68789795 the Activity of Happiness in Aristotle s Ethics

7/31/2019 68789795 the Activity of Happiness in Aristotle s Ethics

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The activity of happiness in aristotle's ethicsGary M GurtlerThe Review of Metaphysics; Jun 2003; 56, 4; Research Librarypg. 801

THE ACTIVITY OF HAPPNESS N ARISOL'S ETHICS

GARY GURTLER, SJ

I

THERE HAS BEEN A LONGSTANDING DEBATE about the relation of rtue

and hainess in ristotes Nicomachean thics ristotle seems to

hae two contradictory ositions One osition is found in book

chater 7, where hainess is the highest good an actity of soul in

conformity with rtue In context this seems to indicate human r-

tue as a whole inolng both moral and intellectual rtues The

other osition occurs much later in book 10 chaters 68 where ha

iness is identified with wisdom alone This later context seems to

osit an oosition between a sureme hainess related to wisdomand contemlation and a secondary hainess ssociated with justice

and the moral irtues The debate centers on how to reconcile these

two ositions

One grou of commentators takes book 10 determinatie and

thus tortures the text in book 1 to say the same thing This osition is

described intellectualist or exclusist and roduces certain uzzles

in reading istotles ethical theory These uzzles are not benign

since the riileged osition gien wisdom in book 10 seems at oddswith the discussion of rtue in book 1 and its deeloment in the

Nicomachean thics s a whole Indeed istotle aears inconsis

tent or een contradictoy recommending in these two brief chaters

of book 10 a life deoted to contemlation that only grudgingly allows

for the necessity of the ractical life discussed in such detail in the

rest of his ethical works If this is the case under what conditions are

we exected to forgo contemlation to engage in the arious actities

of the moral rtues? Since no conditions are selled out in the textthe range of seculation is confused and ways around the aarent in

consistencies comlex

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GA M. GE

The other grou takes .7 as determinatie for the definition of

human irtue and its task is to exlain whether 0.78 fits into isto

tle's general ethical osition In this iew, irtue is understood inclusiey wth both ethica and intelectual comonents So far no satis-

factory account of 0.68 h been able to integrate it into Aristotles

account of rtue and hainess, with the result that it is either ig

nored as an aberration or left as an anomay The goal of this aer is

to rode a reading of 0.8 that can show how Aristotle's account

of contemlation and the mora rtues is art of a single sion of

hainess1

I recet AloAmerca literatre, W. F. R Harde, "he Fial Good Astotes Ethcs Philosophy 40 (1965): 27795 articlates the vew ofwsdom as domiat with Arstotle's approach appeari both itellectalis-tc ad sefsh whe Joh Ackril "Arstotle o Eudaimonia," Proceedingsof the British Academy 60 (1974): 33959, proposes a clsve readi thatdefeds a more hmae vew of Arstotle. Harde s defeded by oberteama, "Edamoa ad Selfscecy the Nicomahean Etkcs"

Phronesis 33 (988): 313; Rchard Krat, Astote on the Human Good(Prceto: Prceto Uversity Press, 1989); Athoy Key, "The Ncoma-chea Cocepto of Happess O.{ord Studies in Ancient Philosohy 9(1991) 680; Roer Crsp "Whte o Arstotea Happiess O.ord 'tudies in Ancient Philosophy 10 (1992) 23340. Ackrl, tr, hs hs defed-ers . H rw "Permaet appess: Arstotle ad Solo Oxford Studiesin Ancient Philosophy 3 (198): 89124 mothy D. Roche Ergon ad Eu-damonia Nicomachean Ethics 1," Joual of the isto of Phlosophy26 (1988) 1594; Stephe A. Whte "s Aristotelia Happess a Good Lfeor the est fe? Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 8 (1990): 10343Jeffrey S Prto "Astotes Deftio of Happiess (NE 1 7, 1098a16

18) Oford Studies in Ancint Philosophy 16 (1998): 25997. A few ofthese artces, s wel s others, appear ssays on Astotles Ethics ed.Amlie Okseer Rory (erkeley Uversity of Califora Press 1980).Ths s oly a selecto of the teratre. Roche, Eon ad Eudaimoniasmmi p for the csve view, eds with a cal to reterpret 10. so thatit does ot coct wth 1.513 ad Astote's eeral ethcal postio. yexam 10.68 the cotext of Arstotes dscsso of plesre i 10.15, I attempt to show that the tsk of book 10 is to determe the precse activ-ty costttive of happess i the strictest sese, wth practcal prsitscotribt to happess to a secodary deree ad amsemets s provd- ecessary physcal rest. Ths yelds a read of the text that sdes with

the comprehesve or clsve ew bt from a phosophcal perspectvedfferet from the ssmptios of ether sde.


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THE ACIVIY OF APPNESS IN ARSOLE'S EHICS 3

I will endeavo to ague that the disussion of peasue n 05

s ontinuous wih hat of happiness in 10.68. ne aspet of his on

inuiy is ha peue and happness ae boh defined he saekind of aivity one ha aopanies etain othe ativitis und

speifi onditions nohe aspet of this ontinut s hat soe

distinguishes diffeent kinds of peasue, hose elated to bodl ond-

tons and those elated to ativiies desabe n heseves. He ends

this aount of pleasue b entioning tha eah ania hs its own

speifi pleasue. This las op leads de ino the dsussion of

happiness, whee isotle disnguishes dffeent knds of atives

soiated wih happness and seeks to deene whh ativi sthe happness speif to he huan soul. The ontinu of he ds-

ussion as a whole also povides he ontex n whh isoe dsn

guishes between pesue and happiness. Thei sutue as ates

akes the siila, whih leads soe o hold he opnion tha pea

sue is n fa happness.

