Prepared by: Nonabel Bermejo

G.R. No. 187052 September 13, 2012

Plaintiff-Appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Accused-Appellant: MELISSA CHUA a.k.a. Clarita Ng Chua

Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR.,J.

Facts of the Case:

Private complainants Alberto A.Aglanao,Rey P. Tajadao,Billy R. Danan and Roylan Ursulum filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in large scale against Melissa Chua alleging that the latter offered them a job as factory workers inTaiwan fordeployment within amonth. Sherequired eachofthem onseparate occasions to undergo medical examination and pay aplacement fee of P 80,000each. Chua assured each of them that whoever pays the application fee the earliestcanleavesooner.Aftercompletingpayment,they followed-uptheir applications.However,theylearnedthatChuawasnotlicensedtorecruit workers for overseas employment.

Appellant Melissa Chua was charged on May 6, 2003, with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Appellant was also charged with four counts of estafa in separate Informations, which, save for the date and the names of private complainants.

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges. A joint trial of the cases ensued.

Chua denied having recruited private complainants for overseas employment and interposed the defense that she was only a cashier at Golden Gate Office and that she has no knowledge of whether the agency was licensed to recruit workers during her tenure as it has been delisted. The RTC of Manila found Chua guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, which was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Can an illegal recruiter be held liable for both illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa?

Law:

Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act R.A. No. 8042.

Ruling:

Yes. It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud. In order to hold a person liable for illegal recruitment, the following elements must concur: (1) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b)of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042) and (2) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers.In the case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more persons, individually or as a group.All three elements are present in the case at bar. Inarguably, appellant Chua engaged in recruitment when she represented to private complainants that she could send them to Taiwan as factory workers upon submission of the required documents and payment of the placement fee. The four private complainants positively identified appellant as the person who promised them employment as factory workers in Taiwan for a fee ofP80,000. More importantly, Severino Maranan the Senior Labor Employment Officer of the POEA, presented a Certification dated December 5, 2002, issued by Director Felicitas Q. Bay, to the effect that appellant Chua is not licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.

The Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial court and appellate court. The prosecution witnesses were positive and categorical in their testimonies that they personally met appellant and that the latter promised to send them abroad for employment. In fact, the substance of their testimonies corroborate each other on material points, such as the amount of the placement fee, the country of destination and the nature of work. Without any evidence to show that private complainants were propelled by any ill motive to testify falsely against appellant, we shall accord their testimonies full faith and credit. After all, the doctrinal rule is that findings of fact made by the trial court, which had the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and to determine the probative value of the other testimonies, are entitled to great weight and respect because the trial court is in a better position to assess the same, an opportunity not equally open to the appellate court.The absence of any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence.

Appellant cannot escape liability by conveniently limiting her participation as a cashier of Golden Gate. The provisions of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 are unequivocal that illegal recruitment may or may not be for profit. It is immaterial, therefore, whether appellant remitted the placement fees to "the agencys treasurer" or appropriated them. The same provision likewise provides that the persons criminally liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. Just the same, therefore, appellant can be held liable as a principal by direct participation since she personally undertook the recruitment of private complainants without a license or authority to do so. Worth stressing, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 is a special law, a violation of which is malum prohibitum, not mala in se. Intent is thus, immaterial and mere commission of the prohibited act is punishable.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. In this case, the prosecution has established that appellant defrauded the complaining witnesses by leading them to believe that she has the capacity to send them to Taiwan for work, even as she does not have a license or authority for the purpose. Such misrepresentation came before private complainants deliveredP80,000 as placement fee to appellant. Clearly, private complainants would not have parted with their money were it not for such enticement by appellant. As a consequence of appellants false pretenses, the private complainants suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never materialized and the money they paid were never recovered. In an effort to exculpate herself, appellant presented in evidence 11 vouchersamounting toP314,030, which was allegedly received by Marilen Callueng, the supposed owner of Golden Gate. Notably, the dates on which said vouchers were issued and the amounts purportedly remitted to Callueng by way thereof do not correspond with the placement fee given by private complainants and the dates on which they paid the same to appellant. For instance, private complainants Aglanao and Danan deliveredP80,000 to appellant on August 10, 2002 but none of the vouchers presented by appellant was issued on said date. On August 20, 2002, private complainant Tajadao paidP40,000 to appellant but the latters voucher for said date covers onlyP22,480. More importantly, there is nothing in appellants vouchers to indicate that the amounts listed therein were received from private complainants. On the other hand, while the vouchers presented by private complainants Aglanao, Danan and Tajadao do not bear their names, they could not have come into possession of said form except through appellant. Hence, appellant admitted in open court that she receivedP80,000 from private complainants and that she was authorized to issue receipts.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant Melissa Chua, a.k.a. Clarita Ng Chua is ACQUITTED of one count of estafa filed by private complainant Roylan Ursulum in Criminal Case No. 03-21 7999-403. The Decision dated September I5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01006 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the appellant is ordered to pay a fine ofP1,000,000 and to indemnify each of the private complainants Alberto A. Aglanao, Billy R. Danan and Rey P. Tajadao in the amount of P-80,000. With costs against the accused-appellant. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2216 January 31, 1950

