4.2. Proposal for Improving Bursa’s Resiliency to Natural Disasters … · Balıkesir, Yalova,...

Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey

4.2. Proposal for Improving Bursa’s Resiliency to Natural Disasters

4.2.1. Current Status and Needs of Bursa City General background information and disaster risks are as mentioned in 4.1. Bursa city extends to the foot of the slopes of Uludağ Mountain, mostly in the east to west direction along the Izmir road. Bursa is surrounded by mountain, lakes and farmland.

The current status and needs for the resiliency of Bursa city are described below based on information gathered from interviews with relevant authorities.

(1) General Matters

1) Basic Understanding to Disaster

- Bursa has historically had high risk of natural disasters such as floods and landslides in addition to earthquakes. Prior to 1999, the main natural disasters of concern used to be landslides; however since 2000, earthquakes have been perceived as a more significant threat.

- Bursa is a transport hub of the Marmara region and will be able to function as a back-up center for disaster response activity if Istanbul is affected by a natural disaster. Because Bursa is a major center of industrial activities, impacts could be magnified and extreme in the event of a natural disaster affecting Bursa.

2) Vulnerable Residential Areas

- The city of Bursa is composed of the old town with a number of historic buildings in the south of the city and the new town in the north. The old town was developed before the 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake, and presents many issues identified for disaster prevention, such as densely built old buildings with weak structures and poor road access. Many buildings are not earthquake-resistant.

- In the old town, a large area of congested and dilapidated buildings are at the foot of Uludağ Mountain, and redevelopment of such a large area into a safe township will likely extend over a long period of time.

- A number of reconstruction projects in the old town have included high-rise or mid- to low-rise housings, even before the Urban Transformation Law. Such developments increase population concentration.

- North of the Ankara-Izmir highway, and expending from east to west, there is a mixed-use residential and industrial area and a large densely-built residential area with many buildings unlawfully occupied and/or not structurally sound. There is a high necessity for improvement in the safety of this area from a disaster prevention perspective.

- Local governments started an evaluation of building structures in each district with respect to the Urban Transformation Law; however, it has not been completed yet. The process requires the district administration to propose urban redevelopment plans, and the Provincial office of MOEU through Bursa Metropolitan Municipality to review and approve the plans.

- A redevelopment project has been launched in an area of about 500 ha in Yıldırım District. In Osmangazi District, risk assessment of buildings has been completed for the whole district, and high-risk areas have been identified and given two different classifications based on the level of risk. Redevelopment plans for areas of high priority are now being prepared.

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Source: Prepared by the Inspection Team Based on Information from Osmangazi and Yildirim District Authorities

Figure 4.2.1 Locations of risky areas in Osmangazi and Yildirim Districts

3) Measures for Disaster Prevention

- AFAD Bursa facilities are on the same site as a fire station and a MOH heliport. This site is indeed a model of disaster management complexes in Turkey, but components such as the education center for disaster prevention (Bosaikan) are spread over several locations.

- Bosaikan was constructed for the purpose of educating the general public on disaster prevention. Bosaikan has started offering services to people from Bursa province as well as people from other provinces.

- There are 120 staff members in the search and rescue team in Bursa, covering Çanakkale, Balıkesir, Yalova, Bilecik, and Bursa city proper. In normal times, the team offers training to provincial level officials, private companies, and the public. Training facilities and equipment of the current center should be upgraded.

- Bursa AFAD has selected evacuation/gathering sites in the city in the event of disaster and parks to be turned into tent cities for afflicted people.

- An AFAD logistics center is planned to be constructed in the western part of Bursa to store and distribute materials, supplies, and equipment in case of a disaster.

- Currently, the status of district disaster management centers to collect information and coordinate efforts in the event of a major disaster differs by district.

- It is essential to strengthen the capabilities of the information communication system and computer functionality at AFAD Bursa because telephone communication could break down during a major disaster.

- AKOM, a Disaster Coordination Center, is established under the Bursa municipal fire department. In the event of a disaster, it is expected to coordinate with other institutions if required by AFAD.

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey (2) Spesific Matters

1) Road Traffic

- As traffic in Bursa is concentrated on a major arterial road that crosses the city center from west to east, it is important to provide alternative routes. With many rivers in Bursa, more bridges are needed.

- To improve the road network, Bursa Metropolitan Municipality recently developed a transportation master plan for 2030 in coordination with Germany. The plan includes the construction of additional roads and bridges as alternative routes. Part of the plan is already in the implementation phase.

- Security of the transport network connecting the airport, Gemlik Port, and Mudanya Port is imperative for times of disaster. (When the Kocaeli Earthquake struck, Bursa did not experience major damages to the roads and bridges, but roads to Istanbul and Izmit were congested for a week after the earthquake limiting the support Bursa could provide to Istanbul and Izmit.

- Emergency roads need to be designated and/or regulations put in place to ensure an emergency network for times of disaster.

- Strengthening of roads and bridges is underway.

2) Supply of Clean Water

- A disaster water supply plan (e.g., substitute pipelines) already exists, and there is also a water reservoir. In addition, the municipal water department has a number of 20-tonne water tanks ready. Privately-owned water tanks would also be mobilized in the event of a major disaster.

- Although Bursa has a wealth of groundwater supplies, these supplies are saved for emergency use. At the time of a disaster, groundwater can be used.

3) Medical/Health Facilities

- With the evaluation of seismic resistance already conducted on hospital buildings, a plan for necessary reconstruction and retrofits was established and is currently being implemented.

- Specific projects for reconstruction or retrofit are planned and/or in progress at 17 of the 20 hospitals of the province. Plans at two of the 20 hospitals (Çekirge and Yenişehir) are yet to be established.

- All hospitals should operate in the event of a disaster, and two A1-class hospitals (Şevket Yılmaz Hospital and Uludağ University Hospital) are expected to play key roles as bases for disaster medical services.

- Buildings currently under construction satisfy earthquake resistance standards structurally; however, improvement of the earthquake resistance of non-structural materials and equipment is needed. A response project has already been commenced by the Ministry of Health.

4) Education Facilities

- Schools are assumed to function as evacuation sites in times of disaster. At the time of the 1999 earthquake, tents for refugees were placed on school grounds. Since the earthquake, schools are planned to be used as evacuation centers in times of disaster, open for residents of their neighborhood.

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- According to the AFAD disaster prevention plan, newly constructed schools are expected to store emergency supplies for disasters. However, the reality is that schools hold a small quantity of stocks. AFAD keeps large quantities of stock in various other locations across the city.

- According to MONE Bursa, seismic evaluation and retrofit of existing schools to meet the Urban Transformation Law requirements are complete.

- With the increasing population, there has been a shortage of schools, and even double shift schools are not able to cope with the demand. Subsequently a plan has been developed to build school campuses in the suburbs where high schools will be relocated. School facilities within the city center will be converted into primary and secondary schools. Although 12 new school campuses are planned, and sites have been identified, construction has not started yet.

(3) Sesific Situation by Districts

1) Osmangazi District

- A vulnerability assessment has been carried out in accordance with the Urban Transformation Law on most buildings in the district.

- Based on the results of this assessment, a redevelopment plan of the areas identified as risky is currently being prepared. For certain residential areas on the mountain sides, roads need to be upgraded to allow for easier access by motor vehicles.

2) Yıldırım District

- Even though approximately 20,000–25,000 buildings in the district do not meet the building standards, retrofits are difficult due to the financial situation of the residents.

- 66 of the 69 Mahalles (community-scale administrative units) in the district have a warehouse with disaster supplies at the Mahalle chief office, and the remaining 3 Mahalles are planning on establishing such a warehouse. The three to four community centers of each Mahalle will be used as evacuation sites at the time of a disaster. These were set up according to the regulations of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. They conduct an evacuation drill once or twice a year.

3) Nilüfer District

- Previously, the district authority had started an independent survey of the earthquake resistance of the existing buildings within the district. This effort stopped with the enactment of the Urban Transformation Law and the evaluation is now being conducted by the provincial office of MOEU.

- Since most areas of this district have been developed after 1999, only a few buildings are not earthquake resistant.

- The Civic Defense Department of the district administration has actively engaged in training exercises of search and rescue operations in accordance with the district disaster response plan. Training of rescue dogs has also been conducted with support from a German organization.

- Institutions like Istanbul Technical University have also installed seismographs in the district and are monitoring them.

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey 4) Gemlik District

- 90% of the buildings in Gemlik District were constructed before 1999, and are not earthquake resistant.

- Gemlik’s citizens have demanded that the municipality actively construct earthquake resistant buildings.

- There are no disaster response plans or guidelines prepared by the municipality.

- There is a 150-member volunteer organization called MAG. Members share knowledge regarding disaster prevention and receive search and rescue training. MAG has three storage rooms containing materials and equipment for disaster response.

4.2.2. Proposed Improvements for Disaster Prevention and Disaster Mitigation in the Bursa Province Based on the current status, important challenges in making the resilient city in Bursa province (i.e. developing the city that is to be capable of quickly recovering from functional breakdown caused by disasters) are summarized as follows.

We postulate the following perspectives to evaluate the challenges. Perspectives are basically those referred to as perspectives of seismic disaster prevention measures stated in the “Charter on measures against the earthquake that directly strikes the south Kanto region” under “Tokyo Metropolitan White Paper (Shuto-ken Hakusho).” Original perspectives were reviewed with taking into account of the disaster resilient urban planning point of view as well as the current situation in Turkey.

6 perspectives listed up in the charter as seismic disaster prevention measures are: a) Prevention and mitigation of damages in the urban area from the seismic disaster. b) Development of urban structure resilient to earthquakes, c) Capacity enhancement of disaster prevention system, d) Promotion of public awareness and community activity, e) Disaster drill, f) Observation and prediction research.

The assessment, information gathering and analysis of disaster risks,which serve as the basis for above-mentioned measures, are not well organized in Turkey. Therefore disaster risk assessment is added as one of the perspectives to be considered in the disaster resilient urban planning in this study.

Since the present project aims at formulation of the disaster resilient urban planning, we particularly focus on a)to d). It should be noted that, since f) Observation and prediction research has been being conducted by universities in Turkey and it contributes to c) Capacity enhancement of disaster prevention system, f) is regarded as a part of c) in this study. Also, since e) Disaster drills are not prevailing in Turkey yet, it is regarded as a part of d) Promotion of public awareness and community activity.

Thus, we set the following 5 perspectives to evaluate and categolize challenges in the resilient urban planning of Bursa. Perspectives on the Resiliency of the Bursa’s Urban Plan

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(1) Disaster Risk Assessment

(2) Reduction of Disaster Risks in the Urban Areas

(3) Formation of a Disaster Resistant Urban Structure

(4) Disaster Management System Development

(5) Enhancement of Public Awareness regarding Disaster Risk Management

(1) Disaster Risk Assessment:

1) Review of Seismic Risk and Hazardous Estimates

Assessments of disaster risks, vulnerability, and hazards have not been conducted since the latest one in 1985. Collection and analysis of updated information would contribute to an effective disaster prevention in urban planning.

(2) Reduction of Disaster Risks in the Urban Areas:

1) Regeneration of Vulnerable Residential Area

Regeneration of vulnerable urban areas is currently in progress pursuant to the Urban Transformation Law. Despite different approaches taken by each municipality, the basic method is redevelopment of housing. Safety of the urban area will be comprehensively improved by creating a public disaster management complex combined with some open space amid the redeveloped area.

2) Establishment of a Disaster-Resistant Infrastructure Network

Disaster risk mitigation measures taken for each infrastructure are not satisfactory, and destruction and/or breakdown are anticipated for infrastructure such as ports, roads, transport system, supply, and processing facilities. Investment into both hard and soft ware is needed in order to establish a disaster-resilient infrastructure network that can recover its functions quickly after disaster.

(3) Formation of a Disaster Resistant Urban Structure

1) Establishment of Disaster Management Bases

It is necessary to establish disaster bases in a strategic manner and to clarify the main bases for each district and region, taking into account the risks specific to Bursa city such as geographic character, vulnerability of densely populated areas, and large scale manufacturing complexes.

2) Security of Road Network for Evacuation and Implementation of the Disaster Response Activities

Traffic in Bursa tends to heavily depend on the east-west transport link because of the limited road network. Since there is only a very limited number of alternatives, fundamental weaknesses exist in the road network system. Construction of alternative routes are necessary.

3) Security of Gemlik Port

In addition to securing an emergency road network, it is necessary to ensure the safety and availability of Gemlik Port in times of disasters, as it is an indispensable hub for business

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continuity in Marmara region. Gemlik Port is also an important base to receive relief supplies and it is expected to be a major source of assistance if Istanbul is hit by a serious disaster.

4) Enhancement of Evacuation Points ant Neighborhood Level

Bursa boasts plenty of green spaces, and some residential areas have a historic building (referred to as Külliye in the old Ottoman era) at the center of community with a mosque and community facilities. However, these sites are not always well prepared in a comprehensive and strategic manner, with their functions not being uniformly provided.

Therefore, it is assumed that the safety of the urban area will be enhanced by the following measures: 1) secure evacuation points accessible on foot in the densely populated areas, ensure their safety, and clearly identify the evacuation routes 2) add disaster prevention facilities to these evacuation points.

It is also recommended to establish open spaces and public disaster management bases in the redevelopment activities conducted pursuant to the 2012 Urban Transformation Law.

5) Emergency Medical System and Enhancement of its Functions in the Populated Area at the time of Disaster

Although a number of hospital construction projects are planned, due to the limitation of land availability, actual constructions are limited mainly to major hospitals in the suburbs. Construction or expansion of hospitals in the densely populated area, especially in the old town, is not taking place.

In consideration of the expansion and improvement of medical system in the event of disasters, new approaches will be desired with consideration of the anticipated damages, such as upgrading existing core hospitals within the city from the viewpoint of protecting human lives from a major disaster.

6) Maintain Flexibility for Possible Expansion of Evacuation Spaces by using School Facilities

According to the MONE Bursa, the anti-seismic reinforcement works of school facilities is complete. However, some damages to buildings constructed before 1999 can be expected in the event of a major disaster.

As the city is likely to receive numerous refugees and injured people in such an event, it is imperative to maintain flexibility for expanding evacuation space as needed. Utilization of school facilities will be an effective measure to that effect.

It will also be beneficial from the perspective of disaster management to incorporate the possibility in the planning process of the construction, taking into account possible usage of evacuation points.

7) Development of a Sustainable City Resilient to Disaster

The infrastructure investment has not been able to meet the demand from increased residential development in proportion to the population. Development of a sustainable society with low-carbon footprint, energy-efficient systems, and limited waste of resources will increase its tenacity against the regional isolation expected at the time of a major disaster.

(4) Disaster Management System Development:

1) Collection of Disaster Information and Clarification of Command Structure to Avoid Confusion

Regarding disaster management at the provincial level, concerned parties are to congregate at the disaster command room of the provincial AFAD and take necessary measures. Disaster

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management at the district level is under the district administration. The DMC, which is to oversee the evacuation points, is supposed to always receive and dispatch information related to disaster prevention, and conduct effective and immediate disaster relief efforts as well as evacuation activities while avoiding confusion.

2) Enhancement of Training Facilities for Search & Rescue Team Members

Although AFAD Bursa already has some training facilities, they are not sufficient to provide technical training. It is believed that the development of an appropriate facility is required to upgrade and train search and relief rescue specialists in such as for lifesaving efforts, etc.

(5) Enhancement of a Public Awareness regarding Disaster Risk Management:

1) Establishment of Promotion Center for Educational Activities of Disaster Prevention and Disaster Mitigation (Initiatives on soft component)

It cannot be said that the citizens awareness of disaster prevention is high. Although an education center for disaster prevention (Bosaikan) were built and children have been taught about disaster prevention at school, regular practices of disaster prevention drill at many levels of the society will be indispensable to raise their awareness of the importance of disaster prevention on a daily basis.

Disaster prevention awareness activities at the community level such as MAG in Gemlik have not been widely conducted so far. At the moment an earthquake strikes, such community level activities are highly effective. Hence, in addition to training and facility development, further awareness of community level organizations is required.

In order to fix the problems listed above, we propose the deployment of a structured DMC as well as the establishment of “Disaster-Resilient Infrastructure,” which is to support the DMC operations in Bursa Province.

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Table 4.2.1 Needs and Challenges in improving Bursa’s Resiliency

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12] (13)

Review of Seism

ic Risk and Hazardous Estimates

Regeneration of Vulnurable Residential Area

stablishment of Disaster-Resistant Infrastructure N

etwork

Establishment of Disaster Bases

Security of Road Netw

ork for Evacuation and Implem

entation of the Disaster Response Activities

Security of Port Gemlik

Enhancement of Evacuation Points at N

eighborhood Level

Emergency M

edical System and Enhancem

ent of its Functions in the Populated Area at the tim

e of Disaster

Maintain Flexibility for Possible Expansion of Evacuation Spaces

by using School Facilities

Development of Sustainable City Resilient to Disaster

Collection of Disaster Information and Clarification of Com

mand

Structure to Avoid Confusion

Enhancement of Training Facilities for Search &

Rescue Team

Mem

bers

Establishment of Prom

otion Center for Educational Activities of Disaster Prevention and Disaster M

itigation

（１）G

eneral

Basic Understanding to Disaster

◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ◎ ◎ 〇 ◎

Vulnurable Residential Area

◎ ◎ ◎ ○ ◎ ○

Measures for Disaster Preevntion

○ ○ ◎ ○ ◎ 〇 ◎ ○ 〇 ◎

（２）Spesific

Road Traffic ◎ ◎ ○ ◎ ○ ○

Suppy of Clean Water ◎ ◎ ◎ ○

Medical/Health Facility ○ ○ 〇 ◎ ○

Education Facility

〇〇〇 ○

◎

（３）District

Yıldırım District ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ 〇〇 ○

Osmangazi District ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ○ ○ ○

Nilüfer District ○ ○ ◎ ○ ○

Gemlik ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ○ ◎ ◎ ○

4.2.3. Significance and Necessity of the Deployment of DMC in Bursa Province Reflecting on our own disaster experiences in Japan and the directions of DMC development currently in progress mainly in the metropolitan areas of Japan, the necessity, benefits, and effectiveness of introducing the concept of DMC in Bursa as a pilot project is explained in Chapter 3.

Challenges in Disaster Prevention and Mitigation

Needs for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation

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Particularly, the establishment of the DMC in the central area of Bursa, where many of the old buildings constructed before 1999 are concentrated, is highly valuable as a model project to be later deployed nationwide in terms of analyzing the effectiveness of the project.

Source: JST

Figure 4.2.2 DMC Network in Bursa province

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Be

nefit

s

Effe

ctiv

enes

s

With the high probability of major earthquakes in the Marmara coastal region, disaster response strategy should be immediately prepared against large-scale damages anticipated at the time of a major disaster.

N

eces

sity

Es

tabl

ishm

ent o

f a R

egio

nal L

evel

DM

C in

Bur

sa a

s the

firs

t pilo

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to b

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Being a center of the densely populated region, priority is given to prepare DMC in the Marmara coastal area.

With the high concentration of manufacturing facilities around the Marmara coastal region, the backbone of the Turkish economy, a DMC is crucial for providing emergency response as well as recovery and reconstruction efforts.

The transport network in the Marmara coastal region is relatively advanced, with road, sea, and air transport facilities in place, in addition to a plan for major rail network construction, holding a superior position for providing quick relief efforts against a broad-based disaster inflicting the densely populated cities of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir. Bursa Province, at the center of the Marmara region, is conveniently located for relief/rescue operations at the time of a disaster in this region.

There are urban areas developed before 1999 in Bursa Province, especially concentrated in the central part of Bursa city. Construction of the DMC in Bursa will be effective as a a pilot project to improve situation of high density area in Turkey.

Source: JST

Figure 4.2.1 The role of DMC in Bursa province

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4.2.4. Approach to Resilient Urban Planning in Bursa Province It is essential to take an integrated approach, incorporating the following listed points, in urban planning in order to increase the resilience of the urban area in Bursa:

- A regional-level DMC will be established at the center of Bursa, which is at the center of the South Marmara region.

- A regional-level DMC and district-level (I) DMCs (in Osmangazi, Yildirim, and Nilüfer) will be established in close connection to each other and located with good access to the transportation system, while being relatively close to the city centers, where population is concentrated with a higher risk of damages from disasters.

- An information communication network with Ankara and Istanbul should be secured, along with a redundant system so as to maintain connectivity under normal and disaster circumstances.

- Bursa city center should be connected to Gemlik port, Mudanya port, and Yenişehir airport through a disaster-resistant road network. Coastal DMCs are proposed to be set up both in Gemlik and Mudanya.

- Establish district-level (II) DMCs in Kütahya, Balıkesir, and Karacabey.

- Establish an emergency road network with disaster-resistant roads to connect various DMCs to support coordination of disaster relief activities among DMCs.

- Set up an environment to enhance public awareness on disaster prevention, and to foster specialists and leaders of disaster prevention activities.

Source: JICA Study Team

Figure 4.2.4 DMC network in Bursa province

Wide-AreaBroad-area Emergency Road

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The following figure shows the stratified DMC structure deployment proposed in Chapter 3 with a regional DMC in Bursa Province.


Figure 4.2.5 Stratified DMC Structure Proposed for Turkey

4.3. Proposal for Resilient Urban Planning for the city of Bursa

4.3.1. Characteristics and Issues in the city of Bursa Based on the approach that has been described in the above sections up to 4.2, specific suggestions are made below to make Bursa a resilient city.

The characteristics of Bursa are as follows:

- The city is located on a long basin-shaped flatland stretching east to west (including areas at risk of liquefaction and flood) at the foot of Mount Uludağ (including areas at risk of landslide).

- New urban areas are expanding to the suburbs and the city has been extended.

- The highway has been developed along an east–west axis. The urban area is expanding along the framework created by the highway with high traffic volume. Congested urban areas are expanding mainly from the old town in the center of the city towards the east.

- Small-scale manufacturing industries are concentrated in the city in areas which are also residential. Comparatively large factories are expanding along the highway outside of the city center.

- Risky areas and reserved areas have been designated in Osmangazi and Yildirim based on the Urban Transformation Law and urban redevelopment is in progress.

- Although a number of medical facilities, such as hospitals, are located in populated urban areas, A1 class hospitals, which can provide advanced medical services, are

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located on either side of the city in the east and west, away from the city center. The new City Hospital is planned to be located in a suburb to the northwest of the city.

- The majority of high schools are planned to move to the suburbs in accordance with the planned school campus projects, aiming to improve the beyond capacity situation of schools within the city. Rearrangement of primary and secondary schools is progressing in the city.

- There are old city areas with dense population on the slope of the mountain, where access by car is limited.

- In addition to an earthquake due to the Uludag and Bursa faults and an earthquake in the coastal area of Marmara Sea, it is necessary to consider landslides and floods.

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.1 Perception of Structure of Bursa City

If a disaster of extreme severity hits Bursa, the densely populated old town with many dilapidated buildings at the foot of the mountain and highly populated residential-industrial mixed use area (the center of it is designated as a risky area) will have high need for search & rescue operations.

Additionally, the road network consists mainly of east-west highways, so traffic at the time of a disaster is likely to be heavily congested. Some of the areas on the mountainside are inaccessible by emergency vehicles, which will also be a cause of traffic congestion.

4.3.2. Suggestions for Making City of Bursa Resilient to Disasters With the above characteristics of the city center of Bursa as well as Japan’s experience in disaster resilient urban planning stated previously, suggestions to enhance the resilience of the city were studied in accordance with the following five policies. The main suggestions are presented in this section:

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Policies

1) Collection and evaluation of information on disaster risks that should underpin the development of disaster resilient urban planning.

2) Reduction of disaster risks in urban areas by: improving and strengthening vulnerable areas, reinforcing existing building structures, securing essential utilities, etc.

3) Development of a disaster-resistant urban structure by: ensuring a disaster-resistant road network and sea and air transportation routes, creating disaster management complexes, etc.

4) Development of a disaster management system: institutional development, human resources development, legal framework development, etc.

5) Enhancement of disaster prevention awareness and of disaster preparedness.

Information on disaster risk and hazard maps is not available for Bursa, but AFAD has started to work on this matter with a JICA Technical Support Project.

It is recognized that the high density residential-industrial mixed area and the densely inhabited districts on the mountain side need improvements to reduce disaster risks in Bursa. It has been confirmed that the municipalities have been taking initiatives to improve these residential areas in accordance with the Urban Transformation Law.

Much effort is needed for local communities to establish local DMCs within walking distance of the community residences and to create a network of these local DMCs. These local DMCs do not necessarily need to include all components of a DMC presented in Chapter 3; some local DMCs can be set up to solely act as evacuation centers. Existing public facilities (including government buildings and community centers), school buildings, small medical facilities, bus terminals (also referred to as otogar), and areas surrounding shopping centers can serve as these “community DMC” evacuation centers.

As for the development of the disaster management system, new efforts in line with the revision of the AFAD Law have been launched.

With regard to raising awareness and knowledge about disaster prevention, the Bursa provincial governor’s office built its own education center for disaster prevention (Bosaikan). Japan has been providing assistance in cooperation with the city of Kobe.

As for the development of a disaster-resistant urban structure, roads have been widened and bridges have been built to improve the network. No comprehensive plan has been established to improve the disaster resistance of the urban structure.

(1) Suggestions for Developing a Network of Wide-Area DMCs

Taking account the situations stated above and focusing on development of a disaster-resistant urban structure, in order to make the urban area more resilient to disasters, the following suggestions to develop DMCs and a road network connecting the DMCs are proposed.

A DMC network should be set up with DMCs at the regional level (also serve as a provincial DMC) as a center of the South Marmara Region and district levels. Establishment of the district level DMC in all 17 districts is necessary; however, Osmangazi and Yildrim Districts, which include the old historical area with dense population, residential and industrial mixed area and vulnerable areas with illegal occupation should be prioritized.

Also, coastal DMC should be developed together with enhancement of Gemlik Port as the entrance point of relief supply from outside, since the road network will be unserviceable in the event of a disaster, ocean transportation over the Marmara sea is being utilized during

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the normal period due to geographical features and Gemlik Port support is essential for the economy of Bursa.

We envisage that local temporary evacuation centers (local DMCs) will be located within walking distance and connected to each other by evacuation routes. We propose that district and regional DMCs be set up to manage the local temporary evacuation centers. DMCs would be connected by an emergency transportation road network.

- Component A: Development of regional DMCs as centers in the South Marmara Region - Component B: Development of District Level (I) DMC in the Osmangazi District - Component C: Development of District Level (I) DMC in the Yildirim District - Component D: Development of a coastal DMC in Gemlik District - Component E: Development of emergency road networks - Component F: Improvement of urban area on steep slopes

Other suggestions about medical services and anti-disaster prevention facilities will be stated in Section 4.4 and later sections.

District DMCs should be developed in all districts. However, in this project, priority is given to Osmangazi District and Yildirim District, which are the highly populated districts, covering historical and old areas and vulnerable residential-industrial mixed areas. A coastal DMC is also proposed at Gemlik as a gate to receive support from outside in case of disaster.

Level DMC:

A

D

B C

Transport System for the Sloped Urban Area

F

Mutual Support

Coastal DMC(District Level (II)DMC)

Mutual Support

Center ofthe City Regional Level DMC

(Center for Disaster Management or South Marmara Region Centered on Bursa Province)

District(I) Level DMC(DMC for Yildirim District, example of DMCwith Disaster Base Medical Center)

District Level (I) DMC(DMC for Osmangazi District, example of DMC in conjunction with Urban Transformation Project/ Public Park)

Emergency Road Network

E

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.2 Proposed Components for Strengthening Disaster Risk Management of the Urban Structure of Bursa Province

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey 4.3.3. Suggestion for Developing the Regional Level DMC (Component A) (1) Current Status

The Bursa AFAD office does not yet have a function as a commanding headquarters to control the Marmara region. Although the AFAD office is located on a main road and on the same ground as the fire department and the MOH heliport, its location is far from the densely populated city center. A logistics center to handle disaster aid materials is planned to be constructed at a different location from the mentioned premises.

(2) Main Challenges

The existing facility may be used as a back-up support base in case of a disaster of extreme severity, but performance as a frontline base cannot be expected due to its location outside the city center.

There is a need for constructing facilities for a “disaster management center” (the main component of a DMC, see Chapter 3) where officers in charge of disaster management of the national, provincial, and municipal authorities in the Marmara region can gather and control information. It is also necessary to construct a base to control search and rescue teams (“training center” under the DMC model presented in Chapter 3), to manage aid materials effectively (“logistics center” under the DMC model presented in Chapter 3), and to secure connecting routes between Marmara and surrounding major cities The resilience of the Marmara region must be enhanced and Bursa’s disaster prevention functions must be improved.

(3) Proposals

The regional level DMC should be constructed in a sizable open space as close to the city center as possible, close to existing parks and green areas, and connected to multiple access routes.

Based on the DMCs at a regional level proposed in Chapter 3, and taking into account existing infrastructure in Bursa, the following facilities are proposed to be included in the regional level DMC. Supervisory authorities of each facility are shown in parenthesis.

Proposed facilities

[1] Disaster control management center (AFAD offices and operation room))

[2] DRM-related facilities (Firefighting brigade, AKOM, 112, police etc.)

[3] Main disaster base hospital (MOH): To be relocated to the military base site

[4] Disaster-prevention parks/open spaces as evacuation center (BBB)

[5] Sports facilities (BBB)

[6] Logistics center (AFAD)

[7] Waste incineration plant (BBB)

[8] Search and rescue training center (AFAD)

[9] Heliport

(4) Considering Potential Sites

The proposed criteria for site selection to develop a regional level DMC are as follows:

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey 1) Criteria for site selection

Easy access from emergency road network (to/from other emergency facilities, key facilities, and surrounding provinces).

Presence of alternative ground routes to/from: surrounding provinces, airports (including military airports), and Gemlik and Mudanya ports.

Sufficient distance to fault lines and high-risk facilities. Firm ground with low potential for liquefaction.

Close to densely populated areas. Availability of the land.

Based on the above criteria, three sites in the city of Bursa were chosen as shown in Figure 4.3.3 and the pros and cons of these sites are described in Table 4.3.3 Industrial parks in Bursa:

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.3 Location of three potential sites for Component A

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Table 4.3.1 Comparison of potential sites for Component A

Potential site 1a: An area planned for a new stadium and hospital

Pros.

Military land planned for a new stadium and a new hospital

Having access to the highway to the east and west as well as

Yalova road and Mudanya road via the bypass

Close to the military airport.

Currently the city hall and the municipal water department of

Bursa are located here but are to move soon.

Cons

Difficulty in acquisition of the land. The green area to the north

is privately owned and the owner intends to maintain it as a

green area.

Access to the highway and the military airport needs to be

improved.

Potential site 2a: Military airport

Pros

It used to be a military airport. Currently it is used not as an

airport but as accommodation for military staff.

The site has an extensive flat area.

Close to Mudanya road and Ankara road.

Cons

Currently managed by the Ministry of Finance. The city of Bursa

is not aware of a redevelopment plan.

Access from the highway needs to be improved and roads need

to be expanded.

Potential site 3a: Site in the vicinity of the AFAD offices

Pros

Located directly adjacent to the existing AFAD offices and the

exhibition center.

The area is owned by the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, and

part of the area is used as a training center and storage for

construction machinery.

The area has good access to Yalova road and Ankara road.

Cons

The area carries a high risk of liquefaction.

The area is surrounded by rivers and there are nine bridges

around the area, which could become isolated if bridges were

to fail in a disaster.


(5) Recommendation: Site 1a

Among the above three potential sites, an image of facilities regarding the potential site 1a was created in order to give shape to a regional DMC.

The characteristics of the site are as follows:

- The site has easy access to the east and west of Bursa via the highway.

- The site is located next to the business district currently being developed. A new stadium and a new large-scale park are being constructed.

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- The site has a large green area, which is an advantage for operations in disasters. An additional open space is being created around the new stadium, and a large park is being constructed in the south.

- There is a plan to relocate a general hospital to the military site for use as a base for disaster and emergency medical services. The DMC can be developed in cooperation with this relocation plan.

- The site is close to the military airport, which is currently operational although not in use. By extending roads from the airport to the site, the site will become convenient for access from the air as well.

- The highway crosses the site in its middle, so the proposed facilities would be on either side of the highway. It is necessary to create local access routes between facilities, and it will be necessary to extend the road to improve access from the highway to each facility.

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.4 Image of provincial DMC

The concept of each facility is described in Section 4.5.

4.3.4. Suggestion for Developing the District Level DMC (Level l) in Osmangazi District (Component B)

(1) Current status:

Covering the old town, Osmangazi is densely populated and its land is highly utilized, but no emergency base or evacuation facility is built close to civilian areas.

Most properties in the old town were constructed before 1999, and would have difficulty in withstanding a mega earthquake.

On the other hand, there is a plan under consideration to update and improve the buildings in the urban areas based on the Urban Transformation Law.

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey (2) Main Challenges

It is important to incorporate components of DMCs into the urban transformation plan such as parks, which may serve as evacuation bases. This will facilitate developing disaster-prevention capabilities of the urban areas.

If it is difficult to secure land through projects related to the Urban Transformation Law, the District Level DMC may be developed utilizing existing large parks.

(3) Proposals

We propose development of a district-level DMC (level I), either in the target redevelopment areas under the Urban Transformation Law or by utilizing existing parks, to serve as disaster-prevention bases for Osmangazi, which has historical areas, and has approximately 900,000 people and high-risk areas. The following facilities are proposed in consideration of the current status of Osmangazi. Supervisory authorities are shown in parenthesis.

Proposed facilities

[1] District disaster control management center, including emergency stock storage (District)

[2] Schools (MONE)

[3] Sports facilities: gymnasiums and playgrounds, grounds etc. (Municipality)

[4] Parks and green areas (Municipality)

(4) Considering Potential Sites

1) The criteria for site selection to develop district level DMCs were set as follows: Criteria for Choosing the Site

Based on the above criteria, three sites in the city of Bursa were chosen as shown in Figure 4.3.5, and the pros and cons of these sites are described in Table 4.3 2.

As a case study of a DMC at a district level (Level I), the DMC in Osmangazi District is presented as follows.

Based on the three potential sites illustrated in the following figure, the possibility of a DMC at the district level was considered.

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.5 Location of three potential sites for Component B

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Table 4.3.2 Comparison of potential sites for Component B Potential site 1b: Reserved Area

Pros The site is a Reserved Area for Urban Transformation

specified by the Law. Development can be executed by the authority of IUT under MOEU, and may include housing and public facilities.

The northern part of the site is a botanical park, which is assigned as an evacuation area (meeting point) by AFAD in case of disasters.

Cons The site is located in the northern part of Osmangazi

District. Access from the old town on the hillside is not easy.

The site is owned by private owners.

Potential site 2b: Site in the vicinity of the AFAD offices

Pros Located directly adjacent to the existing AFAD offices and

the exhibition center. The area is owned by the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality,

and part of the area is used as a college and storage for construction machinery.

The area has good access to Yalova road and Ankara road. Cons The area carries a high risk of liquefaction. The area is surrounded by rivers and there are nine

bridges around the area, which could become isolated if bridges were to fail in a disaster.

Potential site 3b: The area of the stadium and Culture Park

Pros This is a well-known culture park and existing stadium.

The site is located in the center of Osmangazi District and directly south of Izmir-Ankara road. Easily accessible to the residential area on the hillside.

No need to obtain the land, if it is in the park. Cons As this area is in the cultural heritage area as well as a

natural protection area, the committee that maintains cultural aspects needs to approve new constructions.

The area of the existing stadium is going to be redeveloped as a civic plaza.

Source: JST

(5) Recommendation: Site 1b or 1c

Regarding the Osmangazi district, two case studies were conducted on proposed sites of different types.

1) Recommendation of Site 1b

The site is a Reserved Area under the Urban Transformation Law. It has an area of approximately 35 ha, and was planned to be utilized as a temporary housing site for relocation of people living in the risky area to improve the living condition of high-risk areas.

The suggestion is to develop a residential area that incorporates the DMC. Half of the site will be utilized as a residential area with an open and green space, and the other half will be utilized for the DMC, which will be an effective evacuation and rescue base in case of disasters.

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The proposed development of the residential area will be a model town that is robust against disasters with facilities for disaster prevention, highly efficient energy use, and a smart community approach.

The facilities considered to be included in the district level DMC (I) in Osmangazi are as follows:

- Disaster management center of the district

- Community health-care and welfare facilities

- Schools

- Sports facilities (gymnasiums and grounds)

- Parks and green areas

Given the current nationwide promotion of the projects to improve vulnerable areas through the implementation of the Urban Transformation Law, this proposal shows significant advantages in promoting incorporation of the disaster risk management approach into projects related to the Urban Transformation Law.


Figure 4.3.6 Conceptual layout of a district DMC (I) combined with a housing development by the Urban Transformation Scheme

2) Suggestion for the Potential Site 2b

The potential site 2b is the Culture Park and the existing stadium area located in the center of Osmangazi District, south of the Izmir-Ankara road. The site includes a culture park (about 38 ha), and sports facilities and schools are around the park.

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It has been decided that a new stadium will be built at another location, the existing stadium will be demolished and its grounds will be redeveloped as a civic plaza, after completion of the new stadium.

The site can be easily accessed from the residential area on the high-risk slope ground in the south. As the park is owned by the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, there is no need to secure the land. However, because the area is in a Cultural Heritage Area as well as a Natural Protection Area, the Cultural Heritage Project Committee reviews all construction projects.

The following facilities are suggested to be built in this component:

- Disaster management center of the district

- Storage warehouse

- Sports facilities (swimming pools and gymnasiums)

Following is an image of the DMC layout proposed for this Culture Park:


Figure 4.3.7 Image of District DMC (I), utilized with a large park

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4.3.5. District Level DMC (Level I) in Yıldırım District (Component C) (1) Current Status

Yıldırım District has a comprehensive set of educational and cultural facilities as well as the first education center for disaster-prevention (Bosaikan) in Turkey and the A1 level Şevket Yılmaz Hospital where excellent research facilities and functions are available.

On the other hand, as a result of the sharp increase of population in the last 20 years, the Yıldırım District has urban areas and mixed residential-industrial areas with high disaster risks. A large-scale redevelopment is being carried out through the application of the Urban Transformation Law.

(2) Main Challenges

The Şevket Yılmaz Hospital is to be used as a base for medical services when disasters occur. However, access roads from the highway to the hospital are narrow and the area tends to have traffic congestion with users of other facilities.

(3) Proposals

By utilizing parks and public owned lands and by advancing medical facilities, development of a district level (I) DMC in the Yıldırım District is proposed in this area with the purpose of enhancing the resilience of urban areas. This DMC will incorporate the A1 level hospital and the Centre for Disaster Prevention (Bosaikan).

The Şevket Yılmaz Hospital stands on a site along a river. Several public facilities including government offices, schools, and other hospitals, and parks are around the hospital site.

The hospital is already planned as a base in case of disasters in Bursa, and has stocks for disaster medical care. A new hospital for cardiovascular diseases will be constructed soon. The hospital is also planning on expanding its capacity by acquiring the site of the adjacent police academy. In line with the redevelopment of public facilities around the hospital, the Şevket Yılmaz Hospital is likely to be upgraded and developed as a base for disaster medical care.

Proposed facilities

[1] Enhancing the function of the Şevket Yılmaz Hospital

- Increase the number of beds

- Increase the capacity of medical gas equipment

- Base for the activities of UMKE

- Introduction of a medical information system (backing up information and segregation, information communication equipment using satellite)

[2] Accommodation for medical staff in case of disasters

[3] Storage of supplies for disaster preparation

[4] Park and green areas to use as an evacuation place in times of disasters

[5] Heliport

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Site

Existing

Proposed Plan


Figure 4.3.8 Image of the proposed District DMC (I) located on a large park

C

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey 4.3.6. Suggestion for a Coastal DMC (Gemlik) (Component D)

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.9 Location of Gemlik port zone

(1) Current Status

The Gemlik Port Zone, ranked fifth to sixth in Turkey in terms of the export amount, is the entrance to Bursa, and supports the industry of Bursa. The port zone is facing the Sea of Marmara, and there are six private commercial ports (it will become five when two ports are merged) controlled by the Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications and one small port controlled by the Gemlik Municipality.

The private commercial ports are shown in the above figure. They are relatively close to each other but are located about 10km from the Gemlik city center. The private port facilities are concentrated on a fault, and are thus at high risk of being damaged by an earthquake.

At those private commercial ports, chemical/petrochemical products are received, and mechanical products such as components of automobiles produced in the industrial park of Bursa are shipped. There is no disaster operation plan, but when a disaster of extreme severity occurs and the nation declares a state of emergency, the port facilities owned by private companies can be used for official relief activities.

On the other hand, public ports are mainly used for fishing boats and do not have sufficient capacity for large ships.

In Gemlik, urban development projects based on the Urban Redevelopment Law are being carried out mainly on higher ground.

