62 Watts Street, March 1994

8/4/2019 62 Watts Street, March 1994

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VOLUME I

-DIVISION OF SAFETY SAFETY'

OPERATINGBATTALION

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INVESTIGATIVE ~ R E P O R T FATAL FIRE AT 62 WATTS STREET

March 28, 1994


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SUMMARYOn March 28, 1994 a t 6:35 PM the New York City Fire

Department, Manhattan Borough communications .Office,received a telephone alarm of f i re . The cal le r reportedsmoke on the top f loor of 60 watts s t reet .Uni t s of the N. Y C Fire Department were d i s ~ a t c h e d . The five f i r s t alarm units arrived at the 1ncidentlocat ion almost simultaneously and out of the normalresponse order. Ladder Co. 8 , a l though assigned seconddue, arrived f i r s t a t Watts s t ree t and Varick s t ree t andencountered heavy vehicular t r a f f i c . watts s t . i s a westbound feeder s t ree t for the Holland Tunnel. At 6: 40 PMthe off icer in command of Ladder 8 saw smoke emitting from62 Watts .Street and ordered a 10-75 (notification of af i re) t ransmit ted via department radio. 62 watts s t ree t i s

a 3 story, non f ireproof ,. multiple dwelling. The locationof the f1re was in the f i r s t f loor apartment kitchen area.Fire Department operations were ini t ia ted, enginecompanies stretched and operated hose l ines . and ladderc o m ~ n i e s performed the i r vent , entry and search duties.Durl.ng the in it i a l stage of the operation there was asudden and unexpected intensif icat ion of fire in the f i r s tf loor apartment. Intense flame erupted from the' frontwindows and the apartment entrance door on the. f i r s tf loor . Fire and extreme heat t raveled up the open inter iorhal l and s t a i r s and engulfed the entire hallway from thef i r s t f loor to the third f loor . A large volume of flameerupted through the skylight and roof scutt le to a height

of 12 to 16 fee t above the roof. Captain John Drennan,Firefighter Christopher Siedenburg and Firefighter JamesYoung of Ladder Co. 5 were on the second f loor attemptingto force the apartment door, in order to conduct a searchand examination. They were exposed to intense heat,products of combustion and direct flame contact.Firefighter Young perished a t the scene. captain Drennanand Firef ighter Siedenburg were located, ~ i v e n f i r s t aidand removed from the building by F1re Departmentpersonnel. They were then medically stabi l ized by EMS andtransported to the New York Hospita l Burn Center, incr i t i ca l condition.Firefighter Seidenburg expired on March 29 , 1994 andCapta.in Drennan expired on May 7, 1994 .

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FnmDlGS: At the beginning of the 6 X 9 tour of duty on 3/28/94 the officer of Ladder Co. 8 determined tha t there would be animbalance in manpower in his uni t for tha t tour . Hecontacted Battalion 2 and was instructed to exchange amember with Ladder Co. 5 to bet ter balance the availableladder company personnel.

At 7:35 P.M. on Karch 28, 1994 uni ts of the NYC FireDept responded to a f ire in a 3 story residential buildinga t 62 Watts s t reet , in the Borough of Manhattan. The f i reoriginated in the f i r s t floor, kitchen area of anunoccupied a ~ e n t .The f i re had been burning in anoxygen defic1ent atmosphere for a period of time tha tcould have been as long as one hour. Ladder 8 was a t thequarters of Ladder 5 exchanging personnel when th is alarmwas received. Ladder 8 .was the f i r s t arriving uni t anddiscovered tha t the f ire was not located on the top f loorof 60 Watts s t reet as reported, but a t 62 watts s t . on thef i r s t f loor.

