Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 924 www.globalbizresearch.com Modeling the Effects of Banking Sector Reforms on Bank Management Practices in Nigeria Adolphus J. Toby, Department of Banking and Finance,Rivers State University of Science and Technology, Rivers State, Nigeria. E-mail: tobyadolphus@ust.edu.ng Daerego S. Thompson, Department of Banking and Finance,Rivers State University of Science and Technology, Rivers State, Nigeria. ___________________________________________________________________________________ Abstract Thisstudymodelstheeffectsofbankingsectorreformsonbankmanagementpracticesin Nigeria.Comparable data for the pre-reform period (1960-1985) and the post-reform period (1986-2008) were generated from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin and analyzedwithdescriptiveandinferentialstatisticaltools.Theexplanatorypowerofthe specifiedmultipleregressionmodelsisrobustsincetheaverageVarianceInflationFactors (VIFs)andtolerancevaluesconfirmthenon-existenceofmulticollinearityamongthe independent variables (IVs).The descriptive statistics show steeply rising lending rates and widening bankmarginsin thepost-reform period.Critical bankmanagement variableslike bankliquidityratio(BLR)andloan-to-depositratio(LTDR)felloutsideprudentiallimits, portrayingcontinuingcompliancelapsesinthepost-reformperiod.Moreover,theliquidity and funding capabilities of banks did not improve significantly with falling savings rates and cash reserve ratio (CRR).In the pre-reform period, the banks adopted conservative lending policiesastheprimelendingrate(PLR)becamemoresignificantindeterminingtheir liquidity and funding profiles.In the post-reform period, bank management was aggressive in their lending policies as the loan-to-deposit ratio was more significantly sensitive to changes inthemaximumlendingrate(MLR).Bothprudentialandpolicyincentivesmadebanksto expandfundingtoallsectorsirrespectiveoftheirriskclass.Marginalincreasesinthe treasurycertificaterate(TCR)andminimumrediscountrate(MRR)broughtabouta significantreductioninthecashreserveratio(CRR),hencefacilitatingbanking intermediation.Currentreformsshould,however,moderaterisinglendingrates,promote prudential compliance and ensure sound financial management of the banks.Complementary monetarypolicyreformsshouldaimatminimizingrent-seekingbehaviour,moralhazards and consequential systemic failure. _____________________________________________________________________ Keywords: Modelling, Banking Reforms, Bank Management, Bank Performance Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 925 www.globalbizresearch.com 1. Introduction Thebankingsectorasanimportantsectorinthefinancialservicesindustryneedstobe reformedfromtimetotimeinorder to enhance itscompetitivenessandcapacitytoplaythe fundamentalroleoffinancinginvestment.Reformsinthebankingsectorarenecessaryto ensure the safety of depositors funds and deepen the financial system to engender growth of the economy (Somaye, 2008; Okpara, 2011).The widespread reforms that characterized the Nigerianbankingindustryinrecenttimesareaimedataddressingweakcorporate governance,riskmanagement,operationalinefficienciesandundercapitalizationforthe purpose of complying with international best practices. TheNigerianbankingindustryhasevolvedinsevenstagessinceitsinceptionin1891.Thefirststage(1891-1951)wasthefreebankingera,characterizedbyunregulatedbanking practicesandhencemassivebankfailures.Thesecondphase(1952-1959)startedwiththe enactment of the Banking Ordinance (1952) which provided for a clear definition of banking business,prescriptionofminimumcapitalrequirementsfortheexpatriateandindigenous banks, maintenance of a reserve fund, adequate liquidity and banking supervision.The third stage(1959-1985)camewiththecommencementoftheCentralBankofNigeria(CBN)in June1959.TheCBNActof1958incorporatedalltherequirementsinthe1952Ordinance and introduced mandatory liquidity ratio in the banking business. The fourth stage of banking sector reforms (1986-1992) was liberalization of the banking industry that hitherto was dominated by Government-controlled banks.During this period the bankingsectorsuffereddeepfinancialdistresswhichnecessitatedanotherroundofreforms designed to manage the distress.The fifth phase (1999-2002) saw the return of liberalization, accompaniedbytheadoptionofdistresssolutionprogrammes.Theeraalsosawthe introductionofuniversalbankingwhichempoweredthebankstooperateinallaspectsof retail banking andnon-bankingfinancial markets (Balogun, 2007a).Thesixth phase (2004-2008) was described as the consolidation period which focused on strengthening the financial systemthroughbankingmergersandacquisitions,foreignexchangemarketstabilization, interestraterestructuringandthepursuitofstabilizationasagainststructuraladjustment policies for monetary and inflationary controls (Soludo, 2005). Theseventhstagealsocalledthepost-consolidationperiod(2008-2011)witnessedan interplay between the adverse effects of the 207-2009 Global Financial Crisis and heavy risk-concentrationsinthepreviouslyconsolidatedbanks.TheCBNdevelopedablueprintfor reforming the Nigerian banking industry built around four pillars (a) enhancing the quality of banks,(b) establishing financial stability, (c) enabling healthy financial sector evolution and(d)ensuringthefinancialsectorcontributestotherealeconomy.Therewasalsogreater Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 926 www.globalbizresearch.com emphasisonrequisitedisclosure,transparencyandrisk-basedsupervision(RBS)torestore sanity in the banking system. In2010,theCBNintroducedthenewbankingmodelaimedatwithdrawingthe permission given to banks to engage in non-traditional banking activities.A bank will not be allowedtoownsubsidiaries,andmayalsoberestrictedincertaingeographicalmarkets (Mike,2010).Thiswill ensure that abank concentrates andspecializes in the corebanking