(2) Main Challenges

When private port facilities are used for official relief activities their owner may not be able to continue to operate their businesses, which goes against the principles of disaster resiliency. Additionally, some facilities developed by those private companies store chemical substances and oil, which could cause fire or pollution, intoxication, or other risks when a disaster occurs. In addition, these ports are built on a fault; the risk of earthquake needs to be investigated and necessary measures need to be taken. The disaster-prevention plan should include alternatives to relying on these private port facilities, as they are privately

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owned and operated, are located away from the urban areas and have some risks, including fire.

For BCP in the industrial park of Bursa, when a large-scale earthquake occurs, measures need to be taken so that those private ports will not stop functioning or will quickly return to operation even if damages were caused.

(3) Japan’s Experience

There is a DMC (27.9 ha) at the Sakai Senboku Port in the Sakai Second District of the Osaka Prefecture (with highly advanced support functions). The area provides a place for recreation and relaxation for the citizens as a seaside park during normal circumstances but plays the following roles when a disaster occurs.

Reference: Disaster-Prevention Centre on the Coast in the Kinki Region

Figure 4.3.10 Image of coastal DMC (Japanese example for reference)

(4) Proposals

Based on the above case in Japan and the current conditions in Gemlik, development of a coastal DMC that includes the expansion of the public port in Gemlik is suggested together with retrofits to make commercial port facilities earthquake-proof.

To enhance the capacity of disaster prevention of Gemlik district, the following specific suggestions are made:

- Apart from the measures to be taken in preparation for disasters in those private commercial ports with high-risk facilities, it is suggested that public ports should have the facilities to accept large ships in case of disasters so that access to relief supply and relief workers will be secured.

- Reclamation work at the inner part of the bay in Gemlik may be carried out in conjunction with the development of higher ground. Soil and sand from housing developments on higher ground can be used for reclamation work.

The roles of DMC at a port

1) Receive and distribute relief goods.

2) A base camp to gather support for wide-area relief units.

3) Store materials and equipment for emergency and restoration.

4) Support marine transport.

5) Support disaster medical care. In case of disasters: - Receiving, transporting and allocating of aid supply and relief teams from outside. - A base camp for relief teams. - Base for disaster relief activities in Gemlik.

Disaster Management Centre

Under normal circumstances, the area can be used for community activities and disaster drills.

Earthquake-proof quay

Versatile expansive area

In case of disaster

Disaster management centre

Base Camp

Heliport

Floating Bridge Supply of relief goods

Accumulation yard of relief goods

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- Develop the port as a base to receive relief goods by making the base accessible from the park, which can function as an evacuation site in the case of a tsunami.

- Ensure that the capacity of DMC can be expanded by liaising with the existing university and the high school when a large-scale disaster occurs. Enhance the connection with the emergency roads that lead to the city center of Bursa.

- Incorporating the function of district level DMC in Gemlik will be effective for disaster prevention and will contribute to improve disaster prevention and mitigation in Bursa.

4.3.7. Proposal for Emergency Road Network (Component E) (1) Current Situation of Road Network in Bursa

The roads of Bursa have been administrated by two organizations. The planning, construction, and maintenance of the main roads in Bursa and the roads connecting to neighboring provinces were under the responsibility of 14 Regional Directorates (Burusa) and of the General Directorate of Highways, while the planning, construction, and maintenance of the roads within Bursa city were under the responsibility of the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality. After the expansion of the metropolitan area in March 2014, the Bursa roads have come under the control of Bursa Metropolitan Municipality.

Since the transportation between Bursa and neighboring cities mainly relies on ground transportation, the road network has been well established. Bursa city is spread longer in the east-west direction and traffic is concentrated on the Ankara-Izmir road, the main road which passes through the center of the city. Traffic jams can often be seen in the city. There is a bypass on the north side of the Ankara-Izmir road. The old city area is located on the south side of the road and a lot of narrow and steep-sloped roads are located there. On the other hand, on-street parking can be seen everywhere (Figure 4.3.12) and slows traffic. A regulation is necessary to prohibit on-road parking.

Bursa Metropolitan Municipality has worked out a road master plan for the improvement of traffic conditions. Additional roads and bridges were planned in the master plan for

Dock Upgrade Expansion

Utilising the campus of Uludag university

when a disaster occurs.

Disaster prevention park + site for DMC 25ha (including the sea surface).

Disaster prevention park Utilise a part of the sloping land.

Army site.

Disaster prevention park Expand the site by land reclamation.

Base to distribute relief goods.

Storage for goods and equipment.


Figure 4.3.1 Image of portside DMC in Gemlik

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decreasing traffic congestion and providing alternative routes in case of disaster. During the process of preparing the master plan, there was an idea to construct a bypass in the southern part of the city, but it was abandoned because the road would have had to avoid historical and forested areas and most of it would have had to be constructed in the steep mountainous areas. In accordance with the master plan of Bursa city, a highway connecting Istanbul and Izmir via Bursa is under construction and is on schedule to be finished in 2017. This highway is expected to contribute to the transportation of support goods, equipment, and staff in case of disaster.

(2) Preparation for Disaster Management

During the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake, damages to transportation infrastructure in Bursa were limited to slight damage to the road to Kocaeli and slight damage to a bridge. The road to Kocaeli became congested for a period of about one week after the earthquake and caused difficulty for emergency traffic. The importance of securing emergency traffic during a disaster has been widely recognized.

Currently, the provincial governor has the authority to limit road use of general vehicles in case of a disaster, but there is no clear designation of an emergency road network or corresponding operating procedures.

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.12 On-street Parking in Bursa

(3) Concept of Emergency Road Network in Japan

During the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, roads were obstructed due to damages to viaducts and bridges as well as collapsed buildings, leading to difficulties for emergency traffic.

shows the locations of road damages in the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. Since then, the designation of an emergency road network and the formulation of operating procedures have become a part of municipalities’ disaster management plans in Japan.

Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

Figure 4.3.13 Road Damages from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake 4-48


In the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake, although there was no road damage in Tokyo, the traffic in Tokyo was abnormally congested for the entire day of the earthquake because of the closure of highways, the soil liquefaction in coastal areas, and the service disruption of public train transportation. Supposing that an earthquake happened in Tokyo, it is easy to imagine the traffic situation that might occur based on what happened during the Great East Japan earthquake if no appropriate measures are taken. The necessity of an emergency road network is again demonstrated.

The emergency road network of Japan is usually composed of highways, national roads and the roads which connect the abovementioned roads and major disaster management facilities. According to the function and importance of roads, the emergency roads are generally classified into primary to tertiary in many cases and have been given different names by the municipality. For example, the classifications of the emergency transportation roads of Tokyo are as follows:

- Example of Primary emergency transportation roads: roads needed to transport for a wide area, linking the Tokyo metropolitan office, disaster operation center, important airports, and seaports.

- Secondary emergency transportation roads: roads linking primary emergency roads to disaster management facilities such as police stations, fire stations, hospitals, and district offices.

- Tertiary emergency transportation roads: roads linking primary and secondary roads to logistics centers and supply warehouses.

(4) Proposed Emergency Road Network in Bursa

Based on the city scale and current road network, the proposed emergency road network is composed of wide area emergency roads and city emergency roads.

1) Wide Area Emergency Roads

Wide area emergency roads are roads that are important to allow traffic of emergency vehicles for rescue, relief, firefighting and, at the same time, reception of outside support personnel and relief materials. Wide area emergency roads are also important for providing support personnel and relief materials to neighboring provinces in case of a large scale disaster in those provinces. The roads should be controlled immediately after a disaster for dedication of enough lanes (which may mean all lanes depending to the disaster and road situation) for the sole traffic of emergency vehicles. Wide area emergency roads are meant to link the following facilities.

- Provincial governor’s office, Metropolitan office, Regional disaster management complex

- AFAD office, AFAD logistics center

- Airport, Gemlik port, Mudanya port

- Neighboring support provinces designated by the Turkey disaster response plan

2) City Emergency Roads

City emergency roads are roads necessary for rescue, relief and fire fighting in case of a disaster in Bursa. These roads also need to be controlled immediately after a disaster. Since roads within the city limits generally have a limited number of lanes, city emergency roads will typically be completely dedicated to the use of emergency vehicles. Details of the control of these roads, for example the control period, should be decided based on the disaster scale and road situation. City emergency roads are roads connecting the following facilities:

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- District office, district disaster management center

- Police station, fire station, disaster base hospital

- Wide area emergency roads

- Stockpile warehouse, tent city

The major emergency road network of Bursa, based on the principles described above, is shown below.

(5) Proposal for introducing an Emergency Road Network system

In order to make the emergency road network function well in times of disasters, prior preparation is necessary. The preparation could be divided, in general, into two categories, i.e. structural and non-structural. The structural preparation includes the vulnerability assessment and associated necessary improvements. The vulnerability assessment includes a review of the road damage caused by ground deformation, elevation, subsidence, liquefaction, and landslide, and the damage to bridges, viaducts, and retaining walls. The non-structural preparation means the regulation, standard operation procedures, and a plan and operation manual covering the roles and coordination methods of concerned organizations. The plan and operation manual should consider all potential situations after a disaster, for example, the obstruction of roads by collapsed buildings and utility poles, a traffic light system problem due to power failure or the damage to the traffic light itself, the increase of traffic volume caused by emergency traffic, and the damage to the other transportation means such as airports and railways. The plan should also consider the fast recovery by rapid removal of debris and by specifying alternative roads.

Based on our survey, the following improvements to the emergency road network are considered necessary.

1) Road Widening and Landslide Prevention for Gemlik – Mudanya Road

There are six private sea ports in Gemlik, being the base of transport of raw materials and products to the industrial areas of Bursa. An agreement between three port owners and the municipality allows the use of these ports in case of emergency. The road connecting to the port is also important for securing the supply chain and a rapid return to normal industrial activities after a disaster. There is a single road between the port and the city.

The port in Mudanya is where the ferries between Bursa and Istanbul operate. A section of the road between Gemlik and Mudanya is narrow and not well-paved (Figure 4.3.15 Road

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.2 Proposed Major Emergency Road Network

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between Gemlik and Mudanya). The Bursa Metropolitan Municipality has started widening the road and extending it to Bandirma, another port city. In this way, the road between Gemlik and Mudanya could be an alternative road in case of damage to the road connecting Gemlik to Bursa or Mudanya to Bursa. The improvement of the road also makes it possible to secure the receipt of support materials by sea even if one of the ports is damaged.

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.15 Road between Gemlik and Mudanya

a. Seismic Performance Assessment and Strengthening of Bridges

Bridge damage was experienced in many past earthquakes from flexural failure or shear failure of piers caused by ground shaking, or from bridge collapse due to large ground deformations or liquefaction. Seismic strengthening of bridge piers and bridge collapse prevention have been promoted in Japan since the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. It is important to ensure the seismic performance of the bridges because a damaged bridge will considerably affect emergency traffic.

There are a number of bridges in Bursa. Most of them are multi-span and simple girder reinforced concrete bridges. There are three bridges on the Ankara-Izmir road, which is the main emergency road. These are the Nilufar bridge, Baliklidere bridge and Delicay bridge (Figure 4.3.16).

It was found by visual inspection that the Baliklidere and Delicay bridges are in good condition and that the Nilufer bridge shows severe deterioration and tilted piers as shown in Figure 4.3.16. Bursa Metropolitan has planned to rebuild the bridge.

Nilufer bridge Baliklidere bridge Delicay bridge Nilufer

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.16 The Bridges on Ankara-Izmir Road 4-51


Source: JST

Figure 4.3.17 Deterioration of Piers and Girders of Nilufer Bridge

b. Seismic Strengthening of Buildings along the Emergency Road

In the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, roads were obstructed by collapsed buildings. It was found that the degree of obstruction was related to the width of the road and the ratio of building collapse, as shown in Figure 4.3.18. The narrower the road and the higher the building collapse ratio, the greater the possibility of obstruction. Tokyo Metropolitan has derived a numerical relationship, shown below, for the estimation of expected road obstruction in future earthquakes.

【Road width less than 3.5 m】

Ratio of expected road obstruction (%)＝0.9009×Ratio of building damage＋19.845

【Road width more than 3.5 m and less than 5.5 m】

Ratio of expected road obstruction (%)＝0.3514×Ratio of building damage＋13.189

【Road width more than 5.5 m and less than 13.0 m】

Ratio of expected road obstruction (%)＝0.2229×Ratio of building damage－1.5026

The ratio of building damage will be evaluated by the following relationship. The damage to buildings includes the damage by both ground shaking and liquefaction.

Ratio of building damage =Ratio of collapse＋1/2×Ratio of half collapse

Obstruction assessment and seismic strengthening of buildings along emergency roads are necessary.

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Source：Tsukaguchi et al. (1997)

Figure 4.3.18 The Relationship of Road Obstruction and Road Width

c. Seismic Performance Assessment of Grade Separation

There exist a number of grade separations in Bursa city and the grade separations on the Ankara-Izmir road are mostly underpasses (Figure 4.3.19). Damage to this kind of grade separation could cause the collapse of bridges and/or damage to retaining walls. Since grade separation is a key point on the emergency road, it is important to perform the seismic assessment of grade separations.

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.19 Grade Separation on Ankara-Izmir Road

d. Preparation of Regulations and Manuals for Emergency Road Operation

In addition to seismic strengthening of the road, it is also necessary to prepare regulations and operation procedures for the efficient operation of the Emergency Road Network during a disaster. Based on the experience in Japan, the following contents are proposed to be included in the regulations and manuals:

- Securing the number of emergency vehicles

- Pre-registration of emergency vehicles

- Determining the roles and cooperation of the municipality, police, firefighting, etc.

- Conditions for the announcement of emergency control

- Administration of emergency control

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- Road damage information collection and distribution

- Regulation for prohibiting on-street parking along the emergency road

- Traffic control for the first three days after a disaster, when time is a critical issue for lifesaving and firefighting.

- Traffic control after the first three days of the disaster, when the main activity is shifted to the recovery phase.

- Resuming the operation of public transportation as fast as possible.

- Preparation of staff and equipment for rapid removal of debris on the Emergency Roads caused by landslides and collapsed buildings.

- Assessment of the bottlenecks on the emergency road network and their improvement.

Note that the above list is not comprehensive and additional content should be included after further review of the needs of the regulations and manuals.

4.3.8. Improvement of urban area on steep slopes（Component F） (1) Current Status:

- In the southern part of the Yildirim or Osmangazi District, there are dense urban areas at the foot of Uludag mountain, which from the beginning, did not follow public procedures, and many of the buildings were built without permits.

- However, many residents are living there currently. In addition, businesses are operating in the area. The risks and challenges for the city are recognized by the government, who has however not undertaken sufficient measures. This has led to the present situation.

- In steep slope areas, there is a difficult passage and stairs must be climbed for people to access their vehicles. Further there are many two-story masonry (thus not seismically safe) buildings concentrated in the area. The area has electricity, water, sewage, and gas. This was confirmed by site visits by the JICA study team.

- Public transportation is by minibus. But for many residents, moving on foot is the basic means.

- The roads for access to the slopes of the city are not wide enough for the traffic demand, and roads have been chronically congested.

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-

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.20 Urban areas of steep slopes on In the Osmangazi District

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.21 State of dense urban areas spread on steep slopes In the Osmangazi District

zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.22 Situation of dense urban areas on the steep slope of Osmangazi District

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Source: JST

Figure 4.3.23 Mosque on the steep slope of Osmangazi District

- In a large earthquake or heavy rain, there is a risk of slope collapse and landslide in steep slope areas. In addition, in a large earthquake, there is a risk that the buildings could collapse, and evacuation routes and relief supply routes become clogged. And, there is also a danger of fire.

- At present, the number of roads that can be used for emergency supplies and evacuation routes is limited. If there is some blockage of the road, considerable time is required before recovery. Therefore, there is a large possibility that the dense urban areas on the slope will be isolated.

- Open space adequate for refuge cannot be found within these areas. There are open spaces around the mosque, etc., and a children's small park next to the mosque. However, the area of the open spaces is not sufficiently secured. There is not enough space for relief activities such as distribution of relief supplies to the victims and evacuation of residents of the surrounding urban area.

- On the other hand, it may be possible to improve urban safety while promoting the renovation of the mosque, etc.

(2) Reference in Japan:

In Japan, it takes a considerable time to improve dense urban areas that have wooden buildings. "The extremely dangerous and dense urban areas during an earthquake, etc." Among the dense urban areas, evacuation difficulties and risk is particularly high in a disaster, there is a possibility of loss of the evacuation route due to road closure or large fire. Because of the amount of lives and property in dense urban areas, safety is extremely difficult although critical to ensure, and improvements of these areas should be a priority. Among those that the National government recognizes as dense urban areas in steep slope areas, there are examples of efforts for Nagasaki, in Nagasaki Prefecture and Onomichi, in Hiroshima Prefecture. There are the following basic measures:

- Fireproofing and earthquake resistance of buildings

- Ensuring evacuation routes (emergency roads)Ensuring open space which is the shelter and evacuation place

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- Promoting the awareness of the residents (Residents are informed of the nature of the risk)

In addition to those measures, if a public building became vacant in these Japanese prefectures it was demolished and developed as a public square or other component along the concept of DMC.

1) Measures in Nagasaki

In Nagasaki, about 70% of the urban area is on a steep slope. Most of the streets in the steep area are steep and narrow (1-2m wide) with staircases, and houses are very concentrated. In these steep areas, there are not enough roads that allow vehicle access. The specifications for the following areas have established. Steep slope collapse danger zone Landslide prevention area Fire danger forecast area, other Disaster prevention measures based on the zoning (Disaster Prevention Projects, etc.) have been developed. For this reason, transport equipment (South Oura area) such as simplified inclined elevators have been developed in five locations in the city. (In, stepped road, 3 locations)) Even the elderly and disabled can move safely and in comfortwith this new means of transportation.

Source：Nagasaki city

Figure 4.3.24 Mini monorail installation in Nagasaki

Mizunoura district (suspension type) "Mizudori-go"

Glover-en (land-based)

· Capacity: 2 people ride • Speed: 15m / min - Can carry a wheelchair

Mizudori-go: can carry a folded wheelchair Glover-en: Available remains wheelchair ride

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey 2) Measures case of Onomichi

Onomichi is a port city that was developed as a commercial port a long time ago. (JR Sanyo Line currently) Sanyo railway was developed in the Meiji era. Thus the area has developed as a hub of shipping and rail. There are many historic remains in the town. On the other hand, it is less flat along the coastline. Due to its topographical characteristics the urban area has expanded to the sloped areas. Therefore, there are many steep and narrow roads, and stairs. Maintenance of the living environment has become an issue. In the sloped part of the city, there is no willingness for rebuilding the housing. Currently, houses cannot be rebuilt. Therefore, a house usually becomes vacant after the residents leave. A number of vacant houses are gradually aging. Therefore, the risk of collapse of the house has increased. In addition, management of vacant houses is insufficient, which increases the danger of fire and crime and this is spreading. As a result, the entire district became the image of devastation. It was a situation where the outflow of population proceeds further, and the number of vacant houses continues to increase. So, the city has introduced measures to increase the value of the region by effectively utilizing the vacant land or vacant houses. Efforts for community regeneration that take advantage of the empty houses and the management of vacant slopes have been carried out.

In addition, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.21, areas prone to landslides are published on a Web site. As a result, it is encouraging disaster reduction activities and awareness of the residents. Shelters are displayed on the map. In this way, the path is updated on a daily basis and made available to residents so that they know where to evacuate in the event of a disaster. As shelters, a high school existing, elementary school, Working Youth Home, lifelong learning center, community center, and green space have been used.

Source: Hiroshima Prefecture Disaster Prevention Web

Figure 4.3.25 Hazard Map Created and Published by Hiroshima prefecture (Enlarged view of a part of Onomichi range)

(3) Proposals:

On the basis of the above-mentioned case of Japan, urban environmental improvement measures for dense urban areas with steep slopes in Osumangazi District are proposed below to ensure both convenience during normal times and the safety of the city in a disaster.

Landslide hazard Debris flow

Debris flow danger mountain stream Damage is assumed area

Debris flow: Phenomenon due to heavy rain ad, and sediment intention of mountains and rivers flows vigorously together with the water

Steep terrain Steep slope collapse hazard Damage is assumed area

Steep slope collapse: In the influence of rain, snowmelt, such as an earthquake, a phenomenon that slope collapse rapidly

Landslide

Landslide hazard

Damage is assumed area

Landslide: Snowmelt and rain to wet-out into the basement. Phenomenon that is sliding out slope intermittently

Other Shelter

Heavy rain warning, alarm and special alarm

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Source: JST

Figure 4.3.26 A proposal for improvement of urban steep slopes in Osmangazi District

With the aim to strengthen the performance of disaster prevention at the community level, the following proposals have been made in particular.

1) Improvement of the road network

From the general urban area, access roads leading to the sloped built-up areas must be made available to allow adequate passage of emergency vehicles, even if there is a disabled car parked temporarily on the road. In order to expand the width and increase the traffic speed, the roads should be as linear as possible. This would make it possible to increase the capacity and smooth the traffic flow. In addition, a new round road that is accessible from above the slope in the urban area on the slope is proposed to be put in place. Existing roads on the slope within the existing urban area is better to be connected as much as possible to eliminate dead end roads.

2) DMC development at the community level

The DMC at the community level shelters nearby residents, would act as a distribution center for relief supplies, etc. Also it would receive information from various quarters that is transmitted to the management center of the District by aggregating the status of the disaster site, process incoming information, and transmit outgoing information. It should also have an open space of a certain scale, a meeting place that can accommodate nearby residents that have evacuated, supply equipment warehouses, and communication facilities. It is desirable for the community level DMC to have the important points mentioned above in conjunction with the open space along with the development of new roads. Further, as described below, the community level DMC could consider utilizing the existing peripheral mosques.

3) Development of community center based in Külliye

There is a complex tradition called Külliye in Turkey, on which the mosque is centered.

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It is a group of welfare facilities such as schools, medical facilities, dining rooms, and baths, gathered around the mosque. Külliye means General, kull in Arabic. Meeting facilities and an open space were developed in the vicinity of the existing mosque following the Külliye tradition. In normal times, this is used as a community center. In a disaster it is used as a community level DMC distribution center for relief supplies such as shelter.

Source: JST

Figure 4.3.27 A Külliye that plays a community center function (Yildirim, Beyazit, Camii, Bursa)

4) To develop a transport system for the sloped urban area

A transport system can be introduced to help the logistics and transportation of people and goods on the slope in the city. Practical application of a slope car or mini monorail is advancing in Japan. It is conceivable to take advantage of this technology. The slope car or mini monorail, network should be created as a base in the community level

DMC. The transportation system is used as a means of transport in normal times. And in the event of a disaster, it is utilized to transport emergency relief supplies, and also the transport of the sick or injured. The facility is made for that purpose. An emergency power source (generator) is installed. It is possible to travel even in the event of a power failure.

Yildirim,Beyazit,

Camii

Clinic

Park

Tomb

School

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Source: Kita city, Tokyo

Figure 4.3.28 Reference case of mini monorail "Asuka Pearl Rail Asukarugo" (16-seater, Kita-ku, Tokyo Asukayama Park)

4.3.9. Proposal for supply chain improvement of industrial parks (1) General condition of Turkey’s economy and the industry of Bursa

The Turkish economy has shown remarkable performance with its steady growth, as the GDP more than tripled from 231 billion USD in 2002 to 786 billion USD in 2012 and the GDP per capita soared from 3,500 USD to 10,504 USD in the same period. The visible improvements in the Turkish economy have also boosted foreign trade, with exports increasing from 36 billion USD in 2002 to 153 billion USD in 2012. Significant improvements in such a short period of time have registered Turkey on the world economic scale as an exceptional emerging economy, the 17th largest economy in the world and the 7th largest economy when compared with the EU countries, according to GDP figures in 2012. Turkey had a vision to become one of the top 10 economies in world by 2013

2 .

The province of Bursa is ranked sixth in Turkey according to the Socio-Economic Development Ranking Survey of Provinces and Regions (SEGE) by the Ministry of Development

3. Bursa has

become an important province responsible for socio-economic development in the country

In the 1970s, the Turkish government made it a priority to attract Renault S.A.S. (French automobile manufacturer) and FIAT (Italian automobile manufacturer) factory to develop the

2 IMF World Economic Outlook Databases Oct. 2013, Investment Support and Promotion Agency, Turkey Prime

Ministry, WB 3 UNDP in Turkey, Note: In SEGE-2011, 61 variables, mostly from the years 2009 and 2010, in 8 subcategories

were used. These variables touch upon demographics, education, health, employment, competitive and innovative capacity, financial capacity, accessibility, and quality of life. The top ten provinces are 1. Istanbul, 2. Ankara, 3. Izmir, 4. Kocaeli, 5. Antalya, 6. Bursa, 7. Eskisehir, 8. Mugla, 9. Tekirdag, and 10. Denizli

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automotive industry in Bursa. In addition, manufacturers of automobile parts established factories around the Renault S.A.S. and FIAT factories, and thus developing the industrial area involved in automobile manufacturing in Bursa. Currently, according to the Automotive Manufacturers Association in Turkey, one million automobiles were produced in Turkey in 2012, and 730,000 of which for export; the resulting profit was approximately 20 billion USD. In addition, the textile industry of silk such as traditional also prosperous, Bursa is one of the important industrial areas in Turkey.

(2) General situation of the industrial parks in Bursa

There are 13 industrial parks in Bursa and an additional eight industrial parks are planned for development in the near future. As of 2013, BURSA OSB (46,184 employees) and DOSAB Demirtas (41,094 employees) are the largest industrial parks in Bursa. Another 11 industrial parks have 200 to 18,000 employees. BURSA OSB industrial park has OYAK RENAULT (the joint venture of Renault and OYAK financial group in Turkey), DOSAB industrial park has TOFAŞ (the joint venture of FIAT and Koç Holding in Turkey) and a bus factory. Automobiles and textiles are the main industries in Bursa. For the future, there are construction plans for eight additional industrial parks for factories such as leather factories and painting material factories. In the past, the industrial parks had been developed without a strategic plan. However, recently, industrial parks have been developed strategically by the sector.

Table 4.3.3 Industrial parks in Bursa

District

OSB

Directorate

Total Area (ha)

Total Industrial Area (ha)

Num

ber of total em

ployment

NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL PARCELS Parcels with technical

infrastructure and Social Equipage

Total Num

ber of Parcels

Occupied Parcel Empty Parcels (Land)

Total Industrial Parcels

In Production

Out of

Production

1 Osmangazi

Bursa OSB

679 458 46.184 254 8 30 292 171 463

2 Osmangazi

Demirtas 484 382 41.094 291 10 47 348 35 383

3 Nilufer Nilfufer 234 136 18.386 253 6 32 291 22 313 4 Gursu Gursu 101 71 6.014 67 11 46 124 21 145 5 Nilfuer Hasanag

a 104.54 76.66 3.659 66 8 20 94 26 120

6 Nilfuer Deri 177 63.93 800 32 15 90 137 24 120 7 Kestel Kestel 73.43 59.44 5.000 73 0 21 94 7 101 8 Inegol Inegol 274.5 221.2 13.000 101 7 0 108 14 122 9 M.K.Pasa M.K.Pasa 220 126 345 14 18 31 63 11 74 10 Yenisehir Yenisehir 173.58 73.42 1.098 2 0 0 2 0 2 11 Inegol Mobilya 675 445 1.000 8 1 272 281 20 301 12 M.K.Pasa Mermer 80 42 200 0 0 32 32 6 38 13 Nilfuer Tekstil 204 131 0 0 0 69 69 19 88

Source: Bursa Governorship Provincial Directorate of Science, Industry and Technology

Eight additional industrial areas which are planned are: Akgalar, Kayapa, Gali, Baskoy-Gorukle, Kestel2, Barakfakih-icestel, Inegol Cerrah, and Inegol Yenice. The locations of existing industrial parks in Bursa Province are shown in the figure below. The ○ number corresponds to the numbers in the above table.

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Figure 4.3.29 Map of Industrial Parks in Bursa

DOSAB Demirtas Industrial Park (USD 150 million capital) has 414 private companies (total of 41,094 employees) and is the second largest Industrial Park in Bursa. The percentages of products of the main factories are textile factories (70%), auto parts factories (20%), and plastic and other factories (10%). The production in the DOSAB industrial parks is approximately 4.0 billion USD per year, due to the big production of the TOFAŞ factory (7,000 employees). There are firefighting facilities in the industrial park, and the management of infrastructure facilities such as electricity, gas and water supply has been centralized and lines were installed underground. There is also a clinic onsite. In addition, DOSAB is a model of an advanced industrial park in Turkey, mainly due to its natural gas power plant.

Figure 4.3.3 Map of DOSAB Demirtas Industrial park

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey (3) Disaster Management in the industrial park

Newly constructed factory buildings follow the earthquake-resistance standards, and they are single-story buildings. Handling of hazardous materials such as gas, chemicals, and toxic substances is managed by the provisions of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. These provisions have become stricter and require an inspection of the containers every two or three months. In addition, fire drills are carried out at a similar interval in the DOSAB.

(4) The importance of disaster preparedness in the industrial area from the experience of Japan

In the Great East Japan Earthquake, a variety of production and distribution resources, such as transportation infrastructure of ports, airports, etc., factory, logistics and distribution facilities, transport vehicles, containers, etc., were affected at the same time. Because the supply of various materials and parts was interrupted, the impact on the manufacturing businesses extended widely and over the whole country and foreign countries. In addition, a fire occurred as a secondary disaster in a factory that handles nitrogen. It had a major impact on the transportation network, but in the recovery phase, routes to the affected areas were connected like "comb teeth" to the main road. The advantage of having access from several arterial roads in the event of disaster was recognized again. With regard to the export of the manufactured products in Bursa, the ratio of the container shipping is 85% of the transport by sea through the Gemlik port and 15% of the transport by land through Istanbul. Therefore, regarding transport from the factory, the stakeholders have recognized that the main road to Gemlik port is very important. However, currently, there is only one main road from Bursa center to Gemlik. If the road is disrupted by a disaster, serious traffic disturbance is expected when using the narrow detour. Other EU countries have taken measures to prepare alternative routes for the main roads. In addition, there is no particular relationship between AFAD and the industrial park, and guidance and disaster preparedness planning is not carried out in the industrial park. Therefore, we would like to recommend the following proposal.

(5) Proposal for disaster prevention at the industrial park

1) Assessment of Supply Chain and Logistic Route

Prepare to create the disaster preparedness plan by assessing the supply chain and logistic route status from each factory to Gemlik port and to Istanbul or Ankara by land.

2) Creation of Sustainable Supply Chain and Logistic Plan and Manual

Create a plan and manual for securing the supply chain and logistic route in a disaster.

3) Assessment of industrial area in terms of disaster management, and improvement

Create a disaster preparedness plan for each factory.

4) Support creation of BCP plans at the industrial park

Create a Business continuity plan (BCP) for each industrial park.

5) Introduction of the Fast Response Equipment against Quake Load (FREQL) system

FREQL has a combined alarm and sensor function. This system gives an alert as soon as it senses an earthquake, without waiting for the information from the state. It is expected that BCP measures for a factory can be begun more quickly and minimize the impact on production

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activities. Further, it will help to minimize the effects of secondary disasters in a factory that is handling gases, chemicals, and toxins.

It is expected to reduce interrupting the factory production and supply chain in the event of a disaster, and will reduce the impact on the economy by applying the above proposed measures.

4.4. Proposed Disaster Healthcare Services in Bursa

4.4.1. The present state of disaster healthcare services (1) Disaster healthcare systems

1) Organizational system

a. Ministry of Health (MOH)

- The General Directorate of Emergency Health Service of the MOH is responsible for disaster measures in the health services in Turkey. More specifically, the Department of Disaster and Emergency Management takes disaster preparedness and response measures.

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Source: http://ashgm.saglik.gov.tr/belge/1-15828/teskilat-semasi.html

Figure 4.4.1 Organization chart of the General Directorate of Emergency Health Service

Tasks of the General Directorate of Emergency Health Service

- Coordination and provision of emergency health services during and after disasters in Turkey

- Assistance to humanitarian aid bodies during and after disasters outside Turkey

- Supply of telecommunication equipment, medical supplies, and healthcare equipment during and after disasters, and formulation of storage plans

Tasks of the Department of Disaster and Emergency Management

- Surveys on health service delivery needs during and after disasters, and formulation of disaster preparedness healthcare plans to respond to the needs

- Operation of SAKOM1 24 hours a day

- Gathering and assessment of information during and after disasters from SAKOM and other entities, and information sharing with governmental administrations if necessary

- Recruitment, training, and supervision of UMKE4 members, and provision of healthcare

1 SAKOM: Health Disaster Coordination Center

DEPUTY OF

DISATER AND EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

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materials and equipment necessary for activities of UMKE

- Provision of psychological and social care to UMKE members and international aid personnel during and after disasters

- Planning of response to chemical, biological and radiological disasters b. Bursa Governorate

- In the Province of Bursa, the Provincial Directorate of Health is responsible for disaster preparedness. Personnel of the directorate are from the central government’s MOH, but the directorate is affiliated with the Bursa Governorate.

c. Bursa Metropolitan Municipality

- In the Bursa metropolitan municipality, the Disaster Coordination Center (AKOM) founded within the Fire Fighting Department is responsible for disaster measures. It undertakes no specific activities in healthcare but works together with the Bursa Governorate and the Provincial Directorate of Health in times of disasters.

2) Disaster medical plan

a. AFAD Disaster plan for all sectors

AFAD formulated the Turkey Disaster Action Plan which covers all sectors in the country. The plan defines disaster management measures taken by each organization. As for health services, it refers to the mutual backup system among the UMKE teams in each region.

b. Organizations in charge of disaster management in health services and their tasks

The MOH takes the initiative in the management of disaster health services with the collaboration of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Food Stock, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Turkish Red Crescent, citizen groups and private companies. Their tasks include:

- Installation of temporary healthcare facilities (healthcare tents, etc.) and supply of necessary equipment during and after disasters

- Supply of personnel, equipment, and materials to afflicted areas

- Provision of triage and first-aid in afflicted areas

- Isolation of patients to prevent spreading infectious diseases

- Elimination of risk factors related to the environment and water quality, including prevention of infectious diseases

- Prevention of risks factors that may arise in the event of poor environment and water sanitation

- Acquisition of information held by regional blood transfusion centers, and improvement of their capacity

4 UMKE: Ulusal Medikal Kurtarma Ekibi, known as the National Medical Rescue Team in English

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- Acquisition of information held by hospitals and examination centers across the country, and improvement of their capacity

- Preventive measures against infectious diseases and hazardous substances at checkpoints near the national boundary

- Statistics of the number of injured and sick people c. Disaster medical plan of the MOH

The General Directorate of Emergency Health Services of the MOH is formulating disaster medical plans for the entire country. The Study Team requested the ministry to disclose information about these plans but has not obtained it yet.

d. Guidelines issued by the MOH for provincial disaster medical plans

The General Directorate of Emergency Health Service of the MOH issued guidelines for provincial disaster medical plans (including planning formats) in 2010, and the Provincial Directorates of Health are required to formulate their disaster medical plans according to the guidelines.

e. Disaster medical plans at the provincial level The MOH requests the provinces to formulate their disaster medical plans.

- The “Implementation Directive of province-based disaster and emergency plans” published on August 27, 2013, by the General Directorate of Emergency Health Services of the MOH requires the Provincial Directorates of Health to formulate their own provincial disaster medical plans.

f. Summary of the “Implementation Directive of province-based disaster and emergency plans”

The Provincial Directorates of Health will:

- formulate emergency health plans;

- update their plans on March 15 every year. They are required to submit their first plan on March 15, 2014;

- Demonstrate their plans indoors in the second week of May and on the field in the second week of October every year; and

- Include their roles as backup provinces (referred to as “Emergency Health Service Region”) in their plans.

The MOH will provide training necessary to execute these plans.

Bursa Governorate: The Study Team requested the Bursa Provincial Directorate of Health to disclose information about their disaster medical plan but has not obtained it yet.

g. Hospitals in the Province of Bursa under the management of the MOH

All hospitals in Turkey have been required to formulate hospital disaster plans since 2008, and hospitals in Bursa prepare their disaster plans under the instruction of the Association of Bursa Public Hospitals (regional organization of the Association of Turkey Public Hospitals affiliated to the MOH). Hospitals use a format standardized under a WHO project, which includes responses to disasters and risk management to prevent disasters (education and training of staff members, furniture and fixtures fall prevention, securing of evacuation routes, etc.). Hospitals are also required to set forth in detail fall-prevention measures for non-structural members and equipment. Although legally required, many hospitals comply with the standards stipulated by the Kandilli Observatory in the Boğaziçi University and the

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standards approved by the JCI when preparing their disaster plans. Moreover, they are required to have the ability to decontaminate chemical, biological and radiological substances (including radiological substances from nuclear power stations and nuclear weapons, and substances that are normally used). According to a directive of the Prime Minister’s Office and the MOH (issued in October 2009), hospitals were required to have these functions operational by 2012, but only some hospitals have managed to do so (including the Şevket Hospital). Hospitals are also required to conduct emergency drills twice or more (including at least one actual training session) each year according to their disaster plans.

(Source: Meeting with Hacettepe University staff on 9.10.2013)

(2) The present emergency healthcare cooperation system in Turkey

1) Emergency Health Services Region

The General Directorate of Emergency Health Services of the MOH divided the country into 21 emergency health regions according to population, access to hospitals, and available health services. It also stipulated that, according to the impact of disasters, regions mutually shall help and provide each other with necessary personnel and materials.

- Definitions of damage levels

1. Large scale disaster (S3 and S4): Case where two or more provinces in a region cannot handle the disaster on their own.

2. Medium scale disaster (S2): Case where one province in a region cannot handle the disaster on its own.

3. Medium scale disaster (S1): Case where damage is limited to a certain area of one province.

- Response system from bodies outside the affected region, based on damage level

S4: backup regions of the 1st degree and 2nd degree, aid from the national government, and international aid

Figure 4.4.1 Emergency Health Service Region

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S3: backup regions of the 1st degree and 2nd degree and if necessary, aid from the national government

S2: backup regions of the 1st degree

S1: no need of backup aid from other regions

2) Backup regions for individual provinces

The following maps illustrate backup regions of Istanbul and Bursa, respectively. In the same fashion, each province has its own backup regions.

Red: afflicted area, Yellow: backup region 1st degree, Blue: backup region 2nd degree

Istanbul Bursa

Source: JST prepared based on Health Statistics Yearbook 2011(MOH)

Figure 4.4.3 Backup Regions

3) Role of the Provincial Directorate of Health in Bursa

The Provincial Directorate of Health in Bursa is designated as playing a leading role in Emergency Health Region 17. As stated in the previous section, if a disaster occurs in Bursa, regions in yellow or blue provide the province with assistance. Similarly, if these regions are affected by a disaster, the Province of Bursa offers assistance. According to Figure 4.4.3, the Province of Bursa will give assistance if any disaster or emergency arises in the following regions:

Region 14. (KOCAELI, SAKARYA, DUZCE); Region 15. (ESKIEEHIR, BILECIK, KUTAHYA, AFYONKARAHISAR); Region 18.(IZMIR, MANISA, USAK); Region 20. (EDIRNE, KIRKLARELI, TEKIRDAG); or Region 21. (ISTANBUL).

4) Disaster Medical Plan by the Turkish Red Crescent

The Turkish Red Crescent has blood centers and disaster management centers with a total of over 700 branches in 81 provinces across the country. Its Disaster Management Directorate, nine regional disaster management bureaus (BAYM), 23 rural disaster management divisions (YAYS), and AFOM (Disaster Coordination Center) provide humanitarian support activities at times of disasters. The Turkish Red Crescent has established a disaster logistics system with regional disaster management logistics centers across the country in preparation for and response to disasters. Its disaster response system is well organized with the nationwide network. Efforts of the Turkish Red Crescent for disaster medical service are summarized in Appendix A-6.

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Source: http://afetyonetimi.kizilay.org.tr/Default.aspx

Figure 4.4.4 Locations of the Turkish Red Crescent Disaster Management Centers

(3) Disaster management chain of command

At the time of a disaster, AFAD makes a report on the situation of the disaster and formulates a specific action plan in collaboration with the SACOM of the MOH, other disaster management organizations of ministries and agencies, and regional organizations. Specific activities are performed according to an emergency disaster management plan formulated by AFAD. Until AFAD was founded, the Disaster Coordination Center (AKOM) used to be a part of the Fire Fighting Department of the Metropolitan Municipality and was giving instructions concerning disaster management. In 2009 when AFAD was founded, the AKOM was placed under AFAD and has engaged in disaster management activities only under the supervision of AFAD. In the Province of Bursa, to avoid any confusion, signboards of AKOM are no longer used at the premises of the Fire Fighting Department.