Heavy Holland Tunnel bound t raf f ic produced gridlockc:ondit ions on Watts s t reet , reducing .the -.options .. foroptiDlWll. positioning of arriving apparatus.Ladder 8 , al though assigned 2nd due, arrived 1s t .a tthe location of the alarm, and assumed 1s t . due position(f ire floor) and transmitted the 10-75 signal . Ladder 5was the 2nd ladder company to arrive and assumed the 2nd

due posit ion (floors above the f i re) . The balance of theassigned unit s (Engines 55, 24 and 7) arrived almostsimultaneously, but out of normal response. sequence.Engine company operations were in i t ia ted.While the members of Ladder 8 were in the process offorcing the f i re apartment door, the off icer and forcibleentry team of Ladder 5 entered the f i re building. Theoff icer of Ladder 5 advised the off icer of Ladder 8 t ha tthey were going up the interior s ta i r s to operate on thefloor(s) above. This is the normal position for thesecond due ladder company a t a f ire of th is type.The forcible entry had not been completed on the door tothe f i re apartment and the door was s t i l l closed a t th is

time.The members of Ladder 5 went up the in ter ior s ta i r s tothe 2nd floor and encountered a box spring, mattress andpiece of furniture stored in the 2nd f loor ballway. Theybegan vent, entry and search operations on the secondfloor.Engine 55 took a position a t the hydrant located a tthe Northeast corner of watts and Varick s t , approximately

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120 feet west of the f i re building. The 1st hose l ine wasstretched by Engine 55, assisted by Engines 24 and 7. Atleas t 6 lengths of hose were stretched to the f i rebuilding.' This led to a number of kinks in the hoselineand required the hose to be flaked out and straightened.When the door to the f i re apartment was forced thehose line was not yet in posit ion. The f ire intensifiedin the f i re apartment, smoke and flame started to lap outof the top of the doorway and extend up the in ter iorstairway. The members of Ladder 8 were unable tocompletely close the apartment door and isolate the f i rearea. Physical control of the door could not be regained

. The required, self-closing apartment entrance doorfa1led to operate' in i t s proper manner. Although thef i r s t floor apartment door was equipped with self-closingdevices, there i s evidence tha t they had been inoperative~ r i o r to the f i re . This defect caused the door to remain1n the open posit ion.

There ,was no communication from members operatinq onthe 1st floor to the Ladder 5 forcible entry teamoperatinq on'the ' 2nd f loor or to the incident commander,to warn them.of the deteriorating conditions.

An URGENT-URGENT handi-talkie message was transmittedby the officer of Ladder 5. The Jlessaqe was acknowledgedb y the incident COJlllltinder. It has not been determinedwhat conditions existed on the 2nd floor a t the time the

nozzle of Engine 55's hoseline in the f i r s t floor hallway,messaqe was t ransmtted or the exact reason for themessage.

At approxill8.tely the time that water reached thethe two front windows to the f i re apartment were vented,(broken) by the outside vent man of L a d d ~ 8.

The investigative team, af ter analyzing the physicalevidence, interviewing w1tnesses and consultinq withtechnical experts concluded tha t the explanation for theunusual and violent behavior of this f ire was theoccurrence of a BACKDRAFT.After Engine 55 positioned the i r charged hoseline a tthe fire apartment door an d during the i n i t i a lextinguishment stage, a phenomena ,that is defined as abackdraft occurred in the f i r s t f loor f ire apartment. Thisbackdraft produced a tremendous volume of f i re whicherupted from the front windows, through the interiorapartment door, into the public hallway, up the interiorstairway and through-the vented roof scutt le and skylight.

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During interviews several m e m b ~ r s operating a t thef i re reported hearing what was described as a garbled ormuffled handi-talkie radio message which sounded l ike"Mayday", just after the backdraft occurred. The origin ofthis message could not be determined.At the time of the urgent and mayday messages theincident commander did not have uncommitted personnelimmediately available, to ins t i tute a f i re fighter ass is tteamThe f i re continued to burn violently in the publichallway for a period of approximately 8 to 9 minutes.There was no extension of f i re to the 2nd. floor apartment. and only minor extension to the 3rd. floor apartment. Theheavy volume of f i re produced by the backdraft in i t ia l lyexceeded the' extinguishment capability. of the hose l inethat was positioned and. operating in the f i re apartmententrance door.The three members of Ladder 5, who were performing theduties of the 2nd due ladder company on the floor abovethe f i re , had not completed the forcible entry of thesecond floor apartment door, ..thereby denying them an areaof refuge- when the 'backdraft .occurred. They. were exposedto extreme heat, products of combustion and direct fleaecontact. The three members received severe thermalinjuries which resulted in the i r deaths. These memberswere expQsed to these extreme conditions for approximately4 to 5 minutes. .The operations a t 62 Watts s t ree t basically followedestablished procedures with some variations performed byspecific members.. The actions taken by the officer andforcible entry team of Ladder 5 were prudent and .incompliance with exist ing Hew York City Fire Departmentstandard operating procedures and practices. The positionthat they assUllled, on the floor- .. over the fire , i s ahazardous location, but a c r it i ca l area that must beentered to search for possible trapped occupants.Alterations had been made to the fire building.Al though approved. by the Department of Buildings, thealterations created conditions tha t si9Dificantly effected