businessratherbecometheso-calledfinancialsupermarketswitnessedundertheerstwhile Universal Banking Programme. Under thenewmodel, abankwillbecomeeither commercialormerchant. A merchant bank is required to have a minimum paid-up share capital of N15billion. A commercial bank maybeoneofthethreetypesregional,nationalandinternationalwithminimumpaid-p capital requirementsof N10billion, N25billion andN50billion respectively.The model also provides for specialized banks which include primary mortgage institutions (PMIs), discount houses, development banks, micro-finance banks (MFBs), and non-interest banks which may be either regional or national. A holding company model is an essential part of the new licensing structure.The primary activity of a holding company will be to provide banking and other financial or non-financial servicesdependingonitsregulatoryauthorizationthroughitssubsidiarieswithinthearea specifiedinitsoperatinglicense.Theassetsoftheholdingcompanyconstituteessentially investments in subsidiaries, which are represented by the sum of share capital and reserves on the liability side of the balance sheet. However,recentworksontheeffectsofbankingreformsinNigeriahaveshownmixed results.Somoye(2008) hasarguedextensively with empirical data that the consolidation of the Nigerian banking industry in 2006 did not improve the overall performance of the banks andcontributedmarginallytothegrowthoftherealsector.Ubirimie(2008)usingapanel datacomprising1,153observationsof138Nigerianbanksoverthe1980-2007periodand industry-level indices over the same period has argued that the recent banking reforms did not significantly improve bank profitability and stability. Azeez and Oke (2012) have equally found that banking reforms have not adequately and positively impacted the Nigerian economy.Oputu (2010) has, however, noted that the policy responsestothebankingcrisisinNigeriaemphasizedtheneedforstructuralreformsinthe financialandcorporatesectors,inadditiontotheimplementationofappropriate macroeconomicpolicies.Sanusi (2012) has arguedthat theCentral Bank of Nigeria(CBN) undertookvariousbankingreformstoenablethebankingsystemplayitsactualroleof Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 927 www.globalbizresearch.com intermediation,strengthenitsgrowthpotentials,andestablishitsglobalpresenceinthe international financial markets. ItisdocumentedinCurtie(2003)thattheintroductionofnewownershipstructures, market mechanisms and financing techniques under policies of liberalization and privatization arenotnecessarilysolutionswithoutprovidingforchangesineconomic,societalandlegal infrastructure.Uppah(2011)hasshownempiricallythatinIndiaforeignandnon-private sectorbanksaremuchbetterinperformancewhencomparedtonationalizedbanksinthe post-bankingsectorreformsperiod.TheworksofBoatengandHuang(2010)haveshown thattheliberalizationoftheChinesebankingbusinesstoforeignbanksin2003hasan encouraging effect on the banking sector, although the evidence is not statistically significant.Atmacroeconomiclevel,higherpercapitaGDPandlowerunemploymenthavebeen significantly related to better bank performance. Themajorresearchquestions,therefore,are(1)whatistheeffectofvariationsinbank ratesonbankliquiditymanagementinNigeriabeforeandafterthebankingreforms?(2) what is the nature of the relationship between selected central bank rates and the cash reserve requirementsbeforeandafterbankingreforms?and(3)whatistheeffectofbankrateson bank funding management before and after banking reforms? In this study we test three major null hypotheses: H01: There is no significant relationship between bank rates and bank liquidity ratio in the pre and post reform periods. H02: There is no significant relationship between CBN rates and cash reserve requirements in the pre-and post-reform periods. H03:Thereisnosignificantrelationshipbetweenbankratesandloan-to-depositratiointhe pre-and post reform periods. The next part of thepaper review relevant literaturein thecontextsof Nigerian banking reforms, the experience of other countries and the nexus between banking sector reforms and bankperformance.Thisisfollowedbythedatasources,methodologyandmodel specification, and then results and discussion.The paper ends with summary, conclusion and recommendations. 2. Review of Relevant Literature The worksof Balogun (2007a) review theperspectives of banking reformsin Nigeria in fiveeras:pre-SAP(1970-85),thepost-SAP(1986-93),thereformsLethargy(1993-1998), pre-Soludo(1999-2004),andPost-Soludo(2005-2006).Usingbothdescriptiveand econometricmethods,thestudyfoundthateachphaseofreformsculminatedinimproved incentives,thatpolicyreformsresultedinincreasedcapitalizationandexchangerate Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 928 www.globalbizresearch.com devaluation.Interestraterestructuringandabolitionofcreditrationinghadpositiveeffects onrealsectorcredit.Theempiricalresultsconfirmthaterasofpursuitsofmarketreforms were characterized by improved incentives without necessarily increasing the credit purvey to therealsector.Alsowhilegrowthwasstifledintheerasofcontrol,thereformserawas associated with rise in inflationary measures.Among the pitfalls of reforms identified by the study are faulty premise and wrong sequencing of reforms and a host of conflicts emanating fromtheadoptionoftheoreticalmodelsforreformsandaboveall,frequentreversalsand/or non-sustainabilityofreforms.Thestudynotestheneedtobolsterreformsthroughthe deliberateadoptionofpolicies thatwouldensureconvergenceofdomesticandinternational rates of return on financial market investments. Inanotherstudy,Balogun(2007b)focusesspecificallyontheSoludosbankingsector reforms.AreviewofthetheoreticalqualificationstotheSoludosreformshowsthatin thoughts,itisrootedintheclassicaltraditionsofSaysLaw,actsmonetarist,butexpectsa Keynesianoutcomethatmoneycanstimulateexpansioninaggregatedomesticproduct.In conclusion,thestudynotedtheneedtoadoptaninterestrateoperatingprocedurefor