r the r towards E o p e a n economic and p o l i t i c a l union; Germany, I t a l y and Luxembourg.
t h e opposite app l ies i n Belgium,
The fear of los ing nat ional cu l tu re and ind iv idua l i ty i s on t h e whole less common among opinion leaders: emerges most clearly i n Germany, I t a ly , t h e Netherlands and Belgium, while t h e tendency i s ra ther t h e opposite i n Ireland, Denmark and t h e United Kingdom.
t h i s
And finally, t h e conviction t ha t national independence should be t h e over-riding consideration ''whatever agreements o r a l l i ances exis t" tends t o be more popular among non-leaders, pa r t i cu l a r l y i n t h e Wetherlands, t h e United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium and fiance.
These f indings a r e i l l u s t r a t e d i n Graph 14, drawn on t h e ba s i s of an index of agreement/disagreement corresponding t o each leadership rat ing.
- 91 -
.
- 92 -
I I 1 n I
- 93 -
There i s by no means a uniform corre la t ion between react ions t o these f o u r propositions and basic a t t i t u d e s towards Europe. Take opinions on t h e e lec t ion of t h e European Parliament, f o r instance: it i s most c losely r e l a t ed t o t h e response t o t h e first proposition: as we might expect, those who a r e i n favour of t h e e lec t ion a r e more l i k e l y t o f e e l t ha t t h e Common b r k e t i s a garantee of s t a b i l i t y . e lec t ion and on t h e importance of national independence is more tenuous: would give precedence t o national independence, but t h i s opinion a l s o f i nds currency among 6676 of those who a r e completely i n favour of t h e election'.
On t h e other hand, the l i n k between views on t h e
8% of those who a r e completely against t h e e lec t ion
(See Table 4.8)
'These results can be compared with those presented ea r l i e r , pp. 39-44.
%ble 48
THE IRELATNE INnUENCE OF HOPES AIIT) FEARS
ON BASIC ATTITUDES FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION
(Community as a whole)
Membership of t h e Common Market i s t h e best guarantee of p o l i t i c a l and economic s tab i 1 it y:
Agree completely Agree t o some extent Disagree t o some extent Disagree completely Don't know
T o t a l
1 Index
A country l i k e ours runs a r i s k of losinp. i t s own cu l tu re and individual i ty: Agree oompletely Agree t o some extent Disagree t o some extent Disagree completely Don' t know
Basic at t i tude t o t h e e lect ion
omplet e ly against
%
7 14 16 49 14
100
1.76
48 17 11 16 8
Co some jxt ent rgainst
%
6 29 29 22 14
100
2.22
23 33 19 16 9
To some ext ent
f o r
%
19 55 13
5 8
100
2.96
8 21 34 29 8
Completely f o r
%
41 40 10 4 5
100
3.23
9 15 23 49
4 .- .
- 94 -
23 48 13 4
12
Table 48 (contd)
47 34 8 4 7
To ta
35 34 17 6 8
1 Index
39 27 18 12 4
The member countr ies of t h e EEC should go much fu r the r (...) towards economic and p o l i t i c a l union i n Europe:
Base
Agree completely Agree t o some extent Disagree t o some extent Disagree completely Don't know
438 567
Total
Index 1
&tional independence should be t h e over- riding considerat ion:
Agree completely Agree t o some extent Disagree t o some extent Disagree completely Dont t know
To ta 1 1 Index
Basic a t t i t u d e t o t h e e lec t ion - ., c ompl e t ei, against
% 100
3 .O6
12 19 12 36 21
100
2.10
To som ext ent againsl
% 100
2.70
12 26 26 20 16
1 O0
2.36
45 27 11 7
10
100
3.57 I 3.23
I I
100 100
2.10 1 1.85
3.01 I 3.33
100 I 100
3.06 I 2.98
3469 I 2679
'"Agree completelyf1 4; "disagree completely" = 1.
- 95 -
2.5 Sol idar i ty : a t t i t u d e expected from member countries
((Lf one of t h e countries of t he Common Market (European Community) f i nds i t se l f i n major economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , do you feel t h a t t he other countries, including (your country), should help it o r not?"
- -
"Are YOU. pe rsonally. prepared o r not t o make some personal sacrifice, f o r example paving a l i t t l e more taxes, t o help another country i n t he European Community experiencing economic d i f f i cu l t i e s ?"
. The first of these questions has been asked at various po l l s since More than three quarters of those interviewed are i n autumn 1973.
favour of so l idar i ty , but i n t e r e s t i ng var ia t ions occur both between countries and between successive s e t s of r esu l t s :
- the I t a l i a n s continue t o be the strongest advocates of helping countries i n d i f f i cu l t y : No doubt they are well aware t ha t Community assistance works t o t h e i r benef i t
88% i n favour i n 1973 and 94% i n 1978.
1
- Between 1973 and 1978 support f o r so l i da r i t y increased most i n the United Kingdom (+ 11 points) and the Netherlands (i- 9); on the other hand, regis tered a drop of 14 points, from 77% down t o only 63%.
Germany,
(See Table 49)
' A t an e a r l i e r p o l l more than 7 i n 10 Italians repl ied t ha t Community so l i da r i t y hac- worked t o the benefi t of t h e i r country. No 6, Jarnuary 1977, p. 33.
See Euro-Barometer
- 96 -
In the event of one of the member countries
difficulties, the others: ' being in major economic
Table 49
SOLIDARITY BEZWEEN INEBIBER COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Don't know
Belgium Autumn 1973
!-j
I I 1976 , ' I 1977
' I 1978
Denmark -- Autumn 1973
I' 1976 IJ 1977 ' I 1978
II 1976 II 1977 II 1978
France Autumn 1973
' I 1976 II 1977 II 1978
I r e l and Autumn 1973
" 1976 I' 1977 II 1978
I t a l y hf" 1973
' I 1976 II 1977 'I 1978
Luxembourg Autumn 1973
" 1976 I' 1977 II 1978
Should not help
9% 8
11 9
25 18 16 17
7 12 10 12
9 15 12 10
10 10 10
7
2 1 3 2
8 4
10 17
13% 10 15 15
13 14 9
18
16 14 18 25
13 10 12 12
10 7 7 8
10 4 5 4
5 10 7 8
Total
100% 100 100 100
100 100 100 100
100 100 100 100
1 O0 100 1 O0 100
100 100 100 100
100 100 100 100
100 100 100 100
- 97 -
Table 49 (conta)
Net he rl ands Autumn
II
II
II
,
Uni ted K i nadom hut wnn
II
I l
II
1973 1976 1977 1978
1973' 1976 1977 1978
COMMUNITY Autumn 1973
I' 1976 'I 1977 'I 1978
In the event of one of the member countries being i n major economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , the others
Should
79% 84 85 88
76 80 79 76
-'Northern Ireland was not includ.ed i n
2Weighted average.
Should not help
9% 8 6 6
28 16 17 21
11 11 10 11
1973.
