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Delivering dem

ocracy? The future of postal voting

The Electoral CommissionTrevelyan HouseGreat Peter StreetLondon SW1P 2HW

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We are an independent body that wasset up by the UK Parliament. We aim togain public confidence and encourage people to take part in the democraticprocess within the UK by modernisingthe electoral process, promoting publicawareness of electoral matters, andregulating political parties.

© The Electoral Commission 2004ISBN: 1-904363-44-X

4261/RP

/08.04

August 2004

Deliveringdemocracy?The future of postal voting

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Tel: 020 7271 0500

The Electoral Commission

We are an independent body that was set up by the UK Parliament. We aim to gain publicconfidence and encourage people to take part in the democratic process within the UK bymodernising the electoral process, promotingpublic awareness of electoral matters, andregulating political parties.

On 1 April 2002, The Boundary Committee for England (formerly the Local GovernmentCommission for England) became a statutorycommittee of The Electoral Commission. Its dutiesinclude reviewing local electoral boundaries.

Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting

Copyright © The Electoral Commission

ISBN: 1-904363-44-X

Email: [email protected]

4267 Delivering cover+spine 8/19/04 17:17

Contents

6 The road ahead 69Postal voting on demand 69All-postal voting 69

7 Delivering confidence 75Legal framework 75Electoral registration 77Protecting the secrecy of the ballot 77Criminal justice system 79Post-election security audits 79

8 Delivering convenience 81Clear and simple processes 81Communicating the process 83

9 Delivering capacity 89Project management 89Timetable for postal voting 90Resolution of policy issues 90Royal Mail 91Software support 92Election staff 92

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Preface 3

Executive summary 5

1 Introduction 9

2 Postal voting: how did we get here? 11Elections in Great Britain 11Postal voting on demand 13All-postal voting 14

3 Context: the June 2004 elections 17Elections in June 2004 17Participation at European Parliamentary and local elections 19The political context and the campaign 20Public attitudes towards the voting process and its reform 21

4 Postal voting in June 2004 23Support for postal voting 23Availability of postal voting in June 2004 25Turnout and the impact of postal voting 26The pilot experience 33The administration of postal voting on demand 41The integrity of postal voting 46Costs of postal voting 51

5 Postal voting: where are we now? 55Public attitudes 55Stakeholders’ views 62Key issues 63Choice: the central issue 67

Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting: XXXXX

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Preface

The all-postal pilots in the Juneelections in four European Parliamentelectoral regions, held to a very tight timetable, were the subject ofsignificant political controversy andgenerated intense media scrutiny.That the Regional Returning Officers,Returning Officers and electoraladministrators delivered successfulelections in these challengingcircumstances is a tribute to theirprofessionalism and hard work.

The all-postal pilots nevertheless raise a numberof important issues that need to be addressedfor the future development of voting methods inBritain. As our polling shows, public confidence inpostal voting has declined as a result of the Juneexperience in comparison with previous levels, so it is vital that future voting arrangements cancommand high levels of public confidence.Concerns about fraud and intimidation were not confined to all-postal regions and measuresrequired to enhance security and secrecy arecommon to all-postal voting and to postal votingon demand. However, what was different in theall-postal regions compared to the others wasthe widespread perception among voters thatall-postal voting deprived them of the choicethey wanted in voting methods. This is a keyissue to address for the future.

This overview report draws on the individualstatutory reports on the all-postal pilots in theNorth East, North West, Yorkshire & the Humberand East Midlands regions, but also looks morewidely at the experience of postal voting acrossthe country as a whole. We decided that it wasimportant to publish this overarching report atthe same time as the four individual reports.Although the shortness of the statutorytimeframe means that the information we haveis in some areas still incomplete and ongoinginvestigations or possible litigation mean thatjudgments cannot be final, there is nonethelessample evidence on the basis of which to identifysome key priorities for the future. Our hope isthat the agenda we set out here is one whichcan attract widespread support and activeengagement as we seek to take it forward over the coming months.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank allthose on whose co-operation the Commissionhas depended in the evaluation process –elections professionals, the political parties, and the many organisations and individuals whohave contributed their experiences and views. I would also, on behalf of all the Commissioners,like to thank the staff of the Commission for theirhard work in ensuring that we have been able tomeet a demanding statutory reporting timetable.

Sam YoungerChairmanThe Electoral Commission

Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting: preface

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4

Executive summary

The most important factor inimproving participation is persuadingvoters that the election (and thepolitical process more generally) isrelevant to them and that their votematters. That is the responsibility ofpoliticians – of all parties, and at alllevels of governance – and,arguably, the media.

But it is not the only solution toencouraging engagement. Theevidence from academic studies,from opinion polling and from pilotsschemes is that eliminating some ofthe practical conditions discouragingturnout can have a beneficial impacton participation rates.

The Commission believes that it is essential we exploit the opportunities new technologiesprovide and respond to new expectations aboutconsumer choice and service. However, inexpressing this view and pursuing its implicationsthrough this report, we do not lose sight of thefact that, as our own research demonstrates:

There is a substantial segment of thepopulation who make a decision not to vote for reasons of political disconnection...for this group, the mechanics of the votingprocess is not a critical factor, and eventhough they may recognise that the newarrangements offer advantages in terms of simplicity and convenience, this alonewill not encourage them to vote.

Public opinion and the 2003 electoralpilot schemes (MORI, May 2003)

Our vision is of a future in which voters have achoice about how to cast their ballot – and votersalso have confidence that all the voting channelsopen to them are as secure (if not more so) than the traditional polling station. This visionencompasses use of ‘old’ and new technologyat a range of voting times and locations.Critically, realising this vision requires investmentof time, of money, and of political will.

The Commission believes that postal voting hasa role to play in this vision of the future. But theway in which postal voting has worked to dateis not necessarily the way forward. Postal votingin Great Britain (both ‘on demand’ and as asingle voting channel) has developed veryrapidly over the last four years. This report takesstock of where we are today and makes wide-ranging recommendations for the future.

Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting: executive summary

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FindingsTurnout at the European Parliamentary electionsacross the UK was 38.8% – significantly higherthan at the 1999 contests, in both pilot and non-pilot areas. The average turnout across the25 EU member states fell to a record low levelof 46% and was lower still in the 10 new states.

In the four UK pilot regions turnout was 42.42%.This is just over five percentage points higherthan the 37.11% in non-pilot regions.

This year’s European Parliamentary and localelections also saw a continuation of increasingtake-up of postal voting outside the pilotregions. We looked specifically at three regionsof England outside the pilot areas – postalvotes were issued to 8.4%, 8.7% and 10.5% of electors in London, the West Midlands andthe South West respectively. This represents adoubling of the take-up of postal voting since the 2001 general election.

In 2004, as in previous years, concerns aboutthe security of postal voting centred on thescope for coercion or undue influence during thecompletion of ballot papers. Most allegationsreceived by Returning Officers and police relatedeither to voters being coerced to vote a certainway, or to voters being coerced into handingover their uncompleted ballot paper forcompletion by someone else. There is alsoconcern over the integrity of the electoral register.

Public opinion surveys demonstrate that bothpostal voting on demand and all-postal methodssuffer from perceived weaknesses in terms of theintegrity of voting. However, public attitudes to the two methods are significantly different

with ‘perceptions of fraud and abuse... moreassociated with all-postal voting’. Publicperceptions were doubtless influenced in partby a number of high profile allegations of fraudreported in the media during the election period.

However, these perceptions need to be setagainst the facts. The Commission is currentlyaware of only two investigations into improprietyin relation to postal voting across Great Britainthat have resulted in arrests. Similarly, ReturningOfficers who have conducted ‘integrity checks’after the close of poll report that no evidence offraud or other irregularities have been found.Nevertheless, we recognise that in pilot areasprosecutions may be brought up to two yearsafter the close of poll (the time limit remains 12 months in other areas of Great Britain), andmany Returning Officers have yet to completetheir post-election audits. As a result, theCommission is not yet able to concludewhether the increased use of postal votingacross Great Britain has led to an increase offraud or malpractice.

According to an extensive public opinion surveyfor the Commission, people in pilot regionswere satisfied with all-postal voting by a margin of two to one – 59% against 29%. Underpinningthis satisfaction is a strong rating of theconvenience of all-postal voting. However, this is not to say that the public do not have strongreservations and concerns about all-postalvoting. A notable feature of public opinion thisyear compared to previous measures is theincreased strength of criticism of all-postalvoting and opposition to its future use (althoughthose taking this stance are still in a minority).


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Perhaps the most compelling evidence from the analysis of the 2004 elections is the strength of public support for choice. Oursurvey found that ‘People demand choice andeffectively swapping postal voting on demandwith all-postal voting is not considered to be asatisfactory development…’.

Key recommendationsThe road ahead

Postal voting should remain part of the UKelectoral system. Postal voting on demandcontinues to enjoy very high levels of publicsupport, and increasing levels of use. However,the Commission believes that work can and mustbe done to improve the process of postal votingon demand, improve security and the capacityof electoral administrators to manage thethroughput of postal votes.

In particular, the Commission urges theGovernment to agree to introduce a system of individual electoral registration, which is thekey building block on which safe and secureremote elections can be delivered.

The Commission recommends that all-postalvoting should not be pursued for use at UKstatutory elections.

Instead, a new foundation model of votingfor statutory elections and referendums should be developed. The Commission will work withall interested stakeholders to design this newapproach to voting, which must be capable ofoffering electors both choice and security.

The Commission will report on a recommendedapproach to this foundation model by 31 March

2005. The model must by definition and designenable the introduction of additional votingchannels as and when appropriate, particularlythe various electronic channels that have beentrialled in pilots.

Delivering confidence

The Commission recommends the urgentintroduction of primary legislation to give effect to:

• an updated offence of undue influence inrelation to postal voting; and

• a new offence relating to the fraudulentcompletion of postal vote applications.

The Government must also undertake a widerreview of the existing legal framework for postalvoting on demand to ensure that it is ‘fit forpurpose’ in the light of the increased use ofpostal voting.

The law relating to the issue of postal votesshould be revised to require Returning Officers to use the most efficient means of dispatchavailable. This should not, however, beintroduced without a parallel commitment fromlocal and central government to meet the costsof using first class post for issue of postal ballots.

The law should explicitly require ReturningOfficers to conduct post-election audits of electionstationery such as declarations of identity, securitystatements and postal vote applications.

Delivering convenience

Any voting methods involving voting ‘remotely’should require the Returning Officer to send apre-election information card.


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Postal voting, whether on demand or otherwise,should provide for:

• home visits;

• helplines and assistance email addresses; and

• suitable provision for disabled electors tovote independently.

The current Declaration of Identity should bereplaced with a new security statement toaccompany postal ballots. This securitystatement should:

• require the voter to sign a statement thatthey are the individual to whom the ballotpaper was addressed;

• not require any form of witness signature;

• include a clear explanation of the role and use of the statement, in particular that it will be separated from the ballot paper before counting can begin and that failure to complete the statement will render a ballot paper invalid; and

• be designed and printed to make it obviousto the voter that this separation will occur.

Delivering capacity

All legislation pertaining to an election –particularly a fixed term election – should be in place in time to allow the implementation of proper and robust procurement process.

The Government should support thedevelopment of the election markup language(EML) to facilitate the accurate transfer of datafrom voter registration systems for use in theautomated issue of postal votes.

The Commission will undertake a feasibilitystudy on a certification and accreditationscheme for ballot pack production.

Further recommendations are set out in the full body of the report.


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1 Introduction

This report sets out the Commission’sviews on the use of postal voting atstatutory elections in Great Britain. It is presented to the Secretary ofState for Constitutional Affairs underSection 6 of the Political Parties,Elections and Referendums Act(PPERA) 2000. The Commission’sfindings and conclusions should be read in the context of theCommission’s overarching vision for the future administration ofelections, in which voter choice(through the provision of a range ofdifferent, but equally secure, votingchannels) is central.

1.1 The Commission has supported the pilotingof innovative voting methods in recent years asa key component of the wider ‘modernisation’agenda in electoral administration. While theCommission has a statutory duty to evaluatesuch pilots schemes and to keep electoral lawand practice under review, the Commission’srole in this regard is advisory. We recognise that it is not for the Commission to make the finaldetermination as to how arrangements mightbe changed and we have no powers to ensureimplementation of any of the recommendationswe make. It is for the Government to initiate and ultimately Parliament (or, whereappropriate, the devolved institutions ofgovernment) to decide on how to take forwardany proposals for legislative change that mightbe recommended by the Commission.

1.2 This report considers issues relating to thelaw and practice of postal voting on demand inGreat Britain and is in this respect a companionto the Commission’s 2003 report Absent votingin Great Britain (2003). In addition, the reportexamines the use of ‘all-postal’ voting anddraws heavily on our evaluation of the all-postalvoting schemes operated under the EuropeanParliamentary and Local Elections Pilots Act2004. As such, it is part of the series of strategicevaluation reports Modernising elections (2002)and The shape of elections to come (2003).

Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting: introduction

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1.3 The report has also been submitted to otherMinisters with an interest in electoral matters:

• the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minster for Local and Regional Government, who are responsible for local elections, local andregional referendums and the GovernmentOffices for the Regions, including London; and

• the Minister for Finance, Local Governmentand Public Service in the Welsh AssemblyGovernment, who has responsibility fordevolved local government matters in Wales.

1.4 We are also submitting our report to theMinister for Finance and Local Government in the Scottish Executive in the belief that ourfindings and recommendations may usefullyinform the development of policy in relation tothe administration of local government electionsin Scotland, although we recognise that this is a devolved matter.

1.5 This report does not cover Northern Ireland,where elections are conducted under differentarrangements for both voter registration andabsent voting.

Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting: introduction

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2 Postal voting: how did we get here?Our electoral practices andprocedures are rooted in history and tradition. They reflect thecircumstances of the late nineteenthcentury when electorates weremuch smaller and elections tookplace against a background ofwidespread bribery and intimidation.

Elections in Great Britain2.1 One of the underlying features of ourpresent electoral arrangements is the desireto minimise fraud. In this they have beenconspicuously successful. The non-partisannature of the UK’s electoral arrangements(based on the independence of the individualconstituency Returning Officer), coupled with the professionalism and dedication of theelectoral administrators, have guaranteed an electoral process that is more or lessuniversally perceived as fair.

2.2 Nevertheless, as the House of CommonsPublic Administration Select Committee notedprior to the last general election:

Elections and party politics have rarely been actively organised so as to encourageparticipation in British government.

Public Participation, Issues andInnovation, Public Administration

Select Committee, April 2001.

That weakness in the electoral process hasrightly become a cause for concern, not least as a result of declining turnout evidencedacross all types of elections and across mostWestern democracies.

2.3 In a country where there is no compulsoryvoting, the right not to participate in an electionis held dear. However, significant and growinglevels of non-participation in elections anddisengagement from the wider political processmust give the committed democrat cause for concern.

Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting: postal voting: how did we get here?

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In 1994, following the American elections of that year, a group of journalists from Central and South America (used to a system ofcompulsory voting) posed the followingquestions to a group of US academics:

• How do you know what the people truly want, when so few of them actually voted?

• Will the new leaders find it difficult to governbecause so many did not vote for them?1

As the US academics attempted to respond,they found themselves contemplating a morepragmatic question:

• How can citizens be motivated to vote ingreater numbers?

2.4 It is this same question that sits at the heartof much of the Commission’s work and currentpolitical debate. It is evident that the mostimportant factor in improving participation ispersuading voters that the election (and thepolitical process more generally) is relevant to them and their vote matters. That is theresponsibility of politicians – of all parties, and at all levels of governance – and, arguably,the media.

2.5 But it is not the only solution to encouragingengagement. The evidence from academicstudies, from opinion polling and from pilotschemes is that eliminating some of the practicalconditions discouraging turnout can have animpact on participation rates. The Commissionbelieves that it is essential we exploit theopportunities that new technologies provide and

respond to new expectations about consumerchoice and service. However, in expressingthis view, and pursuing its implications throughthis report, we do not lose sight of the fact that:

There is a substantial segment of thepopulation who make a decision not to vote for reasons of political disconnection...for this group, the mechanics of the votingprocess is not a critical factor, and eventhough they may recognise that the newarrangements offer advantages in terms ofsimplicity and convenience, this alone willnot encourage them to vote.2

2.6 Our vision, as we have set out previously, is of a future in which voters have a choice abouthow to cast their ballot and voters also haveconfidence that all the voting channels open tothem are at least as secure as the traditional.This vision encompasses use of ‘old’ and newtechnology, of public voting facilities and moreprivate voting methods. Critically, realising thisvision requires investment of time, of money,and of political will.

2.7 The Commission believes that postal votinghas a role to play in this vision of the future. Butthat is not to say that the way in which postalvoting has worked to date is necessarily the wayforward. Postal voting in Great Britain (both ‘ondemand’ and as a single voting channel) hasdeveloped very rapidly over the last four years.This report takes stock of where we are today andmakes wide-ranging recommendations for thefuture. Before doing so, we examine the originsof this voting method and the background to itsgreatly increased use in recent years.


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1 Charles N. Wheeler III, University of Illinois at Springfield in IllinoisIssues, October 1998 http://www.lib.niu.edu/ipo/ii981042.html 2 Public opinion and the 2003 pilot schemes (MORI, May 2003).

Postal voting on demand2.8 Postal voting in Great Britain was firstintroduced in 1918 for people with a physicalincapacity and for those required to undertakea journey by sea or air. The prompt for theintroduction of the postal ballot was the numberof servicemen who had not returned from theFirst World War in time to vote in the 1918general election.

2.9 On a number of occasions since then theavailability of postal voting has been widened, for example, to include those taking holidays.Until 2000, legislation had always definedspecific categories of people who could apply for a postal vote within the UK. For example, ifservice or employment kept an individual awayfrom their designated polling station, or theyhad moved out of the area, or had a disability.

2.10 After the 1997 general election, theGovernment set up a working party to examineways to modernise electoral procedures andpersuade more people to vote. It recommendedthat postal voting should be available ‘ondemand’ throughout Great Britain and to allregistered voters living overseas. The practicalimplication was that no reason would need tobe given for preferring a postal vote to the more traditional polling station. A witnessedDeclaration of Identity would continue to berequired for all postal votes. This conclusionechoed that of the House of Commons HomeAffairs Select Committee in 1998, whichrecommended that absent votes should beavailable on demand, noting that this changewas supported by all the main political parties:

Change must not be allowed to threaten theintegrity of the election process. Reformsmust therefore be approached cautiouslyand changes which are based on visions of what new technology can offer must beassessed not simply on the basis that theyare ‘modern’ or ‘exciting’ but on whether theyare safe and effective. Change must not beintroduced to a system which works wellsimply for change’s sake.3

2.11 The Representation of the People Act (RPA)2000 gave effect to these changes, and now any elector is able to request a postal vote at all statutory elections in Great Britain. Followingits introduction, there has been a significantincrease in the take up of postal voting on demand. This has been despite surveysshowing significant levels of non-awareness of the availability of this postal voting facility.The variation in take-up rates between differentareas is, in part, related to the differentapproaches to promotion taken by localelectoral administrators and local authorities.

2.12 There was a near doubling of postal votingbetween the 1997 and 2001 general elections –2.1% of the electorate was issued with a postalvote in 1997 rising to 3.9% four years later.4

Sample data from 2,050 of the 3,300 wards inEngland with local elections in 2002 suggestedthat 7.7% of the electorate cast their votes bypost.5 At the Scottish Parliament elections in2003, there was a 116% increase in postal


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3 Select Committee on Home Affairs (1998) Fourth Report: ElectoralLaw and Administration.

4 The Electoral Commission (2003) Election 2001: The official results.

5 The Electoral Commission (2003) Absent voting in Great Britain.

voting but, at 3.6% of the electorate, take-upwas much lower than the 6.9% at the NationalAssembly elections in Wales last year.6 Thisyear’s European Parliamentary and localelections saw a continuation of increasing take-up of postal voting, with between 8-10% of theelectorate choosing to request a postal vote inLondon, the West Midlands and the South West.7

All-postal voting2.13 An all-postal election is one where alleligible electors are sent their ballot paper bypost. They must complete the ballot paper(s),certify their identity and return them to theReturning Officer before the close of the poll. In most such elections, voters have been ableto return their vote in person to one or moredesignated delivery points as well as by post.

All-postal voting pilot schemes

2.14 In addition to introducing postal voting ondemand, the Representation of the People Act2000 provided for the use of pilot schemes totest new methods of voting at local elections inEngland and Wales. The Home Office workingparty had agreed that there was merit in triallingnew voting methods in a manner that wouldboth test their impact on participation and allowfor their implementation to be assessed. The working party concluded:

Our preferred approach is to move forward in this key area through piloting, that is, by enabling different arrangements to betested in discrete schemes and then fullyevaluated before deciding whether it is safeor sensible to extend their application. Werecognise that approach cannot be simplytheoretical, but must involve real electionsand real voting.8

2.15 Pilots schemes have been conductedunder this legislation at the major rounds oflocal elections in England in spring 2000, 2002and 2003. In addition, the Scottish Parliamentapproved plans for similar pilots in Scottishlocal elections, with the first such pilot schemetaking place in Stirling in April 2002 and the mostrecent in South Ayrshire in January this year.Increasingly, Returning Officers are applying torun pilots at local authority by-elections acrossEngland, Wales and Scotland. Pilots were notpossible at the local elections in June 2001 asthese were first postponed due to the outbreakof foot and mouth disease and then combinedwith a UK Parliamentary election. Similarly, pilotschemes were not possible at the Scottish localelections in 2003, which were combined withthe Scottish Parliamentary election.

