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here are no two peoples in the Mid-dle East whose histories have beenso intertwined as the Arabs and the urks. Forcenturies, both were subjects o the OttomanSultanate, where a dominant Ottoman culture

and an Ottoman mode o religiosity aectedalmost all o the Muslim peoples o the em-pire; Ottoman systems o government and jus-tice were applied in Adana as well as in Cairo;and ulama, administrators, soldiers and mer-chants moved reely between various cities othe empire, but neither people identied itselin terms o the nation. With the emergence

o the modern state in the mid-19th century,sel and mutual consciousness would begin tochange. Advances in the means o communi-cation, military conscription and modern edu-cation, escalating oreign threats and compe-tition or power and inuence in the modernstate would all contribute to the developmento an Ottoman shared space as well as to its

ABSRAC

For centuries, the Arabs and urkswere subjects o the OttomanSultanate, and were largely shapedby the dominant Ottoman cultureand mode o religiosity. Te

ounding o the urkish Republicand several Arab states during the1920s created a new political mapin the region and subsequentlyled to the evolvement o a newArab consciousness o the modernurkey. Tis article explains therole played by our major actorsin raming the urkish imagein Arab eyes: interpretations othe Ottoman past, legacy o the

Kemalist era, conicts and allianceso the Cold War period, and therecent rise to power o the Justiceand Development Party. Te articleconcludes by underlining thechallenges that the Arabs and theurks are now acing to enhancethe relations between them asnations, not subjects o an empire.

he Arabs and Modernurkey: A Century o Changing

Perceptions

BASHEER M. NAFI*

* Reader, History and Islamic studies at Birkbeck College and theMuslim College, London & Senior research ellow at al-JazeeraCentre or Studies, [email protected]

Insight urkey Vol. 11 / No. 1 / 2009

pp. 63-82

Articles

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contradictions, the urkish and Arab

sense o nation-ness. Gradually, howev-er, the Ottoman sense o belonging, onthe one side, and the novel sense o na-tional identity, on the other, were to pullthe empire in two dierent directions.

Te last decade o the Ottoman Sul-tanate was the most turbulent in the re-lations between the Arabs and the urks.

Pressures o the modern state, centralization policies and nationalism played theirpart in raising doubts about the uture o the Ottoman league. But the nal parti-tion o the empire was certainly the result o deeat in World War I. Te oundingo the urkish Republic and several Arab states during the 1920s created a newpolitical map in the region and subsequently led to the evolvement o a new Arabconsciousness o the modern urkey. o be sure, Arab perceptions o the urkishRepublic were never simple or constant, but rather a continuously changing aair,inuenced by a variety o elements and historical conditions. Some o the mostpowerul orces that contributed to the raming o the urkish image in Arab eyes

related to interpretations o the Ottoman past, the legacy o Mustaa Kemal, ColdWar conicts and alliances, and the recent rise to power o the Justice and Devel-opment Party (AKP).

Te Ottoman Past Reconsidered

Arab nationalism was rst born in Greater Syria, during the interwar period;however, it was soon to become the main legitimating theme or almost all Arabentities, whether independent countries or those still struggling against imperialist

control. Imbedded in the Arab nationalist discourse was a narrative condemnatoryo the Ottoman past, in which Ottoman and urk would requently appear assynonymous. Te historical projection o the regime o the Committee o Unionand Progress (CUP) and the 1916 Arab revolt o Shari Husayn o Makka wouldplay a crucial role in the construction o this narrative. Although Arab responses tothe revolt were at the time mixed, to say the least, the publishing o George Anto-nious Te Arab Awakening, Sati al-Husaris works on Arab nationalism and a ewother academic and semi-academic tracts with a similar outlook1 created a newperception o the revolt and its contribution to the making o Arab nationalism.

According to this version o history, the origins o Arab nationalism were rootedin the 19th century, and the Arab revolt was a legitimate response to the urkica-tion and despotic policies o the CUP, and the ultimate, inescapable expression o

Arab perceptions o the

urkish Republic were neversimple or constant, but rathera continuously changingaair, inuenced by a varietyo elements and historicalconditions

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the Arabs aspiration to establish their independence rom the heavy burden o the

long Ottoman occupation. By denoting it as al-thawra al-arabiyya al-kubra (thegreat Arab revolt), the Sharian movement was depicted as a mass Arab insurrec-tion, and a positive, major orce in the revival o the modern Arab nation.

Te appearance o Zeine N. Zeines Origins o Arab Nationalism, and its laterArabic version, represented the rst challenge to the dominant nationalist ver-sion.2 While asserting the link between the CUPs policies and the developmento Arabist eelings, Zeine questioned the whole assumption o the existence o anArab liberal-nationalist awakening prior to the Ottoman second constitutional

period. In assessing responses to the revolt in Greater Syria, he also noted thedivisions within ranks o the Arab elites, and between the elites and the ordinarypeople. During the next ew decades, the academic debate on Arab nationalism,especially in American and British universities, made its way into Arab academiccircles, contributing to the raising o new questions and developing new researchapproaches.3 As a result, a more balanced view o the late Ottoman period hasemerged.

Arab nationalism, like its urkish counterpart, is understood in light o Ot-

toman modernization and centralization policies, while the Arab revolt is beingre-examined, not only in terms o the Sharian private motives but also in relationto the almost total lack o popular opposition to Ottoman rule in major Arab cit-ies throughout the war years. Although independence would eventually suraceas the main demand o scores o Arab notables and members o the Ottomanmilitary and bureaucracy, a large majority o the Arab educated classes, includ-ing those with strong Arabist dispositions, such as Shakib Arslan, Kurd Ali, Yasinal-Hashimi and Naji al-Swaydi, ullled their duties as loyal Ottomans, well untilthe nal deeat o the sultanate. With an estimated 300,000 men under arms, the

Arabs constituted one-third o the Ottoman army during the war.4 wo-thirds othe troops who made up the 19th Division, led by Col. Mustaa Kemal during thetriumphant deense o the Gallipoli Peninsula, were Arab soldiers, comprising the72nd and 77th regiments. During the rst two decades o the 20th century, Arabistsentiments were certainly on the ascendant, but only a relatively small segmento the Syrian, Iraqi and Hijazi Arabs believed that the upholding o Arab identityand rights called or the breaking up o the Ottoman league. What is interesting isthat as the nationalist version o history was not conned to learned and academic

quarters, the growing debate about the late Ottoman period is leaving a similarimpact on the public sphere and popular culture.