SAKOM

The Health Disaster Coordination Center (SAKOM) is affiliated with the Deputy of Disaster and Emergency Management of the General Directorate of Emergency Health Service of the MOH, and its Disaster Management Center, launched in 2009, collaborates with relevant organizations and afflicted areas in times of disasters.

When a disaster occurs, the local 112 Command Control Center responds to it and, depending on the scale of the disaster, the SAKOM works with various directorates of the MOH, armed forces, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Communication & Information, Ministry of Environment & Urbanism, AFAD, Red Crescent, international organizations and other parties to to provide emergency healthcare services in affected areas.

● ：Regional Disaster Management Directorate (BAYM) ●：Local Disaster Management Chieftaincies (YAYS)

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Source: Schematic by SARMaster System of SAKOM, MOH

Figure 4.4.5 Coordination between SAKOM and Organizations Concerned

The Central SAKOM in Ankara works together with the AKOM of the Ministry of Interior at the time of disasters. All provinces have their provincial SAKOM, which are comprehensively controlled by the Central SAKOM. Only four provincial SAKOMs (in Istanbul, Sakarya, Bursa and Izmir provinces), as well as the Central SAKOM in Ankara, are active in normal times. However during a disaster, provincial SAKOMs are required to engage in disaster management depending on the level of the disaster and necessity even if they are non-active at normal times. The Provincial SAKOM is staffed by members of the Provincial Directorate of Health and is given necessary equipment by the General Directorate of Emergency Health Service of the MOH. The Provincial SAKOM has several responsibilities during disasters including: reporting to the Central SAKOM on the extent of damage seen in the province, sharing information with relevant organizations, specifying triage hospitals, dispatching UMKE volunteers, and establishing temporary emergency healthcare facilities.

Disaster response is conducted at three levels: (i) provincial level, (ii) response including the relevant region, and (iii) national level, and the SAKOM coordinates specific actions for disaster response, while AFAD makes decisions on the level of disaster response. The National Earthquake Strategy and Action Plan of AFAD states three matters for which the MOH is responsible. The SAKOM is responsible for two of the three matters: updating of provincial and hospital Disaster Plans, and improving and enhancing transportation means in times of disasters. The remaining matter, improvements in hospital systems, is assigned to the Health Investment General Directorate.

The SAKOM in Ankara engages in the following activities at normal times.

- In 2010, the Central SAKOM in Ankara introduced the SAR Master Search and Rescue System, which monitors the number of emergency patients, number of patients transported, and the number of available beds at all the public, private and military hospitals and their departments, and displays information on a map. The map is updated every five minutes. The system also manages activities of the 112 Command and Control Centers and displays the movements of the 4,000 ambulances across the country on the map.

- There are 17 emergency helicopters, which are used in 15 provinces and monitored by a tracking system to control long-distance transportation of patients.

- The system monitors the status of earthquakes on screen; the information about earthquakes in Turkey arrives from the earthquake observation center of Bogazici University

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in Istanbul and AFAD. It uses a system different from the system at AFAD, but they share information with each other, if necessary.

Source: Picture taken by JST(Upper ) SAKOM Webpage（Lower）

Figure 4.4.6 Information center of SAKOM

1) Information system of the SAKOM

As telecommunication devices in disasters and emergencies, the Central SAKOM is equipped with video remote communication systems, high-frequency radio, satellite telephones, facsimiles and ordinary telephones. Thus, even if it has a bad telephone connection, it can connect emergency dial (112) through the high-frequency radio.

The Central SAKOM uses GPS to learn the locations of UMKE members and ambulances and arrange them in disasters and emergencies. UMKE members and ambulances are given an electronic device enabling instant messages, voice mails, 112 calls, and GPS locators. Through this system, the locations of callers/message senders are shared by 112 Command and Control Center.

Source：Website of General Directorate of Emergency Health Service, MOH

Figure 4.4.7 Information system of SAKOM

According to interviews with officials of the Bursa Provincial Directorate of Health on October 3, 2013, the Provincial SAKOM has a system linked to the 112 system and hospitals through the Internet to find vacancies in intensive care units, CT and bedrooms at each hospital. If the

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system goes down because of a disaster or other reason, Provincial SAKOM in the neighboring provinces and regions support the Provincial SAKOM in trouble.

2) 112 Command and Control Centers

Emergency calls (112) are answered at the local 112 Command and Control Centers, where resident doctors assess the state of the patient based on the information provided on the phone. If deemed necessary by the doctors, staff members make arrangement for a 112 Ambulance Station to take the patient and issue an order to send emergency personnel. Some 112 Ambulance Stations always have local doctors who work shifts upon the order of the Bursa Provincial Health Bureau. 112 Ambulance Stations are classified into four types – A1, A2, B and C – in terms of whether or not they operate on 24-hour schedules, whether or not doctors are always stationed, and other factors. 112 Ambulance Stations are built so that each covers 50,000 inhabitants and in consideration of traffic conditions, time required for transportation and other local factors. In the Province of Bursa, there are a total of 52 112 Ambulance Stations (28 stations in the 3 metropolitan districts – Osmangazi, Yıldırım and Nilufer – and 24 stations in other districts), some of which are located on the premises of hospitals. 112 Command and Control Centers are also responsible for coordination of regions, provinces and cities outside Bursa which can offer support to the Province of Bursa. (A 110 call is for the fire department.) They arrange ambulances within 10 minutes of a 112 call receipt for 90% of all calls.

The Provincial Directorates of Health manage ambulances other than those owned by the Ministry of National Defense. They also manage ambulance crews other than those owned by the Ministry of National Defense.

The Command and Control Centers, ambulance stations, ambulance personnel and staff members communicate with each other by radio. In disasters and emergencies, they use a special frequency for 112 calls. They also have special communication devices for marine and air rescue.

In the Province of Bursa, emergency helicopters, which are owned by contracted private companies are available in Osmangazi; no public hospital owns a helicopter. In 2013, helicopters were used for patient transportation 293 times. Since Bursa is the center of the Marmara Region, quite a few patients are sent to Bursa from the region.

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Source: JST prepared based on documents from Provincial directorate of health in Bursa

Figure 4.4.8 112 Ambulance Stations in Bursa

3) UMKE (in Turkish, or the National Medical Rescue Team in English)

The UMKE is a team undertaking rescue activities in afflicted areas during and after disasters. It is affiliated with the General Directorate of Emergency Health Service of the MOH and there is a UMKE center that has established its own independent office within one of the hospital premises at each province. Persons with certain qualifications can join the team after receiving training and registering at the MOH. (Since they are on a voluntary basis, members engage in their own works in normal circumstances.) According to interviews with officials of the Bursa Provincial Directorate of Health on October 3, 2013, the UMKE comprises medical doctors, nurses, officers of 112 centers and other personnel, and members are normally available within 30-45 minutes after being called. The UMKE trains their personnel at the civil defense training facilities of the AKOM and AFAD.

Each Provincial Directorate of Health has staff members qualified as UMKE members. In the event of a disaster, officers of the directorate form a disaster unit to supervise the UMKE in the afflicted area, and the leader of the disaster unit serves as a leader of the UMKE. Working together with the Provincial SAKOM, the disaster unit gives instructions and supervises the UMKE, and provides the UMKE with necessary equipment. If there is a shortage of UMKE members, officers of the Provincial Directorate who are qualified as UMKE members are mobilized, too.

A total of 6,000 people in Turkey are registered as UMKE members and Ankara has 600 of them.

The UMKE uses radio contacts via mobile vehicles and personal devices, and GPS-mounted electronic devices of SAKOM as communications means.

Yıldırım 631,482 9,867 7Osmangazi 792,219 1,664 15Nilüfer 339,667 685 6Gürsu 64,144 583 1Gemlik 101,257 269 3Mudanya 75,344 226 2İnegöl 229,812 223 3Orhangazi 75,076 125 2Kestel 48,490 113 2Yenişehir 51,837 66 2Karacabey 79,757 61 2İznik 43,425 59 1Mustafakemalpaşa 99,994 57 2Orhaneli 22,470 28 1Büyükorhan 11,969 23 1Keles 13,876 21 1Harmancık 7,352 18 1Bursa Province 2,688,171 247 52

PopulationDensity(/km2)

Number of112 StationPopulationDistrict NameWaiting Position of

Helicopter

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Source: Picture taken by JST

Figure 4.4.9 UMKE Center in Bursa (located in Yuksek Ihtisas Hospital)

Source: http://www.acilafet.gov.tr/UMKE/

Figure 4.4.10 Command Chain of UMKE

Table 4.4.1 UMKE members

OCCUPATION NUMBER PERCENTAGE DOCTOR 723 31% NURSE 562 24%

MEDICAL OFFICER 640 27% EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIAN 193 8%

ANESTHESIA TECHNICIAN 54 2% LABORATORY TECHNICIAN 35 1%

OTHER 176 7% TOTAL 2383 100%

Source: http://www.acilafet.gov.tr/UMKE/

Basic training curriculum and advanced training courses for UMKE members are shown in Appendix-7.

Vice manager in charge of disaster and emergency

City Health Authority

UMKE Dispatch

Disaster site SACOM

112 stations112 command and control centers

Disaster Unit（Control UMKE)

Bureau of health service of disaster and emergency

Chief of city ambulance service

Provincial MoH（Permanent） To be established In case of Disaster

Afflicted site SAKOM

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey (4) Healthcare service system in Turkey

1) Number of medical institutions and beds (by type of founder, region, etc.)

The number of medical institutions, excluding outpatient institutions, has been increasing in Turkey, totaling 1,453 in 2011. By type of founder, the number of MOH hospitals is the largest, accounting for 58% of all, followed by private hospitals (35%) and university hospitals (4%). Other hospitals account for 3%, including municipal hospitals and social insurance union hospitals (Table 4.4.2).

Both the numbers of medical institutions and patients have been increasing, but it seems that the increase in the number of patients outstrips that of medical facilities. While the number of patients has been increasing, the growth rates of the number of medical institutions and that of beds, compared to the figures in 2006, were 121% and 112%, respectively, in 2011. The growth rates of the numbers of inpatients and outpatients over the same period were both approximately 150%, showing the gap in the growth rates of the numbers of patients and medical institutions (Figure 4.4.11). Accordingly, the number of patients per bed increased about 15 from 2006 to 2011, and the total number of patients per medical institution increased 53,000 (Table 4.4.3). The medical demand in the Provinces of Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa and elsewhere with high population rates is expected to continue to be high over the years to come.

Table 4.4.2 Changes in the number of hospitals (2006-2011)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

No. of

Hospitals

Ratio No. of

Hospitals

Ratio No. of

Hospitals

Ratio No. of

Hospitals

Ratio No. of

Hospitals

Ratio No. of

Hospitals

Ratio

(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)

Total 1,203 100 1,317 100 1,350 100 1,389 100 1,439 100 1,453 100

MOH 767 63 849 64 847 63 834 60 843 59 840 58

University

56 4 56 4 57 4 59 4 62 4 65 4

Private 365 29 365 28 400 30 450 32 489 34 503 35

Others 49 4 48 4 46 3 46 3 45 3 45 3

Source: MOH Health Statistics Yearbook 2011

Source: prepared based on MOH Health Statistics Yearbook 2011

Figure 4.4.11 Increase rate of number of hospitals and patients in Turkey from 2006 to 2011

No. of hospitals

No. of inpatients (1,000)

No. of inpatients per bed

No. of beds

No. of outpatients (1,000)

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Table 4.4.3 Changes in number of hospitals, beds and patients (2006-2011)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

No. of hospitals 1,203 1,317 1,350 1,389 1,439 1,453

No. of

beds

MOH 110,819 112,037 114,428 115,443 120,180 121,297 University 31,193 30,978 29,912 30,112 35,001 34,802 Private 14,639 17,397 20,983 25,178 28,063 31,648 Others 17,691 17,588 17,905 17,905 16,995 6,757 Total 174,342 178,000 183,183 188,638 200,239 194,504

No. of inpatients (1,000) 7,689 8,720 9,684 9,902 10,528 11,437

No. of outpatients (1,000) 217,540 249,141 273,703 295,262 302,984 337,850

Ratio of the No. of annual inpatients over the No. of beds

44.1 49.0 52.9 52.5 52.6 58.8

No. of inpatients per hospital (1,000) 187.2 195.8 209.9 219.7 217.9 240.4

2) Classification of medical institutions by type of founder, function and size

Hospitals in Turkey are classifiable into “university hospitals”, “national hospitals (MOH)”, “private hospitals” and a small number of “municipal hospitals” and other hospitals (including military hospitals). There is no “national center” equivalent to national cancer centers or cardiovascular centers that are common in Japan. In this sense, Turkish hospitals do not form any functional pyramid. A referral system is available but does not work properly, so patients tend to concentrate in general hospitals.

By function, there are maternal and child medical care centers, heart disease centers and other hospitals specializing in particular functions, as well as “general hospitals”. Quite a few national and private hospitals have centers specializing in particular functions on the same premises (hospital complexes).

3) Healthcare Personnel (doctors, nurses, medical engineers, etc.)

a. Number of healthcare personnel

In Turkey, the absolute number of both doctors and nurses is much fewer than that in other countries. As of 2011, the number of doctors and nurses per 1,000 patients was approximately 1.7, whereas the figures in other countries are commonly between four and eight. In 2006, however, the number of outpatients per doctor was 4.6, which was lower than that in other countries. In 2008, the figure outnumbered that in the U.K., increasing to 6.3, more or less the same as the number in France. This was because the number of patients in Turkey is relatively fewer than other countries, but Turkey's population will certainly increase in the future while the population will age with the decreasing number of children. This suggests that the number of patients will sharply increase in future, unless the number of doctors increases at the same rate, which is currently not the case. In fact, the number of doctors per 1,000 persons increased from about 1.1 doctors in 2002 to about 1.5 doctors in 2008, but the number of patients per doctor almost doubled from about 2.6 patients in 2002 to 6.3 patients in 2008 (Table 4.4.4).

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Table 4.4.4 Number of health care workers per 1,000 inhabitants in major OECD countries (2002-2011)

No. of doctors per 1,000 people No. of nurses per 1,000 people No. of outpatients per doctor

2002 2006 2008 2011 2002 2006 2008 2011 2002 2006 2008

Japan 2.04 2.15 2.22 2.28 8.38 9.10 9.54 10.04 14.1 13.6

Turkey 1.12 1.43 1.51 1.70 1.09 1.19 1.41 1.69 2.6 4.6 6.3

Spain 3.29 3.88 3.88 4.36 4.43 4.43 5.17 5.47 8.1

Greece 4.58 5.35 6.02 6.14 3.46 3.4 3.41 3.30 4 4

Italy 4.43 3.65 4.19 4.00 4.10 6.30 France 3.31 3.33 3.31 3.31 7.03 7.8 7.93 8.70 7.5 7 6.9

Germany 3.65 3.78 3.89 4.20 9.81 10.36 10.72 11.37 7.6 7.4 7.8United Kingdom

2.80 9.80 8.57 5.7 5.1 5.9

United

States

2.5 2.57 2.58 2.60 10.18 10.5 10.75 11.10 4.1 3.8

Source：OECD Health Data 2013 b. Regulations for Personnel allocation

Personnel allocation and facilities at national hospitals are regulated pursuant to the Regulations of the Ministry of Health on Bed and Personnel Standards in Provincial Organizations (Regulation No. 22093) and the Regulations on Operation of Treatment Institutions with Beds (Regulation No. 17927).

These regulations set forth the statutory number of personnel at national hospitals in accordance with the sizes (number of beds

5) and types of hospitals. They specifically

determine the number and types of staff members necessary for each hospital. The types of staff members include medical practitioners, dentists, pharmacists, nutritionists, psychiatrists, nurses, laboratory technicians, midwives, drivers and treasurers.

4) Healthcare Insurance System in Turkey

Persons under the social insurance system (employees, self-employed and civil servants) are subject to the insurance set forth in the Social Insurance and Universal Health Insurance Law and are eligible for medical benefits and cash benefits. The system of healthcare Insurance is summarized in Appendix 9.

(5) Current Situation of Hospitals in Turkey

1) Hospitals in Bursa

The Study Team visited the hospitals (3 public hospitals, 1 private hospital and 1 university hospital) listed below and the Bursa Provincial Directorate of Health. The following are important matters clarified in the survey.

5 For personnel allocation, public hospitals are classified into 19 classes in terms of the number of

beds: 25 beds, 50 beds, 75 beds, 100 beds, 150 beds, 200 beds, 250 beds, 300 beds, 350 beds, 400 beds, 450 beds, 500 beds, 600 beds, 700 beds, 800 beds, 900 beds, 1,000 beds, 1,100 beds and 1,200 beds.


Hospitals visited

- Medical Park Bursa (private)

- Şevket Hospital (public)

- Çekirge Hospital (public)

- Bursa Devlet Hospital (public)

- Uludağ University Hospital (university)

Important matters:

- A total of 20 hospital construction projects are in progress in the Province of Bursa. Half of them will be seismic isolated structures.

- Reinforcing works are in progress to make the existing hospitals earthquake resistant.

- Fall-prevention measures are to be taken for non-structural members and equipment.

- The hospitals surveyed have storage plans, but the storage spaces for the amount of stock are uncertain.

- The hospitals surveyed have their hospital disaster plans, but the plans do not include a clear statement about collaboration with other hospitals.

- None of the hospitals surveyed has satellite communications means.

- The hospitals surveyed have neither a backup information system placed outside the hospitals nor alternative system in case of malfunction of the information system.

- None of the hospitals surveyed has any plan to deal with the stoppage of elevators.

- None of the hospitals surveyed has estimated the number of patients to expect at the time of disasters.

Results of the inspection of hospitals related to hospital buildings including structure and MEP work are described in 4.4.3.

2) Operation status of national hospitals

The following table outlines the operation status of national hospitals – that is, the Çekirge and Şevket Hospitals in the Province of Bursa, as well as national hospitals in Ankara and Antalya for reference.

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Table 4.4.5 Operation status of four national hospitals

Hospital name Çekirge National Hospital

Sevket Yilmaz Education and Research Hospital

Ankara Ataturk Education and Research Hospital (reference)

Antalya Education and Research Hospital (reference)

Year of opening 1961 2002 2003 2007 Healthcare services

Mon-Fri (8:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m.) Emergency services available 24 hrs/7 days

Mon-Fri (8:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.) Emergency services available 24 hrs/7 days

N/A Mon-Fri (8:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.) Emergency services available from 7:00 a.m. to midnight Dialysis available Mon-Sat

No. of beds 529 beds 879 beds 471 beds 914 beds

No. of beds in intensive care unit

N/A 88 (42 beds in the main building and 46 beds in the annex)

52 beds 71 beds

No. of beds in emergency room

N/A N/A N/A 50 beds (18 beds for primarily emergency healthcare)

Dispensary rooms

N/A N/A N/A 155 rooms

Total floor area 55,400 m2 Main building: 62,000 m2

Annex building: 55,700 m2

65,000 m2

(A building of 2200 m2

is under construction)

119,500 m2

Land area 47,500 m2 Main building: 20,000 m2 Annex building: 25,000 m2

70,000 m2 122,609 m2

Parking lot 600 cars 800 cars 420 cars (for staff) + 1000 cars (for visitors)

800 cars (there are 4 parking lots)

No. of staff members

1,500 persons 1,509 persons (full-time) and 1,384 persons (part-time)

794 persons (under contract with the government) (The hospital outsources some services to the private sector, but the number of workers is unknown.)

1,706 persons (of whom about 500 workers are from external organizations)

Doctors 200 persons 330 persons 291 persons (under contract with the government)

454 persons

Nurses 450 persons 563 persons 451 persons (under contract with the government)

610 persons

No. of inpatients 37,578 persons/year 54,737 persons/year 85 persons/year 160 persons/year

No. of outpatients 851,937 persons/year 767,009 persons/year 5,000 persons/year 3,174 persons/year

Occupation rate of beds

87.6% 75.25% N/A N/A

Average length of stay

4.47 days 4.46 days N/A N/A

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Hospital name Çekirge National Hospital

Sevket Yilmaz Education and Research Hospital

Ankara Ataturk Education and Research Hospital (reference)

Antalya Education and Research Hospital (reference)

No. of operating rooms

14 rooms 21 rooms (15 rooms in main building and 6 rooms in annex building)

12 rooms (plus a robot operation room)

23 rooms

No. of operations (FY2009)

26,061 81,240 41,000 36,231 (most of which were major operations.)

Artificial dialysis Available 16 units Available Available

Major medical equipment

・MRI ・CT ・PET

・MRI (1) ・CT (1) ・Mammography (1) ・Nuclear scintigraphy (1) ・Endoscopes (7) ・EEG (2) ・EMG (2) ・Ultrasonic inspection instruments (26)

・MRI (2) ・CT (2) ・PET (1) ・Gamma-camera (1) ・Liniac (2: including tomotherapy)

･MRI (1) Manufactured by Philips 120 times /day ･Radiation therapy machines (10) ･CT (2) Manufactured by Toshiba and Shimazu 20～25 times/day ･Mammography (3) ･Angiography (2) ･Endoscopes (one each for upper and lower bodies)

Major facilities

Generators: 1,650KW, 250KW 5.5KW (mobile) UPS: 160KVA x 2, 30KVA

Generators : 1,650KW, 680KW、60KW UPS:120KVA×5、 60KVA×2 40KVA×2 20KVA×8 Water tank: 1,000 tons (total)

N/A N/A

Storage Inside the building Inside the building N/A N/A Source: JST prepared based on the interview survey result

(6) Demand for Healthcare in Bursa

1) Population

The table obtained from Bursa Municipality, gives estimates of future population. The table shows that the population is estimated to increase from approximately 2.6 million in 2012 to approximately 4 million in 2050.

The following table shows the trend in birth rate in the Province of Bursa. The figures outnumber those of OECD countries. (e.g., the rate in Japan is 8.39.)

Table 4.4.6 Birth rate in Bursa

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Number of Births 40,571 38,894 39,129 38,540 41,079 Birth rate (births/1,000 population) 16.18 15.25 15.02 14.53 15.28 Population 2,507,963 2,550,645 2,605,495 2,652,126 2,688,171

Source: Provincial directorate of health in Bursa

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The Republic of Turkey, as Japan, will be increasingly aging, so the number of patients is likely to increase in future.

The population of the Province of Bursa is distributed as drawn inTable 4.4.6, which shows that population is concentrated in Osmangazi, Yıldırım and other urban districts.

2) Numbers of hospitals and patients

The following table lists the number of beds, discharged patients, outpatients, bed occupancy rate and average length of stay for the hospitals under the management of the MOH. The table shows that the Şevket Hospital in Yildrim district, and the Çekirge and Bursa Devlet Hospitals in Osmangazi district receive the largest number of patients.

Table 4.4.7 Number of patients of MoH hospitals in Bursa

No. ofBeds

No ofDischarge

/Year

No ofOutpatients

/Year

BedOccpancy Rate（％）

Ave.lengthof stay(days)

YILDIRIM 1,272 67,755 992,705Bursa Yüksek İhtisas Eğitim ve Araştırma Hastanesi 261 8,723 117,909 53.45 5.84Şevket Yılmaz Eğitim Araştırma Hastanesi 876 53,982 767,009 75.25 4.46Prof. Dr. T. Akyol Göğüs Hastalıkları Hastanesi 135 5,050 107,787 92.49 9.02OSMANGAZİ 1,856 98,199 2,060,043Bursa Devlet Hastanesi 808 32,194 875,922 60.87 5.58Dr.Ayten Bozkaya Spastik Çocuk Hast. Rehabilitasyon Merkezi 54 199 64,616 61.83 61.24Ali Osman Sönmez Onkoloji Hastanesi 306 10,089 157,051 61.88 6.85Bursa Zübeyde Hanım Doğumevi 163 18,139 110,517 79.78 2.62Çekirge Devlet Hastanesi 525 37578 851,937 87.6 4.47ORHANGAZİ 410 26,250 580,685Orhangazi Devlet Hastanesi 60 2,925 182,213 58.35 4.37Dörtçelik Çocuk Hastanesi 350 23,325 398,472 76.22 4.17İNEGÖL 308 15,121 405,010İnegöl Devlet Hastanesi 308 15,121 405,010 53.69 3.99MUDANYA 45 5,919 134,712Mudanya Şaziye Rüştü Devlet Hastanesi 45 5,919 134,712 73.35 2.04YENİŞEHİR 75 4,433 132,156Yenişehir Devlet Hastanesi 75 4,433 132,156 55.62 3.43ORHANELİ 25 1,897 36,172Orhaneli Devlet Hastanesi 25 1,897 36,172 61.27 2.95İZNİK 75 2,319 63,698İznik Devlet Hastanesi 75 2,319 63,698 63.698 3.58GEMLİK 128 8,933 303,143Muammer Ağım Gemlik Devlet Hastanesi 128 8,933 303,143 60.62 3.17MUSTAFA KEMAL PAŞA 179 10,341 371,193Mustafa Kemal Paşa Devlet Hastanesi 179 10,341 371,193 59.48 3.76KARACABEY 151 5,723 186,674Karacabey Devlet Hastanesi 151 5,723 186,674 49.24 4.74

Sum 4,479 240,971 5,131,479 Source：Bursa Health Office

3) Deaths by Diseases

The following table lists the number of deaths by disease in Turkey and the Province of Bursa. The percentage of deaths by each disease in the province is more or less the same as that in the entire country: the percentages of deaths by problems with circulatory system and malignant neoplasms are relatively high.

Table 4.4.8 Number of deaths by diseases

Total

Diseases of the

circulatory system

Malignant Neoplasms

Diseases of the

respiratory system

Endocrine, Nutritional,

and metabolic diseases

Diseases of the nervous system and the sensory

organs

External causes of injury and poisoning

Others

Turkey 294,501 116,710 62,587 24,418 18,992 10,807 12,985 48,002 100% 40% 21% 8% 6% 4% 4% 16%

Bursa 12,806 5,414 2,751 916 725 515 535 1,950 100% 42% 21% 7% 6% 4% 4% 15%

Source: TUIK

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey 4.4.2. Proposed Disaster Healthcare Services (1) Proposed disaster healthcare service system; Japan’s experience and the role of Disaster

Base Hospitals

1) Japan’s experience

Based on experience with the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake in 1995, Japan’s medical institutions, Japan Medical Association and other relevant organizations, and experts on disaster medical services, architecture, equipment and facilities, information telecommunications, and pharmaceutical products have made the following proposal.

- If a natural disaster has occurred, medical institutions in the afflicted areas themselves are often affected by the disaster. But they must still play a crucial role in offering emergency healthcare services promptly at the scene of the disaster. What is necessary for this are the establishment of emergency hospitals that have prepared for disasters in advance and provide assistance to other medical institutions in the afflicted areas; the establishment of a wide-area disaster and emergency healthcare information system that swiftly and accurately supports rescue operations at the time of disasters; the strengthening of the functions of health centers to deal with emergency healthcare; and the collaboration with transport organizations.

- What is necessary are the establishment of emergency hospitals that have prepared for disasters in advance and provide assistance to other medical institutions in the afflicted areas; the establishment of a wide-area disaster and emergency healthcare information system that swiftly and accurately supports rescue operations at the time of disasters; the strengthening of the functioning of health centers to deal with emergency healthcare; and the collaboration with transport organizations.

Accordingly, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan has presented the following requirements for Disaster Base Hospitals.

- Critical care services for seriously ill patients

- Earthquake resistant structure

- Possession of EMIS (Emergency Medical Information System) terminals

- Lifeline maintenance functions

- Heliport

- Emergency supply of first-aid materials and equipment for use at the hospital or for provision to another hospital in the affected area.

- Training on emergency healthcare

Following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare has added the following requirements to the original requirements for Disaster Base Hospitals.

- Possession of satellite telephones and access to satellite Internet connection

- Develop organization to input data to EMIS

- Possession of non-utility power generation with the capacity of about 60% of the utility power generation, and storage of fuels for 3 days

- Possession of water tanks, development of water wells, and conclusion of agreements or other form of priority supply of water

- Storage of foods, drinking water, medicines and other articles for 3 days or so

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- Establishment of a system of Disaster Base Hospitals by concluding agreements with local relevant organizations and businesses

- Heliport

- Emergency supply of first-aid materials and equipment for use at the hospital or for provision to another hospital in the affected area Possession of DMAT and development of a system that enables accepting DMAT and medical teams

- Lease of first-aid medical materials and equipment at the time of disasters

- Regular training in cooperation with regional medical institutions

2) Roles of Disaster Base Hospitals

The roles of Disaster Base Hospitals in Japan are defined as:

a. Medical institutions with 200 or more beds in principle

b. The buildings are earthquake-resistant and fire-resistant structures.

c. Possession of large lecture halls and meeting rooms that can accommodate severely injured and ill persons for first aid

d. Possession of hospital wards (patients rooms, ICU, etc.) and medical care wards (dispensary rooms, examination rooms, X-ray rooms, operation rooms, dialysis rooms, etc.) and storage for stocks and cot beds

e. The function of maintaining electric power and other necessary infrastructures

f. Possession of a heliport on the premises

(If it is difficult to have a heliport on the premises, the hospital is required to secure a place near the hospital, which can be used as a heliport at the time of emergencies.)

g. Terminals of a wide-area disaster and emergency healthcare information system

h. Medical care facilities necessary to deal with critical patients (multiple trauma, crush syndrome and extensive burns) who will increase in number during and after disasters

i. Cot beds for patients who will increase in number during and after disasters

j. Possession of first-aid medical materials and equipment, medicines, power generator, etc. that are potable and self-contained for healthcare services in afflicted areas

3) Situations during and after disasters

The Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 fully destroyed 10 healthcare facilities and partially destroyed 290 healthcare facilities out of a total of 380 facilities in the afflicted Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures. Because of this, surviving hospitals were obliged to limit the number of patients to accept or even refuse to accept patients. In other words, natural disasters may damage hospitals and increase the number of injured people, causing congestion in hospitals.

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Table 4.4.9 Facility situation in the Great East Japan Earthquake

Total Limited Outpatients Couldn’t accept

Outpatients Limited Inpatients

Couldn’t accept

Inpatients

Iwate 94 54 7 48 11

Miyagi 147 40 11 7 38

Fukushima 139 66 27 52 35

Total 380 160 45 107 84

Source: JST

(2) Proposed establishment of a disaster medical system in the Province of Bursa

1) Necessity of Disaster Base Hospital in city center

a. Healthcare service supply system in urban districts

The number of hospital beds in urban districts totals 3,565 (of which those at national hospitals account for 88%) and the number of doctors per 1,000 people in the province is about 1.5, less than half of the average number among the OECD countries, 3.24.

b. Damage estimation in the city center

The number of outpatients at public hospitals in the urban district of the Bursa metropolitan municipality is 8,364 per day.

Taking the case of the 1999 İzmit earthquake for damage estimation.

In Gölcük (with the population of about 109,000), the numbers of injured persons and deaths totaled 5,064 and 4,656, respectively. The population of Osmangazi, Yildrim and Nulifer, the central areas in the Province of Bursa, totals about 1,400,000, so the estimated numbers of injured persons and deaths are 65,000 and 60,000, respectively.

This suggests that in the event of disasters hospitals will be flooded with patients considerably outnumbering the present capacity of the hospital. Certain measures must be taken to estimate the number of casualties.

c. Necessity of continued medical care of patients “immediately after disasters” and in the

Dr.Ayten Bozkaya Spastik

Çocuk Hast. Rehabilitasyon

Bursa Yüksek İhtisas Eğitim ve Araştırma Hastanesi (261)

Şevket Yılmaz Eğitim Araştırma Hastanesi(876)

Prof. Dr. T. Akyol Göğüs Hastalıkları Hastanesi(135)

Bursa Devlet Hastanesi(808)

Medical Park Bursa (287)

Çekirge Devlet Hastanesi(525)

Bursa Zübeyde Hanım Doğumevi (163)

Bursa Vatan Hastanesi (95)

Ali Osman Sönmez Onkoloji

Doruk özel Bursa Hastanesi (55)

Source: JST

Figure 4.4.2 Distribution of hospitals and population

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“super-acute phase” in urban districts

In urban districts, where the lifelines and transport means are not functioning due to a disaster, it is necessary to care for a great number of patients “immediately after the disaster” and in the “super-acute phase”.

Table 4.4.10 Healthcare needs in disaster

Category Assumed Period Situation

Immediate After

Disaster

Occurrence - 6hours Mass injured and sick people. Rescue work is started.

Super Acute Phase 6 hours

-72 hours

Although a lot of rescued injured and sick people are transported to hospitals,

staff and material support from outside of the disaster area is insufficient by

disruption of lifelines and transportation.

Sub Acute Phase 1 week -1 month Regional medicine, lifelines and transportation are recovered gradually.

Chronic Phase 1 month - 3 months Evacuation life is prolonged.

Lifelines are almost recovered and regional medical institutions and pharmacies

restart their services gradually.

Medium- to Long-

Term

After 3months Almost all medical rescue stations are closed and regional medical services are

recovered as ordinary.

Source: JST

Emergency healthcare is in the highest demand immediately after a disaster. Response of hospitals in urban districts is crucial during the time until a rescue team such as UMKE arrives. The following figure schematically illustrates the trend in the number of patients during a disaster in red, and the trend in the number of patients helped by UMKE in blue. The circle shows the need for medical care immediately after the disaster, for which hospitals in the city center themselves must take action because patients cannot wait for a rescue team to arrive from outside the affected area.

Source: JST

Figure 4.4.13 Medical needs until arrival of UMKE

d. Importance of access to hospitals

During disasters, although they are the key to the provision of medical services staff members of hospitals have difficulty rushing to emergency healthcare services for the following reasons.

0 hours 48 hours 24 hours

Immediate Medical Needs after

No. of Patients helped by UMKE

No. of patients

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- The fact that staff members and their families themselves are affected by the disaster

- Road disconnection

- Depletion of gasoline

- Loss of transport means

- Disconnection of public transport network

- Secondary disaster on the way to hospitals

On the day when the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake occurred in the early morning in 1995, a mere 58.4% of medical doctors and 44.2% of nurses showed up at their hospitals. This highlights the importance of the location of hospitals: they must be located conveniently enough not only for injured persons but also for staff members to reach without difficulty even at the time of disasters. Moreover, the number of medical staff members at work varies depending on the day and time of day (daytime, night and holidays have less staff members), which must be taken into account when disaster risk management plans are formulated.

2) Emergency healthcare cooperation in the Province of Bursa

Public hospitals in Turkey are classifiable into various levels: those which supply advanced healthcare services and are equipped with research and educational functions are designated as A-1, and general hospitals following A-1 hospitals in terms of the quality are designated as A-2. In the Province of Bursa, there are two A-1 hospitals: the Uludag University Hospital and the Şevket hospital (Şevket Yılmaz Eğitim Araştırma Hastanesi). In addition, the City Hospital for which the construction plan is in progress is expected to be another leading hospital with the largest capacity (1,355 beds). The green areas in the following figure are within 10km of any of the A-1 hospitals. The figure also shows that the urban district around the Çekirge Hospital (529 beds, and A-2 level) is not covered by any of the A-1 hospitals.

To deal with such situations, the Study Team proposes that the Çekirge Hospital should be upgraded so that it can serve as a Disaster Base Hospital for the city center, which will lead to better disaster medical services in the Province of Bursa.

When the construction is completed, the City Hospital (1,355 beds) will be regarded as the top-level hospital in the province. But the Study Team proposes that, because it is located on the outskirt of the central area, it should be counted as a core Disaster Base Hospital that accepts seriously injured or ill patients who cannot be treated at hospitals in the urban

②UludagUniv. Hospital

③Sevket Hospital

①City Hospital

City CenterCekirge State Hospital

②UludagUniv. Hospital

③Sevket Hospital

①City Hospital

City CenterCekirge State Hospital

Source: JST

Figure 4.4.3 The coverage area (Green) by A1 level hospital

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district at the time of disasters. The Study Team also proposes that the A-1 hospitals in the urban district should be refurbished and upgraded as regional Disaster Base Hospitals, and that the Çekirge and Şevket Hospitals should be made components of the Disaster Management Complex (DMC). The following figure shows the image of the disaster medical cooperation scheme.

The core Disaster Base Hospital and regional Disaster Base Hospitals will accept chiefly seriously injured and ill patients, centrally gather regional information, coordinate the liaisons with various organizations and other hospitals, and serve as backup hospitals for each other.

The table below lists the functions and roles of the core Disaster Base Hospital and Disaster Base Hospitals.

Figure 4.4.4 Proposal for medical cooperation in a disaster

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Table 4.4.11 Function and roles of core disaster base medical centers and regional disaster base medical centers

Source: JST

3) Proposed disaster medical plans in the Province of Bursa

Japan’s experience

Lessons learnt from the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 include the following situations.

- The afflicted Iwate Prefecture had not stipulated a command channel for rescue teams in advance and thus was unable to dispatch rescue teams efficiently to where they were needed. After the disaster, a collaboration scheme was established, which specifies the command channel and the roles of the prefecture, prefectural medical association, dentist association, pharmaceutical association, nursing association, medical institutions, prefectural police and the Self-Defense Forces.

- The Japanese Red Cross Ishinomaki Hospital in another afflicted prefecture, Miyagi, had already built cooperative relationships with the neighboring hospitals prior to the earthquake. Staff members in charge of emergency medical services held meetings, and a network for dialysis treatment was built with the neighboring hospitals, and the emergency healthcare departments and rescue teams of these hospitals had already worked together to consider various medical cases. Thanks to these collaborative relations, the Ishinomaki Hospital successfully built an emergency medical service scheme at an early stage after the disaster.

- In order to make any collaboration plans function properly at times of disasters, hospitals and other parties concerned must establish close connections in advance in normal circumstances, based on which they are also required to formulate a collaboration plan at the prefectural level which specifies the roles of the parties concerned and the command channel.

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- Because the damage from the earthquake disaster was extensive, quite a few patients were transferred to the neighboring prefecture and staging care units (SCUs) of other prefectures. But it took time to commence transfer of patients because prior planning was insufficient and also because healthcare services in other prefectures were under the management of other prefectural governments.

- Transfer plans and wide-area healthcare transfer plans involving the neighboring prefectures must be formulated in advance. Inter-prefectural transfer, in particular, requires administrative arrangements, so the command channel and decision-making must be established and conducted at the national governmental level.

The prefectural governments arranged dispatches of rescue teams but had many difficulties in inter-prefectural transfer, allocation of rescue teams to the prefectures concerned, and inter-prefectural coordination. They also had difficulty making arrangements because they relied on telephones only to contact the national government and the bureau of rescue teams. The liaison among the afflicted prefectural governments did not work properly, confusing the command channel. Although the hospitals were expected to gain support of the Internet telecommunications from rescue teams, they did not have sufficient instruments and failed to get the Internet connections.

- That is, the operation under emergency circumstances is extensive across more than one province, so that the SAKOM of the MOH, Prefectural SAKOM, UMKE and other parties concerned must clarify the command channel and communication methods, while all UMKE must be equipped with satellite telecommunication devices to get Internet connection.

Disaster medical plans of the Province

The present provincial disaster medical plan does not refer to the role-sharing among medical institutions. This means that they would not understand which hospitals are responsible for what kinds of activities and with which hospitals they should collaborate with if a disaster occurred. The Study Team proposes the role-sharing and collaboration among medical institutions to be included in the disaster medical plan of the Province of Bursa.

Figure 4.4.5 Wide-area medical transportation in case of disaster (Proposal)

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Medical Facility

Severe

Core Disaster Base Hospital>

City Hospital

Severe-Moderate

Disaster Base Hospital>

Cekirge State Hospital

Sevket Hospital

Uldag University Hospital

Moderate-Mild Hospital other than above

Mild Close clinics and gather staff and medical resources

of the clinics to the above hospitals for effective

medical services / Clinics. Only limited clinics

Figure 4.4.17 Role for each facility in a disaster (Proposal)

4) Development of an emergency medical information system

a. Japan’s experience

Lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 include the following situations.

- Many hospitals lost connections to the internet and failed to input information. Those which could not directly input information were contacted by their local disaster management headquarters to confirm and input information on their behalf. Even so, it was still difficult to gather information from areas which had not had any collaboration system for data inputting by proxy.

- The authorities could not confirm the safety of hospitals that had not had the system. The Miyagi prefectural government had not had such a system either, and had difficulty gathering information about damage to hospitals, resulting in delay in assistance to isolated hospitals.

- The authorities collected information about healthcare services only and failed to have enough information that could help collaboration with the Self Defense Forces and other relevant organizations.

A collaboration system to input information in the network by proxy must be established in advance. A cross-sectoral information gathering system involving all the provinces and hospitals must be built.