Don't know
12% 8 9 6
13 7 8 9
13 9
11 13
Total
100% 100 100 100
100 100 100 100
100 1 O0 100 100
On analysing the r e s u l t s for. each country by leadership ra t ing , we find t ha t they fa l l i n to two main categories of re la t ionship , which have developed i n one of three ways:
- the differences i n viewpoint between leaders and non-leaders may be pronounced (as i n Germany and Belgium) o r s l i g h t (as i n I t a l y a.nd Ireland) ;
- these differences may have diminished, increased o r remained constant i n the medium o r long term; ou r conclusions, which must be t en ta t ive as they are based on only four s e t s of results spread over f i v e years, are t ha t the gap between leaders and non-leaders seems t o have stayed more o r l e s s the same i n the United Kingdom and i n Ireland, i s tending t o widen ( a f t e r narrowing between 1973 and 1976) i n Germany and France, and i s diminishing i n Denmark and I t a ly l .
The findings f o r each country between 1973 and 1978, re la ted t o leadership ra t ing , are shown i n Graph 15.
'We have not considered the posit ion i n Luxembourg, i n view of the s i ze of the samples.
- 98 -
...... *. ..
... ;......-*
m i a u e no 15 / G r a p h No 15
.- .-. v.-.-.-.
'., ........ ............ -. .... .. * ..*
L A SOLIDARITE SOUHAITEE ENTRE LES PAYS P'lEtIBRES SELONERSH I P ------ ~~~
100%
50
O 73
ELGIQUE/BELGIE
RANCE
.......... -i
UXEMBOURG a a
76 77 78
SOLIDARITY DESIRED BETMEEN MEPlBER COUNTRIES BY LEADERSHIP RATING --_I.___.___I
DAN31AR K DEUTSCHLAND I ...................................... t I RELAND I I T A L I A
-.. ....
L++ L+ --- L- -.-.e
L- .............
- 99 -
B DK D F IRL I L NL U K
Feel tha t other sountries should ( a ) 76% 65% 63% 78% 85% 94% 75% 88% 70% help
Prepared t o make personal ( b ) 28 42 26 37 39 64 34 60 35 sacr i f ices
R a t i o ( b ) / (ai 37.3 64.9 41.3 48.0 46.7 67.7 45.2 68.6 49.5 2
c
Ec1
76%
41
53.2
There i s no doubt tha t the above question tends t o induce a "conformist" response (although a th i rd of the Danes and Germans chose the negative reply o r didn't know); t o see how far each person interviewed w a s prepared t o make some personal sacrifice t o help another country i n diff icul t ies .
a supplementmy question was therefore included
As might be expected, support f o r sol idari ty i s much lower when seen i n these terms: But here again there are significant variations from country to'country: more than s ix i n ten of the Dutch and the Italians adopt the unselfish at t i tude; Belgians, Bri t ish and Prench.
only one person i n f o u r would be prepared t o make sacrifices.
but t h i s i s f l a t l y rejected by an absolute majority of
(See Table 50)
On comparing both s e t s of repl ies t o the questions on Community sol idari ty , we find that a t t i tudes are most consistent i n the Netherlands, I t a l y and Denmark, and least consistent i n Belgium.
(See Table 51) Table 50
WILLINGNESS TO MAKE Som PERSONAL SACRIFICE TO HELP ANOTHER -ER COUNTRY
Yes - prepared t o ( a ) Mo - not prepared ( b )
Don't know
T o t a l
D i f f e rence ( a ) - ( b )
19
1 O0
-25
DK D F I R L I L
% % % % % %
42 26 37 39 a 34
40 1471 1521 48 24 147) 18 27 11 13 12 19
100 100 100 100 100 100
2 - 21 -15 -9 40 -13
D K ~ D ~ F ) I R L / I I L I I I
40 1471 1521 48 24 147) 18 27 11 13 12 19
I I
Table 51
NL
%
[601 28
12
100
32
-
-
U K
%
35
a 12
100
- 18
-
- -
EC'
%
41
43
16
--
100
-2
'Weighted average. *Caloulated on the basis of percentages t o the f i r s t deoimal place.
- 100 -
Feel t ha t o ther countr ies should help (a)
Prepared t o make personal s ac r i f i c e s (b)
Opinion l e d e r s i n a l l countr ies profess greater readiness than others t o make personal sacrifices. They are a l so more consistent than non-leaders i n t h e i r r ep l i e s t o both questions. a whole, 58$ of opinion leaders claimed tha t they would be prepared t o make personal s ac r i f i c e s t o help another country i n d i f f i c u l t i e s .
I n the Community as
62% 78%
24 40
(See Table 52 and Graph 16)
Table 52
SUPPOKI' FOR SOLIDARITY BETWEEN MEMBl3R COUNTRIES
AND READINESS TO W PERSONAL SACRIFICES
BY LEADERSHIP RATING
(Community as a whole)
I Non-leaders
Ratio (b)/(a)
"
Leaders
81%
47
57.7
86%
58 ~
67.2
- 101 -
c
- ASPIRATION A LA SOLIDARITE ENTRE LES PAYS MEMBRES ET DT$PÖSITION A FAIRË DI-S-ShTRTm C ES PE RS O N RE L S T m E m R k DE LEADmHIP
-- --
- - - ~~
Graphique no 16 / Graph 16
1004
50:
O
ELGIQUE/BELGIE
/. 0
P0
L a I . RANCE
0 0
PR
UXEMBOURG
ASP I RAT I O N FOR SOL I DARITY BETWEEI4 PlEMBER COUNTRIES AND IJILLINGNESS TO MAKE _-_------
K R S O N A L SA c R I F I CE- BYEADERSHIPTTÏNG --- --
IAN! 1 ARK
-* o--
/* - , .’
‘JE DE RLANO 1
EUTSCHLAND
/ 1 ,*- - 4
/ 1
1 L
TAL
/--- /’
0’ J
I L . NITED KINGDOM
NL-- NL- L+ L++
Aide aux pays en d i f f i c u l t e / Help c o u n t r i e s i n d i f f i c u l t i e s A c c e p t e r a i t des s a c r i f i c e s 1 Would accept t o make s a c r i f i c e s
- - -
- 102 -
DK D
% %
17 20
26 3 1
34 32 23 17
100 100
- 9 -11
2.6 Benefit derived compared with other countries
._
F
%
13
22
30
35
100
- 9 -
ItYakinw ever.vth i ng i n to consid.eration, would YOU say tha t (your country) .has benefited more than, o r benefited l e s s than, o ther countries of the Market by i t s membership of t he European Community ( . . . )?It'
I RL
%
39
28
14
19
100
11 - -
This proved t o be another d i f f i c u l t question, with approximately one i n two of a l l those interviewed being unable t o make a clear decision.
I
%
27
21
24 28
100
6
In most countries, and pa r t i cu l a r l y i n the United Kingdom, the majority of those who did choose one o r other option took the view tha t t h e i r country had benefi ted less than others. I t a l y d id the opposite view prevail.
Only i n Ireland, Belgium and
L NL
% % % %
18 15
16 24
51 33
15 28
100 100
2 - 9
(See Table 53)
UK EC2
14 19
(491 - 30
17 26 20 25
100 100
-35 -11
Probably because they found t h i s an eas ie r question t o answer, opinion leaders were more l i k e l y than non-leaders t o opt f o r the posi t ive view, t he negative view, o r the neutra l view, depending on nat ional i ty .