In act, the whole history o the Ottoman epoch is being reconsidered. Dur-

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ing most o the 20th century, in contrast

to Arab nationalist circles, Arab Islamistorces, such as the Muslim Brothers andthe Islamic Liberation Party, expressedstrong attachment to the memory o theOttoman Caliphate, although much othis attachment reected religious nos-talgia rather than a proper understand-ing o history. Te rising interest in Ot-

toman history since the 1970s, at least, maniested in the organization o academic

conerences, the establishment o specialized research centers and the increasingnumber o post-graduate students undertaking research on the Ottoman era, hasundamentally changed the way the Arabs have come to perceive and relate totheir Ottoman past. A greater number o Ottoman historical manuscripts havebeen edited and published, a better understanding o Arab Ottoman society hasbeen evolving, and the Ottoman intellectual history, in which Arab ulama madeimmense contributions, has been receiving more attention. Te Ottoman period,with its powerul urkish dimension, is no longer seen as external to the making

o Arab society and culture, but rather as an organic and pivotal phase in the Araband Islamic history. Like Peter Gran, Nelly Hanna, an eminent Egyptian Copthistorian, seems even to question the whole notion o Ottoman decline.5

Te Kemalist Legacy

No less controversial in shaping modern Arab-urkish relations was the ound-ing o the urkish Republic and its consequences. Contrary to the common view,deeat o the Ottoman army in Syria, its withdrawal to the north o Aleppo andthe subsequent signing o the Armistice o Mudros did not put an end to Arab-

Ottoman ties. Most o the Arab Ottoman of cers who joined Faysals Damascusgovernment had maintained their allegiance to the sultanate to the last momento the war, only a ew o whom had been recruited rom British prisoner-o-warcamps by Sharian emissaries.6 With the outbreak o the urkish resistance inAnatolia, Arab of cers in Damascus contacted their ormer comrades in Ankara,with the view o staging an all-Arab revolt in Syria and Iraq and re-uniying theOttoman realm. Te French troops in Cilicia were constantly harassed, and theirsupply lines rom the Beka valley were disrupted. Te 1920 Iraqi revolt, sparked

by Arab of cers incursions rom Syria into Mosul and alaer, should be seen inthis context.7

Support or Mustaa Kemal and the urkish resistance orces were recorded

Te Ottoman period, with its

powerul urkish dimension,is no longer seen as external tothe making o Arab society andculture, but rather as an organicand pivotal phase in the Araband Islamic history

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in Palestine and Iraq, creating a sense

o apprehension among of cials o theBritish occupying authorities.8 With theurkish victory in the war o indepen-dence, Ahmad Shawqi, the renownedArab-Egyptian poet o the time, com-posed one o his most memorable po-ems in which he described Kemal asKhalid o the urks, identiying himwith the early Muslim legendary mili-

tary commander and companion o theProphet, Khalid ibn al-Walid. Not long later, however, when the republican statetook the decision to abolish the institution o the caliphate, Shawqi wrote his Fallo the Caliphate, another immortal piece o 20th century Arab poetry. Expressingstrong disappointment with the Kemalist regime and evincing a proound senseo melancholy, Shawqis poem depicted an image o the world o Islam shakenrom its roots.

o a large extent, no Arab quarter could escape the repercussions o the ca-liphate question. Rashid Rida, the most inuential gure o the Arab-Islamic re-ormist movement in the interwar period, republished a series o essays that hadappeared earlier in al-Manar,deending the caliphate and calling or its preser-vation in a reormed institution.9 Immediately aer the removal o the Ottomancaliph rom Istanbul, Shari Husayn declared his bid to the caliphate seat whileon a visit to his son Abdallah in Jordan. However, mosque imams in Palestiniancities who mentioned Husayns name in the Friday sermon were harshly attackedby members o the congregation or received death threats.10 wo pan-Islamic con-

erences, held in Makka (1924) and Cairo (1926), ailed to reach an agreement onhow to elect a new caliph or the most appropriate candidates or the prestigiousposition. Most o the Arab countries were by then under imperialist control, andwith the downall o the caliphate, there was very little le to tie the Arabs to thenew urkey. On the other hand, the urkish Republic was not particularly keenon reviving old connections with the Arab world.

Among the Arabs o the interwar period, it was widely elt that the urks hadnot only turned their back on the caliphate but also on their responsibilities to

the aith. o be sure, even in those turbulent times o the republican era, urkeydid not completely disappear rom the Arab imagination. Te republic, too, hadits admirers. An important episode in the caliphate debate was the publication

With the urkish victory in the

war o independence, AhmadShawqi, the renowned Arab-

Egyptian poet o the time,composed one o his most

memorable poems in which hedescribed Kemal as Khalid o

the urks

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in Cairo o al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm,

by the Azhari judge, Shaykh Ali Abdal-Raziq.11 In one o the most controver-sial tracts o 20th century Arab-Islamicculture, Abd al-Raziq denied that thecaliphate was a religious institution andargued that Muslims were ree to decidethe orm o their government according

to the changing conditions o time. Faced with widespread condemnation, Abdal-Raziq was accused o recycling anti-Islamic ideas developed by Western ori-

entalists. Te truth is that the main thesis advanced in al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukmwas derived rom the document issued by the Ankara Grand National Assemblyin deense o its resolution to abolish the caliphate.12

More signicant was the rising admiration o Mustaa Kemal among the emer-gent modern Arab elites. With the growing belie in the power o the state amongyoung Arab nationalist intellectuals and military of cers, republican urkey wasseen as a success story, where a committed nationalist leadership gained inde-pendence and used the instrument o the state to establish order and stability and

enorce a program o modernization. urkish inuences were distinctively clearin the 1933 ounding declaration o the National Action League, one o the mostimportant orerunners o the ideological Arab nationalist organizations. With astrong impact on the development o the Arab nationalist discourse in greaterSyria and Iraq, the league emphasized the role o the state in deciding the Arabnational uture. Especially appealing to Arab nationalist of cers during the in-terwar period was the role played by Mustaa Kemal, a ellow army of cer, in thecreation o the urkish Republic rom the ruins o the Ottoman Sultanate, and the

structuring o its state machinery.13

Almost all Arab of cers who became involvedin politics saw the state as the righteous embodiment o the national will and themilitary as the savior o the nation.