istote, howeve, holds ha hey ae diffeen Fs, pe


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4 GARY M. GURTER

this rtue In this discussion conteplation itself is shown to have a

range of eanings that is gradual brought to precision with its

strictest sense ound in the ce o the diine where other actitiesdoing or aking are ecluded This clarification of the nature of con

tepation indicates that happiness hs its root in the dine in con-

trast to pleure with its roots in organic wellbeing Such a clariica

tion is not eant to restrict happiness eclusivel to one huan

activit but to show that al activities conteplative political and

pleasurabe relate in dierent was and to diferent degrees to the

central case defining huan happiness in ters of the divine.2

II

We begin with an investigation o the nature of pleasure in Nico

rahean Ethics 0.5. In chapters 1-3, istotle provides a brie

surve o the conct in coon opinions basical the contrasting

views that pleasure is either the good or essential bse In chapter

3, he rules out the second view because it goes against the fact that all

living things seek pleasure in order to surive and soeone who saidpleure should be avoided would inevitabl be contradicted b his

actions. The first vew b contrt sipl identiies pleasure with

happiness but this wi need careul eaination before Aristotle an

deterine to what etent it is rue First in chapter 2, he notes the

latonic distinction that pleasure is a good but not the good which is

singed out as not being ore desirable b the addition of soething

to it Second in chapter 3, he distinguishes dierent kinds of plea

sure. The clearest and siplest kind of pleasure concerns desires andeotions and applies to al ling things; pain is the correlative state.

These pesures accopan activties that a living thing possesses b

nature and are reated to the desires and appetites it needs for a par

ticular good its phsical suriva Aristotle net describes a kind of

pleasure related to activities desirable in theselves and not because

the relieve soe need or restore soe phsical balance This second

kind includes the pleasure o leaing and the pleasures associated

with certain sense actities wel as with eor and the possession of the vrtues In distinction to the first group this te of plea


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TH ACTVT O APPNESS N ASTOTS TCS

ure i neither pped t pain nr eential t an f the activitie

ine they an be purued even when pleaure de nt apany

the: neither all thing een nr all learning need be pleant S far,Aritle h uarized a nuber uptin that underlie vari

u part he Ethics and in fat f Greek ehial hinking in general.

Pleure and pain, partiular bdily tate are he raw atter, it

were, upn whih he ral life i built, either pitively in ter f

virtue r negatively in ter f vie Far fr being identified with

2 In the debate, there is an nderlying asmption that the thre lives

of pleasure, of mora itue, and of contemplationrepresent competing the-ories and exclusive choices. This reading of the three ives ha a long tradi-tion and transcends philosophica approaches. For example, ThomAquin, Summa eologiae IIII, qq. 17982 also assumes a choice amonglives, with the comparison of the contempative and practical lives treatedspecifically in ST IIII q. 82 . 4 As White, "Aristoteian Happiness,3643 for a engthy discussion of these sorces) and Kenny, "Conception ofHappiness, 74 (more briey) make cear, this reading traces back to late an-tiquity, in Apasius, Heiodors, and Aexander, and contines in the MiddleAges, in Eustratius, Abers Magns, and Aqins himself. The isse is theaning f "prft and "bst a< qalifying virtue in NE.7. If this virtue is

best in an exclsive sense and perfect in the sense that nothing can be adddto it, then it is not hard to see why the tradition looked to 07 to nd a virtethat could fit such strict reqirements. The three lives mentioned in .5 and0.68 became completely differentiated theories, and opting for one becamean exclusion of the other two I argue that both the tradition and its moderninterpreters miss the way in which Aistotle maintains that happiness is ex-clusive and perfect in definition but not in relation to the sage as a concretehman being He is constanty distingshing the nature of the activity ofcontemplation and happiness from the compex needs and activities of thehuman sbject. Ony in the cae of the gods does contemplation find an ex-clusive and absolute sense Ths al three actiitiespeasre, practical pr-

suits, and contemplationhave a role to play in the happinss of the sage,namely, a providing necessary rest, or as a secondary happiness that is ori-ented to the eisure of contempation, or s the nal end in the strictest senseFor an accont of the isse otside the analytic tradition, see J Donald Mo-nan, Moral Knowledge and Its Methodology in Aristotle (Oxford: CarendonPress, 1968) Monan defines the conict in terms of a difference in methodand psychoogy NE1 and 10 represent a dedctive method based on a psychology where the self is idenified with no'us and happiness is limied o con-templation; the rest ofNEandEudemian Ethics utilize a broader psychologyin which the composite of body and so and the respective irtues of bodyand sou are integrated into a synthetic whole see especialy 226, 1327)

Monan aso discusses how this debate plays out in the wider literature of thetwentieth century, with Jaeger's theory of the development of Aristotlesthought as the nderying isse


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8 GARY M. GURTLER

uman happness, peasure and pain provie nsead he first arena

for mora deveopmen te goal of wic is to feel pleure or pain

for he proper hings nd not to be domnaed b bodil appeies and

desres.:3 Te divergence of opnons derives from not dstingushing

between peasure and pain as reaed to particular organic saes and

ceran activities hat can be pleasurable in themseves; furher dis

tinctions wil be needed to specif te natur of appiness and its re

ation to pleasur

In is scentifc dscusson in 10.4-5, Aristotle explores he imp

cations of aking peasure an acvit, vgya.4 In descrbng per

fec activities, Aristotle begins wit tese words "for seeing seems o

be compete at whatever momen, since it lacks noting wic at a

later moment wil complete te becomng of its form (6xE1 yg JV ogam xa8' 6vuvoDv xgvov tEda av ou yg uv v6Eou6v6, 0 UOtEQV YEV!EVV tEAElCDOEl auti t 6).5 Seeingis an activy hat is dentica in form, whole an compt at vy

sant, wit no reference to duration. Each part of a motion, on the

contrary, s incomplete and s dfferent in form both from te oter

pars and from he whole ping word, for exmple, takes the sep

arate motions of ttng differen kes, and iting one ke s not he

:J Eugn Gv "isol's Mphysics of Mols Joual of theHistory ( Ph'losoph:I 27 989) 7-28 discsss pl nd pin p ofhe il cs ofve (17). Hs ic givs n insing dng ofhow isol ss ds fo his physicl nd psychologicl wok,sch a n pony n h fs of h so n h frn onxo hics Th vs fo pl ov nih s n oclly)no s cs nding dsi b wh spcs of boh; no is i ionl o