The findings a re described i n Table 54, and i l l u s t r a t e d i n Graph 17. Only i n the United Kingdom i s the majority viewpoint p la in ly negative, i r respec t ive of respondents' l e d e r s h i p ra t ing.
Table 53
MOliE BENEFIT OR LESS BENEFIT FOR OWN COUNTRY COMPARED WITH OTHER COMNKJNITY COUNTRIES
L ' %
Feel t h a t t h e i r country;
- has benefi ted more
- has benefi ted less ( a>
(b)
3 Neither
Don't know
Tot al
Difference (a) - (bl
20
13
32 35
100
7
-
-
LI
'The question specified, as appropriate, "since 1958" o r "since 1973". 2Weighted average. 3Volunte.ered.
- 103-
Table 54
Feel t ha t t h e i r count has benefi t ed more :
Nonyl eaders ( - - )
( - > ( +)
Leaders ( + + I
Feel t ha t t h e i r count has benefited ].ess:
Non-leaders ( - - )
( - ) ( + I
Leaders (++>
B
% Y
8
23 27
33
Y
10
11 17
19
DK
% -
12
11 21
26 -
17
28 27
30
-
- D
% -
10
21
23
24 -
30
29 33
37
-
__-
F
%
5
13
15
23
21
22
23
21
- R L
% -
34
38 43
4 1 -
21
31 26
46
-
I
% -
23
25
3 1
30 -
14
18 21
39 -
iiL
% -
14
12
14
25 -
21
20 26
26
UK
%
7
13
20
17 -
49
48 49
59
EC2 I - -
%
12
18 22
25
27
29 30
35
---
~~ ~~
'Those replying "neither" o r "don't know" a re not included i n the Table.
*Weighted average.
c
- 104 - I
Graphique no 17 / G r a p h g
AVANTAGE OU DESAVANTAGE ATTRIBUE A SON PROPRE PAYS PAR RAPPORT AUX AUTRES PRYS -- SELON LE DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP
:IORE BENEFIT OR LESS Br rJEF IT ATTRIBUTED TO H I S OWN COUNTRY CONPARED WIW THE OTHER COUNTRIES BY LEADERSHIP RATING
- --
;IL-- ;;L- L+ L++
A v a n t a g e /
D é s a v a n t a g e / More b e n e f i t - Less b e n e f i t - - --
- 105 -
3. ATTITUDE TO SPANISH i'r3XBEXSHIP OP' THE C O ~ ~ ~ N I T Y
"Three coun t r i e s from Southern Europe, amongwhich Spain, have r ecen t ly asked t o j o i n t h e European Community (Common Xaricet). would t h e en t ry of Spain i n t h e European Community be a good th ing , a bad t h i n g o r n e i t h e r a good nor a bad t h i n g f o r (your country)?"
I n your opinion,
"And f o r Spain i t s e l f , would it be a good th ing , a bad t h i n g , n e i t h e r good nor bad?"
Approximately one i n t h r e e (31%) i n t h e Community as a whole f e l t that Spanish membership would be a good t h i n g f o r h i s own country and seven i n t e n (7@) thought t h a t it would be a good t h i n g f o r Spain.
A comparison of t h e answers t o t h e first ques t ion i n autumn 1978 wi th those given i n autumn 1977 reveals t h a t t h e neu t ra i response ("nei ther good nor bad") is gaining ground, a common occurrence as debate makes a n event more familiar t o t h e general public .
The I t a l i a n s , t h e I r i s h and t h e Germans a r e again most i n favour of Spain jo in ing t h e Community; but a c l e a r majori ty i n t h e Community as a whole f e e l s t h a t it would be a good t h i n g f o r Spain.
(See Table 55)
Support f o r Spanish membership was more widespread among opinion l eade r s than among non- leaders i n a l l t h e count r ies , but had f a l l e n s l i g h t l y between autumn 1977 and auturm 1978.
(See Table 56 and Graph 18)
- 106 -
Table 55
H ME3!BERSHIP OF "Hl - SPAN3
8
% -
33 15
18 34
1 O0 - -
COMMUNITY -- - F
% -
33 20
27 20
100 - -
- I RL
% -
Q 14
20 24
LOO - -
DK
% -
22 26
28 24
1 O0 - -
- L
% -
35 13
27 35
- NL
% -
35 24
22 19
100 -
I
% -
m 14
24 19
LOO - -
UK
% % Far o m .oounfry:
(Autumn 1977)r
- R good thihg 31 22
39 16 - a bad thing
- neither good nor bad 27
20 25 20 Don't know
Total - I O0 roo - I O0
fir own country:
(Autumn 1978):
- a good thing - a bad thing
32 12
13 2 0
15;rl 12
El 13
Fs 13
26 20
20 25
26 26
24 16
31 16 - neither good nor
bad 26 30
37 30
32 19
23 25
36 18
28 20
36 19
26 22
41 19
33 20 Don ' t know -
1 O0 - - 100 -
- 1 O0 - LOO - LOO - - 1 O0 I_
1 O0 - L O0 Total
For Spain:
(Autumn 1978):
- a ,yood thing
- a bad thing 65 3
62 4
72 2
74 2
64 7
74 2
65 5
61 7
70 3 3 - neither good nor
bad 6 26
6 28
10 16
8 16
8 6 18
11 19
3 11 21
9 18 Don ' t know -
100 - I O0 - - 100
- I O0 -- - 100 - 100 100 100 Total
- 'Helghted average.
- 107 -
L
% %
(28) (28) (41) (43)
(11) (16) (26) (21)
(51) (66) (70) (56)
'Pable 56
ATTITUDE TO SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY
-- NL
28 35 35 41
--
k7 19 24 38
--
72 71 87 91
-1-
. .
A md. thing for own country (1972)
Non-leaders (0 0 )
( -1 ( +)
Leadere (+ +I
A mod thinR for own count.ry (1978)
Non-leaders (- -) ( 4 ( +) ( 4 Le ad e re
Non-leaders (- -) ( 4 ( +)
Leadere (+ +I
I LE B - -
%
16 35 39 58 -
21 36 37 -1 7 -
44 64 83 83 -
WRSH
DK - - %
17 22 24 27 -
7 12 15 20 -
36 53 68 68 -
' RA
D - -
%
31 49 53 58 -
26 3 ci 43 52 -
60 72 77 Dl -
NC F - - %
24 31 40 40 -
20 24 20 35
_I_
56 74 80 86 -
- RL - %
34 46 45 52 -
36 36 44 45 -
58 65 72 62 -
- 1 -
x
33 43 48 52 -
35 37 41 47 -
6 1 70 84 85 --
- UK - %
23 31 38 37 -
19 21 30 31 -
44 63 69 70 -
- m1 - %
27 38 44 47 -
25 29 35 40 -
55 69 78 82 _I
- 'Weighted average
.i
- 108 -
Graphique no 18 / Graph 18
L ’ ENTREE DE t ’ ESPP.GNE D A M LA COPlMUIiAUTE
SELON L E DEGRE DE LEADERSHIP
ST UNE BONME CHOSE
/
SPANISH MEWBEEtSHIP A GOOD THING
BY LEADERSHIP RATING
100%
50
O
BELGIQUE/BELGI E
I 1 I L r
:RANCE
t t L L
UXEIlGOURG
n
?ANMA R K
. I L L
EDERLAilD
DEUTSCHLAND
. . I T P, L I P.