Petitioner: DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC.Respondents: THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CONGRESS OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (CLO), KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS and JULIAN LUMANOG AND HIS WORK-CONTRACT LABORERS

Ponente: TUASON,J.

Facts of the Case:

Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. assails the validity of an order of the Court of Industrial Relations. The order made upon petitioner's request for authority to hire" about twelve (12) more laborers from time to time and on a temporary basis," contains the proviso that "the majority of the laborers to be employed should be native." The petition was filed pending settlement by the court of a labor dispute (strike) between the petitioner and Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas.

It is next said that "The Court of Industrial Relations cannot intervene in questions of selection of employees and workers so as to impose unconstitutional restrictions," and that "The restrictions of the number of aliens that may be employed in any business, occupation, trade or profession of any kind, is a denial of the equal protection of the laws." Although the brief does not name the persons who are supposed to be denied the equal protection of the laws, it is clearly to be inferred that aliens in general are in petitioner's mind. Certainly, the order does not, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely, discriminate against the petitioner on account of race or citizenship. The order could have been issued in a case in which the employer was a Filipino. As a matter of fact the petitioner insists that 75 % of its shares of stock are held by Philippine citizens, a statement which is here assumed to be correct.

Issue:1. Can an alien question the constitutionality of a Philippine statute?

2. Is Commonwealth Act No. 103 which has precisely vested the Court of Industrial Relations with authority to intervene in all disputes between employees or strikes arising from the difference as regards wages, compensation, and other labor conditions which it may take cognizance of a valid order?

Ruling:1. Yes, an alien may question the constitutionality of a statute (or court order) only when and so far as it is being, or is about to be, applied to his disadvantage. (16 C.J.S. 157 et seq.) The prospective employees whom the petitioner may contemplate employing have not come forward to seek redress; their identity has not even been revealed. Clearly the petitioner has no case in so far as it strives to protect the rights of others, much less others who are unknown and undetermined.

2. Yes, the order under consideration meets the test of reasonableness and public interest. The passage of Commonwealth Act No. 103 was "in conformity with the constitutional objective and . . . the historical fact that industrial and agricultural disputes have given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in our country." (Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 8th Supp., 173.)1 "Commonwealth Act No. 103 has precisely vested the Court of Industrial Relations with authority to intervene in all disputes between employees or strikes arising from the difference as regards wages, compensation, and other labor conditions which it may take cognizance of." (Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supp., 319, 324.)2 Thus it has jurisdiction to determine the number of men to be laid off during off-seasons. By the same token, the court may specify that a certain proportion of the additional laborers to be employed should be Filipinos, if such condition, in the court's opinion, "is necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling disputes or doing justice to the parties." Supreme Court cannot agree with the petitioner that the order constitutes an unlawful intrusion into the sphere of legislation, by attempting to lay down a public policy of the state or to settle a political question. In the first place, we believe, as we have already explained, that the court's action falls within the legitimate scope of its jurisdiction. In the second place, the order does not formulate a policy and is not political in character. It is not a permanent, all-embracing regulation. It is a compromise and emergency measure applicable only in this case and calculated to bridge a temporary gap and to adjust conflicting interests in an existing and menacing controversy. The hiring of Chinese laborers by the petitioner was rightly considered by the court likely to lead the parties away from the reconciliation which it was the function of the court to effectuate. We should not close without adverting to the fact that the petitioner does not so much as pretend that the hiring of additional laborers is its prerogative as a matter of right. It seems to be conceded that during the pendency of the dispute the petitioner could employ temporary laborers only with the permission of the Court of Industrial Relations. The granting of the application thus lies within the sound judgment of the court, and if the court could turn it down entirely, as we think it could, its authority to quality the permission should be undeniable, provided only that the qualification is not arbitrary, against law, morals, or established public policy, which it is not; it is an expedient and emergency step designed to relieve petitioner's own difficulties. Also important to remember is that it is not compulsory on petitioner's part to take advantage of the order. Being a permute petitioner is the sole judge of whether it should take the order as it is, or leave it if it does not suit its interest to hire new laborers other than Chinese.

