Pergamon

Information Processing & Management, Vol. 31, No. 4. lap. 479-490. 1995 Copyright 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd

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TRENDS IN . . . A CR IT ICAL REVIEW

THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION- - I I . CONCEPTS OF

INFORMATION AND ITS VALUE

MICHEL J. MENOU CIDEGI, 129 Av. P. Vaillant-Couturier, F-94250, Gentilly, France

(Received September 1994; accepted in final form January 1995)

Abstract--A renewal of interest for the theory of information seems to emerge from a series of recent publications. A number of them advocate a shift toward a cognitive perspective. The preliminary investigation of the concept of impact of information and the research questions raised by its assessment suggest that the most significant impact may be found in the transformation of knowledge structures at the deep paradigmatic level as a result of information-as-contents. This leads to propose a revised formulation of Brookes' Funda- mental equation and possible approaches for describing the attributes of the beneficiaries and their knowledge structure.

INTRODUCTION

The previous article, "The impact of information--I. Toward a research agenda for its definition and measurement" described the project "Impact of information on development" of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and reviewed the research issues involved in the assessment of the impact of information, further to the first report of the project (Menou, 1995). It stressed that among the different states of information, information-as-contents might be the most critical. We now expand these considerations by revisiting the theories of information and suggesting a model for the assessment of information-as-contents, which was first outlined in an earlier paper (Menou, 1995).

THE NEED FOR A THEORY

The question of the impact of information inevitably brings to the fore the lasting issue of a theory of information. Recent literature seems to evidence a renewal of interest for this question. Dervin and Nilan (1986) reviewed the major tensions and stressed the role of "a definitional conceptualization" as "clear premises for focusing on variables and generating research questions" (p. 5).

Many efforts are directed at refining Shannon and Weaver's theory (e.g. Heilprin, 1989; Cole, 1993) and incorporating into it some additional parameters which, by way of simplification, may be coined as "intelligence factors". One of the latest examples is Hayes' introduction of a syntactic measure (Hayes, 1993). But these models are mostly geared to the analysis of discrete transactions, either single or iterative, of single messages exchanged between a single pair of sender and recipient. The engineering perspective which commands this form of information theory, prevents the required distinction between "the concepts of information itself and amount of information" as Langlois (1982, p. 395) puts it.

Even in the most simple situation, any human being, or adaptive system, is in fact exposed to, or using, a plurality of sources and channels conveying a plurality of messages, e.g. checking

479

480 Michel J. Menou

I PItOBI.I~ IDENTIFICATION

! PROBLEM FORaMULATION

1 I SOLUTION FORMULATION

_1 CHOICE OF

ACTION

ACTION

EX RNAL I INFORMATION I RESOURCES ,,,,,,I

E /Jt S

INTERNAL

KNOWLEDGE

BASE

I

PERSONALITY I

CULTURE I

EMOTION ]

LOGIC I

INTELLIGENCE

m

Fig. 1. Information use, externalities and internalities.

the time at one's watch, the car's clock and from the radio; assuming they do not give exactly the same time, which is quite likely, how to decide which is the correct one, and how much does it matter, depending on the nature of one's next commitment, depending also on individual and social concepts of punctuality? I have tentatively depicted the real information use situations in the model presented in Fig. 1. It tries to show in first place that the steps in the problem-solving process primarily rely upon the internal knowledge base (individual or collective) to which external resources have to be combined. The internal knowledge base, in second place, operates under the influence of a series of factors, or motors if we wish to use an artificial intelligence metaphor, identified for the time being as personality, culture, emotion, logic (reasoning process) and intelligence (quality of judgement). The latter also continuously interact one with the other. The distinction between logic and intelligence may find a basis in Brookes' observation (Brookes, 1980a, p. 252) that "Problems can be solved by objective calculation or by making a judgement .... As sound judgements are of great social importance, it surprises me that so much effort is devoted to the teaching of calculation and so little to the teaching of judgement". I was pleased to discover, retrospectively, that the motors identified in this model are quite close to the

Concepts of information and its value 481

attributes Brookes had mentioned for what he called the "meta-cognitive basis". Other attractive metaphors about information are mentioned or tried from time to time. One

of them stems from the many analogies between information and energy, of which Stonier (1991) recently reminded us. Otten and Debons (1970) also noted that "information, like, energy, can be viewed as a fundamental phenomenon . . . . Similarly, the attributes of information are experienced in various forms (knowledge, news, etc.)". Another metaphor, which should have deserved more attention, is based on the similarities between information and money, which Ribault (1993) explored with a parallel between information and capital.