iion pow b sohow in bwn. In hs wy Gv gsAisol bnds his hcl disincons to fi h ch dn conof h pccl spcily in dfining h n of hbi s d o chocwh chcisis boowd fo nl ows a wl cqid silsb ncssily diffn gvn h vi dfins pn of bho his sb l n b lso d o onl cho. Gv isol onVi nd Ps Te Geks and th ood Ife, d Dvd Dpw Flon: Cifoni S Unvsiy Pss 1980 1576 psns pliny vson of his hss in s of cog wh h on nd ion fcos prcly pononcd Gv sps mohy ochsciiq of Iwns p o connc hcs d pysics in On h A

gd Mphysic Fondon of isols Ethic," Anient Ph'looh 81988): 49-60 wh h ighy shows h Aisol dos no nd o jsifynd is no nsd in sifyng his hicl posion by ipoing pinplsfo his physics


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H ACV OF APPSS AISO'S HICS

same ahittng another, and it is on when the kes are ht n propr

order that a word eerges at the en Whe stote uses exape

of makng or dong to ilustrate the inoplete nature of motions, heturns to the senses, espeial when fntionng properl n relation to

ther obets, to illustrate what he eans b a omplete or perfet a

tivit There are no parts nto whih suh ativtes an be dvided

and, sgnant, the are omplete for ong or sho as the ast.

4 aid Bosock "Peasue and Aciy in Aisoes Ethic" Phrones's33 (988): 25172 pesens anohe eading of hese fis chapes of ook 0.

He akes fo ganed ha he peue of an aciiy is is compeness andha Aisoe hods ha a peasue is he compeion o an aciiy (25253) Wihou saying so he infes he inese as w ha a compee aciiis ae peasan Bosock poins ou ha some peues ae eaed o -penishing naua saes wih pain indicaing he oss as in he case o hunge o his He ings in he discussio of peasue in ook 7 o show heconnecion of such peues wih he pocesses of epenishing concudingwih he sujecs need o e awae of sch aciiy fo hee o e pr(26370) Wha ohes Bosock is ha his accoun sems o conadicook 0 whee peaue is associaed wih compee aciiis u is iusaed y aciiies ha ae pocesses sch waking o uiding a house.

Bosocks souion ionicay denies his opening pemise ha pea is jushe aciy addng nohing exa e dsinguishes eween he aciy andou hough o pecepion of he aciy hoding ha peu is ony in heae aciy of he mind (27). t sees howee ha his disincion in-oduces he idea ha peasue is somehing exa and no jus he aciiy assuch which fis y agumen ha peasue is diffeen fom h aciiy i ac-companies and ha hee is a disincion eween aciiies ha a awaysaccompanied y peasue and hose ha ae no This ceas up much confu-sion. isoe disinguishes eween peasues associaed wih naua e-penishens whee awaeness is auomaic (due o he pain no dou) andohe peasues ssociaed wih sigh o he ohe senses memoy and ea

ing and he iues whee peasue is no auoaic u depends oh on hcondiion of he facuy and he appopiaeness of he ojec. As Bosockpoins ou in caes whee he aciiy is pocess he peasue coes whnsuch aciiy is ooked a as whoe and compee wheh anicipaing oconempaing he copeed ojec. In his anicipaion o conempaion Iwoud ague ha hee is a sepping ac fom he pocess so ha i can eaken a compee and enjoyed (such sepping ack whie fuy engaged inhe pocess woud a disacion and iee wih is compeion In hcase of compee aciiies such as sensing memory o eaning isoe iscea ha no a insances ae peasan u ony whee he ogan and is o-jecs ae he es. The diffeence again seems o e a sepping ack in

which he aciiy is enjoyed. This emphasies he connecion of peasuewih conempaion whee oh coe a h end of an aciiy and hod i inew a whoe and compee. end o see his aciiy s disinc and s add-ing soehing exa u no sepaae if ha impies in any way ha he peasue o conempaion coud occu wihou he undeying aciy egadessof whehe ha is copee o a pocess.

NE10.4.174a46; a ansaions ae y own.


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88 GA GE

istotl bgins wth th snss baus thy ar asily known to us

and thus llustrat th diffrn btwn prft atiitis and mo

tions mor silyThs ativitis morovr hav plsur attahd to thm For

thr s a plur blonging to ah sns th sam as for roning

and ontmplation and th most omplt is most plant and

[ah sns] is most omplt that h a wllfuntionng organ to

ward th bst obts of thos undr it thus plsur would prft

th atity (xat n&av yg a18v v 6ov, !OW< 6E xa6ivav xal 8WQV, 6t 6' tALOtt, tAOtt 6 tOU ijXOVtO JQ t JO6mtatOV tV im autv tALO 6 tVvgycwv 6ov). Plur rlats to th ativity of snsing in twoways by aompanying and by prftng t Lk th ativty t a-

ompanis plur is whol and omplt at any momnt and is

thrfor unlik a motion whih is omplt ithr in th whol tim

it taks or only at ts nd istotl ontinus with an initial dsrp-

tion of how plur omplts th atiity

Bt pleare wod peret te atvty not a a abt nerng wtn tbt a some end omng to be pon t st a te bloom o yot or

tose n ter prme Ts so ong a te ntelgble or sensble obeta well a te jgng or ontempatng sbet are t need betere wll be pleasre n te atvty or wenever te pasve and atve parts reman te same and ave te same relaton to one anoterte same rest natraly appens (AELO' Tv vtgyav ovl ouxs SL vungxuo, & s myLyv6wv6v TL TAO lv TO