Te Cold War Era: Conficts and Alliances

One o the main eatures o the early period o the Cold War was the Westsadoption o an anti-communist approach, based on the construction o multiplezones o alliances, with the purpose o blocking the possible expansion o commu-nism and Soviet inuence. At the same time, the rise o the Arab army of cers in

Egypt, their embrace o Arab nationalism and their anti-imperialist outlook poseda ormidable challenge to the traditional monarchic regimes o Iraq, Jordan andSaudi Arabia. Nasser, who was certainly not pro-Soviet in the beginning, strongly

Among the Arabs o the

interwar period, it was widelyelt that the urks had notonly turned their back on thecaliphate but also on theirresponsibilities to the aith

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believed that the Arabs rst priority was

to remove the vestiges o imperialism,not to be involved in the Western gameo power. Re-asserting Egypts positionin the Arab world, Nasser rejected thenotion that withdrawal o the colonialpowers rom the Middle East would cre-ate a strategic vacuum and saw the West-ern-oriented alliances as a new orm oimperialist administration.

A powerul tide o mass protests in1955-56 orced King Husayn o Jordan to revoke an earlier decision to join theBaghdad Pact and consent to the appointment o a government with nationalistand leist leanings. In 1956, Nasser emerged triumphant rom the Suez War, theoutcome o which dealt a atal blow to the British position in the Middle East.Prior to and aer the Suez crisis, Egypt extended support to the Algerian nationalliberation movement against French colonial rule. In 1958 Egyptian-Syrian unitywas declared, and the pro-British regime in Iraq was overthrown by a group o

nationalist army of cers.14 urkey, o course, had opted or a pro-Western policyrom the end o World War II, becoming a member o the North Atlantic reatyOrganization (NAO) and the pro-Western system o alliances in the MiddleEast, as well as the rst Muslim country to recognize and establish diplomaticrelations with the state o Israel.15 Not surprisingly, Menderess urkey was viewedwith great suspicion by the majority o peoples in the Arab world. Since the Arabmasses rallied behind Nassers call or unity, independence and development, ur-key was seen as a mere imperialist instrument in the Middle East and a orce or

the perpetuation o the status quo in the region.16

Very ew Arabs, not even the Arab Islamists, paid special attention to the re-ormist program o Menderes and his government, or to his attempt to reconcilesociety with the republican system. Not until aer the tragic removal o Menderesin 1960 did his legacy become a subject o discussion in Arab circles, especiallyamong those concerned with the authoritarian tendencies o the Arab nationaliststate, its more secular attitudes and the heavy-handedness o its socialist policies.

With the Arab deeat in the June 1967 war and the expressions o solidar-

ity shown by the urkish people,17 a soer image o urkey would emerge, andan Arab consciousness o the shared history o what is common with the urkswould quietly and slowly begin to grow. Te 1967 deeat led to a new conguration

Republican urkey was

seen as a success story,where a committed

nationalist leadership gainedindependence and used the

instrument o the state toestablish order and stability

and enorce a program o

modernization

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o Arab politics and culture, character-

ized by the emergence o the Palestinianresistance movement, on the one hand,and the Islamic political movement, onthe other. For the urkish le, like le-ists throughout the world, the Palestin-ian resistance represented a great pro-gressive orce in the world and MiddleEastern politics, and urkish leist ele-ments were thus to make an appearance

in Palestinian of ces in Beirut and guerrilla bases in south Lebanon. By the late1970s and early 1980s, young urkish Islamists would ollow suit. As the ques-tion o Palestine dominated Arab politics and dened Arab political attitudes ordecades, Palestine became the arena in which Arabs and urks, however ew theywere, would nd a common cause.

Yet the Arab perspective o urkey at the time was also shaped by political de-velopments within urkey itsel, as two urkish politicians were to capture Arabattention more than any other since Mustaa Kemal: Blent Ecevit and NecmettinErbakan. Ecevits democratic-socialism,18 critical views o the world system andhis palpable attempt to establish strong relations with urkeys Arab neighbors,appealed to large sections o Arab public opinion, especially those on the le. Butsince the Arab masses during the 1970s and 1980s were becoming more Islamicin outlook, it was Erbakan who would be held with a high degree o aection andappreciation.19 Erbakans reerence to the glorious Ottoman achievements wasnot only to recall the most powerul historical bonds between the Arabs and theurks, but was also to contribute to the rehabilitation o the Ottoman past in the

Arab collective imagination. Equally important was the commitment to the Pales-tine question that was expressed by all the parties he ormed since the beginningo the 1970s.

News o the urkish armys landing on northern Cypriot shores in 197420 toprotect the lives o the urkish people o the island was received with enthusiasmand wide approval in Arab-Islamic circles. Very ew in the streets o Cairo wereprepared to listen to reports speaking o American complicity in the urkish step,and though Erbakan was the junior partner in the urkish government at the time,

all credit or the Cyprus decision was given to him. Te National Salvation Par-tys mass protest against the Israeli annexation policy, held in Konya prior to the1980 military coup, electried the Arab street and elevated the Arab perception

Since the Arab masses

rallied behind Nassers callor unity, independence anddevelopment, urkey wasseen as a mere imperialistinstrument in the Middle Eastand a orce or the perpetuationo the status quo in the region

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o the urkish Islamists to new heights.

Te armys subsequent intervention wascondemned by large sections o the Arabpublic, especially the Arab Islamists,who saw the military coup as an anti-Is-lamic measure, not only in urkey but inthe region as a whole; others, however,elt that the armys step was inevitable,since the degree o political violence inurkish cities had already reached a stage that threatened the very survival o the

country.21 Tese diverse reactions to the urkish situation pointed not only to theArab internal divisions but also to a major development in the Arab awareness omodern urkey.