UNITED KINGDOII
L I . *
- 1977
1978 - --
- 109 -
For Spain
?here Is a correl;.ticr, between vieva on 3p:inIsh entqy nnd rci-cY-1 * t t ? t w ? e o t o w r d n l2uropcr.n u n i f í c n t i o n : t h o more c o n t a c t s f+wourcd unification, t h o more likely t hey were t o feel t h x t Spmlnh mcnbcrohip would b e ,- Cood t h ine . Thin c o r r e l n t l o n w o even more mtrkcd uhen i n t e r v l c - : e e s were :#aked t o cor:nlder t h o gffecte on t h c i r own country. (See Table 57)
Ccncr:hlly spe\kinK:, contrrr te who conoldered thcmeelvos t o bo on t h e P r r lc -h t were more i n c l i n e d thrin o t h e r s t o feel t h n t ít would be a good t h i n e for t h c i r count ry í f Spain Joined t h e Colrmuníty. renbomhip would be cood for S :)ín itself wae more popular nmong thooe on tho left (but no t t h e fíw l e f t P , of t h e p o l i t i c a l e p e c t m .
Convoraelyt t h e view t h n t
(See Table 58)
*B.
Table 5 1
ATTITUDE TO SPANISH MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY
RELATED TO " E R A L ATTITbDES TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNIFICATION
(Community a8 a whole)
~~ - ~
For every 100 whose
a t t i t ude t o mopean
unificat ion was:
For - very much
For 3wn oountry
- b
2 O a d- P
E
-
07% 30 13 13
- w (D P. rc P (D Y
2
ro O p.
Y
E -
293: 38
36 37
b d (P a rc D-
i.
142 14 *
35 32
10% 18 16 18
85Z 74 57 52
59 9
16 8
- 1 1 0-
B DK
Table 58
- - - 0 F I R L I ' L tiL UK bl
SPANISH MEMHERSHIP A OOOD THING -
80 48
84 63
85 Gl 86 74 77 65
REUTED TO POSITION ON THE: POLITICAL SpECTRtJM -
69 79 71 75 70
A good thing f o r o m oountryt
Far Left Left Centre
Right ?hr Right
I
d good thing for Spdnr
Far Left
Left- Cent r e
Right Far right
(33% 36 34 35 38
-
(55) 85 70 74 75
-
10% 14 13 15 20
-
49 72 63 73 68
(55% 4 1 35 32 58
(76) 85 73 75 67
-
211 27 28 36 29
67 e3 76 79 78
-
(32%) 44 36 44 48
-
50 69 66 68 68
39% 36 42 35
(56)
-
77 78 76 65
(81)
26% 27 24 30 28
28% 26 22 27 29
-
33% 32 31 31 43
-
7
'Weighted average,
- 111 -
c
Pol i t ica l leaders i n some countries are clear ly divided on the question of Spain joining the Community. be featured by two of the main part ies - the Communist Party and the Rassemblement pour la Rdpublique - i n the campaign for -the hropean elections.
I n Bance notably, t h i s issue w i l l probably
We have, therefore, purely as a pointer, analysed the views on Spanish accession of those contacts who stated which po l i t i ca l party they would vote fo r i f there were an immediate national election.
It was confined t o Germany, France, I t a ly and Great Britain; the findings are shown i n Table 59.
There is very l i t t l e var iat ion i n the views of German voters, although SPD supporters a re s l ight ly more i n favour than CDU/CSU supporters. i s a greater divergence of a t t i t ude i n France and I t a ly , and more part icular ly i n Great Britain:
There
- i n ??rance, UDF (and especially Republican Party) supporters axe most posit ive about Spanish entry ("a good thingt1 f o r France); the negative view (Ita bad thingt8 fo r France) has more currency amongst RPR and - even more 80 - Communist Party voters;
- i n Italy, posit ive a t t i tudes dominated among supporters of the r ight and centre r ight , while negative a t t i tudes were more common on the far lef't (and, unexpectedly, also with Republican Party supporters); the posit ion of Communist Party sympathizers was -ry close t o the national norml ;
- i n Great Britain, the voters most i n favour were the Liberals, followed by Conservatives, Labour and Nationalists.
'In France and I ta ly , seven i n t e n Communist voters think that Spanish membership would be a good thing for Spain; the Spanibh Communist Party has i n fact come out i n favour of membership. But supporters of the two largest Communist Part ies i n the Common Market hold widely d i f fe r ing views on the re la t ive advantwe for t h e i r own countries:
Replies of Communist Voters
France Italy
For t h e i r country:
- a good thing - a bad. thing 41% 16
For Spain: - a good thing - a bad thing
71% 6
7% 2
- 112 -
Table 59
ATTITUDE TO SPANISH lvlEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY
RELATED T O VOTING INTENTIONS I N NATIONAL ELECTIONS
DEUTSCHLAND Sozialdemokrat ische P a r t e i (SPD)
F r e i e Demokratische P a r t e i (FDP)
Christ l ich-Demokra- t i s c h e Union / C h r i s t - l i c h Soz ia le Union (CDU/CSU)
,
FRANCE P a r t i - s o c i a l i s t e u n i - f i é / Fa,r I e f t
P a r t i communiste (P.C.F.) P a r t i s o c i a l i s t e ( P . S . e t Radicaux de Gauche (R.G.)
Eco log is tes
P a r t i Republ ica in (U. D.F. ) Démocrates sociaux (U .D.F. ) Radicaux (U.D.F.)
Rassemblement pdúr l a Républ ique (R.P. R . )
ITALIA Democrazia p r o l e t a r i a P a r t i t o comuni s t a
- --
(P.C.I.) P a r t i t o r a d i c a l i (P.R. P a r t i t o s o c i a l i s t a (P.S. I . ) P a r t i t o S o c i a l i s t a Cegocrat ico (P .S .D. I .)
-
For own country
s s on, Y r
d & D e -CD P Y w o O P -
31%
31
34 -
(42)
28
39 42
36
(30) (48)
35 -
(38)
24
(37)
27
48)
- tt.
i3
- ti'
O a ct 3
79%
70
71
For Spain Base' ..
3 58
70
384
118
385 56
133
132 -.
150
P a r t i t o repubbl icano ( P . R . I . ) Democrazia c h r i s t i a n a ( D . C . ) P a r t i t d l i b e r a l e
Democrazia nar io- na l e (D.N.)
(P.L. I .)
