55

Marek Menkiszak (ed.)

Late Putinthe end of growth, the end of stability

NUMBER 55WARSAWOCTOBER 2015

Late PutinThE ENd Of gROWTh, ThE ENd Of STABiliTy

Text prepared by the Russian department of OSW under the direction of Marek Menkiszak

© Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies

Content editorsOlaf Osica, Adam Eberhardt

EditorKatarzyna Kazimierska

Co-operationhalina Kowalczyk, Anna Łabuszewska

TranslationOSW

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Contents

SUMMARy /5

iNTROdUCTiON /8

I. PUTiNiSM: SUCCESSivE STAgES Of AUThORiTARiANiSM /11

II. A SOCiETy Of OBSERvERS – ThE fACTOR ThAT KEEPS ThE REgiME TOgEThER /23

III. ThE OUTlOOK fOR ThE fUTURE – ChANgE Of ThE lEAdERShiP OR ThE SySTEM? /31

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Summary

• SinceVladimirPutinreturnedtotheKremlinasPresidentinMay2012,theRussiansystemofpowerhasbecomeincreasing-lyauthoritarian,andhasevolvedtowardsamodelofextremelypersonalised rule thatderives its legitimacy fromaggressivedecisions in internal and foreign policy, escalates the use offorce,andinterferesincreasinglyassertivelyinthespheresofpolitics,history,ideologyandevenpublicmorals.Theeventsofrecentyears–theannexationandoccupationofCrimea,mili-tary operations in eastern Ukraine and the assassination ofBorisNemtsov–alltestifytothescaleoftheRussianpoliticalregime’sevolution;andatthesametimetheyhavebeenpush-ingtheregimetowardsfurtherradicalisationandpreventingareturntotheearlierpragmaticpolicyofreconcilingtheinter-estsofvariousgroupsintheeliteandthepublic.

• The nature of the regime’s internal operation has alsochanged.Putin’spowernowrestsoncharismatic legitimacytoamuchgreaterextentthanitdidduringhisfirsttwopresi-dentialterms;currentlythePresidentispresentednotonlyasaneffective leader,butalsoas thesoleguarantorofRussia’sstabilityandintegrity.Hisinnercircleofpeopleinfluencingthedecision-makingprocesshasbecomeevennarrower,andisdominatedbymembersofthesecretserviceswhosharethepresident’sworldviewandhis visionof the threats facedbyRussia.Other,moremoderategroups, suchasbusinessmen,economists and lawyers, have been marginalised. The en-tiremechanismwherebytheKremlinmanages theelitehasalsochanged,aspositive instruments (distributionofassetsandpromotions,guaranteesof immunity)havebeen largelyreplacedbynegative instruments(demonstrationsofpower,disciplinarymeasuresandselectivepunishments).

• After 15 years of Putin’s rule, Russia’s economic modelbasedonrevenuefromenergyresourceshasexhaustedits

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potential,andthecountryhasnonewmodelthatcoulden-surecontinuedgrowthfortheeconomy.ThemainreasonsforthisarethestructuralfactorsthatstemfromthegeneralphilosophyunderlyingthePutinistsystem,i.e.theprimacyof control over development. This priority has preventeda diversification of the Russian economy, promoted thecentralisation of decision-making processes, exacerbatedtheweaknessof institutions (including the judiciary)andguaranteesofpropertyrights,curbedcompetitionandfur-therunderminedtheinvestmentclimate.Ithasalsoledtoanegativeselectionofstatecadres(wherebythosewhoareloyalandpassivewerepromoted,andthosewhoareactiveand creative facedblocks topromotionanddevelopment).Asaresultofthis,standardsofgovernancehavebeendete-riorating,capitalhasbeenf leeinginrecordlevels,andRus-siahasbeenexperiencingabraindrainandanintellectualdegradation.

• Theoriginalsocialcontracthasalsoreachedthelimitsofitspotential;withtheeconomydeteriorating,theRussianleader-shipisnolongerabletoguaranteesteadilyimprovingstand-ards of living,which have hitherto provided the leadershipwithundiminishedpopularity.However,thegovernmenthasbeenabletoeffectivelymakeupforthesacrificesthatpeoplehavehad tomake over the course of the last year, using anauthoritarian consolidation fuelled by an actively promotedsense of threat from the ‘hostile’West andpride inRussia’sterritorialconquests.TheattitudesofRussiansocietyatlargearehelpful inmaintainingthecurrentauthoritarianmodel,which is being held together by social apathy, atomisation,mutualdistrustandthelackofhorizontalsocialrelationsthatcouldgiverisetolastingcivilsocietystructures.Thetraumaof the SovietUnion’s collapse,which is still alive in Russia,makes peoplemore susceptible to the government’s imperi-alistic stratagems, suchas theannexationofCrimea,whichevokedsocialeuphoria.

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• ThePutinistsystemofpowerisstartingtoshowsymptomsofagony–ithasbeenunabletogeneratenewdevelopmentpro-jects,andhasbeencompensatingforitsongoingdegradationbyescalating repressionand theuseof force.However, thisdeclineisnotequivalenttothesystem’simminentcollapse,astherulingteamhaveinstrumentsattheirdisposaltoextendthepresentstateforyears,evenifdegradationcontinues.Ontheotherhand,theriskofdestabilisationisinscribedintheverynatureofthissystem;thelackofanyformalorinstitu-tionalguarantees forpoliticalactorsmakes it impossible forthemtocedepowervoluntarily,asdoingsowouldmeanrisk-ingtheirpositions,possessionsoreventheirpersonalsecuri-ty.Thisinturnmakesapeacefulsuccessionofpowerunlikelyand imposes the logicofaconstantextensionof the leader’srule.As the last 15yearsofRussia’shistoryhaveshown, themosteffectivewaytoconsolidatepowerandboostthepopu-larity of the leader is to resort to ‘extraordinarymeasures’,andespeciallymilitarysuccesses.Thismeansthatthepossi-blefurthererosionofpowermakesitextremelylikelythattheRussianleadershipwillescalatetheuseofsuchmethods.

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IntroductIon

Whilethelast15yearsoftheRussianpoliticalregimeshouldbeviewedintermsofcontinuity,thecountry’spoliticalsystemhasnonethelessundergoneaconsiderableevolutionwithinthatperi-od.Asaresultofthepolicyofcentralisation,therelativelyplural-istmodelofthelast1990shasgraduallytransformedintoaclearlyauthoritarian,monocentricandpersonalisedmodel. In itsmostrecentphase,i.e.sincePutin’sreturntotheKremlinin2012,thissystemhasestablishedtightcontrolnotonlyoverpoliticsandtheeconomy,butalsothespheresofideologyandpublicmorals,andhassteppeduprepressionandescalatedthepolicyofmilitaryex-pansionism.

ThecomprehensiveanalysisofVladimirPutin’s15yearsinpow-er showsapersistent legacy of authoritarian rule,whichhasbeentherealityforRussiathroughoutalmosttheentirehistoryofitsstatehood.Thatlegacyensuresthattheauthoritarianmodelisabletoreproduce itselfaftereachcrisisorattemptedreform.At itscore is thepoliticalcultureof thegenerationcurrently inpower,i.e.thehabitsoftakingauthoritarian,top-downactions,takingarbitrarydecisionsbehind thescenes,andstymying thedevelopmentofanytoolsofsocialcontrolofgovernment.DuringPutin’srulethesecretservices,themostrepressiveinstitutionoftheSovietstate,havebeenthepillarofthepresident’spower.Theworldviews,mentalityandinterestsofthesecretservicehaveleftamarkonRussia’spolicy,bothdomesticallyandinternationally.Theauthoritariancultureofgovernancehasalsobeensupportedbythelegislation:theRussianconstitutionvestsnearlyfullpow-erinthestateinthepresident’shands.Andfinally,thismodelhasbeenkept togetherby theattitudesof themajorityofRussians,whoseworldviewsandpoliticalculturehavebeenshapedbythelegacyofauthoritarianism.