From 1980 onward, the Arab public was becoming more inormed o urkishaairs, while Arab states showed greater interest in the direction which urkeywas to take. One reason behind this development was the Islamic revolution inIran. While supported by the Arab masses and growing Arab interests in the non-Arab neighborhood, the change in Iran was met with proound hostility by themajority o Arab regimes. Te outbreak o the Iraq-Iran war in 1980 drew urkeyinto its prolierations, as the Kurdish armed rebellion erupted simultaneously innorthern Iraq and eastern urkey, encouraged, as it seemed, by Iran. Second, itbecame clear during the 1980s that urkeys opening to its Arab neighbors wasturning into a national policy, pursued with varying degrees o commitment byall urkish governments. Tird, while urkish universities started to attract thou-sands o Arab students, a growing number o their urkish counterparts headedor Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian universities. At the same time, travel or pur-

pose o tourism, business and trade between urkey and the Arab countries in-creased noticeably. Te 1980s were also the decade o growing and maniest urk-ish popular solidarity with the Palestinian people, encouraged by Islamist as wellas leist groups. Finally, rapid advances in the means o communication helpedto overcome barriers o language and geography, bringing urkish political issuesinto Arab amilies sitting rooms.

During the 1980s, Arab of cials and educated classes paid close attention tourgut Ozals policy o strengthening and broadening relations with the Arab

countries and to the economic program o his government,22 as well as to theloosening grip o the urkish state on the media and other orms o civil organi-zation. Since the question o the state was to emerge as a major issue in the Arab

As the question o Palestine

dominated Arab politics anddened Arab political attitudes

or decades, Palestine becamethe arena in which Arabs and

urks, however ew they were,would nd a common cause

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political debate,23 Ozals urkey was be-

lieved to be an important experiment towatch. From an economic perspective,the collapse o the urkish economy inthe late 1990s, along with the Argentin-ean and South Asian economies, raisedstrong doubts about the neo-liberal ap-proach.24 But what le an even greaterimpact on the Arab assessments o theurkish situation was the powerul re-

turn o the state, maniested in the re-moval o Erbakans short-lived coalition

government. Erbakans rise to power in 1996 came a ew years aer the abortiono the Algerian nascent democracy by the military and the consequential erup-tion o the Algerian civil war. Te reaching o a well-known Islamist to the highestpinnacle o the urkish state demonstrated that the Algerian ate o democraticIslamic orces was not universal or inevitable. However, the optimism ed by de-velopments in urkey would not last or long.

Te Arab public took note o Erbakans success in improving the economicsituation, as well as o his declared policy o bolstering ties with the Arab andIslamic world. With Erbakan seen as a late 20th century Ottoman sultan, his proj-ect or the Muslim G-8 was enthusiastically welcomed by many Arabs but wasequally regarded by others as highly unrealistic.25 It was also obvious that majorArab states, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, were not particularly comort-able about Erbakans eort to turn urkey into a leading regional power, settingthe uture agenda or the Muslim Middle East. Soon, o course, Erbakan would be

subjected to mounting pressures rom the military, leading eventually to his res-ignation in 1997. Te orced downall o the urkish Islamic leader underminedthe position o Arab proponents o peaceul and democratic change and suppliednew ammunition to the argument o those who called or an all-out war againstthe entrenched ruling classes and their Western supporters.

Te Coming o the AKP

Te dawn o the new century was heralded by the September 11 attacks onWashington and New York, intensiying the already existing tension between the

Muslim world and the United States. While Islam and Muslims came under sus-picion throughout the world, the United States launched a war on Aghanistan,started to prepare or another against Iraq and gave the Israelis the green light to

In this apocalyptic world o

war, terror and religion, thevision presented by the Justiceand Development Party (AKP)represented a resh start orthe debate about Islam and themodern state and what it meansto be a Muslim in the modern

world

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crush the second Palestinian intiada. In this apocalyptic world o war, terror and

religion, the vision presented by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) repre-sented a resh start or the debate about Islam and the modern state and what itmeans to be a Muslim in the modern world. Te Arabs, like many others through-out the world, were stunned by the success o the AKP in the parliamentary elec-tions o 2002.26 Teories about the rise o the AKP were diverse and contradictory,ranging rom being an American version o Islam to a political-Islamist partyenveloped in a secular, democratic discourse. Gradually, however, all sides o theArab political debate began to realize that not only urkey, but the region as awhole, was entering a new phase with an entirely dierent orm o politics.

With strong roots in the Islamic Reah Party, ounders o the AKP were not, ocourse, unknown gures. For the Arab Islamists, thereore, the challenge posedby the AKP was how it was possible to reconcile individual devotion to Islam withthe AKPs commitment to the secular system o government, and whether theAKPs program represented a genuine transormation o its leaders assessmento the urkish situation, or a mere opportunistic shi in order to gain power. I itwas the ormer, then what could have been that peculiar about modern urkey toprecipitate such a transormation? For the non-Islamists, the challenge was evengreater, or the AKP appeared to reect a combination o a major evolution in themaking o political Islam and a undamental transormation o the urkish soci-ety itsel. What both sides could not see at that early stage, and which was later tobecome an important aspect o the lively Arab discussion about the urkey o theAKP, was the question o inner divisions and whether the AKP would be able toreconstruct the urkish consensus in the beginning o the 21st century.

Yet what would continue to nurture Arab interests in urkey aer the 2002

elections was not only the unexpected political achievement o the AKP, ornever since the emergence o the republic had urkey become so involved withher neighboring Arab sphere.27 Business, investment and trade relations betweenurkey and the Arab countries have grown to unprecedented levels, both as a re-sult o of cial agreements or by private initiatives. urkey is an active member othe Iraq neighboring-states regular meetings, and urkish troops are part o themultinational security orce in south Lebanon, ormed aer the 2006 war. Tiscertainly is the rst time since the end o World War I that urkish soldiers havebeen stationed on Arab land, albeit under the UN umbrella.28 Movement o Arab

and urkish of cials between Ankara and the Arab capitals has never been soextensive. Even the long-troubled urkish-Syrian relations have taken a startlingturn,29 as a ree-trade zone between the two countries has been inaugurated and

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urkey has been entrusted to arrange and play a direct role in the Syrian-Israeli

negotiations. Tis rapidly advancing interaction between the AKPs urkey andthe Arab region, however, has not been without complications.