NE 1041174b203 Krat uman ood, obsres te lose paralelbetween sensng and ontemplaton atvtes As a onseqene e snot abe to see lly te role o stotles dssson o plere n s a-

ont o ontemplaton Krat's dssson o peare does denty ts role a means to appness wt te need or relaton and notes aso tat "tepleare soated wt any atvty . [aets] te way we engage n tatatvty, bt e seems to take ts a reerrng to tose pysal plearestat sere a means to appness rater tan tat appness tsel an ele-ment o pleare ntrns to t 2367) n ts text and te ollowng ow-ever Arstotle s makng a m stronger am abot te relatonsp be-tween pere and appness Happness and ontempaton are te mostpeant o atvtes presey beng ree and ompete. Happnessmoreover s te same role o peretng te atvtes t aompanes and sts not te knd o atvty tat an be exersed ndependently o te atv

tes t ompetes or peets Fang to see ts reslts n t dentatono appness exsvely wt plosopal atvtes sen. 29 below)


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HE ACVY APPSS AISLE'S EHICS 89

cqwLou; c. ECD &v fv T TE V0TV o8TV oTov d Tivv 1 8v oL v T" vy v OfoLv y vTv JQ AAA TV {V TQOV XVTCV TOU TE :r8TLOU TOU

JOLTOU T T E yv8)7

Pleasure annot be engaged in a an ativty on ts own, apart fro

sensing, but aopanes suh ativities as an end. This eans, on

the one hand, that pleasure is not like a power or state that oves an

agent internaly fro possesson to exerise of soe knd of atvity

and, on the other hand, that pleure funtons a na ause, an nd

or good that oves an agent externally.

t this point, rstote s a bit laoni in desrbing how t s an

end, provding ony the ontrast with the foral perfetion an agentaqures n a habit or dspositon Ths series of oents, oreover,

suggests that pleasure adds to the perfetion of an ativty under er

tain optia onditions, when the organ and objet are at their best.

Peasure thus does not aopany any hane ativty of a sense but

one in whih the agent is ating we in relation to the best of objets,

whether the agent is sensing, judgng, or ontepatng and whether

the objet s sensibe or nteligible Together wth the previous en

tion of reaoning and onteplation, these oents are the first indiation that this disussion of plesure is related to that of onte

paton and happiness that wi shorty oow Even f one argues that

ontepation in the present ontext has a eanng ore akin to

ere sensible obseration, there are aspets of ths obserng that

show a ontinuous sense of takng n an obet as a whoe opposed

to dsernng its several parts

istotle next explans why peaure is not ontnuous, n a re-

strted sense of the ter. It s not beause t is iperfet lke a o-tion, whih is essentially nonontinuous as having a series of parts.

Pleasure s not ontnuous beause the agent an get tred or bored

even of the ost pleaant ativity The onditions, thus, perain to the

nature of the agent, and pleaure perdures only for long the

agent reans in a ertain state. Ths is sgnant for it ndiates that

peasure is ontinuous without at the sae te iplying that the

agent is always engaged n it. istote is defining the struture and

7NE10.41174b3175a3


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81 GARY GURTR

naur o h aivi and no h aoun o h agn spnds do

ng , a poin also ruia or undrsanding h naur o happinss

and h aivis assoad wih i8 Sn happinss s an aivi

ik plasur, on anno ngag in i isoad ro hos spii a

ivs ha i aopanis undr ran ondiions

Eah aivi, orovr, has a orrsponding plasur This

orrspondn ads o h gra dvrsi o pasurs and hus

Arisols own xpanaon wh pasur anno b h good or idn

iid sipl wh happinss Mor poran howvr, Arisol pro

vds ruia inoraon abou how pasur ops h pau

ar aiv aopanis. For s own pasur inrs an

av: sin hos who do an avi wih plasur ar or dis

rnng and sharpr abou s paruars, as hos who no doing

Kra uman ood 68 4 ic h irc bw aciv-iy a proc xLV10) i hir applicaio o complaioH amp o clar p om poib cofio: ha rfrc o a "prfc lgh of lf o o ma ha "h projc of compaio ibrogh o a ag of compio mch l ha h coary happ ofh morl vr h om or of ompio &" i goa So far o goo b

h h a ha happi a coiig i ch acivii ha a mporaraio o ha a happy if cao b iifi wih oly a fw iacof conteplation or with th scoday happinss of oraly vituous tiv-iy hi m o ca a ilmma Aio ha fi happi a aaciviy rahr ha a habi o i m giv h fiiio of ch a aciv-iy a whol comp a coio ha oc bg happi migh bachiv oc a for all or ha compaio m b proog mor amor v o h poi of rivg o ohr acivi o of h orc ofcoic for hi poiio) hi oo a happi abracly a i i co bpara from h aciy i accomai a alo fail o ak io accoh ar of h hma bc wo cao gag i ch acivy for vry

og prio o m Sic compaio folow po viro aciviy ii iircly p o h vlopm of vir a habi a oly fol-ow po i aciv xrci Th complaio i o a proc o bcomp b a aciviy ha i mor aily a mor ply gag i ah vir i accompai i vlop mor fly a xrci mor fr-qy a aily Compaio i o i compiio wih h aciviy of

r b hy ar rla o h am ag who boh ki of acivi-i a iffr a appropria im Th failr o ma hi iiciobw h ar of h aciy a h coiio wihi h bjc fori xrci a o iviabl cofio amog h commao Ka a avoi h rror of Irwi who comm ha a "compl im wil

o b a ho im h criiciz "Ario a olo 05, a qo iuman ood, 68 4) O ca hav a mom of complaio wih ill o happi b ha o o iica o' if i characrii-caly compaiv a coqly happy H o howvr o complaio a aciviy ha i omhow qaifiabl wih om ragl uch a h o proog i mio hr a blow 28