TheauthoritariannatureofthePutinistsystemhasnotbeenaf-fectedbythefewattemptsatmodernising it (albeit toa limited

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extent), i.e. the liberal economic reforms initiated after Putincametopowerin2000,orthe liberalmodernisationrhetoricofDmitryMedvedev’spresidency (2008–2012).Theeffectsof thoseeffortswere limitedand short-livedbecausemanyof themeas-urestakenweremerelyillusory(e.g.Medvedev’smodernisationrhetoric),orstumbledonafundamentalobstaclestemmingfromtheverynatureofthesystem,i.e.the primacy of control over development. TheKremlin’s imperativehas invariably been tokeepandconsolidatepower,andreformsweretreatedmerelyasameanstoenhancetheefficacyofthestatestructuresorimprovetheirimage.Moreover,theliberaleconomicreformsinitiatedbyPutincoincidedwithastrongtendencytowardscentralisationinthepoliticalandsocialspheres,whichsoughttorestorethepresi-dentialteam’scontroloverpoliticalactors(regionalgovernmentsandpoliticalparties)aswellastheeconomy,andreinforcedthe‘manualcontrol’modeofgovernanceattheexpenseofinstitution-almechanisms.Likewise,themodernisationeffortsundertakenduringDmitryMedvedev’sshortpresidencyweresuperficial,andexpectationsofgenuineliberalisation,whichsomegroupsinthepoliticaleliteandthewiderpublichadstartedtocherishatthattime,weresuppressedbythecounter-reformsinitiatedafterPu-tinreturnedtotheKremlin.

Putin’spolicywasareactiontothefermentwithwhichsomepartsoftheeliteandthepublicrespondedtotheprospectofhisreturntopower,aprospecttheyassociatedwithstagnationandthelackofany lastingguaranteesof rightsandproperty.TheKremlin’spolicyofconsolidatingpower,mobilisingsupportandpersecut-ingopponentsreacheditsclimaxaftertherevolutionintheKyivMaidaninearly2014andtheescapeoftheUkrainianpresidentViktorYanukovych,developmentswhichtheKremlininterpret-edas foreshadowingabottom-updestabilisationthatcouldalsoaffectRussia. This consolidated the authoritariannature of theRussianstate,butatthesametimemadetheleadershiphostagetoitsownpolicy,especiallythedecisiontoannexCrimea,whichhad far-reaching geopolitical, internal political and economic

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consequences.AnanalysisoftheRussianelite’spresentcondition–the‘latePutin’period–leadstotheconclusionthattherulingteamisunabletodeviseorimplementinternalreforms.Itseemsdoomedinertlytocontinueitscurrentpolicy,whichcontributesto Russia’s further economic and social degradation, and limitsthe set of instruments available to the leadership to repressionandmilitaryaction,includingabroad.

Thepurposeof thepresentpaper isnotsomuchtocomprehen-sivelydiscussthesystemofpowerinRussiaastopresentitscur-rent condition after 15 years of Vladimir Putin’s rule. The firstchapterdescribes themain featuresof the systemofpower, itsmainactorsanddecision-makingprocesses,aswellasthechal-lenges generated by its internal specificity. The second chaptercharacterisesRussiansocietyand itsrole inholdingthesystemofpowertogether.Thefinalchapterattemptstooutlinethepros-pectsofthesystem’sfurtherdevelopment(orinfactdegradation),andthepotentialconsequencesofacrisisinthePutinistsystemofpower.

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I. PutInISm: SucceSSIve StageS of authorItarIanISm

From the start, terminology associatedwith authoritarian sys-tems has been applied in describing Vladimir Putin’s rule, al-thoughthenotionsusedhaverangedfrommilderonesreferringtoso-called‘democracywithadjectives’(controlledorfaçadede-mocracy) to terms directly referring to authoritarianism (e.g.electoralauthoritarianism,1denotinganauthoritariansystemofpowerthatderivesitslegitimacyfromasham,controlledelectoralprocessthatdoesnotleadtoachangeofgovernment).ThePutinistsystemofgovernmenthasfromitsbeginningbeencharacterisedbyacentralisationandpersonalisationofpower,restrictionsonpoliticalpluralismandeconomiccompetition,selectedrepressionandtheuseofforcebothinRussiaandabroad,aswellasideologi-calandhistoricalmanipulationsforpoliticalpurposes.

Inrecentyears,however,thesystemofpowerhasgrownincreas-ingly more authoritarian and repressive. This evolution isindicativeoftheKremlin’sstrategicchoicemadeinthewakeofthe political experiment - DmitryMedvedev’s presidency. Dur-ingthistime,themainfeaturesofthePutinistregimecontinuedbutthestyleofgovernancechanged,VladimirPutin’spollshow-ingsdeclined,andgroupsformedwithinthepoliticaleliteandinthegeneralpublicwhichvoicedtheirexpectationsofliberalisa-tion.That‘hardline’,whichwasadoptedinordertoremedytheweakening ofVladimir Putin’s legitimacy as the leader, provedthattheKremlinhadchosenthepathofauthoritarianconsolida-tion;thatis,ithaddecidedonceagaintoconcentratetheformaldecision-makingmechanismsinthehandsof thepresidentandpursueapolicyofrestrictionstowardsthoseactorswhodidnotunconditionallysupportthisline.Thiswaschoseninsteadofopt-ing for an evolutionary variant, i.e. Medvedev’s re-election, as

1 Seeinter aliaGrigoryGolosov,Электоральный авторитаризм в России,Pro et Contra,January-February2008.

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aresultofwhichtheoriginalmodelwouldhavestayedinplace,butpowerwouldbedecentralisedandsplitamongthedifferentgroupswithintheeliteinacontrolledandgradualmanner.Theprocess of authoritarian mobilisation gained momentum inthewakeoftheKyivMaidaninwinter2014,Russia’sannexationofCrimea,theconflictineasternUkraineandtheconfrontationwiththeWest.

One of the main symptoms of the system’s evolution concernsthesubstitutionofthemainsource of the russian leader’s le-gitimacy–thedevaluationoflegal(electoral)legitimacy,whichwasdominantduringPutin’sfirsttwotermsaspresident,infa-vouroftheincreasinglydominantcharismatic legitimacy.Thepresident,whoactedasthekeydecisionmakerevenbeforehand,andwhocouldnothavebeenchallengedattheballotboxbyanyotherpolitician,iscurrentlyrepresentedasthesoleguarantorofRussia’sstabilityandintegrity,andasapoliticianendowedwithnearlysuperhumanpowers.2

Anotherstage in theevolutionofhowtheRussianpolitical re-gimederivesitslegitimacyconcernsitsprogressing ideologisa-tion.Previously,theregimeusedtobepragmaticandideological-lyeclectic,whichreflectedtherelativepluralismoftheRussianelite.However, sincePutin’sreturn in2012, theRussian leader-shiphassteppedupefforts todevelopa state ideologybasedonaspecificversionofconservatismrootedin‘traditional’Orthodoxvalues.3TheKremlin’s conservatism is supposed to serveas theregime’sideologicalfoundationandjustifythepreservationofthe

2 Airedonpublictelevisionon26April2015,thedocumentaryThe President. 15 years of new RussiacreatesanimageofPutinasapoliticianwhohassavedRussiafrompoverty,chaosandtheterroristthreatofthe1990s,whosingle-handedlytakesallthekeydecisions,andwhoisendowedwithpoliticalge-niusandotherexceptionalvirtues.

3 Formoreinformation,seeWitoldRodkiewicz,JadwigaRogoża,Potemkinconservatism.AnideologicaltooloftheKremlin,Point of View,3February2015,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2015-02-03/potem-kin-conservatism-ideological-tool-kremlin

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‘traditional’ (buteffectivelyauthoritarian)modelofgovernanceinRussia.Thishasbeenpresentedasanalternativetotheliberalideologywhich, in theKremlin’sview, is incompatiblewith theRussianreality,andasajustificationforthepolicyofconfronta-tionwith theWesternworld,which is presented as a source of‘alien’ values and an aggressor inRussia’s sphere of vital inter-ests. For theneedsof the state ideology, theRussian leadershipand its loyal experts have also constructed a specific histori-cal policy, wherein the interpretations of history are adjustedtocurrentpoliticalneeds.Forinstance,thevictoryoverfascisminWorldWar II is juxtaposedwith thepresentRussianaggres-sioninUkrainewhereRussiaisallegedlyfightinganewvarietyoffascism,andamanipulatedversionofthe19th-centuryRussianWorld(Russkiy Mir)conceptissupposedtojustifytheculturalandpolitical dominance of Russia over Ukraine and Belarus.4 Thispolicyalsogeneratesjustificationsforauthoritarianandtotalitar-ianrule,5whileavoidinganyre-evaluationsofthetragicorcon-troversialchaptersofRussia’shistory.