monetarypolicyinadditiontomovingtheeconomyconsciouslytowardsthelawofone market and one price for the domestic and foreign money markets. Earlier studies on the effects of banking sector deregulation in Nigeria found that initially deregulationseemstoenhanceprofitsandprofitabilityattheexpenseofbankliquidityand capital adequacy (Toby, 1994).Medium-term strategy emphasized new patterns of portfolio behaviour with greater emphasis on bank liquidity than on bank profitability.The challenges of financial deregulation in Nigeria between 1986 and 1992 occasioned a consequential shift in banks assets and liabilities, an increasing proportion of rate-sensitive components of assets and liabilities, and growing interest elasticity of balance sheet items (Toby, 1993).The bank distressthatfollowedthepost-liberalizationperiod,andtheresolutionmeasuresareaptly documented extensively in Toby (1999, 2002, 2005). Empirical results have, however, raised the question of whether or not capital adequacy requirement affects banks asset quality, and hence limit risk concentrations in the Nigerian banking industry.The works of Toby (2005) arguethatwell-capitalizedbanksrevealpoorassetqualitycharacteristics,while undercapitalized banks display better asset quality in their loan portfolio. More recent studies have revealed that the minimum liquidity ratio (MLR) was irrelevant in controlling industry non-performing loans (npls) portfolio prior to banking consolidation in 2006 (see Toby, 2007).The cash reserve ratio (CRR) was found to be a more effective tool in controlling the level of npls in the industry as a whole and the distressed banks in particular.AnextensivesurveyofX-efficienciesandscaleeconomiesinbankinginthepreandpost Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 929 www.globalbizresearch.com reformperiodsraisesacautionagainstthewholesomeimplementationofderegulationand consolidation in developing banking systems (Toby, 2006.It is also shown that the adoption of loose monetary policy regimes in the post-consolidation era (2006-2011) provided further constraintsonbanksbalancesheetsasbanksstillreliedmoreonpurchasedfundstomeet liquidity and lending requirements (Toby, 2010).Toby (2011) also found that the pursuit of consolidationandrisk-basedsupervision(RBS)moderatednplswithoutacorresponding impact on liquidity and lending growth. Intermsofpolicythrustthebankingsectorreformsareexpectedtobuildandfostera competitiveandhealthyfinancialsystemtosupportdevelopmentandtoavoidsystemic distress(Soludo,2007).Thetraditionalviewingeneralisthatbankingsectorreformsis encapsulated in institutional, monetary and exchange rates restructuring, and can be analyzed viathebodyoftheirtransmissionmechanisms(Balogun,2007a).Theliteraturenotesfour majorchannelsbetweeninstrumentsofmonetarypolicyanditsultimatetargets(inflation controlandgrowthinrealoutput).Theseare(i)directinterestrateeffects,whichaffect investmentandconsumptiondecisions,(ii)indirecteffectviaotherassetprices,suchas prices of bonds, equities and real estate, which will influence spending through balance sheet andcashfloweffects,(iii)exchangerateeffects,whichwillchangerelativepricesof domesticandforeigngoals,influencingnetimports,andalsothevalueofcurrency denominatedassets,withresultingbalancesheeteffects,and(iv)creditavailabilityeffects, which may include credit rationing if there are binding ceilings on interest rates. ItisarguedthattheCentralBankofNigeria(CBN)initiatesfinancialsectorreformsto enhance competition, reduce distortion in investment decisions, and evolve a sound and more efficientfinancialsystem(CBN,2011).Thereformswhichfocusedonstructuralchanges, monetarypolicy,interestrateadministrationandforeignexchangemanagement,encompass both financial market liberalization and institutional building in the financial sector. TheworksofToby(2006)showthattheliquiditymanagementpracticesofNigerian bankswereatvariancewithmonetarypolicytargetsboth intimesofintense deregulation andguidedderegulation.Theevidenceconfirmsthatareductioninthecashreserve requirementnecessitatedanincreaseinaveragebankliquidityandaparadoxicaldeclinein aggregate credit to the economy.The study also shows that interest rates moderated in times of guided deregulation with commercial banks playing a dominant role in the Certificate of Deposit (CD) and Commercial Paper (CP) markets. Inthepost-globalcrisisera(2007-2009),theemphasiswasonloosemonetarypolicy directioninthemedium-term(Toby,2010).However,Mora(2010)foundthatthebank-centrednatureofthecrisismadeitharderthaninthepastforbankstoattractdepositand Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 930 www.globalbizresearch.com provide liquidity to borrowers shut out of securities markets.Saxegaard (2006) examines the pattern of excess liquidity in Sub-Saharan Africa and its consequences for the effectiveness of monetary policy.The study suggests that excess liquidity weakens the monetary transmission andthustheabilityofmonetaryauthoritiestoinfluencethedemandconditionsinthe economy. Ziorklui (2001) has argued that many developing countries embarked on financial sector reformstoremovethevestigesoffinancialmarketrepressioninordertopromotefinancial marketefficiencyandsavingsmobilization.Ziorkluireviewsin-depthwithpolicy implications,Ghanasfinancialsectorreform,theFinancialInstitutionsSectorAdjustment Programme(FINSAP)toaddresstheendemicproblemsofGhanasfinancialsector.The efficiency of financial markets in promoting financial deepening and savings mobilization of financialresourcesiswidelyrecognizedintheliterature(McKinnon,1973;Shaw,1973). McKinnon postulates that an increase in holding financial assets (financial deepening) by the publicpromotessavingsmobilizationwhichleadstohigherlevelsofsavings,investment, production,growthandpovertyalleviation.However,financialmarketinterventionby governmentsindevelopingcountriesconstrainsthepotentialoffinancialmarketsin