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ACIV O AINESS IN ASTOTES ICS 811

geomery become geoericians and understand its particulars better

and similary those ineresed in music, architecure, and the other

[ars each give themselves freely to heir own funcion since they enjoy it" (o'm)/L 1v Qa oxda #>o Ao xama QV xat axgLBuv o f8' 6ol VQYV oioWQo om o XCQV ( YWQ xa xavuvxaoa Ao W 6E xa o cA xa cxo6 xatV A xaowL b66av oxo o XCQVa'n).9 Peasure, mentioned in 10.41174b03, comes upon an actiy hat is already complete or perect. For a sense like sigh, seeing

a particularly pleasant obec constitues such perection. For crats

and vrtues, however, i is not merely doing an action but doing it rom

a fuly formed disposition that makes it perfect and hus in a position

where pleasure may accompany is exercise (compare 8.099a2

in relation o moral vrue). Furher, pleaure increases such an aciv-

ity. This implies two complemenary aspecs in he present passage,

hat an actity is done more intensey a the moment of is exercise

and hat the corresponding disposiion is developed more lly or he

uure ristole uses various skills to illusrae what he means

Someone who h become adept at geometry, for example, finds pleasure in i, which makes it eier o do since such an individual udges

beter, is more accurate abou, and has a greater grasp of the reevant

pariculars Pleaure thus frees the agent to be more sharly focused

on the actiy, and this in turn leads o developing the skill more pro

ficiently and with greater interest Boh aspects indicae how closely

akin an activity and is pleasure really are.This discussion o pleure in 0.4 already includes ideas relevan

to istole's analysis o happiness, which some scholars have akento e incoheren or conused, 10 u he susequent examinaion o h

closeness o pleure and actiy in chapter 5 prodes he actual

DNE051175305HI {chrd rt Human Good trdct 4 ts th r

Arsttls prstt tht r clr stmmg rm th drcsbw h s o hies i oo d d sks o rslths sss th rmdr hs b prmrly by cmprg th tw

kds ls d thr mplcts r thr sss (cmpr HmSlSccy, 4 Rch Rcsdrg th tllctlst trprt-t 1924, d Prt, Dt Hppss, 296, pt t tht thprblm s spc t ths wh hld th w tht hppss s rstrctd tth ctmplt l d tht rtrprtt 07 wld sst thcgrty wth Arsttl's pst lswhr


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812 GARY M. GURTLR

cntt in wic t dicuin f ain finally m. T

kini btwn a lau and it actiity i cl tat lu

diff fm n ant bd n ti cti actiti Aittlut ti wit t batin tat an actity n find m

luabl i abl t di ut cmtin actiti and ti la

u. Sinc ti wn lu an actiiti and mak tm

m nduin and btt, but alin lu il tm, it i cla

w muc ty d, f alin lu almt duc t am f

fct [n actiti] an" (n o' EV otxda OvaQL s VQydas a XQVWQas a S JL, a 'QLL aVVm, OAV ws JAU OLLV" XOV yQ aQLL Ovat LLV Q a L unm).1 In t ali dicuin f 1013 lu and ain w lkd at it

anic tat, but in i cintific accunt Aittl can t

fam f fnc by dfinin ain and lu in tm f acti

ti. f n d nt y an actity, tn n find it ainful n it

wn and c din it If n i nad n n actity, but t

tunity cm f ant actity in wic n find muc at

lu, t nw lu i tn nu t di ut t lu

f t fm actiity T nw lu i alin t t ld actiityand tu functn lik it ain, makin it unyabl

In ti cntxt, lu and ain a dfind in latin t ac

quid abit diitin, nt anic tat, and a tu latd

t t ant' ntt and caact lu i in ti n nu

tal, and Aittl indicat tat t diffntiatin btwn dcnt

and b lu cannt b bd n t lu tml. N

can it b bd n t ant' caact intt aln inc t

ant can b tuu iciu H tu cnclud tat d andl attac maily t actiiti, and if lu inc t wn

actiti, t ffct i n m dltiu mally tan fllwin

n' di and atit. T lu in actiti a m

ti wn tan t di [tat lad t tm]; f t di a a

atd in tim and natu, but t lu a linkd t t actiiti,

and inaabl tat it i diutabl wt t actity i t

am t lu (LQL 0 as VQyda; a V aas

o

va


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TH ACIVY OF APPINSS IN ARISOL'S HICS 813

-


14/34


84 GARY M GURTL

pleasures strictly, but the rest are [pleasures] secondarily or to an

even esser degree, as are their activties" ( x 'WV vgyv ov;

caa yg nom a ova h ov fa v h n a wuo xa .xago vQ a a. AoDm ova XQWyv v &vgno ova dvm, a 0 Ana 'QC xanoAo nQ a Evgyam).14 The search for the properly human peure jons up wh the definion of happiness in terms of the

human function aready given in 1 and thus sets the agenda for he

discussion of happness in 106-8 The context of 105, moreover, in

dicates that Arstoe is not comparing competing kinds of ives but

ooking at those activties that beong to someone supremely perfect

and happy

III

Arsote begns he analysis of happness by placg it in the con

ext of h rest of the Ethis, specicaly lstng three areas: rues,

friendshps, and peasures (loosely, books 7, 8-9, and 0-, re

spectivey) Ths staement ndicaes that all three areas are important for determining the nature of happiness, although this paper wilfocus rmariy on references to peasure Aistote refers back to

omments n .11-14, where happiness, or the highest good, is an ac

iviy and he nature o such an activy is some kind of pleure (:ov)5 More importany, however, he uses the discussion just concluded n 0-5, with its caeful anaysis of peasure as acvy

that accompanies and perfecs the exercise of other activities This

includes wo nterrelated ssues, the closeness between peasures andther acvities and the determination of he goodness of a peasure on

the basis of the goodness of he acvty t accompanies (105) It s

precisey his ast question that leads o the ce of the sage as perfec

and bessed and whose viruous acviies relae n dfferent ways to

happiness, the topc of 06-8

Arstoe reiteraes tha happiness is not a habit but properly an

activiy (rvgyiv va), s made both n 8 ad 05. He

H B 105176a25-91' B 713113b914iB 1061176b


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H ACIVY OF APPNSS N ASO'S CS 85

adds tat atvtes are dvded to two ds tose ose as

meas opposed to tose cos for temselves te appess wl

be amo tose cose for temselves Te sae moreover appearsto coose a varety of actvtes or temseves If te ast seto o

105 a deed set te cotet for te osderato o appess

te ese atves ave soe am to asoato wt appess

weter te fuest sese seodarly or some esser degree a

Arstote put t tere Furter ts ommet dates tat te prob

lem s eter oosg amog tem depedg o te rumstaes

or avodg oe of tem etrey but rater ow a tree atvtes

are related to someoe perfectly bessed as a uma beg.