GREAT BRITP.IN La bou r Par ty L i bera l Party N a t i o n a l i s t s (SNP Pla id Cymru, e t c . . ) Conservative Par ty
- 113-
Table 59 (contd)
For own country For Spain
'Figures i n brackets indicate l e s s than 50 rep l ies .
c
EURO-BAROMETRE No 1 O EURO-BAROMETRE N r 1 O
r
ANNEXES E T TABLEAUX DETA ILLES / APPENDIX AND DETA ILED TABLES
A l
Toutes l es données r e l a t i v e s aux Euro-Baromètres son t déposées aux "Be lg ian Arch ives fo r t h e Soc ia l Sc i ences", ( 1 P I ace Montesqu i eu, 8-1348 Louvain- la-Neuve). E l l e s son t tenues à l a d i s p o s i t i o n des c.rganismes membres du European Consortium f o r P o l i t i c a l Research (Essex), du I n t e r - u n i v e r s i t y Consortium for P o l i t i c a l Research (Mich igan) e t des chercheurs j u s t i f i a n t d 'un i n t é r ê t de recherche. Pour tous renseignements sur l e s études d ' o p i n i o n pub l i que f a i t e s 2 l ' i n i t i a t i v e de l a Commission des Com- munautés européennes, é c r i r e à J.-R. RABIER, 200 r u e de l a Lo i , €3- 1049 Bruxe I I es.
si
1. INSTITUTS CHARGES DU SONDAGE ET SPECIALISTES RESPONSABLES / INSTITUTES WHICH CARRIED OUT THE SURVEY AND EXPERTS IN CHARGE
Be I g i que/Be I g i ë
Da nma r k
Deutschland
France
I r e I and
l t a l i a
Luxembourg
Neder I and
Un i t e d K i ngdom
DI MARSO/ I NRA
GALLUP MARKEDSANALYSE
EMNID-INSTITUT
INSTITUT FRANCAIS D'OPINION PUBLIQUE ( x )
IRISH MARKETING SURVEYS
ISTITUTO PER LE RICERCHE STA- TISTICHE E L'ANALISI DELL'OPI- NIONE PUBBLICA(D0XA)
DIMARSO/INRA
NEDERLANDS INSTITUUT VOOR DE PUBLIEKE OPINIE (NIPO)
SOCIAL SURVEYS (GALLUP POLL) (xx+ 1
X
x x
P a t r i c k DAVIES
Rolf RANDRUP
Günther BIERBAUM
Hélène RIFFAULT
John MEAGHER
Enn i o SALAMON
P a t r i c k DAVIES
Jan STAPEL
Norman WEBB
Al I Euro-Barometre da ta a r e s to red a t t h e Be lg i an Arch ives fo r t h e So- c i a l Sciences ( 1 , P lace Montesquieu, B-1248 Louvain- la-Neuve). They a r e a t t h e d isposa l o f a l l i n s t i t u t e s members of t h e European Consortium f o r P o l i t i c a l Research (Essex), o f t h e I n t e r - U n i v e r s i t y Consortium fo r P o l i t i c a l Research (Mich igan) and o f a l l those i n t e r e s t e d i n s o c i a l sc ience research. For a l l i n f o rma t i on regard ing o p i n i o n p o l l s c a r r i e d o u t f o r t h e Commission of t h e European Communities, p lease w r i t e t o J.-R. RABIER, 200 r u e de l a Loi, 8-1049 Brusse ls .
Chargé en o u t r e de l a coo rd ina t i on i n t e r n a t i o n a l e e t de l ' ana l yse des r é s u l t a t s / A lso respons ib l e f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n and a n a l y s i s o f t h e resu I t s .
Le sondage en Nor thern I r e l a n d e s t f a i t en c o l l a b o r a t i o n par l e I r i s h Marke t ing Surveys e t l e Ga l lup P o l l / The Nor thern I r e l a n d survey i s conducted j o i n t l y by I r i s h Market ing Surveys and t h e Soc ia l Surveys (Ga l lup P o l l ) .
~~ . .
A 2
2. ECHANTILLONNAGE / SAMPLING
L ' o b j e c t i f de l a méthode d 'échant ¡ I - lonnage e s t de c o u v r i r de façon re- p r é s e n t a t i v e l a t o t a l i t é de l a popu- l a t i o n des neuf pays de l a Communau- t é âgee de 15 ans e t p l us .
L ' é c h a n t i l l o n ae chaque pays e s t con- s t i t u é à deux n iveaux:
1' Régions e t l o c a l i t é s d 'enquête.
Les s t a t i s t i q u e s de l a Communauté européenne d i v i s e n t l 'espace européen en 120 rég ions ( v o i r l i s t e c i - j o i n t e ) . L 'enquête a l i e u dans 117 r ég ions (Corse, Groenland e t Val d 'Aoste excep tés ) .
Chaque pays a c o n s t i t u é a l é a t o i r e - ment un é c h a n t i l l o n - m a i t r e de l o c a l i - t é s d 'enquête de t e l l e s o r t e que t ou- t e s l es c a t é g o r i e s d ' h a b i t a t s o i e n t représentées p ropo r t i onne l l emen t à l e u r s popu la t i ons r espec t i ves .
Au t o t a l , l e s i n t e r v i e w s de l ' enquê te Omnibus Européenne o n t l i e u dans pas moins de 1 100 p o i n t s d 'enquête couvra.nt l e s 117 r ég ions de l a Com- mu nauté.
2' Choix des personnes i n t e r rogées .
Les personnes i n t e r rogées s o n t tou- j o u r s d i f f é r e n t e s d 'une enquête à l ' a u t r e . L ' é c h a n t i l l o n - m a i t r e a léa- t o i r e évoqué c i- dessus i nd i que l e nombre de personnes à i n t e r r o g e r 2 chaque p o i n t d 'enquête. Au s tade s u i - vant, l e s personnes à i n t e r r o g e r son t dés ignées :
- s o i t pa r un t i r a g e au s o r t su r l i s t e dans l e s pays oÙ on peu t a v o i r accès 2 des l i s t e s exhaus- t i v e s d ' i n d i v i d u s ou de f o y e r s : Be lg ique, Pays-Bas, Danemark, Luxembourg.
- s o i t pa r é c h a n t i l tonnage s t r a t i - f i é s u r l a base des s t a t i s t i q u e s de recensement, I ' é c h a n t i l l o n é t a n t c o n s t r u i t à p a r t i r des c r i - t è r e s de sexe, âge e t p r o f e s s i o n : France, I t a I ie , Royaume-Uni, I r- lande, Allemagne.
The sample has been designed t o be re- p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n aged 15 years and ove r of t h e n i n e c o u n t r i e s o f t h e Community.
I n each coun t r y a two s tage sampl ing method i s used:
1 ' Geograph i c a I d i s t r i b u t i o n .
For s t a t i s t i c a l purposes t h e European Community d i v i d e s Europe i n t o 120 re- g i o n s (see a t t ached I i s t ) . The survey takes p l ace i n 117 of t hese reg ions (Cors ica, Groenland and Val d 'Aos te exc luded) .
I n each coun t r y a random s e l e c t i o n o f sampl ing p o i n t s i s made i n such a way t h a t a l l t ypes o f area (urban, r u r a l , e t c . ) a r e represented i n pro- p o r t i o n t o t h e i r popu la t i ons .
The i n t e r v i e w s a r e d i s t r i b u t e d i n more than 1 100 sampl ing p o i n t s i n t h e 117 reg ions o f t h e Community.
2' Choice of respondents.