The Study Team proposes that Disaster Base Hospitals should adopt the hospital information display system of the Provincial Directorates of Health so that they can grasp information about possible hospitals that can host patients in a wider area. Japan’s emergency medical information system (EMIS) may be a good example for a useful disaster healthcare system. The proposals are to establish a disaster healthcare system integrated with the nationwide information system network, an on-line system which specializes in medical information at the time of disasters, enables all hospitals in Turkey to share information, and allows the general public to have access to healthcare information.

b. Japan’s experience

- While many medical institutions lost clinical records and other medical information, Ishinomaki City Hospital managed to recover its medical information data after the

Transfer

Patient transfer to

outside of the province

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disaster because it shared the data with Yamagata City Hospital Saiseikan, some 100km from the city of Ishinomaki.

After the disaster, many hospitals began to use the data center or introduce a system to keep backup data at other medical institutions and elsewhere.

A system to keep backup data on medical information such as mutual data sharing with a remote hospital must be established.

Loss of information about patients because of disasters results in disruption of continued healthcare services. The Study Team proposes that hospitals should work together with other hospitals or external entities to keep backup data on their patients.

(3) The present state of hospital PPP projects in Turkey

1) Progress of PPP projects

MOH has been promoting City Hospital-PPP projects as national projects for improvement of the quality and efficiency of health service provided by public hospitals. The following table lists hospital PPP projects currently in progress as national projects in Turkey.

A total of 20 buildings are now in the bidding stage, 5 projects have been approved by a higher planning council, 2 projects have been transferred to the council and 26 projects are in preparation stage. Out of all the 53 projects, the bidding for 17 projects has already been closed. But none of the 17 projects has yet secured financial resources. (List of PPP projects is attached : Appendix-8)

The failure in securing funds is chiefly attributable to uncertain sharing of responsibilities between the public and private sectors for services that SPV

6 (Special Purpose Vehicle) plan

to offer (a total of 18 services including image diagnoses, inspections, transportation and catering), and thus to uncertain risk and costs to be borne by the private SPV. Currently, successful bidders have already submitted their proposed service contracts to the MOH, and the MOH is examining the proposals.

2) Comparison of Disaster Base Hospitals as facilities to respond to BCP

In hospital planning including PPP in Turkey so far, “securing of healthcare functional continuity in disasters” has not been clearly defined and taken into consideration.

In hospital PPP projects, buildings are designed to be anti-disaster, but no specific conditions are given in advance; hospital functional continuity has been left to the discretion of the SPV or negotiations between the SPV and the hospitals at the design stage. In short, the function necessary for Disaster Base Hospitals is not necessarily secured.

The Study Team representing Japan will propose the desirable features of Disaster Base Hospitals as follows.

6 SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle): Business corporation established in order to undertake a special enterprise. In PPP,

the consortium that makes proposal to the general invitation, establishes SPV and is in charge of construction, management and management.

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Table 4.4.12 Desirable features of Disaster Base Hospitals Facilities (i) Space (including space for triage) large enough to handle twice as many inpatients and five times as many

outpatients as normal times, medical gas outlets, cots, medical supplies and materials for emergency (ii) Private power generators that can produce electricity at 60% of the normal consumption level, and fuels

for three days (iii) Storage of food, drinking water, medicines and other supplies for the estimated number of patients for

three days in an emergency (iv) Satellite telephone and satellite Internet connections (v) Heliports (two or more) (vi) Special ICU beds, emergency resuscitation units, emergency examination units, radiographic rooms and

operating rooms Functions (i) Response to critical patients (multiple trauma, crush syndrome and extensive burns) who will

increase in number during and after disasters (ii) Response to patients with acute-phase heart disease and stroke patients who need emergency treatment. (iii) Response to patients with chronic diseases who need continued treatment even at the time of disasters (iv) Coordination at the time of disasters

* Gathering information about damage, patients and activities of healthcare organizations, and reporting to the province

* Gathering of healthcare staff members, medical supplies, etc., dispatch of personnel to the province, and request for supplies

Hospitals under PPP projects have requested the following facilities, but no specific specifications of these facilities are defined. The storage and management plans in preparation for an increase in the number of patients in disasters are basically proposed by PPP SPV, and the MOH and consultants examine and decide to approve such proposals. Thus, the nature and types of facilities in preparation for disasters, as well as management plans, are likely to vary substantially among hospitals. In such circumstances, Japan’s desirable features of Disaster Base Hospitals will be a meaningful reference for Turkey.

Table 4.4.13 Anti-disaster facilities included/not included in PPP hospitals Facilities required by PPP hospitals Facilities not included in PPP hospitals

・ Earthquake-absorbing technology ・ Use of reclaimed water and rainwater ・ Cogeneration/tri-generation ・ Renewable energy ・ Energy-saving measures ・ Duplication of power sources and backup generators ・ Heliports ・ Medical shelters * These facilities are cited, but no specific specifications are defined. (The hospitals have not made specific requests, such as “something for a certain number of days to deal with such and such number of patients in disasters”.) The capacity and specifications are proposed by PPP SPV first, and then examined and approved by the consultants and MOH.

(1) The following plans for an increase in the number of patients in disasters

・ Extra medical gas outlets ・ Stockpile (water, medicines, medical supplies, food

and fuel) ・ Waste water management (2) Operation and development of backup functions in case the following facilities become disabled ・ Elevators ・ Transport devices (medicines, food, etc.) ・ Electronic health records, etc. * The designing and planning of anti-disaster facilities greatly depend on proposals of PPP SPV, and the authorities simply give approval. The nature and types of facilities in preparation for disasters vary substantially among hospitals, depending on the competence of SPV and consultants.

(4) Proposed formulation of a hospital disaster plan during and after disasters

1) The present situation

Each hospital in Turkey formulates its hospital disaster plan (HDP) according to a format prepared by the MOH. Hospitals annually update and biannually review their HDP. Hospital disaster plans basically stimulate disaster preparedness, procedures, plans (who undertakes what in what kind of manner), and action plans of personnel in charge of disaster management which define actions in the initial 2 hours, 12 hours and 24 hours after disasters.

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In the event of disasters, hospital administrators, head physicians, and administration specialists establish a hospital incident command center in collaboration with the officers in charge and supervisors designated in the HDP, and put their emergency action plan into practice.

The action plan list of officers in charge of disaster management is used by the HDP. The officers in charge confirm whether actions have been taken timely according to the action plan, and record the execution time and sign the list.

The HDP stipulates that officers in charge are required to: - Determine the period for preparing the emergency action plan and the date of

execution; - Create a list of personnel subject to training, and determine the training dates; - Ensure that the HDP training is included in the annual training program; - Hold meetings prior to training to prepare information; - Decide the place of meeting - Supply waistcoats, training materials, equipment and other necessary tools for the HDP.

The HDP is required to include the following matters. - Preparation of a disaster preparedness list - Standards for the commencement and termination of the HDP - Procedures to get access to personnel - Safety measures - Standards for decision-making on evacuation order - Measures for voluntary participation - Standards for care of patients in emergencies - Regulations on emergency evacuation standards in disasters

All the staff members of the hospitals are required to have HDP training which includes 1-hour programs and, for administrators, advanced training for 120-150 minutes.

The following figure illustrates an organizational chart of the HDP which is headed by the hospital administrator at the time of disasters.

Source: Cekirge HDP

Figure 4.4.18 Organization of Hospital Disaster Management Plan (HDP)

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The HDP is required to include statements about communication means in emergencies and disasters; operation rules of the disaster management center (triage, evacuation, acceptance of patients, transfer, and standards for registration and notification); evacuation from the hospital; tasks of evacuation supervisors in the departments and divisions; areas for emergency healthcare and triage; and protective measures against disasters (earthquakes, fires, SBRN contamination, terrorist attacks, crowd of people, power outage, water failure and floods).

Procedures for actions at the time of disasters - Establishment of a hospital incident command center - Assessment of damage (according to the technical board) - Decision-making on whether to evacuate entirely or partially according to the

assessment - The evacuation order is based on the priority order specified by the hospital incident

command center - Patients are given priority for evacuation and led to designated evacuation shelters

(meeting places are specified in the main and annex buildings) - Patients are given a triage tag staging their healthcare records. Those who are able to

return home are advised to go home, while those who need treatment are given the relevant treatment.

- If the hospital becomes unable to provide healthcare services, patients are transferred to neighboring hospitals, with which the hospital has concluded a cooperation agreement in advance. An agreement is also concluded with the fire department.

- Contact the 112 center.

2) Japan’s experience and proposed formulation of hospital BCP plans

a. Facility and equipment fall prevention

The Great East Japan Earthquake was not a local earthquake such as the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake but a subduction-zone earthquake causing vibration with flexible structure. Thus, the quake-absorbing structure alone was unable to prevent damage, movement and falling of facilities in buildings. Accordingly, various facility and equipment fall-prevention measures have been examined in Japan since then. Japan’s National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention, an independent administrative agency, has conducted quake tests using full-sized hospital models and produced a manual for fall-prevention measures to fix facilities in hospital rooms.

The Study Team proposes that Japan offer cooperation for development of a manual and training on facility and equipment fall-prevention measures in Turkey in accordance with the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake.

b. Storage and lifeline measures according to damage estimation

Storage and lifeline measures must be designed to cover the amount of necessities until the recovery by assuming (i) the number of patients; (ii) healthcare services to offer (the amount of medical resources varies substantially depending on the need of dialysis, operations, ICU and other healthcare services); and (iii) the time required to recover the lifelines. In Japan, the time required for the recovery of lifelines is assumed to be about 2-3 weeks for water and 8-72 hours for electricity if an earthquake with a magnitude of 6+ occurs. The Study Team proposes that Turkey should formulate a plan that meets the circumstances in various regions in the country.

Storage and lifeline measures must be formulated in consideration of (i) the estimated

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number of patients; (ii) healthcare services to offer; and (iii) the time required to recover the lifelines at the time of disasters. As for healthcare services to offer, in particular, the province must specify the role-sharing of hospitals in its disaster medical plans, formulate an action plan to have each hospital to play its role, and conduct necessary training.

c. Measures against stoppage of elevators

Stoppage of elevators causes considerable trouble with transfer of patients. Hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake, Kesen-Numa City Hospital suffered from stoppage of its elevators so that 4-5 staff members were needed to carry one patient. The Japanese Red Cross Ishinomaki Hospital, hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake, had its heliport not on the roof of the building but on the ground floor, so that it managed to conduct wide-area transfer of patients even if its elevators stopped. In the event of the Great East Japan Earthquake, there was little stoppage of elevators that were built in and after 2009 when the official earthquake resistance standards were revised.

The Study Team proposes that the authorities in Turkey should prepare manuals including the following matters in preparation for stoppage of elevators.

Transfer routes and means in consideration of stoppage of elevators

Earthquake-resistant standards for the elevators themselves

Early recovery measures against stoppage (system to promptly secure elevator maintenance workers, introduction of at least one elevator satisfying the latest standards for each building, etc.)

d. Measures to use electronic medical records at the time of disasters

After the Great East Japan Earthquake, hospitals that could not use their electronic medical records, and therefore, continued their operation with medical records on paper. In afflicted areas, more than one physician at more than one medical institution examines one single patient. Thus, it is effective to use duplicate record formats and give a copy to the patients. (At normal times, duplicated medical records are used as emergency medical records.) If access to electronic medical records is disconnected, advanced medical equipment using the picture archiving and communication system (PACS) such as computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is also disabled. Thus, measures to prevent these medical instruments from stopping are also needed.

Plans to use medical records on paper at normal times, and disaster measures for the electronic medical information system (location of the server room, quake-absorbing measures, measures to fix the instruments, etc.) must be prepared.

e. Proposed hospital operation plans in disasters backed by the experience and realistic training

The Great East Japan Earthquake caused power shortage and stopped air conditioners. Hospitals became unable to sterilize or clean medical equipment and conduct operations for many days except for emergency operations. Persisting aftershocks, shortage of consumable goods and water and various other factors obstructed medical operations. Meanwhile, since 1990, the Osaka Police Hospital has practiced disaster drills by actually turning off electricity and continuing to update its operation plan for disasters.

Actual experience is reflected in hospital operation plans and disaster drills. Disaster drills are designed to include planned outage and water outage and to be conducted at night. This will clarify possible obstacles to continued provision of healthcare services in line with the actual circumstances of hospitals, and help formulate better hospital disaster plans.

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey 4.4.3. Proposal for disaster base hospitals (1) Architectural Planning

1) Current situation of hospitals in Turkey

The current situation of hospitals in Turkey was assessed through inspections and interview surveys, from the viewpoint of a disaster base hospital.

Assessment of hospitals in Turkey from the viewpoint of a disaster base hospital

During the survey in Turkey (October in 2013 and February in 2014), 8 hospitals (2 private, 4 public, and 2 national university hospitals) were investigated. Assessment of the hospitals was made according to the criteria which were set from the view point of disaster base hospitals. The results of 7 hospitals out of 8 hospitals are shown in Table 4.4.14. One private hospital at the city center of Bursa, located in a high story building originally built as a hotel, is excluded from the table as their building differs from other hospitals.

Uludag University Hospital (1,200 beds) * There is a ground type heliport on the premises.

Cekirge Hospital (529 beds)

Bursa Devlet Hospital

Sevket Yilmaz Research and Education Hospital (879 beds)

The maternity department (371 beds) was investigated.

Hacettepe University Hospital (1,150 beds) * There is a plan for building a heliport on the premises. A budget request has been made.

Kanuni Sultan Suleyman Egitim ve Arastisma Hospital (650 beds)

ACIBADEM Maslak Hospital (205 beds)

Table 4.4.14 Results of Hospital Building Assessment in Turkey (Architectural Plan) Assessment Points Legend of assessment C Compliant

N Having some challenges - Unconfirmed or other

A B C D E F G Ideal situation

Architectural Planning 1) Is there a heliport on

the ground?

C N N N N N C A heliport is provided only on the premises of Hospital A.

Hospital E has a plan to build a new heliport, and has been waiting for the budget allocation. There is currently no heliport in the other hospitals. Whether any alternative heliport exists outside is unconfirmed. If a heliport is built outside of the premises, it is necessary to secure a reliable emergency traffic route to the hospitals.

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2) Are there two or more heliports including an emergency heliport?

N N N N N N N It is important to equip at least 2 heliports, because the transfer of patients in critical condition will

concentrate on these hospitals, in the event of disaster.

This is a lesson learned from the case of the Japanese Red Cross Ishinomaki Hospital after the Great East Japan Earthquake.

3) Is there a waiting space and equipment

space for disaster medical assistance

teams been secured near the emergency

heliport?

N N N N N N N Securing of equipment for the teams and meeting place

4) Relief supplies will be carried in. Is there enough space for

parking trucks and setting up a tent for

storing supplies on the premises?

C C N N C C C As many trucks loaded with relief supplies will arrive at the disaster base

hospitals, it is necessary to set up a tent for storing supplies on the premises, and

an outside space is needed on the premises.

5) Is there a plan for setting up toilets and other infrastructure for the support staff on the outside space

of the premises?

N N N N N N N It is preferable to prepare an infrastructure on the outside space of

the premises as a place of operation for support teams from the outside.

6) Are there large entrance eaves where a triage tent can be set up to protect patients from rain or snow in

the event of a disaster?

N N C N N C C It is preferable to provide large entrance eaves so that a tent can be set up even

in bad weather such as a snowfall.

7) Has space been secured in the

emergency zone so that an additional tent can be set up outside?

N C C C C C C Secure outside space for setting up additional tents as well as a traffic route so that an increased number of patients

in critical condition can be accepted.

8) Is there outpatient space which will

function as a space for accepting moderately-injured patients in the

event of a disaster? How many patients can be accepted in

that space?

C C C C C C C As the reference area of the hospital is large, there is no problem with the space

for an emergency response.

9) Has medical gas been secured in the

outpatient space for accepting patients in


＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ Portable gas cylinders will be used to supply medical gas for emergency

response. The gas should be maintained based on a clear acceptance plan and

the amount corresponding to the plan.

10) Has a courtyard which can secure daylight

and ventilation been provided for

outpatient space for accepting patients in


C C C C C C N Daylight and ventilation from the courtyard are secured in the medical

examination rooms and treatment rooms.

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11) Has a short and safe traffic route been secured so that a critical condition

emergency patient zone can be linked with the operation department even while use of the

elevators is suspended?

N N N N N N C For Hospital E, when a new emergency ward is completed, which is now under

construction.

12) Are operating rooms or halls provided with

windows which can secure natural lighting and ventilation so that they will function even

in the event of a disaster?

N N N N N N N In-house power generation will be used in the event of a disaster. However, if

fuel is used up, no operating rooms can function.

13) Is there allowance for setting up temporary

beds in hospital rooms and accepting

emergency inpatients in the event of a disaster? (What

percent increase can be accepted by the

entire hospital?)

＿＿＿ * ＿ * * In Hospital D, the amount of medical gas for 2 bed rooms is prepared for 1 bed

rooms, and 1 bed rooms will be used as 2 bed rooms in case of an emergency.

14) Is the first floor or its vicinity in the hospital

provided with information facilities as well as a room in

which a disaster response

headquarters can be set up?

N N N N N N N If a room such as a conference room which can be used as a disaster response headquarters is located on the first floor or its vicinity and emergency power and communication facilities are prepared, a response headquarters can be set up in

the event of a disaster.

15) In addition, can the room in which a

disaster response headquarters be set

up secure natural lighting and ventilation?

N N N N N N N To save fuel for in-house power generation and maintain the medical

care function, the room should be located in a place where natural lighting

and ventilation can be secured.

16) Has the possibility of a tsunami or flooding been analyzed? If

there is a possibility of a tsunami or flooding, it may be preferable to place kitchen devices

and the machine room which is highly

important, on the second floor to be less

susceptible to flood damage.

＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ Kitchen devices and the important machine room should be placed on the second or higher floor so as to be less

susceptible to flood damage.

17) Is there a plan for securing space which can provide a place to stay and meals for the hospital staff’s family members so that the staff can be engaged in medical services

feeling certain about family members even

in the event of a disaster?

N N N N N N N If the safety of family members is not secured, the staff cannot be engaged in

medical services.

JICA Study Team

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey 2) Regulations for hospital buildings

a. Hospitals under MOH Areas, etc.

No particular law or regulation exists in Turkey to regulate the total floor area, land area or the number of floors of national hospitals. These elements of national hospitals are specified by technical specifications and project agreements concluded between the MOH and contractors.

As for the area per bed at existing hospitals, the MOH introduces the standard of 200m2 per bed. Number of beds

The number of beds at national hospitals is regulated in accordance with the types of hospitals. For example, any general hospital must have 50 or more beds, and any day hospitals, five or more beds. No national hospital is allowed to provide new medical services or change the number of beds7 unless it obtains the approval of the MOH.

Other than these legal regulations, the Manual on Minimum Design Standards of Turkish Healthcare Facilities stipulates construction of national hospitals. The manual is a standard recommended by the MOH but has no legal binding force in the present situation. Even so, technical specifications in the manual are expected to be incorporated in regulations with legal binding force in the future.

Patient rooms

There is no law or regulation on the size of patient rooms, which is generally regulated by the Manual on Minimum Design Standards of Turkish Healthcare Facilities. For example, the manual requires each room with one bed to have an area of 9m2 or more, and each room with two beds to have an area of 7m2 or more per bed8. It also requires to have a distance of 110 cm or more between beds.

As for the number of beds per room, there used to be 3-4 beds in each patient room. Since the healthcare reform in 2002, however, the country has been planning to create a new facility environment to provide higher quality healthcare services. The 2010 Guideline on Minimum Design Standards for Healthcare Buildings in Turkey published by the MOH and the Regulation on Private Hospitals (Regulation No. 24708, issued on March 27, 2002) stipulate that the maximum number of beds in each patient room must be two.

b. Private Hospitals

There are various healthcare-related laws and regulations applicable to municipal and private

7 Patient rooms are classified into private rooms, first-class rooms and second-class rooms. A private room must

have a bed, refrigerator, TV, telephone, space for attendants, unit bath and sink; a first-class room must have a bed, space for attendants and sink; and a second-class room must have two or three beds and a sink. 8 The standards on the area of special patient rooms per bed stipulate that a paediatric patient room must

have an area of 6m2 or more per bed; an intensive care unit must have an area of 12m2 or more per bed; a new born intensive care unit (NICU) must have an area of 6m2 or more per bed; and an intensive observation unit (IOU) must have an area of 6m2 or more per bed.

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hospitals. ÖZEL HASTANELER YÖNETMELİĞİ provides a wide range of regulations for facilities and personnel of private hospitals as follows. It also applies to the floor planning of public hospitals.

Facility size

The Regulations on Private Hospitals require private hospitals to have in principle 100 or more beds. The MOH, however, allows the establishment of a private hospital with less than 100 beds in accordance with hearings of the Planning and Employment Commission, and the number of doctors and nature of necessary services (still, all private hospitals are required to have at least 50 beds and each medical department must have at least one bed). There is no regulation on the total floor area, land area or the number of floors, but hospitals are required to have staircases of 1.5 meters or more in width for stretchers and corridors of two meters or more in width. Private hospitals are also required to have power generators capable of producing 70% or more of power consumption calculated in their power consumption plans. Moreover, they are required to have at least two elevators that have passed the standards of the Turkish Standards Institute, and at least one elevator must be large enough to have wheelchair and stretcher access.

Necessary facilities

The Regulations on Private Hospitals stipulate that all private hospitals must have the following facilities: (i) general treatment rooms (treatment rooms for obstetrics and genecology departments and urology departments must in principle have bathrooms); (ii) at least two operating rooms and awakening areas (the space in each operating room must be 30m2 or larger, and the height from the floor to the ceiling of the operating rooms must be in principle three meters or more. The corridors inside operating rooms must be two meters or more in width); (iii) intensive care units with two or more beds; (iv) emergency room; (v) pharmacy; (vi) examination units with special permission granted; (vii) specimen room; (viii) disinfection room; (ix) central heating system (particularly hygienic air-conditioning systems must be installed in operating rooms, ICU and other facilities that require disinfection processes); (x) a sufficient number of sinks, toilets and bathrooms; (xi) garbage storage for medical and general wastes; (xii) morgue; (xiii) kitchen and washing room; and (xiv) ambulance.

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Necessary equipment

The Regulations on Operation of Treatment Institutions with Beds stipulates the nature of services that national hospitals are required to provide

9, setting forth the general conditions

of facilities to provide these services. The regulations, however, do not stipulate any specific technical requirements.

The Manual on Minimum Design Standards of Turkish Healthcare Facilities, on the other hand, stipulates a wide range of technical requirements, though it has no legal binding force as stated above.

3) The MOH’s plan to adopt new technologies for disaster medical services

Currently, there is no standard or rule for the following technologies in Turkey. But hospitals to be newly constructed are expected to have such standards and rules, and the MOH is planning to formulate them.

- Seismic isolation structure: Hospitals with 100 or more beds in regions designated as earthquake hazard levels 1 and 2 are required to adopt quake-absorbing structures.

- Cogeneration

- Green roof and energy-saving facilities

- Grey water facilities

- Facilities to allow the use of rainwater

- Geothermal power generation

- Power generation

Standards for installation of medical shelters

- Underground

- Close enough to ICU and operation room and directly accessible

- Place safe from damage by fire or disaster

- Spacious enough to accommodate half of the beds in the ICU at the hospital

9

The Regulations on Operation of Treatment Institutions with Beds specifies the following healthcare services that national hospitals must provide: (i) outpatient treatment services; (ii) diagnostic, treatment and care services provided by doctors, resident physicians, pharmacists, nutritionists, physiotherapists, psychiatrists or a team of specialists according to the nature of cases; (iii) 24-hour emergency medical care services provided by a sufficient number of personnel; (iv) laboratory services; (v) operating room services including necessary facilities and the necessary number of personnel under the supervision of doctors; (vi) disinfection services for facilities for operations; (vii) intensive care and resuscitation services; (viii) postoperative services to prevent complications; (ix) dispensing services; (x) cleaning services; (xi) meal and nutrition services for patients and hospital staff; (xii) cleaning services provided by persons responsible according to disinfection rules; (xiii) procurement and storage services for consumables, medicines, food, cleaning supplies, fuels, medical care supplies and others; and (xiv) gardening and other technical services.

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- Equipped with a care unit with equipment enabling temporary care of patients in the ICU and operating room

- Equipped with electric outlets at bed side and having room for medical gas, medical preparation and equipment

- Having medical equipment exclusively for medical shelters

- Unnecessary to have the inside of shelters completely sterilized

- Equipped with elevators satisfying the following requirements One elevator each for hospitals with 100-200 beds, two elevators each for hospitals

with 200-300 beds, three elevators each for hospitals with 300-400 beds, four elevators each for hospitals more than 400 beds

Loading capacity: 1600kg Door: 1.5m wide Dimensions: 2.4m x 2.4m Directly linked to rescue divisions at the time of fires and natural disasters Equipped with 4 electrical outlets (220V), 2 medical gases, 2 oxygen tanks and 1

aspirator Electricity supplied from the usual main power supply of the hospital. In case of

failure in electricity supply, a power generator exclusively for elevators of the medical shelter will supply electricity to the elevators.

4) Experience in Japan, requirements for designing Disaster Base Hospitals

Design criteria and requirements for Disaster Base Hospitals are described in 4.4.2.

In the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, massive damage was caused by the unexpected impact of the earthquake. From that experience, the importance of the Disaster Base Hospital has been recognized and a new standard for the Disaster Base Hospital has been institutionalized.

Disaster Base Hospital means a general hospital, which has additional or specific arrangements for facilities, utilities, equipment and stockpiles etc. to provide medical service even in the event of disasters. The hospital should be nominated as a Disaster Base Hospital by local government authorities. From the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, additional issues came out, and the standard of Disaster Base Hospital has been revised. It is proposed to develop facilities which will operate and keep providing medical services in the event of disaster, i.e., facilities similar to disaster base hospitals in Japan, and to establish a new system so that medical services can reliably be provided in the event of a disaster.

a. Requirements to operate as a disaster base hospital in Japan

(in terms of major facilities and equipment) ・ Accept inpatients twice the normal number, and outpatients 5 times the normal

number in the event of a disaster. ・ Having an electric generator which can supply 60% of the amount of electric power

at a normal time for 3 days. ・ Having a water reservoir tank(s) with an appropriate capacity and water well

facilities which can be used during a power outage. ・ Internet network via satellite communication system ・ Participation in widespread disaster and emergency medical service information

systems

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・ Self-contained medical services using portable medical devices for an emergency.

・ Stockpiles of food, drinking water, and drugs for approx. 3 days ・ Secure a heliport basically on the premises of the hospital.

b. Requirements to be enhanced in consideration of the experiences in the Great East Japan

Earthquake ・ Secure 2 heliports. At least one of them shall be set up on the ground. ・ Secure traffic routes to transfer emergency patients to the operating room even if

use of the elevators is suspended ・ Operating room/hall with natural lighting and ventilation, which can be used in

case of power failure ・ Large entrance eaves where a triage tent can be set up ・ Secure a room with natural lighting, ventilation, and information facilities on the

ground floor or in the vicinity of an entrance, in which a disaster response headquarters can be set up

・ Earthquake-resistant measures for building equipment, large-sized medical equipment, and interior finishing materials

・ Storage of sewage water ・ Duplexing of electric power supply system ・ Cooking devices which can be operated by an emergency generator ・ Elevator which can be recovered (restarted) immediately after an earthquake

It is required to build hospitals which satisfy all of the above mentioned requirements. It is also necessary to secure a place appropriate for a base of disaster medical service from all-round view points, including the condition of surrounding roads and urban infrastructure. In the event of a disaster of extreme severity, hospitals will be crowded with the affected citizens. In addition to space necessary during normal times, it is necessary to envision the required additional space in the event of a disaster including triage space for the affected citizens and space for medical experts and volunteers who have come to engage in support activities, and to secure necessary space and facilities in advance.

5) Issues and Proposal for Disaster Base Hospitals in Turkey

It was recognized that hospitals in Turkey have been doing considerable work on preparation for disaster response according to the rules and systems in Turkey. However, from the inspection of the existing hospitals, many challenges regarding the hospital buildings were observed that need to be improved / upgraded to be disaster-resistant as a disaster base hospital, with consideration of lessons learned from Japanese experience. Restructuring of the concept and system of disaster base hospital in Turkey is proposed. Following are the significant challenges observed in the hospital investigations in Turkey.

a. Floor planning with consideration of the situation when an elevator stops due to an earthquake Floor plan of Uludag University Hospital is shown below. This hospital has rooms for patients in critical condition and operating rooms on the 3rd floor in the disaster medical service building. This floor layout is planned based on the premise of using an elevator from the entrance on the ground floor.

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It seems that a scenario in which the use of the elevators would be suspended during and after disaster was not taken into account in the hospital building design. It is a common issue among all of the hospitals investigated in the survey. It is proposed to ensure circulation routes to transfer patients in critical condition from an emergency entrance to the operating room, even if the elevators are suspended. A horizontal route or sloped route for patient transfer from the emergency entrance to the operating room should be considered.

Figure 4.4.19 Building Layout of Uludag University Hospital

Disaster Medical Service Building

Ward Building

Outpatient Building

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Figure 4.4.20 Floor Plan of Uludag University Hospital

Elevators will stop in the event of an earthquake or fire. Even if the in-house power generator can be reliably operated, the elevators will stop for the sake of safety. The elevator can be used after a qualified maintenance engineer has come and restarted it after confirming the safety of the elevator itself and the internal shafts. In the event of a large-scale disaster, there is no guarantee that a maintenance engineer will come immediately. In this case, unless a horizontal traffic route is secured on the same floor, the staff members need to take a patient who will undergo emergency surgery to the operating room or a patient after surgery to the ICU or HCU by stairs. Many staff members are required for transport and the burden on the patient becomes large.

Figure 4.4.21 Training for transporting a patient by stairs assuming a case when an elevator stops (example in a Japanese hospital)

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By providing a structure which allows horizontal movement from the emergency entrance to a room for a critical condition patient such as an operating room or ICU on the same floor, the hospital can function in the event of a large-scale disaster.

b. Securing of space for accepting outpatients and facilities (medical gas, outlets for medical care) in the event of a disaster

The following pictures show a scene in the waiting space for outpatients in the Japanese Red Cross Ishinomaki Hospital during normal times, and after the Great East Japan Earthquake.

Normal Time After the Disaster

Figure 4.4.22 Waiting Space for Outpatients in the Japanese Red Cross Ishinomaki Hospital

As there were outlets for medical gas and medical care on the walls, the waiting space was used for emergency treatment in the disaster and saved many lives. In the disaster base hospitals in Japan, outlets for medical care and medical gas are generally provided on the walls of the waiting space, conference room, and rehabilitation room. This installation of extra outlets for medical care and medical gas will be useful in Turkey. In Turkey, it seems that emergency gas cylinders are frequently used. However, in case of an emergency, it will take time to carry the heavy iron gas cylinders from the storeroom, even though the cylinder becomes empty of oxygen. Emergency response will be easier by providing outlets on walls as much as possible.

Figure 4.4.23 Example of outlets for medical gas and medical care on the wall of the conference room (in Japan)

Figure 4.4.24 Scene of carrying in/out medical gas cylinders in Hacettepe University Hospital

c. Secure water to continue medical services

A large amount of water is used for medical services in a hospital. It could become impossible to provide medical services continuously in the event of a disaster if water is not

Medical gas

Outlet for medical care

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secured for drinking and hand washing before and after treatment, treatment of the affected part of a patient before disinfection, and cleaning of medical devices. According to the common practice in Turkey, a water storage tank should have a capacity above a certain level (in Japan, the amount for approx. 3 days), and if city water supply has been halted due to damage to the water piping there will be a wait for aid while using the water remaining in the storage tank. However, the data required to determine the necessary capacity for the number of patients to be accepted are unclear. Thus, it is necessary to clarify the basis for the capacity calculation and determine the capacity.

Figure 4.4.25 Water supply by a water tank truck in the event of disaster

d. Considerations given to power failure in the Architectural Design of a Disaster Base

Hospital Even if a private electric generator is installed to cope with power outage during a disaster, it will not be enough to continue hospital service until power supply system is recovered. Some of the operating rooms should have windows that will allow natural light into the arena. It will help to save energy by cutting light use in the daytime.

Figure 4.4.26 Operating room with natural lighting & ventilation system in a hospital in Germany

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e. Installation of heliports From the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake, it was learned that a great number of patients will be transported by helicopters in the event of a wide-scale disaster, and disaster response activities will be made easier by having two heliports on the premises of the hospital. If a heliport is located on the top of the building, there will be difficulties if the elevators are stopped due to power outage. Thus, it is important to set up at least one heliport on the ground. It was confirmed that having two heliports is useful for the disaster base hospital in order not to consume precious time in waiting for landing.

Figure 4.4.27 Heliports

In Turkey, it has been determined that there are not many hospitals equipped with a heliport. Due to the cost for building heliports and the difficulty in securing safe air routes in the urban areas, building of heliports has not been proceeding smoothly, even if the need is recognized. It is impossible to set up heliports in all hospitals, unless hospitals which take on special tasks as a disaster base are clearly designated and an adequate budget is allocated to those hospitals.

f. Earthquake-resistant measures for building facilities

Even when the collapse or damage of the building can be avoided in the event of a disaster, the hospital will not be able to maintain its functions and disaster response cannot be taken, if the facilities or finish materials are damaged.

(h1) Water tanks Sufficient earthquake-resistant measures should be taken for building facilities such as water storage tanks. Otherwise, the certainty of disaster response cannot be ensured.

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Figure 4.4.28 Damaged Water Tanks

Figure 4.4.29 Damaged Water Tanks

Water tank panel was damaged and caused water leakage as a result of a shock from the Great East Japan Earthquake

The panels of the water tank were deformed and the lower part of the panel was damaged.

It is also important to secure the earthquake resistance of building facilities other than the above-mentioned water storage tanks, including large-sized medical equipment, and interior materials such as walls and ceilings in the hospital as with the case of securing the earthquake resistance of the building structure.

(h2) Power generators Generally, hospitals in Turkey handle energy in a separate building. However, whether the earthquake resistance is sufficient is uncertain. The following photo shows the installation state of the in-house power generators. From the magnified photo of the footing (photo below), it is found that the generators are not fixed to the floor. Kanuni Sultan Suleyman Egitim ve Arastisma Hospital (National hospital in Istanbul) is a general hospital in Istanbul completed in May 2011. It is the largest scale hospital on the European side of Istanbul, with 650 beds and an area of 115,000 m2. The iron angle is provided with a hole for fixing to the floor, but it is not fixed by bolts. Although it is a national hospital in Istanbul which was completed in May 2011, no reinforcement has been made even after 2 years have passed.

Figure 4.4.30 Backup Generators in Kanuni Sultan Suleyman Egitim ve Arastisma Hospital

As a countermeasure, it will be effective and necessary to establish a system of obligatory regular inspection and maintenance, with a list of check items for disaster prevention, in addition to the sevior inspection before completion of construction.

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g. Storage of sewage water Not only water supply but also sewage water measures are important. However, measures to handle sewage water tend to be insufficient in many cases. If water is supplied, the used water will become sewage. In the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, a lack of toilets became a great issue at that time. In facilities such as hospitals, it is important to prepare portable toilets and tanks for storing sewage as well.

Figure 4.4.31 Temporary Toilets (in Japan)

In Turkey, it seems that there are not many hospitals which have a sewage storing function. However, it is important to secure sewage tanks as well as water supply functions such as water storage tanks. Sewage tanks should be provided in disaster base hospitals.

h. Earthquake-resistant measures for non-structural materials and interior finish materials With regard to the anti-seismic reinforcement in the ceilings and the openings for connection between facilities and building materials, damage and collapse by a big earthquake must be prevented. The pictures show ceiling materials which were damaged and collapsed due to insufficient reinforcement of the ceiling backing materials in the Great East Japan Earthquake.

Figure 4.4.32 Damaged Ceiling Materials

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey (2) Structural planning

1) Current situation in Turkey

Results of investigation of the existing hospitals in terms of building structure are summarized below. (Names of the hospitals are described in 4.4.3 (1) 1)).

Table 4.4.15 Result of Assessment (Structure) Assessment Points Legend of assessment C Compliant



Structure 1 Has the aseismic performance

target been clearly specified?

N N N N N N N As the standard was revised in 2007, an efficient usage of 1.5

was allocated for hospital construction. However,

comprehensive criteria are necessary including non-structural components.

2 Have earthquake-resistant measures been taken for building

facilities, large-sized medical equipment, and non-structural

components (such as ceilings and exteriors)?

__ ＿＿＿＿＿＿ A guideline has been established. Reinforcement will

be promoted in the future according to the guideline. However, it is necessary to

establish detailed assessment and design methods.

3 What about the spread of earthquake-absorbing structures

(number of cases, application purpose)?

N N N N N N N There is a plan to build new public hospitals with 100 or

more beds which are earthquake-proof (MOH).

However, there are only a few practical examples. The plan has just begun. With regard to major

disaster prevention facilities including base hospitals in the

area with a high risk of earthquakes, it is preferable to

promote seismic isolation in the existing facilities.

4 Has the aseismic performance target been clearly specified?

N N N N N N N Only the method dependent on recording the earthquake

vibrations based on the U.S.-style method. It is necessary to add verifications on long-period and long-duration earthquake vibrations by using a rational

simulation method. 5 To what extent have

displacement follow-up properties been secured for the vertical

transfer devices and facilities in the base-isolated layer?

C C C C C ＿＿ Displacement follow-up properties need to be secured

depending on predicted displacement values by various types of earthquake vibrations.

The administrative worker at the site said that the displacement

follow-up property was secured. However, it is necessary to verify

the effects of various earthquake vibrations

mentioned in ④.

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6 Can various base isolation devices be used?

N N N N N N N There was no practical example as far as the engineers that were

interviewed at the site knew. The system should be

established as soon as possible. 7 Has an inspection system for

ordinary circumstances and in the event of a big earthquake been established for base isolation

devices?

＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ There was no practical example as far as the engineers that were

interviewed at the site knew. The system should be

established as soon as possible.

To ensure the continuation of hospital functions after the occurrence of a disaster, the structurally safest earthquake-absorbing structure will be proposed. By adopting an earthquake-absorbing structure, damage to building facilities, finish materials, and large-sized medical equipment can be minimized in the event of an earthquake. On the occasion of adopting an earthquake-absorbing structure, it is proposed to realize a highly-reliable hospital by performing simulations using a large amount of earthquake data obtained from the experience in Japan and making optimum seismic isolation designs in comprehensive consideration of propagation of vibrations depending on the soil structure on the premises (for details, refer to Chapter 5).

(3) MEP system

1) MEP system of hospitals in Turkey

The facility standard for hospitals in Turkey is stipulated by THE 2010 GUIDELINE ON MINIMUM DESIGN STANDARDS FOR HEALTHCARE FACILITIES IN TURKEY. However, this is a minimum standard. Specific facility criteria for disaster measures are not described there. It seems that the recently planned PPP project has been designed at the discretion of each business establishment. Investigation on site is given below. (Names of surveyed hospitals are in 4.4.3. (1), 1))

Table 4.4.16 MEP system assessment of hospitals in Turkey Assessment Points Legend of assessment C Compliant



MEP Work 1. Stockpile of drinking water C N N N C --- ---

*：Over 3 days n：1-2 days ----：Unconfirmed or other

2 Emergency generator capacity N N N C C C C

*：70% or more of demand n：50-70% ---：Unconfirmed or other

3 Fuel storage capacity for emergency generator

N --- --- N C --- C

*： 3 days or more or supply contract n：1-2 days --：Unconfirmed or other

4 Protection against flood for important rooms (electrical, telecommunication, heat source equipment and control room)

C N N N --- --- ---

*：Comply n：Not comply ---：Unconfirmed or other

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5 Stockpile of domestic water (flushing water and etc.)

N N N N N --- N

* ： 3days or more or water recycling system n：1-2 day ---：Unconfirmed or other

6 Temporary storage of sewage in case of infrastructure breakdown --- --- --- --- --- --- N

*：Storage for 3days or more n：No ---：Unconfirmed or other

7 Backup of city water C -- -- -- C --- ---

*：Well water supply or stockpile n：Not comply ---：Unconfirmed or other

8 Sufficient backup for heat source, boiler, etc. normally driven by city gas

-- -- -- -- -- N --- *：Comply n：Not comply ---：Unconfirmed or other

9 Availability of the usage of natural ventilation and lighting in case of emergency

C C C C C C C *：Comply n：Not comply ---:Unconfirmed or other

10 Redundancy of communication systems (dual incoming, satellite system, etc.)

C -- -- -- C --- --- *：Comply n：Not comply ---：Unconfirmed or other

11 Availability of temporary generator connection -- -- -- -- -- --- ---


12 Dual power incoming from power company N N N N N --- ---


13 Backup of cooking devices normally driven by city gas (Electric cooker, etc.)

N N N N N --- --- *：Comply n：Not comply ---：Unconfirmed or other

14 Sufficient stock of medical gas --- --- --- --- --- --- ---


15 Emergency generator and UPS backup of medical information system

C --- --- C C --- C *：Comply n：Not comply ---：Unconfirmed or other

16 Restoration system for elevator after earthquake N N N N N --- ---


Table 4.4.17 shows a summary of the MEP system of Sevket Yilmaz Research and Education Hospital which would be a disaster base hospital in Bursa.