Frst e exames ow amusemets cotrbute to appess t

seems te tese ts pea to appess sce tose power

sped ter esure tem" (box1 tEV ov Omovx -au-a dvmO ' U< V OVa< V < cmooxoatav) I resposeArstote socates appess wt morally good atvtes were te

peaure s pure ad free (bov< XQvou< xaL A8Q),20 adot wt actvtes socated wt power or te body Hs pot s

tat te actvtes eared to uma appess are reated to uma

reao a te deg part of uma ature ad tus ave ter

source vue ad tellee eco 1 7. Tose wo are moraly

vrtuous value wat s eessary te best we te wked or c

dre detfy te best wt wat tey desre

7NE ..7a7-.

18 Wha s mpora o o h pres cox s ha amusmmora virtu and conmplaio ar sn as rlad o happinss, a as incommon opiio. A h disiguishs h rs wo from h pris aciviyof happnss, Arisol wil idnif h particular os ha mak compaon diffrn from amusmn ad mora acivy dfnig how happinss issfsuic ad consiss i lisur, whl h acviies of moral vrue havsur as hr d ad h sur aordd b amusms is acua o ameans rlav to bodiy ondon of th subjct. Ts onntons ds-

appar n h radiioa rpraio whr happiss is analzd rmsof a choc bwn wo lvs horica or pracica wih pasur simpldiscardd. Mos of h auhors mio slfsufficnc and complss s

h major characrisics of happiss ad conmplaion bu almos oalyngc h ro o sur ad h k provids amog h hr acivis

WNE 676b6-72oNE .6. 76b


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816 GARY M. GURTLR

Amusement, then, cannot be identified with the authentic happi

ness of the viuous. Nonetheless, it continues to play a role s a

means "For amusement is like est; those who ae not able to wokcontinuously have need of est but rest is cerainly not the end, since

it is fo the sake of actiity (vaJaO yg EXV aCH6VaiVt 6 O'VW JVLV vanaUO Movtm ou 6 tA va'O" yvtm yg VXa t VQYl).21 Aristote reiterates acondition of the agent that makes the rest provided by amusement

necessay Actiity involves effo and thus cannot be sustained for

long, and usement restoes ou organic well-being so the actity

can be resumed Amusement is thus distinct both om pesures othe senses and from happiness It als between the two: amusement

is not simply the exercise of one sense or another but is linked to lei

sre a fom of rest; it is thus actually only a means and so does not

count s happiness, though some may mistakenly choose it s if it

were a means, it is not conceed with the stucture of happiness

a perfect activity but rather with the condition of the agent as sub

ject to fatigue and needing rest in ode to eturn to those actities

which happiness can accompany This point about the agent hs itsst aiculation in his analysis of pleure at 1041175a410 Thus,

istole's accoun of amusemen s no of a heory or a lfe oally e-

jected but of an actity that plays a limited role in relation to happi

ness The imitation is twood since amusement is not an end and

does not directly relate to virtue but concerns only the bodily well

being of the agent. Of the three options Aristotle gives at the end of

105, amusement is only to a lesser degree related to happiness

1078 brings us, finally, to the crux of scholary dispute These

two chapters can be divided into three sections. Each section begins

with a straightforward identification of happiness with contempla

tion, which is then supported by analysis of relevant issues The first

section identifies happiness with contemplation, listing characteris

tics derived fom 178 and 1045 and introducing the notion of ei

sue23 The second revolves aound the issue of life, with possible al

lusion to 1.5, but developed in tems o whethe the contemplative life

is actually possible and concluding once moe that happiness consists

z1NE 10.6.1176b34-1177al


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THE ACTVITY OF HAPPNESS N ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 81 7

in contemplation despite the fact that it seems to go beyond the hu

man24 The third dentifies happiness properly contemplation since

it is the one activity the gods can have All these arguments are thenconfirmed by appeal to the opinions of the wise and lived experi

ence.2

For context, let us recall that in 11098a1618 he sets the task of

looking for the human good in terms of an actity in conformity with

vrtue and if there are several rtues with the one that is best and

most complete In 10511765 and 1016, he states that each animal

has its own proper pleasure but this is complicated for human nature

since no pleasure is such proper to a human being Instead theproper human plesure is found by examining the actiity or actities

of someone completely perfect and blessed Thus in both of these

psages, Aristotle leaves open whether one or more activities is at is-

sue, but in 107 he begins with the ssertion that happiness is an activ

ity in conformity with the highest virtue, the irtue of the best part in

us The actity of this [par] according to its proper rtue would be

perfect happiness; but this is contemplative activity it is said" (

2 This agrees with the traditiona reading that amusement is not to beidentied with happiness, but emphasizes that it is stil reated to happinessunderstood in reation to virtue Amusement may not be needed or the happiness of the gods, who do not have the sme kind of corporeal componentbut such excusion does not fit Aistote's account of the human subject Athough a ife o pleure is not so much a riva theory about a third kind ohappiness but a ife that is essentially icious since the bsis or action issoely ound in pesure), this does not elminate the roe of amusement or

peure in a virtuous ie characterized by moral actiity and contempation.The qualification that pesure or amusement conce bodily rest and the

consequent connection of happiness with rue, moreover emphize thatAristote sees the virues intelectual and mora a going together. My division of 1078 is designed to show that both rtues are discussed togetherthroughout these two chapters One might compare Plato's discussion ohappiness in Republic 89, where the happiness o the philosopher may asobe seen in contemplation but where the philosopher is distinct rom othersprecisey in integrating the three aspects of the sou reson the spirited parand the appetites For Plato cities or sous devoted to honor or peure(subdivided to yield our types) cut of the actity of the higher par and arethus not integrated wholes are the wise It does not seem dicult to construe Aristotle saying something quite simiar about a lie that woud be

limited to practica pursuits3NE 107.1177a12-b2624NE 10 7.1177b2610.8.1178b725NE 10.81178b7-11792