Dispositive: The order appealed from is affirmed with costs to this appeal against the petitioner-appellant.

G.R. No. 100641 June 14, 1993

Petitioner: FARLE P. ALMODIELRespondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), RAYTHEON PHILS., INC.

Ponente: NOCON,J.

Facts of the Case:

Petitioner Farle P. Almodiel is a certified public accountant who was hired in October, 1987 as Cost Accounting Manager of respondent Raytheon Philippines, Inc. through a reputable placement firm, John Clements Consultants, Inc. with a starting monthly salary of P18,000.00. Before said employment, he was the accounts executive of Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. for several years. He left his lucrative job therein in view of the promising career offered by Raytheon. He started as a probationary or temporary employee. As Cost Accounting Manager, his major duties were: (1) plan, coordinate and carry out year and physical inventory; (2) formulate and issue out hard copies of Standard Product costing and other cost/pricing analysis if needed and required and (3) set up the written Cost Accounting System for the whole company. After a few months, he was given a regularization increase of P1,600.00 a month. Not long thereafter, his salary was increased to P21,600.00 a month.

On August 17, 1988, he recommended and submitted a Cost Accounting/Finance Reorganization, affecting the whole finance group but the same was disapproved by the Controller. However, he was assured by the Controller that should his position or department which was apparently a one-man department with no staff becomes untenable or unable to deliver the needed service due to manpower constraint, he would be given a three (3) year advance notice.

In the meantime, the standard cost accounting system was installed and used at the Raytheon plants and subsidiaries worldwide. It was likewise adopted and installed in the Philippine operations. As a consequence, the services of a Cost Accounting Manager allegedly entailed only the submission of periodic reports that would use computerized forms prescribed and designed by the international head office of the Raytheon Company in California, USA.

On January 27, 1989, petitioner was summoned by his immediate boss and in the presence of IRD Manager, Mr. Rolando Estrada, he was told of the abolition of his position on the ground of redundancy. He pleaded with management to defer its action or transfer him to another department, but he was told that the decision of management was final and that the same has been conveyed to the Department of Labor and Employment. Thus, he was constrained to file the complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the National Capital Region, NLRC, Department of Labor and Employment.

Petitioner claims that the functions of his position were absorbed by the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department under the management of Danny Ang Tan Chai, a resident alien without any working permit from the Department of Labor and Employment as required by law thus raising the issue whether bad faith, malice and irregularity crept in the abolition of petitioner's position of Cost Accounting Manager on the ground of redundancy.

Issue: Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to (lack of) or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring as valid and justified the termination of petitioner on the ground of redundancy in the face of clearly established finding that petitioner's termination was tainted with malice, bad faith and irregularity.

Held:

No. Petitioner held a position which was definitely managerial in character, Raytheon had a broad latitude of discretion in abolishing his position. An employer has a much wider discretion in terminating employment relationship of managerial personnel compared to rank and file employees.The reason obviously is that officers in such key positions perform not only functions which by nature require the employer's full trust and confidence but also functions that spell the success or failure of an enterprise. Termination of an employee's services because of redundancy is governed by Article 283 of the Labor Code which provides as follows:

Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.

There is no dispute that petitioner was duly advised, one (1) month before, of the termination of his employment on the ground of redundancy in a written notice by his immediate superior, Mrs. Magdalena B.D. Lopez sometime in the afternoon of January 27, 1989. He was issued a check for P54,863.00 representing separation pay but in view of his refusal to acknowledge the notice and the check, they were sent to him thru registered mail on January 30, 1989. The Department of Labor and Employment was served a copy of the notice of termination of petitioner in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and the implementing rules.