Thesocial contract between the leader and the publichasalsochanged.As the economic situationhas beendeteriorating, theKremlinisnolongerabletoensuresteadilyimprovingstandardsoflivingforthepeople,whichusedtobeitswayofwinningthepublic’ssupportandloyalty.Thecurrentsocialcontractcouldbephrasedintermsof‘sacrificesinreturnforheroismandasenseofdignity’.Theleadershiphasbeentryingtooffsetthesacrificeswhich theRussianshavebeen forced tomakeasa resultof the

4 SeeMarekMenkiszak,ThePutindoctrine:TheformationofaconceptualframeworkforRussiandominanceinthepost-Sovietarea,OSW Commen-tary, 27 March 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-com-mentary/2014-03-27/putin-doctrine-formation-a-conceptual-framework-russian

5 EventhoughPutinhasformallycondemnedStalinasacriminal,therecentyearshavewitnessedanapologiaforJosefStalin(toleratedbythegovern-ment):historianswithcloselinkstotheleadershiphavebeenpresentinghimasan‘effectivemanager’,andinMay2015amonumenttoStalinwaserectedinthetownofLipetskattheinitiativeoftheCommunists.

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sanctionsandeconomicstagnationbyresortingtoanauthoritar-ianmobilisation fuelledbyasenseof threat fromthe ‘eternallyhostileWest’andthrivingonasenseofprideinsuchachievementsasthe‘regainingofCrimea’.Themostvisibleelementofthismo-bilisationisthemassivewaveofaggressive media propagandawhichisextremelybiased,exploitshatespeechandresortstodis-informationtechniques,ofwhichthemostglaringexamplescanbeobservedinconnectionwiththecrisisinUkraine.6Despitetheobjectivefactthatthepeople’sstandardsoflivingandpurchasingpowerhavedeclined,atthepresentstagethatpropagandaisca-pableofgeneratingthedesiredoutcomesfortheKremlin,boost-ingthepresident’spopularityevenmoreandfanningtheaversiontowardstheWest.7

the evolution of the leader’s position in the system of power has been accompanied in recent years by changes in the presi-dent’s inner circle.Originallyconsistingofseveralmutuallybal-ancedgroupswithdiversebackgroundsandinterests,ithasnowbecomeentirelydominatedbyrepresentativesofthesecretser-viceswhosharePutin’sworldviewandvisionofthethreatsfacedbyRussia.Thenarrowgroupinchargeofstrategicdecisions,suchastheannexationofCrimeaandthepoliciestowardsUkraine,theCommonwealthofIndependentStatesandtheWest(forexample,thecounter-sanctionsagainstthestateswhichhaveimposedeco-nomic sanctionsonRussiaorbannedRussianofficials) consists

6 The extremely aggressive and emotionalmediatisation of storieswhichwouldthenturnouttobeuntrue,suchasthereportagebroadcastbythemainTVstation,1Kanal,on12July2014,showingthestoryofaboyfromSlavyanskreportedtohavebeencrucifiedbytheUkrainianmilitary,orthepracticeofillustratingreportsabouttheUkrainianarmy’sallegedatrocitieswithmaterialsdocumentingotherconflicts,etc.

7 Thepresident’spopularityreached89%inJune2015(accordingtotheLevadaCentrepollof24June2015).AccordingtootherpollsbytheLevadaCentre,62%ofRussiansbelievethatRussia’srelationswiththeWest“willalwaysbebasedonmutualdistrust”(26June2015);66%ofrespondentsbelievethattheobjectiveoftheWesternsanctionsisto“weakenandhumiliateRussia”,and70%believethatRussiashouldnotpayheedtothesanctionsandcontinuewithitsownpolicy(29June2015).

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almostexclusivelyofmembersofthesecretservices.Intheafter-mathofaseriesofreshuffles in thePresident’sAdministration,thesecretserviceshavebecomethemain,oreventhesolepro-viderofinformationtothepresident,andhavebeenreinforcingPutin’svisionoftheworld(e.g.withregardtotheWest’shostilepolicytowardsRussia)whileatthesametimeshapinghiscurrentorientationinkeepingwiththeirownsectorialinterests.Thishasmadethe maindecision maker increasingly isolated in terms of access to information, as the services have been providingthepresidentwithaselectiveviewoftheworldlargelydrivenbywishfulthinking.Thesecretservices’monopolyoninformationreinforces theKremlin’svisionand its geopoliticalprioritiesbyrepresenting theWesternworld as an eternal enemy intent onunderminingorevendestroyingRussia.8Thoseperceptionshaveovershadowedanyeconomiccalculations,alsowithregardtode-cisionswhoseconsequencesaffecttheconditionoftheentirestate(sincetheannexationofCrimea,theRussianeconomyhaspracti-callybeenhostagetogeopoliticaldecisions).Thedecision-makingprocesseshabituallyentailnegativeside-effects,whichinthem-selvesrequirethedevelopmentofremedialstrategies.Thesecretserviceshavealsobeenmanningthepresident’smainorganisa-tional staff, fullycontrollinghisdaily functioning,personalre-lationsandphysicalsecurity.Thishas left thepresident largelyahostage to the security service people around him,quiteincontrasttotheimpressionofone-manleadershipthathehasbeenostensiblymaking,and theundisputed fact that themaindeci-sion-makingmechanismsareconcentratedinhishands.

Atthesametime,thepresidenthasbeenincreasinglyalienatedfrom the broader political and business elites. Putinhasbeenemphasising the single-handed nature of important decisionsever more frequently, often confronting his own political and

8 NikolaiPatrushev,secretaryoftheSecurityCounciloftheRussianFedera-tion,saidthattheUnitedStates“wishedRussiatoceasetoexistasastate”.Interview for theKommersant daily, 22 June2015,www.kommersant.ru/doc/2752246

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businessbasewithaccomplishedfactsandinsomecasestakingdecisionsthathaveadverselyaffectedtheinterestsofthatbase.9Theelitegroups inquestion, i.e.membersof thestateadminis-tration, business and expert and research communities, havelost their influence on the decision-making processes concern-ing strategic issues ormatters affecting their ownposition andwell-being.10Mostpeopleinthesegroups(includingtheSberbankCEOGermanGref,theeconomicadvisorandformerdeputyprimeministerAlexeiKudrin,andtheCentralBankgovernorElviraNa-byullina)havekepttheirjobs,buttheirroleiscurrentlylimitedtoexecutingtheKremlin’spoliticaldirectivesanddevelopingtacticsto implementstrategies thathavealreadybeendecided.This il-lustrates the change thathasoccurred in thegeneralnatureoftheKremlin’s relations with the broader elites –wherebyposi-tiveinstruments(distributionofassetsandpromotions,guaran-tees of immunity) have been replaced by negative instruments(demonstrationsofpower,discipliningmeasures,selectivepun-ishments).ModeratemembersoftheelitewhodonotsupporttheKremlin’saggressivepolicyunconditionallyhavebeendismissedasa ‘sixth column’11whose loyalty toRussiahasallegedlybeen

9 Thepolicyofso-called‘nationalisationofelites’mayserveasanexamplehere;thisaimstostepuptheKremlin’scontrolofthepropertyandprivatelivesofmembersoftheadministrationandbusiness,forexamplebyprohib-itingofficialsandemployeesofstate-ownedcorporationsfromholdingfor-eignbankingaccounts;imposingstricterrequirementsconcerningpersonalpropertydeclarations;thecreationwithinthePresident’sAdministrationofaregisterofassetsheldbytheeliteandfinancialflowstoothercountries,etc.Formoreinformation,seeJadwigaRogoża,Thenationalisationoftheelite:Kremlintrackingofficials’foreignassets,OSW Analysis,10April2013,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-04-10/nationalisation-elite-kremlin-tracking-officials-foreign-assets

10 TheelitehassufferedvariousnegativeconsequencesofthedecisiontoannexCrimea,whichhitatitseconomicinterestandpositionintheWest,wheremostoftheelitemembershavebeeninvestingtheircapital,wheretheirfamilieshavebeenlivingandwheretheirchildrenhavebeengoingtoschool.

11 ThistermwascoinedbyAlexanderDugin,theideologuewithcloselinkstotheKremlin,whosaidthatthe“sixthcolumn”consistedof“thosemembersoftheRussianleadershipwhosupportPutinbutatthesametimecallforalib-eral,pro-Western,modernisedandWesternisedRussia,forglobalisation,integrationwiththeWesternworldandEuropeanvaluesandinstitutions,

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erodedbyitsextensiveeconomictieswiththeWest.Allthishasaffectedtheattitudesoftheseelitesandthequalityoftheirsup-portforthestateleader.Overthelastthreeyears(andespeciallysincetheannexationofCrimea)manyrepresentativesofthiselitehaveopenlyvoicedconcernovertheKremlin’s increasinglyun-predictablepolicyanditsharmfuleffectsontheconditionoftheRussian economy– andon their ownpersonal interests.12OnceVladimir Putin’s convinced and ardent supporters, they havegraduallybecomehostagestotheevolvingregimewhich–whilestillrewardingthemwithprofits–hasbecomeincreasinglypre-carious.