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818 GARY M. GRTLER

OlJOU VQYELU x; tV oxav QEtV E v tcAa EafVU'oL b' Ot 8EWQtX, dgtm).26 He identifies the best part of us as

intelligence (oD), either dine or the most divine part in s, wth itsobjects as the highest objects of knowledge, again the noble and di

vine From the discussion of pleasure, it is clear that Aistotle sees in

telligence at its best and engaged with the best of its objects s the

most obious candidate for the highest kind of happiness. n rapid

succession, he then lists the attributes of such an activity

Fo ths actvty s tsef the hghestfor ntegence s [the hghest] ofthe thngs n us and [the hghest of knowable objects [are those] about

whch telgence thnks] and t s the most contnuous, fo we aeabe to contemplate moe contnuously than to do anythng ese whateve We aso thnk t necessary that peue be mxed wth happness,and the most pleasant of actvites n conformty wth vtue s confessedy the one n confomty wth wsdom; nded phosophy seems tohave pleaues amazng purty and certanty and t s easonabe thateoyment of dea s more peasant than nvestgatng them (XQ0 yaQ v 1 QyL-x yaQ 6 s w V, x 1wYVWOV JEQ & 0 s L uc 8EWQEV yaQufc8 ucws dA rQn . t6c8 rQfEf8m Vl\ w x' UQE VEQYV

xa AyufVWS xci y LA8ua< as x8QCLL x_( c y M V VWV V Lyy m)27

These first three attributes that contemplation is the actiity that

is highest, most continuous, and most pleasant, are presented as un

controversial The first attribute is based on Aristotle's constant posi

tion that intellect is the highest part, indicated implicitly in 1 7 and ex

plicitly in 6.6 That this actity is most continuous is related to the

continuous nature of perfect actiities, discussed in relation to plea

sure at 1041175a410 and to amusement at 1061176b34-1177a In

10., pleasures are perfect activities that accompany the activities of

the senses and, although they are continuous in the snse of being

whole and complete all at once, we do not engage in them continu

ously because they are relative to the condition of the agent, espe

cially as hang sense organs Contemplation as not related to a cor

poreal organ is intrinsically more continuous s a perfect actity, but

engaging in contemplation also depends on our physical condition as

2fNE 07 77a6127 E 0.71177a19-27


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HE ACIVIY OF HAPPNESS I ARISOTE'S EHICS 81 9

cmpsi bings as h s pidd b amsmn ass in 10.6

T b cnins hs ds n impl ha w a ngagd in cnm

plain all h im ha w shld b ngagd in i ng pssi-bl h xclsin h aciiis28 Finall ha happinss is

ms plan indicas ha Aisl disingishs i m p

b nvhlss ss hm as clsl lad H adds h ha

pl is assciad wih cnmplain pcisl bcas i is in

cnmi wih wisdm.

Ths cmmns a psnd psiivl and wih an cm-

paisn h vis aciviis Th din wha isl

mans b happinss in ms inllc s h highs pa in s and

hs pclia hman bings Th happinss inllc is m p

cisl dind in ms wisdm is i and cnmplain h

ms plan acii in cnmi wih wisdm Th h inlc

al is whh cas scincs (1vm xed o"fm), a n

sciad wih happinss n a hi aciiis alhgh h w

ad in h anasis pas in 104 Th h dscipin

h plass philsph indicas smhing ab h chaac

cnmplain I is n ab invsigaing sding id b

ab hs hings knwn wih pi and cain. Cnmplain ishs n assciad wih an kind philsphical acii b wih

ha njmn ha cms a h nd sd invsigain and

cnsis a and cnins sing in h h

This ags agains idniing h acivi cnmpain wih

vais ms ning indciv ddciv h wk

sd invsigain Ths aciviis a n cnmplaiv in h

sns inndd h bcas h a mins and hs n cmpl.

28In this context Krauts clam nH Good (15, 27), that one shouldengage n contemplatve acttes much as possble wth a heavy stresson the quantty of tme spent in t, needs to be examined. e furher arguesthat maxmizing contemplaton (, 2, 29, 30 n. 15, 32, 76, 0, 2) brings upthe ssue of egosm whch would have us maxmze such actvty &' much &'possible n contrast to a nonegost reading, where it may n fact be limtedwthin the context of other responsibltes proper to one's lfe. My argumentrests on the dea that contemplaton s not an actty that one can engage nby tsel but only as accompanying other actvtes related to wsdom the

vrtue o intellgence. Such actvty s essentally nonquantfable as completeand perfect but becomes more requent and thus more characteristic of theindvidual as wsdom s ncreaed. Such vrtues moreover elminate by ther

very nature a dchotomy baed on egosm and altrusm. See n. 8 above.


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820 GARY M. GURLER

So, not everything a philosopher does is automatically contemplative,

wth ts accompanying pleure. Writing a philosophical paper, pre-

parng a class, or dong reseach n phlosophy reman motons or

becomings, with beginnings, middles, and ends. They involve steps

and their goals may or may not be attained and are, therefore, imper-

fect, however phlosophcal thy may be29 Contemplaton, however,

comes at the end of these motions, like amusement, but while amuse-

ment provides rest contemplaion perfects and increases them, like

pleure.