REDUCING THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE CONCEPT OF INFORMATION

Thow-Yick (1994, p. 653) suggests in his first postulate that "Data, information, knowledge and wisdom are the only basic entities of information theory". The taxonomy is however far from established and systematically adhered to. It would be advisable, even if this is to be an open-ended task, to establish it more firmly and avoid the shifts between these basic notions, especially information and knowledge, which are far too common in the literature.

The word "information" encapsulates a wide range of concepts and phenomena, of which Belkin (1978) provided a most useful review. They relate to both processes and material states which are closely inter-related and may often come to play in any situation. That they are inextricably interwoven is no excuse for not pursuing their differentiation and definition, even if the latter are only tentative and temporary. Remaining alert about what type of information one is dealing with at any stage appears to be a basic requirement for effective reasoning.

The processes refer to the transformation and transportation of information. One may consider that they involve 6 main types of activities:

--acquisition, --material, or physical, processing, --intellectual processing, --transmission, --utilization, and --assimilation.

Information-as-object may be differentiated according to its source, or store, as suggested by Ruben (1992). I would rather consider 4 instead of his 3 orders:

- - the hidden information existing in nature but yet to be discovered, - - the information existing in the environment, consisting of messages or stimuli, which are

intelligible but waiting to be perceived and interpreted (also called latent information), - -the information configured by individuals, and --the information configured by groups or social systems.

There might soon be a need for a fifth order, the artificial information contained in computer systems for collective use.

Information may further be categorized according to its various "states", which can be:

- -a product, which encompasses information-as-thing, as-object, as-resource and as- commodity;

- -what is carried in a channel, including by extension the channel itself, as for instance assumed in expressions such as "electronic information", or "the media"; and

--the contents.

All processes, sources and states constantly interact and are interdependant. But they are distinct and do not have the same "value". Protons and neutrons are both basic constituents of nuclei, neither the higher nor the lower orders exist without the other. Likewise information when communicated can be characterized concurrently by its source, process(es) and form(s) under each product, channel and contents states. The primitive logic by which western thought tries to force reality into rigid classifications and obliges to consider any entity is either in or out

482 Michel J. Menou

a given category, while it is both in and out, is more an impediment than anything else. In this respect, the communitarian, or dialogic, ontological stereotype suggested by Dervin (1994) might offer a most appropriate alternative.

When considering the nature and role of information, from whatever perspective, meaning, or sense-making, becomes central. Sperber and Wilson (1986) tell us that "a fact is manifest to a person at a given time if and only if he can understand it at that time, and accept its representation as true or probably true". Information operates only when it "makes sense", that is either fit with pre-existing meanings, or even can be integrated to them, and thus possibly transform them. Asking West African mothers to report incidents such as blood in the urine of their children, in order to monitor the spread of bilharziosis, when they instead consider the lack of blood as being abnormal, is one among the many examples of the basic requirement for meaning.

THE "FUNDAMENTAL EQUATION" REVISITED

If, in our quest for the impact or value of information, we "focus on how people construct sense", as Dervin and Nilan (1986, p. 16) advocated, we should then recognize that it is only in the contents state that the essential value of information might be discovered. This by no means implies that the other states have no value. They clearly have one, would it be only transitory. The perspectives which have so far prevailed were perhaps too much dependant on grossly oversimplified types of "users" or "use" seeking an immediate solution to discrete problems. While a value of information can be found there, I feel that its lasting value, if any, is far more significant.

The contents state is itself made of successive layers:

--semantic, --syntactic, and --paradigmatic.

All three contribute to the construction of meaning. But, from the example above, which is a typical case of what Belkin and Oddy (1978) call an "Anomalous state of knowledge", it is clear that in the absence of a supportive paradigm, a message recognized only at the semantic and syntactic levels will have no, or limited, effect. However, information-as-contents which is not supported by existing paradigmatic structures, may well be assimilated, or memorized and further used, to some extent. Most people know and can use, at least for communication purposes, facts and concepts which they do not believe in and do not rely upon when it comes to making serious choices or taking action. For instance, as a result of the current campaigns, one may assume that many West-African males "know" appropriate means of protection against AIDS. Yet, as most of those means are perceived, at the deeper paradigmatic level of their knowledge base, as destructing their male identity, a surrogate of castration, they are not likely to use them.