One o the rst important issues the AKP government had to grapple withwas the approaching American war on Iraq. On the eve o the invasion, the urk-ish parliament won plaudits or rejecting American requests or transit passagethrough urkey into northern Iraq. Te war on Iraq was extremely unpopular inurkey, and though the vote o the AKP deputies in the national assembly did notnecessarily reect their governments will, the decision le a strong impression

on Arab public opinion. On more than one occasion aerwards, Recep ayyipErdogans government expressed its displeasure at American policies and tacticsin Iraq, reinorcing an image o urkish independence rom the American policyin the region. Yet while urkey became more involved in Iraqi aairs (as it was, atany rate, expected to be), the AKPs approach to the occupied Iraq was not alwaysconsistent, properly positioned or particularly inuential.30

Soon aer the American occupation o Iraq, urkey did become a major sup-ply line or the American orces in northern Iraq, even without urther reerence

to the urkish Parliament. Te urkey o the AKP, like almost all Arab states,could not see the drastic consequences emanating rom the sectarian and ethnicbases upon which the new Iraq was structured. And as the security situation inIraq deteriorated and urkey was invited by Washington to send troops to theSunni-dominated areas, Ankara accepted the invitation, thereby engenderingstrong opposition rom almost all Iraqi communities, each or their own reasons.31urkey, o course, was greatly apprehensive o the American backing o the Kurd-ish nationalist parties and the de acto Kurdish independence rom Baghdad, but

Ankara seemed to be unsure about what to do to stop the evolving o a highly un-desirable situation in northern Iraq, not even aer the border area was eectivelyturned into a sae haven or the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). urkish pressurecontributed to the postponing o the inammatory reerendum on the uture oKirkuk, but not until the late months o 2007 did the American authorities inBaghdad and the Iraqi government consent to a urkish military interventionagainst the PKK. Te AKP government had already prepared the groundwork orthis development by a visit that Erdogan made to the White House and by extend-

ing ull political recognition to Malikis government, receiving the Iraqi primeminister in a high-prole visit to Ankara.

Te mixed signals sent by its attitudes to the Iraqi situation were mirrored in

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the AKPs Palestine policy. On several

occasions, urkish spokesmen, includ-ing the prime minister, voiced their pro-test over the harsh Israeli treatment othe Palestinians. In 2005, however, Erdo-gan made a rare visit by a urkish primeminister to Israel, where he met with Is-raeli leader Ariel Sharon, ollowed by akind o balancing visit to the Palestinianauthority in Ramallah, in which he de-

scribed urkish-Palestinian relations ashistorical. A ew months later, the AKPgovernment helped in arranging an un-precedented meeting between Pakistani and Israeli of cials, a role that proved noless controversial than Erdogans visit to Israel.32 o avoid American and Israelireactions, the AKP government kept its distance rom the Palestinian Hamas-led governments, even beore the 2007 ri between Gaza and Ramallah. WhenKhalid Mashal, the Hamas leader, arrived in Ankara in February 2006, he was not

received by Erdogan, but met with Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, and the meet-ing was tellingly held at AKP headquarters, not at the urkish Foreign Ministry.33

In addition to the long-established channels o military and economic coop-eration, what seemed to inorm Erdogans Israel policy was partly the role that theAmerican pro-Israel lobby has been playing in conronting the Armenian geno-cide allegation, and partly the wish to secure a urkish mediating role in the Pal-estinian problem. During his visit to Israel, Erdogan publicly oered to play sucha role, but the oer was conspicuously ignored by Sharon. In November 2007, the

now-urkish President Gul hosted a meeting in Ankara between the PalestinianPresident Mahmud Abbas and Israeli President Shimon Perez. Since meetingsbetween the two were not particularly unusual, and as Perez lacked the constitu-tional authority to inuence a uture Israeli-Palestinian settlement, the Ankaragathering was rather cosmetic. In another rst in the history o urkish-Israelirelations, however, Perez was given the opportunity to address the urkish Parlia-ment. On November 27, 2007, urkey, along with other 40 countries, took partin the Annapolis conerence, organized by the Bush administration to re-launchthe Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. urkeys attendance highlighted its determi-

nation to be an active party to developments in the Middle East peace process; yet,according to the urkish press, it was Israel that pressed or the urkish presencein Annapolis.34 urkey nally did win a mediating role in the long-stalled Israeli-

What would continue to

nurture Arab interests inurkey aer the 2002 elections

was not only the unexpectedpolitical achievement o the

AKP, or never since theemergence o the republic had

urkey become so involved

with her neighboring Arabsphere

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Syrian negotiations, but not in the Pal-

estinian track.In November 2007, a urkish com-

mittee investigating Israeli excavationsunder the Aqsa mosque, agreed uponduring the visit o the Israeli prime min-ister, Ehud Olmert, to Ankara in Febru-ary, published its report. Te report con-cluded that the Israeli excavations were

not justied at all, neither legally, norscientically.35 However, publication o

the committees report was a noticeably low-key event, reecting Ankaras desirenot to disrupt the signicant improvement in urkish-Israeli relations. Earlier,during Olmerts visit to the urkish capital, the Israeli prime minister announcedthat the volume o trade between the two countries had reached $2.83 billion andthat 152 Israeli companies were operating in urkey. In September the AKP gov-ernment kept suspiciously quiet over reports that an Israeli air raid on a Syrian in-stallation near Dayr al-Zur had passed through urkish airspace, and in October

the urkish energy minister signed a crucial agreement with the Israeli ministero inrastructure, with the aim o constructing an oil pipeline between the urkishport o Ceyhan and the Israeli port o Ashkelon.36

Viewed rom the coeeshops and the university halls in the main Arab urbancenters, the meaning behind the AKPs polices has not always been athomable.Regular and educated Arabs alike look with great admiration at urkish econom-ic growth under Erdogans government and the integrity and seriousness o theurkish prime minister as well as at the expanding urkish inuence in the region.