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Table 4.4.17 Investigation of Sevket Yilmaz Research and Education Hospital

Item Specification Seismic resistant Seismic resistant structure Power Single incoming from power company (unconfirmed) Gas City gas Communication Fiber optics and metal (No satellite communication system) Domestic water City domestic water, Water storage tank for 1 – 3 days Sewage Sewage infrastructure (No temporary storage) Emergency generator 50-100% capacity of demand

Fuel storage for 1 day operation) Heat source Chiller for cooling, Gas boiler for heating Energy-saving system Nothing in particular (unconfirmed compliance with Energy

Efficiency Law) There is an energy efficiency law in Turkey. >Secondary Legislation in Energy Performance in Buildings >Minimum performance criteria

Location of main plant Independent building other than hospital building Cooking devices Gas-operated devices are mainly used Medical gas Stockpile amounts are not confirmed Seismic resistant fixing for MEP equipment

Weak compared to that in Japan

2) MEP requirements for disaster base hospitals in Japan

The current facility requirements for disaster base hospitals in Japan are described for the purpose of comparison.

Table 4.4.18 MEP requirements for disaster base hospitals in Japan

Item Requirements Seismic resistant Seismic resistant and isolation structure Power Dual incoming from power company *1 Gas City gas Communication Fiber optics, metal and satellite communication system *2 Domestic water City domestic water, Water storage tank for 3 days and well water backup *2 Sewage Sewage infrastructure and temporary storage for 3 days Emergency generator 60% capacity of demand *2

Fuel storage for 3 days operation *1, 2 Heat source Diverse energy sources (Gas and electricity) Energy-saving system Energy consumption standard based on CASBEE Location of main plant Inside of hospital building Cooking devices Gas-operated devices are mainly used Medical gas Stockpiles for 3 days *2 Seismic resistant fixing for MEP equipment

Fixation which can withstand a seismic force approx. twice the minimum limit *1

*1: General seismic resistance standards for government facilities of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

*2: Requirements for disaster base hospitals specified by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare

Compared to Japanese requirements, there seems to exist some concerns regarding Sevket Yilmaz Research and Education Hospital which are listed below .

【Provision of earthquake protection】

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- Dual power and communication and incoming satellite communication system

- Fixation of MEP equipment

- Seismic resistant energy plant building

【Provision of infrastructure failure countermeasures】

- Fuel storage capacity for 3 days or more

- Temporary sewage tank

- Backup for gas operated equipment (Boiler, cooking devices)

3) Proposed MEP requirements for a disaster base hospital

As a major condition of the MEP system for disaster base hospitals, operations should be performed 24 hours a day as these hospitals provide important medical facilities not only in normal operation but also in the event of a disaster. To achieve this, systems required for maintaining the functions of the facility such as a power supply system, air-conditioning system in the important rooms, and water supply system shall be duplexed or organized with a redundant configuration. The systems shall be configured so that operations will not be stopped on the occasions of a facility inspection, equipment failure, future upgrading of facilities, etc. In addition, in consideration of the risk of fires in the facility, the electrical room will be divided into 2 fireproof compartments to ensure the operation of the facility.

Furthermore, to operate the facility even in the event of a disaster, the period when the facility can operate independently during infrastructure breakdown shall be 3 to 7 days. (Three days shall be the minimum standard. Maximum 7 days shall be assumed depending on regional characteristics.) The independent operation for a certain period shall be achieved by the stockpiles of fuel and water, diversification of energy sources (electric power, city gas), and ensuring of alternative means (well water, wastewater recycling system). Also, to make the above functions maintainable, facilities for which energy and operation cost can be saved will be introduced proactively with state-of-the art technologies.

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Figure 4.4.33 MEP system image of a highly-reliable cost-saving system

Table 4.4.19 Proposed MEP requirements for a disaster base hospital

Item Requirements Seismic resistant Seismic isolation structure Power Dual incoming from power company

Dual power distribution system Division of the electrical room into two compartments (to avoid the risk of fires in the electrical room and operation interruption during periodic inspection and expansion/repair work)

Gas City gas Communication Fiber optics, metal and satellite communication system Domestic water City domestic water Water storage tank for 3 days

Water recycling system for flushing water (for 7 days operation at maximum) Well water backup

Sewage Sewage infrastructure Temporary storage for 3 days Water recycling system

Grey water service Grey water service piping to use recycled water Emergency generator 100% capacity of demand

Dual fuel turbine generator (can be operated by diesel fuel and city gas) Division of generator room into 2 fire compartments (to avoid the risk of fires) Fuel storage for 3 to 7 days operation (Fuel is divided into 2 tanks to avoid breakdown)

Heat source Diverse energy sources (Gas and electricity) Energy-saving system Co-generation system

LED lighting fixtures, Highly efficient heat source Rainwater utilization system

Location of main plant Inside of hospital building Cooking devices Gas and electric operated devices are used Medical gas Stockpiles for 3 to 7 days Seismic resistant fixing for MEP equipment

Fixation in accordance with horizontal acceleration by base isolation

4.4.4. Proposed Disaster Base Hospitals in Bursa (Components A & C) As for earthquakes with a seismic intensity of 7 or higher, Japan experienced the Great Hanshin earthquake in 1995 and the Great East Japan earthquake in 2011, while Turkey experienced the İzmit earthquake in 1999 and the Van earthquake in 2011. Having learned

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from a series of big earthquakes, both countries have made improvements in hospital information systems, emergency medical assistant teams and other fields. As for hospital facilities, Turkey has promoted earthquake resistance and developed disaster risk management manuals. But there is still room for improvement in the manuals in terms of approach to securing stockpiles and lifelines, response to an increase in the number of patients in disasters, and task sharing and collaboration with other healthcare institutions. Contrary to the decentralized hospital system in Turkey, the concept of Disaster Base Hospitals which incorporates the idea of a business continuity plan (BCP) recently established in Japan is considered to produce great beneficial effects if it is applied to disaster medical measures in Turkey.

The following table compares improvements in the healthcare sectors after the recent great earthquakes in Japan and Turkey.

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Table 4.4.20 Improvements in the healthcare sector after the recent great earthquakes in Japan and Turkey

Japan Turkey

Recent great earthquake

Improvements Recent great earthquake

Improvements

Great Hanshin earthquake (M7.3, 1995)

Great East Japan earthquake (M9.0, 2011)

(i) Disaster Base Hospitals (1996) * Earthquake-resistance * Enhancement of wider area transport * Establishment of the concept of BCP

(ii) EMIS (2001) (iii) DMAT (established in 2005)

İzmit earthquake (M7.6, 1999)

Van earthquake (M7.2, 2011)

(i) Enhancement of disaster risk management

* Introduction of earthquake-resistance to buildings * Preparation of disaster risk management manuals * Preparation of temporary residences and hospitals

(ii) Establishment of SAKOM (development of information system) (2009) (iii) UMKE (established in 2003)

Table 4.4.21 Comparison of disaster healthcare in Japan and Turkey, and proposals

Item Japan Turkey

Present state Features Present state Features

① Disaster Base Hospitals

662 hospitals have been remodeled as Disaster Base Hospitals (2013)

Bases to accept injured and sick persons from areas afflicted by disasters

Promotion of earthquake-resistance, development of disaster risk management manuals, etc.

Integrated disaster medical measures, and development of bases

Wide area transport

Transport of injured and sick persons to outside the afflicted areas

Installation of heliports. SCU (transport bases) established will enable appropriate transport of patients in disasters.

Chiefly, transport within the region

Installation of heliports, and consideration of transport bases (SCU)

BCP Facilities, equipment and stockpiles

BCP has been established as a system covering entire facilities including non-infrastructure and capable of performing comprehensive anti-disaster measures

The concept of BCP has not yet taken root.

Fixing of non-structural materials, calculation of stock and raw materials, and establishment of the concept of BCP

Referral system

The primary, secondary and tertiary referral systems have been established.

Each hospital can now deal with an appropriate number of patients.

Low function Establishment of the system

② Wide-area emergency medical information systems

EMIS (web-based disaster medical information system)

Not just information about vacancies in each department of the hospitals but also healthcare information, especially for the time of disasters, can be provided through portal sites that are available to the public.

SAKOM medical information system gives vacancy information at each hospital.

The following functions will be added.

(i) Information provision through portal sites that are available to the public (ii) Medical information, especially for the time of disasters

③ Emergency medical assistance teams

DMAT Disaster Base Hospitals now perform integrated training, specializing in disaster healthcare.

UMKE

Making provincial bases and Disaster Base Hospitals

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Figure 4.4.34 Proposal for Disaster Base Hospitals in Turkey

In line with the foregoing consideration of the disaster healthcare system, construction, structures, and facilities of Disaster Base Hospitals, this section outlines proposals for the two hospitals cited in the case study in Bursa.

(1) Çekirge Hospital

1) Proposed Disaster Base Hospital

The Çekirge Public Hospital (hereinafter called the “Çekirge Hospital”) was founded at the center of Bursa in 1961. With a total of 529 beds, it is an A-2 level hospital with the third largest bed capacity in Bursa and is under the management of the MOH. According to interviews with officers of the MOH of the central government on October 4, 2013 and February 5, 2014, the Çekirge Hospital is planned to be merged with a perinatal hospital and a pediatric hospital and moved to a neighboring military reservation to be rebuilt as a new hospital with 700 beds. Because there is no A-1 level hospital in the city center of Bursa, the Çekirge Hospital currently deals with about one sixth of all the patients at the hospitals under the management of the MOH. It is also expected to accept many patients if a disaster occurs.

2) Geographical significance in the Province of Bursa

- The Çekirge Hospital is located conveniently, covering the central area of the urban district, adjacent to the traffic node, and accessible to patients and staff both at normal times and in an emergency.

- It is adjacent to a military airport and thus can accept emergency patients at the time of disasters and easily procure medical materials and equipment.

- The new location is adjacent to vacant land and a park which can serve as first-aid stations in an emergency. Located near three high schools, it can secure emergency evacuation areas and triage spaces.

3) Proposed roles as a Disaster Base Hospital

- In case of disasters, the hospital will centrally gather information about the surrounding areas, report to the SAKOM of the Bursa Provincial Health Directorate and the regional

Disaster Base Hospital

Disaster

Base Hospital


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headquarters for disaster control, dispatch necessary medical staff and medical supplies, and make requests for such personnel and supplies.

- The hospital will deal with critical patients (multiple trauma, crush syndrome and extensive burns) who will increase in number during and after disasters.

- The hospital will deal with patients with acute-phase heart disease and stroke patients who need emergency treatment.

- The hospital will care for patients who need continued treatment even at the time of disasters (provision of oxygen to home patients with chronic diseases, administration of medicines to patients with high blood pressure and diabetes, etc.)

- The hospital will deal with patients with heart diseases who will increase in number during and after disasters because of acute stress and stress from living in evacuation shelters.

- The hospital will take in 112 centers and serve as a basis of UKME in Bursa.

- The hospital will be equipped with advanced functions to deal with critical patients requiring diagnosis and treatment in more than one medical department.

Table 4.4.22 Medical Staff and facilities for Disaster Base Hospital 1

Medical staff

• Doctors versed in the special knowledge and skills of tertiary emergency medical care

• Physicians specializing in critical emergency patients who will increase in number during and after disasters

• Full-time physicians and surgeons specializing in heart diseases and cerebral hemorrhage, and pediatricians

• Full-time emergency nurses and emergency nurses specializing in pediatrics • Radiological technologists and clinical laboratory staff • Other medical staff members necessary for emergency surgical treatment

Facilities Special beds (20 or more) and special ICU / coronary care units (CCU) / stroke care units (SCU) / pediatric intensive care units / emergency resuscitation units / emergency examination units, radiology rooms and operating rooms

4) Summary of the present state of the Çekirge Hospital

The number of beds, etc. - Number of beds: 529, number of inpatients: 37,578 patients/year, number of

outpatients: 851,937 patients/year, bed occupancy rate: 87.60%, average length of hospitalization: 4.47 days (2011)

Departments

- Emergency, internal medicine, general surgery, gastroenterology, thoracic surgery, cardiology, cardiovascular surgery, neurosurgery, neurology, kidney disease, urology, incretion and metabolic disease, rheumatism, radiology, obstetrics and gynecology, pediatrics, psychiatry, ophthalmology, otorhinolaryngology, infection and clinical microbiology, dermatology, plastic and reconstructive surgery, orthopedics and external injuries, physiotherapy and rehabilitation, sports medicine, geriatrics, anesthesiology, pathology, biochemistry, and microbiology

Medical doctors (Specialist)

- 6 emergency physicians. No other emergency medical specialists.

- 4 specialists in circulatory organs; 2 neurosurgeons; 2 cardiovascular surgeons; and 3 pediatricians

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey 5) Summary of the Plan

The following plan is presented to make the Çekirge Hospital function as a Disaster Base Hospital as described above.

- Development of a function as an emergency healthcare center, and strengthening of the functions of cardiovascular surgery, neurosurgery and pediatric departments

- Equip an information system to build a cooperation scheme with various organizations (a system including not just ordinary telephone lines but also disaster preparedness administration radio systems, satellite phones, satellite communication functions enabling Internet connection, and wide-area disaster medical information systems)

- Strengthening of facility measures for continued medical care and backup measures (as listed in the following table)

Table 4.4.23 Disaster measures for the facilities for Cekirge hospital

Facilities • Seismic isolation structure • Space and functions for dealing with twice as many inpatients and five

times as many outpatients as those in ordinary times • Triage space and installation of outlets for medical gas for increasing the

feasible number of patients • Facility and equipment fall prevention • Measures against stoppage of elevators • Backup infrastructures (energy saving measures, cogeneration, etc.) • Heliport

Backup measures

• Storage of medical supplies, food, fuels and other necessities by considering the damage estimation

• Formulation of disaster-preparedness manuals and training scheme for staff members

• Backups of healthcare information

6) Proposed Architecture for the Disaster Base Medical Centre

Source: JST

Figure 4.4.35 Image of the Disaster Base Medical Centre 4-123


The figure above shows an image of ideal hospital facilities that reflects the proposed Disaster Base Hospitals. The buildings are all low-rise for a hospital, and the hospital wards are laid out separately from the outpatient treatment ward. Advanced medical care units such as emergency rooms, operating units and ICU should be horizontally placed on the same floor to make mutual communications easier through sloped ramps and other foot traffic lines at the time of disasters. As for the external facilities, certain space and necessary facilities must be secured in advance so as to accept emergency assistant teams at the time of disasters. Proposed hospital size The latest standards of the MOH (2012 version) stipulate that the area per bed must be 200m2 or larger. The hospital size planned according to the standards is assumed as follows.

Table 4.4.24 Proposed hospital size for Cekirge Hospital (Component A)

Major contents No. of beds proposed

Total proposed area Structure

Improve the Çekirge Hospital to be a core Disaster Base Hospital by encouraging its relocation and renewal plan

700 140,000m2 - Seismic isolation structure - Hospital wards are laid out separately from the outpatient treatment ward

Table 4.4.25 Facility plan: standards to be developed

Item Contents Earthquake-resistance Seismic isolation Electric power Lead in 2 lines from electric company

Duplication of substation facilities and division of electricity room into two places (Reduce a risk of fire in an electric room and of stopping of operation during regular inspection and repair and extension works)

Gas City gas Telecommunication Optical fiber and communication satellite Water Lead in water

Storage for around 3-day use (ensuring water quality) Waste water reprocessing system (available for around 7 days) Use of well-water

Wastewater Discharge into the general waste water system Backup drainage tank (for 3 days) and waste water reprocessing system

Grey water Build grey water system and utilize it for flushing toilets (by reprocessing rainwater and wastewater)

Emergency generator Backup 100% of electricity Dual fuel gas turbine generator (operable either by light oil or city gas) 2 fuel tanks for 3- to 7-day use (divided into 2 tanks to reduce the risk of failure) Divide generator rooms into two. (Reduce the risk of fire in the electric room and of stopping of operations during regular inspection and repair and extension works)

Heat source Chiller (air conditioning) and gas boiler + heat pump (heater) (electric heating is available during city gas outage)

Energy-saving system Cogeneration system LED lighting, highly efficient heating system, and system to permit use of rainwater

Energy plant Seismic isolated building integrated with the Emergency Operation Center Kitchen equipment Gas + electric apparatus Medical gas Backup gas storage for 3- to 7-day use Aseismic fixing method for equipment

Fix in line with horizontal acceleration for seismic isolation

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey (2) Şevket Hospital

1) Proposed Disaster Base Hospital

The Şevket Yılmaz Eğitim Araştırma Hospital (hereinafter called the “Şevket Hospital”) was founded in the east of the city of Bursa in 2005. It is an A-1 level core hospital with a total of 876 beds. According to interviews conducted on October 7, 2013, there is a plan to construct a hospital specializing in cardiovascular diseases with 200 beds and a heliport in a vacant lot adjacent to the hospital. The Şevket Hospital provides specialized medical education in 13 fields but is considering increasing the number of fields to 25.

As for disaster-preparedness measures, the hospital is earthquake resistant and has elevators with earthquake sensors. It has a plan to have containers to store water, food, healthcare supplies and rescue kits to last for three days in case of disasters. It is equipped with a water treatment unit for CBRN.

2) Geographical significance in the Province of Bursa

The Şevket Hospital is in Yildrim, a highly populated district like Osmangazi, in Bursa. The main access road is E90, but the hospital will be equipped with a heliport so that it can serve as a core hospital that can transport patients from remote places during and after disasters.

It has a vacant lot in the vicinity, which can be used as a rescue base, evacuation shelters and triage space during and after disasters. In light of the expansion plan, there is a possibility that the hospital will acquire the surrounding land.

3) Proposed Roles as a regional Disaster Base Hospital

- The Şevket Hospital will provide healthcare services that other healthcare institutions in the region can hardly provide during and after disasters, serve as a core hospital in the eastern part of Bursa, and collaborate with the Çekirge Hospital

- In case of disasters, the hospital will centrally gather information about the surrounding areas, report to the SAKOM of the Bursa Provincial Health Directorate and the regional headquarters for disaster control, dispatch necessary healthcare staff and medical supplies, and make requests for such personnel and supplies.

- The hospital will deal with critical patients (multiple trauma, crush syndrome and extensive burns) who will increase in number during and after disasters.

- The hospital will deal with patients with acute-phase heart disease and stroke patients who need emergency treatment.

- The hospital will care for patients who need continued treatment even at the time of disasters (provision of oxygen to home patients with chronic diseases, administration of medicines to patients with high blood pressure and diabetes, etc.)

- The hospital will deal with patients with heart diseases who will increase in number during and after disasters because of acute stress and stress from living in evacuation shelters.

- A 112 ambulance station will be allocated in the hospital and incorporate UMKE in Cekirge hospital through SAKOM.

- The hospital will be equipped with advanced functions to deal with critical patients requiring diagnosis and treatment in more than one medical department.

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Table 4.4.26 Medical Staff and facilities for Disaster Base Hospital 2

Medical staff • Doctors versed in the special knowledge and skills of tertiary emergency healthcare services

• Physicians specializing in critical emergency patients who will increase in number during and after disasters

• Full-time physicians and surgeons specializing in heart diseases and cerebral hemorrhage, and pediatricians

• Full-time emergency nurses and emergency nurses specializing in pediatrics

• Radiological technologists and clinical laboratory staff • Other medical staff members necessary for emergency surgical

treatment Facilities Special beds (20 or more) and special ICU / coronary care units (CCU) /

stroke care units (SCU) / pediatric intensive care units / emergency resuscitation units / emergency examination units, radiology rooms and operating rooms

4) Summary of the present state of the Şevket Hospital

The number of beds, etc.

- Number of beds: 879, number of inpatients: 54,737 patients/year, number of outpatients: 767,009 patients/year, bed occupancy rate: 75.25%, average length of hospitalization : 4.46 days

Departments

- Emergency, internal medicine, general surgery, gastroenterology, thoracic surgery, cardiology, cardiovascular surgery, pulmonary disease and tuberculosis, neurosurgery, neurology, kidney disease, urology, incretion and metabolic disease, rheumatism, nuclear medicine, radiology, obstetrics and gynecology, neonatology, pediatrics, pediatric cardiology, pediatric neurology, pediatric kidney disease, pediatric psychiatry, psychiatry, ophthalmology, otorhinolaryngology, infection and clinical microbiology, dermatology, plastic and reconstructive surgery, orthopedics and external injuries, physiotherapy and rehabilitation, sports medicine, heredity clinic, anesthesiology, and dentistry

Medical doctors (Specialist)

- 5 emergency physicians, 1 traumatologist. No other emergency medical specialists.

- 4 specialists in circulatory organs; 8 neurosurgeons; 3 cardiovascular surgeons; and 32 pediatricians

5) Summary of the Plan

The existing hospital buildings will be refurbished, a new hospital extension with 150 beds will be built for high care, and the hospital functions strengthened. Possible measures to strengthen the hospital functions include the use of the premises of the police school currently not in use in order to enhance specialized education, build accommodations for staff members, storage and evacuation shelters, and ensure triage space.

- Development of a function as an emergency healthcare center, and strengthening of the functions of cardiovascular surgery

- Equip an information system to build a cooperation scheme with various organizations (a

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system including not just ordinary telephone lines but also disaster preparedness administration radio systems, satellite phones, and satellite communication functions thus enabling Internet connection, and wide-area disaster medical information systems)

- Strengthening of facility measures for continued medical care and backup measures (as listed in the following table)

Table 4.4.27 Disaster measures for facilities for Sevket hospital

Empowerment (Extension of existing hospital)

• Twice bed capacity in disaster (Currently 10% only) with Medical gas system

• Heliport shall be allocated • Separate patient data backup • Satellite communication system • Specialized educational function • Coordination function with UMKE

Hospital extension (150 beds)

• Seismic isolation • Emergency supplies for disaster • Double bed capacity in disaster • Patients, staff and material flow with Sevket hospital • Common HIMS with Sevket hospital and data back-up

Existing Police College

• New hospital for additional clinical departments/ Disaster Management function

• Accommodations for staff members, storage and evacuation shelters, and ensure triage space

Proposed hospital size As in the case of the Çekirge Hospital, the hospital size can be assumed as follows in accordance with the latest standards (2012 version) of the MOH.

Table 4.4.28 Proposed hospital size for Sevket Hospital (Component C) Major contents No. of beds

proposed Total proposed area Structure

To strengthen the size and function as a hospital with advanced medical care, associated with the Şevket Hospitals and equipped with 150 beds

150 30,000m2 Same as above

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Table 4.4.29 Facility plan: standards to be developed

Item Contents Earthquake-resistance Seismic isolation Electric power Lead in 2 lines from electric company

Duplication of substation facilities and division of electricity room into two places (Reduce the risk of fire in an electric room and of stopping of operations during regular inspection and repair and extension works)

Gas City gas Telecommunication Optical fiber and communication satellite Water Lead in water

Storage for around 3-day use (ensuring water quality) Waste water reprocessing system (available for around 7 days) Use of well-water

Wastewater Discharge into the general waste water system Backup drainage tank (for 3 days) and waste water reprocessing system

Grey water Build grey water system and utilize it for flushing toilets (by reprocessing rainwater and wastewater)

Emergency generator Backup 100% of electricity Dual fuel gas turbine generator (operable either by light oil or city gas) 2 fuel tanks for 3- to 7-day use (divided into 2 tanks to reduce the risk of failure) Divide generator rooms into two. (Reduce the risk of fire in an electric room and of stopping of operations during regular inspection and repair and extension works)

Heat source Chiller (air conditioning) and gas boiler + heat pump (heater) (electric heating is available during city gas outage)

Energy-saving system Cogeneration system LED lighting, highly efficient heating system, and system to permit the use of rainwater

Energy plant Seismic isolated building integrated with the Emergency Operation Center Kitchen equipment Gas + electric apparatus Medical gas Backup gas storage for 3- to 7-day use Aseismic fixing method for equipment

Fix in line with horizontal acceleration for seismic isolation

4.5. Proposal for Other Facilities for Disaster Prevention The following is a proposal for other facilities for disaster prevention based on the current situation.

4.5.1. Disaster and Emergency Management Center The Disaster and Emergency Management Center is the main facility of a proposed DMC as stated in Chapter 3. This section describes the current situation of the Disaster and Emergency Management Center in Bursa Province and the proposal for Bursa.

(1) Current Situation of Disaster and Emergency Management Center

The provincial AFAD, the fire station and the emergency heliport for the Ministry of Health are located together in the northern part of Bursa Municipality. A training center for the search and rescue team and storage facilities of related organizations are also located on the site.

In Bursa Province, the Disaster and Emergency Management Center is set up in the AFAD Bursa building, which consists of a meeting room for about 20 persons and a communication center. The communication center has different systems according to purpose and communication distance:

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- Radio communication system: Long distance radio communication system for national level communication such as between Ankara and Bursa Short distance radio communication system for communication within Bursa Province Frequency bands are also allocated to the metropolitan municipality, municipalities, and the gas company for their internal communication

- Satellite phone For communication with Ankara For international communication

- Early warning system: For military use such as air-raid alarm

The Disaster and Emergency Management Center has seven stations where responsible persons from each public institution (such as security forces, police and Department of Forestry) will collect information. Radios for different frequencies such as public radio, aircraft radio, VHF-UHF, and HF-VHF-SSB are also installed and communication with Japan is possible from 4:00 to 7:00 AM. All of the equipment uses analogue communication systems and is in good working condition. The cost of converting from analogue systems to digital systems is estimated at about USD 200,000 to USD 300,000.

Source: JST Figure 4.5.1 Bursa Disaster and Emergency Management Center

According to AFAD Bursa, there is a plan to establish a Disaster and Emergency Management Center with construction costs of about EUR 2,000,000, but it has not been implemented yet.

Source: JST Figure 4.5.2 Plan of Bursa Emergency Operation Center

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey (2) Proposal for Facilities

1) Concept and Architectural Plan

The Disaster and Emergency Management Center must be a reliable facility able to function during disasters to collect and provide information and to give instruction to relevant organizations. Utilizing low-rise buildings, such as a one or two-story building, is preferable in order to minimize the damage to the building and enable the center to carry out efficient operations after a disaster event. The mechanical room and storage are important facilities so they must be integrated with the main building. If the Disaster and Emergency Management Center is planned together with the disaster and emergency training center, meeting rooms can be utilized as lecture rooms and the facility use can be optimized during normal periods as well. The following are conceptual and architectural plans:

Layout and Flow Planning

： Buildings shall not be placed in the flow of people from other facilities so that the officials can easily gather in the event of a disaster. An exclusive driveway, approach, car parking and heliport shall be planned.

Required Function

： The facility shall be able to accommodate with the disaster and emergency board for initial response and shall include an operation zone and a living zone to allow for efficient use of staff around the clock. A security system shall be planned for smooth operation of the disaster and emergency board.

Operation Center

： A large display shall be arranged for integrated management of disaster information. Each organization that is a part of the disaster and emergency board shall have exclusive space for their own operations.

Meeting Rooms

： Small meeting rooms shall be planned for each organization. Partition walls shall be movable to accommodate various requirements.

Information collection and analysis

： A computer room shall be planned for analysis of collected disaster, traffic, and relief supply information.

Living Area ： Dining room, rest room, bedroom, locker room and storage for staff shall be planned.

Car Parking ： Necessary area for car parking shall be maintained.

2) Structural Plan

The building shall be a seismically isolated structure because of the importance of the facility. Details on seismic isolation are included in Chapter 5.

3) Mechanical, Electrical and Plumbing Plan

In Turkey, there are no specific facility standards for disaster control centers. Thus, the existing facilities were investigated to capture current conditions.

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Table 4.5.1 Investigation on existing facilities (AFAD Istanbul emergency operation center)

Item Specification Outline There are 3 emergency operation centers in Istanbul (2 facilities

in addition to this operation center). It is planned that they will be able to back up each other. In principle, this facility supports regions in Thrace.

Seismic Resistant structure

Seismic resistant buildings (2 stories max）

Power Dual power incoming from power company (Unconfirmed) Gas City gas (LNG)

Backup LPG tank Communication Fiber optic lines, metallic lines, VHF/UHF/HF radio, satellite

communication Domestic water City water

20 tons of water supply x 2 tanks Sewage Sewage infrastructure line Emergency generator 1200kW x 2 (100% backup x 2)

Fuel storage tank for 15 days operation (80 tons) Heat source Chiller (cooling), Gas boiler (Heating) Data center An independent data center is established in this facility to

collect and manage information related to disasters in Istanbul (whether an external backup system is provided is uncertain)

Energy plant Independent building different from the Emergency Operation Center

Other Radio facilities Mobile (in-vehicle) command center

Table 4.5.2 MEP requirements for disaster and emergency management center in Japan

Item Requirements Seismic resistant structure

Base-isolated building

Power Dual power incoming from power company Gas No city gas (electrical heating) Communication Fiber optic lines, metallic lines, VHF/UHF/HF radio,

satellite communication Domestic water

City water 7 days of water supply in a tank

Sewage City sewage line Backup sewage tank for 3 days Water recycling system

Emergency generator 100% backup x 2 sets Fuel storage tank for minimum 3 days operation and special supply contract

Heat source Electric heat source system (Chiller, heat pump system) Data center Offsite data center Energy plant Base isolation building

Compared to the requirements of emergency operation centers in Japan, the operation center in Istanbul is almost at the same level on preparedness for the case that infrastructure

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will be damaged. Items to be improved are the redundancy of systems (dual systems for 24/7 operation) and the provision for an internal fire (such as a fire compartment for electrical room and communication room)

Proposed standards for MEP

In Bursa’s case, it is difficult to justify establishing as many backup facilities as in Istanbul due to the population size. Thus, the facilities of each center shall be reinforced to allow 24/7 operations. To achieve this, systems required for maintaining the functions of the facility such as the power-supply system, the air-conditioning system of important rooms, and the water supply system shall be doubled or made with a redundant configuration. The systems shall be configured so that operations will not be stopped due to equipment failure or for inspections and future upgrades of the facility. In addition, due to the risk of fires in the facility, the electric room will be divided into two fireproof compartments to ensure the continuous operation of the facility.

Furthermore, to operate the facility even in the event of a disaster, the recommended period when the facility can operate independently without supply of electricity or water from the outside (due to breakdown of infrastructure) is 3 to 7 days. Three days shall be the minimum standard. A maximum of 15 days could be assumed depending on regional characteristics. This independent operation shall be achieved by having a reserve of fuel and water, diversification of energy sources (electrical power, city gas), and ensuring alternative supply means (well water, wastewater recycling system).

Also, to make the above functions sustainable, facilities for energy with state-of-the-art technologies and low operational costs will be introduced proactively.

Table 4.5.3 Proposed MEP requirements for disaster and emergency management centers

Item Requirements Seismic resistant structure Seismically isolated structure Power Dual incoming from power company

Dual power distribution system Division of the electrical room into two compartments (to avoid the risk of fires in the electrical room and operation interruption during periodic inspection and expansion/repair work)

Gas City gas Communication Fiber optic lines, metallic lines, and satellite communication system Domestic water

City domestic water Water tank available for 3 days Water recycling system for flushing water (for 7 days operation at maximum) Well water backup

Sewage Sewage infrastructure Temporary storage for 3 days Water recycling system

Emergency generator 100% backup x 2 sets Dual fuel turbine generator (can be operated by diesel fuel or city gas) Division of generator room into 2 fire compartments (to avoid the risk of fires) Fuel storage for 3 to 15 days operation (Fuel is divided into 2 tanks to avoid breakdown)

Heat source Diverse energy sources (Gas and electricity) Data center Offsite data center Energy plant Base isolation building

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey 4.5.2. Education Facility (1) Current Situation of Schools

1) Seismic Strengthening

According to the Ministry of National Education (MONE), there are about 144,000 schools in Turkey but most schools do not meet the seismic resistance standard legislated in 2007. The cost for seismic strengthening or the necessary reconstruction work to meet the standard was estimated at 6 Billion USD based on a survey conducted in 2008. Most schools do not have alternative classrooms to be used during renovation work and the overall number of classrooms is insufficient nationwide. Therefore, seismic strengthening methods that can be implemented during school activities without disturbance have been sought.

On the other hand, seismic strengthening of schools is almost complete in Bursa according to the MONE Bursa provincial office. Source: JST

Figure 4.5.3 shows a primary school in Osmangazi district in Bursa in which the columns have been strengthened seismically.

Source: JST Figure 4.5.3 Seismically Strengthened School in Bursa

2) Strengthening of Disaster Prevention Capability

AFAD encourages schools to strengthen their disaster prevention capability. AFAD has completed a school information survey to determine where to install storage areas for emergency supplies but storage areas have not yet been installed according to MONE Bursa.

3) School Campus Project

Currently, the classroom shortage due to the increase in the number of students, especially in the urban areas has become a serious problem throughout the country. In order to deal with this issue, the “School Campus Project” was launched in 33 provinces among all 81 provinces which moves existing schools in urban areas to the suburbs and integrates them into a large school. In the current plan, existing high schools will be moved to the suburbs and the remaining buildings and lots will be utilized as primary and junior high schools. Once relocation of high schools has been completed, junior high schools are planned to be moved to the suburbs and the remaining buildings will be utilized as primary schools. The prime minister decided that these projects will be implemented by means of PPP scheme and will be solely funded by government budget.

A total of 11 School Campus Projects are planned in Bursa as shown in Figure 4.5.4. However, construction has not been started at the time of this report.

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Source: JST based on data from MONE

Figure 4.5.4 Locations of School Campus Projects in Bursa

4) Urban Transformation and Other Projects

The Osmangazi district office plans to develop the north-western area of the district and has reserved large areas for schools.

In Yıldırım district, the Urban Transformation Project has been implemented in disaster risky areas. Yildrim’s Urban Transformation Project involves demolishing existing buildings, lot by lot in risky areas and constructing apartments which are safe in terms of disaster. Residents will basically be able to return to the same lots and schools will remain at the same locations.

(2) Lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake: Necessity to Strengthen School Capability for Disaster Prevention

The improvement of the safety of school structures, of the capacity to act as an evacuation center, and the ability to coordinate with public facilities are important for strengthening school capability for disaster prevention based on the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake. At the time of the earthquake, various issues were brought up regarding safety, emergency evacuation, and living in evacuation centers while schools were damaged and played a role as evacuation centers for the neighborhoods.

1) Improvement of Safety

The primary purpose of strengthening school structures is to protect students from disasters. There have been no deaths reported due to damage to a school facility but there are cases where the structures of school buildings were seriously damaged as they had not been seismically strengthened. A building without seismic resistance cannot be utilized as an evacuation center.

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey 2) Improvement of Function to be used as Evacuation Center

Schools are required to be equipped so as to act as education facilities as well as evacuation centers since many schools were utilized as evacuation centers for students and neighborhoods during the Great East Japan Earthquake.

A safe space needs to be available for storage for supplies during a disaster since food, water, blankets and equipment for withstanding the cold is essential before relief supplies arrive. In addition, temporary toilets, wells, water reservoirs, portable generators, photovoltaic power cells and radio communication devices are also important.

If a school is to be utilized as an evacuation center for a long period, spaces for administration and operation, health care, cooking, relief supply and communication must be planned. Changing rooms in consideration of women’s privacy and universal design for elderly and physically disabled people shall be considered. At the time school activities are resumed, clear zoning for educational areas and evacuation areas is important.

There are cases that operation of evacuation centers could not perform successfully because of the unclear status of schools as evacuation centers and supply storage could not be opened because of the lack of administrative staff. It is important to conduct periodical training regarding the operation of the evacuation center and share manuals of operation among school organizations and the local government.

3) Coordination with Public Facilities

The importance of schools as community centers was recognized again in Japan after the Earthquake. Therefore, in addition to capability for disaster prevention, strengthening of coordination with other public facilities is necessary in order to address various needs as community centers.

In normal time, integrated public facilities such as school, library, hospital, sports center, fire station and government office contribute to students in terms of gaining experience through after school education and holiday education programs and they also contribute to the neighborhood in terms of lifelong learning.

Figure 4.5.1 School Facility as Evacuation Center

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In the event of a disaster, the school plays an important role as disaster management complex with the function of emergency operation center at the community level

Figure 4.5.6 Coordination with School and Public Facilities

(3) Proposal for School Facilities

1) School Development in District Level Disaster Management Complex (DMC)

Schools which are strengthened against disaster shall be constructed in the district level Disaster Management Complex (DMC). As mentioned above, improvement of safety, of the ability to act as an evacuation center, and of coordinating with public facilities is important. These concepts shall be reflected in the new school plan of the school standards in Turkey.

2) School Development in the Urban Transformation Project

In the Urban Transformation Project, existing schools will remain in the same locations, while vulnerable schools will be demolished and replaced by strengthened schools and residential apartment buildings. It is expected that the community’s capability regarding disaster would be further strengthened through the simultaneous reconstruction of apartment buildings, public facilities, and schools.

3) Seismic Strengthening of Structural and Non-structural Members for Existing Schools

According to the MONE Bursa provincial office, seismic strengthening has been completed for most schools in Bursa. Table 4.5.4 represents the number of schools by construction year in Bursa and it also shows that 584 schools of the total 660 schools were constructed before 2007 when the seismic structure standard was enacted. Inspections and review of plans shall be carried out to evaluate the seismic safety of school buildings and if necessary, strengthening work on structural and non-structural members shall be implemented for existing schools.


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Table 4.5.4 Number of Schools by Construction Year in Bursa

Municipality Construction Year

Total ~1969

1970 ~1999

2000 ~2007

~2007 Total

2008~ Not

Identified YILDIRIM 9 49 30 88 7 7 102

YENİŞEHİR 2 15 6 23 1 2 26OSMANGAZİ 19 49 26 94 11 9 114ORHANGAZİ 3 15 8 26 3 0 29ORHANELİ 1 7 6 14 0 0 14NİLUFER 0 36 26 62 3 11 76

MUSTAFAKEMALPAŞA 11 30 3 44 0 1 45MUDANYA 3 12 7 22 2 0 24

KESTEL 4 11 6 21 1 0 22KELES 2 12 2 16 0 0 16

KARACABEY 7 19 4 30 1 0 31İZNİK 10 13 2 25 0 0 25İNEGÖL 9 36 16 61 12 1 74GURSU 6 4 11 21 1 0 22GEMLİK 4 16 3 23 2 1 26

BUYUKORHAN 4 8 2 14 0 0 14Total 94 332 158 584 44 32 660

Source: AFAD Bursa GIS Data

A construction method which only requires a short period and which will not disturb school activities is required for seismic strengthening of schools. The following seismic strengthening methods implemented in Japan can be completed within short periods and without interruption of school activities.

- SPAC Method (Steel Plate and Aramid Fiber Composite): 22-day construction period

The method is to strengthen the existing columns by wrapping existing reinforced concrete column with steel plate and aramid fiber sheet and filling with grout in the gap. Seismic resistance is increased since the column is surrounded with steel plates and fiber sheets. The shape of the building remains unchanged.

Features: This method does not change the shape or design of the building and maintains the size of internal space, doors and windows. Construction work can be implemented while school activities are conducted. Temperature during the work shall be monitored since bonding and grout are used.

Source: JST based on MEXT “Seismic Retrofit Case Studies”

Figure 4.5.7 SPAC Method

Steel Plate Aramid Fiber Sheet

Grout

Finishing


4-138

- External Pre-cast and Pre-stressed Concrete Frame: 129-day construction period

Connected external pre-cast and pre-stressed concrete frames and existing structures resist seismic forces.

Features: Construction work is possible while the building is utilized for school activities, the period generating noise is short, the traffic lines for school staff and students as well as construction workers can be clearly divided, and the quality of the frame is high because it is pre-cast and pre-stressed. However, the concrete strength of the existing structure must be 18N/mm2 or more.

Source: JST based on MEXT” Seismic Retrofit Case Studies”

Figure 4.5.8 External Pre-cast and Pre-stressed Concrete Frame

- Additional Pre-cast Concrete Wall: 138-day construction period

Improvement of seismic resistance is accomplished by connecting a pre-cast concrete wall to the existing column/beam using post-installed anchors, bolts and non-shrink grout.

Features: The construction period can be shortened because the concrete is pre-cast, work can be done without interrupting school activities, and noise is minimal. Carry-in routes for the pre-cast walls shall be secured, and size and position of the opening becomes limited. The compressive strength of the existing concrete structure must be 15N/mm2 or more.

Source: JST based on MEXT Seismic Retrofit Case Studies

Figure 4.5.9 Additional Pre-cast Concrete Wall

Post-installed Anchor

Re-bar

Non-shrink GroutBolt

Beam

Column PC Steel

Pre-cast Wall


4-139

- Steel Plate and Tightly Attached Concrete Column Method: 140-day construction period

Connecting a thin reinforced concrete member (250mm) including a steel plate to an existing structure with post-installed anchors.