All-postal voting at referendums

2.16 Since 2000, legislation has allowed for the creation of directly elected mayors to lead English and Welsh unitary authorities. Before taking such a step, however, the LocalGovernment Act 2000 requires that localauthorities must first hold a referendum.


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6 The Electoral Commission (2003) The National Assembly for Wales elections 2003, The Electoral Commission (2003) Scottishelections 2003.

7 These figures are based on data supplied by Returning Officers and analysed for us by Professors Rallings and Thrasher. The threeregions represent those for which data was returned in time to be used for this report, although the aggregate data for the WestMidlands does not include data from three local authority areas.

8 Home Office (1999) Final Report of the Working Party on Electoral Procedures.

Authorities have had the option to conduct suchreferendums on an all-postal basis and 20 havedone so to date.

2.17 On 22 July 2004, Parliament approved an Order to provide for a regional referendumon whether to establish an elected regionalassembly in the North East of England to beheld in November 2004. In October 2003 theGovernment had announced that any suchreferendum would be held on an all-postalbasis. This was reflected in a separate Ordermade in July 2004, setting out the detailedarrangements for conduct of the ballot.However, the Order providing for the North East referendum is specific to regional ballotson the creation of regional assemblies. Atpresent there is no generic legislative provisionregarding the voting methods to be used at any other regional or national referendums (in contrast to the mayoral referendums).

The Electoral Commission and all-postal voting

2.18 The Electoral Commission was established by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. Among theCommission’s responsibilities are to keepelectoral law and practice under review. TheCommission was also given responsibility for evaluating and reporting on local electionpilot schemes and we have now evaluated over 100 such schemes since 2002.

2.19 In 2002, we published our first reportlooking at the use of all-postal voting:Modernising elections (2002), drawing togetherour findings from evaluation of the spring 2002local election pilot schemes and recommending

a number of changes to be adopted in developingthe programme of pilot schemes. In 2003, theCommission published two further reports inrelation to postal voting. In Absent voting inGreat Britain (2003), we examined the law andadministration of postal voting on demand, andmade several recommendations for the future.

2.20 In The shape of elections to come (2003), we assessed the use of all-postal voting at localelections, and recommended that, based on theevidence available at that stage, the Governmentconsider the extension of this mode of voting to alllocal elections as the standard practice (althoughwith a statutory entitlement for the ReturningOfficer to rebut this presumption and decide touse traditional voting methods instead where localcircumstances made this appropriate). We sawthis as a step towards the ultimate goal ofincreased participation through multi-channelelections. However, we made clear that anyextension of the use of all-postal voting shouldtake place only after the implementation of manyof the Commission’s wider recommendations forchanges to the legislative framework for elections;notably, the introduction of a system of individualrather than household registration. Theserecommendations for changes to the legislativeframework for elections are summarised in ourreport Voting for change (2003).

2.21 A central conclusion of Absent voting inGreat Britain (2003) was that:

It is clear that this report will not be the final word on absent voting in Great Britain,even for the foreseeable future. Ourelectoral processes are now changing at a faster pace than at any point in the


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previous 100 years. The Commission will continue to monitor and review the use of absent voting, and make furtherrecommendations for changes in the law or good practice as appropriate.9

2.22 We note that the Government has yet to respond formally to the Voting for change(2003) programme for electoral modernisation,although we understand that work has beenunderway within Government to take forwardimplementation of many of the key changesproposed. We hope that the recommendations in this report can be considered alongside ourearlier proposals for legislative change.


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9 The Electoral Commission (2003) Absent voting in Great Britain: 37.

3 Context: the June2004 electionsSince 1979, the European Parliamenthas been directly elected throughsimultaneous national elections runaccording to each member state’slaws and traditions.

In 2004, alongside the UK EuropeanParliamentary elections there werealso local elections across Walesand in parts of England, includingelections for the London Mayor and Assembly.

Elections in June 20043.1 The sixth election to the European Parliamentwas conducted between 10 and 13 June 2004.In accordance with established practice, the pollclosed in the United Kingdom on Thursday 10 June 2004, although the results were notannounced until after the Europe-wide closeof poll on Sunday 13 June.

3.2 Since 1999, the UK’s Members of theEuropean Parliament (MEPs) have been elected on a regional basis from 12 EuropeanParliamentary electoral regions using a closed list system of proportional representationeverywhere except Northern Ireland, who use the Single Transferable Vote to elect MEPs. Thenine English regions are largely contiguous with those covered by the Government Officesfor the Regions; Scotland, Wales and NorthernIreland form their own regions.

3.3 The Commission is required to prepare aseparate statutory report on the administrationof the European Parliamentary elections whichis to be published by early 2005.

Combination of elections

3.4 In May 2003, the Government announced itsintention to seek to combine the local electionsin England scheduled for May 2004 with theEuropean Parliamentary elections in June. This was formally agreed by Parliament inMarch 2004, when the Local Elections (OrdinaryDay of Election 2004) Order 2004 and theRepresentation of the People (Combination ofPolls) (England and Wales) Regulations 2004were passed. These provisions give effect tothe provisions contained within Section 103 and

Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting: context: the June 2004 elections

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of the Local Government Act 2003, and alsoprovide generally for the combination ofparliamentary, European Parliamentary andlocal government elections, as well asspecifically for combination in 2004.

3.5 In November 2003 the Welsh AssemblyGovernment announced that the elections for all community and county councils would alsobe combined with the European Parliamentaryelections. The Local Government (Ordinary Dayof Election) (Wales) Order 2004) (created withpowers contained within Section 104 of theLocal Government Act 2003) facilitated this andcame into force in February 2004. There were nolocal elections scheduled for 2004 in Scotland.

All-postal pilot schemes

3.6 In September 2003 the Governmentintroduced the European Parliamentary andLocal Elections (Pilots) Bill to provide forpiloting of innovative voting methods at theJune 2004 elections. Prior to this, there was no statutory basis for using non-traditional votingmethods in relation to European Parliamentaryelections. It should also be noted that thelegislation applied only to the 2004 elections,not to future European Parliamentary elections.

3.7 Following the introduction of the Bill, the Commission was directed by Government torecommend up to three European Parliamentaryregions that would be suitable to run pilots in 2004 and to consider which one of thesewould be most suitable to incorporate an e-voting element. The Commission launched aconsultation exercise on 25 September 2003 and

published its recommendations in Electoral pilotsat the June 2004 elections on 8 December 2003.

3.8 We recommended that the North East andEast Midlands regions were, respectively, highlysuitable to undertake an all-postal pilot scheme.Four other regions were named as potentiallysuitable for piloting, although we were not ableto make a positive recommendation that theGovernment proceed to designate them as pilot regions. These regions were, in order ofsuitability, Scotland, Yorkshire & the Humber,North West and West Midlands. The Commissionrecommended that no region was suitable toundertake an e-enabled pilot scheme.

3.9 Following the submission of theserecommendations, the Government announcedon 16 December 2003 that it would be takingforward the Commission’s recommendations to hold all-postal pilots in the North East andEast Midlands at the June 2004 elections. TheGovernment also accepted the Commission’srecommendation not to proceed with electronicvoting pilots in the June 2004 elections. TheGovernment announced, on 21 January 2004,that it intended that two more regions, Yorkshire& the Humber and the North West, would alsopilot all-postal voting at the June 2004 elections.Following extensive discussion in both Housesof Parliament, the European Parliamentary andLocal Elections (Pilots) Act 2004 designatingthese four regions as all-postal pilot areas inJune 2004 received Royal Assent on 1 April2004. The European Parliamentary and LocalElections (All-Postal) Pilots Order 2004 wasmade on 27 April 2004.


18

Participation at EuropeanParliamentary and local elections3.10 The 2004 elections took place against abackdrop of declining participation in the UK inEuropean Parliamentary and local governmentelections. Turnout at the European Parliamentelections in 1999 fell to a record low for a UK-widepoll with only a quarter (24%) of the electoratecasting a vote – a 12 point decline from 1994.10

3.11 As we have discussed above, and isevidenced through much of the researchconducted for the Commission and others,recent turnouts are a ‘symptom rather than thecause of the democratic malaise’.11 The prevailingpolitical climate in 2004 was described by MORIand Professors Rallings and Thrasher in theCommission’s research report Public opinionand the 2004 elections (2003) as ‘a deep senseof disconnection with political process anddisillusion with the political class’.12

3.12 A full exploration of the reasons for the low recorded turnout in 1999 can be found inPublic opinion and the 2004 elections (2003)but these include the particular circumstancesand timing of those elections, occurring onlyone month after devolved elections in Scotland

and Wales and local government elections inmany parts of England. Voters in 1999 used a new and unfamiliar closed list system ofproportional representation (PR), which hadattracted public controversy. Additionally, andperhaps more importantly, low turnout at suchelections is related to the public’s perceptionthat there is ‘less at stake’ than at aparliamentary general election, giving rise to a greater tendency to abstain.13

3.13 Public opinion and the 2004 elections(2003) also highlighted a strong relationshipbetween knowledge and electoral abstention with very low levels of public awareness andunderstanding of the European Union and the European Parliament’s place within it. This theme could equally be applied to localgovernment elections, which have recordedturnouts of around a third since 2000 and 36%in the period between 1990 and 1999.14 Surveyresearch for the Commission by NOP in 2002and MORI in 2003 found lower levels of publicinterest in local elections as distinct from otherelections, particularly general elections, and asense that local elections are less likely to giverise to real change.15


19

10 There is no standard methodology for calculating electoral turnout in the UK. Traditionally, turnout has included only valid votes cast.However, the Commission has tended to regarded unadjusted turnoutas providing a better indication of participation rates, especially whenconsidering pilot schemes in which a significant portion of votes castmay be regarded as invalid for procedural reasons. The figuresquoted here are adjusted turnout figures and are sourced from:House of Commons Library Research Paper 04/50 (23 June 2004)European Parliament elections 2004 and House of Commons LibraryResearch Paper 04/48 (18 June 2004) 2004 London elections.

11 The Electoral Commission (2002) Voter engagement and young people.

12 The Electoral Commission (2003) Public opinion and the 2004 elections.

13 Reif and Schmitt distinguish between ‘first order’ and ‘second-order’elections. The most important distinction between the two is thatparties and the public consider there to be ‘less at stake’ in the caseof ‘second order’ elections. See K. Reif and H. Schmitt (1980) ‘NineNational Second-Order Elections: A Conceptual Framework for theAnalysis of European Election Results’, European Journal of PoliticalResearch 8: 3-44.

14 DETR (2000) Turnout at Local Government Elections.

15 See B. Marshall and M. Williams (2003) Turnout, elections andattitudes towards voting. Paper for EPOP Conference September2003, pp5-7 available at www.electoralcommission.org.uk

3.14 The authors of Public opinion and the 2004elections (2003) concluded that mobilisingturnout at the European elections would be aformidable task with the fact of combination ofEuropean Parliamentary and local elections likelyto assist ‘to a small degree’. However, they alsonoted that ‘the chain of cause and effect thatis lacking at the European level is apparent inLondon, with voters able to point to at leastsome changes to their environment that havetaken place as a result of the London electoralprocess’, suggesting that this might boostturnout in the capital.

3.15 In the event, turnout at the EuropeanParliamentary elections across the UK was38.5% – significantly higher than at the 1999contests, in both pilot and non-pilot areas.16 Bycontrast, the average turnout across the 25 EUmember states fell to a record low level of 46%and was lower still in the 10 new states.17

3.16 According to analysis by Professors Rallingsand Thrasher for the Commission, unadjustedturnout18 in the pilot regions – including all thosewho cast their ballot, whether ultimately ruledvalid or invalid19 – was 42.42%, just over fivepercentage points higher than the 37.11% in non-pilot regions. Unadjusted turnout was41.86% in Wales where there were local

elections, 30.75% in Scotland where there were only European Parliamentary elections. InLondon where European Parliamentary electionswere held alongside London Mayor and Assemblyelections, the European Parliamentary turnoutwas 37.65%. Turnouts for the London Mayoraland Assembly elections were around onepercentage point lower.

The political context and the campaign3.17 The political backdrop to the June electionsincluded the continued aftermath of the war onIraq and the publication of the Hutton report,20

well-publicised increases in council taxes in somelocal authority areas and the Government’sannouncement of its intention to hold areferendum on whether the UK should adoptthe new European Union Constitution.

3.18 Some commentators dubbed Thursday 10 June ‘Super Thursday’ given its status as thelargest test of electoral opinion between generalelections and media coverage of the electionswas boosted by the UK Independence Party’srecruitment of the former TV personality RobertKilroy-Silk as a candidate. Postal voting – andalleged irregularities and administrativedifficulties – also became a campaign issue,making front page news in some broadsheetsand thus raising the profile of the elections.


20

16 House of Commons Library Research Paper 04/50 (23 June 2004)European Parliament elections 2004.

17 Ibid.

18 The figures cited here are based on analysis of data from ReturningOfficers undertaken by Professors Rallings and Thrasher on behalfof the Commission.

19 The unadjusted turnout figures quoted here include invalid votesrejected at the count but not those rejected before the count (this datahad not been provided by all Returning Offices at the time of writing).

20 Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of DrDavid Kelly, published January 2004. The investigation was led byLord Hutton.

Public attitudes towards the votingprocess and its reform3.19 Public attitudes towards different methodsof voting are also a key factor in examining thecontext for these election. Over the last threeyears, the Commission has developed asubstantial body of evidence of evidence in this area.

3.20 Numerous post-election surveys for theCommission have found a significant proportionof non-voters saying that alternatives to thetraditional methods of voting – such as all-postal, telephone and internet-based voting –would have made them more likely to havevoted. However, at the same time, we haverepeatedly found strong public satisfaction with,and high levels of confidence in, the existingarrangements for voting. People are positiveabout polling stations based arrangements and see them as a ‘tried and tested’ system.

3.21 Security and the risk of fraud have beenamong the most contentious elements of postalvoting raised with the Commission over the pasttwo years and were again this year. Past researchhas found a difference in public perceptions ofthe security of postal voting as compared tomore traditional methods.

3.22 However, survey research conducted for the Commission by MORI in December 2003and published in April 2004 found that the publicperceive electoral fraud to be less of a problemthan benefit fraud and false insurance claims.A quarter (24%) considered electoral fraud tobe a problem, lower than the 86% and 84%thinking the same of benefit fraud and false

insurance claims respectively. At the same time,only 1% reported having had any personal orsecond-hand experience of electoral fraud,although only 29% say they would know how to report someone who had committedelectoral fraud.21

3.23 Also in 2003, on behalf of the Commission,MORI asked a sample of 1,500 adults about the most important features of the process ofvoting. It was clear from the results that peoplerate privacy and safety from fraud or abuseabove convenience or ease of use (althoughthere are some significant differences by age as shown in Table 1).


21

21 MORI (2004) Perceptions of electoral fraud in Great Britain. Technicalnote: MORI conducted 1,001 interviews with a GB sample of adultsaged 18+ between 11-17 December 2003.

Q. Thinking generally about elections, whichone of the following would you say is mostimportant to you when you vote?

All adults 18-34 55+My vote being private 33 22 45My vote being safe from fraud or abuse 30 29 29Voting being convenient 20 29 12Voting being easy to use 15 21 12Don’t know 1 - 2

Source: MORI/The Electoral CommissionBase: 1,500 UK adults, 2-11 May 2003

Table 1: People’s priorities for votingarrangements (by per cent)

3.24 However, MORI qualified these findingsusing insights obtained from their programme of focus groups conducted for us in 2003:

The research suggests that combatingfraud and improving privacy could be moreof an important focus once the electorate ingeneral has accepted that voting is worthdoing; until then, making voting easier andmore convenient is likely to have more ofan impact on turnout.22

3.25 Public attitudes to new voting methods arecentral to policy development in this area. Publicconfidence in the mechanics of democracy isessential and if lost is difficult to regain. While theCommission’s research has consistently foundpublic backing for reform of voting arrangementsand successive pilot schemes have shown thatthe introduction of new methods of voting hasmade a very real difference in turnout terms,there are also real anxieties. The complexities ofpublic attitudes should not be underestimated.This report examines in detail the evidence ofpublic opinion drawn from the 2004 elections,drawing on the largest scale opinion surveyconducted to date by the Commission, workingwith the research organisation ICM.


22

22 MORI (2003) Public opinion and the 2003 electoral pilot schemes.

4 Postal voting in June 2004At the June 2004 elections, moreelectors that ever before voted bypost in the United Kingdom. Theirexperiences of postal voting willhave differed markedly: someelectors chose postal voting; othershad it imposed on them; for many it represented a more convenientway of voting; and for others itcreated new barriers to participation.

Support for postal votingPostal voting on demand

4.1 The Commission has consistentlysupported the availability of postal voting ondemand. It provides a convenient choice formany electors. In a busy society with changinglifestyles, offering voters the choice of applyingfor a postal vote is a natural method of enabling wider electoral participation.

4.2 Levels of support for the principle of postalvoting on demand are high among the mainpolitical parties, who have encouraged thismethod of voting. Those responsible for runningelections also recognise the benefits to theelectorate of postal voting (although – as wediscuss below – the practical implications cancreate difficulties). The public are equallysupportive of postal voting on demand,although few express dissatisfaction with themore traditional polling station arrangements.

All-postal voting

4.3 In September 2003 the Governmentintroduced the European Parliamentary andLocal Elections (Pilots) Bill to provide forpiloting of innovative voting methods at theJune 2004 elections. The Government, in themany debates leading up to the 2004 pilots,maintained a consistent line that all-postalvoting pilots engage a maximum number ofvoters in the elections, and make participationeasier and more convenient.

Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting: postal voting in June 2004

23

We are committed to increasing voterparticipation, and all-postal voting offers a useful, practical alternative to traditionalpolling stations.23

4.4 The Conservative Party, on the other hand,has taken the view that the more traditionalmodel of voting (including postal voting ondemand) is preferable. They believe all-postalvoting presents unnecessary risks:

Greater participation in elections should be asign of a healthy democracy – but increasedturnout should not come at such a high cost.The Government’s reckless fiddling with theelectoral system has raised widespreadpublic concern about the integrity of Britain’selectoral system. The electoral practices ofthe 18th and early 19th Centuries, such asintimidation and fraud, risk becoming thehallmark of the 21st.24

4.5 The Liberal Democrats have generally acceptedthe need to trial new voting methods on a pilotbasis, while pointing to the need for parallelimprovements in the legal framework.

I have said all along that I am not intrinsicallyagainst novel forms of voting. There arecases for exploring ways of making thevoting process better and more accessibleto our electorate, but that process must bebeyond challenge and reproach.25

4.6 The Local Government Association (LGA)has supported applications made from localauthorities in previous years for innovative pilotschemes at local elections. In submittingevidence to the Office of the Deputy PrimeMinister (ODPM) Select Committee on thesubject of postal voting, the LGA said:

The LGA therefore lobbied for theintroduction of the piloting arrangements inthe Representation of the People Act 2000.We have encouraged councils to pilot newarrangements and are pleased with thenumber, breadth and success of theelectoral pilots that have been undertakensince May 2000—which reflects theimportance councils attach to this issue and their willingness to innovate.

We have noted the positive impact that allpostal elections appear to have on electoralturnout. However, we also recognise that itis vital to address concerns about secrecyand security of all postal ballots and tocombat the potential of electoral fraud.Moreover, whilst we accept the need to testall postal pilots over a wider geographicarea we do not believe that all postal ballotsshould be rolled out on a mandatory basisto all councils without additional securitybeing in place – as recommended by theElectoral Commission – in particular theproposed move from household toindividual registration.26

4.7 In our July 2003 report The shape of electionsto come the Commission recommended that, onthe basis of the evidence available at that point,


24

23 Rt Hon Nick Raynsford MP, Minister for Local and RegionalGovernment 21 January 2004 in press release ‘Two more regions forall-postal voting trial’ at www.dca.gov.uk

24 Alan Duncan MP http://www.alanduncan.org.uk/pp/pressrelease/ pressdetail.asp?id=2644-

25 David Heath MP, House of Commons 16 December 2003 Hansardcolumn 1533.

26 Local Government Association (2004) Written evidence to the ODPMSelect Committee on Postal Voting HC 400-I.

there should be a statutory presumption that all local elections be run as all-postal ballotsunless there are compelling reasons why an all-postal ballot would be inappropriate ordisadvantageous for a group or groups ofelectors. We suggested that the final decisionshould rest with the Returning Officer followingconsultation with party group leaders andindependent members represented on thecouncil. However, we made clear that any suchextension of all-postal voting should take placeonly after the implementation of many of theCommission’s wider recommendations forchanges to the legislative framework forelections – notably, the introduction of a system of individual rather than household registration.We also recognised that the form of localelections in Scotland was a devolved matter.