From an impact perspective, it seems to me that information is only a means to an end and thus not the principal, or most promising, object of investigation. Machlup (1980, p. 56) already alerted us that "information as the act of informing is designed to produce a state of knowing". The impact of information is to be seen in the improvement of a new state of knowledge over the previous one as a result of information-as-contents. That is in first place the reduction of the anomaly. But the reduction of the anomaly does not only temporarily add contents to the state of knowledge, it may also transform the contents and organization of its superficial layers (semantic and syntactic levels) and possibly of its deep layer (paradigmatic level) as noted by Katzer and Snyder (1990). Brookes (1980a) had already suggested that "information (is) that which adds to or modifies a knowledge structure". He also mentioned that "Yet the subjective provides the meta-cognitive basis---4he overview, the perspective, the judgements--which give purpose and direction to all objective thought". The "meta-cognitive basis" is what I call the paradigmatic structure, for lack of a better expression. This notion may also be refered to as the stock of cognitive maps, global layers, frames etc. Cole (1994) shows the importance many

Concepts of information and its value 483

authors have recognized to the existence and role of a lower and higher, or deeper, level in the knowledge structure. It may well be that the deeper, paradigmatic structure is itself composed of several sub-layers. At the surface those which provide the connections necessary for understanding and use, though not necessarily acceptance. At the core, those on which appropriation is grounded, which contain "our theory of the world in our heads" (Smith, 1988). That the different levels in the knowledge structure work independently seems to be a reasonably established, but this does not exclude their interdependance in the later stages of sense making and integration of the new elements into the knowledge structure.

Strong stressed the importance of "another kind of information to be considered in behaving systems which is not directly treated in classical information theory--that deals with pattern, and thus with meaning in relation to goal-directed behavior". Assuming that the process of information reduction by which significance is established in terms of meeting goals and needs is primarily a pattern-based selection as he suggests (Strong, 1982, p. 403), the principal benefit of information is to be looked for in the enhancement of the paradigmatic structure of the knowledge base.

The "fundamental equation" proposed by Brookes (1980a,b) is not altered in this statement. He tentatively formulated (Brookes, 1980a) it as:

A I-,K(S + A S)-K(S)

where

K(S) is the knowledge structure AI is the increment of information S is the effect of the modification.

He also gave (Brookes, 1980b) another formulation which reads:

K(S)+AI=K(S+AS).

If the knowledge structure is defined as the paradigmatic structure, the fundamental equation may be kept as it is. However one may wish to distinguish between the superficial knowledge structure (semantic and syntactic) and the deep structure (paradigmatic) and thus use two parallel equations of the same form. One may further consider that the ultimate benefit of information is a combination of the two. I feel that it may be possible to derive from the above another "'fundamental equation" for the effect, or value, of information, which would read:

E=K(S+f(S, AI))-K(S)

where K(S) stands for the paradigmatic structure of the knowledge base. Brookes also mentioned that the increment of information could be measured in bits, what

may apply for the superficial structure, but not for the deep one. As a matter of fact, we do not know which measures could be appropriate for the paradigmatic structure, the pattern content, of information or the knowledge structure, whether the subject is an individual or, even less, if it is a group. This is yet another exciting subject for future investigations.

The above implies that information-as-contents, in order to have a lasting value, should first present attributes that meet the requirements resulting from the existing paradigmatic structure of the knowledge base, in order to be acknowledged, possibly understood, memorized and eventually used at a later stage. Information-as-contents should secondly, in order to have a lasting impact, transform the existing knowledge structure in such a way that it becomes more able to cope with the kind of problem at hand, or is perceived as such. These two conditions can be seen as a result of the quality which Cole (1994, p. 473) expects from information: "being unexpected and expected, old and new at the same time". Until further examination, I feel that the requirement set by Cole (1994, p. 470) in his second criterion that "Information must modify knowledge structure at the highest fundamental level of it, not the lower level of it" can apply to the essential and lasting value of information-as-contents. But a less valuable yet significant modification can be limited to increments to the existing structure, e.g. simply validating it through another experience, and also occur at the superficial level.