Features: Work can be done without interruption of school activities, there is limited demolition of the existing structure, and future maintenance of members is easy. This method depends on the situation of the existing structure and repair of the existing structure may be necessary.

Source: JST based on MEXT Seismic Retrofit Case Studies

Figure 4.5.10 Steel Plate and Tightly Attached Concrete Column Method

There are many school buildings in Japan where non-structural parts were damaged by earthquakes. Therefore, seismic retrofit should strengthen non-structural elements as well as structural elements. The following are examples of strengthening of non-structural elements implemented in Japan.

- Prevention of the Fall of Ceilings

A brace shall be installed (with screws, not welding) for X and Y (horizontal) directions for every 9m2 of ceiling. Important or large elements shall be fixed with bolts and hardware in accordance with horizontal forces.

Source: Drawing; Nikken Sekkei HP “Nikken Solution, Non Safety and Security of Non-structural component” Picture; MEXT ”Seismic measure case studies of Non-structural component in School facilities” March. 2012

Figure 4.5.11 Prevention of Fall of Ceiling

Steel PlateAnchor Re-bar

Existing Structure Reinforced Member

Clearance

Brace

Brace


4-140

- Prevention of the Fall of Interior Wall

Inner walls shall be placed so as to allow inter-laminar deformation, pitch of base stud shall be close, and reinforcing steel bars shall be installed on large walls.


Figure 4.5.12 Prevention of the Fall of Inner Wall

- Prevention of the Fall of Air Conditioning

Air conditioning units shall be hung with an anchor to the slab of the above floor rather than to the ceiling. Anchors shall be post-installed anchors.


Figure 4.5.13 Prevention of the Fall of Air Conditioning

- Shatterproof Window Glass

A shatterproof film shall be place on the interior of transparent window glass. Frosted windows shall be replaced with reinforced glass and fixed with elastic sealing.

Slab

A/C


4-141


Figure 4.5.14 Shatterproof Window Glass

4.5.3. Disaster Prevention Park

(1) Current Situation of Parks in Bursa

Bursa, known as “green Bursa (Yeşil Bursa)”, has many parks, gardens and open spaces. There is a large park near the existing stadium in Osmangazi district and another large park is planned near the new stadium as well.

Osmangazi district office has constructed 51 parks, one for each Mahalle (neighborhood). However, the concept of disaster prevention parks and evacuation locations was not considered so there is no plan for seismic resistant water reservoirs, supply storage, or plants that help prevent the spread of fires.

Planning of parks is controlled by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (MOEU) and the district government needs to obtain approval of plans from MOEU.

(2) Disaster Prevention Park in Japan

Level of disaster prevention parks is defined as follows in Japan.

Table 4.5.5 Definition of Disaster Prevention Park Level Disaster Prevention Park as Wide-area Disaster Prevention Base

- Park as a base for recovery and reconstruction in a wide area - Area of 50ha or more - 1 park for the appropriate region considering size, traffic and logistics

Disaster Prevention Park as Regional Disaster Prevention Park

- Park with smooth access to wide-area disaster prevention base or evacuation place by emergency road network or main road

- Park as a relief activity base for self-defense forces, fire fighters and volunteers - Park as relay base for transportation of relief supplies from another base or region - Area of 10ha or more - To be located in major cities, cities with prefectural offices, and cities with a population of

100,000 or more Disaster Prevention Park as Wide-area Evacuation Place

- Park as a wide-area evacuation place in case of disaster - Area of 10ha or more - 1 park for each 1km radius urban area

Disaster Prevention Park as Temporary Evacuation Place

- Park as temporary evacuation park in case of disaster - Area of 2ha or more - 1 park for each 250m radius urban area

Source: Guideline for disaster prevention park planning, Public Works Research Institute of Japan

(3) Proposal for Disaster Prevention Parks

There are many parks or open spaces in Bursa that can be utilized as evacuation places in case of disaster. However, it is necessary to equip them with storage for supplies, temporary toilets, and other necessary elements of disaster prevention parks in the Disaster

Reinforced Glass

Shatterproof Film


Management Complex (DMC), as described in Chapter 3. The following are important concepts for disaster prevention parks.

1) Disaster Prevention Park

- Evacuation Place：Open area for evacuees and disaster response activities

- Supply Storage Area：Administration office with storage for food, water, blankets, portable generators, floodlights, cooking equipment, and gas cylinders

- Consolidation Area：Open area for consolidation and distribution of relief supplies and tent space for rescue teams

- Water Supply：Seismic resistant water reservoir and emergency well to secure potable and service water in case of disaster

- Fire Spread Prevention：Planting zone to prevent fire spread and heat radiation

- Emergency Transportation：Heliport for transportation of critical patients, emergency materials, information collection, etc.

- Temporary Toilets：Temporary toilets which can be used without water or electricity

The following is the proposed layout of neighborhood parks, and can be used as a guideline for park planning.

Figure 4.5.15 Disaster Prevention Park

2) Neighborhood Parks

Neighborhood parks and community (Mahalle) centers with supplies shall be constructed in areas developed in accordance with the Urban Transformation Law. Constructing parks near schools is preferable for easier coordination of these facilities in times of disaster. Besides a mosque, an evacuation facility shall be developed within walking distance of the park or open space.

4-142


4-143

3) Hierarchy and Guideline for Disaster Prevention Parks

Parks shall be classified into wide-area disaster prevention base, regional disaster prevention base, wide-area evacuation place and temporary evacuation place. Definitions and standards of each park shall be compiled into a guideline.

4.5.4. Waste Incineration Plant

(1) Current Situation of Waste Treatment Facility

1) Landfill and its Capacity

There are landfills in the north-western part of Osmangazi district and Inegol in Bursa and general waste from Bursa municipality is managed at the landfill in Osmangazi. The total area of Osmangazi Landfill is 156ha, 83ha of which are utilized for landfill, and the remaining 73ha are used as buffer zone. Development of the first section was completed in 1995 and the successive sections have been continuously developed. The total cost of development amounts to 23 Million USD, including 12.5 Million USD financed by the World Bank. The landfill is scheduled to expand over the entire 156ha by 2025 with a total amount of waste of 22,200,000 tons. Currently 9,000,000 tons have been disposed of at the landfill which represents 40% of the total final capacity. By regulation, no development is allowed on the site within 30 years of the landfill closure but thereafter, a park and an open space are planned to be developed over the landfill.

At first, waste landfilled at Osmangazi Landfill was only from Osmangazi, Yildirim and Nilufer districts, but it is currently receiving waste from Gursu, Kestel, Gemlik and Mudanya at a total rate of 2,100 tons per day, or approximately 400 garbage truckloads. The administrative area of Bursa Municipality was extended to the Bursa provincial boundaries in March 2014 and waste from the remaining 10 districts will be landfilled at Osmangazi Landfill as well. It is expected that the amount of waste will increase by 300-400 tons per day to a total of about 2,500 tons per day.

Figure 4.5.16 Landfill at Osmangazi District

Center of Bursa


4-144

2) Garbage Collection

In accordance with the regulations of Bursa Municipality, garbage collection is conducted by the relevant districts and waste treatment and storage is conducted by the municipalities. Garbage collection is entrusted to the private sector through an annual tender. Twelve private companies participated to the tender in 2013, and four companies were selected to implement garbage collection that year. Previously, the district governments managed garbage collection and a large budget was allocated to this service, but the expense was reduced and the service was improved by outsourcing to the private sector.

3) Waste Treatment

All garbage is landfilled together without segregation and most of the garbage is wet garbage. In Osmangazi district, separation of plastic garbage started in 1987 but it was not obligatory. In 2004, separation of plastic garbage became a requirement, but currently garbage is not being separated properly.

Bursa municipality plans composting or incineration of waste as the next waste treatment after 2025 and is considering waste incineration methods used in the EU which have been promoted in Turkey. Waste treatment is administrated by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (MOEU) and MOEU has made policies, regulations and carried out supervision with regard to the issue.

4) Thermal Power Generation by Methane Gas

A thermal power generation facility has been developed at Osmangazi Landfill by an independent power producer. Daily, 9.8MW (7 generators x 1.4MW), which represents the power consumption of 47,000 households, can be produced from methane gas which is generated from the landfill. This project is being implemented based on a 29-year contract between Bursa municipality and the power producer. The power producer sells electricity and gives a commission to the municipality so the project is a source of income for Bursa municipality. Methane gas is generated after 6 months of the landfill of general waste and after 3 months of the landfill of organic waste. Methane gas has been generated from the section since 2000.

5) Medical and Industrial Waste

Medical waste is landfilled, after sterilization, at a medical disposal treatment facility in Osmangazi Landfill. Treatment is entrusted by Bursa municipality to a private company under a contract that runs until 2017. The facility is operated by a staff of 28 with 6 garbage trucks and medical waste is collected from 2,200 medical institutions in Bursa, Yalova and Balikesir provinces. Medical waste to be treated amounts to 300 tons per month. Medical institutions pay the treatment cost to the private company and the private company pays a commission to Bursa municipality so this project is also a source of income for Bursa municipality.

Industrial waste such as concrete is treated at Izmit landfill in Kocaeli.

(2) Waste Incineration Plant by Japanese Company

The following are major incineration plants are operated by Japanese companies.

Setagaya Incineration Plant

Site Area ：approx. 30,000m2 Incinerator type ： Gasification scorifier Continuous Operation Type (Fluid Bed Type)

Scale ： 300t（150t×2）/24h Incineration ： 300t/day


4-145

capacity Power generation capacity

： 6,750kW Heat supply ： Vapor

Source: JST Figure 4.5.17 Setagaya Incineration Plant

Shinagawa Incineration Plant

Site Area ： approx. 47,000m2 Incinerator type ： Stoker furnace Ash melting furnace

fuel type Scale ： 600t（300t×2）/24h Incineration

capacity ： 600t/day

Power generation capacity

： 15,000kW Heat supply ： Hot water

Source: JST Figure 4.5.18 Shinagawa Incineration Plant

Chengdu Incineration Plant (China) Riverside Resource Recovery Ltd. (UK)

Incineration capacity

：1,200t/day（600×2） Incineration capacity

：2,290t/day（763×3）

Power generation capacity

：24,000kW Power generation capacity

：73,000kW


4-146

Source: JST

Figure 4.5.19 Incineration Plants Overseas

(3) Proposal for Waste Incineration Plant

As mentioned earlier, Osmangazi landfill will be completed by 2025 and Bursa municipality is considering composting and incineration of waste instead of landfill. It is recommended that a waste incineration plant with a power generator be developed at the Disaster Management Complex (DMC) so that the plant can supply electricity to DMC and the neighborhood. Advantages of incineration plants are as follows.

- Power generation from incineration plants as a renewable energy source contributes to reduction of environmental load in normal times

- Safe facility by Japanese seismic resistant and isolation technology and disaster prevention technology

- Electricity supply to DMC (emergency operation center, hospital, etc.) from power generation at the time of disaster, regardless of the state of long distance utility lines

- Reduction of waste amount

- Hygienic treatment of organic waste

- Power generation is greater than that of methane gas power generation plants

- The first waste incineration plant with power generator for disaster prevention in Turkey

Figure 4.5.20 Function of Waste Incineration Plant with Power generator


4-147

Outline specifications of the incineration plant are as follows.

- Incineration Capacity

: 3,000t/day(750t/day､4 lines)

- Thermal Input : 260MW- Steam Condition : 40bar､400℃- Electrical Power

Output : 54MW

- Steam Supply : 0.06MPa､20t/h- CO2 Reduction : 201,400t(Reduction base unit 0.555kg-CO2/kWh, Yearly

operation 280 days)- Flue Gas Treatment

System : SNCR (Selective non-catalytic reduction for NOx emission

control), Dry system, Fabric Filter- Area : Furnace 20,000m2, Power generator 2,500m2


5. Study on Possibility to Introduce Japanese Advanced Technology related to DRM

In this chapter, regarding the disaster reduction field in Turkey, a list of Japanese technology that has potential to be introduced to Turkey is summarized below.

5.1. Prospective Japanese Technology to be Introduced to Turkey Japanese technologies to strengthen the disaster management system and to contribute to resilient city planning in Turkey are listed below.

5-1


5-2

Tabl

e 5.

1.1

Japa

n’s T

echn

olog

y Co

nsid

ered

for I

ntro

duct

ion

in T

urke

y Fi

elds

Pr

ospe

ctiv

e Te

chno

logi

es to

In

trod

uce

in

Turk

ey

Com

petit

ive

adva

ntag

es o

f Jap

an’ t

echn

olog

y co

mpa

red

with

Tur

key

and

Amer

ican

cou

ntrie

s N

eeds

from

Tur

key

Side

/ Ch

alle

nges

to b

e co

nsid

ered

in in

trod

uctio

ns

Pros

pect

ive

Japa

nese

Co

mpa

nies

to

Intr

oduc

e

Deg

ree

of

Poss

ibili

ty

Se

ismic

Is

olat

ion

Eart

hqua

ke

Gro

und

Mot

ion

Sim

ulat

ion

Tech

nolo

gy to

Ve

rify

Perf

orm

ance

for

Vario

us T

ypes

of

Eart

hqua

ke

Actio

n.

・ S

eism

ical

ly is

olat

ed st

ruct

ures

in T

urke

y ar

e de

signe

d us

ing

the

resp

onse

spec

trum

pro

cedu

re. T

he d

ynam

ic

time

hist

ory

resp

onse

ana

lysis

to v

erify

seism

ic

perf

orm

ance

is c

ondu

cted

aft

er th

e m

anuf

actu

rer o

f the

de

vice

s are

sele

cted

and

full

dyna

mic

ana

lysis

is n

ot

usua

lly p

erfo

rmed

on

the

stru

ctur

al d

esig

n.

・ I

n th

e U

S de

sign

code

whi

ch is

ado

pted

by

Turk

ey,

reco

rded

ear

thqu

ake

grou

nd m

otio

ns w

ith so

me

mod

ifica

tions

are

use

d in

the

dyna

mic

ana

lysis

. Pe

rfor

man

ce is

not

ver

ified

for a

num

ber o

f gro

und

mot

ions

such

as t

hose

with

pre

dom

inan

t lon

g-pe

riod

com

pone

nts a

nd/o

r lon

ger d

urat

ion

of m

otio

ns w

hich

ha

ve b

een

obse

rved

in re

cent

ear

thqu

akes

in Ja

pan

and

coul

d oc

cur i

n Tu

rkey

in th

e fu

ture

.

・Se

ismic

isol

atio

n sy

stem

s wou

ld b

e m

ore

relia

ble

and

high

-per

form

ance

by

intr

oduc

ing

usin

g th

e th

is ea

rthq

uake

gro

und

mot

ion

simul

atio

n te

chno

logy

to

simul

ate

vario

us g

roun

d m

otio

ns d

ue to

inla

nd n

ear f

ault

eart

hqua

kes,

meg

a ea

rthq

uake

s etc

. whi

ch a

re d

iffer

ent

in th

eir c

hara

cter

istic

s and

usin

g th

ese

in ti

me

hist

ory

eart

hqua

ke re

spon

se a

naly

ses.

【N

eeds】

Onl

y a

limite

d nu

mbe

r of s

truc

tura

l en

gine

ers a

nd re

sear

cher

s in

Turk

ey re

cogn

ize

the

impo

rtan

ce o

f sim

ulat

ed e

arth

quak

e gr

ound

m

otio

ns.

【

Chal

leng

es】

Awar

enes

s am

ong

the

stru

ctur

al

engi

neer

s sho

uld

be in

crea

sed

to h

ighl

ight

the

fact

that

ther

e ar

e sig

nific

ant d

iffer

ence

s in

the

char

acte

ristic

s of e

arth

quak

es a

nd th

at it

is

impo

rtan

t to

verif

y th

e pe

rfor

man

ce o

f se

ismic

ally

isol

ated

stru

ctur

es fo

r var

ious

ch

arac

teris

tics o

f sei

smic

gro

und

mot

ions

.

ABC

Corp

orat

ion

Very

goo

d

Stru

ctur

al d

esig

n m

etho

dolo

gy o

f se

ismic

ally

iso

late

d bu

ildin

gs

for v

ertic

al

eart

hqua

ke

mot

ion.

・ I

n th

e U

S de

sign

code

, ver

tical

gro

und

mot

ions

due

to

ear

thqu

akes

are

not

con

sider

ed in

the

seism

ic

isola

tion

syst

em sp

ecifi

catio

ns a

lthou

gh th

ey a

re

cons

ider

ed fo

r the

des

ign

of o

rdin

ary

build

ings

. Th

eref

ore,

pot

entia

l effe

cts o

f upl

ift fo

rce

on is

olat

ion

devi

ces a

re o

verlo

oked

.

・ O

n th

e ot

her h

and,

the

Japa

nese

des

ign

met

hodo

logy

take

s int

o ac

coun

t the

effe

cts o

f ver

tical

gr

ound

mot

ions

on

seism

ical

ly is

olat

ion

syst

ems,

and

w

ould

enh

ance

the

safe

ty o

f sei

smic

ally

isol

ated

bu

ildin

gs in

Tur

key.

【N

eeds】

Seism

ic is

olat

ion

stru

ctur

es a

re n

ot

com

mon

in T

urke

y ye

t. Fu

rthe

r aw

aren

ess o

f th

e ne

ed fo

r sei

smic

isol

atio

n is

nece

ssar

y, a

nd

that

incl

udes

the

need

to c

onsid

er u

plift

in

seism

ic is

olat

ion

syst

ems.

Sei

smic

isol

atio

n an

d de

sign

agai

nst u

plift

is p

artic

ular

ly c

ritic

al fo

r hi

gh b

uild

ings

and

long

span

con

stru

ctio

ns, a

nd

are

expe

cted

to b

ecom

e m

ore

and

mor

e cr

itica

l in

the

futu

re a

s Tur

key

cont

inue

s to

impr

ove

its

urba

n in

fras

truc

ture

.

【Ch

alle

nges】

Awar

enes

s of T

urki

sh e

ngin

eers

th

at th

is iss

ue is

impo

rtan

t sho

uld

be e

nhan

ced.

- G

ood


5-3

Seism

ic is

olat

ion

devi

ce.

・ P

roto

type

test

s of s

eism

ic is

olat

ion

devi

ces a

re

man

dato

ry in

Tur

key

(sin

ce th

e pr

oduc

t qua

lity

verif

ying

sy

stem

in th

e U

S is

still

imm

atur

e ).

As th

ese

test

s are

no

n-de

stru

ctiv

e, v

ario

us q

ualit

y as

pect

s of t

he p

rodu

cts

unde

r lar

ge d

ispla

cem

ents

cau

sed

by e

arth

quak

e m

otio

ns g

reat

er th

an th

e de

sign

mot

ions

are

not

take

n in

to a

ccou

nt. T

hese

asp

ects

incl

ude

but a

re n

ot li

mite

d to

: var

iatio

ns in

the

devi

ce’s

cha

ract

erist

ic v

alue

s,

varia

tions

due

to c

yclic

load

ing

and

tem

pera

ture

, in

fluen

ce o

f axi

al lo

adin

g du

e to

the

vert

ical

seism

ic

mot

ion,

and

per

form

ance

at a

nd in

the

vici

nity

of

ultim

ate

drift

. Con

sequ

ently

, the

leve

l of r

elia

bilit

y of

iso

latio

n de

vice

s is n

ot a

s hig

h as

in Ja

pan

whe

re th

ese

aspe

cts a

re re

quire

d to

be

take

n in

to a

ccou

nt in

des

ign

docu

men

ts, w

hich

are

then

revi

ewed

and

app

rove

d fo

r us

e by

the

cert

ifica

tion

agen

cy. S

eism

ical

ly is

olat

ed

build

ings

in T

urke

y co

uld

beco

me

high

ly re

liabl

e by

in

trod

ucin

g Ja

pane

se is

olat

ion

devi

ces.

・

Lim

ited

type

s of i

sola

tion

devi

ces a

re c

urre

ntly

use

d in

Tur

key:

isol

ator

s (be

arin

gs) c

ombi

ned

with

dam

pers

. In

Japa

n, in

add

ition

to su

ch c

ombi

ned

prod

ucts

, var

ious

ty

pes o

f iso

lato

rs a

nd d

ampe

rs h

ave

been

dev

elop

ed. B

y us

ing

thes

e Ja

pane

se is

olat

ion

devi

ces a

nd d

ampe

rs, t

he

optim

um so

lutio

n of

isol

atio

n sy

stem

suite

d to

the

char

acte

ristic

s and

dem

ands

of e

ach

build

ing

can

be

real

ized

in T

urke

y.

【N

eeds】

Japa

nese

seism

ic is

olat

ion

devi

ces

shal

l ach

ieve

hig

h re

puta

tion

in T

urke

y in

term

s of

thei

r per

form

ance

and

qua

lity.

【

Chal

leng

es】

In T

urke

y, e

ngin

eers

and

ac

adem

ics d

o no

t rec

kon

that

isol

atio

n de

vice

s of

the

perf

orm

ance

and

qua

lity

of Ja

pane

se

prod

ucts

are

nec

essa

ry. I

n ge

nera

l, m

any

build

ing

owne

rs d

o no

t rea

lize

the

diffe

renc

e in

pe

rfor

man

ce o

f sei

smic

isol

atio

n sy

stem

s and

are

sa

tisfie

d by

any

seism

ic is

olat

ion

syst

em.

In a

dditi

on, s

uppl

iers

of i

sola

tion

devi

ces a

re n

ot

sele

cted

by

the

qual

ity a

nd p

erfo

rman

ce o

f the

ir pr

oduc

ts b

ut b

y th

eir e

ngin

eerin

g ab

ility

in

stru

ctur

al d

esig

n an

d an

alys

is as

wel

l as f

or

econ

omic

reas

ons (

cost

). It

is ne

cess

ary

to

esta

blish

a n

ew p

roce

ss o

f pro

cure

men

t in

whi

ch

desig

n en

gine

ers c

ondu

ct a

mor

e de

taile

d ev

alua

tion

to se

lect

isol

atio

n sy

stem

s and

a

publ

ic e

valu

atio

n sy

stem

is d

evel

oped

and

ap

plie

d to

ver

ify th

e ov

eral

l per

form

ance

of

isola

tion

syst

ems.

The

Japa

nese

pro

duct

ap

prai

sal a

nd a

ppro

val s

yste

m c

ould

be

adop

ted

in T

urke

y to

ass

ist e

ngin

eers

in d

esig

ning

seism

ic

isola

tion

syst

ems a

nd in

cho

osin

g de

vice

s bas

ed

on p

ublis

hed,

relia

ble,

and

tran

spar

ent d

ata.

On

the

othe

r han

d, it

is st

ill n

eces

sary

for J

apan

ese

supp

liers

to im

prov

e th

eir a

bilit

y in

eng

inee

ring.

Oile

s Cor

pora

tion,

Br

idge

ston

e,

SWCC

Sho

wa

hold

ings

, As

eism

ic D

evic

es,

Yoko

ham

a Ru

bber

, Ka

was

aki M

etal

In

dust

ry,

Nip

pon

Pilla

r Pa

ckin

g, N

TN

Corp

orat

ion,

Da

ido

Seim

itsu

Corp

orat

ion,

KO

KAN

KYO

En

gine

erin

g Co

rpor

atio

n,

Mits

ubish

i Hea

vy

Indu

stry

, N

ippo

n St

eel a

nd

Sum

itom

o M

etal

Co

rpor

atio

n,

THK

Tom

oe

Corp

orat

ion,

KY

B Co

rpor

atio

n,

Sanw

a Te

kki

Corp

orat

ion,

Hi

tach

i.

Very

goo

d,

alth

ough

will

re

quire

a

subs

tant

ial

perio

d to

set

cond

ition

s.

Com

mitm

ent

from

Japa

nese

co

mpa

nies

is

nece

ssar

y.

Japa

nese

way

of

oper

atin

g an

d m

aint

aini

ng

seism

ic is

olat

ion

devi

ces

Ther

e is

no c

lear

stip

ulat

ion

in T

urke

y fo

r the

ope

ratio

n an

d m

aint

enan

ce o

f sei

smic

isol

atio

n de

vice

s. T

here

fore

, Ja

pane

se e

xper

tise

rega

rdin

g in

spec

tion

for

dete

riora

tion

need

s to

be in

trod

uced

. In

trod

ucin

g Ja

pane

se d

evic

es fo

r rec

ordi

ng th

e dr

ifts i

n iso

late

d st

orie

s dur

ing

inte

nse

eart

hqua

kes i

s hel

pful

to

conf

irm th

at n

o un

expe

cted

ly e

xces

sive

disp

lace

men

ts o

f th

e st

orie

s tak

e pl

ace

and

to c

heck

the

soun

dnes

s of t

he

stru

ctur

e im

med

iate

ly a

fter

the

eart

hqua

ke.

【N

eeds】

Lim

ited

num

ber o

f str

uctu

ral

engi

neer

s rec

ogni

ze th

e im

port

ance

of t

his i

ssue

in

Tur

key.

【

Chal

leng

es】

Prom

otio

n ac

tiviti

es to

show

the

need

for o

pera

tion

and

man

agem

ent p

erso

nnel

an

d fo

r leg

al re

quire

men

ts fo

r the

insp

ectio

n an

d m

aint

enan

ce.

Trai

ning

for t

he te

chni

cian

s an

d co

mpa

nies

in c

harg

e of

insp

ectio

ns a

re

requ

ired.

Ve

ry g

ood

Expa

nsio

n jo

ints

fo

r sei

smic

st

ruct

ures

and

fle

xibl

e jo

ints

fo

r pip

ing

A fu

lly fl

at e

xpan

sion

join

t whi

ch d

oes n

ot m

ake

a le

vel

diffe

renc

e is

com

mon

ly u

sed

for f

loor

s for

its a

ccur

acy

and

usab

ility

.

【N

eeds】

Not

as m

uch

accu

racy

is re

quire

d in

th

e Tu

rkish

mar

ket c

ompa

red

with

the

Japa

nese

m

arke

t.

【Ch

alle

nges】

Spec

ifica

tions

of J

apan

ese

prod

ucts

shou

ld b

e ad

just

ed to

suit

the

situa

tion

ABC

shok

ai、

Pala

cap

Goo

d: T

here

are

so

me

need

s for

sp

ecifi

c bu

ildin

gs su

ch

as h

ospi

tals.


5-4

in T

urke

y to

redu

ce o

vera

ll co

sts a

nd e

nabl

e pr

oduc

ts to

be

man

ufac

ture

d in

Tur

key.

Elev

ator

sy

stem

s to

with

stan

d th

e fo

rces

in a

se

ismic

st

ruct

ure

Adva

nced

tech

nolo

gies

for e

leva

tors

whi

ch p

enet

rate

a

base

-isol

ated

laye

r. 【

Nee

ds】

The

curr

ent n

eeds

are

low

. Ho

wev

er,

in th

e fu

ture

, if t

he v

arie

ty o

f the

seism

ic

stru

ctur

e, in

clud

ing

the

inte

rmed

iate

bas

e iso

latio

n la

yer w

ill b

e de

velo

ped,

the

tech

nolo

gy

will

be

high

ly d

eman

ded.

【

Chal

leng

es】

Non

e.

Tosh

iba

elev

ator

, Hi

tach

i, Fu

jitec

h,

Mits

ubish

i El

ectr

ic,

Very

goo

d

Seism

ic R

etro

fit

Cons

truc

tion

Prod

ucts

and

co

nstr

uctio

n m

etho

dolo

gy fo

r se

ismic

retr

ofit

In T

urke

y, th

e M

inist

er o

f Hea

lth a

nd th

e de

part

men

t of

cons

truc

tion

have

set a

pol

icy

that

pub

lic h

ospi

tals

with

m

ore

than

100

bed

s sha

ll be

seism

ical

ly is

olat

ed. I

n fa

ct,

seism

ic a

sses

smen

t is r

equi

red

in th

e bu

ildin

g co

de fo

r ex

istin

g bu

ildin

gs w

ith a

n im

port

ance

fact

or o

f 1.5

(w

hich

is th

e ca

se fo

r hos

pita

l bui

ldin

gs).

This

asse

ssm

ent i

s con

duct

ed in

acc

orda

nce

with

the

met

hod

stip

ulat

ed in

the

2007

seism

ic d

esig

n co

de. I

f the

resu

lts

of th

e as

sess

men

t ind

icat

e in

suffi

cien

t sei

smic

safe

ty,

the

build

ing

has t

o be

seism

ical

ly re

trof

itted

or

dem

olish

ed fo

r rec

onst

ruct

ion.

The

seism

ic a

sses

smen

t an

d re

trof

ittin

g st

anda

rd o

f Jap

an is

not

ado

ptab

le to

th

ose

in T

urke

y.

Furt

herm

ore,

as a

resu

lt of

surv

ey o

n so

me

retr

ofitt

ing

proj

ects

, it t

urne

d ou

t tha

t the

obj

ectiv

es a

nd e

ffici

ency

of

the

retr

ofitt

ing

wor

k in

som

e pr

ojec

ts a

re n

ot c

lear

.

The

cons

truc

tion

met

hods

and

mat

eria

ls de

velo

ped

in Ja

pan,

if th

ey a

re a

dopt

ed a

ppro

pria

tely

in

Turk

ey, a

re e

xpec

ted

to in

crea

se th

e nu

mbe

r of m

ore

effic

ient

and

hig

hly

effe

ctiv

e re

trof

ittin

g w

orks

.

【N

eeds】

The

need

for s

peci

fic sp

ecia

lized

pr

oduc

ts a

nd m

etho

ds is

hig

h bu

t ord

inar

y pr

oduc

ts a

nd c

onst

ruct

ion

met

hods

are

alre

ady

avai

labl

e in

Tur

key.

【

Chal

leng

es】

As th

ere

is a

big

diffe

renc

e in

as

sess

men

t and

retr

ofitt

ing

met

hods

bet

wee

n Tu

rkey

and

Japa

n, th

e co

nsen

t fro

m T

urki

sh

engi

neer

s and

rese

arch

ers t

o us

e Ja

pane

se

prod

ucts

are

nec

essa

ry.

Stru

ctur

al Q

ualit

y As

sura

nce(

SQR)

, N

ippo

n St

eel a

nd

Sum

itom

o M

etal

, Sh

imizu

Co

rpor

atio

n,

Take

naka

Co

rpor

atio

n,

Oba

yash

i Co

rpor

atio

n,

Ryok

o Sa

ngyo

Co

rpor

atio

n,

Mag

une

kaga

ku

Goo

d

Seism

ic

mea

sure

s for

no

n-st

ruct

ural

bu

ildi

ng c

ompo

nent

s an

d m

echa

nica

l, el

ectr

ical

and

pl

umbi

ng (M

EP)

elem

ents

Alth

ough

MO

H iss

ued

a gu

idel

ine

to im

prov

e th

e re

sista

nce

of n

on-s

truc

tura

l bui

ldin

g co

mpo

nent

s and

M

EP e

lem

ents

, rel

evan

t effo

rts a

nd a

ctiv

ities

are

just

st

artin

g no

w. M

any

com

pone

nts a

nd e

lem

ents

iden

tifie

d as

impo

rtan

t for

the

resil

ienc

y of

Tur

key’

s soc

iety

are

not

pr

oper

ly st

iffen

ed fo

r int

ense

seism

ic m

otio

ns, a

nd

wou

ld g

reat

ly b

enef

it fr

om th

e re

cent

ly d

evel

oped

kn

ow-h

ow o

f Jap

an. T

he in

trod

uctio

n of

isol

atio

n sy

stem

s for

indi

vidu

al e

quip

men

t is a

lso n

eces

sary

. In

hos

pita

ls, th

ere

are

cert

ain

piec

es o

f med

ical

eq

uipm

ent t

hat h

ave

to b

e m

ovab

le a

nd th

ese

may

slid

e,

colli

de, o

r ove

rtur

n du

ring

eart

hqua

kes,

eve

n in

faci

litie

s w

ith e

nhan

ced

seism

ic st

reng

th, u

nles

s the

faci

litie

s are

se

ismic

ally

isol

ated

. Flo

or is

olat

ion

syst

ems d

evel

oped

in

Japa

n w

ill im

prov

e th

is sit

uatio

n.

【N

eeds】

The

conc

ern

for t

his i

ssue

is

incr

easin

g in

Tur

key

and

the

need

to in

trod

uce

Japa

nese

pro

duct

s is c

ontin

uous

ly in

crea

sing.

【

Chal

leng

es】

No

subs

tant

ial b

arrie

r was

id

entif

ied

but e

ffort

s of t

he su

pplie

rs to

pro

mot

e Ja

pane

se p

rodu

cts t

o th

e co

nstr

uctio

n so

ciet

y of

Tu

rkey

are

hig

hly

reco

mm

ende

d.

- Ve

ry g

ood


5-5

Thre

e di

men

siona

l sh

akin

g ta

ble

The

only

man

ufac

ture

rs o

f lar

ge sc

ale

thre

e-di

men

siona

l sh

akin

g ta

bles

are

MTS

Sys

tem

s Cor

pora

tion

in th

e U

SA,

and

Mits

ubish

i Hea

vy In

dust

ry in

Japa

n. M

itsub

ishi i

s the

m

anuf

actu

rer o

f the

wor

ld’s

Lar

gest

shak

ing

tabl

e lik

e E-

Defe

nse

whi

ch h

as e

xcel

lent

tech

nolo

gy fo

r man

ufac

ture

an

d co

ntro

l sys

tem

s.

【N

eeds】

Ther

e is

curr

ently

no

larg

e sc

ale

thre

e di

men

siona

l sha

king

tabl

e in

Tur

key.

A sm

all

thre

e di

men

siona

l sha

king

tabl

e is

unde

r co

nstr

uctio

n in

Ista

nbul

Tec

hnol

ogy

Uni

vers

ity.

Ther

e w

as a

pla

n to

bui

ld a

shak

ing

tabl

e in

M

iddl

e Ea

st T

echn

olog

y U

nive

rsity

, but

the

proj

ect w

as n

ot im

plem

ente

d du

e to

insu

ffici

ent

fund

ing.

【

Chal

leng

es】

Ther

e ar

e as

soci

ated

cos

ts fo

r op

erat

ion

and

mai

nten

ance

, and

for a

te

chni

cian

.

Mits

ubish

i Hea

vy

Indu

stry

Ve

ry g

ood

Non

-des

truc

tive

insp

ectio

n te

chno

logy

by

X-ra

y

Japa

n ha

s a c

ompa

ct a

nd li

ghtw

eigh

t sys

tem

that

en

able

s ins

pect

ion

for c

rack

s in

the

pier

s of b

ridge

s. 【

Nee

ds】

The

impo

rtan

ce o

f str

engt

heni

ng

brid

ges i

s rec

ogni

zed

in T

urke

y.

【Ch

alle

nges】

The

exist

ence

of r

egul

atio

ns o

n X-

ray

utili

zatio

n ne

eds t

o be

con

firm

ed.

ACCU

THER

A G

ood

Com

mun

ica-

tion

Sate

llite

co

mm

unic

atio

n sy

stem

: fix

ed

stat

ions

and

m

obile

stat

ions

(in

clud

ing

vehi

cle

mou

nted

st

atio

ns) s

uch

as E

sBird

Ther

e is

not m

uch

dela

y in

info

rmat

ion

tran

smiss

ion

(sin

gle-

hop

conn

ectio

n). I

n ca

se o

f em

erge

ncy,

the

tran

sfer

of i

nfor

mat

ion

is co

ntro

lled

so th

at p

riorit

ized

info

rmat

ion

can

be tr

ansm

itted

with

out d

elay

. Thi

s te

chno

logy

was

pro

ven

durin

g th

e G

reat

Eas

t Jap

an

Eart

hqua

ke in

201

1. E

stab

lishm

ent i

s not

diff

icul

t.

【N

eeds】

A co

nsor

tium

of p

rivat

e Ja

pane

se

com

pani

es (l

isted

in th

e ne

xt c

olum

n) h

as

alre

ady

pres

ente

d th

is sy

stem

to A

FAD.

Its h

igh

perf

orm

ance

is w

idel

y re

cogn

ized

amon

g AF

AD

staf

f. 【

Issu

es】

Inte

nse

com

petit

ion

with

Am

eric

an

and

Euro

pean

com

pani

es is

exp

ecte

d. In

co

mpa

rison

, Jap

anes

e te

chno

logy

show

s bet

ter

perf

orm

ance

but

hig

her c

osts

.

JSAT

TO

SHIB

A, JR

C,

MEL

CO

Very

goo

d

Helic

opte

r sa

telli

te

com

mun

icat

ion

syst

em

High

vol

ume

data

such

as i

mag

es c

an b

e di

strib

uted

fr

om th

e he

licop

ter t

hrou

gh th

e sa

telli

tes.

【

Nee

ds】

Jap

anes

e co

mpa

nies

hav

e al

read

y pr

esen

ted

this

syst

em to

AFA

D. It

s hig

h pe

rfor

man

ce is

wid

ely

reco

gnize

d am

ong

AFAD

st

aff.

【Ch

alle

nges】

The

smal

l num

ber o

f com

petit

ors

is an

adv

anta

ge, b

ut ra

ther

cos

tly

MEL

CO

Very

goo

d

Early

war

ning

sy

stem

/ se

nsor

Early

seism

ic

dete

ctio

n an

d w

arni

ng sy

stem

ut

ilizin

g pr

elim

inar

y ea

rthq

uake

tr

emor

s (P-

wav

es)

Unl

ike

JMA

early

seism

ic w

arni

ng sy

stem

s, P

-wav

e de

tect

ors c

ombi

ne th

e se

nsor

and

the

war

ning

func

tion

in o

ne sy

stem

and

hen

ce c

an b

e ut

ilize

d in

indi

vidu

al

faci

litie

s (e.

g. T

okyo

Met

ro, S

appo

ro D

ome,

Boğ

aziç

i U

nive

rsity

in T

urke

y).

Railw

ay o

pera

tors

in Ja

pan

utili

ze P

-wav

e se

nsor

s and

JM

A ea

rly se

ismic

war

ning

syst

ems s

o th

at tr

ains

stop

sa

fely

as s

oon

as th

e ea

rly si

gns o

f an

eart

hqua

ke a

re

dete

cted

. Ear

thqu

ake

Qui

ck A

larm

Sys

tem

(EQ

AS),

Fast

Re

spon

se E

quip

men

t aga

inst

Qua

ke L

oad

(FRE

QL)

【N

eeds】

Curr

ently

, con

stru

ctio

n of

ear

ly

seism

ic w

arni

ng sy

stem

s in

Turk

ey is

in th

e pi

lot

stud

y st

age.

Pro

mpt

intr

oduc

tion

in se

vera

l fa

cilit

ies s

uch

as th

e su

bway

and

hos

pita

ls is

esse

ntia

l, pa

rtic

ular

ly fo

r Bur

sa w

hich

is in

hig

h se

ismic

dan

ger.

【Ch

alle

nges】

Intr

oduc

tion

depe

nds o

n th

e in

tent

ion

of in

divi

dual

ope

rato

rs a

nd w

ill re

quire

pe

rson

al tr

aini

ng.

Syst

em a

nd d

ata

rese

arch

Ve

ry g

ood

since

th

is te

chno

logy

is

excl

usiv

ely

deve

lope

d in

Japa

n


5-6

Com

pact

dig

ital

acce

lero

met

er

This

syst

em is

cap

able

of t

rigge

ring

an e

arth

quak

e al

arm

ba

sed

on th

e de

tect

ion

of P

-wav

es, e

ven

in th

e ep

icen

ter

area

. It c

an a

lso p

rovi

de re

al ti

me

inte

nsity

and

trig

ger

an a

larm

bas

ed o

n ac

cele

ratio

n or

inte

nsity

.

【N

eeds】

Curr

ently

, con

stru

ctio

n of

ear

ly

seism

ic w

arni

ng sy

stem

s in

Turk

ey is

in th

e pi

lot

stud

y st

age.

Pro

mpt

intr

oduc

tion

to se

vera

l fa

cilit

ies s

uch

as th

e su

bway

and

hos

pita

ls is

esse

ntia

l, pa

rtic

ular

ly fo

r Bur

sa w

hich

is in

hig

h se

ismic

dan

ger.

【Ch

alle

nges】

Intr

oduc

tion

depe

nds o

n th

e in

tent

ion

of in

divi

dual

ope

rato

rs a

nd w

ill re

quire

pe

rson

al tr

aini

ng.

Syst

em a

nd d

ata

rese

arch

Ve

ry g

ood

since

th

is te

chno

logy

is

excl

usiv

ely

deve

lope

d in

Ja

pan

Imm

edia

te

alar

m sy

stem

J-ALE

RT

In c

ase

of e

mer

genc

y in

Japa

n su

ch a

s bal

listic

miss

ile,

tsun

ami,

and

early

ear

thqu

ake

war

ning

, the

nat

iona

l go

vern

men

t com

mun

icat

es in

form

atio

n vi

a sa

telli

te

com

mun

icat

ion.