4.8 The Commission has always seen all-postalvoting as an interim step towards the ultimategoal of increased participation through voterchoice – through the provision of a range ofdifferent, but equally secure, voting channels. We are equally firm that this goal is best achievedthrough a programme of pilot schemes, testingnew voting methods at statutory elections. A true multi-channel election can only beachieved after extensive and successful pilots of electronic voting technologies.

4.9 The Commission’s 2003 recommendationconfined itself to local elections as theCommission had not, at that stage, been asked to consider the applicability of suchvoting methods for other elections, includingthose to the European Parliament. However,the Commission agreed with the Government’s

intention to conduct a further pilot of all-postalvoting at the combined European and localelections in June 2004 in order to test thisvoting method on a scale that had not beenpreviously available.

Availability of postal voting in June 2004Postal voting on demand

4.10 Postal voting on demand was available toall electors across Scotland, Wales, London andthe other four English regions not participating in the pilot schemes. Electors could apply for apostal vote in one of two ways:

• by the completion of postal vote applicationform. Such forms are produced by, andavailable from, Electoral Registration Officers,the Commission, political parties andcampaign groups. Application forms can berequested at any time of the year, and someElectoral Registration Officers also include anopportunity to request an application form onthe annual canvass form sent to householdseach autumn; or

• by providing to the Electoral RegistrationOfficer all required information in, forexample, a letter, rather than on a specifiedform. A signature is required, ruling out thepossibility of online or email applications, but a request can be received by fax.

4.11 Applications can relate either to a singleelection or to all elections until further notice(referred to as a ‘permanent postal vote’).Electors can also nominate a period of timeduring which they wish to receive a postal vote.


25

4.12 In advance of the 2004 elections, severalpolitical parties ran campaigns encouragingelectors to apply for a postal vote. Suchcampaigns are within the parameters of thecurrent law and the Commission has repeatedlyacknowledged the valuable role that politicalparties play in encouraging participation in thisway. We would therefore wish to encourage theuse of such campaigns in the future. However,we explore related issues concerning the way in which applications from electors in responseto co-ordinated campaigns were returned toElectoral Registration Officers later on in this report.

4.13 The Commission itself has producedpostal vote application forms that are availablefrom the Commission or through our website,we also supply bulk copies on request toElectoral Registration Officers. In 2004 we werealso able to produce a postal vote applicationform contained in an application to register as an overseas elector which was availableelectronically and promoted through theexpatriate press. These forms are all availableeither through the Commission’s main website or at www.aboutmyvote.co.uk

All-postal voting

4.14 All-postal voting was used in four regions of England: the East Midlands; North East;North West; and Yorkshire & the Humber. Allelectors in the four pilot regions received theirballot papers automatically by post, and had a choice of returning them by Royal Mail or hand delivering them to a limited number ofAssistance and Delivery Points. No pollingstations were available. The same system of

all-postal voting applied in all four pilot regions.More detail on the detailed operation of the all-postal voting system used in June 2004 isprovided in paragraphs 4.35-4.60.

Turnout and the impact of postal votingPostal voting on demand

4.15 Following the trend in recent elections, thetake-up of postal voting increased across GreatBritain this year in the non-pilot areas. In someareas, a high level of permanent postal voters,coupled with a high level of election-specificpostal voting applications, saw ReturningOfficers issue 50,000 or more postal votes.

4.16 Data analysis for the Commissionundertaken by Professors Rallings and Thrasher,has found a doubling of the take-up of postalvoting since the 2001 general election in threeregions of England outside the pilot areas.27


26

27 The figures relate to three non-pilot regions in England – London,South West and the West Midlands – for which data was returned intime to be used for this report.

4.17 As Table 2 shows, in each of our threecase study regions, turnout among thosechoosing to vote by post remains significantlyhigher than the overall turnout figure. This isconsistent with previous analyses, which haveshown that those requesting a postal vote tend to be more likely to turn out than those without a postal vote (see Table 3).


27

2004 European 2001 general 1999 European Parliamentary election Parliamentary

elections electionsLondonPostal votes issued 423,488 185,995 58,481Returned 263,784 140,174 32,650Postal votes as % of electorate* 8.38 3.72 1.18South WestPostal votes issued 401,009 174,789 65,546Returned 274,200 143,368 36,364Postal votes as % of electorate 10.49 4.71 1.74West Midlands**Postal votes issued 285,587 131,477 47,450Returned 199,227 102,911 25,644Postal votes as % of electorate 8.71 3.29 1.18

Note: * postal votes issued as a % of the electorate ** does not include data from one local authority area.Source: Rallings and Thrasher, based on data supplied by Local Returning Officers.

Table 2: Postal voting on demand 1999-2004

4.18 One interesting issue to look at is theimpact of previous all-postal voting pilotschemes of levels of postal voting on demand. In our evaluation of the 2003 pilot schemes, we examined the performance of Gateshead,Stevenage and Trafford as all three areas hadused all-postal voting for two years running. All three appeared to demonstrate the ability to maintain relatively high levels of turnout overtime. Would this effect be sustained once postalvoting was only an option? In 2004, Stevenage

was not a pilot, but had an exceptionally highlevel of postal voting on demand – 53% of votes cast were cast by post. However, itsoverall turnout was less in 2004 than the turnoutregistered in Gateshead and Trafford, whichwere able to continue to use all-postal voting in2004. Although turnout fell in all three areas ascompared to 2003, it fell the most in Stevenage(see Figure 1).


28

2004 European 2001 Parliamentary general

elections electionLondonPostal votes as % of electorate 8.38 3.72Turnout among registered postal voters (% of postal votes returned) 62.30 75.40Overall adjusted turnout* 37.30 55.20Difference 25.00 20.20South WestPostal votes as % of electorate 10.49 4.71Turnout amongst registered postal voters (% of postal votes returned) 68.40 82.00Overall adjusted turnout 37.70 64.90Difference 30.70 17.10West Midlands**Postal votes as % of electorate 8.71 3.29Turnout among registered postal voters (% of postal votes returned) 69.80 78.30Overall adjusted turnout 35.50 58.60Difference 34.30 19.70Note: * adjusted turnout to allow comparison over time ** does not include data from one local authority area.Source: Rallings and Thrasher, based on data supplied by Local Returning Officers.

Table 3: Turnout among those issued with a postal vote 1999-2004

57.353 52.954.7

52.2 52.447.32

39.15

45.4

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Gateshead Stevenage Trafford

May-02 May-03 Jun-04

All-postal voting

4.19 Turnout increased substantially in bothpilot and non-pilot regions in Englandcompared with the 1999 European Parliamentaryelections. Using either adjusted or unadjustedcalculations,28 turnout was about five percentagepoints higher in pilot regions than in non-pilotregions. While turnout more than doubled in pilotregions, it increased by only half that amount innon-pilot areas (see Table 4).


29

Figure 1: Turnout as a percentage ofregistered electors at all-postal pilots 2002,2003 and 2004

Unadjusted Adjusted Percentage Per cent turnout 2004 turnout 2004 point increase increase

1999-2004* 1999-2004*English pilot regions 42.42 41.98 21.73 109.46English non-pilot regions 37.11 36.86 12.67 53.38Note: * comparisons over time are based on adjusted turnout. Source: Rallings and Thrasher, based on data supplied by local returning officers. Adjusted turnout excludes invalid votes, unadjusted turnout includes them.

Table 4: European Parliamentary election turnout in pilot and non-pilot regions 1999-2004

28 The unadjusted turnout figures quoted here include invalid votesrejected at the count but not those rejected before the count (this datahad not been provided by all Returning Offices at the time of writing).

4.22 In summary, this evidence suggests thatall-postal voting made a difference in turnoutterms, especially where there were combinedelections and where all-postal arrangementswere being used for the first time. Furtheranalysis29 shows that the likelihood of votingincreased for all groups – regardless of gender,age or other factors – if they lived in a pilotregion and/or if the European Parliamentaryelections were combined with local electionsin that area. The 2004 ICM/Commission opinionsurvey also provides further evidence that all-postal voting encouraged people to vote.

Just under one in five people (18%) in the fourpilot regions said they were encouraged to voteby the all-postal arrangements.

4.20 In the North East, adjusted turnout (usedto enable comparison over time) was lower thanat the 2003 local elections (see Table 5). Thiswas the result of an average fall of 9.1% in the13 councils which had tested all-postal voting a year ago, compared with an average increaseof 8.2% in the 10 authorities where all-postalvoting was used for the first time this year. In theWest Midlands, there was a decrease of 11.6%in the five local authority areas where there hadbeen pilots in 2003 but an average increase of 4.8% elsewhere. These trends were morepronounced in areas with local elections.

4.21 There were also some marked changes in turnout within local authority areas. In NorthLincolnshire there was a drop of 16 percentagepoints since local elections last year despite all-postal voting being used on each occasion(although with a modified Declaration of Identityin 2003 and a ‘standard’ Declaration this year).By contrast, in Kirklees, where all-postal votingwas used for the first time, turnout was 14 pointshigher than at the previous local elections in2003 and 30 points (or 160%) up on 1999.


30

Percentage change* Average percentage point change 2003-41999-2004 Pilot area 2003 Non-pilot area 2003

Local elections 133.6 -5.8 14.8No local elections 92.1 -11.6 7.5West MidlandsLocal elections 76.8 -11.7 7.2No local elections 44.3 -14.5 1.5Note: * comparisons over time are based on adjusted turnout.Source: Rallings and Thrasher, based on data supplied by local returning officers.

Table 5: Turnout change and combined elections in the North East and the West Midlands

29 Multi-variate regression analysis by Professors Rallings and Thrasher.This technique looks at relationships between variables – in this case between turnout and the socio-demographics of any area, the arrangements (all-postal or not) and whether there werecombined elections or not – and can predict how one will beaffected if others change.

1 8 1 6 1 9 2 0 2 0 1 7 1 8 1 5

1 3 1 3 1 3 1 0 1 3 1 6 1 39

6 9 7 1 6 8 7 0 6 6 6 7 6 87 6

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Encourage Discourage No difference

AllMale

Female

18-24

25-34

35-54

55-64 65

+

4.23 However, it is worth noting that a similarproportion (16%) said the same in non-pilot areasand as many as 10% of non-voters in the pilotregions said that the arrangements encouragedthem, although clearly not enough to vote. Also,one in eight (13%) adults in the pilot regionssaid that the arrangements discouraged themfrom voting, with 35-54 year olds the most likelyage group to say this (16%) (see Figure 2).


31

Figure 2: Perceived impact of all-postal voting on turnout

Source: ICM.

Base: 2,661 adults aged 18+in four pilot regions.

4.24 ICM also analysed reported turnoutamong different demographic groups in pilot and non-pilot areas (see Table 6). Whencomparing reported turnout among key sub-groups of the electorate in pilot regions and non-pilot regions, the largest differentials inreported turnout were for women – whose

reported turnout was 10 percentage pointshigher in pilot regions than in non-pilot regions,compared to an equivalent +2 differenceamong men. The 55-64 age group were alsosignificantly more likely to have voted in pilotregions than in non-pilot regions, as were thosenot currently in employment.


32

non-pilot regions pilot regions point differenceMen 54 56 +2Women 51 61 +10Full time 47 50 +3Part time 50 51 +1Not employed30 61 70 +9Unemployed31 51 52 +118-24 35 43 +825-34 39 43 +435-44 48 48 045-54 53 58 +555-64 58 71 +1365+ 72 78 +6White 53 58 +5Asian/Black 58 63 +5Note: * As is typical in surveys such as this, more people reported having voted than official figures suggest actually did. N.B. These figures have been calculated by excluding respondents who said there were not registered to vote. Source: ICM and based on 8,512 interviews with UK adults 11-29 June 2004.

Table 6: Reported turnout* in pilot and non-pilot regions (by percentage)

30 The term ‘not employed’ refers to those who are not in employmentand not seeking work (includes those who are retired).

31 The term ‘unemployed’ refers to those who are unemployed butseeking work.

4.25 In conjunction with Professor John Curtice,ICM also conducted statistical analysis to furtherexplore the relationship between demographics,attitudes and turnout. The analysis concludedthat all-postal arrangements have ‘...the sameimpact on more or less all parts of society ratherthan a special impact among any particularsection or sections of it’.32 In other words, whileall-postal voting changed the magnitude of thevoting population, it did not change its profile.

4.26 In addition, and confirming previousresearch for the Commission, ICM assert that:

What [all-postal voting] does not do is re-connect the politically disengaged.Those people who have been reluctant to participate in electoral processes forattitudinal or social reasons, in relativeterms, are still not inclined to do so despitethe use of all-postal voting.

The pilot experiencePlanning for pilots in 2004

4.27 The Government announced its intention torun pilots of new voting methods at the June 2004elections in September 2003 and introducedthe necessary legislation on 23 September.

4.28 At the same time it launched a consultationon the form of, and arrangements for, the pilotsto be run. The consultation ended in November2003. The Electoral Commission was directedseparately, under Section 6 of PPERA, torecommend to the Government up to threeEuropean Parliamentary regions in which to hold pilots.

4.29 In the Commission’s response to theGovernment consultation, we put forward ourconcerns about the timings envisaged in thisprocess, while acknowledging that the entireenterprise was dependent on timelyParliamentary passage of the Bill:

The timetable set out in the Government’sconsultation paper is tight and leaves little room for slippage. The Commissionbelieves that for successful pilot schemes to be delivered in June 2004 the followingkey milestones must be met:

• Potential pilot regions must be informed oftheir selection, and receive a commitmentfrom Government as to the broad form ofthe pilot in sufficient detail for meaningfulwork to commence, by mid-December 2003.

• Potential pilot regions and suppliers mustbe able to start work on the detaileddesign of the voting services by 31December 2003.

• The final detailed Pilot Orders should be made no later than 31 March 2004.

4.30 This view was informed not only by ourown understanding of the work that would berequired, but by the views of Returning Officersand electoral administrators on the time theywould need to organise and run pilots. In theend, the debate on which regions would beincluded in the pilot was not settled until the Bill was passed on 1 April 2004 and the Orderproviding for the form of the pilot was not madeuntil 27 April 2004. Given that the notice ofelection – the official start of the election –


33

32 The full report from ICM and Professor Curtice is available todownload at: www.electoralcommission.org.uk

was required to be issued by 30 April – theCommission regards these timeframes aswholly unacceptable. This view is shared byelectoral practitioners in the four pilot regions,and across Great Britain. The problems createdby the timetable are evidenced in detail in ourevaluation reports on the four pilot regions andsummarised later in this chapter.

The Government should allow sufficient time forthe necessary discussions and preparations tobe made if it expects Returning Officers andtheir staff to deliver successful elections andpilots that are true learning experiences.

4.31 The Commission was particularlyconcerned about the effects that the uncertaintyarising from the protracted Parliamentary debatehad on the ability of Returning Officers to planeffectively for these elections. Our regionalevaluation programme has shown that ReturningOfficers in some local authority areas did notbegin to plan for an all-postal ballot until 1 April.

4.32 The form of the pilot was also finalised toolate to allow for its effective implementation. Latedecisions on the exact design of the votingprocess saw Returning Officers left with no timefor adequate planning and procurementprocesses. The Commission itself was not ableto finalise the training materials it was separatelyfunded to produce, with the result that pilotregions received a lower level of service thannon-pilot regions at a time when they couldlegitimately have expected more support. Thetime available for Royal Mail to plan and organiseits logistics was reduced. Crucially, the timeavailable to test improvements and modificationsto IT and print systems was almost non-existent.

Democracy is worthless if voters do nothave confidence in the way elections areconducted. Change is inevitable and weshould embrace the opportunity to makeimprovements. The process of changehowever has to be managed well andthose charged with making it work shouldbe consulted properly, listened to andgiven the time to prepare.

Electoral administrator, Yorkshire & the Humber

4.33 While late decision-making was alsoapparent in the May 2003 pilot programme (andthe Government was similarly criticised in theCommission’s evaluation report), the scale ofthe 2004 programme saw a significant increasein the level of risk that such uncertainty wascausing. The decision to pilot in four regionswas a massive expansion in the number ofelectors using all-postal voting. In May 2003,just over four million electors could participatein elections featuring all-postal voting, either asthe sole or one of multiple voting channels. In2004, the choice of four regions saw anelectorate of just over 14 million electors beingeligible to participate in an all-postal election.

Central management of the pilots

4.34 In 2004, the combined nature of the electionalso meant that pilots were the responsibility oftwo central departments, the Department forConstitutional Affairs (who led on legislation andpolicy development) and the Office of the DeputyPrime Minister. This mirrors the split in relation topolicy on national elections and referendumsand that on local and regional elections inEngland and Wales. Despite the involvement


34

of two departments, it was still not clear that the Government had directed adequateresources to supporting the pilots, a concernthe Commission had raised in 2003. ManyReturning Officers have commented to us thatthey find the split of responsibilities at bestconfusing and at worst unhelpful.

The Commission believes that, given the scaleof change already underway and contemplatedfor the future, it would be in the best interests ofeffective management if there were to be singleDepartment responsible for policy and law inrelation to elections and referendums. If this isnot feasible, there should at least be clarity as to where leadership on such matters withinGovernment is located rather than continuingthe current approach of ‘parallel’ responsibilities.

Design of the pilot schemes

4.35 In previous local election pilot schemes, itwas possible for each local authority to designits own pilot scheme (within the parameters ofthe legal provisions enabling pilot schemes).This enabled a degree of comparison to bemade between the different approaches. The2004 pilot schemes were all designed to acommon model, as set out in the EuropeanParliamentary and Local Elections (All-Postal)Pilot Order 2004 (the ‘Pilots Order’). The keyfeatures were as follows:

• all ballots were issued by post;

• ballot papers had to be returned either bypost or in person to an ‘Assistance andDelivery Point’ (initially, it was envisaged by the Government that only one fixed

Assistance and Delivery Point would operatein each local authority area; in practice, somelocal authorities deployed as many as eight);

• the Assistance and Delivery Points had toprovide assistance to voters, to provide a placeto complete papers in private and to provide a‘drop-off’ facility for those who did not wish toreturn their ballot papers by Royal Mail; and

• the ballot paper had to be accompanied by a Declaration of Identity, signed by the voterand witnessed by someone else.

‘Convenience undermined by complexity’

4.36 Some Returning Officers in the pilotregions had run three all-postal pilot schemesprior to June 2004 and had therefore built up asubstantial body of knowledge. Work had alsobeen done through the process of pilot schemeevaluation to identify necessary steps to improveaccess to all-postal voting for all groups ofelectors. This in turn informed the Commission’sview of an appropriate model of all-postalvoting, as set out in The shape of elections to come in 2003.

4.37 In autumn 2003, the Government acceptedthe Commission’s proposed model for all-postalvoting at local elections and announced anintention to consult on its implementation.33

However, before such steps were taken, theGovernment decided to proceed with the June2004 regional pilots and initiated a consultationinstead on the form of and arrangements for thepilot schemes. The Government received over150 responses to its consultation, many of


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33 The Government’s response to The Electoral Commission’s reportThe shape of elections to come, September 2003.

which were from electoral administrators,addressing the detail of the proposals to run all-postal voting and sharing specificexperience on what they believed would andwould not work. The Commission also made a detailed response to this consultation.34

4.38 Unfortunately, however, the form of postalvoting ultimately piloted in June was extremelycomplex and difficult to administer. For manyvoters it also proved difficult to use. The evidencefrom the Commission’s opinion polling –explored further in the next chapter – is that thedesign of the 2004 pilot schemes has damagedthe public’s experience of postal voting as astraightforward and easy method of voting. One party worker commented to us that theconvenience of postal voting was underminedby the complexity of the system.

4.39 Some complexities sprung from whatappeared to be good ideas proposed at theconsultation stage – the pilot has thereforeenabled their effect and utility to be assessed.Other elements of the design were inserted inresponse to undertakings given during theParliamentary process, late in the policydevelopment stages or to meet concerns about the potential for malpractice.

4.40 In the process of our regional evaluationprogramme, we have received many commentsfrom electoral administrators to the effect thatthey felt their evidence on what could andwould work was not given due regard. TheCommission understands that the Government

did draw on the responses received indeveloping the form of the pilot, but it has never published a summary of the responsesreceived. Such a summary would haveprovided both valuable feedback for those whoresponded and provided useful information onwhere the form of pilot would be innovative.

4.41 This sense of frustration anddisappointment is also shared by othersoutside the electoral administration community.Scope, the leading disability charity, was askedby the Commission to review access to theelections for electors with disabilities, electorswith low literacy and electors who use Englishas a second language.

4.42 In previous years, Scope had found thatthe majority of disabled people thought thatpostal voting was an easy and convenient wayto vote. However, there have been significantaccess barriers for disabled people who arevisually impaired or have communicationimpairments in the secret exercise of their vote.In 2004, Scope examined the legislationgoverning the pilot schemes, guidance issuedto Returning Officers and key documents suchas ballot packs. Their assessment was that thePilot Order – and in particular the wording andlayout of several key election documentsprescribed – impacted negatively on theaccessibility of the election and could havebeen improved.