The stock of paradigms is not static, even though it may evolve only slowly. It is also not isolated but permanently confronted with incoming information-as-contents it has to process and

484 Michel J. Menou

organize. The more information-as-contents carries patterns that can be absorbed, the higher its value. The more diversified, comprehensive and flexible the stock of paradigms available to individuals and groups, the more they are able to interpret new information, or to generate appropriate meanings, hopefully leading to adapted actions. Not only is the transformation likely to require a two-stage process as Cole is suggesting, but it may well require a series of successful iterations of the process associated with successful actions. The transformation of the knowledge structure, both at the superficial and deep levels, is obviously at least a part of, if not the key to, leaming. These statements echo one of the fundamental questions in information science research mentioned by Kochen (1984, p. 198) "What is the process of learning, of growth in knowledge, growth in understanding and growth in wisdom?".

The shift from information to knowledge, which represents information that has been understood and assimilated, in first place, and more importantly, perhaps further to a maturation period during which the new structure is trialed, information that has been appropriated, has many important consequences. With regard to developing countries, it implies in particular that indigenous knowledge rather than the "world's stores of information" and access to them should be regarded as the main source of potential benefits. Machlup (1980, p. 167) told us that "from various points of view, "living knowledge", or what living people know, may be the relevant stock of knowledge in society".

AND WISDOM IN ALL THAT?

A rich knowledge base does not however guarantee that it will ever be used in a considerate fashion so that the reactions, actions or adaptations it will support will result in a well balanced, more satisfactory, reversible and so to speak, better situation. To that end, adaptive systems need to turn knowledge into wisdom. Wisdom may depict those knowledge structures which have been so organized and factored that their use offers minimal risks of unappropriate outcomes and maximizes the comfort of the users with the outcomes. In other words, wisdom is what increases harmony. Or happiness. This may be dependent in part on the ability of the paradigmatic structure of the knowledge base. And it is certainly also dependent in part on the attributes of the users, of which some will be discussed below.

Criteria for wisdom are certainly not universal and may not apply beyond individual ideology. Wisdom can perhaps be witnessed only in retrospect or in comparison. The seven principles set forth by the Foundation for human progress in its manifesto "For a jointly responsible and liable world" (Foundation pour le progr~s humain, 1994) may offer a first approximation of wisdom. They are: safeguard, humanity, responsibility, moderation, caution, diversity and citizenship.

Schoenhoff (1993, p. 100) reminds us that "In many Third World cultures, where formal education is still the exception, there is a greater emphasis upon wisdom than upon knowledge, a greater respect for the wise judge than for the scholar". By any yardstick, contemporary societies have a long way to go before they achieve it. Societies which are the better off with regard to their material wealth, technological capacity and richness of their knowledge base can be predatory and ultimately self-destructive, as evidenced by so many examples in history and contemporary affairs. Is it wise, for instance to turn thousand of acres of amazonian forests into grasslands for future hamburgers?

In spite of its merits, Thow-Yick (1994, p.652) attempt at formalizing wisdom as "a small increment in knowledge created by a person's intellectual deductive ability after attaining a sufficient level of understanding of the knowledge area" and more drastically his concept that "this creation of new knowledge is usually the activity of experts or intellectuals", sounds somewhat short and biased toward the western-like techno-structure. For the common human beings, rather that the originality or creativity he recognizes as a special attribute of wisdom, it is its general trustworthiness which is critical. And the latter is more dependent on repetition than novelty.

The conditions for the transformation of knowledge into wisdom and the attributes of wisdom are subjects which should deserve more attention in the information science community and

Concepts of information and its value 485

elsewhere. The session on "Wisdom is . . . " organized by Karl Schneider at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Society for Information Science is hopefully a positive signal.

ASSESSING ATTRIBUTES OF THE CONSTITUENCIES

It should also be emphasized that attempts at "measuring" information-as-contents, or any other state, as a discrete entity cannot go without a parallel effort at characterizing the individuals or groups which are using it and possibly measuring their most critical traits. Thus the importance of the description of the Information Use Environments (Taylor, 1991), which was stressed in the previous article, and by other authors such as Debons et al. (1993). The IUEs specifies in particular the power balance under which information use, and thus its impact, occur. Its importance is not limited to the dialectics of information and democracy which Dervin (1994, p. 381) reminded, but apply for all aspects of empowerment. The range of logics upon which people depend is another key consideration which was discussed in the previous article. Dervin (1994, p. 382) puts it beautifully: "To remain muddled, to refuse to choose, to dream instead of seek facts-these can be all as informative, and therefore as gap-bridging-as what traditionally has been thought of as information seeking and use (e.g. fact finding, evidence collecting, deciding, source connecting)". It would inded be interesting to know the relative importance among human beings (individually and in groups) of these activities, and of the purposeful activities and the lower order ones suggested by Ackoff (1971).