With the quiet and steady revival o the shared past in the Arab collective con-sciousness and the unceasing meddling o the world powers in the regions aairs,the great majority o Arabs are more receptive to urkeys increasing involvementin the Middle East, hoping that regional matters will one day be decided by itsown peoples. Still, these same Arabs expect urkey to be a more principled andless pragmatic orce, especially on the Palestinian question.

Largely, the Arabs recognize that the AKP is a secular, conservative party, ledby elements with an Islamic background. Six years aer its coming to power, very

ew Arabs, not even the staunchest o Arab secularists, still think o the AKP inpolitical-Islamist terms. Watching the crisis engendered by Guls candidacy tothe presidency in 2007, and the Constitutional Court case or the closure o the

With the quiet and steady

revival o the shared past in theArab collective consciousnessand the unceasing meddling othe world powers in the regionsaairs, the great majority oArabs are more receptive tourkeys increasing involvement

in the Middle East

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AKP in 2008, many Arabs believed that

the political conict in urkey was es-sentially about power rather than Islam.Yet, at least or the recurrent urkishdivisions over the AKP and the realityo its agenda, the Arabs cannot entirelyview the AKP in isolation o the debateabout Islam.37 One might even eel thatthe Arabs heightened interest in theAKP is a reection o their own inner

struggle as much as, i not even more than, o their concern or a neighboringMuslim country. As the protractible encounter between the Arab Islamists and

ruling classes in several Arab countries seems to have reached a deadlock, many

Arabs have become keen to see the manner in which the AKP might reshapeand/or be reshaped by the republic.38 Despite the considerable dierences that

distinguish the modern urkish political experience rom that o the majority oArab countries, there is an underlying sense, even one o a mystical nature, that

the ate o the AKPs project is somehow related to the ate o the Arabs own

discord over the position o Islam in the public sphere.

For obvious reasons, the Arab publics interest in ollowing the urkish po-

litical arena and its probable shis is also shared by the Arab governments, al-though their real attitudes toward the contending orces in urkey are more di-

cult to discern. In reality, however, the of cial Arab views o the AKPs urkey

are the outcome o more than one set o actors. One important dimension othe main Arab capitals relations with Erdogans government is the search or

a solution to the Iraqi question and the desire o all sides involved to prevent

any urther deterioration in Iraq rom spilling over into bordering countries.Another is related to the rapidly changing conguration o power in the region,

maniested in the assertive Iranian role and the threat o war arising rom theIranian pursuit o a nuclear option.39 A third dimension is certainly linked to

urkeys, perhaps unintended, involvement in the Arab struggle, by extending

a hand to Syrias attempts to break the circle o isolation imposed by Washing-ton, Paris, Riyadh and Cairo. All in all, however, the of cial Arab position on

the AKPs active engagement in Arab-Islamic aairs seems to be torn between

warming up to urkey the old partner and worrying about urkey the emer-gent regional power, in a period when the Middle Eastern theater has become

crowded with competing powers.

Te of cial Arab position on

the AKPs active engagement inArab-Islamic aairs seems to

be torn between warming up tourkey the old partner

and worrying abouturkey the emergent regional

power

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Conclusion

During the past 85 years o its existence, the urkish Republic continued tochange, perhaps even more than the guardians o the republic are prepared toadmit. Te Arabs, peoples and states, have also changed. But while it is extremelysimplistic to assume that the post-Ottoman entities represented a total rupturewith the Ottoman legacy, it is equally mistaken to assume that the process ochange that urkey and the Arab countries have been experiencing will bring a to-tal, rapid transormation o the relations between the Arabs and the urks. Whatis certain, nonetheless, is that neither the idea o nationalism nor the emergence

o the nation-states could break these relations completely, not even during thedif cult period o the interwar years. Sons and daughters o the urkish Republiccan no longer read the Ottoman texts o their ancestors, written in Arabic script,let alone the Arabic texts o their aith, and urkish is no longer spoken in themodern cities o Cairo, Damascus and Bagdad, as it used to be well into the earlydecades o the 20th century. Yet, or the past 20 years at least, Arabs and urkshave been rediscovering each other, motivated by economic prospects, politicalunderpinnings and cultural curiosities as well as historical yearnings.

For the oreseeable uture, urkey, regardless o the ruling party in Ankara,will continue to behave as a nation-state, and Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt willcontinue to look aer their national interests the way they have been doing sincethey came into existence as independent entities. Te project o Arab unity is notmaking any signicant leaps, while urkish national cohesion is being tested asnever beore since the creation o the republic. Both the Arabs and the urks havebeen grappling with the encumbering loss o socio-political consensus, exacer-bated by all orms o oreign intervention in their own, as well as in regional, a-

airs. Closer relations, based on creative sensibility to each sides requirements andinterests, could be o great benet or all peoples o the Arab-Islamic Middle East,exchanging experiences and maximizing national gains. In a very short period otime, the opening o the Syrian-urkish border and the strengthening relationsbetween the two countries have engendered economic vitality on both sides o theborder and transormed the way urks and Syrian Arabs view each other.

In some respects, the challenges the Arabs and the urks are now acing re-volve around how they can create an Ottoman space o nations, not empire; how

they can be inspired by their shared heritage, not be burdened by it; how theycan treat the past as a subject o scholarly examination, not be prisoners o nega-tive perceptions; and how to envision national prosperity as not isolated rom the

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prosperity o the whole region, not as a

small-nationalism-dened enterprise.Yet, even i real and imagined obstaclesin the way o the relations between ur-key and the Arab states can be over-come, the urkish-Israeli connectionswill continue to overshadow the Arabpeoples view o urkey. While the Mid-dle East peace process and the signingo peace treaties between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Jordan, on the

other, have mitigated the impact o the long-established Israeli-urkish relations,one should never underestimate the inuence that the Palestine question exer-cises in determining the Arab peoples political perspective.

Endnotes:1. George Antonius, Te Arab Awakening (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938); Sati al-Husri,

al-Bilad al-Arabiyya wal-Dawla al-Uthmaniyya, 2nd edn (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm lil-Malayin, 1960,.);idem, Nushu al-Fikra al-Qawmiyya (Beirut: Dar al-Itihad, 1956); Amin Said, al-Tawra al-Arabiyyaal-Kubra, 2 vols, (Cairo: Isal al-Babi al-Halabi, 1935-6); Sulayman Musa, al-Haraka al-Arabiyya: al-Marhala al-Aula (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1970).