4.43 The prescribed ‘Instructions to Voter’ andDeclaration of Identity were overly complex andnot broken down into step-by-step instructions.Many of the expressions or words used were


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34 The Electoral Commission’s response to the Government consultationpaper on pilots in 2004 available at www.electoralcommission.org.uk

too sophisticated. Further, election material,including the ballot packs, was generally notproduced in accessible formats or to currentbest practice accessibility guidelines. Forexample, small font sizes on importantdocuments were relatively common.

Assistance and Delivery Points (ADPs)

4.44 The bulk of ballot papers were returned by post. Electors could also use an Assistanceand Delivery Point, which gave effect to aCommission recommendation for supporteddelivery points. The Assistance and DeliveryPoints allowed electors to drop off a ballotpaper, obtain assistance or a witness ifrequired, and provided space for electors to complete their ballot paper in secret.


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Region 1 Jun 2 Jun 3 Jun 4 Jun 5 Jun 7 Jun 8 Jun 9 Jun 10 JunEast Midlands 4 7 7 8 2 9 10 16 36North East 6 7 8 7 2 9 11 11 18North West 5 5 6 8 11 12 19 18 32Yorkshire & the Humber 6 6 6 6 2 6 10 15 36Total 5 6 7 8 6 10 14 16 32

Source: Based on 84 local authorities that provided data to KPMG for the regional evaluation reports

Table 7: Usage of Assistance and Delivery Points (ADPs): ballot packs returned each day as a percentage of total return through ADPs

4.45 Use of the Assistance and Delivery Pointsshould be seen in the context of the public’sawareness of them (shown in Figure 3).According to ICM’s survey, only 50% of peopleacross the four pilot regions knew about theAssistance and Delivery Points. With theexception of age, there were few demographicdifferences in awareness – older age groupswere significantly more likely to be aware thanyoung people.

4.46 Awareness varied a little by region withpeople in the North East least aware (46%) andthose in the East Midlands most aware (51%).ICM’s focus groups found that many people didnot fully read the information provided in theirballot packs, including ‘frequently askedquestions’ which explained the role ofAssistance and Delivery Points. This may havebeen even more likely in areas such as theNorth East where people’s experience of, andfamiliarity with, all-postal arrangements is higher.

4.47 The Commission had originallyrecommended that there should be only oneAssistance and Delivery Point per local authorityarea and the Government initially provided forthis level of provision. However, some ReturningOfficers wished to offer additional Assistanceand Delivery Points and the Government didagree in response to fund further Assistance andDelivery Points. In some areas, unstaffedcontingency delivery points were also set upwhen the ballot packs were dispatched late.

4.48 The statistics provided to us by ReturningOfficers have indicated a higher level ofAssistance and Delivery Point usage than inprevious pilot schemes and than was expectedby Returning Officers and the Commission. Wehave also collected information to suggest thatsignificant numbers of Assistance and DeliveryPoint users required assistance due to thecomplex nature of the ballot pack, although thiscould be expected to reduce if ballot stationerywere to be simplified. Interestingly, there is muchanecdotal evidence that electors wanted to havegreater access to Assistance and Delivery Points,in terms of hours and days of opening andphysical location.


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50% 50%

No – wasnot aware

Yes – was aware

Figure 3: Awareness of Assistance and Delivery Points

Source: ICM Base: 2,661 adults aged 18+ in four pilot regions

Q. Were you aware or unaware that you couldgo to certain places set up by the council inyour areas for you to receive assistance, vote inprivate and drop off completed ballot papers?

Election timetable

4.49 One particular aspect of the design of thepilots schemes worth examination is the impactof changes to the standard election timetable.Since the beginning of the electoral pilotsprogramme in 2000, it has been the Government’spractice to modify the standard election timetableto allow changed periods of time to deliver variousstages of the election. However, this has notalways proved an adequate method of providingfor new or expanded processes. Pilots of futureelectoral innovation – such as electronic voting – clearly need to identify first the time actuallyrequired to undertake processes and tasks and then construct the timetable accordingly.

4.50 The three months available to theCommission under law to complete ourevaluation of the regional pilot schemes has notallowed us to undertake any consultation on anideal timetable for an election that involves votingconducted outside polling stations. However, wecan identify some key issues that emerged fromevaluation of this year’s pilot schemes that wouldneed to be reflected in any future use of ‘remote’voting channels:

1) The inclusion of a deadline for the issue ofthe ballot packs was useful. Electors shouldreceive their ballot packs a minimum of tendays before the close of the poll.

2) The deadline for electors to change theirdelivery details should be moved to the closeof nominations to allow production of ballotpacks to proceed on an agreed data set.

3) The deadline for close of nominations mayneed to be earlier to allow sufficient time forthe production of ballot packs.

Capacity to deliver

4.51 In an all-postal election, unlike traditionalpolls, the role of commercial suppliers is centralto the efficient and effective management of theprocess. In advance of the election period,much concern focused on the potential forproblems in relation to delivery of the mail.However, it was the production of the ballotpacks rather than delivery that created thebiggest difficulties. Substantial media attentionwas directed towards the capacity of ReturningOfficers and printers to produce ballot packs.

4.52 The Pilot Order specified the form of theballot pack. It was to contain:

• relevant ballot paper(s);

• Declaration of Identity;

• instructions to voters;

• inner return envelope; and

• outer return envelope.

4.53 The contents of these forms wereprescribed in the Pilot Order and the ballot packshad to be issued to electors by 1 June. Forvarious reasons explored in detail in our regionalevaluation reports, some Returning Officers’ printsuppliers indicated in the weeks before 1 Junethat they would not be able to deliver the requiredballot packs to this deadline. We understand thatsome Returning Officers and printers are takinglegal advice on their contractual obligations.The Commission will monitor the situation forthe purposes of future learning.

4.54 Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority –around 99% – of ballot packs across the four


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pilot regions were issued to Royal Mail on orbefore 1 June, and in many cases electors hadtheir ballot packs by the unofficial target date of26 May. It is worth noting that in the three largestauthorities in the pilot regions – Leeds, Liverpooland Sunderland – ballot packs were issued by26 May. All three were also running ‘all-out’combined elections resulting in a complex andlarge ballot pack. The three also illustrate thatthere is no one model of success as far as ballotpack procurement – Leeds were the sole clientof an experienced printer, Liverpool were part ofa consortium of Merseyside authorities whoseprovider supplied ballot packs for 44 authoritiesacross three of the four regions and Sunderlandused their in-house printer.

4.55 The Commission has concluded that whereproblems did arise they were the result of:

• Late decision-making: the delays in achievingParliamentary approval caused consequentdelays in achieving certainty about thenumber and form of pilots. This had a majorimpact on the ability of, and time available for, Returning Officers to procure suitableprinters, especially given the fact that theprescribed design of the ballot pack waschanging right up until three days before the official start of the election period.

• The complex combination of elections. Thelarge ballot papers and the need to customisethe production process for each ward in areas where there were local elections meantthat production could not proceed at anoptimum rate.

• Insufficient capacity at the time. While theCommission believes that sufficient capacityand expertise will develop in the print industry to support all-postal voting, it was not availablewithin the timeframes of the 2004 pilotsscheme, for the size of the pilot or for thecomplex nature of this particular set of electionsand the complex design of the voting materials.

• A lack of suitable contract managementprocedures by some Returning Officers. Theoutsourcing of key election tasks is unfamiliarto many electoral staff. The skills to deal withprocurement and project management taskswere not always available within electoralservices departments and the need for suchskills was not always recognised byReturning Officers.

4.56 During the week leading up to 1 June, Local and Regional Returning Officers,Government officials, printers and Royal Mailworked around the clock to monitor the progressof production. The direct intervention of RegionalReturning Officers and the Government officials,particularly in the Department for ConstitutionalAffairs, was, according to many ReturningOfficers, necessary to ensure production wasfinalised in time.

4.57 The dedication shown by these officers iscommendable, and their contribution to theeffective conduct of the election is recognised.However, that this was necessary raises realquestions about the ability of the print industryand Returning Officers and their staff at thepresent time to manage an exercise on this scale,let alone any further extension of all-postal voting.


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4.58 The Commission notes that productionproblems were in most cases ameliorated by theexcellent performance of Royal Mail in areas thatexperienced problems. Royal Mail needed toreschedule the delivery of millions of ballot packsacross and around a bank holiday weekend andthis was done effectively and efficiently. For manyReturning Officers, Royal Mail staff provided themost accurate information on the progress oftheir printing and delivery.

4.59 Royal Mail had implemented many of therecommendations from our 2003 report Theshape of elections to come. We were particularlypleased that a product was developed to includea ‘sweep’ of mail centres as close to the close ofthe poll as possible. While the Commissionaccepts that the timing and cost of this sweepprocess should be further evaluated, we continueto believe that it provides a vital assurance that asmany ballot papers as possible can be admittedto the count. The low number of ballot papersreceived on the day after the close of poll –detailed in the four regional reports – testifies tothe utility of this service.

4.60 Royal Mail made firm and high levelcommitments to the delivery of the pilot and theCommission believes that they performed verywell. We hope to see a similar level of servicemaintained at all future elections.

The administration of postal votingon demand4.61 The postal voting system used outside ofthe pilot areas has not substantially changedfrom that in place prior to the introduction ofpostal voting on demand in 2001. However, asthe number of postal voters has increased, ithas become increasingly evident that theprocedures are not fit for the efficientmanagement of large numbers of postal votes.These problems are especially pronounced atthe point of issue. Indeed, some previous localelection postal voting pilot schemes – notablyManchester in 2003 – were designed to testnew ways of improving the issue of postal voteson demand when large volumes were involved.

4.62 The main barriers to the efficient andtimely issue of postal votes to electors arelinked to the legal requirements imposed on theprocess, and can be summarised as follows:

1) The ballot stationery is highly prescribed inlaw and precludes the use of innovativemailing techniques such as ‘one piecemailers’ which can (if well designed) be morevoter-friendly and efficient to produce.

2) The official mark must be applied so as toperforate the ballot paper, which is not viablein many printing technologies. This is aparticular problem in relation to postal votesas it inserts a further level of complexity, anda further opportunity for error, in the issuingprocess. In polling station voting, theproblem is addressed through the PresidingOfficer’s role in issuing the ballot paper.


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3) The materials sent to the voter – the ballotpaper and Declaration of Identity – must allbe matched to accommodate the need for aserial number (or other vote tracing device,such as a barcode). As the printing ofseparate parts cannot be combined due to (1) and (2) this is often done by hand.

4) The time allowed between the last date forapplications and the last date for issue hasproved inadequate if many late applicationsare received.

5) Many printers are either not able toundertake this service to the required level oraccuracy or find the relatively low numbersinvolved not worth the effort of set up andtesting. The current rules do not provide theflexibility that can be required to deliver alegislatively compliant product at anaffordable price and within the timescales.

4.63 Many of these complexities mean that theefficiencies that can be gained from automatedissue of postal ballot papers cannot currently beapplied in a postal voting on demand system.However, there are potential solutions availablein relation to some of the areas of concern.

4.64 In relation to the first point, theCommission has evaluated a number of pilotschemes in previous years that tested the useof different forms of design. Not all weresuccessful and a small number were clearlyworse than existing arrangements. TheCommission considers that further work mustbe undertaken on the design of postal ballotpacks and we will continue to identify andpromote good practice in this area.

4.65 The Commission has separatelyrecommended that the rules pertaining toofficial marks should be amended to allow forthe use of alternative security marks such aswatermarking.35 This would allow the integrationof security marking with the printing process.The Government has responded that it intendsto seek to allow the use of alternative officialmarks as early as is practicable.36 We are alsocommencing later this year a review of the need for, and use of, serial numbers and othervote tracing devices.

4.66 We also believe that there should bescope to learn lessons from previous all-postalpilot schemes in relation to the printing processand so develop better large scale ‘postal votingon demand’ print services.

4.67 We examine below in more detail theissues of timetabling, which are not so readilysusceptible to reform, and the problemscaused by late receipt of large numbers ofapplications for postal ballots.


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35 The Electoral Commission (2003) The shape of elections to come.

36 The Government’s response to The Electoral Commission’s reportThe shape of elections to come, September 2003.

Task Days before pollFinal publication of statementof persons nominated -16Changes to existing postal vote application details -11Deadline for receipt of new postal vote applications -6

Timetable for postal votes on demand

4.68 In our report Election Timetables in theUnited Kingdom,37 we recommended that thereshould be no change to the timetable for theapplications for postal votes or changes to existing applications. Our model 25-daytimetable included the following cut-off points in regard to postal voting:

4.69 Despite the high degree of prescription inother areas of electoral law, there is presentlyno deadline by which postal votes must beissued to electors by the Returning Officer. AReturning Officer can issue a postal vote assoon as the Electoral Registration Officer (inpractice often the same person in England and Wales) has granted the application, when it is election-specific. For those electors with apermanent postal vote, postal ballot paperscannot be issued until the closing date forchanges to the details in their application, which is 11 days before the close of the poll.

4.70 Returning Officers will normally begin theproduction of ballot papers as soon as thestatement of persons nominated has beenpublished, as this finalises the list of candidatesstanding for election. However, this date is only16 days before the close of the poll. Ballotpacks for existing postal voters can bedispatched after 5pm on the eleventh daybefore polling day – in practice in 2004 thismeant that the first postal votes were dispatchedon 26 May. The final deadline for receipt of newapplications was 5pm on 2 June, meaning thatthe last postal votes would go out, if processingwas complete, on 3 June. There is no deadlinefor when these postal votes must be dispatched,although we have been informed that manyReturning Officers outside pilot areas had staffthat worked through the night of 2 June toensure that the late applications could bedispatched as soon as possible. Weunderstand that in some areas the volume oflate applications received was such that somepostal votes would not have been dispatcheduntil 4 June had this not been done.

4.71 The Commission supports the view ofmany Returning Officers that a suitable timeperiod for electors to receive, consider,complete, and return their ballot papers isessential. We also recognise that this needmust be balanced by the time it takes toproduce and issue postal ballot packs.


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37 The Electoral Commission (2003).

Recommended election timetable

4.72 The difficulty in balancing these needs is that addressing the problems created forReturning Officers by the tightness of thetimetable would involve allowing ReturningOfficers more time between receipt ofapplication and issue, which in turn wouldinevitably infringe the interests of voters at one end of the process or the other:

• If the deadline for postal vote applicationswere set earlier in the process, this wouldalmost certainly result in a reduction in thenumber of registered postal voters (andtherefore reduce overall participation rates).

• If the deadline for changing details forexisting postal voters were moved earlier, no significant administrative benefit would begained when compared with the reduction inthe accuracy of the address details.

• If ballot papers are issued later, the voter thenhas less time to consider how to vote and gettheir completed ballot paper back in time.

4.73 In addition to the proposals alreadyreferred to in paragraph 4.65 regarding designand use of alternative official marks, one furtherpotential change could help to ameliorate thesituation. At present, the law is silent on methodand class of postal vote issue (i.e. Royal Mail or by hand, first or second). Returning Officersmake their own judgments about theappropriate approach in the light of localcircumstances and resource constraints. Thepressures on the timing of issue of ballot paperswould be less severe if it were to be acceptedthat the norm was to use first class post (orhand delivery if that achieved a similar result)and Returning Officers were funded accordingly.

The Commission recommends that the lawrelating to the issue of postal votes shouldrequire Returning Officers to use the mostefficient means of dispatch available. Thischange should not, however, be introducedwithout a parallel commitment from local andcentral government to meet the costs of usingfirst class post for issue of postal ballots.

4.74 Even with this change, however, the latereceipt of large numbers of postal voteapplications at or near the deadline forapplications – which is only six days beforepolling day – is liable to push the postal votingsystem to breaking point.

Applications for postal votes

4.75 We have already noted (and welcomed inprinciple) the increasing number of campaignsby parties and campaign groups to encourageapplications for postal votes. Very often suchcampaigns involve the distribution ofapplication forms. All examples of suchapplication forms seen by the Commission in2004 provided all the relevant informationrequired by law and offered electors all therelevant choices. However, many used a returnaddress that was not that of the relevant ElectoralRegistration Officer but rather that of the partyor group’s own offices, or that of a contractor.We understand that this is done for bothpractical and resource reasons. However, theCommission made clear before the electionsthat we regarded this as inappropriate.37


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37 The Electoral Commission (2004) Draft code of conduct for politicalparties, candidates and canvassers on the handling of postal votingapplications and postal ballot papers.

4.76 We discuss elsewhere in this report theimpact the use of ‘third party’ return addressesmay have on elector confidence in the systemsof postal voting in use. For the purpose of thecurrent discussion, our concern is limited to theimpact of this practice on the administration ofthe election.

4.77 The practice of many groups is that postalvote applications sent in by electors are receivedby a central mailing house and then sorted intoeither Parliamentary constituencies or localauthority area. They are then dispatched to localbranches, whose members are in turn requiredto sort and deliver them to the appropriateElectoral Registration Officer. The administrativeproblems caused by this practice were firsthighlighted by the Commission in our 2001report. However, because of increased take-upin 2004, the problems created were even moremarked this year.

4.78 We are aware that some ElectoralRegistration Officers proactively contactednational and local branches and agents to alertthem to potential difficulties when they becameaware of these campaigns. The response frompolitical parties was that applications would bereturned to Electoral Registration Officers ingood time for processing. This was also raisedby the Commission with senior party officialsand similar assurances were given.

4.79 Unfortunately, we have received numerousreports of Electoral Registration Officersreceiving large numbers of applications frompolitical parties or campaign groups just inadvance of the deadline: 5pm on the sixth day

before the close of the poll. The ability ofelectoral services staff to process such volumesand dispatch postal ballots in time for electorsto receive them is not guaranteed even if theapplications are in order. Unfortunately, in manycases they were not and the following problemswere reported to the Commission:

• many applications were duplicates or insome cases triplicates, but still had to beprocessed for this to become apparent;

• many were from electors who were alreadypermanent postal voters, but still had to beprocessed for this to become apparent;

• some were from existing permanent postalvoters including a change of address thatcould not be actioned as it was received toolate in the timetable;

• applications were forwarded to the wrongElectoral Registration Officer, especially whenthey had been sorted by Parliamentaryconstituency rather than local governmentareas; and

• in some cases they were delivered after thedeadline, despite being signed by the electorin some cases up to two months previously.One Electoral Registration Officer reportedreceiving some 60 such applications in Julythat bore electors’ signatures from May.

4.80 As a result, we estimate that several hundredvoters (and potentially more) across Great Britainwere disenfranchised or lost the opportunity tocast their ballot either in their preferred way or atall. These problems could have been avoided if the applications were received earlier.


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4.81 The Commission acknowledges thevaluable and legitimate role of parties inencouraging the take-up of postal voting andincreasing participation. But we are deeplyconcerned that there continues to be a lack ofawareness or understanding as to the impact ofsuch bulk applications on Electoral RegistrationOfficers, and on the capacity for such practicesto effectively disenfranchise those electors whohave completed application forms in good faith.Accordingly, we believe that more concretesteps should be taken to ensure thatcampaigns designed to increase participationdo not have the opposite effect.

The Commission recommends that the lawrelating to postal vote applications be revised to provide that postal vote applications mustbear the return postal address of the ElectoralRegistration Officer at their normal place of business.

4.82 We recognise that such an approach maycause concern to parties and campaign groups,who would need to produce separate form foreach area in order to provide the relevantElectoral Registration Officer’s address. We arealso aware that the use of a single mailing houseaddress for return allows campaigners toprocess their applications more efficiently. An alternative, but in our view less effective,approach would be to penalise political parties,campaign groups and others for any delays inforwarding applications received from a thirdparty. The Commission has identified a clause inthe Australian electoral legislation that addressesa similar problem. It is designed to ensure theswift return of postal vote application forms or

postal ballot papers to the relevant statutoryofficers. Section 197 of the CommonwealthElectoral Act 1918 imposes a penalty for anydelay in the forwarding of such documents:

Failure to post or deliver postal voteapplication etc.

A person to whom an elector entrusts:

(a) an application for a postal vote; or

(b) an envelope apparently containing apostal ballot-paper;

for posting or delivery to an officer shall postor deliver the application or envelope, as thecase may be, as soon as practicable.

Penalty: £1,000.

If the law is not changed to prohibit return ofpostal vote application forms via third parties,the Commission recommends that UK law bechanged to include a new provision similar tothat of section 197 of the CommonwealthElectoral Act 1918 to require the timelyforwarding of postal vote applications.

The integrity of postal voting4.83 In 2004, as in previous years, concernsabout the security of postal voting centred on thescope for coercion or undue influence during thecompletion of ballot papers. Most allegationsreceived by Returning Officers and police relateeither to voters being coerced to vote a certainway, or to voters being coerced into handingover their uncompleted ballot paper forcompletion by someone else. There is alsoconcern over the integrity of the electoral register.