Petitioner relies on the testimony of Raytheon's witness to the effect that corollary functions appertaining to cost accounting were dispersed to other units in the Finance Department. And granting that his department has to be declared redundant, he claims that he should have been the Manager of the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department which handled general accounting, payroll and encoding. As a B. S. Accounting graduate, a CPA with M.B.A. units, 21 years of work experience, and a natural born Filipino, he claims that he is better qualified than Ang Tan Chai, a B.S. Industrial Engineer, hired merely as a Systems Analyst Programmer or its equivalent in early 1987, promoted as MIS Manager only during the middle part of 1988 and a resident alien.

Raytheon insists that petitioner's functions as Cost Accounting Manager had not been absorbed by Ang Tan Chai, a permanent resident born in this country. It claims to have established below that Ang Tan Chai did not displace petitioner or absorb his functions and duties as they were occupying entirely different and distinct positions requiring different sets of expertise or qualifications and discharging functions altogether different and foreign from that of petitioner's abolished position.

An objection founded on the ground that one has better credentials over the appointee is frowned upon so long as the latter possesses the minimum qualifications for the position. In the case at bar, since petitioner does not allege that Ang Tan Chai does not qualify for the position, the Court cannot substitute its discretion and judgment for that which is clearly and exclusively management prerogative. To do so would take away from the employer what rightly belongs to him as aptly explained inNational Federation of Labor Unions v. NLRC. It is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not authorize interference with the employer's judgment in the conduct of his business. The determination of the qualification and fitness of workers for hiring and firing, promotion or reassignment are exclusive prerogatives of management. The Labor Code and its implementing Rules do not vest in the Labor Arbiters nor in the different Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the courts) managerial authority. The employer is free to determine, using his own discretion and business judgment, all elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. There is none in the instant case.

Dispositive: Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission in reversing and annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and that on the contrary, the termination of petitioner's employment was anchored on a valid and authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the instant petition for certiorarimust fail. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93666 April 22, 1991

Petitioners:GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and EARL TIMOTHY CONE, Respondents: HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment, HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment, and BASKETBALL COACHES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

Ponente: FELICIANO,J.

Facts of the Case:

The National Capital Region of the Department of Labor and Employment issued Alien Employment Permit in favor of petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a United States citizen, as sports consultant and assistant coach for petitioner General Milling Corporation ("GMC").

Petitioners GMC and Cone entered into a contract of employment whereby the latter undertook to coach GMC's basketball team.The Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation approved petitioner Cone's application for a change of admission status from temporary visitor to pre-arranged employee. Petitioner GMC requested renewal of petitioner Cone's alien employment permit. GMC also requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged coach. The DOLE Regional Director granted the request. Alien Employment Permit valid until 25 December 1990, was issued.

Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines ("BCAP") appealed the issuance of said alien employment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor who issued a decision ordering cancellation of petitioner Cone's employment permit on the ground that there was no showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing to perform the services required nor that the hiring of petitioner Cone would redound to the national interest.

Petitioner GMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and two (2) Supplemental Motions for Reconsideration but said Motions were denied by Acting Secretary of Labor. Petitioners elevated the case before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's prerogative has no legal basis at all. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor. Petitioner GMC's right to choose whom to employ is, of course, limited by the statutory requirement of an alien employment permit.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code is null and void as it is in violation of the enabling law as the Labor Code does not empower respondent Secretary to determine if the employment of an alien would redound to national interest.

Ruling:

No, because the law specifically provides:

Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, provides as follows:

Section 6. Issuance of Employment Permit the Secretary of Labor may issue an employment permit to the applicant based on:

a) Compliance by the applicant and his employer with the requirements of Section 2 hereof;

b) Report of the Bureau Director as to the availability or non-availability of any person in the Philippines who is competent and willing to do the job for which the services of the applicant are desired.