Thepresident’sprogressingalienationhasbeenaccompaniedbyadrasticnarrowingof the limitsof thatpolitical and social ac-tivitythatremainsuncontrolledbytheKremlin.Theregimehas increasingly been penalising any opposition or independent social and political activity,startingfromthecondemnationofopponentsasa ‘fifthcolumn’or ‘foreignagents’,13 topersecutionand repression (a largernumberof custodial sentences, includ-ing for participation in oppositiondemonstrations), all thewayuptopoliticalassassinations(themurderofBorisNemtsovbytheKremlinwallinFebruary2015,perpetratedbypeoplewithlinkstotheChechenleaderRamzanKadyrov).Thelimitsofthefreedomofspeechhavenarroweddowndrastically,especiallyinrelation

andwhowantRussiatobecomeaprosperingcorporationinaworldinwhichtherulesaresetbytheglobalWest”.SeeA.Dugin,Шестая колонна,http://vz.ru/opinions/2014/4/29/684247.html.

12 TheSberbankCEOGermanGref,theeconomyministerAlexeiUlyukayev,CEOsofprivatecorporationsandevenlobbyistsinfriendlyrelationswithPutin,suchasGennadyTimchenko.EvenlobbyistscloselyassociatedwithPutin,whohavebeenbeneficiariesoftheKremlin’sdecisionsformanyyears,havenowbeenpushedintosubordinatepositions(YuriKovalchuk,ArkadyRotenberg,VladimirYakunin,andevenIgorSechin);theKremlinkeepssup-portingthemfinancially,butthepresidentevermorefrequentlyreprimandsthempubliclyinordertoremindthemoftheir‘vassal’status.

13 Theterms‘fifthcolumn’and‘traitorsofthenation’wereusedbyPresidentPutinhimselfinhisaddresstotheFederalAssemblyon18March2014;http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

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to thesphereofonline information,whichhadpreviouslybeenunfettered.14 Inaddition tocurbingpoliticalandcivil freedoms,theregimehasalsostartedtosystematicallyrestrain individual freedoms and encroach on the sphere of public morals.15

Asthesystemhasbeenevolving,soitsmodus operandihasbeenchanging. The leadership has increasingly resorted to ‘manual control’ mode(whichhadexistedsincethestartofPutin’srule)instategovernance.ThecentralisationofpowerandtheKrem-lin’sdrivetocontrolthemainaspectsofpubliclifehasledtoiner-tiaintheinstitutionsresponsibleforthefunctioningofthestate,which have become ‘service providers’ to the Kremlin. Againstthisbackdrop,thepresidentialteam(andthePresident’sAdmin-istrationintheinstitutionaldimension)appearstoberelativelyeffective,16althoughitalsotendstobecomechaoticincrisissitua-tions(suchasthecurrencycrisisinDecember2014),whilemanypresidential decrees are implemented in a dilatory manner orevenobstructed.Asaresult, theKremlinneeds to intervene ineveryimportantcaseinordertoensurethatitsdecisionsareim-plemented.This ‘achievement’oftheRussianpowersystem,i.e.thefactthattheKremlinnowcontrolsalltheimportantactorsofpubliclife,isatthesametimeoneofitsmaindisadvantages:with-

14 Bloggersarenowlegallyrequiredtorevealtheirpersonaldataandcomplywithasetofrestrictivelaws.StructureswithcloselinkstotheKremlinhavetakenovercontrolofRussia’slargestsocialnetworkVkontakte,andmanypopularportalshavebeenforcedtochangetheireditorialpolicies(Gazeta.ru,Lenta.ruandothers).TheindependentonlinetelevisionDozhdhasfacedpersecution,andanumberofpopularoppositionportals(Grani.ru,Ej.ru,Kasparov.ru,AlexeiNavalny’sblog)havebeenblockedbythegovernmentalRoskomnadzorservice.

15 Thelawnowrequireseveryonetodeclaredualcitizenshipsandregistertheirresidence.Notonlyoppositionactivistsbutalsoordinarycitizensareper-secutedforexpressingcriticalopinionsofthegovernmentortakingpartinprotests.Finally,sexualminoritieshavealsofacedpersecutioninstigatedbytheauthorities.

16 VladimirPutinhimselftriestostrengthenthisimpression;forinstanceintheTVdocumentaryCrimea. The road to the homelandbroadcastontheanni-versaryofthepeninsula’sannexation,heexplainedthesuccessofthatopera-tionbythefactthathehadpersonallycontrolledeverystepoftheprocess.

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outtheleader’sinvolvementthesystemerodesandbecomesinert,whiletheweakness,orperceivedweakness,oftheleaderbecomesafatalsignalfortheentiresystem,demonstratinghowfragilethe‘stability’underPutinis.17Thefactthatthesystemisbasedonin-formal rules not grounded in law and on personal relations and arrangements has likewisebeenadouble-edgedswordforthe ruling team. Itmeans that there areno reliableguaranteesoftherightsofcitizens,politicalactorsandeconomicoperators,andtheinstitutionsappointedtodefendthoserightsareamerefacade.ThishasenabledtheKremlintoarbitrarily‘manage’thoseguaranteesbecause,intheabsenceofdefinitivelegalguaranteesof theoligarchs’propertyrights, theyremaindependentonthepolitical leadership, and the recurrent ‘redistributions’ of theirassetsremindthemofthisdependence.18However,suchasystemdoesnotofferanyreliableguaranteestothemembersofthenar-rowrulingelite, either.For them,givinguppowermeans risk-ingtheirassets,sometimestheirfreedom,andinextremecaseseventheirlives.Thissituationhasaffectedthecruciallyimpor-tantprocessofthesuccession of power,whichinthisparadigmisperceivedasariskfactor.AsthereactivepolicythatfollowedDmitry Medvedev’s short presidency demonstrated, even ‘con-trolled succession’ is seen as a risk; the potential emancipationof thenewpresidentwouldhaveentailedpainful losses for thegroup cedingpower.As anatural consequenceof this, those inpowerseektostaythereusinganymeansavailable,whichover

17 Inthiscontext,theten-daypauseinthepresident’spublicappearancesinMarch2015triggeredawaveofspeculationsandunderminedthesenseofstabilityintherulingcamp.SeealsoLiliaShevtsova,HastheRussianSys-tem’sAgonyBegun?,The National Interest,17March2015,http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/03/17/has-russias-agony-begun

18 Forexamplethetakeovers,underlegalpretexts,ofthebusinessempiresownedbyVladimirGusinsky(2000),MikhailKhodorkovsky(after2003)ormorerecently,VladimirYevtushenkov(2014).VladislavInozemtsevhastermedthePutiniststabilisation‘thestabilityofthetime-limited’(«cтабиль-ность временщиков»)becauseithascreatedagroupofpeopleinpowerandaclassofpropertyholders,buthasfailedtocreatemechanismstoguaran-teetheirpropertyrights.W. Inozemtsev,Распад стабильности,snob.ru,10March2015.

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timedegradesthequalityofgovernanceandleadstheregimetoevolvetowardsdictatorship.

Intheeconomicdimension,thePutinistsystem–withitscentral-isationofdecision-making,thepoliticisationoftheeconomyandthe suppressionof competition–has led toa situation iswhichthe economic model based on revenues from energy resources has reached the limits of its potential, whilenonewmodelthatcouldreplaceitandensurefurthergrowthfortheRussianecon-omyhasbeenproposed.Foraroundadecade,theRussianecono-mygrewdynamicallyowingtothehighandconstantlyrisingoilprices.19Thismodelstartedtocrumblearound2012,withoilpric-esstillpeaking(ayearlyaverageofUS$100perbarrel)butgrowthslowlydecreasing.In2012theRussianGDPgrewby3.4%(downfrom4.3%in2011),by1.3%in2013,andby0.6%in2014,andRussiaisexpectedtoclose2015withitsGDPsmallerbyseveralpercent.Thisslowdownismainlyduetomany years of structural ne-glect:thefailuretodiversifytheeconomy(sincethestartofPu-tin’srule,theRussianeconomy’sdependenceontherawmaterialssectorshas increasedconsiderably20), thesupportandsubsidiesprovided to many unprofitable enterprises; a poor investmentclimate; the weakness of institutions (including the judiciary);thelackofpropertyrightguarantees,whichhasweighedonthedevelopmentofentrepreneurship;andfinally, the technologicalbackwardnesswhichhasexacerbatedtheunprofitabilityandun-competitiveness of production inmany sectors of the economyandmadethemmoredependentonimports.