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4.84 We are aware of only two investigationsthat have resulted in arrests to date. In Oldham,three men have been arrested in connectionwith stealing ballot papers and in Halton therehave been two arrests for forgery. There havealso been well-publicised allegations in otherparts of the pilot regions such as Burnley,Sheffield, Derby and Bradford but it is too soonto know if any of these will result in prosecution.Outside pilot regions, the media gaveprominence to allegations of so-called vote‘harvesting’ in Birmingham, where WestMidlands Police were asked to investigate 15 allegations of impropriety. Two electoralpetitions – in the Aston and Bordesley Greenwards of Birmingham – are based onallegations of electoral offences. As thesematters are ongoing it would be inappropriatefor the Commission to comment at this stage.The Commission is also aware of ongoingpolice investigations in Reading and Glasgow.

4.85 Some members of the public, as well as candidates and agents, have expressedconcern over the possibility that postal votingcould increase the likelihood of dominantmembers of a household coercing others in the house to vote the way they want. Mostallegations of this type are centred on minoritycommunities, especially in large urban areas,and this is discussed more in chapter 7. Otherallegations made have related to apparent dualor multiple voting and votes being cast byelectors known to be away from the UK.

4.86 Allegations surrounding voting by deceasedelectors, ‘child electors’ and fictitious electors doappear to be on the increase. These concernsappear to have been particularly resonant in the

pilot areas. ICM asked people how much of aproblem they thought fraud or abuse was at theJune 2004 elections. Just over a quarter (26%) of adults across the UK said that it was a very or fairly big problem – representing little changefrom the 24% who considered electoral fraud to be a problem in Britain in a MORI surveyconducted for us in December 2003. However,those living in the ‘postal voting on demand’regions were much less likely to consider fraudto be a problem at the June elections thanthose in pilot areas – 24% against 30%.

4.87 The Commission believes that the integrityof all elections will be enhanced by theintroduction of individual electoral registration.This move would enable a check to be madebetween ballot papers and details held on theelectoral register – while registration continuesto be managed on a ‘household’ basis, this isimpossible. However, some attempts weremade within the framework of the June pilotschemes to address issues of security.

Voter attitudes and behaviour

4.88 The bedrock of our voting system is thesecrecy of our ballot. The 2004 pilots, unlikemany previous pilots, involved:

• the inclusion of a ‘secrecy envelope’ – aninner envelope into which the ballot paperswere sealed;

• a prohibition on electoral staff matching theelector with their vote; and

• the provision of staffed Assistance andDelivery Points designed to provide (amongother services) a private and supervisedvenue in which to cast a vote.


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Nevertheless, one of the biggest concerns ofelectors is that they do not feel that the currentarrangements for postal voting facilitate thecasting of a ballot in secret.

4.89 One of measures regarded by someparliamentarians in 2004 as central to theprevention of fraud was the witnessedDeclaration of Identity. This is a standardrequirement in postal voting on demand,although the witness signature had beendispensed with in some previous pilotschemes. In fact, some pilots had done awaywith a Declaration altogether. For the purpose of the June 2004 pilots, supporters of thewitnessed Declaration argued in Parliament that a witness to the Declaration would provide agreater degree of confidence that the voter reallywas who he claimed to be. This approach wasultimately adopted. However, in practice it causedsignificant problems, with little if any evidence ofincreased protection against fraud. Accordingto ICM ‘many people question the value of theDeclaration of Identity – it is considered to bean unnecessary inconvenience. It is thought to be easily abused, and in the worst-casescenario, dissuades people from voting’. Twelveper cent of those who voted reported problems.

4.90 Nevertheless, the survey found mostpeople of the view that it was easy to fill in theDeclaration and get someone to witness it. Morethen eight in ten of those who voted (84%) heldthis view. Non-voters were also asked how easyor difficult they thought it would have been tocomplete the Declaration. While 26% thought itwould have been difficult to complete, 55% tookthe opposite view. Combining the responses ofvoters and non-voters, 71% rated the Declaration

as easy to complete while 18% rated it asdifficult. Older age groups were relatively morepositive as were those in 2+ personhouseholds and those from ethnic minoritybackgrounds reported more problems. Noequivalent figures are available in relation topostal voting on demand (as the numbersinvolved are much smaller), but it is obviouslylikely that there would not be such significantlevels of difficulty reported amongst those whohad requested the postal vote in the first place.

4.91 Both all-postal and combined elections areassociated with a greater number of ballot paperrejections before the count. This year, there wasalso considerable variation between localauthorities. For example, in the North East, theproportion of postal votes where the coveringenvelope or contents were rejected before thecount varied from 0.65% in Alnwick to 4.93% in South Tyneside. In addition, somewhatsurprisingly, Professors Rallings and Thrasher’sanalysis for the Commission has found a higheraverage rejection rate in repeat pilot areas thanin first-time pilots. This may reflect the fact thatthose in repeat areas were not always usingexactly the same method of postal voting as in previous pilot schemes.

4.92 A greater proportion of votes were rejectedat the count in pilot regions than in non-pilotregions. By way of an example, in the North East0.6% of votes reaching this stage were rejectedwhere there were only European Parliamentaryelections and in the West Midlands the figure was0.3%. Again, combination had an effect – in theNorth East 2.2% of votes were rejected at thecount where there were combined elections,compared with 1.1% in West Midlands.


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Draft Code of conduct

4.93 One initiative to try to counter perceptionsof undue influence in the postal voting processwas the publication (in April 2004) of theCommission’s draft Code of conduct forpolitical parties, candidates and canvassers onthe handling of postal voting applications andpostal ballot papers. This was producedfollowing discussion with the Westminster,Scottish and Welsh Political Parties Panels andthe vast majority of it reflects existing campaignguidelines provided by the parties themselves.The Commission’s intention in publishing thedraft Code was to help build confidence in the system of postal voting. The Commissionhas always acknowledged the vital role thatcampaigners play in encouraging participationin elections, but we believe that certainactivities, either in practice or because of publicperceptions of them, are inappropriate forcampaigners. The Code was always intendedto be reviewed after the elections in the light ofthe experience of using it in a ‘live’ election andfeedback from those involved.

4.94 However, this draft Code was not wellreceived by some political parties, and this hasbeen the subject of some high profile pressreports. Particular concerns have arisen wherethe Commission has suggested in the draftCode that certain practices, while not unlawful,are undesirable and should be avoided. Forexample, some parties suggest that handlingsealed ballot papers or witnessing aDeclaration of Identity should be permitted andis acceptable once the ballot paper had beencompleted and sealed in its return envelope.The draft Code states that the Commissionregards such activities as unwelcome.

4.95 Some political parties are concerned thatsuch statements from the Commission riskcausing confusion about what the law actually is.The Conservative Party commented that ‘…anycode which diverges from the law is a recipe forconfusion’, especially among non-professionalvolunteers and activists who may not be certainwhat practices are lawful.

4.96 However, there is more agreement thandisagreement between the Commission and the parties on the underlying principles. TheCommission is pleased that there is generalagreement that campaigners and party workersshould not handle ballot papers or witness aballot paper being completed. There is alsosupport for the principle that postal votes shouldbe sent directly to the elector’s chosen individualaddress and not to a ‘warehouse’ address.

4.97 The Commission will continue to work withthe political parties to agree on appropriateguidance in relation to the conduct ofcampaigners. We have already discussed theparties’ concerns on the timing and presentationof the draft Code with them and, as noted, havefound many areas of common ground. The draftCode of conduct is being re-edited for furtherevaluation in the planned regional referendumin the North East of England in November 2004,and final assessment of its impact and valuewill be undertaken after that event.

4.98 We will also continue to consider whetherthere is a need for legislation to underpin theconduct of campaigners. We are firm in ourview that if appropriate levels of conduct cannotbe agreed and delivered through discussionand consensus then new statutory provisionsmay be required.


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Incidence of fraud

4.99 In 2003 we recommended that ReturningOfficers should conduct post-election checkson security statements returned in all-postalpilot schemes. These checks would allow someauditing of signatures Declarations of Identityagainst existing electoral records. TheCommission was committed to issuing guidanceon this for Returning Officers’ use in 2004; theGovernment’s decision to proceed with pilots in 2004 meant this could only be issued in draftform. At the time of writing many ReturningOfficers are still conducting these tests and the Commission will continue to gather theirevidence with a view to providing final guidance.

4.100 Those Returning Officers (in both pilotand non-pilot regions) that have conductedsuch checks report that no evidence of fraudhas been found. Of those samples examined,at most only one or two signatures haverequired further checks, usually done by theelection staff. The majority of electors andwitnesses contacted have been happy to assistin these checks.

4.101 It is important that Returning Officers areable to demonstrate the integrity of the processand the Commission will continue to refine andpromote model integrity checks taking intoaccount further input from their trials.

4.102 There are also some additional sources ofevidence to consider. The Regional ReturningOfficer for the North West and GreaterManchester Police in June issued a jointstatement that ‘in Greater Manchester, the scaleof allegations of fraud and malpractice is broadly

similar to previous years. While the nature ofallegations has changed this year, the scale hasnot increased – if anything it has lessened’.38

4.103 The Commission also notes thatReturning Officers were required to return toelectors Declarations of Identity that wereincomplete for completion by either the electoror a witness. The return of these papers clearlycould have exposed failings in the security ofthe process. However, the Commission is notaware of any allegations or claims made as aresult of returning incomplete Declarations tothe effect that the Declaration had not originallybeen submitted by the elector concerned.

4.104 In summary, we are not aware of anyevidence to date to suggest any widespreadabuse of postal voting either within or beyondthe pilot regions. However, the Commission isnot yet able to conclude whether the increaseduse of postal voting across Great Britain has ledto an increase of fraud or malpractice. In pilotareas the time limits for bringing prosecutionswere increased to two years (it remains 12months in other areas) and we will continue to monitor the incidence of allegations. TheCommission is aware that not all ReturningOfficers will notify the Commission ofallegations and, as the Commission has nopowers to effectively compel the disclosure of such information, this makes the task ofassessing the incidence of fraud more difficult.In addition, the type of intimidation that is oftenreferred to in the context of postal voting will, byits very nature, be difficult to quantify.


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38 Joint Statement from Regional Returning Officer Sir Howard Bernsteinand Detective Supt Martin Bottomley, Greater Manchester Police.

Costs of postal votingResourcing piloting

4.105 At the time of writing the Commission hasbeen unable to evaluate fully the cost of the2004 pilot schemes as not all local authoritieshave supplied the necessary data. This isdisappointing as one of the key objectives ofthis year’s evaluations was to investigate thetrue costs of running elections in the manner,and we hoped to have a significant pool ofevidence from which to draw from.

4.106 We have collected cost information aspart of our evaluation process, and whatinformation we feel is reliable is discussed inour regional reports. Particularly noteworthy isthe wide divergence in the cost of ballot packproduction and the differing levels of staffdeployed to open and process ballot papers.The Commission will continue to investigatethese areas for future reference, particularly tosee if late decisions and inexperience of postalvoting led to higher costs.

4.107 The Government issued the guidance forpilot regions on expenditure levels (usuallyreferred to as ‘fees and charges’) on 18 June2004, eight days after the poll had closed. Whilethe legal framework for fees and charges wasprovided in the Pilot Order, Returning Officers(quite rightly) rely on the guidance that followsto set budgets and monitor expenditure. Inaddition, what guidance had been available inadvance changed during the election period –for example, as we have noted, centralGovernment had originally agreed to fund onlyone Assistance and Delivery Point per principal

area but then subsequently agreed to fundmore. Similarly, no publicity activities apart fromthe information card were supported, until27 May Ministers directed that the Governmentwould meet the cost of publicity activities in theface of adverse media coverage of the delays in ballot paper production.

4.108 Although we welcome the Government’swillingness to invest in the pilots to assist indealing with the issues that Local ReturningOfficers faced, it makes any analysis of theeffectiveness of local financial management forthe pilot schemes more complex.

4.109 Under these circumstances it would beinappropriate for the Commission to suggestthat there was an ideal ‘cost per elector’ levelthat Returning Officers should have, or couldhave, met. However, as a key aim of piloting isidentify the potential for any additional costs orsavings, we are firmly of the view that the June2004 pilots have failed in this regard.

Resourcing postal voting on demand

4.110 The Commission has always stressedthat any changes to our electoral arrangementsmust be accompanied by an appropriate levelof resources. The experience of many ReturningOfficers in 2004 is that the current level andmethod of funding for postal voting on demandhas not evolved to match the current volume.

4.111 Returning Officers receive their financialresources for national elections through asystem of fees and charges set in legislation.Postal voting costs are met in two ways. Thecost of printing and postage is reimbursed.


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There is also a set clerical allowance for thepreparation and receipt of the ballot packs. Thisallowance is set based on the number of electors,not the number of electors who vote by post.

4.112 The resourcing of electoral services is nota new issue and is one that the Commissionhas separately examined in previous reports.The 2004 elections have proved again that thissystem is not a suitable base for electoraldevelopment and reform.

4.113 In previous elections where the level ofpostal voting was 5% or so of an electorate thisallowance was adequate. However, the currentlevels of postal voting have rendered thissystem unworkable and the amounts availableinsufficient. A new system could support theautomated issue of postal votes whereappropriate and reflect the predictabilityprovided by permanently registered postalvoters. We would hope to see such changes inplace for postal voting on demand at the nextelections in spring 2005.

4.114 The Commission has also previouslyrecommended that, in the short term:

• there should be an annually negotiatedreview of the Fees and Charges Orders,rather than preparing a new Order in advanceof specific elections; and

• there should be rationalisation of the fees andcharges mechanisms and changes to the‘miscellaneous’ heading within the ChargesOrder to give greater freedoms andflexibilities to local managers, and to ensurethat legitimate costs, reasonably incurred, areefficiently reimbursed.

The current fees and charges structure must be reviewed, in line with the Commission’s 2003 recommendations (in Funding Democracy),to support the existing and expected levels ofpostal voting.

4.115 There is also a clear difference betweenthe levels of promotion of postal voting ondemand initiated by different ElectoralRegistration Officers. Some are very proactive,including applications forms with canvass formsor on poll cards, whilst others are more reactivein their provision of information.

4.116 Some Electoral Registration Officersbelieve that it is not their role to promote postalvoting on demand, only to make informationavailable if requested. Similarly, some ElectoralRegistration Officers and Returning Officers areuneasy about promoting electoral participationmore generally, having construed their role in a more narrow procedural light. For almost allElectoral Registration Officers and ReturningOfficers it is difficult to obtain the necessaryresources to promote elections and registration.

4.117 The Commission has previously urgedthe Government to clarify the legal position ofReturning Officers in relation to funding publicityto encourage participation, including theavailability of postal voting on demand. Wehave also recommended that, if uncertaintycontinues to exist Government should explicitlylegislate for such powers. Following clarificationor legislation, the Commission will issue guidanceon good practice in promotional techniques,building on the research in Making an impact.


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Structural reform of funding

4.118 Longer term, the Commission hasrecommended that more structural changes areneeded to ensure that arrangements for fundingdemocracy are fit for the 21st century. In thelight of the fact that electoral services in the UKface a future of change and modernisation – anational electronic register, multi-channel votingusing new technology, new elections andincreased use of referendums – continuing toallow local autonomy in determining corebudgets for electoral services will not providethe consistency of service levels necessary orgenerate the investment needed for the future.

4.119 Even a brief review of the pattern ofresource allocation to, and within, localgovernment in recent years suggests that it issimply not realistic to expect local authorities toprioritise electoral services over other more‘front-line’ service provision. We have thereforerecommended that core funding for electoralservices (i.e. funding for staffing, training,infrastructure, registration services and UKelections and referendums) should come fromthe Consolidated Fund so that the funding canbe matched with national standards that can be monitored centrally.

4.120 Linked to this, we have also recommendedthat further discussions should take place withthe Government, the devolved legislatures andrepresentatives of local government (includingparish councils and community councils) toidentify the most efficient and effective fundingarrangements for sub-UK elections tocomplement the structural changes to funding of core services and UK electionsrecommended above.


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5 Postal voting: where are we now?On balance, the public are positiveabout postal voting both on demandand in all-postal voting schemes.However, it is clear that confidence inpostal voting to deliver safe, secureand secret elections is not as highas it has been in recent years.

Public attitudes 5.1 To help assess reactions to the 2004elections, the Commission asked ICM to conductsurvey and qualitative research to measure andexplore public attitudes. This research looked in particular at the public’s experience of votingin 2004, both in pilot and non-pilot areas. Inconjunction with Professor John Curtice, ICM alsoconducted statistical analysis to explore furtherthe relationship between demographics, attitudesand turnout and to investigate the extent to whichthe variables associated with abstention werecommon across pilot and non-pilot areas.48 Inthis report, we explore their findings in relationto postal voting. Further analysis in relation tothe wider issues raised by the elections willfeature in our forthcoming statutory report on theEuropean Parliamentary elections more generally.

Satisfaction

5.2 According to ICM’s survey for theCommission, people in pilot regions weresatisfied with all-postal voting by a margin of twoto one – 59% against 30% (see Figures 4 and 5).Underpinning this satisfaction is a strong rating ofthe convenience of all-postal voting. On balance,public opinion in the four pilot regions waspositive about the experience of all-postal votingthis year, as it was in all-postal pilot areas in 2003and in 2002. By more than three to one peoplein the 2004 pilot regions were positive about theconvenience of all-postal voting; 69% rated thearrangements as being very or fairly convenientcompared to 19% who said they were very orfairly inconvenient; and four in ten (42%) ratedthe arrangements as very convenient.

Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting: postal voting: where are we now?

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48 The figures relate to three non-pilot regions in England – London,South West and the West Midlands – for which data was returned intime to be used for this report.

5.3 Moreover, the public is confident enough inthe all-postal arrangements to back their futureuse. A majority (55%) of those living in the pilotregions supported holding future electionsexclusively by post with no polling stations with a third (34%) strongly in favour.


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29%

30%

11%

18%

12%

Neithersatisfied nor dissatisfied

Verysatisfied

Don’t know 1%Very

dissatisfied

Fairlysatisfied

Fairly dis-satisfied

Figure 4: Satisfaction with all-postal voting

Source: ICMBase: 2,661 adults aged 18+ in 4 pilot regions

Q. As you may remember, in your areaeveryone voted by post rather than in theirlocal polling stations. Regardless of whetheror not you voted, how satisfied or dissatisfiedwere you with this arrangement…

5.4 However, this is not to say that the public do not have strong reservations and concernsabout all-postal voting – they do. Moreover, ICMfound all-postal voting ‘falling short’ of traditionalarrangements for voting in several key respectseven where it is highly regarded. A notablefeature of public opinion this year compared toprevious measures is the strength of criticism

of all-postal voting and opposition to its futureuse (albeit that the people taking this stance arein a minority).


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59 58 59 59 57 56 62 62 64 56 57 61

29 30 28 24 25 31 30 32 31 30 2924

-40%

-20%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

Satisfied Dissatisfied

Pilot

Male

Female

18-24

25-34

35-54

55-64 65

+

North E

ast

North W

est

Yorks

& H

umb

East M

ids

Figure 5: Satisfaction with all-postal voting

Source: ICM Base: 2,661 adults 18+ in the 4 pilot regions

Q. As you may remember, in your area everyone voted by post in the elections on June 10rather than in their polling station. Regardless of whether or not you voted how satisfied ordissatisfied were you with this arrangement?

Fraud and security

5.5 Public criticisms of, and concerns about,all-postal voting are particularly pronouncedwhen it comes to safety from fraud and abuse.

5.6 ICM found that six in ten adults in the pilotregions, (59%), rated postal voting as beingvery or fairly good at ‘allowing people to vote insecret, but a significant minority (24%) said thatthe arrangements were very or fairly bad in thisregard. Actual voters were more positive thanaverage, but 27% of non-voters rated secrecyas very or fairly bad and the 59% positive ratingis significantly lower than the 84% equivalent innon-pilot areas.

5.7 ICM’s qualitative research provided somediagnostic insights into the reasons for concernsabout secrecy and found anxieties aboutcompromised secrecy focusing on bullying and intimidation whether it be husbands puttingpressure on their wives to vote a certain way,those in shared living conditions beingpressured by housemates, or workplacepressure (this was a major news issue in the North West region). Additionally, the use of barcodes was off-putting to some:

The barcodes are a little bit like Big Brotheris watching you. I just wonder if secrecy isbeing compromised.

ICM focus group participant

The thing that concerned me about thebarcodes is the anonymity. Theoretically itis possible to tie up the identity of the voterwith how they voted.


The use of barcodes for identification I finddegrading. It makes me feel no different toa can of beans on a supermarket shelf!

Letter to The Electoral Commission

5.8 ICM caution that such findings should beseen in the context of a fairly limited knowledgeof how the arrangements actually work in termsof protecting the secrecy of the vote and howthese compare with often unknown mechanismsfor polling station voting. Also, despite someconcerns about the potential for secrecy beingcompromised by household members or others,ICM report that this was ‘not a major issue’ andthat ‘most people realised that they couldcomplete the ballot form away from any pryingeyes if they so wished, with some not caring iffamily members did see how they voted’.

5.9 Overall, while half (51%) of those in pilotregions say all-postal voting was in their viewvery or fairly safe from electoral fraud and abuse,a third (34%) say it was not, and this includes16% who rated it as very unsafe (see Figure 6).Again, all-postal voting suffers by comparisonwith traditional polling stations and postal votingon demand arrangements with 71% of those innon-pilot areas rating these as very or fairly safe.