Em

erge

ncy

info

rmat

ion

is th

en

imm

edia

tely

dist

ribut

ed in

coo

pera

tion

with

the

emer

genc

y br

oadc

astin

g sy

stem

s at t

he p

rovi

ncia

l lev

el.

Curr

ently

, sys

tem

s are

in o

pera

tion

in m

ost o

f the

loca

l pu

blic

bod

ies.

【N

eeds】

Dem

and

for a

n al

ert s

yste

m se

ems

high

, esp

ecia

lly fo

r flo

od a

nd la

ndsli

des,

in

addi

tion

to e

arth

quak

es.

【Ch

alle

nges】

The

impo

rtan

ce to

pro

vide

in

form

atio

n di

rect

ly to

pub

lic sh

ould

be

shar

ed

with

AFA

D.

NTT

Co

mm

unic

atio

ns,

Rike

i

Goo

d

Em-N

et

(Em

erge

ncy

info

rmat

ion

ne

two

rk sy

stem

)

Publ

ic b

odie

s sha

re e

mer

genc

y in

form

atio

n vi

a a

loca

l G

over

nmen

t Wid

e ar

ea n

etw

ork

(LAG

WAN

). De

spite

less

im

med

iacy

than

J-AL

ERT,

mos

t of t

he lo

cal p

ublic

bod

ies

have

alre

ady

intr

oduc

ed th

is sy

stem

bec

ause

it e

nabl

es

simul

tane

ous t

rans

miss

ion

of e

mer

genc

y in

form

atio

n by

pu

sh m

ail a

t fai

rly lo

w c

osts

.

【N

eeds】

Whe

n AF

AD d

evel

ops d

isast

er &

em

erge

ncy

oper

atio

n ce

nter

s at t

he p

rovi

ncia

l le

vel,

this

syst

em w

ill b

e us

eful

to su

ppor

t the

ir ac

tiviti

es.

【Ch

alle

nges】

It is

nece

ssar

y to

coo

rdin

ate

AFAD

’s c

once

pt re

gard

ing

whe

ther

the

emer

genc

y in

form

atio

n is

to b

e tr

ansm

itted

on

natio

nal l

evel

.

Com

bina

tion

of

mul

tiple

pro

duct

s of

seve

ral

man

ufac

ture

rs

Goo

d

Publ

ic

Info

rmat

ion

Com

mon

s

A ce

ntra

lized

info

rmat

ion

base

will

be

esta

blish

ed in

w

hich

info

rmat

ion

orga

nize

rs (g

over

nmen

t, lo

cal p

ublic

bo

dies

, life

line

and

tran

spor

tatio

n op

erat

ors)

and

tr

ansm

itter

s (Br

oadc

astin

g M

edia

, Mob

ile P

hone

op

erat

ors)

will

be

able

to sh

are

imm

edia

te a

nd p

reci

se

info

rmat

ion

and

prov

ide

faci

litie

s in

whi

ch th

ey w

ill b

e ab

le to

est

ablis

h th

eir l

ivin

g qu

arte

rs in

tim

es o

f lar

ge

scal

e di

sast

er.

【N

eeds】

Adop

tion

of th

e sy

stem

for t

he n

ew

Cent

ral A

FAD

disa

ster

man

agem

ent c

ente

r in

Anka

ra h

as a

lread

y be

en e

nvisa

ged

by IT

div

ision

. 【

Chal

leng

es】

Syst

ems a

dopt

ed a

t the

pr

ovin

cial

leve

l sha

ll be

abl

e to

com

mun

icat

e an

d sh

are

info

rmat

ion

with

that

of A

nkar

a.

NEC

G

ood

Info

rmat

ion

Diss

emin

atio

n M

obile

Pho

ne

One

SEG

br

oadc

astin

g

(Com

mun

ity

One

SEG

)

This

is a

regi

onal

ver

sion

of Ja

pane

se te

rres

tria

l dig

ital

broa

dcas

ting

One

SEG

. Thi

s dev

ice

allo

ws l

ocal

resid

ents

to

gai

n di

sast

er in

form

atio

n vi

a m

obile

pho

ne a

nd T

V du

ring

pow

er o

utag

e. T

his d

evic

e is

auto

mat

ical

ly

activ

ated

and

the

war

ning

func

tion

star

ts in

cas

e of

em

erge

ncy.

【N

eeds】

Sinc

e m

obile

pho

nes a

re p

opul

ar in

Tu

rkey

, the

re is

a p

ossib

ility

to in

trod

uce

the

One

SE

G sy

stem

.

【Ch

alle

nges】

Alth

ough

Tur

kish

terr

estr

ial

digi

tal b

road

cast

ing

is in

the

Euro

pean

styl

e, O

ne

SEG

for m

obile

pho

nes,

for w

hich

the

wor

king

ar

ea is

lim

ited,

can

be

intr

oduc

ed re

gard

less

of

the

styl

e. It

has

bee

n su

cces

sful

ly in

trod

uced

in

othe

r cou

ntrie

s suc

h as

Indo

nesia

.

Send

ing

side:

Hi

tach

i Kok

usai

El

ectr

ic, e

tc.

Rece

ivin

g sid

e:

mob

ile p

hone

m

anuf

actu

rer

prod

ucin

g de

vice

s th

at c

an re

ceiv

e O

ne S

EG se

rvic

e.

(e.g

. Sha

rp)

Goo

d


5-7

Mes

sage

Boa

rd

Carr

iers

and

mob

ile p

hone

car

riers

pro

vide

mes

sage

bo

ard

serv

ices

at t

he ti

me

of d

isast

er. I

t can

be

in th

e fo

rm o

f pus

h bu

tton

, voi

ce re

cord

ing,

or w

eb te

xtin

g.

【N

eeds】

AFAD

inte

nds t

o in

trod

uce

mes

sage

bo

ards

. 【

Chal

leng

es】

Coor

dina

tion

with

car

riers

is

esse

ntia

l.

Mes

sage

boa

rds

com

bine

mul

tiple

m

anuf

actu

rers

’ pr

oduc

ts

Very

goo

d

Com

mun

ity F

M

radi

o Lo

cal F

M ra

dio

stat

ions

can

eas

ily b

e es

tabl

ished

and

re

quire

lim

ited

inve

stm

ent.

Thos

e st

atio

ns a

re

esta

blish

ed fo

r the

pur

pose

of d

isast

er p

reve

ntio

n w

hich

ca

n be

dist

ribut

ed to

a w

ider

are

a. T

he ra

dio

stat

ion

may

be

tem

pora

rily

esta

blish

ed in

the

disa

ster

stric

ken

area

.

【N

eeds】

Ista

nbul

AFA

D ha

s bee

n pr

ovid

ing

radi

o se

rvic

e, w

hich

is u

sed

not o

nly

for d

isast

er

info

rmat

ion

but a

lso fo

r disa

ster

pre

vent

ion

purp

oses

. The

re is

a p

oten

tial t

o us

e ra

dio

for t

he

sam

e pu

rpos

es.

Devi

ce fo

r FM

ra

dio:

Hita

chi

Koku

sai Y

agi

Solu

tions

FM

Stu

dio

devi

ces:

co

mbi

natio

n of

m

ultip

le

man

ufac

ture

rs’

prod

ucts

Very

goo

d

Disa

ster

pr

even

tion

adm

inist

ratio

n w

irele

ss sy

stem

.

Info

rmat

ion

tran

smiss

ion

syst

em fr

om lo

cal m

unic

ipal

en

titie

s to

resid

ents

is e

stab

lishe

d by

util

izing

a V

HF

wire

less

syst

em. T

his s

yste

m sh

ould

not

be

the

only

co

mm

unic

atio

n sy

stem

in p

lace

, as i

t has

bee

n w

itnes

sed

in th

e G

reat

Eas

t Jap

an e

arth

quak

e th

at m

essa

ges a

re

not a

lway

s hea

rd.

In n

orm

al ti

mes

, thi

s sys

tem

can

be

utili

zed

for v

ario

us

purp

oses

, inc

ludi

ng b

road

cast

ings

disa

ster

pre

vent

ion

awar

enes

s pro

gram

s.

【N

eeds】

It w

ill b

e ef

fect

ive

to p

rovi

de d

isast

er

info

rmat

ion

and

inst

ruct

the

publ

ic o

f the

nex

t st

eps v

ia th

is w

irele

ss sy

stem

, rat

her t

han

a sim

ple

siren

. 【

Chal

leng

es】

A sy

stem

to c

olle

ct a

nd sc

reen

in

form

atio

n to

be

diss

emin

ated

shou

ld b

e es

tabl

ished

.

Japa

n Ra

dio,

NEC

, Pa

naso

nic,

OKI

, To

shib

a, H

itach

i Ko

kusa

i, Fu

jitsu

G

ener

al,

Mits

ubish

i Ele

ctric

Very

goo

d

Loud

spea

ker

for l

ong

dist

ance

tr

ansm

issio

n

This

spea

ker t

rans

mits

ove

r lon

ger d

istan

ces t

han

the

trum

pet s

peak

er c

omm

only

use

d by

radi

o co

mm

unic

atio

n fo

r disa

ster

pre

vent

ion

and

adm

inist

ratio

n. E

ffect

ive

cove

ring

redu

ces t

he to

tal

inve

stm

ent c

osts

. It s

olve

s diff

icul

ties i

n he

arin

g du

e to

ec

ho e

tc. H

owev

er, t

here

are

disa

dvan

tage

s inc

ludi

ng;

rela

tivel

y he

avin

ess,

con

sum

ing

a lo

t of e

nerg

y.

Com

bina

tion

with

the

exist

ing

styl

e sp

eake

r will

be

effe

ctiv

e.

【N

eeds】

Loud

spea

kers

are

par

ticul

arly

ef

fect

ive

in th

e re

mot

e ar

eas.

【Ch

alle

nges】

Pric

e is

muc

h hi

gher

than

the

trad

ition

al sp

eake

rs. T

his l

oud

spea

ker s

houl

d be

co

ordi

nate

d w

ith th

e sir

en sy

stem

pla

nned

to b

e in

stal

led

by T

urki

sh si

de.

Horn

Arr

ay

Spea

ker

TOA

Very

goo

d

Rem

ote

star

ting

loud

spea

ker

(DTM

F et

c)

The

syst

em is

est

ablis

hed

with

fairl

y lo

w c

osts

such

that

in

the

case

of e

mer

genc

y, lo

udsp

eake

rs in

the

dist

ant

area

s are

act

ivat

ed a

nd se

nd o

ut in

form

atio

n vi

a ra

dio

wav

es. A

lthou

gh it

is c

erta

in to

con

trol

act

ivat

ion

by

utili

zing

the

gene

ral V

/UHF

wire

less

, con

trol

ling

sizab

le

spea

kers

in a

wid

e ar

ea re

quire

s a la

rge

inve

stm

ent.

By

supe

rpos

ing

the

spea

ker c

ontr

ol si

gnal

ont

o th

e ra

dio

broa

dcas

t wav

es, d

istan

ce sp

eake

rs c

an b

e co

ntro

lled.

【N

eeds】

Rem

ote

cont

rol s

yste

m o

f lo

udsp

eake

rs w

ill b

e ef

fect

ive

in re

mot

e ar

eas.

Diffi

cult

to sp

ecify

co

mpa

ny n

ame,

sin

ce th

is is

a pa

rt

of v

ario

us

prod

ucts

.

Goo

d


5-8

Syst

em fo

r Pr

edic

tion

of

Envi

ronm

enta

l Em

erge

ncy

Dose

In

form

atio

n (S

PEED

I）

SPEE

DI h

as b

een

esta

blish

ed b

y th

e N

ucle

ar R

egul

atio

n Ag

ency

(NRA

). W

hen

sizab

le ra

dioa

ctiv

e su

bsta

nces

may

ha

ve b

een

rele

ased

from

nuc

lear

pla

nts,

the

NRA

im

med

iate

ly p

redi

cts t

he a

tmos

pher

ic le

vel o

f ra

dioa

ctiv

ity a

nd e

xpos

ure

dose

in th

e su

rrou

ndin

g ar

ea

base

d on

rele

vant

info

rmat

ion

incl

udin

g em

issio

n so

urce

, met

eoro

logi

cal c

ondi

tions

and

topo

grap

hic

data

.

【N

eeds】

Due

to th

e pr

ojec

t to

cons

truc

t new

nu

clea

r pow

er p

lant

s, in

tere

st o

f pre

vent

ion

of

nucl

ear-

rela

ted

disa

ster

s has

bee

n in

crea

sing

in

Turk

ey.

Not

ope

n to

the

publ

ic

Goo

d

Hosp

ital

man

agem

ent/

m

edic

al

serv

ices

Emer

genc

y M

edic

al

Info

rmat

ion

Syst

em

In th

e ev

ent o

f disa

ster

, thi

s ass

ists i

n im

med

iate

and

pr

ecise

med

ical

/rel

ief a

ctiv

ities

ove

r a w

ides

prea

d ar

ea

acro

ss re

gion

s.

Durin

g an

acu

te p

hase

of d

isast

er, i

nfor

mat

ion

from

the

med

ical

inst

itutio

ns re

gard

ing

dam

age

situa

tion

and

the

num

ber o

f pa

tient

s tha

t can

be

acce

pted

will

be

put t

oget

her a

nd sh

ared

Nee

d fo

r a d

isast

er m

edic

al a

ssist

ance

team

and

a

disp

atch

man

agem

ent s

yste

m. T

his i

nfor

mat

ion

is sh

ared

am

ongs

t tea

ms.

Info

rmat

ion

rega

rdin

g th

e pa

tient

s’, t

rans

port

airc

raft

w

ill b

e sh

ared

and

man

aged

.

In T

urke

y an

d Eu

rope

whe

re e

arth

quak

es a

re n

ot a

s fr

eque

nt a

s in

Japa

n, e

stab

lishm

ent o

f an

info

rmat

ion

base

in th

e ev

ent o

f a g

reat

disa

ster

is n

ot e

asy.

The

disa

ster

med

ical

car

e sy

stem

in Ja

pan

allo

ws s

moo

th

coop

erat

ion

amon

gst h

ospi

tals

and

ambu

lanc

e se

rvic

es.

It ha

s bee

n gr

adua

lly d

evel

oped

thro

ugh

tria

l and

err

or.

The

Japa

nese

syst

em e

xcel

s in

shar

ing

and

prov

idin

g in

form

atio

n re

gard

ing

med

ical

car

e na

tionw

ide

in th

e ev

ent o

f disa

ster

.

【N

eeds】

This

syst

em e

nhan

ces t

he

unde

rsta

ndin

g of

the

situa

tion

in m

edic

al

inst

itutio

ns in

the

even

t of a

disa

ster

, and

it

prov

ides

info

rmat

ion

for a

ppro

pria

te p

atie

nt

tran

spor

tatio

n. A

lso it

allo

ws U

MKE

to w

ork

effic

ient

ly.

【Ch

alle

nges】

The

deve

lopm

ent o

f IT

soft

war

e co

mpa

tible

with

the

exist

ing

SAKO

M sy

stem

and

a

rele

vant

tech

nica

l sur

veys

are

requ

ired.

NTT

Dat

a Ve

ry g

ood,

aft

er

furt

her

tech

nica

l st

udie

s

Ba

ryon

Lin

e,

Prot

on B

eam

, Bo

ron

Neu

tron

Ca

ptur

e Th

erap

y (B

NCT

)

Six

Bary

on L

ine

faci

litie

s are

cur

rent

ly o

pera

ting

wor

ldw

ide,

four

of w

hich

are

in Ja

pan.

Thi

rty

Prot

on

Beam

faci

litie

s are

cur

rent

ly o

pera

ting

wor

ldw

ide,

eig

ht

of w

hich

are

in Ja

pan.

【N

eeds】

Ther

e is

grea

t dem

and

in T

urke

y w

here

a fa

irly

larg

e nu

mbe

r of c

ance

r pat

ient

s ex

ist, t

hus i

t will

be

a gr

eat c

ontr

ibut

ion

to

Turk

ish m

edic

ine.

【

Chal

leng

es】

Ther

e is

curr

ently

no

such

faci

lity

in T

urke

y, h

ence

the

met

ropo

lis o

f Ank

ara

or

Ista

nbul

wou

ld b

e th

e fir

st c

andi

date

s for

in

trod

uctio

n. Im

plem

enta

tion

as w

ell a

s m

aint

enan

ce c

ost i

s gre

at.

Mits

ubish

i El

ectr

ic, H

itach

i, To

shib

a

Very

goo

d: in

Tu

rkey

ther

e ar

e a

larg

e nu

mbe

r of

patie

nts w

ith

canc

er


5-9

Adva

nced

m

edic

al se

rvic

es

such

as

rege

nera

tive

med

icin

e,

diag

nosis

and

tr

eatm

ent o

f ca

ncer

by

endo

scop

e.

In Ja

pan,

adv

ance

d re

sear

ch a

nd d

evel

opm

ent t

hrou

gh

the

coop

erat

ion

betw

een

Uni

vers

ities

and

Med

ical

eq

uipm

ent m

aker

s are

und

er w

ay.

【N

eeds】

Cont

ribut

ion

of a

dvan

ced

med

ical

se

rvic

es fa

cilit

ies t

o Tu

rkish

med

icin

e is

larg

e.

【Ch

alle

nges】

Join

t dev

elop

men

t with

un

iver

sitie

s in

Turk

ey c

an b

e co

nsid

ered

.

Hita

chi O

lym

pus,

U

nive

rsiti

es

Very

goo

d: in

Tu

rkey

ther

e ar

e a

larg

e nu

mbe

r of

patie

nts w

ith

canc

er

Hosp

ital

Faci

litie

s and

Eq

uipm

ent

pipe

join

ts,

wat

er su

pply

pi

pe, d

rain

age

pipe

, sto

rm

wat

er p

ipe,

gas

pi

pe

Japa

n ha

s var

ious

faci

litie

s reg

ardi

ng d

isast

er p

reve

ntio

n.

Thei

r effe

ctiv

enes

s was

pro

ven

in p

ast e

xper

ienc

es

(incl

udin

g th

e G

reat

Eas

t Jap

an E

arth

quak

e) a

nd th

eir

qual

ity is

con

tinuo

usly

bei

ng im

prov

ed.

【N

eeds】

Japa

nese

faci

litie

s per

form

ed w

ell i

n th

e G

reat

Eas

t Jap

an E

arth

quak

e.

【Ch

alle

nges】

Rela

tivel

y hi

gh c

ost c

ompa

ring

with

com

petit

ors o

vers

eas.

Kura

shik

i Kak

o Co

.Ltd

. Ve

ry g

ood

Dual

Fue

l G

ener

ator

A

Dual

Fue

l gen

erat

or is

a g

as tu

rbin

e ge

nera

tor w

hich

ca

n us

e ga

s or o

il (p

araf

fin/d

iese

l). A

dditi

onal

ly, i

t can

be

used

as c

ogen

erat

ion

(env

ironm

enta

lly fr

iend

ly

perf

orm

ance

). Ja

pane

se c

ompa

nies

are

the

only

m

anuf

actu

rers

of 1

000k

w g

ener

ator

s whi

ch a

re ty

pica

lly

used

in E

mer

genc

y O

pera

tion

Cent

ers a

nd H

ospi

tals.

(fo

reig

n co

mpa

nies

pro

duce

larg

er c

apac

ity g

ener

ator

s )

【N

eeds】

Smal

l sca

le g

ener

ator

s tha

t can

be

intr

oduc

ed in

to d

isast

er b

ase

hosp

itals

are

only

m

anuf

actu

red

in Ja

pan.

【

Chal

leng

es】

Rela

tivel

y hi

gh c

ost c

ompa

red

to

com

petit

ors o

vers

eas

Kaw

asak

i Hea

vy

Indu

stry

G

ood

Elev

ator

Au

tom

atic

dia

gnos

is sy

stem

allo

ws i

mm

edia

te

rest

orat

ion

with

out m

anua

l ins

pect

ion.

Add

ition

ally

, the

el

evat

or is

hig

hly

resis

tant

to e

arth

quak

es.

【N

eeds】

In T

urke

y, th

e re

cogn

ition

of t

he

impo

rtan

ce o

f thi

s tec

hnol

ogy

is no

t su

ffici

ent b

ecau

se th

ere

are

only

a sm

all

num

ber o

f cas

es w

here

it h

as b

een

an is

sue.

【Ch

alle

nges】

Mits

ubish

i Ele

ctric

alre

ady

has

deliv

ery

reco

rds.

Cos

ts a

nd e

ffect

iven

ess o

f ris

k re

duct

ion

need

s to

be e

xpla

ined

.

Mits

ubish

i, Hi

tach

i, To

shib

a Ve

ry g

ood:

So

me

Japa

nese

co

mpa

nies

hav

e al

read

y de

liver

ed

syst

ems i

n Tu

rkey

.

LE

D lig

htin

g LE

D lig

htin

g sa

ves e

nerg

y 【

Nee

ds】

Japa

n ha

s a g

ood

reco

rd in

term

s of

ener

gy e

ffici

ency

【

Chal

leng

es】

Rela

tivel

y hi

gh c

ost c

ompa

red

to

com

petit

ors f

rom

ove

rsea

s

Pana

soni

c,

Tosh

iba

Ligh

ting

and

Tech

nolo

gy

Co.

Not

goo

d

BMS

(Bui

ldin

g M

anag

emen

t Sy

stem

)

BMS

save

s ene

rgy

and

cost

in b

uild

ing

man

agem

ent b

y us

ing

labo

r-sa

ving

tech

nolo

gy a

nd o

ptim

izes t

he

oper

atio

n. Ja

pane

se B

MS

prod

ucts

hav

e an

adv

anta

ge in

te

rms o

f ene

rgy

savi

ng.

【N

eeds】

Japa

n ha

s a g

ood

reco

rd in

term

s of

ener

gy e

ffici

ency

【

Chal

leng

es】

Rela

tivel

y hi

gh c

ost c

ompa

ring

with

com

petit

ors o

vers

eas

Azbi

l N

ot g

ood

Pack

aged

air

cond

ition

ing

syst

em

A pa

ckag

ed a

ir co

nditi

onin

g sy

stem

ope

rate

s with

el

ectr

icity

. In

the

even

t of a

disa

ster

, it i

s abl

e to

ope

rate

on

an

emer

genc

y ge

nera

tor.

Japa

nese

pro

duct

s are

pa

rtic

ular

ly e

ffici

ent a

nd e

nerg

y-sa

ving

.

【N

eeds】

Japa

n ha

s a g

ood

reco

rd in

term

s of

ener

gy e

ffici

ency

【

Chal

leng

es】

Rela

tivel

y hi

gh c

ost c

ompa

ring

with

com

petit

ors o

vers

eas

Daik

in In

dust

ry,

Mits

ubish

i, To

shib

a, H

itach

i

Goo

d


5-10

Wat

er re

cycl

ing

syst

em

Thes

e ar

e se

wag

e tr

eatm

ent a

nd w

ater

recy

clin

g sy

stem

s. P

artic

ular

ly, f

acili

ties o

pera

ting

inde

pend

ently

in

the

even

t pub

lic in

fras

truc

ture

bre

ak d

owns

will

nee

d th

is te

chno

logy

.

【N

eeds】

Japa

n ha

s a g

ood

reco

rd in

term

s of

ener

gy e

ffici

ency

【

Chal

leng

es】

Rela

tivel

y hi

gh c

ost c

ompa

ring

with

com

petit

ors o

vers

eas

Tore

y, H

itach

i G

ood

Heat

supp

ly

Regi

onal

he

atin

g an

d co

olin

g

In Ja

pan,

BCP

of e

nerg

y-sa

ving

as w

ell a

s hig

hly

effic

ient

re

gion

al h

eatin

g an

d co

olin

g sy

stem

from

bes

t-m

ix o

f en

ergy

of g

as a

nd e

lect

ricity

can

be

esta

blish

ed.

【N

eeds】

Japa

n ha

s a g

ood

reco

rd in

term

s of

ener

gy e

ffici

ency

【

Chal

leng

es】

Rela

tivel

y hi

gh c

ost c

ompa

ring

with

com

petit

ors o

vers

eas

Toky

o G

as,

Osa

ka G

as

Goo

d

Util

ity

Life

lines

(Gas

/Ele

ctric

ity/

Wat

er）

Gas

: Sup

er-

dens

e Re

al

time

seism

ic

disa

ster

pr

even

tion

syst

em

SUPE

REM

E (S

uper

-den

se R

eal t

ime

Mon

itorin

g of

Ea

rthq

uake

s) h

as a

rem

ote

shut

off f

unct

ion

empl

oyin

g a

supe

r-de

nse

SI se

nsor

and

dam

age

estim

atio

n.

【N

eeds】

Curr

ently

, the

gas

supp

ly sy

stem

in

Burs

a re

quire

s man

ual s

hutd

own

in th

e ev

ent o

f a

disa

ster

or a

ccid

ent.

The

curr

ent s

ituat

ion

mig

ht c

ause

seco

ndar

y di

sast

ers s

uch

as fi

re.

【Ch

alle

nges】

Sinc

e th

e ga

s is s

uppl

ied

by

priv

ate

com

pani

es, i

t is i

mpo

rtan

t to

mak

e an

ag

reem

ent w

ith th

em.

Toky

o G

as

Very

goo

d

Wat

er

Pure

Hy

brid

: Por

tabl

e w

ater

pu

rific

atio

n sy

stem

Port

able

wat

er p

urifi

catio

n sy

stem

for t

he e

vent

of

disa

ster

, whi

ch w

orks

with

a so

lar p

anel

【N

eeds】

It ca

n be

use

d as

a b

acku

p fo

r dr

inka

ble

wat

er in

a d

isast

er.

【Ch

alle

nges】

Rela

tivel

y hi

gh c

ost c

ompa

red

with

com

petit

ors o

vers

eas

Y's G

loba

l Visi

on

co. L

td.

Goo

d

Mon

itorin

g of

th

e ro

ad

dam

age

situa

tion

Dam

age

degr

ee

in a

hig

hway

br

idge

de

term

inat

ion

syst

em

It im

med

iate

ly e

valu

ates

the

dam

aged

deg

ree

in b

ridge

s by

usin

g th

e da

mag

ed d

egre

e de

term

inat

ion

sens

or a

nd

wire

less

com

mun

icat

ion.

【N

eeds】

Eval

uatio

n of

dam

age

degr

ee in

br

idge

s is p

artic

ular

ly im

port

ant f

or e

mer

genc

y ro

ads.

【

Chal

leng

es】

Trai

ning

for t

he sy

stem

ope

ratio

n in

clud

ing

dete

rmin

atio

n of

the

dam

aged

deg

ree

is re

quire

d.

Publ

ic W

orks

Re

sear

ch

Inst

itute

(PW

RI)

Very

goo

d sin

ce

thos

e te

chno

logi

es

are

only

de

velo

ped

in

Japa

n An

omal

y de

tect

ion

syst

em

The

anom

aly

dete

ctio

n sy

stem

ana

lyze

s im

ages

from

m

onito

ring

cam

eras

and

repo

rts t

o ro

ad

man

ager

/ope

rato

rs, w

ho a

re n

ot re

quire

d to

mon

itor i

t th

emse

lves

.

【N

eeds】

It al

low

s the

imm

edia

te d

etec

tion

of

abno

rmal

con

ditio

ns o

n ro

ads b

y co

ntin

uous

m

onito

ring

both

in n

orm

al ti

mes

and

in th

e ev

ent o

f a d

isast

er. E

stab

lishm

ent o

f mon

itorin

g ca

mer

as is

pro

ceed

ing

in B

ursa

. 【

Chal

leng

es】

Trai

ning

for a

nom

aly

dete

ctio

n an

d au

tom

atic

ala

rm sy

stem

are

requ

ired.

Orie

ntal

Co

nsul

tant

s Ve

ry g

ood,

es

peci

ally

for

auto

mat

ic

alar

m sy

stem

s an

d an

omal

y de

tect

ion

syst

ems

Sim

ulat

ion/

Mon

itorin

g Ts

unam

i ev

acua

tion

simul

atio

n

Ther

e ar

e se

vera

l sim

ulat

ion

mod

els a

pplic

able

to

spec

ific

char

acte

ristic

s of v

ario

us re

gion

s.

【N

eeds】

In B

ursa

, the

sea

coas

t of M

arm

ara

mig

ht su

ffer f

rom

tsun

ami.

In G

emlik

and

M

udan

ya, a

sses

smen

t for

tsun

ami a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

f eva

cuat

ion

spac

es a

re im

port

ant

beca

use

ther

e ar

e re

siden

ts c

lose

to th

e co

ast

and

the

land

ele

vatio

n is

low

.

【Ch

alle

nges】

The

dang

er o

f tsu

nam

i is n

ot

wid

ely

reco

gnize

d.

DOM

ING

O

Very

goo

d


5-11

Floo

d sim

ulat

ion

This

anal

yses

and

pre

dict

s the

floo

d ar

ea o

n th

e ba

sis o

f va

rious

dat

a. H

azar

d m

aps c

an a

lso b

e cr

eate

d.

【N

eeds】

Floo

d sim

ulat

ion

is a

usef

ul a

naly

tical

to

ol to

ass

ess f

lood

haz

ards

. 【

Chal

leng

es】

Not

onl

y sim

ulat

ion,

but

tota

l so

lutio

ns to

floo

ding

shou

ld b

e co

nsid

ered

.

Hita

chi S

olut

ion

Goo

d

Rive

r/w

ater

re

sour

ce

man

agem

ent

syst

em

For t

he p

urpo

se o

f the

pre

vent

ion

of w

ater

disa

ster

, it

man

ages

the

river

side

and

dam

disc

harg

e, a

nd m

itiga

tes

dam

age

from

Tsu

nam

i/hig

h tid

e, a

nd m

onito

rs

land

slide

s.

Japa

nese

tech

nolo

gy re

gard

ing

sens

ors a

nd te

lem

eter

s

h

ave

been

trac

king

goo

d re

cord

s ab

road

and

ther

efor

e ar

e co

mpe

titiv

e.

【N

eeds】

Mon

itorin

g sy

stem

s for

rive

r lev

el a

nd

land

slide

s are

ess

entia

l for

ear

ly w

arni

ng.

【

Issu

es】

Intr

oduc

tion

of fl

ood

simul

atio

n w

ould

be

effe

ctiv

e.

JRC

Goo

d

Prec

ipita

tion

rada

r M

ulti

para

met

er m

etro

logi

cal r

adar

(MP

rada

r) is

qui

te

effe

ctiv

e fo

r sen

sing

tech

nolo

gies

for p

reci

pita

tion

pred

ictio

n. M

P ra

dar i

s cap

able

of p

redi

ctin

g pr

ecip

itatio

n w

ith a

hig

h ac

cura

cy.

【N

eeds】

Prec

ipita

tion

pred

ictio

n is

impo

rtan

t fo

r disa

ster

eva

cuat

ion.

【

Chal

leng

es】

In c

ombi

natio

n w

ith th

e w

ater

/riv

er re

sour

ce m

anag

emen

t sys

tem

it

wou

ld b

e ef

fect

ive

JRC

Goo

d

Port

/Airp

ort

Soil im

prov

emen

t te

chno

logi

es

for h

arbo

rs

and

airp

orts

Soil

impr

ovem

ent m

easu

res a

gain

st li

quef

actio

n su

ch a

s hi

gh p

ress

ure

inje

ctio

n of

cem

ent s

lurr

y. T

here

are

a

num

ber o

f suc

cess

fully

impl

emen

ted

exam

ples

in Ja

pan.

【N

eeds】

At th

e G

emlik

Por

t, th

ere

is a

need

for

lique

fact

ion

prev

entio

n m

easu

res s

uch

as so

il im

prov

emen

t tec

hnol

ogie

s, a

s wel

l as f

or

eart

hqua

ke-r

esist

ance

retr

ofits

by

both

the

publ

ic a

nd p

rivat

e se

ctor

s.

【Ch

alle

nges】

It is

nece

ssar

y to

rein

forc

e ea

rthq

uake

-res

istan

ce, t

o fil

ter t

he a

rea

of

foun

datio

n im

prov

emen

t, as

wel

l as t

o co

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com

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Po

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set

man

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ent

tech

nolo

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Tech

nolo

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now

-how

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ain

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port

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term

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base

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inve

stig

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sess

men

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afet

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exist

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port

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ai

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t fac

ilitie

s.

[Nee

ds] I

n th

e po

rts o

f Gem

lik a

nd M

udan

ya,

faci

lity

man

agem

ent m

etho

dolo

gy a

nd te

chni

que

that

incl

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colle

ctio

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roce

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naly

sis o

f da

ta, c

an b

e in

trod

uced

. How

ever

, the

nee

ds o

f Tu

rkey

are

unc

onfir

med

. 【

Chal

leng

es】

Ther

e is

a po

ssib

ility

that

the

expe

rienc

e, te

chno

logy

, and

info

rmat

ion

stor

age

of Ja

pan

does

not

app

ly to

the

spec

ifica

tions

of

Turk

ey a

s it i

s. T

urke

y sp

ecifi

catio

ns fo

r sof

twar

e de

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pmen

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essa

ry.

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truc

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Cons

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ld b

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vest

igat

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Harb

ors:

a

seism

ic

quay

wal

l and

re

info

rcem

ent

proj

ect

Stre

ngth

enin

g th

e st

ruct

ure

of th

e qu

ay w

alls

will

cre

ate

a qu

ay th

at c

an b

e us

ed fo

r the

tran

spor

t of e

mer

genc

y su

pplie

s eve

n af

ter a

n ea

rthq

uake

. (K

obe

port

de

mon

stra

ted

this

func

tion

in th

e Ko

be e

arth

quak

e in

M

aya

Pier

)

【N

eeds】

Appl

icat

ion

is ex

pect

ed in

Gem

lik a

nd

Mud

anya

. In

addi

tion,

ther

e is

a ne

ed fo

r ea

rthq

uake

resis

tanc

e of

the

quay

in th

e ex

istin

g po

rt in

the

back

of t

he G

emlik

Bay

. 【

Chal

leng

es】

Sinc

e th

e po

rt it

self

is sm

all

com

pare

d to

thos

e in

Japa

n, c

ost-

effe

ctiv

enes

s of

the

inve

stm

ent s

houl

d be

stud

ied.

Port

and

Airp

ort

Rese

arch

in

stitu

tion

(PAR

I)

Goo

d


5-12

Cont

aine

r cra

ne

seism

ic is

olat

ion

tech

nolo

gy

This

has b

een

alre

ady

enfo

rced

. 【

Nee

ds】

Ther

e is

a ne

ed fo

r con

tain

er c

rane

se

ismic

isol

atio

n at

the

priv

ate

Gem

lik P

ort.

【Ch

alle

nges】

Prod

uctio

n of

cra

nes i

n or

nea

r Tu

rkey

. (Al

tern

ativ

ely,

tran

sfer

of t

echn

ical

lic

ense

can

be

cons

ider

ed)

Port

and

Airp

ort

Rese

arch

in

stitu

tion

(PAR

I)

Goo

d

Was

te

trea

tmen

t G

arba

ge

inci

nera

tion

faci

litie

s with

ge

nera

tors

This

faci

lity

will

mee

t the

stric

t exh

aust

gas

regu

latio

ns

by in

trod

ucin

g po

llutio

n co

ntro

l sys

tem

s, a

nd h

ence

po

ssib

ly b

e co

nstr

ucte

d in

an

urba

n ar

ea.

Low

air

ratio

com

bust

ion

tech

nolo

gy fo

r a h

igh-

effic

ienc

y ge

nera

tor w

ill b

e de

velo

ped.

【N

eeds】

In T

urke

y, it

is re

quire

d to

mee

t re

gula

tions

for g

arba

ge in

cine

ratio

n in

the

EU.

Japa

nese

tech

nolo

gy m

eets

thos

e re

quire

men

ts.

【Ch

alle

nges】

An in

stitu

tion

to c

lass

ify n

on-

com

bust

ible

s is r

equi

red.

Hita

chi Z

osen

Ve

ry g

ood

since

Ja

pane

se

mak

ers h

ave

good

reco

rds

in th

e E.

U.


5-13

5.2. Study on Seismic Isolation

5.2.1. Need for Seismic Isolation Technology in Turkey Although regional differences of seismicity in Turkey are large, the highest expected intensities of earthquake ground motions are at the same level as those in Japan. Figure 5.2.1 below shows maps of Turkey and Japan which were developed by the collaboration of geological survey institutes in the world in GSHAP (Global Seismic Hazard Assessment Program) that shows the anticipated value of an earthquake‘s strongest acceleration on standard ground (bedrock) for a return period of 475 years with an exceedance probability of 10% in 50 years. It is obvious from these maps that seismic risks in the two countries are similar. Comparing Figure 5.2.1 with Figure 3.1.2 which shows the zoning of design earthquake loads of the Turkish Seismic Design Code, it is seen that the latter strongly reflects the former.

Figure 5.2.1 Seismic Risk of Turkey and Japan

The Turkish Seismic Design Code has 5 Seismic Zones (from I to V) as shown in Figure 3.1.2 Roughly speaking, the value of design earthquake loads stipulated in Zone I, which has the highest seismic risk, is close to those stipulated in the Building Standard Law and the Enforcement Order of Japan for the areas with the highest Z aerial coefficient such as Tokyo and Osaka. Turkish Design earthquake loads in Zone II, III, IV and V correspond to the Japanese aerial coefficients of 0.75, 0.50, 0.25 and 0.0 respectively. However, the actual zone factors stipulated in the Japanese Building Standard Law for the area with the lowest seismic risks are 0.7 (for Okinawa only), 0.8 or 0.9. Compared to the Turkish Code that strictly follows the results of the probabilistic seismic risk assessment in the Global Seismic Hazard Assessment Program (GSHAP), the Japanese Building Standard Law still assigns rather conservative earthquake loads even to the area with low seismic risks from the probabilistic point of view.

In conclusion, Turkey is under similarly severe seismological conditions as Japan, but its current building practices are not adapted to resist likely earthquakes. Therefore, Turkey is in great need for seismic isolation technology with enhanced seismic safety and reliability. It is compulsory to promote the application of seismic isolation systems to the facilities critical to disaster response after strong earthquake motions such as disaster management centers and hospitals. Seismic isolation is the only technology to realize such performance today.


5-14

Additionally, the importance of mitigating damages in non-structural elements10

and in the MEP (mechanical, electrical and plumbing) systems should also be highlighted. Concerns regarding these issues are currently increasing in Turkey and guidelines to install earthquake-resistant devices are being developed, especially for hospitals. Many operators of the hospitals interviewed in this study were also concerned by the risk of non-structural elements to break or fall during an earthquake. However, just like in Japan, various factors and problems that hinder sufficient strengthening can be predicted by implementing a reinforcement plan. In addition, visits to some hospitals during this survey revealed that wall and floor connectors of important MEP elements were clearly insufficient. Though it will take time to entirely install seismic isolation, a radical solution to this matter, is highly significant..

5.2.2. Status of Seismically Isolated Buildings in Turkey (1) Introduction and Widespread Status

The first code for seismic design in Turkey was established in 1940. After several revisions, the 1998 edition, the main body of which was kept unchanged in the latest edition in 2007, was established. In fact, the main modification in the 2007 edition is the additional requirement for seismic assessment and retrofit, based on the experience of the 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake. The history and outline of the Turkish Seismic Design Code are described in more detail in the Appendix entitled “General Technical Report on Turkish Seismic Design Code” by Dr. F. Sutcu from Istanbul Technical University, which is linked to this project. It can be said that when compared to The Japanese or US Building Codes, which are considered as the international standard for earthquake-resistance and that have a long history, Turkish Seismic Design Code is not too far behind.

However, the actual application of seismic design in buildings in Turkey (including seismic isolation) has largely fallen behind other countries. The first application of seismic isolation in Turkey was for the seismic retrofit of Atatürk International Airport which was damaged by the 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake. The isolation system provided for the roof was designed based on the US seismic code (the American Society of Civil Engineers / Structural Engineers Institute [ASCE/SEI] 7) which was adopted as the basis of the Design Standard for Seismically Isolated Structures provided by the Turkish Association for Seismic Isolation (TASI) in 2009. Since then, the number of applications of seismic isolation to building structures in Turkey has remained limited according to a number of local structural engineers interviewed during our survey. No official statistical data was identified during our investigation and the number of seismically isolated buildings in Turkey was not confirmed, even in the interview with the vice president of the TASI. An academic study report dated December 2013 indicates that the total number of buildings and civil works to which seismic isolation has been applied to date is 42 including retrofitting works and those under construction.

This problem is common in many countries where seismic risk is not negligible. A result of investigation on the number of seismically isolated structures in countries of high seismicity in the world conducted by A. Martelli in 2011 is shown in Figure 5.2.3. Approximately 80

10 Non-structural building components: a component of buildings which is not a part of structural system such as claddings,

interior partitions, ceilings, etc.