19 Russia’sGDP grewby 10% in 2000 (with the average annual oil price atUS$23.9perbarrel),5.1%in2001(US$20.8),4.7%in2002(US$21.02),7.3%in2003(US$23.81),7.2%in2004(US$31),6.4%in2005(US$45.2),8.5%in2007(US$64.3). Intheyears2012–2013thepriceofoilwasaboveUS$100.www.cbr.ru/statistics/credit_statistics/print.aspx?file=crude_oil.htm

20 DuringPutin’srule,theshareofrevenuefromoilandgasexportsintheRussianbudgetexpandedfrom18%in1999to54.5%in2011;accordingtotheMinistryofEnergy,in2014itwas52%.

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UnderlyingthoseproblemsisthefundamentalprincipleonwhichthePutinistsystemrests,i.e.theprimacy of control over devel-opment.Since2000,theKremlinhasconsistentlycentralisedthedecision-makingprocesses,andlimitedcompetitionandtheauton-omyofotheractors(whetherpolitical,businessorsocial),whileatthesametimepromotingattitudesofpassiveloyaltywithout ‘ex-cessive’initiative.Manyyearsofsuchnegativeselectionofthestatecadreshaveresultedinapoorlevelofgovernanceatthefederalandregional levels,and inertiaand incompetence in theadministra-tion.Thishasloweredthequalityofmanystrategicdecisions,andderailedeventhoserareattemptsatreformormodernisationthattheRussian leadershipundertook in the last 15years.Activeandinnovative groups have been denied promotions and opportuni-tiestodevelop,whichhasresultedinapermanentflightofcapital(whichreachedrecordlevelsin2014)andabraindrain,deprivingthesystemofitsmostcreativemembers.21Thishasledtoagradualintellectual degradation of the system,whichhasbeentakingadvantageofthefavourableeconomicsituation,buthasceasedtogeneratethenewideasandtechnologieswhichdeterminetheposi-tionofstatesontheglobalstagetoday.Sincemid-2014thoselong-terminternalproblemshavebeenexacerbatedbyadverseexternalfactors,includingfallingglobaloilprices,therelateddepreciationoftherouble,andtheimpactofWesternsanctions,whichhaveex-posedthefragilityoftheRussianeconomyanditsdependenceonthefluctuationsoftheeconomicsituation.

Thecollapseofthewelfare state model inRussia,whichusedtobepresentedintheKremlin’spropagandaasoneofRussia’sgreat-estachievementsthroughoutPutin’srule,marksanothersociallypainful failure of the Putinist system, and runs counter to thetriumphalist propaganda of ‘Russia rising from its knees’. Ris-ingstandardsofliving(andmorebroadly,economic,politicaland

21 TheflightofcapitalfromRussiain2014increasedtwoandahalftimescom-paredto2013asitsvolumeexceededUS$150billion(figuresfromtheCentralBank;US$61billionin2013);emigrationhasalsoreachedrecordlevels.

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socialstability)werethecornerstonesoftheRussiansocialcontractsinceVladimirPutincametopower.Drasticallylowinthe1990s,thosestandardsoflivingthenimprovedconsiderably;duringthefirstdecadeofPutin’sruleGDPper capita increasedfourfold,andthepeople’srealincomesgrewyearonyear.22Despitethat,Russiacontinuestostrugglewiththeinefficiencyofthestateinstitutionsin charge of providing social services, i.e. healthcare, educationandresearch,andmunicipalinfrastructures,whichareindeplor-ablecondition,especiallyoutsidethelargecities.23Thescaleoftheunsolved problems reveals itself, for instance, in the president’sannualtelevisedconferenceswiththeinhabitantsoftheRussianregions, which despite the television programmers’ censorshippresentapictureofasocietystrugglingwithbasicsocialandin-frastructuralproblemsthathavenotchangedforyears,andwiththecorruptionand lawlessnessofstateofficialsand lawenforce-mentfunctionaries.Thoseproblemsare largelyaconsequenceoftheKremlin’sstrategicdecisions,suchasthe2001financialreformwhichtransferredaconsiderableportionoftherevenuesofregion-albudgets(responsibleformanagingthesocialinfrastructure)tothecentralbudget,thetoleranceofcorruption,andtheincompe-tenceofthoseincharge.Socialspending(oneducation,healthcare,culture) in the central budget has also been cut in recent years,which stands in contrast to the constant growth of security and defence spending (whichaccounted for40%of totalbudgetspendingin2015,comparedto30%forsocialspending)24.

22 NominalGDPper capitaincreasedfromUS$5914in1999toUS$24,083in2012(andbasedonpurchasingpowerparity,fromUS$4200in1999toUS$18,000in2012),whileaveragenominalincomeper capitaincreasedfrom2281roublesin2000to38,340roublesin2013.

23 Lastyear,thenumbersofhealthcareestablishmentsinseveraldozenRus-sianregionswerereducedaspartofan‘optimisation’operationthatsparkedanoutcryinRussia.Formoreinformation,seehttp://www.gazeta.ru/so-cial/2013/02/22/4978173.shtml

24 EwaFischer,AmendmenttotheRussianbudgetfor2015:anattempttomain-tainthestatusquo,OSW Analysis,18March2015,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-03-18/amendment-to-russian-budget-2015-at-tempt-to-maintain-status-quo

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II. a SocIety of obServerS – the factor that KeePS the regIme together

The specific nature of the Russian society, and especially theweaknessofcivicinstitutions,isoneofthemainpillarssustainingtheviabilityofthecurrentregime.Civilsocietyinstitutionsthatcouldprovideacounterbalancetothestateandsupervisethoseinpowerhavenotdeveloped inpost-SovietRussia,despite severalattemptstocreatethem.Thisisalegacyofthemanycenturiesofauthoritarianstatemodelsinwhichsocietywasreducedtoamereobject,anditspublicactivitywasusuallylimitedtouncontrolledanddestructiveoutbreaksofangerthatfailedtoimproveitsover-allsituation.25Uptothepresentday,theRussianleadershiphasanextensivesetofinstrumentsatitsdisposaltoinfluenceandma-nipulatethepublic.Firstly,theyholdthesystemicandeconomictools,includingtheexistenceofanextensivepublicsector26;thestate is the largestemployer inRussia,whichmakesiteasiertoco-ordinateandcontrolthepoliticalbehaviourofalargesegmentofthepublic(andpublicsectoremployeesareindeedconsideredtobeabastionoftherulinggroup).Secondly,theRussianleader-shiphaseffectivepropagandainstrumentsatitsdisposal,includ-ingthestate-controlledmedia,especiallytelevision,27whichfeedthepeoplebothpoliticalpropagandaandsensational&entertain-mentcontentthat‘hypnotises’theaudienceandreinforcesitsat-titudeaspassiveobserversofevents.28

25 AlexanderPushkinhadalreadydefineditaccuratelyinthenineteenthcen-tury:“GodsaveusfromseeingaRussianrevolt–senselessandmerciless”.

26 TheRussianpublicsectoremploys14.5millionpeople(morethan20%oftheentireworkingpopulation),ofwhich3.3millionpeopleworkinthefederalinstitutions(2014,novainfo.ru/archive/24/sovershenstvovanie-oplaty-tru-da).Thenumbersareevenbiggerifweincludetherelatedsectorsthatbenefitfrompublicfunding.

27 Televisionis themainsourceof informationaboutRussiaandtheworldfor90%ofRussians(accordingtoaLevadapoll,June2014).Thispercentageshowedadownwardtrendintheyears2010-2013,butincreasedagainaftertheannexationofCrimea.

28 Thediagnosiswasformulatedin2001bytheleadingRussiansociologistsDmitryGudkovandBorisDubinoftheLevadaCentre,intheirpaperentitled

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The Russian public’s great susceptibility to the Kremlin’s ma-nipulation,asobservedinthecourseoflastyear,stemsfromthestillextantpost-imperial complexandthetraumaoftheSovietUnion’scollapse,whichformanyRussiansmeanta lossof iden-tityandtheirsenseofsecurity,andwhichPutinoncedescribedasthegreatestgeopoliticalcatastropheofthetwentiethcentury.TheSovietmentalitycanbeeasilyreanimated,asdemonstratedbytheRussianleadership’ssuccessinrevivingtheattitudes,prac-ticesandevenaestheticstypicaloftheSovietperiod.Thedevelop-mentofademocraticstatemodelhasalsobeen impededby thefactthatWesternvalues,suchasdemocracyandthemarketecon-omy,werediscreditedintheeyesofthepublicduringthe1990s.Theactivitiesofthethen-leadersofRussia,whoinvokeddemoc-racybutinfactoversawtheprivatisationofthestatebytheeliteandgroupsassociatedwithit,createdacaricatureofdemocracy,whichmostRussiansstillassociatewithpoverty,chaos,corrup-tionandtheunbridleddevelopmentofcriminalstructures,andwiththestate’sfailuretodeliveronitsbasicsocialcommitments.TheKremlinhasbeenskilfullytakingadvantageofthosepercep-tionsbyemphasisingtheharmfulnessof‘transplanting’Westernmodels to Russia, and championing a specifically Russian pathofdevelopment.TheRussian leadership’smainpostulate inthiscontexthasconcerned theneed topreservetraditionally rus-sian social and political values,amoveintendedindirectlytolegitimisethetraditionalist,authoritarianmodelofgovernment.