5.10 ICM report that ‘although both [traditionaland all-postal] methods suffer from perceivedweaknesses in terms of the integrity of voting,public perceptions of the two methods isevidently different’ with ‘perceptions of fraudand abuse…more associated with all-postalvoting…’. Public opinion research by MORI forus last year found that people were positiveabout the all-postal arrangements and


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particularly the convenience it affords but, at thesame time, there was a reflective and relativeconcern about security and the potential forelectoral fraud. This year, it would appear thatthe public’s concerns are less the product oftime to think, and more instinctive.

5.11 ICM found that those living in the four pilotregions were much more likely to consider fraudto be a problem at the June elections than thosein non-pilot areas – 31% against 23% (seeFigure 7). However, perceptions aside, ICMfound only 2% in pilot regions recalling personalor second-hand experience of electoral fraud(although higher than the 1% in non-pilot areas)and many of the examples given were neitherfraudulent nor substantive.


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16%

Very safe

Don’t know 4%

Very unsafe

Neither safe nor unsafe

Fairlyunsafe

16%Fairlysafe

35%18%

12%

Figure 6: Public perceptions of the integrityof voting

Source: ICM Base: 2,661 adults aged 18+ in 4 pilot regions

Q. And when it comes to being safe fromfraud or abuse, would you say that voting inthis way was…

5.12 Public confidence in the integrity of votingarrangements is an important objective – whetherbased on perceptions borne out by reality or not.This is all the more important given that ICMsuggest that concerns about the potential forfraud and abuse did dissuade some people fromvoting. Thirteen per cent of people in pilot areassaid that the arrangements discouraged themfrom voting, likely to be in part related to concernsabout fraud and these are no doubt a key factorin leading a third (34%) to oppose the future useof all-postal voting in place of polling stations witha quarter (24%) saying they are strongly against.

Media influence on public attitudes

5.13 In 2003, MORI concluded that the public’sperceptions of all-postal arrangements wereliable to be shaped by incidents and major newsstories leading to fears about fraud becomingmore entrenched. This year, ICM conclude thatthere is some evidence to suggest that this didin fact happen in the pilot regions. They suggestthat ‘some negative news coverage in the lead up to these elections both reflected andreinforced prospective voters’ fears about theabuse of the all-postal system’, as illustrated bythese comment from focus group participants:

There was stuff going on in Oldham with thatemployer saying he would sack everyoneunless they voted Labour. There were alsopeople knocking on doors offering to fill[ballot papers] in.


Was it in Burnley where the votes wererigged? About 60 people were arrested forballot rigging.

ICM focus group participant (election diary entry)


60

2417

34

35

2526

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Pilot Non-pilot

No problemNot a very big problemFairly big problemVery big problem

7 6

Figure 7: Public perceptions of the integrityof voting

Source: ICMBase: 2,661 adults 18+ in the 4 pilot regions

Q. From what you know or have heard, howmuch of a problem, if at all, do you thinkelectoral fraud or abuse was at the electionson 10 June?

Four police forces are investigatinghundreds of alleged cases of postal votefraud that could cast doubt on the integrityof today’s local and European elections.

Elections cast into doubt by post voteturmoil (Daily Telegraph 10 June)

Postal voting is too complex to deliver

Chaos over postal ballots could delay theresult of the crucial elections for theEuropean Parliament and town halls acrossEngland on 10 June.

Fear of postal voting election fiasco(Independent 19 May)

Angry voters have told The Sun they havebeen cheated out of postal ballots fortoday’s elections.

Robbed of our votes (The Sun 10 June)

Around a million postal ballot papers forthe local and Euro elections will miss theirRoyal Mail deadline of midnight tonight, theGovernment conceded tonight... Councilswere working round the clock to ensure all14 million voters in postal-only regionswould get their vote in time for polling daynext week. But a series of technical hitchesthreatened to plunge the 10 June poll intochaos, with some candidates warning ofpossible legal action.

One million ballot papers ‘will missdeadline’ (Evening Standard 1 June)


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49 MORI for The Electoral Commission – 1,801 UK adults aged 18+, 9-15 May 2001.

I saw news on TV about the exposure of dirtytricks of the postal ballots (not impressed).


5.14 In 2004, the level of media interest aroundthe pilots was high. The Parliamentarydiscussions on the location and form of the pilotssaw the process of voting become more of apolitical issue than it has been for many years.This prompted many journalists to follow theprocess with interest. The reliance of electorson media to gain political news – 88% of Britishadults use TV to obtain information and newsabout politics and current issues49 – means thatthe impact of media coverage of elections cannotbe underestimated. While the Commission didnot undertake a formal media analysis in the pilotregions some clear trends were obvious.

5.15 Throughout the election process the followingtrends could be seen in media coverage:

Postal voting is open to abuse

Little George Shaw is unable to read orwrite and more interested in watching TheFimbles than Prime Minister’s Questions.But the 11-month-old baby has receivedballot papers enabling him to vote in nextmonth’s European and local elections –and so has his brother Harry, three.

Baby gets a vote (Daily Express 29 May)

Postal voting is too hard to do

Almost 15 million electors in NorthernEngland and the East Midlands will this weekbe faced with one of the most complexvoting forms in the history of British polling.

Confused? You would be if you had todeal with this (Guardian 2 June)

5.16 In 2004 the mechanics of voting, ratherthan the issues at stake in the election, becamethe story. Delays in printing and distributingballot papers prompted predictions of electoral chaos and litigation. The public andParliamentary battle over the inclusion of pilotregions was revisited regularly, accompanied in some cases by suggestions that all-postalvoting was tantamount to vote rigging.

5.17 As noted above, the influence of the mediaon voters’ confidence in the voting system wasnegative. Several media outlets were quick towrite off all-postal voting as unsafe and open to abuse, with no analysis of whether allegationshad any merit or were higher in number than atprevious elections. Electoral fraud is a complexarea, and allegations can be based oncalculations of political gain rather thanevidence of serious wrongdoing.

Public complaints

5.18 During the election period, the Commissionreceived over 500 unsolicited telephone calls inrelation to all-postal voting. Callers in the mainwished to complain about the lack of choiceinvolved in all-postal voting, as well as airsupplementary concerns on the performance of Royal Mail, secrecy of the ballot and fraud.

The Commission also received written commentson the pilot schemes from 730 individuals througha variety of channels including a feedback form on the pilots section on the Commission’swebsite. Sixteen per cent of responses came fromthis channel with 15% via email and 69% by post.

5.19 We have also been forwarded manycomplaints made to local authorities, Members ofParliament, and government departments. All thisfeedback has informed the recommendations ofthis report. There is a striking similarity in both the tone of responses across the board and thespecific issues of concern. Those individuals who contacted us were on the whole unhappythat all-postal voting had been chosen as theirmethod of voting this year, many advocated areturn to the traditional mix of polling stations andpostal voting on demand. The issue was verymuch one of choice. While we estimate that thevast majority of the calls we received during theelection period related to all-postal voting, thosewho identified themselves as voting in non-pilotregions also raised with us issues around ballotsecrecy in postal voting, the use of the declarationof identity and the capacity of Royal Mail.

Stakeholders’ viewsReturning Officers and their staff

5.20 The successful delivery of the elections inJune is in large part due to the dedication andhard work of Returning Officers and their staff.We pay tribute to the electoral administrators in these regions for the significant efforts theymade to ensure the delivery of the elections.However, this was achieved in the face ofconsiderable challenges – many alreadyoutlined in chapter 4.


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5.21 The strain that was placed on theprofessional elections staff was considerable,and it extended through the local authorities theywork in. Some reported this election was like ‘tenor twelve polling days’. This has a very seriousside to it – local authorities are not resourced,nor should they be required, to support theintroduction of new electoral processes in such a short period of time. These pressures were felt not only in pilot authorities, but beyond –especially in Wales and London where therewere large scale combined elections.

5.22 Electoral administration has changeddramatically in the last seven years, and morechanges are on the horizon. Returning Officersand their staff agree that the approach toimplementing the 2004 pilots is not a model to follow. The experience of all-postal voting in2004 is that the attempts to graft new methodsof voting onto existing structures and processeshas not worked. This is equally true of the wayin which decisions on combination of electionswere taken relatively late in the day (which all theconsequences for the legal framework) and theincreased use of postal voting on demand to alevel that is not deliverable under currentlegislation, capacity and structures.

Political parties

5.23 The Commission directly contacted over7,500 candidates who stood for election in thepilot regions in the local and EuropeanParliamentary elections in 2004. We received698 responses from candidates through avariety of channels – 57% corresponded by e-mail, 41% by traditional letter and 1% by fax.

5.24 We received representations from 23registered political parties who raised – as one would expect – broadly similar issues tocandidates. We were particularly pleased thatwe received responses from a broad array ofnational and local parties.

5.25 It was also notable that the viewsexpressed by candidates and parties largelyechoed those put forward by individual electorsin raising concerns with the Commission and inour opinion polling.

Key issues5.26 Looking back at the June 2004 elections,there are a number of messages that emergeclearly from the welter of opinion about postalvoting expressed by the public, media, politicalparties, candidates and Returning Officers.Below, we identify these key issues.

Postal voting in principle

5.27 One clear message was that many peopleregard their trip to the polling station on aclearly defined polling day as an importantoccasion and one that underlines theimportance of the right to vote. It was thereforea frequent comment from electors in all-postalregions that they believed that their ‘democraticright’ to attend a polling station had beendenied. Comments were made by some thatvoting should not be made easier for the ‘lazy’contingent of the electorate who would not goout to vote usually, whilst making the process of voting more difficult for already active andcommitted voters.


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No choice of voting method

5.28 Linked to the point above, many electorswho submitted views to the Commission feltthat it was unfair to compel the use of postalvoting and remove the element of choice nowavailable in a traditional election. Many peoplein pilot regions were clearly unaware of theprovision of Assistance and Delivery Pointswhilst others decided not to vote as a protest atthe inconvenience caused to them by the use ofa theoretically more ‘convenient’ voting method.

Royal Mail

5.29 Many of those submitting view to theCommission (although not Returning Officersthemselves) were concerned at the reliance on the Royal Mail to deliver ballot papers to allof the electorate in the four pilot regions; thisappeared to be prompted both by personalexperience and a high level of adverse publicityon the performance of the Royal Mail generally(rather than in relation to postal voting) in thelead-up to the election period. In the event,many Returning Officers were highlycomplementary of the performance of the RoyalMail, and believe that Royal Mail performedreliably and responsively in the delivery andreturn of postal votes.

Secrecy of ballot

5.30 Many electors who state their preference forpolling stations also refer to what they perceiveto be the more ‘complete’ level of secrecy theirvote enjoys in the polling station. As previouslyindicated, the availability of Assistance andDelivery Points was not well-known by membersof the public submitting views to us, but nor was

it evident that this would have assuaged theanxieties expressed about lack of secrecy –many were concerned not for themselves but forothers. The views submitted to the Commissionalso suggested that many electors are not awarethat the ballot paper number – or a barcoderepresenting this number – is a feature of pollingstation ballot papers as well as postal ballotpapers. This was seen as a feature of postalvoting rather than a long-standing devicedesigned to enhance security. Some electorswere also concerned that the model of all-postal voting provided would allow politicalparties to see who they voted for, although thiswas certainly not the case.

Fraud

5.31 The potential for fraud was generally seenby both the public and politicians to be muchgreater in pilot regions than in non-pilot regions.Ballot papers that were delivered to wrongaddresses, students receiving ballot papers atuniversity residences and at home, and houseswith communal delivery areas were allexamples cited. The potential for voter coercionor intimidation by a strong member of the familyor a community, by the staff in an old people’shome or even by candidates themselves werealso issues that were raised by the public andsome candidates and parties. ReturningOfficers were obviously more aware of themeasures in place to minimise fraud, butbelieve that, in the main, the potential for fraudwas no greater than in a polling station electionwith postal voting on demand.


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Declaration of Identity

5.32 Once the election campaign was underwaypublic, political, media and professional reactionto the Declaration of Identity in pilot areas wasoverwhelmingly negative. Many of the generalpublic who contacted us found it insulting toneed to have their identity witnessed, and manysingle or housebound people simply found ittoo burdensome to complete. There wasconfusion about who could witness the voter’ssignature (was a husband, wife or familymember permitted?) and whether or not thevoter’s vote also had to be witnessed. Therewas also very little faith that the Declarationwould be checked and that it would thereforenot reduce the possibility of fraud. In practice,such concerns were well-founded, as theCommission had pointed out in advance of the elections, there is no list against which a witness signature could be checked.

Receipt of ballot pack

5.33 Many comments were received fromindividuals and candidates in pilot areas whohad not received their ballot papers at the timethey expected. Some believed they receivedtheir ballot papers unacceptably late and asmall number report receiving them after theelection or not at all. Returning Officers cannotbe entirely clear that all ballot packs wereprinted and delivered successfully and thisadds a key element of frustration to theadministration of an all-postal ballot.

5.34 For some electors who did not receive theirballot packs and contacted their Returning Officer,issues arose with the administrative processneeded to obtain a replacement ballot pack.

In contacting their local Returning Officer,people were usually advised to wait for theirballot papers and that if they were not receivedby a particular date a duplicate set would beproduced that should be picked up in person.In some cases, the information required toprove the identity of the person was notexplained leading to numerous journeys to thetown hall. Returning Officers believe that whilesome checks are required the process forreplacements could be easier and more clearlyexplained to electors.

Information issues

5.35 The Commission received manycomments about the complexity of the postalballot papers and the detrimental effect on theexperience of voting. The complex nature of theinstructions that accompanied the ballotpapers, and the process of detaching papersand inserting them into envelopes withbarcodes visible, was said by many to have ledto ballot papers being disposed of rather thanused. Comments from electors that the fontsize was too small, the languageinappropriately complex and the instructionsoverly complicated have all been maderepeatedly. Future efforts clearly need to focuson simplifying information that perplexed atleast a PhD student and even a lawyer.

5.36 Information issues relating to the votingsystems were also a large problem, especiallyin areas where ‘all out’ local elections weretaking place on the same day as the EuropeanParliamentary elections. The fact that there weredifferent voting methods for each electionmeant that different numbers of marks were


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required on different ballot papers – up to threecandidate votes in local elections, and oneparty list vote for the European Parliament.

Inability to reconsider vote throughout the campaign

5.37 The fact that postal ballots were often filledin and returned as soon as possible to ensuretheir timely return meant that people were notgiven the opportunity to change their vote inreaction to current events and the campaignunfolding across the country, which mightotherwise have had some influence on theireventual choice. The example of the 2004Spanish general election was cited – the so-called ‘Madrid effect’ – and the comment that ‘a week is a long time in politics’ often quoted.However, in ICM’s survey for the Commissiononly 3% in the four pilot areas said they changedtheir mind about who they wanted to vote forafter they posted their ballot paper, comparedwith 2% among non-pilot region voters.

Accessibility issues

5.38 All-postal pilots made voting morecomplicated for some groups of people. If adisabled person or elderly person lived alone in apilot region, and had a problem with reading orfilling out the ballot papers, they were effectivelydisenfranchised unless a third person wasintroduced into the process. In many cases therewas insufficient publicity about the fact that theLocal Returning Officer was under an obligation toassist the voter at home in these circumstancesand in some areas such assistance wasrestricted by resource constraints. Some votersfrom other EU states, those with English as asecond language or with low levels of literacyalso faced difficulties in reading the instructions.It was suggested by a number of those whocommented to the Commission that had thesepeople had the opportunity to attend the pollingstation, these problems simply would not arise.Again, the availability of Assistance and DeliveryPoints in pilot areas – a potential solution – didnot appear to be widely known, but some who


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SundayRegion 1 Jun 2 Jun 3 Jun 4 Jun 5 Jun 6 Jun 7 Jun 8 Jun 9 Jun 10 JunEast Midlands 4 7 11 14 9 1 12 15 14 12North East 2 11 11 10 5 0 10 13 10 8North West 12 15 14 11 7 0 10 15 13 12Yorkshire & the Humber 19 14 10 10 5 0 10 9 11 12Total 11 12 11 11 7 0 10 13 12 11Source: Based on 67 local authorities that provided data to KPMG for the regional evaluation reports.

Table 8: Return of postal ballot papers each day as a percentage (%) of the total returned by post

were aware of them also complained that around trip of up to 70 miles would be involved.

Extra cost

5.39 Questions were raised by both the publicand some candidates about the additional costto the taxpayer (there was little clarity aboutwhether this would fall on local or centralgovernment) of the pilot schemes. The cost wasspoken of in terms of finance, but also in termsof the environment and the perceived ‘waste ofpaper’ that would occur.

Errors: names, addresses, duplicate ballots

5.40 Some feedback was received from electorsthat errors had been made in relation toproduction of ballot papers; errors reportedincluded electors claiming to have changed theirregistration but packs being sent to their oldaddress, receipt of multiple ballot packs, etc.However, the Commission has no indication thatthis was a widespread or serious problem andReturning Officers reported no greater level ofprocess error than they would normally expect in a more traditional form of election.

Effective operation

5.41 Despite the range of concerns andcriticisms voiced by public and politicalrepresentatives, as outlined above, a largeproportion of the candidates who responded tothe Commission commented that the run up tothe elections was well-organised and actually ranas smoothly as possible in the circumstances.

Choice: the central issue5.42 Perhaps the most compelling evidencefrom the analysis of the 2004 elections is the

strength of public support for choice. This isparticularly striking given that choice has nottraditionally been a key element of the Britishelection experience – postal voting on demandhas existed for less than four years and proxyvoting remains available only to the few.

5.43 However, there now appears to be aconsistent chorus in support of voters’entitlement to choose. Mirroring theCommission’s findings in 2003, the ICM 2004survey again found that ‘People demand choiceand effectively swapping postal voting ondemand with all-postal voting is not consideredto be a satisfactory development…’. While it isthe case that people in the pilot regions were on balance positive about the all-postalarrangements and a majority would be preparedto see them replace polling stations, whenasked to choose between different scenarios,preference is given to multiple channels:

I think that there should be a variety ofmethods. We should have a system whereyou either turn up in person, vote by post orvote on the Internet. The more choices yougive people the better.


Everyone’s lives are so different that youneed to have different forms of voting, likethe Internet. The future of polling has tomove with the times.


I think that you should have more choice.The more choices you have, the morepeople are likely to vote.



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Q. In your view, which of these, if any, is the best way of holding elections? Given by per centGB Pilot regions Non-pilot regions

To send everyone a ballot paper in the post and to have polling stations as well 36 36 35To send everyone a ballot paper in the post and not have any local polling stations, but also to have other ways of voting such as voting by telephone and voting by computer via the Internet 31 33 31To send a ballot paper in the post to those who ask for one and for everyone else to vote in their local polling stations 23 18 25To send everyone a ballot paper in the post and not have any local polling stations 5 8 3Source: ICM/The Electoral Commission, based on 1,006 GB adults aged 18+, 9-11 July 2004

Table 9: Public preferences for voting arrangements

6 The road ahead

The Commission remainscommitted to the goal of multi-channel elections, provided thatsuitable levels of security andconfidence can be maintained. It isthis future situation, where electorshave a choice of voting method,voting day and voting time, that willhelp build the basis of a truly 21stcentury democracy.

Postal voting on demand6.1 The Commission believes that postal votingshould remain part of the UK electoral system.Postal voting on demand enjoys very highlevels of public support and increasing levels ofuse. However, the Commission believes thatwork can and must be done to improve theprocess of postal voting on demand, improvesecurity and the capacity of electoraladministrators to manage the throughput ofpostal votes. It is clear that the process has notkept pace with the large number of electorswho now regard postal voting as their votingchannel of choice.

6.2 In particular, there is a need to enhance thelevels of security through the creation of asystem of individual registration that wouldenable voters’ identity to be checked and toupdate the legal framework for postal voting ondemand to reflect the operation of postal votingrather than assume a norm of polling stationvoting (for example, through the creation of newoffences). The Commission has already made arange of recommendations for reform of thelegal framework for absent voting in earlierreports, and further recommendations aremade in the remaining chapters of this report.

All-postal voting6.3 The way forward in relation to forms of all-postal voting is less self-evident. TheCommission’s initial response to theGovernment on pilots gave qualified support forthe introduction of pilot schemes in June 2004:

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This is not to suggest that there should be any sense of inevitability about thecontinuing expansion and extension of pilot schemes. As the Commission hasmade clear, the development of innovationsin voting must be contingent on their ability to demonstrate high levels of public confidence.50

6.4 As a result of the problems experienced inJune 2004, outlined earlier in this report, there isnow little consensus among politicians or thewider electoral community as to what the futureof all-postal voting might look like. This lack ofclarity has been exacerbated by the fact that adifferent model of all-postal voting was used inJune 2004 from that in many previous pilots. The model being implemented in the RegionalAssembly and Local Government ReferendumsOrder 2004 which determines the form of theall-postal ballot for the North East referendum in November 2004 incorporates further changes.It is also difficult to assess the value of the Juneall-postal voting scheme as a model for thefuture when it included some aspects – such as a witnessed Declaration of Identity – that are against stated Government policy.