2. Zeine N. Zeine, Te Struggle or Arab Independence (Beirut: Khayat, 1960); which appearedin its Arabic version as Nushu al-Qawmiyya al-Arabiyya ma Dirasa arikhiyya f al-Ulaqat al-Arabiyya al-urkiyya (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1971).

3. See, or example, Ernest C. Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins oArab Nationalism (Urbana: University o Illinois Press, 1973); Rashid Khalidi, British Policy owardsSyria and Palestine, 1906-1914 (Oxord: Ithaca Press, 1980); R. Khalidi, L. Anderson, M. Muslih,and R. Simin (eds.), Te Origins o Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991);Hasan Kayali,Arabs and Young urks (Berkeley: University o Caliornia Press, 1997); Basheer M.

Na,Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question, 1908-1941 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998). Kayaliswork, highly critical o the established version o the early period o the Arab nationalist movement,has also been published in Arabic as al-Haraka al-Arabiyya bi-Uyun Uthmaniyya, 1908-1918 (Bei-rut: Qudmus, 2003).

4. Eliezer auber, Te Arab Movements in World WarI (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p. 59.

5. See, or example, Nelly Hanna,Making Money in 1600: Te Lie and imes o Ismail Abu aqi-yya, Egyptian Merchant(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997). C. Peter Gran, Islamic Roots oCapitalism (Austin: University o exas Press, 1973).

6. auber, Te Arab Movements, pp. 102-121.

7. Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East: Te Destruction o the Ottoman Empire, 1914-

1921 (London: Mansell Publishing, 1987), pp. 170-172; Wamid J. Nazmi, al-Judhur al-Syasiyya wal-Fikriyya wal-Ijtimaiyya lil-Haraka al-Qawmiyya al-Arabiyya fl-Iraq (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-Arabiyya, 1984), p. 160 and pp. 188-191; Musa, al-Haraka al-Arabiyya, pp. 531-532 andpp. 553-554.

Te challenges the Arabs

and the urks are now acingrevolve around how they can

create an Ottoman space onations, not empire; how they

can be inspired by their sharedheritage, not be burdened by it

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8. Na,Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question, 1908-1941, pp. 95-96; Hanna Batatu, TeOld Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements o Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1978), pp. 198, 221, 1140 and 1142; Jacob M. Landau, Te Politics o Pan-Islamism (Oxord: TeClarendon Press, 1990) pp. 197-198.

9. Muhammad Rashid Rida, al-Khilaa aw al-Imama al-Uzma (Cairo: Matbaat al-Manar, 1341A.H.). Written on the eve o the abolition o the caliphate, Rida was apparently responding to theAnkara debate about the uture o urkey and its relation with the rest o the Muslim world. Al-though he believed that the caliphate was a necessity, his vision was largely modernist, proposing aseparation between the temporal power and the caliphate.

10. Na,Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question, 1908-1941, p. 97. For a contemporaryview o the Muslim responses to Shari Husayns caliphate, see al-Manar, 25 (1924), pp. 390-400.

11. Ali Abd al-Raziq, al-Islam wa-Usul al-Hukm (Cairo: Matbaat Misr, 1925).

12. Hamid Enayat,Modern Islamic Political Tought(London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 55-56.

13. Na,Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question, 1908-1941, pp. 213-214, 222.

14. Brian Holden Reid, Te Northern ier and the Baghdad Pact, John W. Young (ed.), TeForeign Policy o Churchills Peacetime Administration, 1951-1955 (Leicester: Continuum Interna-tional Publishing, 1988), pp. 159-179; Ritchie Ovendale, Te Origins o the Arab-Israeli Wars (Lon-don: Longman, 1992), pp. 157-159; Albert Hourani, A History o the Arab Peoples (Cambridge,Mass.: Te Balknap Press, 1991), pp. 356-372. For a ull discussion o the Cold War impact on theMiddle East, see Fawaz A. Gerges, Te Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and InternationalPolitics, 1955-1967(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

15. Bernard Lewis, Te Emergence o Modern urkey(London: Oxord University Press, 1961),p. 307; Stanord J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History o the Ottoman Empire and Modern urkey:Volume II, Reorm, Revolution and Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp.429-430.

16. Despite riendly relations with Jordan, urkey turned down an invitation in 1954 to join aMuslim countries conerence on the Palestine question to be held in Amman, suggested by Pakistan.Aryeh Shmuelevitz, Hashemite-urkish Relations Revisited: Jordan and urkey, 1946-1958, AsherSusser and Aryeh Shmuelevitz (eds.), Te Hashemites in the Modern Arab World (London: FrankCass, 1995), pp. 198-206. urkish threats in 1957, on behal o the American administration, to theSyrian Arab nationalist government, prompted the Syrian move towards unity with Nasserite Egypt.Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 259; Gerges, Te

Superpowers, pp. 85-86. Menderess anti-Arab nationalist policy was pursued by the urkish govern-ments o the early 1960s. When Syrian-Egyptian unity was broken up by a military coup, Jordan andurkey recognized the secessionist Syrian regime with haste, raising suspicion o their involvementwith the Syrian of cers. Yazid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search or State (Oxord: ClarendonPress, 1997), pp. 30-31.

17. Even diplomatic relations with Israel were suspended by Ankara, although briey.

18. Kedourie, Politics in the Middle East(Oxord: Oxord University Press, 1992), pp. 128-9.

19. Seri Mardin, Religion and Politics in Modern urkey, in James P. Piscatori (ed.), Islam inthe Political Process (New York: Cambridge University Press (or the Royal Institute o InternationalAairs), 1983), pp. 138-159; Feroz Ahmad, Islamic Reassertion in urkey, Tird World Quarterly,10 (April 1988), pp. 750-769.

20. Shaw, History, pp. 430-431; Kedourie, Politics, p. 135.

21. Te complex nature o the militarys role in urkish politics is discussed in anel Demirel,Soldiers and Civilians: Te Dilemma o urkish Democracy,Middle Eastern Studies, 40, 1 (2004):

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pp. 127-150.