Otherfactorsthathavecontributedtothepersistenceoftheau-thoritarianmodel in Russia concern the negative attitudes andbehaviourpatternsrootedinRussiansociety, i.e. thepassivity, atomisation, mutual distrust and the lack of horizontal so-cial ties thatcouldgiverisetolastingcivilsocietystructures.29

Asocietyoftelevisionviewers,http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/197/991/1219/05gudkov-31-45.pdf.

29 Seeinter aliaAlexeiLevinson,Боюсь не успеть,Неприкосновенный Запас6/2014.

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Thistragiclegacyderivesatleastfromtheeventsofthetwentiethcenturyanditsrepressionsandwars,whichhavebroughtaboutanegativesocialselection,cuttingpeopleofffromtheirrootsandinstillingasenseofhelplessnessinthefaceofhistory,reinforcedbytheviolenthistoricalupheavalswhichnearlyeverygenerationexperienced.MostRussiansdisplaylowpoliticalawarenessandpassivenessinthepoliticalandprofessionalspheres,helplessnessanddisbelief that their endeavours could be successful (‘I can’tchangeanything’),anddonothavetheskills to takegrassrootsactionandco-operatewithotherpeoplewithsimilarinterestsorproblems.This ‘silent majority’ inRussia isapillarofthegov-ernment’spower.Infact,whatkeepsthesystemtogetherisnotsomuchpeople’sactive,enthusiasticsupportfortheleadership,asapathyandlackofsocialinvolvementinanyprocessesbeyondtheprivatesphere.Thisattitudehasenabledthegovernmenttoshapepolicyonitsown.30ThissocialapathyhasalsodampeddowntheRussians’genuinefrustrationwiththeproblemstheyfaceineve-rydaylife:thelowqualityofhealthcare,socialsecurityandedu-cation,theconditionoftheinfrastructureandotherissues.Thisfrustrationhasnottranslatedintomassprotestsorgrassrootsac-tionforchange;rather,ithaspromptedtheRussianstoseekindi-vidualandad hocwaysofdealingwiththeproblems.Therefore,theclaimsthatsocialunrestcoulderuptinRussiaiftheeconomicsituationdeterioratesaredisputable,asdemonstratedbythewaythepreviouseconomiccrisisintheyears2008–2009unfolded.Atthattime,despitetheeconomicdeclinethatleftlargeindustrialplants introuble,only isolatedsocialprotests tookplace (e.g. inthetownofPikalyovo),whichtheauthoritieswereeasilyabletodealwith.

Inthiscontext,itshouldnotbeoverlookedthatsocialapathyalsoentails some negative consequences for the government.WhilethepopularityshowingsoftheRussianleadershipandespecially

30 SeeVladislavInozemtsev,Секрет путинского консенсуса,snob.ru,11Febru-ary2015.

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the president are high, thequality of the people’s support is questionable;itisusuallypassive,anddoesnotmobilisepeopleinto getting actively involved in pro-Kremlin initiatives, so thestatestructureshavetomakeamajorefforteachtimetheyneedsuchinvolvement.31 IntheeventofmajorproblemsoracrisisintheKremlin,VladimirPutin’srecordpopularityshowingsofover80%will not translate into tangible support fromhis backers.32Russiansocietyhasalsodemonstratedatendencytoeasilydivertits sympathies topoliticiansor groups that appear tobe strongandprojectself-confidenceatagivenmoment,whichalsoappliedtooppositionforcesatthosetimeswhentheyseemedtobegain-ingpower.33Whiletherecentwaveofrepressionagainsttheop-positionhassucceededinrestoringtheimpressionoftheKrem-lin’sstrength,andinattractingpeoplebacktotherulingcamp,thisveryfactprovesthatsocialsympathiesarelikelytofollowthecourseofdevelopments,ratherthanshapethem.

AstudyofthemoreactivegroupsofRussiansocietywithhighersocialcapitaland intellectualpotentialalso leads to theconclu-sionthattheexpectationsofpoliticalandsystemicchangewithinthemarevery limited.Thesegroups,whichcouldbedefinedin

31 Forinstance,atthepeakoftheanti-Kremlinprotestsin2011-2012theau-thoritiesfacedconsiderabledifficultyinorganisingcounter-demonstrationstoexpresssupportforVladimirPutin;participantsinpro-Putinactionshadtobebroughttotheralliesinbusesandpaidtoparticipate,andtheirbehav-iourattherallieswaspassive.

32 AsLiliaShevtsovanoted,Putin’sten-daydisappearanceinMarch2015causedmuchconcerninthestateadministrationandexpertcommunitiesbutdidnottriggeranymajorreactionamongthewiderpublic,whichmaymeanthatthepublicwillbehaveinasimilarwayintheeventthepresident’spositionweakensorfalters.See:HastheRussianSystem’sAgonyBegun?,ibidem.

33 In2011,asthepro-Kremlinpoliticalforceswerelosingtheirsupport(espe-ciallytheUnitedRussiaparty),andtheanti-Kremlinprotests,whosepartici-pantsweremostlyyoungpeople,weregainingmomentum,thepublicsenti-mentsstartedtoturntowardstheopposition;around40%ofpeoplesupportedtheprotesters (seehttp://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2012/12/13_a_4889485.shtml).Anotherevidenceofthisis.AlexeiNavalny’sresultinthe2013elec-tionsformayorofMoscow:afteradynamicandcharismaticcampaign,Na-valnymanagedtogarnernearly30%ofvotes(hisrealshowingwasprobablyevenbetter).

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simplified termsasurban middle class andwhich account foraround 15–18% of the population,34 formed the core of the anti-Kremlinprotestsin2011–2012.ThoseprotestsshowedthatthereweregroupsinRussiansocietywhichhadadoptedattitudesandvaluestypicalofmodernsocieties,whichinturnwarrantedabe-lief that themiddle classes could be the vectors of a new, non-Sovietawarenessandpoliticalculture,andcouldbethesubjectsofmodernisation.35However, a closer look at the values and at-titudesoftheRussianmiddleclassrevealedthatitsexpectationsconcerningchangewereverylimited,andreformofthepoliticalsphereplayedonlyaminorrole in them.Themiddleclass isasdiverseintermsofvaluesasRussiansocietyisasawhole.Valuestypical ofmodern societies (self-reliance, individualism, enter-prise,rationality,respectforprivateproperty)coexistwithvaluesfoundintraditionalistandpatriarchalsocieties,suchastheneedforastrongstateandanequaldistributionofgoods.ThepoliticalnormsandvaluesheldbytheRussianmiddleclassdifferconsid-erablyfromthoseheldintheWest(forinstance,researchershavepointedtolegalnihilisminRussia,amongotherfactors),andeventheideaofrapprochementwiththeWestisnotapriority.36

34 TheRussianmiddleclassonthemost-desireddirectionofthestate’sdevelop-ment:researchprojectbySvetlanaMareyeva,InstituteofSociology,RussianAcademyofSciences,http://www.opec.ru/1813805.html.Theclassificationmethodologywas based on four criteria: education, professional status,wealthandself-identification.

35 Seeinter aliaNataliaTikhonova,InstituteofSociology,RussianAcademyofSciences,ThemiddleclassasthesubjectofRussia’smodernisation,www.lawinrussia.ru/srednii-klass-kak-subekt-modernizatsii-rossi

36 Tikhonova,Mareyeva,op. cit.Mareyeva:ThereisgeneralagreementinRus-siansocietythattheWesternmodelofdevelopmentcannotautomaticallybeappliedinRussia.ThoseadvocatingtheWesternmodelofdevelopmentcur-rentlyaccountfor33%ofthemiddleclass(23%onaverageinothersegmentsofsociety),afigurewhichhasdroppedbyaround10percentoverthelastdecade(from43%in2003).Membersofthemiddleclassarealsoconvincedthatthenormsandinstitutionswhichplaytheirroleseffectivelyindevel-opedWesternsocietieswouldnotproducethesameoutcomesinRussia.Themiddleclass’sattitudetowardstheprincipleoftheruleoflawisalsoambigu-ous:itsmembersbelievethatoneshouldabidebythelawonlyifmembersofthestatebodiesalsoabidebyit(theresultsintheothersegmentsofsocietywerepracticallyidentical).