(c) His assessment as to whether or not the employment of the applicant will redound to the national interest;

(d) Admissibility of the alien as certified by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation;

(e) The recommendation of the Board of Investments or other appropriate government agencies if the applicant will be employed in preferred areas of investments or in accordance with the imperative of economic development;

Article 40 of the Labor Code reads as follows:

Art. 40. Employment per unit of non-resident aliens. Any alien seeking admission to the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who desires to engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor.

The employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer after a determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired.

For an enterprise registered in preferred areas of investments, said employment permit may be issued upon recommendation of the government agency charged with the supervision of said registered enterprise. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of Labor is not authorized to take into account the question of whether or not employment of an alien applicant would "redound to the national interest" because Article 40 does not explicitly refer to such assessment. This argument (which seems impliedly to concede that the relationship of basketball coaching and the national interest is tenuous and unreal) is not persuasive. In the first place, the second paragraph of Article 40 says: "[t]he employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer after a determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired." The permissive language employed in the Labor Code indicates that the authority granted involves the exercise of discretion on the part of the issuing authority. In the second place, Article 12 of the Labor Code sets forth a statement of objectives that the Secretary of Labor should, and indeed must, take into account in exercising his authority and jurisdiction granted by the Labor Code,

Art. 12. Statement of Objectives. It is the policy of the State:

a) To promote and maintain a state of full employment through improved manpower training, allocation and utilization;

c) To facilitate a free choice of available employment by persons seeking work in conformity with the national interest;

d) To facilitate and regulate the movement of workers in conformity with the national interest;

e) To regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a registration and/or work permit system;

Thus, we find petitioners' arguments on the above points of constitutional law too insubstantial to require further consideration.

Petitioners have very recently manifested to this Court that public respondent Secretary of Labor has reversed his earlier decision and has issued an Employment Permit to petitioner Cone. Petitioners seek to withdraw their Petition for Certiorari on the ground that it has become moot and academic.

Dispositive: ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition forcertiorarifor lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. 127162 June 5, 1998

Petitioner: JOSE ABACARespondents: HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Ponente: MARTINEZ,J.

Petitioner Jose Abaca was tried before the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, for the crime of illegal recruitment under Article 38 and 39 of President Decree No. 442, based on an Information which reads: That in the month of November 1988, and for a period prior and/or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Calapan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused thru false manifestation and fraudulent representation made to ROSELIA JIZ JANEO, ZENAIDA J. SUBANG, RENITA J. JANEO and MELROSE S. PALOMO to the effect that he has the authority to recruit workers for employment in Taipei, Taiwan and can facilitate the processing of their necessary papers in connection therewith if given the necessary amount of money to cover the costs of such recruitment and by means of other similar deceit when in truth and in fact he is not authorized nor licensed to recruit, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and feloniously collect from the aforestated applicants the aggregate amount of FOURTEEN TGHOUSAND PESOS (P14,000.00), Philippine Currency, the said accused assuring and representing that the same would be used in depraying the necessary expenses of the complainants' application for employment abroad and having been convinced by said misrepresentation the complainants gave the said amount to the herein accused, but the latter far from complying with his obligations, misapproprated and converted to his own personal use and benefit the aforecited amount, to the damage and prejudice of the said ROSELIA JIZ JANEO, ZENAIDA J. SUBANG, RENITA J. JANEO and MELROSE S. PALOMO. Contrary to Articles 38 and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.

Arraigned on February 6, 1990, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court, reads as follows: The gist of the testimonies of the four complainants revolves on how the accused (petitioner herein) recruited them to work abroad and made them believe that the accused could work out their papers in consideration of a certain sum of money. Specifically, the four complainants similarly testified that the accused was introduced to them by his brothers, Perferio and Guiding Abaca, whom they already knew for a long time. Sometime in the month of November 1988, the accused, accompanied by his brothers, misrepresented himself to be a licensed recruiter and convinced the four complainants that for a consideration they could work abroad at Taipei either as a domestic helper or factory worker with a salary ranging from $300 to $500 a month. The accused asked the sum of P14,000.00 each, but the complainants requested if they could pay P6,000.00 first and before departure they will complete the amount as demanded. Thus, the complainants paid partial amount at the office of the accused at Five Ace Philippines located in Manila and all of them gave their own down payment. Each complainant paid the accused P1,500.00 allegedly to be used for the processing of the passport and the following amounts for processing. All the complainants were able to receive the passport from the accused. From the foregoing, the complainants were able to pay the accused the aggregate amount of P14,000.00, excluding the amount of P1,500.00 each for the passport. It was agreed between the complainant and the accused that the balance of their obligation would be given on or before they leave for abroad. But since their payment, the accused promised them to leave, first on or before December, 1988 and then anytime in January of 1989, and then later. When the complainants sensed that they would not leave anymore, they informed the brothers of the accuse whom they are familiar with, complaining about the failure of the accused to send them abroad when they have already paid the advance payment. The two brothers could not do otherwise but appeased them and promised to contract their brother, the accused herein. Finally, the complainants were able to confront the accused and demanded the return of their money, but the accused merely promised to do so, until such time that they already filed their complaint with the NBI.