Principles and practice

6.5 Despite the serious issues to be addressed inrelation to postal voting, as summarised below,the Commission does not lose sight of the factthat public opinion research undertaken in thefour pilot regions shows that a majority of theelectorate were satisfied with all-postal voting.

6.6 The potential for all-postal voting to boostlevels of participation in the electoral processcontinues to be justified by the data on turnout,but the impact appears to have lessened overtime and is now balanced by a very real concernabout the sinking levels of public confidence inthe process. Public confidence has beenweakened by a range of genuine concernsexacerbated by a concentration in the media onnegative stories. On the other hand, theseissues of loss of confidence are not matched byany evidence to suggest any actual increase inthe levels of fraud perpetrated in postal ballots.

6.7 It was also evident from the June pilotregions that significant numbers of voters wouldprefer to retain the traditional polling station (or something close to it) alongside moreinnovative forms of voting. Partly this related tolack of confidence in other methods but it alsoreflected some strong positive attachment tovoting in the polling station.

6.8 The challenge is therefore whether it ispossible to secure sufficient public support forany form of all-postal voting given the loss ofconfidence evident in the most recent pilotschemes and the preference for traditionalmethods expressed by some, or whether thefuture must embrace a greater degree of choicein voting method.

6.9 In 2003, the Commission recommended that,on the evidence then available, a statutorypresumption should be created that all-postalvoting would be used for local elections.However, we also made clear that ReturningOfficers should be able to rebut this presumption


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50 The Electoral Commission’s response to the Government consultationpaper on pilots in 2004 available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/templates/search/document.cfm/8864

in the light of local circumstances and that anyextension of the use of all-postal voting shouldtake place only after the implementation of manyof the Commission’s wider recommendations for changes to the legislative framework forelections – notably, the introduction of a systemof individual rather than household registration.

6.10 On the basis of the more extensiveevidence gathered in our evaluation of the 2004pilots, the Commission now believes that –even heavily caveated as it was – our 2003recommendation does not provide the rightbasis for moving forward either in practicalterms or in principle.

6.11 In practical terms, the capacity of key printsuppliers was severely tested by the scale of the2004 pilots, even though they covered only athird of the country. Moreover, the levels ofcentral and regional support (both financiallyand in project management terms) necessary to enable the 2004 pilots to be deliveredsuccessfully cannot realistically be replicated ona regular basis – especially given the absenceof a formal regional structure for any electionother than those to the European Parliament.

6.12 Reinforcing these practical concerns is theprinciple of voter choice. While electors valueconvenience and ease of use, they also valuebeing able to choose a voting method that suitsthem, when it suits them. For the majority ofelectors in 2004, there was a choice of votingmethod – they could use their traditional pollingstation on Thursday 10 June or they couldapply for a postal vote (or a proxy vote, if theymet the legal criteria). This is the basic choice

on offer within the traditional model of voting –an ‘attendance’ vote or a ‘remote’ vote. This is achoice that the Commission believes shouldcontinue to be offered. Single channel voting(even if highly secure, convenient and efficient)is not acceptable to all of today’s electorate.

6.13 However, there are positive aspects of all-postal voting on which to build:

• Issuing votes by post, so that the electordoes not need to make the effort to attend apolling station, appears to be a key benefit ofall-postal voting and undoubtedly contributesto increased participation rates.

• Issuing ballot papers in advance of pollingday also gives electors more time to considertheir choice, with access to the informationnecessary to cast an informed vote.

• Assistance and Delivery Points enhanceaccess to voting both through offeringextended opening hours (rather than a singleday), and the range of assistance andinformation on offer.

The objective should be to sustain theseaspects while addressing the concerns of thoseelectors who have serious reservations aboutthe process.

The goal: multi-channel elections

6.14 Voting pilot schemes are part of a widerprogramme of electoral modernisation that hasas its overall aim to provide a secure multi-channel voting environment. The Commissionsupports this aim. Until now, we have viewedall-postal voting as a transitional phase in


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achieving this goal. However, the experience ofJune 2004 is that it has not offered sufficientflexibility to electors nor been as easy to deliveras earlier pilots had indicated. We have nowcome to believe that this form of voting is not,and will not become, adequate. Our position,following evaluation of the 2004 pilot schemes,is that all-postal voting does not offer anappropriate level of choice.

6.15 The Commission recognises that theconvenience of all-postal voting – and itsundeniable impact on turnout rates – providesreal benefits. But these must be weighedagainst other factors. We believe that the loss of voter choice could, if all-postal voting was tocontinue and be extended, have a detrimentaleffect on electoral participation. Moreover, webelieve that it is essential to secure a degree ofpublic and political consensus for significantchanges to the electoral process before movingforward; that has clearly not been achieved inrelation to all-postal voting.

The Commission recommends that all-postalvoting should not be pursued for use at UKstatutory elections. We further recommend that there should not be any further piloting, or rollout, of a form of voting that reliesoverwhelming on the dispatch and return of ballot papers by post.

6.16 The Commission does not, however, wishto turn back the clock and arrest the pace ofelectoral modernisation. We also stress that theCommission has not identified any clearevidence of increased risks of fraud associatedwith all-postal voting. Accordingly, theCommission’s recommendations are not linked

to fears expressed about security breaches orfraud. We wish to continue to encouragemeasures that promote the take-up of postalvoting on demand while providing alternativeways to vote.

6.17 We support further pilots of genuinelymulti-channel elections. But we believe that anew model of voting must be developed tounderpin this process of change. This newmodel can reflect the positive points of all-postal voting – such as the extra time availablefor voters to make their choice, and the clearincrease in participation – while providing thesafety and security that the public perceive inrelation to polling stations.

The Commission recommends thedevelopment of a new foundation model ofvoting for statutory elections and referendums.We will work with government officials, electoraladministrators, political parties and experts inaccess and security to design this newapproach to voting, which must be capable of offering electors both choice and security.

The Commission will report on a recommendedapproach for this foundation model by 31March 2005. The channel must by definitionand design enable additional voting channelsto be included as and when appropriate,particularly the various electronic channels that have been trialled in pilots.

6.18 This foundation model would form thebasis of future multi-channel elections. It wouldencompass all elements of ‘remote’ and‘attendance’ voting that are paper-based(as distinct from electronic methods of voting).


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The Commission intends to convene a workinggroup to examine a variety of issues surroundingthe proposed new model of voting, including:

• what scope there should be for voters tochoose their mode of voting either in advanceof the election period or during the period itself;

• whether all electors should be sent a ballotpaper in the post;

• the level of provision of Assistance andDelivery Points that can issue replacementballot papers in advance of the day of theclose of poll;

• the scope for polling stations to issueordinary ballot papers on the day of the closeof the poll; and

• sufficient and suitable safeguards againstdual or multiple voting.

6.19 We would also support piloting of the newfoundation model of voting we recommend inthis chapter in local elections once it has beendeveloped sufficiently. However, we remainconvinced that there can be no moves beyondlimited pilots of the foundation model or anyother new voting channel without theintroduction of individual registration.

6.20 We recognise that the Government sharesthe goal of multi-channel elections. However, theCommission is concerned that the Governmenthas encouraged or actively imposed the pilotingof all-postal voting at too fast a pace. In particular,we are concerned with the wider electoral lawreform agenda, as exemplified by both theestablishment of The Electoral Commission and the Commission’s own Voting for changeprogramme, has fallen behind, with the result that

essential reforms to support innovation andimprovement have been marginalised by theGovernment’s wish to press ahead with furtherand more extensive pilot schemes. Moreover,technical developments to improve the recordingof, and access to, electoral registration data arestill at an early stage.

The Commission would not be able to lend itssupport to any further piloting of the foundationmodel, or any other new voting channel, until afirm public commitment to the introduction ofindividual registration has been made.

The Commission would not be able to supportthe rollout of the foundation model, or any newvoting channel, until individual registration isfully implemented.

Managing change

6.21 It is clear that attempts to impose newmodes of voting onto existing structures andprocesses have not proved sustainable.Considerable time is required for thedevelopment of processes and systems tosupport successful, long-term delivery of anynew framework of elections.

6.22 The Commission understands that theGovernment will be publishing a strategydetailing how their overarching goal of ‘an e-enabled general election sometime after 2006’51

can and will be reached. The Commissionwelcomes the commitment to develop such astrategy and is pleased that Government waitedto receive this report before proceeding.


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51 Cabinet Office (2002) In the service of democracy.

6.23 Such a strategy will need to take intoaccount the Commission’s concerns in thisreport and the time required to develop the new foundation model of voting. As the currenttraditional method of polling station voting isboth easy to administer and accepted by voters,we believe that this must remain the primarymethod of paper based voting at present.

6.24 The Commission remains willing to workwith central and local government to pilot thefoundation model and other new votingchannels, while recognising that substantial workis required to develop the foundation modelrecommended above. In the meantime, theCommission is of the view that there should be amoratorium on pilots of remote voting methods.

The Commission would not be able to lend itssupport to pilot schemes of any new votingchannels at the May 2005 English countycouncil elections, or by-elections held beforeSeptember 2005, to allow sufficient time todevelop the new foundation modelrecommended in this report.

6.25 It is important that all concerned in takingforward the development of multi-channelelections recognise the difficulties created bylate decision-making on the range of votingchannels to be offered at any given election.The Commission recommends, therefore, thatthe Government’s strategy should include thefollowing milestones:

• The new foundation model to be available forpiloting after September 2005. It could thenbe piloted either alone, or as part of a multi-

channel pilot, at by-elections or at the May2006 local government elections in England.

• Dependent on the outcome of evaluation,further multi-channel pilots at the May 2007elections for English local government or theelections to the devolved assemblies.

• A full multi-channel pilot available for the May2008 London Mayor, Greater London Assemblyand English local government elections.

6.26 The Government should continue to solicitapplications for administrative pilot schemes(including new times and places for polling andmore information to voters about candidates)which may be tested at the May 2005 elections.

6.27 We do not make recommendations hereabout the potential application of the proposedfoundation model to Scottish local governmentas we recognise that the administration of theseelections is a devolved matter and outside the Commission’s remit. However, we believethat our findings and recommendations mayusefully inform the development of policy inrelation to the administration of localgovernment elections in Scotland.


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7 Delivering confidence

The confidence of both electors andelected officials in the ability of postalvoting to deliver security and secrecymust be improved. This chapter sets out our recommendations for changes designed to improvepublic confidence in this regard.

Legal framework7.1 In our 2003 report on absent voting, westressed the need to strengthen the legalframework for absent voting in order to closeexisting loopholes and provide additionalprotection for secrecy. The Government actedon one of these recommendations – makingpersonation an arrestable offence outside thepolling place – in the Pilots Act, but this onlyapplied to the 2004 pilots.

7.2 As we have noted, the level of postal votingcontinues to increase. The Commissionbelieves it is now a matter of urgency that thelegislation underpinning the method that manypeople use is reviewed and updated.

7.3 This will not be an easy process as theexisting law is archaic. However, it is a vitalprocess, not only to allow postal voting tocontinue but to provide for additional remotevoting such as electronic voting in the future.Such a review must consider the reality of theadministration and practice of postal voting,including processes for application andchanges to elector details.

7.4 Two key areas should be examined as partof this review. The first is the question of how theprotections for secrecy in a polling station thatare set out in Section 66 of the Representationof the People Act 1983 can be adapted to offerthe equivalent protection of secrecy for votingtaking place outside polling stations. Ourconcern is that the law must protect all electorsfrom intimidation or undue pressure during whatis now an extended voting period.

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7.5 Such an adaptation should be more thanmechanical and must have sufficient regard tothe actual differences between the situation ofvoting in a polling station and at home. Much ofSection 66(3) is clearly constructed to apply tothe structured and controlled process of voting ata polling station. In the context of remote voting,terms such as ‘recording his vote’ and ‘interfere’are not clear and therefore it is uncertain howand when they could apply to remote voting.

7.6 In addition, there is a need to examinethose situations in which a voter may requireassistance. Secrecy must be afforded to allassisted voters wherever and from whomeverthey ask for assistance, not just in controlledenvironments, and this must be adequatelyaddressed in the legal framework.

7.7 The second key area for careful examinationis the law on undue influence. We remain of theview that there is a need for a revised offence andthat this need is not obviated by the existenceof Section 66 or of the other provisions of the 1983 Act. In particular, it is widely understoodthat Section 115 of the 1983 Act relating to theoffence of undue influence is not only difficult to prosecute, but has become an unsatisfactoryprovision in modern circumstances. Thisobservation was made in the Court of Appeal in 1992:

I would express the hope that in duecourse the legislature will reconsider thelanguage of s115. Some such provision isan essential part of the law’s armoury in ademocratic society, but the present termsof the section were framed in the last

century, and may be thought to requirerevision by reference to the less blatant and less easily detected but no lesseffective methods of exerting influencewhich are available nowadays.

Nolan LJ in R v Rowe, ex parte Mainwaring52

7.8 This must be all the more so in the case ofpostal voting if the offence is expected tosubstitute, at the moment of voting, for theinherent controls that apply to voting at apolling station.

7.9 As the Commission has alreadyrecommended, there should be a specificoffence that relates to the completion of afraudulent application for a postal vote. Thiswould ensure that current safeguards againstpersonation are adequately extended to postalvoting. Such an offence should extend to thefraudulent application for any process relatingto postal voting, such as the redirection of adelivery address.

7.10 The Commission believes that a carefuland systematic review of the legal frameworkmay well highlight additional areas forconsideration. Such a review is essential forenhancing confidence in the electoral system.


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52 [1992] 4 All ER 821: 830-831.

The Commission recommends the urgentintroduction of primary legislation to give effect to:

• an updated offence of undue influence in relation to postal voting; and

• a new offence relating to the fraudulentcompletion of postal vote applications.

These offences should apply at all futureelections, including any pilots of new voting channels.

Beyond these urgent changes, the Governmentshould undertake a wider review of the existinglegal framework for postal voting.

Electoral registration7.11 It is difficult to overstate how vital an accurateand robust electoral register is to the integrity of an election. The Commission has previouslymade a series of detailed recommendations on a new system of electoral registration whichwill, we believe, make the electoral registrationprocess more straightforward and user-friendlyfor voters and improving levels of registration,while enhancing existing levels of security. Thelynchpin of this recommendation is a move toindividual voter registration in place of thecurrent household registration.

7.12 The integrity of postal voting, and any form of remote voting, rests on a belief that theelectoral register contains only individuals whoactually exist and are properly qualified to vote.The form of individual registration is also key.The Commission stands ready to work with theGovernment to design and implement a robustsystem of individual registration to support newforms of voting.

7.13 In addition, work that is alreadyproceeding on the Co-ordinated OnlineRegister of Electors (CORE) must take intoaccount the use of registers to provide the keydata file in the production of postal votes. TheGovernment should engage with the printindustry during the development of this projectto ensure that relevant data standards andchecks are included in the specification.

The Commission urges the Government toagree to introduce a system of individualelectoral registration, which is the key buildingblock on which safe and secure remoteelections can be delivered.

Protecting the secrecy of the ballot7.14 Confidence in the secrecy of the ballot iskey to minimising the risk of intimidation andundue influence. The Commission was pleasedto see the inclusion of a secrecy warning onpostal vote stationery in the pilot regions thisyear, and urges the Government to extend thisto ordinary postal votes. Further voter educationis required to enhance the value that all electorsplace on their vote, and on the secrecy of thevote. The Commission will consider how its owneducational efforts can work to address this issue.

7.15 Any form of voting at home or in anunsupervised place can increase the possibility of people being inappropriately influenced to votein a specific way. Scope, the leading disabilitycharity, also points out that remote voting forcesmany disabled people to ask for assistance fromfamily members or enablers; some report thatthey prefer to ask polling officials.


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7.16 The risk of a dominant household memberputting other voters under pressure is one ofthe most difficult issues relating to remotevoting. The provision of staffed Assistance and Delivery Points did go some way towardsaddressing these concerns together with theother measures referred to above.

7.17 We are clear that any voting method mustdeliver secrecy to the whole electorate for it todeliver confidence to the whole electorate. Asnoted above, Commission research in late 2003found that 33% of adults rated ‘my vote beingprivate’ as the most important factor in votingarrangements, with a further 30% rating ‘my votebeing safe from fraud and abuse’ as their mostimportant factor.44 The Commission believes thatwe should be cautious in proceeding withremote voting unless these factors can bedelivered for the whole electorate.

7.18 As indicated earlier, some of theseallegations – especially those that receivemedia and public attention – centre on minorityethnic communities. The allegations that arisein minority ethnic communities have followed asimilar pattern – they occur against abackground of strong social links withinextended families/groups and competitivestyles of political activism. Traditional socialmores and relationships within the family canalso give rise to perceptions that intimidationand electoral fraud are more likely to occur. TheCommission considers that electoral services,as open public services, should be responsiveto the needs of voters within a diverse society.However, it is also important to seek any

opportunity to tackle undue influence regardlessof the setting.

7.19 The Commission is committed tounderstanding the nature of political and electoralactivity within minority ethnic communities, aswe wish to encourage participation within all sections of our society. In 2004 it was notpossible to undertake a detailed study of minoritygroups and their experience of the June 2004elections. However, the Commission intends toapproach the Commission for Racial Equalityand local and regional race equality councils as part of an ongoing focus on this issue.

7.20 On a practical level, the Commission willcontinue to advocate more accessible ballotstationery. As noted above, the languagecurrently used is inaccessible to many nativeEnglish speakers. We are concerned that thecomplexity of instructions can expose someelectors to coercion through their need fortranslation and assistance.

Ballot instructions should be clear and simpleand Returning Officers must be resourced toprovide official translations of any required form.

7.21 As indicated in chapter 4, the Commissionhas also now received a good deal of commentin relation to its draft Code of conduct forpolitical parties, candidates and canvassers onthe handling of postal voting applications andpostal ballot papers (2004). The Commissionwill take account of this feedback and completea review of this code following the all-postalreferendum scheduled for the North East ofEngland in November 2004. We will make anyfinal recommendations at that stage.


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44 MORI electoral fraud poll, 2003.

Criminal justice system7.22 A consistent theme in our previouscomments on electors’ confidence in postalvoting has been the need to ensure that thepolice and the prosecuting authorities areproperly trained and resourced to take electoralfraud seriously. In recent years the Commissionhas developed an excellent relationship with theCrown Prosecution Service (CPS) caseworkdirectorate in England reflecting the uniqueposition electoral law gives the Director of PublicProsecutions. The CPS have co-operated in therecording of allegations and have gone far inmaking expert advice on prosecuting electoralfraud available to local police forces.

7.23 In 2004, following designation as a pilotregion, the North West Regional ReturningOfficer was also able to agree a protocol for thehandling and reporting of electoral allegationswith Greater Manchester Police, who acted asco-ordinator for the region’s five police forces.This protocol worked extremely well andprovided an excellent example for other regionsto build upon. Greater Manchester Police werevocal in their support of a secure postal ballotand quick to act when allegations arose. TheCommission strongly believes that this providesa model for the future and will shortly initiatetalks with the Association of Chief PoliceOfficers on how this experience can beextended across the country.

7.24 While police forces in the pilot regionswere co-operative, there remains little practicalknowledge or experience in handling electoralfraud ‘on the ground’, this is exacerbated by

resourcing and training arrangements. Electoralfraud is, perhaps understandably, not thehighest priority for police forces. However, the example of Greater Manchester Policeillustrates how a pro-active stance can beeffective. The Commission believes that theGovernment should consider the priority placedon investigation of electoral fraud, which is acrime against democracy, in the context of itsnational policing plans.

Post-election security audits7.25 Those Returning Officers who haveconducted post-election security audits followingguidance issued by the Commission havereported that they were useful and did notrequire undue resources or cause undueconcern amongst electors. We are continuing toreceive feedback on progress and good practice– Manchester, for example, assigned the audit tothe authority’s internal audit function to complete.The Commission believes that such audits areuseful, both in practice and in reassuringelectors. They should not be left to the discretionof the Returning Officer, but should be mandatedin law, explained in the ballot stationery and theresources to fulfil these obligations provided.


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The Commission recommends that the lawshould explicitly require Returning Officers to conduct post-election audits of electionstationery such as Declarations of Identity,security statements and postal voteapplications. The resources necessary toimplement such audits should also be provided by Government.

The Commission will issue final guidance onconducting such audits and proper handling of any documents that cause concern, andtemplates for use by Returning Officers.

8 DeliveringconvenienceOur survey of public opinion found a‘clear and widely held perspective’that the all-postal arrangements wereconvenient. This appears to be a keydriver of majority satisfaction with themethod. It is clearly important to findways of building on this conveniencefactor in promoting the availability of postal voting on demand anddeveloping the proposed foundationmodel. This chapter sets out ourrecommendations for increasingthe convenience of postal voting.

Clear and simple processes8.1 For many electors, postal voting is alreadyregarded as highly convenient.

It is definitely more convenient. You don’teven have to pay for a stamp. I think that it is better for people who are working, likemy mum who has to get home to do thehouse. She never voted this time, but it did give her the opportunity.


I am in favour of postal voting because you will get more people voting becausemany cannot be bothered to walk into their polling station.