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This is largely due to the specificity and origins of theRussianmiddleclass,whichisaproduct of the period of oil-based pros-perity under Putin. Administration officials, including mem-bersoftheinstitutionsofforce,37accountforalargepartofthisgroup,whichalsoincludesaconsiderablenumberofpeoplewhoare formally private entrepreneurs or members of the liberalprofessionsbuthaveeconomiclinkswiththestate,thatis,theybenefitfrompublicprocurement,makemoneyoffprovidingser-vices to thepublic sector,etc.Thisgeneratescomplex identitiesandcomplicatedmotivations in relationswith the state; ononehand, representativesofmiddle class expectgradual liberalisa-tionthatwouldsecuretheirrights,butontheother,theyfearany‘revolutionary’changethatcouldcausedestabilisation.Theopin-ionsvoicedbymanyordinarymembersofthemiddleclassindi-catethatthosepeopledonotexpectathoroughreformofthestatemodel,butsimplywantitsmostrestrictiveaspectstoberemediedwhilepreservingtheinformal(pathological)rulesofwhichtheythemselves have also been beneficiaries.38 For amajority of theRussianmiddleclass,thecaseofUkraine(andespeciallytheca-pabilityof ‘thestreet’ tochangegovernments) is tantamount tothedestructionofthestate,whiletheirmostdesiredscenarioforRussiaseemstobetheruleofDmitryMedvedev,whoofferedmiti-gatedformofexercisingpowerwithoutconsiderablychangingitssubstance.

A‘politically motivated’ section of the middle class,whichbe-lievesthatadeeperreformofthesystemisnecessary,alsoexistsinRussia,but itcannotcreatethecriticalmassneededto influ-encethecourseofevents. Itsdevelopmenthasbeenarrestedbythewaveofrestrictionsitfacedintheaftermathoftheprotests

37 AccordingtoestimatesbyNataliaTikhonova(RussianAcademyofSciences),aroundhalfthemiddle-classpopulationareemployedinthepublicsectorandtheirincomesarenotregulatedbythemarket.Op. cit.

38 Membersofthemiddleclasscommonlyacceptcorruption,whichtheyseeasawayofresolvingsituationswhendealingwiththestatebodies,orwhenonehasviolatedthelaw.

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in2011–2012;aswellasbytheeconomicdecline,whichhashitthesectorswhereitsmembersmaketheirliving,i.e.theindependentmedia,non-governmentalorganisationsand theadvertising in-dustry.39Paradoxically,openbordershavenothelpedthisgroup’sgrowth;manyswornopponentsofthegovernmenthavedecidedtoleavethecountrybecauseofthelackofanyprospectsforde-mocratisation. Russia has experienced an unprecedented waveofemigrationinrecentyears,40whichmainlyinvolvedmembersofthemiddleclasses,andiscomparableintermsofscaletotheemigrationwaveofthe1990s.IthascontributedtothegrowthofRussiandiasporasinCentralEurope(especiallyinLatvia,withitsliberalresidencyrules,aswellasBulgariaandtheCzechRepub-lic)andinWesternEurope(London,Berlin)41.

ThephenomenonobservedinRussia, i.e.theperiodicpoliticalmo-bilisationsofsomeoppositionsocialgroups(theperestroikawaveinthemid-1980s,thefirsthalfofthe1990s,theturnof2012)couldbeseenascyclical social involvement.Thosewavesofactivismhavetriggered(orstrengthened)processesatthenational level,buttheyhavenot ledtotheformationof lastingandinfluentialcivilsocietystructuresthatcoulddefendcivilrightsinRussiaandstrive toestablishsocietyasapoliticalactor.While thegeneralpublicisanimportant(orevencrucial)factorinthegovernment’slegitimacy,atthesametimeitisbeingeffectivelymanipulatedbythegovernmentusingeconomicandpropagandamethods.How-ever,contrarytosomeopinions, thecurrentrulingteamseemsincapableofbuilding a neo-totalitarian system involving themobilisationofthepublicandmassrepression.Theobstaclesthatprevent such a course includeboth the lack of an effective and

39 TheSMEsectorhasshrunkbyaroundamillionpeople.Formoreinforma-tion,seeGeorgyStepanov, Российский средний класс расстается с амби-циями,Novyye Izvestia,30March215.

40 Morethan200,000peopleemigratedfromRussiapermanentlyin2014,andmanyothershaveleftRussiatemporarilyormovedtheirfamiliesabroad.

41 SeeJadwigaRogoża,Emigracjarozczarowanych[Emigrationofthedisillu-sioned],Nowa Europa Wschodnia [New Eastern Europe],6/2014.

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efficient state apparatus, and the lackof an inspiring and com-monlysharedideology,whichtogethercouldeffectivelymobilisethemasses,aswasthecaseintheStalinistperiod.

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III. the outlooK for the future – change of the leaderShIP or the SyStem?

ThePutinistmodelofstateisfacingtheprospectofdegradation and financial & organisational inefficiency.TheresourcesthattheRussianstatewillcommandinthecomingyearswillbe in-creasinglyinsufficienttocovertheinflatedbudgetspendinglev-elsoftherecentpast,andortomeettheneedsoftheunreformedandcapital-intensiveeconomy,aswellastheappetitesoftheelitesatalllevelsandtheextensivenetworkoflobbyistswhohavebeenfeedingoffthepublicfinanceinRussiaandexpecttobecontinu-allysupportedbythestate.Moreover,thequalityofthedecisionsbeingtakenbythestateauthoritieshasbeendeclining,as theyhabituallyentail side-effectswhich in themselvesoftenrequirecostlyremedialmeasures.Asmentionedabove,theannexationofCrimeahasledtoaspectacularconsolidationofVladimirPutin’spower,butitalsotriggeredaconfrontationwiththeWest(whichhasharmedtheinterestsofmanygroupsinRussia)andthesanc-tionswhichhavehittheRussianeconomy;itforcedRussiatostartfinancing both the newly-acquired region and the subsequentmilitaryoperationinDonbas;anditboostedthestate’srepressivenature,againstrikingattheinterestsoflargesectionsoftheRus-sianelite.ThepolicyofconfrontationwiththeWesthasalsoaf-fectedRussia’seconomicmodelbasedonexportingtheresources–ofwhichtheEuropeanUnionis,andwillforsometimeremain,themainconsumer–andtheabsorptionofrevenuebytheelite.42

StudiesoftheRussianstate’sconditionincreasinglyrefertoanag-ony of the system,43whichhasbeenunabletogeneratenewdevel-opmentprojects,andwhosereactiontotheprogressingdegrada-tionhasbeenlimitedtoescalatingrepressionandtheuseofforce.

42 AsLiliaShevtsovahassaid,theKremlinhaschangedRussiaintoafortressundersiege,whichcannotbereconciledwithanotherparadigm,thatofRus-siathepetrolstation.Своим возрождением Запад будет обязан Путину,colta.ru,14April2015.

43 SeeLiliaShevtsova,HastheRussianSystem’sAgonyBegun?,op. cit.

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However,thesymptomsofagonydonotautomaticallymeanthatthecollapseofthePutinistsystemisimminent.Thesystem’sagonymayturnouttobeaprotractedprocess,becausetherearemanyfactorsinRussiawhichincreasethe system’s potential to endure,even while it continues to degrade. The economic and systemicfactorsthatshouldbenamedinthiscontext includethe ‘manualcontrol’mechanismsintheeconomywhich,eventhoughtheyper-petuatethearchaicandinefficienteconomicmodel,maybehelpfulinpostponingcrises in individualbranchesof theeconomy,sus-tainingindividualstrategicallyimportantenterprises,orregulat-ingthepricesofstaplefoods,whichisvitallyimportantforthelessaffluentstrataofsociety.ApossibleimprovementinthemarketforRussia’sexportresourcesinthecomingyearsmayalsocontributetoextendingthelifeofRussia’sinefficienteconomicmodel.