the development and behavior of the f1re.. The alterationsto the f i re apartment produced an environment tha t wasconducive to the development of a backdraft condition.Alterations to the remainder of the' building effected f i ret ravel and extension as well as reducing escape options tothe members trapped on the second floor.The wood plank flooring in the 2nd floor apartment wasstripped and a polyurethane coatin9 applied approximately24 hours prior to the mishap. In1tially it was tho'.lght

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t ha t the freshly applied f loor f inishing material may havecontr ibuted to or affected the fuel supply of the f1re inthe hallway. No evidence was uncovered to substant iatet h i s theory. The Bureau of Fire Invest igat ion securedsamples o f f looring and they were analyzed by the New YorkCity Pol ice Department laboratory. Tests were performedon port ions of f loor ing removed from the second f loorhallway and f i re apartment. There were no s igni f icant orunusual f indings .The personal protect ive equipment (PPE) and se l fcontained breathing apparatus (SCBA) worn by the threedeceased -members was severely damaged by heat and f i r e .The equipment was not designed or constructed to fu l lypro tec t the user aga ins t the durat ion of extreme heat andf i r e it was subjected to a t t h i s mishap. The th ree

members were exposed t o d i r ec t flame contact and hea t t ha ta t ta ined a temperature possibly as high as 2200 degreesF. fo r a period of about 4 to 5 minutes. The est imatedtemperature was substant ia ted by the melted glass from theskyl igh t and resu l t s of the computer ROdel.

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CAUSES:1 . DIRECT

Members operating in a hazardous position on the f loorabove the f i re . There was no communication from the members operating on the f i re f loor to the members of Ladder 5, warningthem of rapidly deteriorating conditions. Members operating on the f i r s t floor were unable to control the door when conditions deteriorated. An unanticipated backdraft occurred in the f i re apartment. This i s highly unusual for th is type ofoccupancy. The class ic textbook indicators or signsof impending b a c k d r ~ f t were ei ther not present or notobserved.

2 . INDIRECTHembers.. of. Ladder 5 did not have a viable escaperoute. The rear door- to the second f loor apartment .. had been removed during al terat ions. They were unable to complete the forcible entry through the front apartment door in time to exi t the hallway. A heavyvolume of f i re prevented the i r use of in te r ior stairway. The magnitude of the f i re generated by the backdraft in i t i a l ly overwhelmed the suppression capabil i ty of the hose l ine operating on the f i r s t f loor.

3. EARLYThe placing of the bag of refuse on or near the burning surface of the gas range. This was the primary cause of the f i re . The absence of operating smoke detectors delayed the discovery of the f i re , allowing the f i re to burnundetected for a period of time which could have beenas long as one hour. This caused the buildup ofcarbon monoxide and other combustible gases whichresul ted in the backdraft. Lack of maintenance of the se l f closing device on the apartment door allowed the door to remain in the openposit ion as f i re conditions worsened.

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Building al terat ions:a. Created a l a r ~ e r apartment size and increased thesize of the f1re area.b . C reated an almost a i r t ight combustion area.c. Greatly reduced the size of the f i r s t f loorhallway.c. Eliminated the second f loor rear apartment door.e. Changed the configuration of the second f loorhallway.

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62 Watts Street, March 1994

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