A tentative list of the attributes to be considered, and possibly included as a subset of the measurements, would include:

(1) readiness, or willingness (2) propensity to change (3) capability, or ability (4) appropriation (5) "gestuality" (6) mediacy (7) objectification or "reification" of institutions.

Readiness and capability, according to Lamberton (1993) may be regarded as especially important. Cole (1994, p. 467) also recognizes their role, after Pratt. Readiness can be described as the willingness and ability to act upon the problem. This in many instances is dependent on another trait, which Slamecka (1982) identified as propensity to change. It should not be limited to the condition of the actual system, after all everybody expects an improvement of his/her lot, but be concerned with the structure of the system. And clearly resistance to change is the first and foremost protection of all adaptive systems against inconsiderate transformations. Capability is the talent to turn action into effective results.

I would add a fourth attribute, "appropriation", which is the sense of ownership of the means and ends, or more simply the perception that what is a stake is one's business. Kuhlthau (1988, p. 300) noted for instance that her subjects "revealed a sense of ownership on an internal, intellectual and private level. There was an element of possession in the process as well as the product". Appropriation may also be expressed through the belonging to the group, or relationship with the master, so essential in the initiation process, which is, as I once stressed (Menou, 1969) a basic information transfer pattern.

A fifth trait, which I would call "gestuality", may be of particular importance. It relates to the fact that the application of paradigms is evidenced in behavior. Strong (1982, p. 405) refers to the possibility "that pattern is constructed via behavior representations--as the "glue" relating one state to another. This particular form of organization of information may be a result of the social adaptation of primates whereby behavioral invariance is important in the ability to pass along group adaptations. This view would lend to a new basis for theories of the social construction of reality in that it is much easier for organisms to copy one another's behavior than share one another's perception". The importance of tales in the transmission of knowledge, stressed by Bruner (1991) could be considered as an indication of the soundness of this

IPM 31-4-C

486 Michel J. Menou

assumption. Tales convey knowledge through the description of behaviors. I would not be surprised that what we call "innate" is nothing but paradigms of the knowledge base which were glued over so many thousands of years of behavior that they became part of our heritage, e.g. the fascination for fire I refered to in the above quoted paper, or standard machism. How could this be demonstrated is another story, worth attention.

Mediacy (Carbo Bearman, 1992), that is the understanding of, and ability to use modem media, was discussed in the previous paper. The last trait was suggested by Cherry (1977, p. 201) who saw the trust in "idealized" institutions, as opposed to personally known individuals, as one key to the effective use of modem information.

These traits are obviously dependent on the complex interaction of a wealth of factors. But they also suppose the existence of paradigms which can support them. In the absence of those traits, the availability of information-as-contents would make no difference, as we have plenty of evidence with regard to the protection of the environment, prevention of AIDS and the like. The timely provision of accurate and relevant information to the highly educated professionals who flourish in today's large and complex organizations seems on the contrary to breed more and more failures.

ASSESSING THE PARADIGMATIC STRUCTURE

Should one accept that the more significant impact of information is to be looked at in the transformation of the paradigmatic level of the knowledge structure, then comes the question of suitable ways to identify and characterize a stock of paradigms and its evolution.

One would have to identify in first place the groups to be studied, whose IUEs should then be described. The groups should then be segmented and sampled as appropriate. One would then proceed with the subjects to the identification of a specific problem, which is regarded as critical, and should be defined as precisely as possible, using when appropriate a nested hierarchy in order to reduce it to discrete components. An example of a problem could be "Defending crops against baboons" or "Availability of welfare programs for single mothers to support the education of their children".

The next step would be to identify, in cooperation with the sample group, the critical factors associated with the solution of the problem. Then, the more important ones may be selected, if there are too many and/or some appear to be more closely connected to the problem. One would have to further list the information which is related to each factor. At this stage, one would be in a position to move into the analysis of the paradigms which are called upon in order to interpret this information. This is obviously a quite difficult exercise, in which one should limit as far as possible, if not avoid, interferences from the observer. Some methods are available for surveying the semantic and syntactic contents of knowledge bases, such as the grids for mental constructs developed by Kelly (1955), or the "informs" and "knows" suggested by Debons (1994), which may provide a useful starting point.