8.2 However, this does not hold true for everyone.The Commission believes that electors’ ownconfidence in postal voting will be enhanced by a better ‘end user experience’.

I found the form confusing and not fullydescriptive of how the vote should be cast– or perhaps, how the form itself should bedivided once completed.

Letter to The Electoral Commission

8.3 At the same time as finding broad satisfactionwith the convenience of postal voting, ICM didfind some public criticism and concerns aboutthe practicalities of postal voting. While suchconfusion is likely to be related, in part, to theincidence of multiple elections and multipleballot papers in pilot regions (and theunfamiliarity of the voting systems used),

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ICM also suggest that the design andcomplexity of the ballot pack was a factor inexplaining why 20% of people (15% of voters)reported difficulty in completing ballot papers:

I could not get the barcode in the window,you kept having to adjust how you folded it.


Why are they making it like some sort ofjigsaw? What is wrong with having oneform, this was put your x there, fold this, put this there…


Finally sat down to vote. V. confusing. We have lost one B envelope so already lost one vote.


Looking at postal ballot papers – confusingi.e. A+B envelopes, and size of forms.Instructions in very small print.


8.4 To deliver a convenient postal votingprocess, care needs to be taken to ensure it is convenient for all electors. This will beachieved through following good designprinciples for all official election material.54

8.5 The design of the voting system must startand end with the elector. The Commissionasked Scope, the leading disability charity,

to identify how access to postal voting can beimproved. Although Scope examined only theall-postal pilots, the lessons they learned areapplicable across elections and many can beimplemented without legislative change. Alarge proportion of Scope’s recommendationsrelate to how information is presented to theelectorate. These recommendations are set outin full in a separate report, available from theCommission’s website. The Commission willissue good practice guidance on how to makepostal voting accessible by the end of 2004.

8.6 The importance of good design ishighlighted by the use of the pre-electioninformation card in 2004 – an excellent idea,which was unfortunately poorly executedbecause of the requirements imposed in law. The card effectively replaced a poll card in the all-postal regions and:

• alerted electors to the upcoming postal ballot;

• informed them of assistance options; and

• told them how to have their ballot redirected if necessary.

8.7 The usefulness of this as a tool to increasethe accessibility of the election was limited byits design. Returning Officers were required to include a long list of contents and were toldthe Government would fund a double-sided A5 card for this purpose. In practice, it wasimpossible to fit all the information onto this sizecard and meet the requirements of accessibledesign. While many Returning Officers didinvest extra funds from local budgets andproduce larger materials, important electiondocuments must clearly be funded by the


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54 Scope, Polls Apart: An evaluation of the accessibility of the 2004European Parliamentary and local elections all-postal pilots (2004).

‘official’ source to a reasonable level. Keymethods of communicating new processes to the electorate must be designed for themaximum impact, including the use of asuitable print size, space for information in other languages and the use whereappropriate of pictograms.

The Commission recommends that any votingmethods involving voting ‘remotely’ shouldrequire the Returning Officer to send a pre-election information card. This card must befully accessible and sent to each elector. Thetiming of the card should be at the discretion of the Returning Officer, however it should beissued before the notice of election.

Communicating the process8.8 In June 2004, more than in any recentyears, the process of voting was the subject of massive media coverage. The controversyover which regions would pilot, allegations of fraud and malpractice and the delays in the production of ballot materials all gained a high profile.

8.9 With any process of change and innovation,effective communication is essential. Overall,56% of adults across the four pilot schemeregions said they were aware of publicity orinformation about the arrangements for voting,an increase on the 51% in all-postal pilots lastyear. But more than four in ten, 44%, said they had not seen, read or heard anything.Awareness levels varied among the four pilotregions – 62% of adults in the North Eastrecalled publicity or information compared with a relatively low 52% in the East Midlands, and

older age groups, voters and those interestedin politics were most likely to have seen, read or heard something.

8.10 Such measures of awareness are not confined to any particular channel ofcommunication and do not necessarily reflect the promotional work of the localauthorities in each region, but qualitativeresearch undertaken for the Commission by ICM found a consensus that not onlydoes the ballot pack need to be simplified but that communication of the process and how it works also ought to be improved.

The Commission will consider both ballot pack design and communication strategies indeveloping the proposed foundation model.

8.11 Where public awareness did exist, it did not appear to assist electors in how to completethe ballot materials correctly. ICM’s focus groupsfound that many people did not fully read theinformation provided and as reported elsewhere,people had particular problems with theDeclaration of Identity (in particular the witnessrequirement) and returning the ballot paper in the envelopes provided.

The role of the Commission

8.12 The Commission has a statutory duty to promote public awareness of democraticsystems and institutions, and has accordinglyrun major public awareness campaigns linked to key electoral events over the last three years.

8.13 In 2004, the Commission’s ‘I don’t dopolitics’ public awareness campaign was


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primarily a motivational one, building on theresearch insight that informing voters of themechanics of voting is ineffective if they don’tcare about the issues at stake. The campaignwas branded ‘Elections June 10th’, as thecampaign ran across Great Britain and this was the only universal message that applied to both all-postal and traditional voting areas(as opposed to ‘Vote June 10th’, which wouldnot have applied to postal voters). A separatecampaign ran in Northern Ireland which alsoexplained the voting system.

8.14 As regards postal voting, the information inthe main advertising campaign on TV and in thepress went as far as explaining the applicationprocess and timings, as well as how to get aballot paper sent to a different address. It alsogave sources of help and further information(Commission-designed leaflets, a call centreand website). What the campaign did notattempt to do was to explain how to fill in a postal ballot paper itself. This was partlybecause instructions are included in the ballotpacks, and it was not anticipated that voterswould find this as confusing as they in fact did.It was also partly because such a thing is hardto explain in words without a ballot paper forreference and all ballot papers are designedand produced locally with no clear consistency.Instead, the call centre was briefed to explain tovoters how to complete the ballot paper whenthey had this in front of them.

8.15 However, since the levels of confusionwere so high in 2004, the Commission willconsider a deeper level of explanation of postalvoting in future elections in which it is expected

to be widely used. Such a complicatedmessage could not be delivered throughadvertising – instead PR, leaflets and/oradvertorials might prove effective. This would be one strand within an overallmotivational campaign.

The role of Returning Officers

8.16 There still exists considerable confusion on the role and powers of the Returning Officer in promoting participation in elections. TheCommission has previously recommended to Government that this be resolved, throughlegislation if necessary. However, even inadvance of this, the Commission believes thatReturning Officers have a clear role – indeed a duty – to explain the mechanics of how theelection was to work.

8.17 At a UK-wide election – such as aWestminster or European Parliamentary election– Returning Officers cannot reclaim the cost of producing explanatory materials not requiredin law. Accordingly, many Returning Officersrunning only European Parliamentary electionsarranged no additional publicity, as this wouldhave to be funded from local budgets. Thesituation in combined areas was different, aslocal authorities are permitted to allocate fundsto publicise the arrangements for their elections.

8.18 In the pilot regions, the Government hadoriginally stated in its consultation paper that the costs of publicity would be considered a cost of piloting, which the Commissionwelcomed. However, the Government did notfollow through on this suggestion until late in theelection process. At this stage it was too late


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for those not already planning publicity to organise any and the Commission isdisappointed that the Government did notsupport such campaigns from the beginning.

8.19 We have seen many effective localcampaigns and this will continue to be animportant avenue for building awareness of the voting method over many years.However, it will be equally important to ensureconsistency between the messages put out by the Commission nationally and ReturningOfficers locally. The impact of advertising andrelated communication is inevitably enhancedby repetition and diminished through multiplicityof images and messages. The Commission willbe aiming to co-ordinate publicity in this way forthe regional referendum scheduled for theNorth East of England in November 2004 and will consider afterwards what lessons can belearned for the future management of publicawareness campaigns.

Assistance to voters

8.20 It is clear that many electors require achoice of information sources and avenues of assistance. Some electors will find all theinformation they require in the ballot pack, while others will require more information onhow to complete their vote, the institution theyare standing for, or an explanation of the votingmethod and the secrecy provisions. For this, acompletely remote vote will never be sufficient.

The Commission recommend that postalvoting, whether on demand or as part of theproposed foundation model, should provide for:

• home visits;

• helplines and assistance email addresses; and

• suitable provision for disabled electors to vote independently.

8.21 In developing the proposed foundationmodel, the Commission will also explore the potential role for mobile Assistance andDelivery Points as both a means of increasingaccess for electors and a key method of fraudprevention in houses in multiple occupation.

8.22 In 2004, the Commission was disappointedthat the issue of replacement ballot papers wasnot a service offered at most Assistance andDelivery Points. Had this been the case, highprofile press stories about emergency pollingstations would not have arisen. This is morethan a technical point – if electors can easilyaccess replacement ballots at any time a strongelement of choice is reintroduced.

The Commission intends that the role ofAssistance and Delivery Points (ADPs)alongside polling stations should be exploredas part of the proposed foundation model,including the scope for issuing replacementballot papers at Assistance and Delivery Points.


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Declaration of Identity

8.23 All postal votes in 2004, whether in pilotareas or elsewhere, featured a Declaration ofIdentity that required a witness to countersignthe elector’s signature. In 2003, the Commissionhad recommended that a new form securitystatement should be introduced for postal votingat all elections. This security statement wouldrequire only the signature of the elector.

8.24 Experience in 2004 suggests that this recommendation still holds force. Thewitness signature adds nothing to the process,confuses electors, and could open the process to intimidation and undue influence. Mostdamningly, it remains an ineffective fraudprevention device.

8.25 In 2003, our survey and focus groupresearch found that people who were in areaswhere a standard Declaration of Identity wasused were relatively less positive about theconvenience, safety, security and ease of use of the arrangements than people in areas with asimplified or no Declaration. Similarly, this year,while ICM found only a minority reportingproblems completing the Declaration of Identity,the qualitative research found most people of theview that it was a hassle and raised concernsabout the value it adds – one focus groupparticipant admitted to faking their witnessstatement to avoid having to bother a neighbour.

I did not like the idea of having to find awitness. I live alone and had to troublesomeone else to witness. It has come tomy address with my name on it, so why do I need a witness to say that it is my vote?



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Region No DOI No ballot DOI DOI DOI DOI received paper received returned resubmitted still

received incomplete incompleteEast Midlands 9,157 2,495 18,918 14,903 7,142 557North East 6,024 4,357 12,673 9,103 4,432 145North West 12,894 3,622 21,575 8,163 8,291 696Yorkshire & the Humber 8,682 3,521 14,116 15,017 7,344 687Total 36,757 13,995 67,282 47,186 27,209 2,085

Source: Based on 81 local authorities that provided data to KPMG for the regional evaluation reports.

Table 10: Declaration of Identity (DOI) summary statistics

The most difficult part of voting was thewitnessing part. It did not even explain if it could be family. I read it all the waythrough, it did not say whether they could be over 21. It did not give you anyinformation on who your witness could be.


The bit that confused me was where you had to get someone to sign it. I bet lots of people looked at it and could not be bothered.


It is an added annoyance. Forget it. Wenever had to do this in polling stations…


8.26 The Declaration itself was prescribed inlaw. Many electors were confused as to whocould act as a witness, and assumed thatspouses and family members could not sign as witness. We had many reports from pilotregions of elderly couples going to Assistanceand Delivery Points to ask staff there to witnesstheir declarations. Scope believes that theinclusion of the requirement for a witnessedDeclaration of Identity in the 2004 pilot schemes(in the face of clear evidence from previous pilotschemes that such an approach added nobenefit to the process, and could harm it)significantly increased the access barriers atthe election.

8.27 This is a clear example of where theconvenience of postal voting was undermined bythe complexity of the system. The Commission

has seen no evidence this year that thewitnesses Declaration of Identity provides anysuitable safeguard against fraud, and indeedcontinues to provide potential for malpractice in that another individual is required to beinvolved in the voting process. Given the lack of any positive benefits from the inclusion of theDeclaration, and the many barriers to effectiveparticipation it has brought to postal voting, the Commission recommends, as it did in 2003,that it be replaced by a security statement for all-postal voting.

The current Declaration of Identity should bereplaced with a new security statement toaccompany postal ballots, whether in thecontext of postal voting on demand or anypostal element of the proposed foundationmodel. This security statement should:

• require the voter to sign a statement that they are the individual to whom the ballotpaper was addressed;

• not require any form of witness signature;

• include a clear explanation of the role and use of the statement, in particular that it will be separated from the ballot paper before counting can begin and that failure tocomplete the statement will render a ballotpaper invalid; and

• be designed and printed to make it obviousto the voter that this separation will occur.


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9 Delivering capacity

Administering postal voting at theJune 2004 elections was a complextask made all the more remarkableby the fact it was managed by 406different Returning Officers andcountless suppliers. For postalvoting to continue to offer a reliablemethod of voting, significantinvestment in the mechanisms fordelivery is required. This chaptersets out our recommendations fordeveloping organisational capacity.

Project management9.1 The Commission believes that the capacityto deliver postal voting efficiently and effectivelycan be developed. It cannot, however, bedeveloped overnight.

9.2 The key to developing the abilities ofadministrators, suppliers, the Commission and parties to cope with high levels of postalvoting is early legislative certainty. In 2004, thelegislation that provided for the conventionalEuropean Parliamentary elections came intoeffect on 23 March 2004, for elections required to commence no later than 5 May. For the all-postal regions, the timing was even tighter.

9.3 Electoral administrators and their suppliersneed early certainty of the form of postal votingto be prescribed in law, especially in relation to the contents of the ballot pack, in terms of both physical inserts and the wording required. If postal voting is to be able to be deliveredwithin the confines of the electoral timetable,sufficient time for planning and design of thestationery is essential.

9.4 Equally, the need to outsource large amountsof work, such as printing and enveloping, meanthat most Returning Officers should run an open procurement process. This has not beenachievable for many at recent elections, given the short periods of time between finalisation of the processes required and the time for theservice to be delivered.

Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting: delivering capacity

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All legislation pertaining to an election –particularly a fixed term election – should be in place in time to allow the implementation of proper and robust procurement process.

9.5 Many Returning Officers have reported their concerns at not only lacking time to run a full procurement excercise, but also havinginsufficient information on the experience andcapacity of suppliers. While some suppliersmay be well known, the level of their capacity in a given timeframe will not be known. As the Commission believes that some firms took on more work than their capacity couldsafely deliver, this is a real concern.

The Commission will undertake a feasibilitystudy on a certification and accreditationscheme for ballot pack production. Such a study will consider:

• the viability of such a scheme;

• by whom such a scheme could best be administered;

• whether it is practical for such a scheme tocertify suppliers to produce certain productsonly; and

• whether it is practical for such a scheme to certify the maximum number of electorsthe supplier can produce in any one round of elections.

Timetable for postal voting9.6 In 2003, the Commission examined thevarious timetables used at statutory elections in the United Kingdom. At that time we did not have any compelling evidence that thetimetable for postal voting on demand should be altered. There is clearly a balance to be struck as to allowing voters whose circumstanceschange to apply for a postal vote and the need to administer the postal voting processeffectively. At this stage, we believe that therecommendations we have made in chapter 4 should be sufficient to make the existingtimetable for postal voting on demand within the context of a traditional election workable.

9.7 However, it is clear that the adoption of a completely new voting process cannot beaccommodated by minor amendments to the standard timetable. In developing thefoundation model recommended in chapter 6, it will be necessary to allow for more significantchanges. The two key processes that need to be accommodated are the closing date for the address list to which ballot packs are to be sent and permitting sufficient time for thedesign and production of the ballot packs.

Resolution of policy issues9.8 This was the fourth year of significant trialsof all-postal voting in Great Britain. The originalrationale for the pilots programme envisagedthat there would be continual development ofnew voting methods over many years. Thepilots would allow a defined and agreed modelto emerge over time building on experience,practicality and voter acceptance.

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9.9 In 2004, this was not the case. Severalelements of the all-postal process – mostnotably the Declaration of Identity – flew in the face of both stated Government policy andacknowledged best practice. While the policyimplications of such decisions are discussedelsewhere in this report, the implications forefficient administration and the capacity of allinvolved in management of the process todeliver should not be underestimated.

9.10 The settling of an agreed foundationmodel of voting would have several positiveeffects. One is that the service offered byexternal suppliers would improve. Printerswould be able to develop a product that islegislatively sound and future refinement of one basic product on their part could seeprices decrease or efficiency increase. It ispossible that additional firms could enter themarket if they felt that a stable model was inplace. It is also self-evident that the potential for errors in design and production coulddecrease as both administrators and printersbecome more expert in the process.

The Government should promote an agreed foundation model based on therecommendations of the Commission expectedto be published in March 2005, to be refinedthrough future pilots.

Royal Mail9.11 The performance of Royal Mail in the pilot regions in 2004 is widely hailed as a keysuccess factor in the delivery of the election.Royal Mail developed a special trial product to support postal voting in June that will also be used at the all-postal North East regional

referendum in November. After this Royal Mailwill evaluate this product with a view to rollingout an integrated postal vote dispatch andreturn product. This is an example of how asettled process will eventually see logisticsmade easier.

9.12 Royal Mail offered several key innovations:

• agreed collection and delivery plans;

• ward-level sortation by Royal Mail of returnedballot papers through the use of wardspecific location barcodes;

• a final day sweep of late papers in the mailcentre; and

• use of distinctive purple flashed envelopes.

9.13 The product being developed by Royal Mailshould be capable of adaptation to postal votingin traditional elections as well as any use of postalvoting with the proposed foundation model.

9.14 The Commission also regards it asimportant that Royal Mail performance across the country should ‘catch up’ with that demonstrated in the 2004 pilot regions. The Commission also regards as essential that Royal Mail continue to use central staff to develop the product offered, and to liaise with Government and the Commission.


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Software support9.15 To support the June 2004 pilot regions, the suppliers of voter registration and electionmanagement software had to write newprogramming to support pilot processes literally during the election process. This led to administrators needing to rely on ‘patches’and updates sent to them without the time orcapacity to test these in a non-live environment.To the credit of the developers these fixesworked relatively smoothly, but this is no reasonto put either developers or Returning Officers inthis position in the future. To risk a time criticalevent such as an election due to insufficient ITtesting time is clearly dangerous.

9.16 Equally, the Commission is aware thatthere were problems in the compatibility of the register data supplied by someReturning Officers and the printers’ own datamanagement system. These must be able towork accurately and speedily to allow for theproduction of ballot packs. The Government hassupported the development of EML (electionmark-up language, a variant of XML) to facilitatesystem integration in electronic voting systems.EML also has excellent potential to improve thereliability of data transfer in postal vote issuing.

The Commission recommends that theGovernment should support, as a matter of urgency, an EML schema to facilitate the accurate transfer of data from voterregistration systems for use in the automatedissue of postal votes.

Election staff9.17 Conventional elections can currently berun from a ‘standing start’ in around four weeks.The ability to deliver such elections successfullyhas developed over many years, and is madeeasier by modern technology. The Commissionbelieves that over time the same will becometrue of new forms of voting.

9.18 The Commission has a role to play inimproving the capacity of Returning Officers and their staff through our mandate to developelectoral staff’s professional skills. In severalprevious reports, notably Absent voting in GreatBritain (2003) and The shape of elections tocome(2003), the Commission committed itself toproducing many practical tools and materials toassist Returning Officers in the implementationof postal voting and to build publicconfidence in the process. Only one elementof this guidance – that on checking identities forreplacement ballot papers – was able to beissued in time for full use at this election. Many ofthese tools, such as guidance, on managingsupplier relationships and outsourcing, wouldhave been of great relevance in 2004.

9.19 The Commission is currently evaluating the 2004 training programme and will consider in the light of both that report and that commissioned following the 2003 devolvedelections what level and type of training supportwould be useful and deliverable in the future.However, the Commission remains committedto supporting electoral staff through structuraland process change and will consider thisfurther should the Government respond to the Voting for change agenda.


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The Government should allow in any projectplan sufficient time for the Commission todevelop and deliver suitable training or briefing materials in the timetable for any further electoral innovation or reform.

9.20 Delivering 21st century elections requirestime to develop the necessary systems andtime to develop the capacity of ReturningOfficers and their staff. This will enable allinvolved in the electoral process to continue to deliver high quality electoral services that are responsive to electors’ changing lifestyles.


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Tel: 020 7271 0500

The Electoral Commission

We are an independent body that was set up by the UK Parliament. We aim to gain publicconfidence and encourage people to take part in the democratic process within the UK bymodernising the electoral process, promotingpublic awareness of electoral matters, andregulating political parties.

On 1 April 2002, The Boundary Committee for England (formerly the Local GovernmentCommission for England) became a statutorycommittee of The Electoral Commission. Its dutiesinclude reviewing local electoral boundaries.

Delivering democracy? The future of postal voting

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Tel 020 7271 0500Fax 020 7271 0505info@electoralcommission.org.ukwww.electoralcommission.org.uk

We are an independent body that wasset up by the UK Parliament. We aim togain public confidence and encourage people to take part in the democraticprocess within the UK by modernisingthe electoral process, promoting publicawareness of electoral matters, andregulating political parties.

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