ontemplaton is also mos selfsufficient, leisured, and an end in

itself With these next three attributes, Aistotle distinguishes how

they apply to contemplation more completely than they do to the bestand noblest activities of other rtues. He contrasts the wise, the ust,

and those with other virtues.30 All three groups need the necessities

of ife. n the case of the just, the selfcontrolled, the brave, and so

forth, they need other people s par of the very structure of their re-

spective actites, whether objects of the actity or as helps to

cary them out. In the cse of the wise, however, contemplation h

its obec withn it and can be carred out by one's self, especally

20 Kaut, Huan Good, in dentfing philosophy tout court wh con-emplaon ens o ientiy any philosophica activy wh contemplaionan hus ntrinsicaly maniesations o happness (6 15-77 especialy 47an 3) e wries: "t occrs no ony when one sienty relects asowhen one lecures or wries aou a certain sject when one reas a ookwhen one lisens o a ook eing rea or when one hears someone presentng a ectre The teacher who is preparing ecures an noes or who sorally presenng a sjec to stuens an coleagues is consciosy consierng ruhs ha he has alreay come o nersan an so he is conemplaing (73) Perhaps he s akng conempative s a genera erm ha coversal acons hat are not pracica hus ncng he activies o al he nteecua vrues In the present conex however isoe is makng a isncion eween complee actvties ha are in a stric sense contempativean motons however intelecal hat are no conempative n this sensehe view hat nerlies rats commens h some unesirae conseuences appe o hese acvites he claim wo e suspec i meanor example hat a phosopher always eoye such acivies preparngnoes or lecuring o suens I happiness like pere s a sperveningactivy hen one canno engage i i y itsel an as i were nepenentyo other acvies such s hose o the ntelecta an mora virues It saso necessary to rememer tha Aisole oes not hol ha such acivies

are necessary accompanie y pesure or happness (compare n 4)These acors seem o arge in avor o takng conempaon in a more restricte sense in the presen psage a move ha is no al ha usua orArstote

:loNE 07a9


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THE ACIVIY OF ANESS N AISOL'S ICS 821

the vual ceases wsom hese commets ee to the

nature of the activity itself a ot how wisom, a virtue, is

acquired and maintained or how contemlation a its activity maynormally occur Sel-sufficiency urher resume the comments

from 1 71097b615 that define it a what makes life deirable and de

ficient in nothing but with the context of our social nature So the

stucture of contemlation a activity does not need others but

other people are esential for the wise Aristotle maintains in the

dicussion of comlete friendshi3 The very tructure o contemla

tion oes not inclue other eople however because they are ot i

herently eee for its exercise The attribute of selsuciecy thusertais i the highest degree to the wise It is important to ote that

Aistotle is not comaring live or choosing among them but indicat

ng iffereces itrisic to the activities o cotemlatio a the vir

tue. The same individual could be wise just elfcontrolle or brave

at differet times.

Aritotle next discusse contemlation an end and involvingeisure. These two attribute are crucial for hi claim that this articuar intellectual activity costitutes complete hapiess and ot the activities of the moral virtues. "It seems that this [activity] aloe is lovefor itself; or nothing comes from it beyod cotemlating but fromractical ursuits we acquire something more or less beyond theactio. Haiess seems to be i leisure for we are busy so that wemay have leisure we go to war so that we may gai eace (o6sm 1'v a1J V ' a{v yan8m OV yg n' au YLVEmnag 0 8wgm, &no 0 ngaxxv ov AanovnQOOUf8a ag V QSV. oxI EaOVLa V Tf OXOA'ca f8a y ta WEV xaL nAEOUEV t' dgVV

31 NE 83-4 discuss perfec frendship, whe 8 1 1 155a23-32 and 98-9dicuss he mportance of frendshp for the politcal order and for he vruous indvidual I s interesting ha he same objections made agans conempaon are also made about pefec frendshp such as he probem ofegoism. Keepng in mind Atl' n f he knds vrus hse pable equaly of perfec friedship and conemplaon seems such indvdas hae moved eyod he nmena caegores ha characerze sceand regard their friend n no ense as a competior but s he object of thatgod w which seeks he friend's success Astotle makes a smilar cam n

Politics 241262b3-24 bu n the context of a srong crcsm of Socraesprposa in Repubic 450b-c 457 and foowing hat wives and chdren behed in common His pont s hat Socraes "atrusc proposa woud havehe opposie effec from tha nended, the waerng down of al relationshpsn he cty; ony the more egostic mne hs he possbty of buildng up hebonds of nity n the cy.


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822 GARY M. GURTLER

ayW[EV).32 In 7109704, when ristotle examines ends in themselves, he distingishes those that are only ends and never means

rom those that are oth ends and means toether, and he concludesthat hapiness is final in the nqalified sense In 1067, he applies

this distinction to the three kinds of actities chosen by one spremely blessed and happy Amsement, we saw, is only seen asan end y children or the cios and is not really an end at all tonly a means, given the need of the agent for rest Practical prsitsand contemplaton, however, qualify both as actities in conformitywith irte and as ends chosen for themselves, bt Aristotle arges

that practical prsits, even the est and noblest, have an end eyond

themselves Aristotle takes the best, most noble actvities of themoral rtes to be politics and war The rest o this section argesthat they are engaged in not or themselves t for some frther end:

war is waged for the sake of peace and politics for the sake of the advantage, prestige, or happiness of the statesman or his fellow ctzens

hey are unesurely ut orente toward esureLeisre ths fnctions a sbtle link among the three activties

considered in 10.68 and as key for nderstanding ther differences

and the natre o happiness as an actvity Ths amsements give a

spros kind of leisre, thogh it is still necessary for bodly wellbe-ing while politics and war have leisre their end bt ot as compo

nent pats of the actiities themselves.33 Contemplation, therefore, isthe only candidate or happiness that s an end in itsel in the strctest

sense Lesre is sociated with sch an end since it denotes an ac-

tiity that s essentially pre and free, having nothing eyond itself

Leisre s discssed here in 1068 and at 891160a207 where it also

occrs in a context where politics has an aim beyond itself Leisre is

the mark of contemplation and key for identifying it with happinesshs dscusson also emphies that happiness is not socated

with irtes dispositions of the agent t with the exercise of these

ites in their proper actiities The strctre is exactly like that of

pee wee pease comes o te eecse o powes sc a

68789795 the Activity of Happiness in Aristotle s Ethics

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