I do not know yet of any tool for digging out the paradigmatic structures, except perhaps those which were used by ethnologists for the structural analysis of tales, beliefs and the like and of course psycho-analytic techniques, which may be difficult to apply in the context we are considering. Both the process of interpretation of information-as-contents and the deepest layers of the paradigms are in fact often "unconscious, what does not necessarily means superficial" (Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983, p. 34). Semi-directive interviews with neutral question leading the respondents to state the attributes attached to each information item and sources may perhaps be a solution. For instance a statement like "The extension agent is seldom available" may be specified by questions like "How often is he/she in the village?", "Is he/she aware of your problems?", "Is he/she doing some fact finding for the administration when you ask for information?" in order to find out whether the original statement refers to such dimensions as exogeneity, distanciation from the group, interference from the administration or any combination of the above. The paradigms behind each information item will hopefully emerge in the course of the fact finding with also possibly some of their attributes, or dimensions.

One would then have to run a second series of interviews in order to position the paradigms

Concepts of information and its value 487

along the axes of the dimensions, as discussed below. Here again extreme care should be taken not to bias the answers and their interpretation. During this process, new dimensions may become apparent. The investigator will also be in a position, either from the original replies or from subsidiary questions, to determine the relative importance and significance of the various dimensions. This discussion may also help single out the most critical factors and/or a selection of the most relevant paradigms. It would then be possible to tentatively draw the maps for single paradigms and, when appropriate and feasible, a combined map, based for instance on mean values on each axis.

The resulting picture could be validated by constructing stories similar to those by which the initial information was gathered, relying upon paradigms with the same dimensions as those found, or on the contrary antithetic ones, and analyzing the feedback of the respondents when they hear these stories. If the behaviour and information reported in the story are judged valid, in the case when the same dimensions are implied, or else invalid, one may assume that the mapping is correct. Group discussions of the findings or the simple observation of relevant cases may also be considered as means of validation. One time investigations are not likely to yield decisive results because of the risk of misinterpretation and other interferences. It would be advisable to repeat them at regular intervals over some time, as a further means of verification. More distant observations would probably be even more interesting by evidencing possible changes in the paradigmatic stock and the related information use and behaviour.

MAPPING THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PARADIGMATIC STRUCTURE

Trying to impose preconceived yardsticks may be fraught with ethnocentric biases. It seems more appropriate to derive the measures from the properties which will emerge from actual observations and be recognized as significant and discriminant by the various groups being investigated.

However, it may be helpful to refer from the inception to a number of dimensions which a priori appear to be useful pointers to the characteristics of a given stock of paradigms. I have tentatively identified 7 dimensions, on the basis of those particular aspects of appropriate information which are often mentioned in the literature, for instance Neelameghan (1981), and/or those I had the opportunity to observe:

--Informal-Formal, which refers to the existence, or not, of an identified formal source for the paradigms,

----Endogenous-Exogenous, which refers to the fact that the paradigms originated, or not, from within the group,

---Resident-Circulating, which refers to the fact that the paradigms remain unsaid or are exposed to open discussion,

---Unconscious-Conscious, which refers to the degree to which the paradigms are grounded in structured justifications,

--Ancient-Recent, which refers to the lasting of the paradigms, --Stable-Changing, which refers to the possibility for the paradigms to be adapted, or not,

as a result of experience, ---Multiple purposes-Single purpose, which refers to the range of events whose

interpretation can be supported by the paradigms.

Not all these dimensions may be relevant in any particular context. Other dimensions may also prove appropriate in particular cases. I feel nevertheless, at the present time, that the proposed 7 dimensions are in fact most critical ones with regard to the ability of a stock of paradigms to put a community in a better position to cope with the challenges of its existence.