22. On the Islamic dimension o Ozals political outlook, and his eort to strengthen relationswith the Arab countries, see Alan R. aylor, Te Islamic Question in Middle East Politics (Boulder:Westview Press, 1988), pp. 91-92. On his neo-liberal economic policy, see Dani Rodrik, PrematureLiberalization, Incomplete Stabilization: Te Ozal Decade in urkey(London: Centre or EconomicPolicy Research, 1990).

23. See, or example, Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State (London: I.B.auris, 1995).

24. David Harvey,A Brie History o Neoliberalism (New York: Oxord University Press, 2005).

25. On Erbakans short term as prime minister, see Aryeh Shmuelevitz, urkeys Experiment inIslamist Government, 1996-1997(el Aviv: el Aviv University, Moshe Dayan Centre, 1999); ZiyaOnis, Te Political Economy o Islamic Resurgence in urkey: Te Rise o the Welare Party in

Perspective, Tird World Quarterly, 18, 4 (1997): pp. 743-766; Hakan Yavuz, Political Islam and theWelare (Reah) Party in urkey, Comparative Politics, 30, 1 (1997): pp. 63-82.

26. For the context o the AKPs rise to power, see Yildiz Atasoy, urkey, Islamists and Democ-racy: ransition and Globalization in a Muslim State (London: I.B.auris, 2005).

27. What two urkish academics have described as urkeys so power. Blent Aras, urkeybetween Syria and Israel: urkeys Rising So Power, SEA, Policy Brie, No. 15 (May 2008); MelihaBenli Altunisik, Te Possibilities and Limits o urkeys So Power in the Middle East, Insight ur-key, 10, 2 (2008): pp. 41-54. During the whole year o 2002, at the end o which the AKP ormed itsrst government, al-Hayat, the pan-Arab daily, contained 124 entries on urkey, covering all newsdepartments, as well as commentaries and analyses. In comparison, during the rst seven months o2008, al-Hayatcontained 559 entries.

28. For the urkish governments vision o its participation in the UN orces in south Lebanon,see Ghassan Charbels interview with Recep ayyip Erdogan in al-Hayat, Oct. 18, 2006. For an Arabview o the urkish debate about urkeys involvement in Lebanon, see Basheer M. Na, al-Adalawal-anmiyya Yujhrij urkiya min al-Uzla al-Attaturkiyya ila al-Uthmaniyya al-Jadida, al-Qudsal-Arabi, Sept. 28, 2006.

29. urkish-Syrian relations were poisoned or decades by urkeys annexation o the disputedSyrian province o Alexandretta (the urkish Hatay province) in the late 1930s. In 1998, tension be-tween the two countries reached a critical point over Syrias sheltering o the PKKs leader, Abdullahcalan.

30. C. William Hale, urkey, the U.S. and Iraq (London: Saqi, 2007), or the dynamics o urk-ish policy on Iraq, especially prior the American invasion and in the early period o occupation.

31. Mevlut Katik, urkish Government Approves Plan to Deploy Peacekeeping Force in Iraq,Eurasia Insight, 10 June 2003; idem., urkish Deployment in Iraq Now Out o the Question, Eur-asia Insight, April 21, 2004; Susan Sachs, Te Struggle or Iraq: Te Allies; urkey Begins to Tinkwice about Sending roops to Iraq, Te New York imes, Oct. 24, 2003.

32. For a survey o the urkish-Palestinian and urkish-Israeli relations rom 2001 to the endo 2005, see M. Salih and B. Na (eds.), al-aqrir al-Istiratiji al-Filastini, 2005 (Beirut: al-ZaytunaCentre or Studies, 2006), pp. 116-120.

33. For the cautious urkish position, see Abdullah Gls statement on relations with the Pales-tinian government,Milliyet, July 7, 2006. For more details, see M. Salih (ed.), al-aqrir al-Istiratijial-Filastini, 2006(Beirut: al-Zaytuna Centre or Studies, 2007), pp. 178-184.

34. odays Zaman, Nov. 15, 2007.

35. odays Zaman, Nov. 16, 2007.

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36. M. Salih (ed.), al-aqrir al-Istiratiji al-Filastini, 2007(Beirut: al-Zaytuna Centre or Studies,2008), pp. 204-216.

37. C. Michael M. Gunter and M. Hakan Yavuz, urkish Paradox: Progressive Islamists versusReactionary Secularists, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 16, 3 (Fall 2007): pp. 289-301.

38. For examples o the various Arab views o the AKP, see Hani Mahjub, Erdogan, Hizb al-Adala wa anmiya, al-Mawazeen, March 3, 2006; Basheer M. Na, urkiya: Sira Ideologi amAzmat abaqa Muhaymina, al-Mawazeen, July 6, 2007; Hani Mahjub, Ishkaliyat Rajab ayyib Er-dogan Islamiyan, al-Mawazeen, November 13 2007; Azad Ahmad Ali, Makhatir Namdhajat ur-kiya Ilmaniyan thumm Islamiyan, al-Hayat, Sept. 14, 2007; Salah Salim, al-Hijab al-urki: MazaqSiyasi Muaal li-Hawiyya Hadariyya Mulhima, al-Hayat, April 27, 2008; Salih Bashir, al-Masaral-urki kama lam ariuhu al-Mantaqa al-Arabiyya, al-Hayat, June 22, 2008; Radwan al-Sayyid,Itijahat al-Islam al-urki wa Mushkilat al-Fahm, al-Hayat, Aug. 5, 2008; Abdallah urkumani, an

athir al-Inmudhaj al-Islami al-urki al-Alam al-Arabi, al-Quds al-Arabi, Feb. 23, 2006; Subhial-Hadidi, Mazaq urkiya al-Muasira: Hijab al-Sayyida Erdogan am al-Askaritariya, al-Quds al-Arabi, June 3, 2007; Abd al-Wahhab al-Aandi, urkiya wa Khatar al-Awda ila al-Mustaqbal, al-Quds al-Arabi, Oct. 25, 2007.

39 For an Arab view o the Arab-urkish-Iranian triangle, written in light o the Saudi mon-archs visit to Ankara, see Radwan al-Sayyid, urkiya wal-Arab wa awazunat al-Sharq al-Awsatal-Jadid, al-Sharq al-Awsat, Aug. 9, 2006.

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