For each survey d i a r e i n t e r v i ewed i n of sampl ing p o i n t s W i t h i n these sampl i n d i v i d u a l s t o be chosen :
f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s t h e master sample descr ibed above. ng p o i n t s t h e n te rv iewed a r e
- e i t h e r a t random f rom t h e popula- t i o n o r e l e c t o r a l l i s t s i n those c o u n t r i e s where access t o s u i t a b l e l i s t s of i n d i v i d u a l s or households i s p o s s i b l e : Belgium, Denmark, Nether lands, Luxembourg.
- o r by quota sampling. I n these cases t h e quotas a r e e s t a b l i s h e d by sex, age and p r o f e s s i o n on t h e b a s i s o f census da ta : t h i s system i s used i n France, I t a l y , U n i t e d Kingdom, I r e l a n d and Germany.
I
..-
A 3
BELGIQUE/BELGIE AN : Antwerpen W.V. : West-Vlaanderen O.V. : Oost-Vlaanderen BR : Brabant L I : Limburg L IE : L iège HAI : Ha inau t
.- NA : Namur LX : Luxembourg
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND S.H. : Sch lesw is- Ho ls te in STA AUR OLD B LUN BR OS N HAN MUN DET H I L DUS A RN KAS AA KO L TRI KO 5
- Stade A u r i c h O I denburg Bremen Luneburg Braunsc hwe i g Osnabrück Hannover Mü ns t e r Detmo I d H i ldeshe im Di lsse ldor f Arnsberg Kasse I Aachen Kö ln T r i e r Kob I enz
AL B.N. : BRE : P.LOI : CEN : BOU : F.C. : P.CH : LIM : AUV :
AQU : M.P. : LAN : P.CDA : COR :
I RE LAND DON : N.W. : N.E. : W. M. E. M.W. : S.E. : S.W. :
ITALIA V.D.A. : PIE :
R-A :
DA.WI.: Darmstadt-Wiesbaden LOM : U.F. : O.F. : SAA : RH.PF. : N.B. : N.W. : M.F. : 0.PF. : N.BAY. : S.B. : S.W. : SCH : 0.BAY.: BER :
DANMARK JYLL : SJPE :
Y FYN : GR0 :
FRANCE NORD : PIC : H.N. : R.P. : CHA : LOR :
U n t e r f ranken Oberf ranken Saar I and Rheinhessen-Pfalz No r d ba den No rdw it r t tem be r g M i t t e l f r a n k e n Oberpf a I z Niederbayern Südbaden Sild w il r t tembe rg Schwaben Oberbayern Be r l i n
J y l land Sjæ I land FY n Grdn I and
Nord P i c a r d i e Haute-Normandie Région Pa r i s i enne Champagne L o r r a i ne
T.AA : VEN : F.V.G. : LIG : E-R : TOS : UMB : MAR : LAZ : ABR : MOL : CAM : PUG : BAS : CAL : SIC : SAR :
A I sace Basse-Normandie Bretagne Pays de l a Loire Cen t re Bou rgog ne Franche-Comté Poi tou-Charentes Limousin Auvergne Rhône-Alpes Aqu i t a i ne Midi-Pyrénées Languedoc Provence-Côte d 'Azur Corse
Donega I Nor th West Nor th East West Mid lands East Mid West South East South West
V a l l e d 'Aosta P i emonte Lombard i a T r e n t i no-A I t o Ad ¡ge Veneto F r i u l i - V e n e z i a G i u l i a L i g u r i a Em¡ I ia-Romagna Toscana Umbr i a Marche Laz i o Abruzz Mol i s e Campan Pug I i a
a
Basi I i c a t a Calabr i a S i c i I i a Sardegna
LUXEMBOURG LX : G.D. du Luxembourg
NEDERLAND GR : Groningen FR : F r i e s l a n d DR : Drenthe OV : O v e r i j s s e l NH : Noord-Holland GEL : Ge lder land
ZH : Zuid- Hol land UT : U t r e c h t ZE : Zeeland N.B. : Noord-Brabant L I : Limburg
UN I TED K I NGDOM SCOTL : Sco t land N. N.I.
N.W. Y .H.
WALES W.M. E.M. E.A. S.W. S.E.
: No r th : Nor thern
I r e I and : Nor th West : Y o r k s h i r e and
Humbers i de : Wales
West Mid lands : Eas t Mid lands : Eas t A n g l i a : South West : South Eas t
A 4
3. POPULATION ETUDIEE, TAILLE DES ECHANTILLONS, DATES DU TRAVAIL / SURVEYD POPULATION, S I Z E OF THE SAMPLES, DATES OF FIELDWORK
B
DK
D
F
I RL
I
L
N
UK
CE/EC
Popu la t ion f l )
m i I I ¡ e rs / thou sa nd s
7 653
3 925
ff8 561
AO 272
2 167
42 611
285
10 292
43 108
98 874
T
3.84
1.98
24.42
20.25
1 .o9
21.42
0.14
5.18
21.68
100.0
Echan t i l l oñs /
(Baro I O ) samp I es
1008
1002
1006
1194 (2) 1005
1030
29 1
91 3
1339
8788 _I
4. RECOMMANDATION AU LECTEUR / I I e s t rappelé que, dans l es enquê- I t e s par sondage, on d o i t t e n i r compte d'une c e r t a i n e marge pour e r r e u r d 'échant i l lonnage. Avec des échan- t i l l o n s de l ' o r d r e de 1000 personnes intérrogées, les d i f f é rences de pour- centages i n f é r i e u r e s à 5% ne de- v r a i e n t pas ê t r e norma l ement con- sidérées comme s ta t i s t i quemen t s i g n i f ¡ ca t i ves .
Dates (Baro 10)
30/X-l5/X1/1978
21 - 29/X
20 - 30/X
16 - 30/X
23/X -3/XI
15/X - 4/XI
30/X - 21/XI
24/X - 2/XI
26/X - 4/XI
ADVICE TO READERS
Readers a r e reminded t h a t i n survey research, one should a l l ow a c e r t a i n margin f o r sampl ing e r r o r . With a sample of 1 O00 cases, percentage d i f fe rences of less than 5 p o i n t s would not normal ly b e regarded as s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t .
( 1 ) 15 ans e t p lus / 15 years and over. u
( 2 ) Y compris sur représenta t ion de 151 ruraux / Inc lud ing oversampling of 151 country-people.