These dimensions should be seen as axes along which the paradigms can be positioned. Although it is possible that some paradigms fully fit at any one end of an axis, the more likely situation is that they take an intermediate position, being more formal than informal, more circulating than resident, etc. The relative position could be depicted by using, for instance, a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 would represent a fully informal paradigmatic stock, 5 an equally

488 MichelJ. Menou

7 FONCTIONS MULTIPLES MULTIPLE PURPOSES

1 2 FORMELLE ENDOGENE

FORMAL ENDOGENOUS

6 CHANGEANTE

CHANGING

5 RECENTE RECENT

4 CONSCIENTE COUNSCIOUS

3 RESlDENTE RESIDENT

4 INCONSCIENTE

UNCOUNSClOUS

5 ANClENNE ANCIENT

3 CIRCULANTE CIRCULATING

6 STABLE STABLE

2 EXOGENE 7

EXOGENOUS 1 FONCTION UNIQUE INFORMELLE SINGLE PURPOSE INFORMAL

Fig. 2. Hypothetical maps of the dimensions of the paradigmatic core of information and knowledge.

informal and formal paradigmatic stock and 10 a fully formal paradigmatic stock, etc. A "traditional" stock of paradigms could hypothetically be characterized as being fully informal, endogenous, resident, unconscious, ancient, stable and multiple purposes. This implying no value judgement. Conversely a flexible and responsive paradigmatic stock may be a priori depicted as one which would concentrate in the area along the axes which is more congenial to the problem at hand, or in general terms evenly distributed around the median position. Considering, for example, the adoption of a new cultural practice, an appropriate stock of paradigms would need to be more on the formal, exogenous, circulating, conScious, recent, changing and single purpose side.

Using these dimensions, one may be able to draw maps similar to the chart of a visual field. The notation of the dimensions could not be done by means of single dots on the axis. It calls for lines to be drawn from the centre and extending toward both ends, so as to represent the balance between the two extreme states. Half a unit on the scale would represent 10% in either direction. An equally formal and informal and informal paradigm would be represented by a line equally distributed from the centre, from 2,5 on one side to 2,5 on the other. A 60% formal paradigm would thus be represented by a line of 6 units on the formal side and 4 on the informal one. A 60 % informal paradigm by a line of 6 units on the informal side and 4 on the formal one. A 100% formal paradigm by a 10 units line on the formal side.

The differences between the paradigmatic stocks of two groups confronted with a particular problem, or the evolution of the paradigmatic stock of a single group over time, in conjunction with an improved supply of information for instance, could then be visualized and assessed. A theoretical example is shown in Fig. 2 where I tentatively mapped the paradigmatic stock of two groups, e.g. farmers and extension workers, involved in a given problem such as the preservation of water resources in a Sahel village.

Concepts of information and its value 489

CONCLUSION

Focusing on information-as-contents and its ability to transform the paradigmatic structure of the knowledge bases does not invalidate the concerns which were discussed in the previous article. Information products whose contents would be appropriate to the problem at hand could certainly contribute to bring about a positive solution, at least in the short-term. But it adds, in my view, an essential perspective which may well form a field of research in its own right.

If one is sensitive to a broad and universal notion of development which would be the enhanced capability of individuals and groups to cope with their problems and achieve more harmony both within themselves and in relation to their environment, the issue of the transformation of the knowledge structures and especially their deep paradigmatic layers becomes central.

The speculative nature of the above outlined concepts and models needs no emphasis. We are nevertheless struck by the apparent convergence they seem to have with a number of recent contributions. A renewal of interest and possibly a leap forward seems to take shape on this front. In addition to the many questions underlying what we said in these two articles on the impact of information, two of those mentioned by Dervin (1994, p. 383) are certainly worth mentioning "What are the different strategies people use to construct and deconstruct their worlds? What are the different ways in which humans conform to and resist order?"

Empirical research is required in order to determine whether:

- - the concepts and models I have suggested can be applied; ---objective, or non-biased, measures of these dimensions can be performed, and - - the resulting assessments and maps allow for meaningful interpretations in the eyes of

both the groups under study and the investigator.

It is hoped that a first attempt could be made in the framework of a research project to be soon initiated in Africa. Appropriate procedures and protocols for fact finding and interpretation can only be devised on this occasion.

Kochen (1984) challenged us with one of his open and fundamental questions for information science research: "Can a deeper conceptualization of "information" that includes the relation to meaning, decision-relevancy, reduction of uncertainty, complexity and tension be devised that lead to insights about its nature and properties?" In face of this questioning, most of the high- tech induced subjects which monopolize the research agenda of information science seem somewhat futile. The two types of research may be more interdependent than usually acknowledged. As a matter of fact, the reader will have noted the convergence, though at different levels and with different perspectives, of the above mentioned concerns and those of, for instance, research on relevance (Froehlich & Eisenberg, 1994), or on knowledge utilization (Lunin & Paisley, 1993).

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