On the other hand, petitioner's version of the case is likewise capsulized by the trial court in this wise,viz: In trying to absolve himself from criminal liability, the accused shifted the blame to a certain Mr. Reynaldo Tan to whom he alleges to have remitted the sums of money he received from the complainants. To corroborate his version of the incident, the accused presented one Alberto Tolentino, an employee of the Department of Public Works and Highways who also was recruited by Mr. Abaca and who was also referred to Mr. Reynaldo Tan.

After trial, judgment was rendered finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged.

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It found petitioner guilty of illegal recruitment on a large-scale and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied on November 7, 1996.

Petitioner now comes to Supreme Court alleging that the respondent court committed grave and reversible errors of law and/or acted with grave abuse of direction 1. In not considering the certification (Exh. 1) issued by the POEA stating, among others, that WORK, Inc. was a duly licensed private recruitment agency prior to August 20, 1989, and that petitioner was then a manager and PDOS (Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar) Trainor in said recruitment agency, and that, therefore, by virtue of his position as manager and PDOS trainor of WORK, Inc., he had the authority to undertake recruitment activities, 2. In not finding that petitioner, being a holder of authority, may not be validly charged of illegal recruitment as defined by law in force at the time of the alleged commission of the offense charged, much less, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, 3. In declaring petitioner guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and sentencing him to a penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, and 4. In finding that herein petitioner undertook recruitment activities, there being a grave misapprehension of the facts.

The petition must be dismissed.

Issue:

Is there an authority to recruit overseas workers by reason of position as manager in a licensed private recruitment agency without approval of the POEA?

Ruling:

1. No. Petitioner's theory that he has the authority to recruit by reason of his position as manager and Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar Trainor (PDOS) of the WORKERS FOR OVERSEAS RECRUITMENT KEY CENTER, INC. (WORK, Inc.), a licensed private recruitment agency is devoid of merit. The Certificationissued by Mr. Mateo, which was relied upon by petitioner is nothing but an affirmation that he is an officer of WORK, Inc. It does not, in any way, prove that petitioner has a license or authority to undertake recruitment activities. Moreover, his employment with a licensed placement agency does notipso factoauthorize him to recruit workers. The record shows that petitioner is not a licensed recruiter as evidenced by the Certificationissued by Mr. Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of the Licensing Branch, POEA. Even assuming that WORK, Inc. had authorized petitioner, by reason of his position in the company, to recruit workers, still, such authority was not previously approved by the POEA. Again, Mr. Mateo explain that a licensee or holder of authority may authorize their employees to recruit for the agency. However, said authority must be submitted to and approved by the POEA. The provision of Article 29 of the Labor Code is very clear on this: Art. 29. Non-transferability of license or authority. No license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor it was issued of at any place other than stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or authority be transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity.Any transfer of business address, appointment or designation of any agent or representative including the establishment of additional officers anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the Department of Labor. Moreover, there is nothing from the record which would show even by implication that petitioner was acting for and in behalf of WORK, Inc. when he was dealing with the complainants. Petitioner gave his calling card13and met with private complainants at his office at Five Ace, Phil., Malate, City of Manila. Petitioner's testimony that he referred the private complainants to a certain Reynaldo Tan because WORK, Inc. is deploying workers to the Middle East and other countries with bilateral agreement with the Philippines undisputably show that he was not representing WORK, Inc. when he dealt with private complainants. It is clear therefore that petitioner never acted for and in behalf of WORK, Inc. when he recruited the private complainants.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.