A numberofpoliticalandsocialfactorswillalsocontributetosus-tainingthe inefficient system.TheRussianpublicatlarge,whichassociatesanychangeofgovernmentwithdestabilisationandcha-os,haslenttherulingcampveryhigh(albeitpassive)support,andissusceptibletomanipulationbythegovernment.MeanwhilethatpartofRussiansocietywhoseattitudesandinterestsruncountertothegovernment’slineistooweakandsmalltobuildthecriticalmassneededtoinitiatechange.Theattitudeofthebroadlyunder-stoodelitesofRussia,i.e.business,thestateadministrationandtheintellectualandculturalcommunities,isevenmoresignificantforthepoliticalregime’sviability.Eventhoughmanygroupsintheelite(andbusinessinparticular)havebeensufferingconsiderablelossesasaresultoftheRussiangovernment’santi-Westernglobal-powerpoliticsandthelackofreliableguaranteesofpropertyrights,whattheyfearevenmoreisachangeofleadershipandthedestabilisa-tionitcouldentail.Thecurrentsystem,whilefarfromperfect,isstillregardedasalesserevilcomparedtotheprospectofchange.The dominant view, also outside Russia, is that Vladimir Putincould only be replaced by ‘someone evenworse’, such as amoreradicalmemberof the security servicesoranationalist.Thisat-titudetestifiestotheefficacyoftheKremlin’snarrative,whichhas

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beenbuildinganimageofPutinasthesoleguarantorofpoliticalandeconomicstability,thesole‘European’44andashieldtoprotecttheoligarchsandtheassetstheyacquiredforpeanutsinthe1990sfromthepeople’swrath.

At present, Putin’s inner circle, consisting of past and presentmembersofthesecretservices,hasthegreatestandmostdirectinfluence on the Russian leader’s position and continued rule.Only thisgroupseemsable toexert influencebothon thedeci-sionsofthepresidentandthedecisionsconcerningthepresident.Asstatedabove,thesepeoplesharePutin’sworldview,whilethepresidentisaguaranteethattheyretaintheirpositionandinflu-ence.However,thegreatestchallengetothesystem’sstabilityisposedbyitsownunderlyingfeature,i.e.thefactthatitisbasedoninformalrules,personallinks,sympathiesandrelationsoftrustthatarefarfromtransparentorpredictable.Insuchconditions,externalobserversfinditverydifficulttopreciselydiagnoseandidentify the relationswithin the system, the shifting interestsandambitionsofindividualactors.Asresearchersargue,intheevent of a ‘palace coup’, the criteria guiding the elitemembersconductingthecoupareveryfarfromwhatisconsideredaspub-lic policy criteria in democratic states. Thekey factors concernneitherthepopularityoftheleadertobetoppled,norlevelsofeco-nomicgrowth,butrather thearbitrary interestsandambitionsofthoseundertakingthecoup.45AtthisstageitcouldbesaidthatPutin’spolicyhasalsobeen triggeringsomemutedreactions inhisclosestcircle.Accordingtoresearchers,thevoiceofYevgenyPrimakov,therecentlydeceasedformerprimeministerandheadoftheForeignIntelligenceService,highlyrespectedinthesecret

44 ThisillustratesacertainhistoricalcontinuityinthethinkingoftheRussianeliteandintelligentsia,whosebiggestfearconcernsa‘revoltofthemasses’;inthiscontextoneoftenhearsthequotefromAlexanderPushkin:“Thegovern-mentisthesoleEuropeaninourcountry”.

45 SeeNaunihalSingh,Seizingpower:Thestrategiclogicofmilitarycoups,inYekaterinaShulman,Неокремлинология и ее пределы,Vedomosti, 2Febru-ary2015.

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servicecommunity,wasasignalof thiskind. Inhis statementsandpublications lastyear,Primakovexpressedcautious scepti-cismabouttheconflictwiththeWest,whichinhisviewhadgonetoofar,andthelossesithadgeneratedforRussia.46

Another challenge to the current personalised regime and Pu-tin’spositioncomesfromtheneedtoconstantlydemonstrate the leader’s strength, skill and vitality.Insuchasystemthepresi-dent’s image,andespeciallythewayhe isperceivedbyhisowncircle,isasimportantashisformalprerogatives.ThisisvisibleintheKremlin’spropaganda,whichhasbeenemphasisingthepresi-dent’spersonalroleinthepivotalmomentsofRussianhistory(thedocumentariesmentionedaboveattributeRussia’ssuccessesoverthelast15yearssolelytoPutin).Atthesametime,Putin’sindeci-sioninsomecrucialsituationshashadanadverseimpactonhisimage.Much criticismwas voiced after the president failed toadoptadecisivestanceintheaftermathofBorisNemtsov’sassas-sination,ortotakeanyvisiblemeasurestoresolvetheopencon-flictthatbrokeoutatthattimebetweenthesecretservices(theFSB and the Investigative Committee) and the Chechen leaderRamzanKadyrov.Thepresident’s imagewasalsomarredbyhispanickyreactionon‘BlackTuesday’(16December2014,whentheexchangerateoftheroubleagainstthedollarandtheeuroplum-meted),orhishelplessnessduringtheannualpressconferencesinDecember2014andApril2015,whenhewasunabletopresenta convincing strategy for solving Russia’s deepening economicproblems or offer a vision of Russia’s further development. Fi-nally,histen-daydisappearanceinMarch2015alsocreatedabadimpression,asittriggeredawaveofspeculationsabouthishealthand plastic surgery procedures that hewas allegedly undergo-ing. Such critiques,which are thepolitical norm indemocratic

46 ProfessorMarkGaleotti,whostudiestheRussianpowerelite,hascoinedtheterm‘seventhcolumn’todenotetheinfluentialsiloviksinPutin’sinnercirclewhoopposefurtherconfrontationwiththeWesternworldandmayposethegreatestchallengetoPutin’sposition.Seehttps://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2015/01/24/russias-intelligence-system-a-presentation

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countries,resonatewidelyintheextremelypersonalisedRussiansystem,andaprotracted,unexplainedabsenceoftheleadermayupsetthesystemasitreliesonthe‘manualcontrol’mode.

TheevolutionofthePutinistsystemdemonstratesthattheRus-sian leadershiphas followed thepathofundemocratic regimes,which often start by carrying out reforms in the spirit of ‘en-lightened absolutism’ and enduppreserving their powerusingevermoreradicalmethods.Suchsystemsrenderitimpossibleforthoseinpowertostepdownvoluntarily,becausedoingsowouldmeanlosingtheirposition,assets,andsometimeseventheirper-sonalsecurity.this makes a peaceful succession less likely to happen and imposes the logicofextendingthe leader’srule in-definitely,which can only be limited by a “human factor”. Theexperienceofthelast15yearsofRussia’shistoryshowsthat‘ex-traordinarymeans’,i.e.military successes and gains in foreign conflicts,arethemosteffectivewaytoconsolidatepower.Putin’spopularitypeakedin2000,attheheightoftheSecondChechenWar;in2008duringthearmedconflictwithGeorgia;andintheyears2014–2015,followingtheannexationofCrimeaandduringtheconflictineasternUkraine.Sucheventsareeffectiveinmak-ingthepublicforgetaboutinternalproblems,includingeconomicdifficulties.47 However, this mechanism may be double-edged,andoncetheforeignconflictisover,thesociety’sattentionshiftsbacktointernalissues,includingthevitalquestionofstandardsofliving(afterthe‘Georgianeuphoria’publicsentimentsquicklystartedtodeteriorateasaresultoftheeconomiccrisisintheyears2008–2009).The subsidence of popular euphoria oneyear aftertheannexationofCrimeaalsoprovesthattheeffectsoftheuseofforceandpropagandainevitablywearoff.That,inturn,makesitmorelikely,oreveninevitable,thattheuseofsuchmethodswillbeescalatedandthefieldsofconflictexpanded.

47 MikhailDmitriyev, Внешнеполитический конфликт как основа рейтинга президента, Vedomosti, 1March2015.

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EventhoughtheRussianleadershiphasinstrumentstoprolongthedurationofthecurrentsystem,itsinternalunpredictabilitymay result in the accumulationofnegative factors and, in con-sequence,anextensive crisis of the state.While it isprobablethat in the aftermath of such a crisis the country’s leadershipmaybereplaced,asystemic change leadingtotheformationofadecentralisedpolitical systembasedon institutions isamuchlessrealisticprospect.TheauthoritarianmodelofpowerrootedintheRussiantraditionseemssettooutlastthecurrentRussianleadership.Atthisstage,therearenomajorforcesinRussiathatcould offer a programme for a deep reform of the statemodel,evenamongtheopposition.Thepoliticalprojectsthatexist,suchasthoseofAlexeiNavalnyortheémigréMikhailKhodorkovsky,aregeneralanddonothavemanysupporters,whichmeansthatatthisstagetheyaresimplyutopian.Anewleadershipcouldonlybe‘ushered’intotheKremlinbymembersofthecurrentrulingelite,whoarelikelytooptforsystemicandpersonalcontinuity.

mareK menKISzaK (ed.)