mobilizing savings for growth and development. The major objectives of financial sector reforms in developing economies include market liberalizationforthepromotionofmoreefficientresourceallocation,expansionofsavings mobilizationbase,promotionofinvestmentandgrowththroughmarket-basedinterestrates (Omoruyi, 1991). It is argued that the reform of the banking sector is imperative to enable it playakeyroleinprimaryandtradingrisksandimplementingmonetaryandfiscalpolicies (Balogun,2007a).Inthisvein,bankingreformsareexpectedtoaddresstheissueswhich mitigatetheefficiencyofthebankingsectorsuchasshallowdepthsofthecapitalmarket, dependenceoffinancialsectoronpublicsectorandforeignexchangetradingassourcesof funding, apparent lack of harmony between fiscal and monetary policies and above all, poor loans repayments performance as well as bad debts (Ojo, 2005; Nnanna, 2005). Many studies have reviewed the impact of the post-reform period on the performance of banking institutions in India.Ahluwalia (2002) has argued that the deregulation of the Indian bankingindustryhassomepositiveoutcomessuchasafallintheshareofnon-performing loans, increased entry of new private sector banks, branch expansion or financial widening as well as deepening, and the achievement of the minimum capital adequacy ratio by 90 per cent of domestic banks.More et al (2006) have shown strong evidence that the sharp increase in growth post 1994 was bank credit-led.There is, however, the general perception that public Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 931 www.globalbizresearch.com sectorinvolvementinthebankingsectorbluntsincentivestoeffectivelyrespondtomarket-based reforms (Bhattacharya and Patel, 2003; Kumbhakar and Subrata, 2003). Price-settingbehaviourmaybeendogenousnot justtomarketstructure,but alsotosize and deregulation.Interest rate deregulation may lead to an increase in bank funding costs and afallinbankprofitability.Thiscouldbecounteredthroughanincreaseinthenumberand priceofservicesofferedbybanks(HumpheyandPulley,1997)astrategythatiseasierfor larger banks to effect.This is consistent with a fall in spreads for large banks with high non-interest expenditure and incomes. Kumbhakaretal(2001)studywhetherandhowderegulation,assumedtogenerate increasedcompetition, affected theprofitability of Spanish savingsbanksbetween1986 and 1995.Their panel study uses a flexible variable profit function and incorporates time-varying technicalefficiency,highratesoftechnicalprogressandincreasingtrendgrowthin productivity. Liberalization of volume and interest rates has been observed to raise profitability in the bankingsectorsofNorway(Berg,etal,1992)andTurkey(Zaim,1995).Bergerand Humphrey(1997)havenotedthattheeffectsofderegulationmaydependonindustry conditions prior to reform and on the type of measures implemented.There is also empirical evidence that shows a decline in cost productivity immediately after deregulation (Berger and Mester,2003;HumphreyandPulley,1997),thoughimprovedoutputandqualityofoutput ledtohigherprofitproductivity(BergerandMester,2003).AnumberofstudiesforUS bankssuggestthatliberalizationofdepositrateshaslittleornoeffect(Bauer,etal,1993); Hughesetal(1996)andJayaratneandStrahau(1998)findthatgeographicalexpansionhas affected profitability in the U.S. 2.1 Nexus between Banking Sector Reform and Bank Performance Brissimis et al (2008) examine the relationship between banking sector reform and bank performance-measured in terms of efficiency, total factor productivity growth and net interest margin-accountingfortheeffectsthroughcompetitionandbankrisk-taking.Theresults indicatethatbothbankingsectorreformandcompetitionexertapositiveimpactonbank efficiency,whiletheeffectofreformontotalfactorproductivitygrowthissignificantonly towards the end of the reform process.Brissimis et al also found that the effect of capital and creditriskonbankperformanceisinmostcasesnegative,whileitseemsthathigherliquid assets reduce the efficiency and productivity of banks. Threeinterrelateddeterminantsofbankperformanceareextensivelyreviewedinthe literatureandtheseincludethefinancialreformprocess,thedegreeofcompetitionandthe risk-taking behaviour of banks(Brissimiset al, 2008).The leading worksof Keeley (1990) Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 932 www.globalbizresearch.com arguethatthederegulationoftheUSbankingsectorinthe1970sand1980sincreased competitionandledtoareductioninmonopolyrentsandthus,throughworsened performance, to a higher equilibrium risk of failure.The Keeleys paradigm has provoked a numberofstudiesexaminingtherelationshipbetweenderegulation,bankrisk-takingand competition,yieldingratherconflictingresults(MatutesandVives,2000;BoltandTieman, 2004;AllenandGale,2004).Onegroupconcludesthatderegulationboostsefficiency through operational savings, thus leading to a surge in productivity growth (Kumbhakar et al, 2001;IsikandHassan,2003).Thealternategroupfoundthatderegulationhasanegative effect on the performance of banks, as it stimulates a decline in productive efficiency and/or totalfactorproductivitygrowth(Griefell-TatjeandLowell,1996;WhealockandWilson, 1999). IntheeconometriccontributionsofSimarandWilson(2007)andKhanandLewbal (2007),bankperformance,measuredintermsofproductiveefficiency(PE)andtotalfactor productivity(TFP)growth,isderivedvianonparametrictechniquesandthenthescores obtained are linked to reform, competition and bank risk-taking.In this context, Brissimis et al (2008) have specified the following empirical model to study the relationship between the performance, reform, competition and risk-taking in banking. (1)Pit = 1 + 1refc + 2i + 3xit + 4mt + it where the performance P of bank i at time t is written as a function of a time-dependent banking-sector reformvariable,reft, anindexof banking industrymarket power,; avector of bank-level variables representing credit, liquidity and