I E
/ T a b l e 1 Tab I eau 1
í
POUR OU CONTRE L'ELECTION DU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN AU SUFFRAGE UNIVERSEL DIRECT / FOR OR AGAINST THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY DIRECT UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE'(1)
1 I
BELGIQUE / BELGIE
L I X/73
- T o u t b f a i t pour / Complete ly f o r
- P l u t ô t pour / To some e x t e n t f o r
T o t a l Irpour" / T o t a l l r fo r1 '
- P l u t ô t c o n t r e / To some ex ten taga ins t
- T o u t à f a i t c o n t r e / comple te ly aga i n s t
To ta I "con t re " / To ta I "aga i n s t "
Sans réponse / No answer
To ta I
N
1 100
v/75
%
23
32
55
6
3
9
36
1 O0
1507
X/78
%
27
35
62
6
7
13
25
1 O0
1008
-I- I
A 6
(o *+ & o o a
T 3-a k -u Et x o o k 3 o a L
ar-, 3 '9) (o k l
-u
1
f; 4-2 +, o o)
4-2 -u o -u
t.4
'U
4 x o m
(o a, k '9) b 'o) Y
DEUTSCHLAND
- Tout à f a i t pour / Comp
- P l u t ô t pour / To some ex ten t f o r
Tota I rrpour'' / Tota I l r fo r ' l
l e t e l y f o r
nst - P l u t ô t cont re / To sane extentaga
- Tout à f a i t cont re / Completely aga i n s t
I ' * I I " Tota I "contre" / Tota I "aga i n s t "
- Sans réponse / No r e p l y
Tota I
N
48
70
5
2
7
23
1 O0 7-
A 8
,
co II \ I n N x M N d
co r- M - a \ M M >
r- r- \ - e e a
M M X -
r- r-
> w coo
N e
UJ r-
X r - N N Q
l w
W r- \ w c o c o > N M
Ln r- \ - M W M X N Q
In I- \ w M I n > M M
M II \
N o \ 2 5 - N N
N N
r- a
__.
r- a
- O r-
_I
e r-
- cn a
- a a
O O 7
a r- N - - cn Q - - W Ln N
- W In M c - c
e N c
c o a
m m
m e
o r - c
cn a
--
co W
- c
In
co c
- r- c
O O c
- O O c
7
O O c
W r- N
- a In
m e
m a
P N N N -
- r - c
L O L - 0 >. - t a , c + a , a , +
X na, E o a , \ u l
Lc
-
" 5 >- a a, L
O z \
-
- a, m ul t c
I- .a, L
ul t m ul I
O z 2
L O X I - O
+ I m o
n \
.- 3
+ a am t
CO + t 3 3 0 -
I I
k a
O - a v m L
+ t + c .- o o m I- V L c
t r m <O + t 3 3
O - at- I I
c I t
la b
X1/75 V/76
% %
38 42
40 32
78 74
I X1/76 I
%
40
37
17
I IX/73
- Tout 5 f a i t pour / Completely f o r
- P l u t ô t pour / To some ex tent f o r
Tota I ' 'pour"/ Tota I
- P l u t ô t cont re / To some ex ter taga ins t
- Tout 5 f a i t con t re / Completely aga i n s t
Tota I "contre" / Tota I "aga¡ ns t "
- Sans réponse / No r e p l y
Tota I
N
34
30
.- 64
8
' 4
12
24
1 O0
1909
v/75
1 O0
1155
%
31
40
1 O0
1175
77
6
2
8
15
1 O0
1043
ITALIA
1110 I 923 11052
v/77
%
43
37
80
7
3
10
10
1 O0
1025
34 32
79 I l7
12 16
b
'o
A 10
o3
r-
O
co
d c
O N
a, -
-
t O 7
O cn c N
O N O N
M
O d O d c M
O N O k? c
O c O O 7 M
O co O 0 c N
O r- O cn
N
O - O
-+-
a r- >
\ 2 I" ;: ' I
s a l n M M
: r- I " ? : : X
Ln a
- r- a
r - d
c o -
l n d
a -
r - M
c o d
2
- N c
t m f C f
> .- t m - 0 s o c u a ,
t a , x -
.- a , m t m
a n a , E E " 2 t ! 1 %
u l \
O ( u v L t t c .-
t dm <O t t 3 3
O - a I - I I
.. - t ul c .- m o m
m t O I-
-
'' -a, L
O V
tr - - - m t O I-
> Q a, I
O z \
a, u) S O Q ,a L ul c m cn I
-
- m t
i- O z
*
0 O
A 11
! *
1 -
M I- \ X -
M O 0 L n M
84 d M d M
-e N O L n M
M - 84 d M
I - N Be N M
M N O M M
M
d O m
d u3 d
L O L + o x + -
I I
t t u ) V I C C .-
(o ( o m m m (o z t - C a , a t t a , x -
.-
:; E O s,
0 s o a , k - L
t \ C
L t t C .- u + t al CO t t 3 3
O
o m
- at- I I
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v/77
%
46
30
76
6
6
12
Total rlpourll / Tota I l1forr1
x I / 77 VI78
% %
49 41
25 30
74 71
6 5
5 5
1 1 10
- P l u t ô t con t re / To some ex tent aga ins t
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Sans réponse / No rep l y
Tota I
N
I RELAND
X I /76
%
29
34
63
9
5
14
23
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Tableau 2 Table 2
POUR OU CONTRE L ' U N I F I C A T I O N DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE : FOR OR AGAINST THE U N I F I C A T I O N OF WESTERN EUROPE :
EVOLUTION OF ATTITUDES I N GERMANY, FRANCE, I T A L Y AND EVOLUTION DES ATTITUDES EN ALLEMAGNE, EN FRANCE, EN I T A L I E ET
EN GRANDE-BRETAGNE DE 1952 A 1978 GREAT B R I T A I N FROM 1952 TO 1978
Tab leau 2 ( s u i t e ) Tab le 2 (continued)
A 19
(11 Données provenant, p o u r l e s années 1952 - 1967, des sondages commandités p a r t a U.S. I n f o r m a t i o n Agency et, pou r l e s années su i van tes , des sondages commandités p a r l a Commission des Communautés européennes; t o u t e f o i s , p o u r l ' a n n é e 1970, l e s données b r i t a n n i q u e s o n t é t é es t imées p a r Rona ld INGLEHART, C f . "The S i l e n t Revo lu t i on" , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977, pp. 344-346.
ment:"Etes-vous en g é n é r a l p o u r ou c o n t r e l e s e f f o r t s q u i sont f a i t s e n vue d ' u n i f i e r l ' E u r o p e occ iden ta le?" ; en Grande-Bretagne (de 1955 a 19671, en
( en 1955 e t 19621, l a q u e s t i o n p r é c i s a i t 'I .... l ' E u r o p e o c c i d e n t a l e , y compr i s l a Grande-Bretagne". En 1970, 1973 e t 1975, il é t a i t demandé aux i n d i v i d u s i n t e r r o g é s s ' i 1s C t a i e n t f avo rab les , i n d i f f é r e n t s , o u d é f a v o r a b l e s a l ' u n i f i - c a t i o n européenne; C f . " Les Européens e t l ' u n i f i c a t i o n de l 'Europe' ' , B r u x e l l e s j u i n 1972, pp. 71-72 e t Euro-Barometre no 4, décembre 1975, pp. 54-56.