capital risk, x; variables that capture themacroeconomicconditionscommontoallbaks,m;andtheerrorterm,.The methodologysuggestedbyUchidaandTsutsui(2005)hasbeenwidelyusedtomeasurethe evolutionofcompetitiveconditionsovertimeinthebankingsystem.Themodeljointly estimates a system of three equations that correspond to a translog cost function, to a revenue equationobtainedformtheprofitmaximizationproblemofbanksandtoaninverseloan demand function: InCit = bo + b1 Inqit + b2 (Indit)2 + b3 Indit + b4 (Indit)2 + b5Inwit + b6 (Inwit)2 + b7 (Inqit)(Inwit) + b8 (Inqit) (Indit) + b9 (Indit) (Inwit) + ecit (2)Rit = c Rit + rit qit + Cit (b1+b2 Inqit + b7 Inwit + b8 Indit + Cit qit (b3+b4 Indit + b8 Inqit + b9 Inwit)Htdit +esit In Pit = go (1/t) Inqit + gi Ingdpgt + g2 Iniri + eit Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 933 www.globalbizresearch.com WhereC is the total cost of bank I at timet, q isbank output, ds are deposit, w isbank output other than deposits, R is bank revenue, r is the interest rate on deposits, p is the price of bank output and e is the error term.Variables with bars are defined as deviations from their cross-sectionalmeansineachtimeperiod,soastoremovetheirtrends.Thevariablegdpg and ir are exogenous variables that affect demand.The degree of competition in each year is given by, which represents the well-known conjectural variations elasticity of total industry output with respect to the output of the ith bank. 3. Data Sources, Methodology and Model Specification The data for this study were generated from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin and NDIC Annual Reports for the period 1960-2008.The pre-reform period (1960-1985)wasdistinguishedfromthepost-reformperiod(1986-2008).Bothdependentand independent variables were identified.The major dependent variables are bank liquidity ratio (BLR),cashreserveratio(CRR)andloan-to-depositratio(LTDR).Theindependent variablesincludebothbankandVBNrates.Thebankratesinthisstudyaresavingsrate (SR),primelendingrate(PLR)andmaximumlendingrate(MLR).TheCBNratesare minimumre-discountrate(MRR),treasurybillsrate(TBR)andtreasurycertificatesrate (TCR). Thefirstlevelofanalysisinvolvesthecalculationofsimpleaveragesandstandard deviationsforcriticalbankmanagementandperformanceindicatorsinthepre-andpost reformperiods,withsomehighlightsontheliberalizationandconsolidationperiodsin selectedinterveningyears.Theliberalizationperiodis1986-92,whiletheearlyyearsof consolidation are from 2006 to 2008.The second level of analysis involves the specification of the multiple regression models for inferential purposes to test the research hypotheses. 3.1 Model specification The multiple regression models specified and tested in this study are given in equations 3-5: (3)BLR= + 1SR + 2PLR + 3 MLR + i (4)CRR= + 1MRR+ 2TBR + 3 TCR + i (5)LTDR = + 1SR + 2TBR + 3 TCR + i Forourgivensetofdata,thevaluesofthealpha()andbeta()coefficientscanbe determinedmathematicallytominimizethesumofsquareddeviationsbetweenpredicted dependent variable and the actual dependent variable scores.In this study weemployedthe SoftwarePackageforSocialSciences(SPSS)toestimatetherelevantvariablesand parametersinthespecifiedequations.Thepackageprovideduswithmultiplecorrelation coefficient (R), t-test, F-ratio and coefficient of determination (R2).Our null hypothesis will Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 934 www.globalbizresearch.com beacceptedifthet-statisticfallswithintherelevantcriticalvalues,otherwiseitwillbe rejected.The model is significant if the F-ratio falls outside the critical region, otherwise it is not significant. Withintheframeworkoftheclassicallinearregressionmodel(CLRM),thespecified multiple regressions models assume the absence of multicollinearity.Multicollinearity means thatwithinthesetofindependentvariables(IVs)someoftheIVsarenearlyortotally predicted by the other IVs.In this study, we estimated the condition index, variance inflation factors (VIFs) and tolerance values. Asnotedintheliterature,iftheconditionindex(CI)isbetween10and30,thereis moderatetostrongmulticollinearityandifitexceeds30,thereismoderatetosevere multicollinearity(Belsleyetal,1980).Asaruleofthumb,iftheVarianceInflationFactor (VIF) of a variable exceed 10 (this will happen if R2 exceeds 0.90), that variable is said to be highly collinear (Kleinbaum, et al, 1988). The tolerance values should not be close to zero. 4. Results and Discussion 4.1 Collinearity Diagnostics ThetestsofmulticollinearityarefoundinAppendixesAandB.Ontheaveragethe Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) have values of less than 10.Moreover, the tolerance values are not close to zero in most of the cases. A rule of thumb is to label as large these condition indices in the range of 30 or larger.We find that this condition is not met for any of the IVs.Although in some cases we could find large proportions of variance (0.50 or more), they did notcorrespondtolargeconditionindices(30ormore).Theabsenceofmulticollinearity among the IVs means that the explanatory powers of our models are robust. 