Nonobstant que lques d i f f é r e n c e s de f o r m u l a t i o n , l a q u e s t i o n é t a i t i n i t i a l e - z
Al lemaane (de f é v r i e r 1955 a a v r i l 1956, a i n s i qu 'en j u i n 19621, e n I t a l i e " I
( 2 ) Royaume-Uni ( y compr is N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ) a p a r t i r de 1975 /
(1) The d a t a f o r 1952-1967 a r e f r o m surveys f i n a n c e d b y t h e U.S. I n f o r m a t i o n Agency and, f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g years, f rom su rveys f i n a n c e d b y t h e Commission o f t h e European Communities; however, f o r 1970, t h e B r i t i s h d a t a have been e s t i m a t e d b y Rona ld INGLEHART, C f . 'I The S i l e n t Revo lu t i on" , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977, pp. 344-346. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g some d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e wording, t h e q u e s t i o n was, i n i t i a l l y , as f o l l o w s : " Are y o u i n g e n e r a l f o r o r a g a i n s t making e f f o r t s towards u n i t i n g Western Europe?". I n Grea t B r i t a i n ( f r o m 1955 t o 19671, i n Germany ( f r o m February 1955 t o A p r i l 1956, as w e l l as i n June 19621 and i n I t a l y ( i n 1955 and 19621, t h e q u e s t i o n s p e c i f i e d : ' l . .. Western Europe, i n c l u d i n g Great B r i t a i n " . I n 1970, 1973 and 1975, t h e i n t e r - v iewed i n d i v i d u a l s were asked whether t h e y were i n favour, i n d i f f e r e n t o r n o t i n f a v o u r o f t h e European u n i f i c a t i o n ; C f . "Les Européens e t l ' u n i f i c a t i o n de L'Europe", B russe ls , June 1972, pp. 71-72 and Euro-Barometre Nr. 4, December 1975, pp. 54-56.
(21 U n i t e d Kingdom ( i n c l u d i n g N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d ) a s f r o m 1975.
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- Bonne chose / Good t h i n g - Mauvaise chose / Bad t h i n g - Chose n i bonne n i mauvaise / Ne i ther good nor bad
- Sans réponse / No rep l y
Tota I
N
1X/73 V/74 X1/74 V/75 X1/75 V/76 X1/76 V/77 X1/77 V/78
% % % % % % % % % % 63 66 70 64 67 75 74 80 74 78
4 4 6 3 3 4 4 3 5 5
20 14 15 18 12 15 14 13 16 14 13 16 9 15 18 6 8 4 5 3
1 O0 1 O0 100 100 1 O0 ' 100 100 100 100 100
1464 1000 1012 1093 1006 904 1123 1033 . 943 1131
- Bonne chose / Good t h i n g - Mauvaise chose / Bad t h i n g - Chose n i bonne n i mauvaise /
Nei ther good nor bad - Sans réponse / No r e p l y
Tota I
N
X/78
% 83
2
12 3
1 O0
313
- Bonne chose / Good t h i n g - Mauvai se chose / Bad t h i ng - Chose n i bonne n i mauvaise /
Nei ther good nor bad - Sans,réponse / No r e p l y
Tota I
N
IX/73 V/74 X1/74 V/75 X1/75 V/76 X1/76 V/77 X1/77 v/78
% % % % % % % % % % 42 35 33 36 41 36 29 30 37 34 30 31 35 25 27 29 34 30 33 31
19 24 25 28 24 22 28 30 24 27 9 10 7 1 1 8 13 9 10 6 8
1 O0 1 O0 100 100 1 O0 1 O0 100 100 100 100
962 1010 932 983 1199 1168 1100 1073 1023 977
XI78
% 36 25
30 3
1 O0
1 O02
D
N N
IX/73 V/74 X1/74 V/75 X1/75 V/76 X1/76 V/77 X1/77 V/78
% % % % % % % % % %
15 25 24 20 12 16 22 17 19 17
21 19 22 25 17 18 22 22 19 23 8 8 4 5 4 6 6 4 3 6
1 O0 1 O0 100 100 1 O0 1 O0 100 100 100 100
1199 1000 1000 1000 998 1007 981 1008 997 1005
56 48 50 50 67 50 50 57 59 54
X/78
% 63 12
20 5
1 O0
1005
GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM
VI /77 (1) B 33 42
18 7
1 O0
945
- Bonne chose / Good t h i n g - Mauvaise chose / Bad t h i n g - Chose n i bonne n i mauvaise / Nei t h e r good nor bad - Sans réponse / No rep l y
Tota I
N
~
X/77 XII77 V/78 V I 1/78 X/78 (1) (2) ( 7 ) L" ( 7 )
% B B B B k B B 37 35 29 25 39
23 28 20 25 8 ~- 5 5 7 5
1 O0 1 O 0 3 O0 1 O0 1 O0
33 37 38 48 31
22
954 1351 1426 981 1339 1
x/72
B ( 1 )
40 21
22 17
1 O0
1028
- Bonne chose / Good t h i n g - Mauvaise chose / Bad t h i n g - Chose n i bonne n i mauvaise /
Ne i ther good nor bad - Sans réponse / No r e p l y
Tota I
N
- I x/73
(2 ) I
31 34
22 13
1 O0
1933
-
- - -
-- v/74 (2)
B 33 39
19 9
1 O0
1031
-
- - -
TiEr ( 2 )
36 35
20 9
1 O0
- B
- 1039 -
v/75 (2)
B 47 21
19 13
1 O0 - 1328
XI /75 (2)
50 24
18 8
- B
1 O0
1438
I I 1 I 1
100 100 1 O0 100 100 1077 992 1340 1038 976 1351 1697 I 1417
Su i t e / contd.
( 1 ) Social Surveys (Gal lup P o l l ) . Populat ion o f 18 years and more, on ly Great B r i t a i n . / Populat ion d e 18 ans e t au-delà, seulement
( 2 ) European Omnibus Survey. Populat ion o f 15 years and more. Great B r i t a i n from 1973 t o 1974; Uni ted Kingdom as from 1975 /
(3)' NOP Market Research. Populat ion of 18 years and more. Only Great B r i t a i n . / Populat ion de 18 ans e t au-delà, seulement
Grande-Bretagne.
, Populat ion de 15 ans e t au-delà. Grande-Bretagne de 1973 5 1974; Royaume-Uni depuis 1975.
Grande-Bretagne.
D
N w
lì
V/75 X1/75
% % 63 67
5 4
24 22 8 7
1 O0 1 O0
EURO 6
V/76
% 57
8
26 9
' 100
- Bonne chose / Good t h i n g - Mauvaise chose / Bad t h i n g - Chose n i bonne n i mauvaise /
Ne i ther good nor bad - Sans réponse / No rep l y
Tota I
N
IX/73 v/74 X1/74 v/75 X1/75 V/76 X1/76 v/77 X1/77 v/78
% % % % % 56 53 57 56 59 60 14 13 1 1 14 14 9 9 14 13 14
20 18 18 23 21 24 25 21 23 24 13 9 8 9 7 9 7 8 7 10
1 O0 1 O0 100 100 1 O0 1 O0 100 100 100 100
% % 59 63 53 55
% % %
13 484 8922 9253 9550 9150 8627 9210 9044 8936 9327
- Bonne.chose / Good t h i n g - Mauvaise chose / Bad t h i n g - Chose n i bonne n i mauvaise /
Nei ther good nor bad - Sans réponse / No rep l y
Tota I
N
x/78
% 60 10
22 8
3 O0
8791
I x i 7 3 i V/ i4 i XI/;
63 67 69 4 6 6
I I
6149 I 5691 I 5303
~
X1/76 I V/77 I X1/77 I V/78
COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE / EUROPEAN COMMUNITY