4.2 Descriptive Statistical Analysis ThedatainTable1showselectedmonetarypolicyandbankmanagementindicatorsin thepreandpost-reformperiods.Theresultsalsoshowtheaveragechangesinthese indicators in the liberalization and consolidation periods.The average savings rate increased from 8.0% in thepre-form period to 9.41% in the post-reform period.Averagesavingsrate peaked at 11.09% in the liberalization period, and began a downward trend after the banking consolidation whichcommenced January 1, 2006.In 2011, averagesavingsrate droppedto an all-time low of between 2.00-2.5%. While average savings rate began a downward trend between the liberalization period and thepost-consolidationera,theprimelendingratehaswitnessedapronouncedrisingtrend from20.54%intheliberalizationperiodto34.43%intheconsolidationperiod.Generally, the average prime lending rate rose steeply from 9.95% in the pre-reform period to 23.77% in thepost-reform period.Thesameupward trendisnoticed in theaveragemaximum lending Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 935 www.globalbizresearch.com rate from 11.6% in the pre-reform period to 27.41% in the post-reform period.The average MLRrosefrom23.34%intheliberalizationperiodto38.41%intheconsolidationperiod.The average bank margin increased from 3.6% in the pre-reform period to 14.19% in the post-reform period. The bank liquidity ratio (BLR) declined from 52.76% in the pre-reform period to 49.30% inthepost-reform period, showing glaring deviations from the stipulatedminimum liquidity ratioof35-4-%.Theconsolidationerarecordedanaveragebankliquidityratio(BLR)of 47.50%stillabovetherepeatedprudentialtarget.Theaveragecashreserveratio(CRR) declined from 8.61% in the pre-reform period to 6.10% in the post-reform era.The average CRRdroppedto2.54%intheconsolidationperiod.Theloan-to-depositratio(LTDR) declinedfrom74.37%inthepre-reformperiodto66.82%inthepost-reformperiod.However, LTDR peaked at 83.9% on theaveragein theearly yearsin the early yearsof the consolidationperiod,showinganotherprudentialbreachabovetheregularlymaximumof 80.0%.Specifically,prudentialcomplianceimprovedmarginallyfrom27.76%inthepre-reform period to 22.55% in the post-reform period.However, prudential breaches were more evidentintheearlyyearsofbankingconsolidation(29.83%).Prudentialcomplianceis measured by the difference between actual and prescribed financial ratios as published by the Central Bank of Nigeria.The wider the gap, the lower the level of compliance. The standard deviation () shows that the bank liquidity ratio (BLR) was more variable in the pre-reform period ( = 7.8152) than it is in the post-reform period ( = 5.0642).The cash reserveratio(CRR)alsoshowedgreatervariabilityinthepre-reformperiod((=2.5623) thaninthepost-reformperiod(=1.7498).However,theloan-to-depositratiowasmore variable in the post-reform period ( = 6.5880) than in the pre-reform period. Table 1: Average Monetary Policy and Bank Management Indicators (Pre and Post Reform Eras) S/NBank Performance IndicatorPre-Reform Period Liberalization Period Consolidation Period Post-Reform Period 1Savings Rate (SR)8.0011.097.049.41 2Prime Lending Rate (PLR)9.9520.5434.4323.77 3Maximum Lending Rate (MLR)11.623.3438.4127.27 4Bank Margin (%)3.68.1231.3714.19 5Bank Liquidity Ratio (BLR)54.2644.9847.549.30 6Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR)8.616.023.546.10 7Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (LTDR)74.3765.8883.9266.82 8Prudential Compliance (PCR)27.7619.9829.8322,55 S.D. () for pre-reform period: BLR (7.8152), CRR (2.5623) & LTDR (3.3498) S.D. () for post-reform period: BLR (5.0642), CRR (1.7498) & LTDR (6.5889) Sources:Authors Calculations based on the CBN Statistical Bulletin (1960-2008) Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 936 www.globalbizresearch.com 4.3 Inferential Results TheinferentialresultsinTable2(Model1)revealthebetaandcorrelationcoefficients, includingtherelevantt-teststatisticsinthepre-reformperiod.Changesinaveragesavings rateprovidedanegativesensitivitytochangesinbankliquidityratio(BLR).Thebeta coefficientof-0.7608showsthatasthesavingsraterisesby100%,weshouldexpectthe bank liquidity ratio to fall by 76.08% and vice-versa.The association between SR and BLR isextremelyweakbothintermsofoverallcorrelationandpartialcorrelationcoefficient.However, the negative beta coefficient is significant at the 5% level since the computed t-test of -1.8940 falls outside the H0 acceptance region of 0.0714. Abetacoefficientof0.5603showsthat as theprimelendingrate(PLR) risesby100%, we should expect the computed t-test of 1.681 falls outside the acceptance region of 0.1068.The beta coefficient of 0.2931 shows that as the maximum lending rate (MLR) rises by 100%, the banks liquidity ratio (BLR) rises by just 29.31%.In this case the beta coefficient is still significantatthe5%sincethet-testof0.9980fallsoutsidetheH0acceptanceregionof 0.3291. Table 2: Effects of Banking Reforms on Selected Bank Management Ratios in the Pre-Reform Period Model/VariablesBeta Coefficient SE Beta Corr. Part. Corr. t-test Sig.t (5%) Model 1 (DV* BLR) SR-0.76080.4016-0.0901-0.3718-1.89400.0714 PLR 0.56030.3332 0.1192 0.3300 1.65100.1068 MLR 0.29310.2937 0.0591 0.1959 0.99800.3291 Model 2 (DV**CRR) TCR0.29400.4452-0.2531 0.1006 0.66100.5158 TBR-0.45160.8902-0.3506-0.1802-0.50700.6170 MRR-0.16420.9111-0.3416-0.3562 0.18000.8587 Model 3 (DV***LTDR) SR-0.10010.0209-0.0489-0.23400.8173 PLR 0.28150.1158 0.1658 0.79300.4364 MLR-0.14310.05679-0.0956-0.45700.6520 SR:Saving Rate PLR: Prime Lending Rate MLR:Maximum Lending RateTCR:Treasury Certificate Rate TBR:Treasury Bills Rate MRR: Maximum Rediscount RateDV: Dependent VariableSource:SPSS Print-Out TheTable2(Model2)resultsshowtherelationshipbetweenCBNratesandthecash reserveratiointhepre-reformperiod.Thebetaof0.2940showsthatasthetreasury certificate rate (TCR) rises by 100%, we should expect the cash reserve ratio (CRR) to rise by 29.40%.This relationship is significant at the 5% level since the t-test of 0.6610 falls outside the H0 acceptance region of 0.5158. The treasury bill rate (TBR) is not significantly related to theCRR at the5% level since thecomputedt-test of -0.5070 fallswithin theH0acceptance region of 0.6170.The MRR is not significantly related to the CRR. Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 937 www.globalbizresearch.com The nature of the relationship between bank rates and loan-to-deposit ratio (LTDR) in the pre-reformperiodissummarizedinTable2(Model3).Thebetacoefficient(-0.1001)for savingrate(SR)andLTDRisnotsignificantatthe5%levelsincethecomputedt-testof-0.2340fallswithinthecriticalregionof0.8173.Themaximumlendingrate(MLR)is insignificantly related to the LTDR at the 5% level since the computed t-test of -0.4570 falls withintheacceptanceregion0.6520.However,withabeta-coefficientof0.2815,wefind thata100% increasein theprimelending rate(PLR) resultsto a28.15% increase in LTDR andvice-versa.Thebetacoefficientissignificantsincethecalculatedt-testof0.7930falls outside the critical region of 0.4364. Inthepost-reformperiod,savingsratecontinueswithanegativebetacoefficientof-0.6610Table3(Model 1). Thisindicatesthat as savingsraterises by 100%, weshould expect thebankliquidityratioto fallby66.1%.Thebetacoefficientissignificantatthe5%level since the computed t-test of -3.3030 falls outside the H0 acceptance region of.0.0037.In the case of the prime lending rate (PLR), a beta coefficient of 0.0908 shows that a 100% increase in the PLR brings about an insignificant increase of 9.08% in bank liquidity ratio (BLR) at the 5% level.Similarly a beta coefficient of 0.0996 shows that a 100% rise in maximum lending rate(MLR)producesaninsignificantriseinbankliquidityratioof9.96%atthe5%level.The t-test of 0.4090 falls within the H0 acceptance region of 0.6874. TherelationshipbetweenCBNratesandcashreserveratio(CRR)inthepost-reform periodisshowninTable3(Model2).TheselectedCBNratesshowbetacoefficientsof-0.6570(TCR),0.1042(TBR)and0.7989(MRR).Asthetreasurycertificaterate(TCR) increases by 100%, we should expect the cash reserve ratio (CRR) to fall by 65.70% and vice-versa.ThisinverserelationshipbetweenTCRandCRRissignificantat the5%levelsince the computed t-test of 0.6610 falls outside the region of . The Treasury bill rate (TBR) is not significantly related to the cash reserve ratio (CRR) at the 5% level since the t-test of 0.5270 falls within the H0 acceptance region of 0.6046. Astheminimumrediscountrate(MRR)increasesby100%,weshouldexpectthecash reserve ratio (CRR) to rise by 79.89%. This positive relationship is significant at the 5% level since the computed t-test of 2.5230 falls outside the critical region of 0.0207. ThesignificantdeterminantsoftheLTDRinthepost-reformperiodaresummarizedin Table 3 (Model 3).The savings rate is not significantlyrelated to the LTDR at the 5% level sincethecomputedt-testof0.1490fallswithintheH0acceptanceregionof+0.8833.However,bothPLRandMLRaresignificantlyrelatedtoLTDRatthe5%levelof significance since the computed t-test falls outside the critical H0 acceptance region. The PLR Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 938 www.globalbizresearch.com is negatively sensitive to LTDR, with a correlation coefficient of -0.3472.With a correlation coefficient of 0.6475,wefindasignificantlypositiveassociationbetweenMLRandLTDR, and this is significant at the 5% level. Table 3: Effects of Banking Reforms on Selected Bank Management Ratios in the Post-Reform Period Model/VariablesBeta Coefficient SE Beta Corr. Part. Corr. t-test Sig.t (5%) Model 1 (DV* BLR) SR-0.66100.2001-0.5910-0.5993-3.30300.0037 PLR 0.09080.2541-0.1190 0.0648 0.35700.7249 MLR 0.09960.2438-0.0526 0.0741 0.40900.6874 Model 2 (DV**CRR) TCR-0.65700.3165-0.0377-0.4101-2.07500.0518 TBR 0.10420.1979 0.0920 0.10406 0.52700.6046 MRR 0.79890.3167 0.2801 2.5230 2.52300.0207 Model 3 (DV***LTDR) SR 0.02840.1906-0.1543 0.0257 0.14890.8833 PLR 0.14080.2420-0.3472 1.0056 0.58200.5675 MLR-0.75030.2323 0.6473-0.5583-3.23000.0440 SR:Saving Rate PLR: Prime Lending Rate MLR:Maximum Lending RateTCR:Treasury Certificate Rate TBR:Treasury Bills Rate MRR: Maximum Rediscount RateDV: Dependent VariableSource:SPSS Print-Out ThemodelsummariesarefoundinTable4.Thecoefficientofdetermination(R2) increasedsignificantlyfrom0.1526inthepre-reformperiodto0.3746inthepost-reform period.Theexplanatorypoweroftheselectedbankrates(SR,PLRandMLR)improved significantly with theintroduction of several banking reforms. Specifically, a100% change in the Deposit Money Banks rates brought about a 15.26% change in the bank liquidity ratio (BLR) in the pre-reform period.However, the same change in the bank rates brought about a 37.46% variation in the BLR in the post-reform period. TheCBNratesaffectedthecashreserveratio(CRR)moresignificantlyinthepost-reform period than the pre-reform period.R2 increased from 0.1400 in the pre-reform period to0.2581inthepost-reformperiod.ThevariationintheLTDRwasnotsignificantwitha significant change in the bank rates in pre-reform period.With a coefficient of determination (R2)of0.0378,thecomputedF-ratioof0.2880fellwithinthecriticalregionof0.8340.However,inthepostreformperiod,a100%changeinthebankratesbroughta43.24% variation in the LTDR. Table 4: Effects of Banking Reforms on Bank Management Practices:Model Summaries Model SummaryPre-ReformPost-Reform Model 1 with BLR* MultR0.39070.6120 R2 0.15260.3746 Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 939 www.globalbizresearch.com Adj. R2 0.03710.2758 F-Ratio1.32103.7930 Sig. F0.29300.0280 Model 2 with CRR** MultR0.37420.5081 R2 0.14000.2581 Adj. R2 0.02270.1410 F-Ratio1.19402.2040 Sig. F0.33500.1210 Model 3 with LTDR*** MultR0.19440.6575 R2 0.03780.4324 Adj. R2 -0.0934 0.3427 F-Ratio0.28804.8240 Sig. F0.83400.0120 *Model 1:BLR = + 1 SR +2 PLR + 3 MLR + i **Model 2:CRR = + 1 MRR +2 TBR + 3 TCR+ i *** Model 3:LTDR = + 1 SR +2 PLR + 3 MLR + i 5. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations Basedondescriptionstatistics,majorlendingrates(PLR&MLR)showedanupward trendfromthepre-reformperiodtothepost-reformperiod.Theaveragebankmargin increasedform3.6%inthepre-reformperiodto14.19%inthepost-reformperiod.The average bank liquidity ratio (BLR) exceeded the prudential limits in the pre- and post-reform periods, although the prudential breach was more pronounced in the pre-reform period.The loan-to-deposit ratio (LTDR) peaked at 83.92% in the early years of the consolidation period, showing another prudential breach above the regulatory maximum of 80.0%. Thebankratessignificantlyaffectedthebankliquidityratio(BLR)inthepre-reform period.Inthepost-reformperiod,thesavingsrateaffectedtheBLRsignificantly,but negatively at the 5% level.Both the prime lending rate (PLR) and the maximum lending rate (MLR)wereinsignificantindeterminingvariationsintheBLRinthepost-reformperiod.The treasury certificate rate (TCR) was significantly related to the cash reserve ratio (CRR) in thepre-reformperiod.However,thetreasurybillrate(TBR)andtheminimumrediscount rate (MRR) were not significantly related to CRR.In the post reform period, both TCR and MRR were significantly related to CRR. In thepre-reform period, theprimelending rate(PLR)was moresignificantly related to theloan-to-depositratio(LTDR).However,inthepost-reformperiodpaid,themaximum lending rate(MLR) wasmoresignificantly related to LTDR.The explanatory powersof the bank rates in determining the bank liquidity ratio (BLR) and the loan-to-deposit ratio (LTDR) Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 940 www.globalbizresearch.com were more significant in the post-reform period than in the pre-reform period.The variation inthebankratesdidnotleadtoanysignificantvariationintheLTDRinthepre-reform period.The CBN rates affected the cash reserve ratio (CRR) more significantly in the post-reform period than the pre-reform period. Recent banking reforms have failed to curb the rising cost of funds in Nigeria. Although savingsmobilizationhasbeenemphasized,mostbankshaveboostedtheirliquidityratios basedonsourcesotherthansavings.Thelevelofprudentialcompliancehasnotimproved drastically.Both bank liquidity ratio (BLR) and loan-to-deposit ratios have always exceeded their prudential limits, particularly in times of intense reforms.However, bank management hasalwaysrecordedsignificantlyrisingmarginsandprofitability,eveninthefaceof increasing compliance lapses. Under regimes of increasing treasury certificate rates (TCR) and minimum rediscount rate (MRR) we should expect the cash reserve ratio to fall, thereby enabling banks to create more credit.The significant beta coefficients in the post reform period are indicative of progressive central banking activities aimed at boosting the real sector. Mostbankersweremoreconservativeinlendingduringthepre-reformperiodasthe primelendingrate(PLR)manifestedasignificantbetarelationshipwiththeloan-to-deposit ratio (LTDR).The preferred borrowers dominated their loans portfolio apparently because of theirtolerableriskclass.Inthepost-reformperiod,bankmanagementbecamemore aggressiveinlendingirrespectiveoftheriskclass.Thebetacoefficientofthemaximum lendingrate(MLR)issignificantlycorrelatedtoLTDR,andcouldexplaintherisingrisk concentrationsinthepost-reformperiod,particularlyaftertheliberalizationofthebanking industry.ThemultiplicityofspecializedandCBN-guaranteedfacilitiestoSMEsand agriculture did not curb bankers risk appetite in boosting their risk assets portfolio. Extensivemonetarypolicyreformscouldhaveresultedinthemoresignificant explanatory powers of both bank and CBN rates in determining bank management practices.The cumulative effect of bank rates on bank liquidity ratio and the loan-to-deposit ratio could portraythepursuitofaggressivemonetarypolicyregimesinthepost-regimeperiod.Bank management,however,remainedinsensitiveto prudentialstandards.Thecurrent risk-based supervisory framework should be sustained with emphasis on Basel III and IFRS compliance issues.Monetarypolicyreformsshouldaimatminimizingrent-seekingbehaviour,moral hazards and consequential systemic failure.The monetary policy rate (MPR) should narrow bankmarginswhileminimizingtheriskofinsolvency.Currentreformsshouldmoderate risinglendingrates,keepliquidityandfundingwithinprudentiallimits,andenhancesound financial management of the banks. 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Appendix A Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) and Tolerance Values for thePre-and Post-Reform Periods Period/Model Independent Variables (IVs) 12 3 Model 1: Pre-Reform Period Tolerance -7.6677.95503.5633 VIF2.88300.44662.2396 Model 1: Post-reform Period Tolerance -0.6040 0.08170.0933 VIF1.21600.50990.5538 Model 2: Pre-Reform Period Tolerance1.5989-2.0715-0.6571 VIP5.06902.27302.2350 Model 2: Post-Reform Period Tolerance-0.57920.00140.7446 VIF2.56601.00302.5680 Model 3: Pre-Reform Period Tolerance-0.86903.4429-1.4861 VIF4.18802.88302.2390 Model 3: Post-Reform Period Tolerance0.52840.3235-1.4513 VIF1.21601.96101.8060 Source:SPSS Print-Out Journal of Emerging Issues in Economics, Finance and Banking (JEIEFB) An Online International Monthly Journal (ISSN: 2306-367X) Volume:2 No.6 December 2013 946 www.globalbizresearch.com Appendix B Condition Indices for the Pre-and Post-Reform Periods Model/Period Eigenval Cond. Index Variance Proportions 1 23 Model 1: Pre-Reform Period 13.894931.000 0.000810.002340.000760.00086 20.086716.7020.046860.281980.000680.00364 30.0126917.5190.005720.002110.424800.55271 40.0056626.2210.946610.713570.573760.44279 Model 1: Post-Reform Period 13.791881.0000.002650.0012260.001600.00182 20.166964.7660.028000.923450.006890.01177 30.0257812.1290.950810.03794 0.103010.27303 40.0153815.7030.018540.026350.888990.71337 Model 2: Pre-Reform Period 13.928621.0000.003610.000270.000280.00076 20.060258.0750.685350.009530.010860.00103 30.0088521.0740.3110120.04146 0.062010.99218 40.0022941.4640.000020.948750.926840.00552 Model 2: Post-Reform Period 13.036461.0000.005670.002340.012720.00281 20.912141.8250.000600.000380.977440.00047 30.037948.9460.939740.053090.009450.17594 40.0134515.0240.053990.944180.000380.82079 Model 3: Pre-Reform Period 13.894931.0000.000810.002340.000760.00086 20.086716.7020.046860.281980.000680.00364 30.0126917.519 0.05720.002110.424800.55271 40.0056626.2210.946610.713570.573760.44279 Model 3: Post-Reform Period 13.935801.0000.000310.004680.000170.00015 20.059508.1330.007820.965160.002990.00318 30.0032712.6840.939190.21400.2196000.06792 40.0014315.4810.052680.008760.77740.92876 Source:SPSS Print-Out