5-15

percent of seismically isolated structures in the world are in Japan. The Turkish design code for seismic isolation is greatly influenced by the US code even though the number of seismically isolated buildings in the US is much lower than in Japan, buildings in many high seismicity areas of the US are not built with seismic isolation. Additionally, recent US experience of intense earthquakes is limited, especially compared to Japan, so US standards can be expected to not be as safe as the Japanese standards.

Figure 5.2.2 Seismic Isolation System of Ataturk International Airport

Turkish engineers are becoming more interested today in seismic isolation technologies and their application to building structures. Academic and practical engineering symposiums and conferences are often held in Turkey. In March 2013, the Japanese Society of Seismic

by A. Martelli, 2011

Figure 5.2.3 Number of buildings with seismic isolation

roof truss

isolator


5-16

Isolation (JSSI) sent a delegation of experienced specialists to Turkey. The Ministry of Health (MOH) of Turkey issued a policy that public hospital buildings with 100 beds or more should be seismically isolated and published the “Standards for Design and Construction of Seismically Isolated Medical Buildings.” However, from the overall performance point of view, there are still some problems regarding dispersion in the anticipated performance level in the seismically isolated structures to build in Turkey.

(2) Current State of Seismic Isolation and its Challenges in Turkey

The Seismic Isolation Design Code for Buildings, which was prepared by TASI in 2009 but became less influential after the publication of Standards by MOH in 2013, has played an important role in the development of seismic isolation in Turkey. However, the Seismic Isolation Design Code for Buildings, which is based on the US code, is limited to two types of isolation devices only: (Laminated Rubber Bearing (LRB) with lead plug and Friction Pendulums as shown in Figure 5.2.4).

On the other hand, the Standards published by MOH were prepared gathering various opinions of specialists around the world and referring to well-known international codes such as Eurocode 8 and Notice 2009 of the Ministry of Land and Infrastructure for the Building Standard Law of Japan in addition to the US code. This mixture of various codes and standards resulted in some questions of efficiency as design standards. The two main concerns are whether the integrity of the philosophy as a design standard is maintained, and whether the various stipulations and criteria are harmonized and organized practically to the level to integrate design performance of the seismically isolated buildings. Based on interviews with Turkish structural engineers who are experienced in designing seismically isolated structures, the present design practices of seismic isolation in Turkey should be improved significantly, as explained below.

Figure 5.2.4 Isolation Devices Used Most Commonly in Turkey

1) Challenges in Structural Design:

According to the structural engineers in Turkey, the general method of designing a seismically isolated structure is to first complete an analysis based on the response spectrum derived from the seismological study. Then, based on this, only the expected performances

The lead plug installed at the center of ordinary laminated rubber bearing acts as a damper.

Friction between a steel stud and concave steel plates produces damping force.

steel plate &

rubber plate

lead plug

Rubber covering

Laminated Rubber Bearing with Lead Plug Friction Pendulum


5-17

(usually, horizontal stiffness11

and damping ratio12

of the isolation layer) will be specified in the tender documents of projects that use this method. Since the suppliers are required to not only conduct tests showing the validity of their products in satisfying requirements, but also to provide a detailed layout of isolators and dampers, these two types of isolation devices shown inFigure 5.2.4 are overwhelmingly abundant in Turkey, though combined devices that function as both isolators and dampers have large advantages over the ones with only either function. In addition, the input earthquake ground motions employed in the time-history response analysis are the recorded ground motions of past earthquakes which are scaled in the manner stipulated in US codes. These input ground motions are strictly in consistence with the probabilistic theory and are adopted in most major international codes today. However, the scaling processes are sometimes unreliable because there are some cases with an insufficient number of recorded ground motions to fit the purpose of the analysis but are still being used, thus resulting in various results, making the evaluation difficult. Employing these procedures for setting input ground motions sometimes leads to a situation in which the verification for certain types of earthquake ground motions such as motions with predominant long-period components or with long duration are overlooked, as is the case in the US practice. Seismically isolated structures are more sensitive to these types of motions than ordinary structures due to their special structural characteristics.

2) Selection of Isolation Devices

There are many cases where the actual situation does not meet with the above design methodology where the design structural engineer should select isolation devices to be employed in the project based on the specific and individual characteristics of each structure. Types of isolators and dampers are selected in the early stage, meaning that the selection may not be based on this design methodology to achieve the optimum combination. Also, it should be noted that there are many important performance aspects of the devices other than the horizontal stiffness or damping coefficient, such as displacement limit, temperature and/or axial load dependency of horizontal stiffness, characteristics of aging deterioration, etc. This design methodology makes it difficult for the structural engineers to verify or confirm these performances.

3) Maintenance (daily and periodical)

History of seismic isolation technology is not as long as those of other types of structures and aging characteristics should be further evaluated. Also, the importance of damage to isolation devices should be confirmed soon after severe seismic motions in order to understand if sufficient performance is maintained to resist expected aftershocks. A framework for routine maintenance and emergency inspection should be established and necessary devices installed in advance. However, the results of our study indicate that no provisions for these issues are in place, and owners, facility managers, and structural engineers do not appear to recognize the issue.

11 Lateral (horizontal) stiffness: ratio of applied lateral force to the corresponding lateral displacement or drift of a building or

structure. 12

Damping ratio: ratio of damping force to the lateral stiffness of a building or structure.


5-18

4) Non-structural Building Components and MEP Systems

Plumbing, ducts and elevator shafts passing through isolated stories and non-structural building components located between isolated and non-isolated portions shall have the ability to absorb the horizontal deformation of the two portions. According to Turkish structural engineers experienced in designing seismically isolated buildings, the importance of these issues is not sufficiently recognized in general by Turkish architects and MEP engineers and precautions for differential displacement are likely not sufficient in many cases. In fact, we identified a lack of such precautions during our visit to a seismically isolated building in Turkey (Figure 5.2.5). These elements and firefighting installations shown in the figure will likely be severely damaged during large earthquake ground motion, resulting in loss of functionality.

Figure 5.2.5

MEP Likely to be Easily Damaged by Horizontal Displacement of the Base-isolated Stories

5.2.3. Introducing the Japanese Seismic Isolation Technology (1) Purpose and Expected Effect

The design, device production, and appraisal of Japanese seismic isolation technology have a longer history than of other countries and have been in continuous development due the experiences of many intense earthquakes with a great variety of characteristics. That is, Japanese isolation systems are not only a result of theoretical development but also of continuous training and evolution of the discipline through actual earthquakes including experience of partial damage. Enhanced performance and reliability of seismically isolated buildings in Turkey are expected from introducing these technologies into Turkey where the level of seismic risk is similar to Japan .

(2) Recommended Japanese Technology

1) Simulation of Input Earthquake Ground Motion

In Japan, it is not common to use scaled records of past earthquakes as described in 5.2.2 (2). Instead, a simulation of input earthquake ground motion with a responsive spectrum matching the design spectrum is commonly used. The ground motion models simulated in this way give more stable responses than the scaled records of past earthquakes. These ground motion models also prevent large variations in the results of the analysis due to little variation allowed to the individual engineers applying the method. As a result, unified and

Clearance of plumbing works is small compared to that of seismic isolation. Probable damage to the plumbing system.

Fire extinguishers are fixed to both isolated and non-isolated portion. They will likely overturn or break due to difference in movement of both portions under seismic action.


5-19

reasonable evaluation standards for results of response analysis can be established. This type of ground motion simulation is also incorporated in the US code, although without detailed description, and the Turkish engineers we interviewed recognize the necessity of these simulations. Therefore, it is expected that this Japanese methodology to simulate ground motions can be accepted by Turkish engineers without substantial difficulty by encouraging and facilitating their understanding.

Simulated ground motions of another type, artificial motions, are often essential in designing seismically isolated buildings. The seismic energy input to seismically isolated structures is remarkably reduced by making use of their peculiar characteristics such as elongated natural periods and increased damping performances which are largely different from the ordinary structural systems. Therefore, as aforementioned, designing seismically isolated buildings requires an investigation of the effects of long period components and of a long seismic action durations, which leads to increased energy absorption capacity

13 in dampers. These

effects are usually negligible in ordinary low to medium rise buildings. It is often difficult or even impossible to represent such motions by recorded motions.

Problems associated with long period components and longer duration of seismic actions observed in the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake attracted public attention. In Japan, the risk of slip in various inland faults such as the Tachikawa Fault, the Ue-machi Fault and other unnamed ones has been recognized. A technology to simulate the most critical earthquake ground motions that can happen in each specific site has been developed aiming at ensuring safety beyond just complying with codes and regulations. It is called the ground motion simulation for “Scenario Earthquakes.

14” Figure 5.2.6 shows examples of

ground motions for a site near Tokyo simulated for earthquakes from three different sources: slips in an unconfirmed but possible inland fault in the vicinity of the site, slips in a large scale inland fault, and occurrence of a mega-earthquake on the boundary of tectonic plates, which is commonly called Plate Tectonics

15. These ground motions take into account the

characteristics of the source, the bedrock seismic wave transmission, and site soil amplification. Long-period and long-duration motions as well as the intense motion due to the fault in the vicinity of the site largely influence the simulation. This simulation technology makes it possible to remarkably enhance the reliability of seismic design by evaluating structural response to seismic actions which may be less probable but more critical than more probable ground motions, due to the characteristics of each building. This technology also evaluates the structural response to traditional ground motions derived from seismological theory.

The importance of the issues presented in this section may not be recognized sufficiently in Turkey and knowledge and experience acquired by Japanese engineers should be shared in

13 Energy absorption: amount of input energy to buildings or structures which is absorbed by damping and/or plastic

deformation of structures. 14

Scenario Earthquake : an earthquake of an assumed focal location and assumed focal mechanism 15

Plate Tectonics: a theory in earth science that the surface of earth is covered by several plates which are moved slowly by the convection in mantle beneath. It is explained that the energy accumulated in the plates by their movement is released abruptly along boundaries of or at parts in the plates and cause earthquakes


5-20

Turkey to popularize the significance and needs for considering ground motions from less traditional earthquake scenarios before the Japanese simulation technology can be generally recognized and applied.

Figure 5.2.6 Earthquake Ground Motion Simulation

2) A variety of Isolation Devices and Product Appraisal Systems

In Japan, methods for evaluating various aspects of performance of isolators and dampers have been developed. These include a range of characteristics including stiffness, damping capacity, aging, ultimate horizontal deflection, permissible compressive and tensile stresses on the bearing surfaces of isolators, dependency of stiffness on temperature, and cyclic deformation. In addition, a technical appraisal of public organizations established a system for approval of isolation devices by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation. The characteristics of approved products are made public so that structural engineers can compare the performance of the various types of devices. Based on this information, they can select a combination of devices and determine their layout for an optimum seismic isolation system for each building. Through this approval system, various types of isolators, as shown in Figure 5.2.7, and dampers in Figure 5.2.8, have been developed in Japan. Products in which laminated rubber isolators and steel dampers are combined were also developed.

The devices shown in Figure 5.2.4, which are frequently used in Turkey, have excellent performance in various aspects but their performance in other aspects may be behind others. What is important in development of seismic isolation technology in Turkey is to provide Turkish structural engineers with a system based on Japanese technology of a performance evaluation method that enable them to design with optimum selection, combination, and layout of isolation devices that suit the buildings in Turkey.

Slip in Large Scale Inland Fault

Slip in Inland Faultin Vicinity of Site Mega Earthquake on

Tectonic Plate Boundary

Slip in Large Scale Inland Fault

Slip in Inland Fault in Vicinity of Site

Mega Earthquake on Tectonic Plate Boundary


5-21

Figure 5.2.7 Examples of Isolators (Bearings) used in Japan

Laminated Rubber Bearing

Fundamental type of isolator but can also be dampers by replacing natural rubber with high damping rubber.

Slide Bearing Single Slide Bearing Elastic Slide Bearing

Laminated Rubber Bearing

Slider (teflon plate)

Base Plate

Roller Bearing

Double Tier of Rail Type Roller Bearing

Structure of Rail Type Roller Bearing

Multiple Ball Bearing

Made movable in two orthogonal directions by stacking rail type roller bearings

Plane Roller BearingRoller Bearing on

Concave Plates

interior rubber sheet interior steel sheet rubber covering

bolt hole

steel flange

natural rubber sheet or

high damping rubber sheet


5-22

Figure 5.2.8 Examples of Dampers used in Japan

It is possible to establish a Turkish approval system for isolation devices but it will take a substantial time. Some foreign products obtain approval from the Japanese approval system, which is becoming globally recognized. The Japanese system could be adopted in Turkey. As both technical appraisal and approval are carried out by a public organization in the Japanese system, use of the product specifications in selecting isolation devices for each project provides sufficient transparency for the design process.

3) Maintenance

In order to fix the manifestly insufficient maintenance of seismic isolation systems in Turkey, it is important to first establish a cooperation system for building owners, operators, design engineers and maintenance engineers. Figure 5.2.9 is the conceptual outline of the

Hysteresis Type Damper

Lead Damper

Steel Damper

Energy dissipation due to cyclic plastic deformation of materials produces damping.

Fluid Type Damper (Viscous Liquid in Steel Wall) The resistance to deformations in the viscous material between steel wall panels produces a damping force.

Fluid Type (Oil Damper)

The frictional resistance of oil moving in the device produces the damping force

Single Type Double Type

Cover Plate

Viscous Material Inner Steel Plate

Outer Steel Plate


5-23

cooperative organization for the maintenance proposed in the “Standard for Maintenance of Seismically Isolated Buildings” published by JSSI. It is necessary to establish the organization at the time of building delivery to make it possible to continue appropriate regular inspections to confirm that no critical aging deterioration is taking place and to require emergency inspections to confirm that isolation devices suffered no excessive damage after intense seismic actions.

The concept shown in Figure 5.2.9 has been developed based on the current social conditions and construction industry in Japan and has contributed to efficient maintenance of seismically isolated buildings. It has been applied in most of the seismically isolated buildings in Japan. The main background of this development is the requirement in Japan to establish a maintenance organization and plan for each seismically isolated building in order to obtain a building permit. Adapting this concept to fit the current situation in Turkey and applying it to every seismically isolated building will ensure the seismic safety of these buildings for an extended duration, to the benefit of the owners and users of the buildings. As this is a “soft” technology, it is not difficult to introduce it in Turkey.

Figure 5.2.9 Maintenance Organization Proposed in the Standard for Maintenance of Seismically Isolated Buildings by JSSI

Proper installations and detailed descriptions for monitoring and inspection are necessary. It is not appropriate to make a generic statement to identify which installations or tools are necessary because they depend on the characteristics of the isolation system and its

“USER MANUAL”


5-24

surrounding environment. Product Specimens16

and Story Drift Recorders which are simple mechanisms and often installed in isolated stories are shown in Figure 5.2.10.

Figure 5.2.10 Examples of Installations for Maintenance

16 Product Specimen: Isolation devices which are installed in addition to the working devices as test specimens to confirm

mainly the influence of aging on the characteristics of the devices under actual conditions of use in regular maintenance activities.

Product Specimen In addition to acting as isolation devices, product specimens are provided in isolation stories to monitor deterioration caused by various factors including aging, fire accident and flooding.

Story Drift Recorder

Drift of the isolation story is recorded by simple tools to identify any excessive displacement or cyclic movement cause problems to isolation devices are taking place.

Example of Record


5-25

4) Plumbing and Non-structural Components Capable of Following Drift

As mentioned in 5.2.2 (2), there are still some non-structural components between isolated and non-isolated portions and plumbing and other MEP systems passing through isolation stories that are not capable of following the drifts in the isolation stories in Turkey. The cause of this problem is believed to be the insufficient attention in the architectural details of non-structural components, and not about technology. Thus, it seems solvable just by making use of the local products without having to procure them all the way from Japan or use Japanese technology. On the other hand, in the case of plumbing and other MEP systems, the demand to follow three-dimensional movements calls for use of special products. Japanese products, such as those shown in Figure 5.2.11, are the results of continued research and development for this issue and provide solutions applicable in Turkey as well.

Figure 5.2.11 Japanese Plumbing Systems to Follow Drift in Isolated Stories

Indicates a movable section


5-26

5.3. Information Communication Technology Among Japanese information communication technologies (ICTs) that are considered available to be proposed to address challenges in Turkey described in Chapter 3.8, some have products that are directly applicable in Turkey, while others are difficult to apply directly; however, it is appropriate to describe or introduce them at the current stage. The following are descriptions of those ICT elements/products that would benefit Turkey in the disaster prevention field.

The proposals in this study focus on “satellite communication systems” and “information transmission systems” in the Platform of the overall image shown in the following figure.

5.3.1. Relevant Japanese ICT Products (1) Satellite communication system (EsBird system)

Vehicle-mounted transportable VSAT earth station

The Uninterruptable and Secure Communication System (KGHS) plan that AFAD is implementing is a plan to procure a total of 700 VSTA earth stations in the three years, from 2015 to 2017. Approximately 200 of these stations are expected to be vehicle-mounted transportable VSAT, and there is a possibility for Japanese products to be selected if the price is competitive.

Helicopter–mounted VAST earth station

The helicopter on-board version of VAST is a system that can transmit high-resolution pictures from an in-flight helicopter to relevant organizations via satellite communication by direct uplink. This technology is only offered by Japanese companies and the Japanese products can enter the market since the System Management and Information Security Working Group of AFAD shows a strong interest in them.

Figure 5.3.1 Overall concept of the disaster prevention communication systems


5-27

Figure 5.3.2 Overall Image of Proposed Satellite Communication Systems

Terminal Fixed Terminal

Portable VSAT Vehicle mounted VSAT Helicopter mounted VSAT

< Fixed Terminal on town >

< VSAT>

Figure 5.3.2 Operational Image of Satellite Communication Systems

-All disaster-related information is collected by AFAD-Provincial/district level would be the base

Telecommunication between AFAD and fixed terminals of Provincial/District

Area stricken by DisasterDisaster prevention center of Province/District

Weather report

Order by disaster prevention center (fixed terminal) of Provincial/District


5-28

Advantages of Japanese products are as follows.

Table 5.3.1 Advantages of Japanese products Low latency Always connectable by

private line Easily usable anywhere and

by anyone A variety of equipment line-

ups

Large-capacity video and audio data can be transmitted without delay by a single hop.

HQ

Blanch

Connectable by private line with no line congestion at the time of disaster. The mainstream system in other countries is the “best-effort system” which may become congested during a disaster.

Small and light transportable station that can be easily operated by anyone. A remote UAT function enables immediate

communication.

There are four Japanese manufacturers. It can be

used for 10 years continuously, and less risk

of discontinuity.

(2) Information Transmission System

1) Comprehensive disaster prevention information system (distributing information from central government to local governments and citizens)

Although the central command system of AFAD and a comprehensive disaster system in Turkey are currently in the development phase, the following aspects are not considered sufficient: collection of information on disaster prevention at the local government level, common information distribution systems to residents within a community, decision-making support, evacuation order management, supply management, and damage prediction system. It is also necessary to raise the awareness of the Turkish government to understand the importance of information transmission to various organizations and to citizens prior to introducing an information distribution system, such as the system used in Japan. When the laws and organizations regarding disaster prevention are developed in Turkey and the responsibilities are clarified between central and provincial levels in the future, a comprehensive disaster prevention information system and a common data distribution system are expected to be required by provinces according to their sizes and needs.

Resource: Hitachi Solutions, Ltd HP

http://www.hitachi-power-solutions.com/products/product03/p03_35.html

Figure 5.3.3 Comprehensive disaster prevention system for local governments

Disaster Information System


5-29

※消防庁資料より抜粋 http://www.fdma.go.jp/neuter/topics/jouhou/pdf/bousaimusen2011.pdf

※NTT東日本資料より抜粋 http://www.ntt-east.co.jp/business/case/2013/007/pdf/kesennuma.pdf

●●市役所

Source: NTT East

Figure 5.3.4 Common data distribution system for local governments (Disaster prevention information system)

2) Emergency information transmission system (J-ALERT element technology)

The project for the development of highly reliable communication infrastructure between central and local disaster prevention agencies is in development in Turkey, and this project mainly aims for the establishment of communication infrastructure. The interface technology that J-ALERT provides to transmit information from several authorities (such as the cabinet secretary and JMA) in Japan, has not yet been developed in Turkey. This Japanese technology might be useful in the implementation of an instant alarm transmission by the development of highly reliable communication infrastructure with TURKSAT satellite communications, which is under development in Turkey.

(3) Others

The needs of AFAD are not clarified at the moment. The following items are recommended for the future proposal.

1) Flood simulation system

This flood simulation system is to analyze and predict flood areas based on various data. The IT Department of AFAD acknowledged the necessity of the system and mentioned the name of the product of a specific Japanese manufacturer which they would like to use. The system can also create various kinds of hazard maps.

Source: FDMA

Figure 5.3.5 Emergency Information transmission system

National Level

Deliver to Town

Deliver to Market, Hospital

Municipality

Remote AccessJ-Alert

Deliver to Mobile

Deliver to Home

Wireless Delivery

Disaster Information

Ststem

Regional/ District Level

Fire Defense Agency

Meteorological Agency

Cabinet Secretariat Receive

Antena

Receiver

Broadcast Community FM


Disaster prevention Radio

Disaster prevention Control

IP Red

Radio

Internet

Mobile red

FM Radio


5-30

Resource: Hitachi Solutions, Ltd HP http://www.hitachi-power-solutions.com/products/product03/p03_08.html

Figure 5.3.6 Image of Flood Simulation System

2) Rivers and water resources management system

The IT department of AFAD showed an interest to learn from Japan regarding this system forriver management, dam water discharge management, tsunami and storm surge disasterprevention, as well as landslide disaster monitoring. However, it is important to define theline of demarcation with DSI that manage the Telemetry and Discharge Alarm Systems inTurkey beforehand.

Resource: Japan Radio CO., Ltd.

Figure 5.3.7 Outline of Telemetry and Discharge Alarm Systems

3) Rainfall radar

Rainfall prediction in upriver regions is important for flood prediction and water resourcemanagement. For rainfall prediction, the use of multi-parameter weather radar (MP radar) asa sensing technology is extremely effective. The MP radar can predict the amount of rainfallwith a high degree of accuracy, and this Japanese disaster prevention technology can beapplied in Turkey.


5-31

Resource: Japan Radio Co., Ltd. Figure 5.3.8 Image of Rainfall Radar

5.3.2. Introduction of Japanese ICTs Table 5.3.2 shows examples of disaster prevention related Japanese ICTs, as a summary of previous sections in Chapter 5. The need for such technologies is expected to grow in Turkey, since these systems and technologies have the potential to contribute to reinforcing the disaster prevention capabilities of Turkey.

Table 5.3.2 Examples of Japanese Knowledge, Experiences, and Technologies regarding Disaster Prevention Information Transmission

Japanese Technologies Brief Summary J-ALERT

J-Alert is a satellite based system that allows authorities (from Cabinet Secretary and JMA via FDMA) to quickly and directly broadcast alerts of emergencies such as ballistic missile information, tsunami information, and early earthquake warning to local media and to citizens by automatically activating wireless disaster administration communication. Today, it is operated by almost all local governments in Japan.

Em-Net (Emergency information system)

Em-Net is the emergency contact information system for governmental agencies which utilizes a local government wide area network (LGWAN). Em-Net does not act as fast as J-Alert, however, almost all local governments in Japan have installed Em-Net since the installation of this emergency information system is low cost and it allows for simultaneous delivery of push notifications.

Public Information Commons

Public Information Commons is the information system to promptly provide accurate information to residents at the time of large-scale disasters. It establishes information infrastructure that shares and centralizes information between information providers such as central bureaucracy, local governments, utility providers, transportation related operators, and information communicators (e.g. mass media and mobile companies) to facilitate the distribution of information to local residents. As of Feb. 6, 2014, thirteen prefectures in Japan have installed the system, and another fifteen prefectures are considering it.

Mobile One-Segment Broadcasting (Community One-Segment)

Mobile One-Segment Broadcasting can disseminate the disaster information in case of power outage via TV broadcasting means, by mobile phones that are the regional limited editions of a Japanese terrestrial digital one-segment broadcasting system. In emergencies, it automatically starts up terminals and delivers warnings. The terrestrial digital broadcasting in Turkey follows the European system, but a community one-segment broadcasting system with a limited area can be successfully introduced to mobile phones in Turkey as it has been in Indonesia.

Warnings by mobile phones (Area mail/Cell Broadcast) （Cell Broadcast)

Delivering warning messages such as SMS to large numbers of specific subscribers is not suitable because the line congestion may hinder message delivery. When prompt transmissions such as early earthquake warnings are required, Cell Broadcast is effective. The system is under study in Turkey.

Disaster Message Board

Disaster Message Board is the service provided by carriers and mobile companies to notify family and friends with safety information. There are three ways to use the service: push button style, voice recording, and written words on the Web.

Community FM radio broadcasting

Community-based broadcasting stations at a municipal level that can be utilized for disaster prevention. They can broadcast the information over a wide range with small investment. They can be established on a temporary basis in the affected areas.


5-32

Disaster Administrative Radio System

The system utilizes VHF radio to transmit pre-alarms and evacuation orders from local government facilities to local residents by sound. Direct sounds can easily transmit messages to local residents. The system is available during normal times, thus, it is effective to use it to raise the awareness of residents about disasters. Its effectiveness was again acknowledged after experiencing the Great East Japan Earthquake, but it has the shortcoming of its audibility depending on the location and environment.

Long Distance Horn Array Speakers

The sounds from horn array speakers reach far greater distances than trumpet speakers, which are typically used for disaster administration radio communications. Horn array speakers reduce investment costs and resolve the problem of echoes that makes it difficult to hear. On the other hand, they have shortcomings in that they are heavy and require more power. It is effective to use both horn array speakers and trumpet speakers in combination.

Remote Activation of Loud Speakers

This system starts up speakers in remote areas and transmits emergency messages by utilizing the radio airwaves with simple installation and low cost. The start-up using the VHF/UHF radio is more reliable, but it is costly to control a number of speakers over a wide area. It can be controlled in a wide area by overlapping speaker control signals with radio airwaves. J-Alert has achieved the practical use of automatic start-up by utilizing community FM airwaves. The automatic start-up by utilizing AM middle-wave radio has also been examined.

Railway stop system by detecting preliminary earthquake tremors (P-waves)

This automatically reduces the speed and stops trains safely by utilizing P-wave sensor detective signals installed by railway companies and Early Earthquake Warnings provided by JMA. Different kinds of systems are applied by each railway company. Immediate Earthquake Alarm System (EQAS) is applied to bullet trains by JR Fast Response Equipment, while Quake Load (FREQL) is applied by Tokyo Metro.

System for the Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI)

SPEEDI is the system installed by the Nuclear Regulation Authority of Japan to estimate concentrations of radioactive materials in areas around a plant, and the exposure doses based on the information of emission source, weather condition, and topography data during a state of emergency when a large amount of radioactive material is released from a nuclear power plant, or when there is a possibility of such a situation.


6. Project Proposals for Disaster Resilient Urban Planning 6.1. Long List of Proposed Projects

The proposed projects that are expected to contribute to disaster resilient urban planning in Turkey and Bursa are listed and summarized in the project long list (Table 6.1.1). The projects are listed in accordance with five key perspectives as discussed in Chapter 4.2.2, with consideration for AFAD’s current initiatives regarding disaster risk management in Turkey and the disaster risk management system in Japan. The scope of measures against disaster is broad. In order to contribute to comprehensive disaster management, each project is studied with consideration of the synergy effect among the proposed projects. Direction of possible support to disaster management sector in short, medium and long term range was taken into consideration to the project long list.

Projects in the long list for Bursa province are classified into 5 categories numbered (1) through (5). Projects in the long list for the national level are classified into the categories (3), (4) and (5); because projects for category (1), “Capacity Development toward Effective Disaster Risk Management” are already in progress as a Technical Cooperation Project by JICA, and for (2), MOEU is already working on “Urban redevelopment plan” for vulnerable areas in cities.

The five categories are described on Figure 6.1.1. The project map for Bursa province is shown on Figure 6.1.2; the project long list is in Table 6.1.1.

Source: JICA Study Team based on the system of the Charter related to earthquake preparedness of the southern Kanto region directly under the "metropolitan area White Paper"

Figure 6.1.1 Framework of Project Formulation related to Disaster Resilient Urban Planning

[1]Disaster Risk Assessment:

Disaster risk and vulnerability assessment is recommended for the development of a disaster prevention plan; however, information for disaster risk assessment is not yet available for any of regions or provinces in Turkey, including Bursa province. Currently, JICA’s technical cooperation project "Capacity Development toward Effective Disaster Risk Management” is ongoing with AFAD, and AFAD has been working on information gathering and risk assessment through collaboration with relevant authorities and universities. The assessment of hazardous areas should be conducted as the first step, especially for the resilient urban planning in Bursa.

6-1


[2] Reduction of Disaster Risks in the Urban Areas:

In Japan, “Disaster Risk Mitigation” is a key concept for disaster risk management. Based on this concept, the improvement of vulnerable areas that are at high risk of disaster is the second step for disaster resilient urban planning.

As a result of the rapid influx of people into urban areas, along with the illegal occupation of land and unpermitted housing, highly dense and vulnerable residential areas are commonly seen in large cities in Turkey. Improvement of vulnerable areas with reinforcement or reconstruction of existing buildings and utilities are urgently required. The Turkish government has been working on redeveloping these areas in order to improve the situation. Through the enactment of the Urban Transformation Law in 2012 (Law No.6306), MOEU and local governments (metropolitan municipalities and municipalities) have been formulating or implementing urban transformation projects.

[3] Formation of a Disaster Resistant Urban Structure:

In order to mitigate disaster risk and make the city resilient, the formation of an urban structure that will withstand disasters is also important and should be done in parallel with efforts to improve vulnerable areas. The key components of disaster resistant urban structure are: to create centers/bases for disaster response activities (Disaster Management Complexes); to establish an emergency road network and resilient infrastructure; to strengthen the airports and ports; to secure evacuate routes; etc. In addition, it is important to build a DMC network connected by an emergency transport road network and to secure alternative transportation routes by land, sea, and air to ensure that routes to receive support and supplies are available when needed.

[4] Disaster Management System Development:

In order to realize the above mentioned measures, the development of a disaster risk management (DRM) system is required. This includes many supporting components, such as institutional development, legislation arrangement, disaster response system development, human resources development, etc.

[5] Enhancement of Public Awareness regarding Disaster Risk Management:

In Japan, the concepts of self/mutual/public assistance in disaster prevention and response are widely recognized. Sound knowledge of historical and potential disasters and disaster prevention and sufficient preparation are crucial to mitigate damages before a disaster even occurs. In addition, enhancement of the capacity of community organizations and volunteer activities are also important components.

The list of proposed projects for the five categories above address essential elements to enhance the resiliency of Turkey’s society, based on our understanding of the current state of Turkey’s existing disaster risk management and disaster resilient elements, as well as Japan’s experience and expertise. While formulating the list of projects, expectation of multiple effects by combination of various kinds of aspects were also kept in mind.

To make disaster prevention mainstream and to incorporate disaster prevention into ordinary construction, projects of buildings and infrastructure were considered, and construction of hospitals, schools, and incineration plants are included as elements of disaster management complexes (DMCs).

6-2


From a long-term urban planning perspective, projects were prioritized according to their necessity and urgency. This long list is intended as a roadmap to lead to a disaster resilient urban plan in the future.

In the process of formulating the proposed project long list, information was shared with the JICA technical cooperation project “Capacity Development toward Effective Disaster Risk Management” team, for use in the output of their project.

6-3


6-4

Fi

gure

6.1

.2

Map

of L

ong

List

ed P

ropo

sed

Proj

ects


Table 6.1.1 Proposed Projects Long List

National Level

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

There is a disaster management plan

at the national level, but the

management plan in consideration for

their relevance and disaster

management planning regional level,

provincial and municipal level can not

be found.

AFAD High High 50.0

AFAD are planning to building 27

logistic centers to store emergency

goods. According to the national

response plan, neighboring provinces

will support each other in case of a

large scale disaster. On the other

hand, there is no plan to secure the

transportation system for delivery of

the emergency goods

AFAD Med High

It is possible for MOH and the

provincial DOH to check the vacancy

and capacity of each hospital's room

including ICU and CT through internet.

However, in case of disaster, they

cannot have information especially

related to each hospital's damage

level.

MOH

A guideline for hospital disater plans is

provided to the provincial health office

by MOH. However, roles of each

hospital and cooperation system of

hospitals during disasters are not

clear.

MOH

Catego ry

3. Disaster Resistance Urban structure

3

Strengthening

of disaster

medical

structure

【Proposal】Development of emergency

road network by specifying the

emergency road which is composed of

the main road connecting to airport,

seaport and logistic centers. Improving

the road network by upgrading bridges and

landslide prevention and creating the

necessary regulations and operation

procedures

【Impact】Securing the delivery of

emergency goods to the disaster area

【Proposal】To develop a medical

information sharing system in case of

disaster through a website similar to the

Japanese EMIS in order:

①To provide citizens with information

through a website

②To provide with each hospital'

information specialised in case of disaster

Additionaly, a backup system at the

national level needs to be provided.

【Impact】By sharing information among all

hospitals and each UMKE, information will

be communicated quickly and

countermeasures against disaster will be

implemented faster. In daily use, local

medical information can be provided to

citizens through the portal website. An

information backup system will prevent

information loss.

3-2

Improvement of the guideline

for hospidal disaster plan

【Proposal】To prepare the guideline for

hospital disaster plan specifying roles of

each hospital and proposing a supply

storage plan, and a patient transfer

method.

【Impact】

By specifying the method of providing the

medical services according to each

provincial level, the application of facility

plan depend on the hospital level

becomes concrete in preparation for

disaster.　And cooperation of each

institution can be strengthened beyond

provinces.

3-1

Developement of emergency

medical information system

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Transportation

2-1.

Development of an emergency

road network and operation

regulations at the national level

Pro jec t Implmen tat ion

Pe r iodPro jec t Cu rren t S itu at ion Proposal and Impac t

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1

Core

DMC(Disaster

Management

Complex)

1-1.

Development of a network at

each level of distaster

management plans

【Proposal】To create the content and

disaster prevention base hierarchy of

neighborhoods to unit level from the

national level.

((Tentative name) disaster-prevention

facility maintenance manual)

【Impact】To understand the need and the

amount of stockpile items necessary for

different levels of up to Neighborhood

unit level from the national level, and

disaster prevention base. It should be

reflected that the regional disaster

prevention plan. Clarifying the priority

maintenance shelters and evacuation

routes are also included in it.

Impo

rtan

ce

6-5


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

AFAD has requested upgrade of

training facilities for professionals

involved in search and rescue.AFAD High High 15.2

A development project of a highly

reliable communication infrastructure

that connects the central level and

provincial level disaster & emergency

management centers/agencies

across the country.

A combination of redundant VSAT

(using satellite TURKSAT), optical

fiber, GSM cell phone, UHF, HF etc,

and to build a reliable communication

infrastructure.

Regarding to satellite

communicationsystem, the project is

on the way (installation of 500 fixed

base stations and 200 mobile stations)

AFAD High High 80.0

Although central command system of

AFAD and comprehensive disaster

information system are under

development, collecting information

on disaster prevention at the local

government level, decision-making

support, evacuation order

management, supply management, and

damage prediction support system are

not considered sufficient yet.

AFAD High High 120.0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Disaster prevention experience-

learning facility is open in Bursa

AFAD High High 22.0

Information has not been integrated.

AFAD High High 50.0

R&D activity is conducted at

earthquake section of AFAD

AFAD High High 19.4

4

Disaster and

emergency

training center

for

professionals

4-1.

Upgrade of Disaster and

Emergency Training Center

(AFADEM) for

Professional/Government Staff

【Proposal】Upgrade of disaster and

emergency training center

【Impact】Promotion of human resource

development for search and rescue

6

Disaster

education

center for

citizens

6-1.

Construction of disaster

education center for citizens

【Proposal】Establishment of disaster

education center

【Impact】Increase in citizen's awareness

of disaster prevention

7

Research &

Development

institution

7-1.

Establish data base and archive

system

【Proposal】Integration and archive of

information stored in university, related

government and etc.

【Impact】Effective provision for disaster

7-2.

Establishment of R&D institute

for policy making

【Proposal】Establishment of R&D center

for comprehensive research activity on

disaster prevention

【Inpact】Information archive and

technology development for disaster

prevention and mitigation

Catego ry Pro jec t Cu rren t S itu at ion Proposal and Impac t

Imple

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Urg

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Impo

rtan

ce

5

ICT

5-1.

Satellite communication system

【Proposal】Uninterrupted and Secure

Communication System (KGHS) plan that

AFAD proceeds has a plan to procure

700 VSTA earth stations for three years

from 2015 to 2017.

【Impact】It's avilable to provide real time

infomation between centaral and each

provice of AFAD in case of disaster.

5-2.

Information transmission system

【Proposal】Establishment of a platform for

information collection and transmission in

case of disaster

【Impact】Mitigation a damage in case of

disaster

5. Enhancement Awareness on Disaster Management

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$

P ro jec t Implmen tat ion

Pe r iod


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Pe r iod

4. Disaster Management System Development

6-6

Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey Provincial Level

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 #

Bursa carried out a seismic risk

assessment for buildings in 1985. But

the population, land use and building

structure from that time are different

from now and it is difficult to apply the

results for the disaster plan now.

AFAD High High

There are 14 seismic ground

observation stations in Bursa, but no

observation on structuresAFAD Med Med

Many buildings were built on the slope

of mountains and there is a possibility

of big damage in case of landslide

during an earthquake. The active fault

may be under the slope and the

movement of the fault may also trigger

a landslide.

AFAD Low Low

With regard to the export of

manufactured products in Bursa, the

ratio of container shipping is 85% of the

transport by sea through the Gemlik

port. Therefore, regarding transport

from the factory, factory stakeholders

have recognized that the main road to

Gemlik port is very important. However,

currently, there is only one main road

from Bursa center to Gemlik.

AFAD

MOSITHigh Med 2.0

It is hard to say the road network of

bursa is enough and the traffic is

concentrated on Ankara-Izmir road. The

limited road network has many grade

separation and mountain road. The

information of road damage is

important, but now the information is

rely on the report of local residents

MOTMA

CMed Med

There are two dams on Nilüfer river.

One is Doğancı dam and the other is

Nilufer dam. The dam were built 20

years ago and it is necessary to make

the risk assessment

DSI High High

The ground water level is high in Bursa

and the possible liquefaction area has

been estimated, but not given the rank

of the possibility

AFAD Med High

There is no concrete measure for

tsunami, though there are some risk

assessments for tsunami in the sea of

Marmara.

AFAD Med Med

1. Risk Assessment


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Pe r iod

【Proposal】Conduct traffic simulation with considering the

traffic volume and road damage during a disaster. The

improvement of road and traffic regulations will be made based

on the simulation results. A monitoring and alarm system will

be established for automatic inspection and assessment of

unusual situation

【Impact】From traffic simulation, the problems for road

planning and emergency use could be found and useful for the

determination of alternative road, traffic control in emergency

case

1-1-6.

Seismic performance

assessment and

strengthening of dam

【Proposal】Seismic performance assessment by dynamic

response analysis and strengthening if necessary

【Impact】Damage prevention of dam

1-1-7.

Liquefaction susceptibility

assessment

【Proposal】The liquefaction risk is estimated for a scenario

earthquake by PL value and zoning the liquefaction with high,

medium and low susceptibility

【Impact】Promotion of countermeasures for liquefaction in

building construction

1-1-8.

Risk Assessment for

Tsunami

【Proposal】Simulate tsunami height including upstream

calculation in the case of earthquake caused by the fault of

the bottom of the Marmara sea. By using calculation of height

of tsunami, evacuation from tsunami is simulated and site and

route for evacuation are analyzed.

【Effect】Evacuation route and space can be improved properly

and damage of human resources can be reduced by knowing

height of tsunami and the flow of people in disaster.

1-1

Risk Assessment

1-1-1.

Seismic risk assessment

for buildings and utility

infrastructure

【Proposal】Risk assessment for buildings, roads, bridges, utility

infrastructure for a design earthquake

【Impact】The risk assessment results can be used in the

disaster prevention plan, the development of disaster

prevention facilities, and the determination of a disaster

prevention target.

1-1-2.

Development of seismic

observation technology for

critical buildings and

bridges for real time

damage assessment

【Proposal】Seismic observation for critical structures of city

hall, disaster base hospital, Emergency operation center and

bridges on emergency road

【Impact】The observation in ordinary time can be useful to

understand the vibration characteristics of the structure and

that after the disaster is useful for rapid damage assessment

1-1-3.

Landslide risk assessment

【Proposal】Slope stability assessment not only for strong

ground motion but also the movement of fault

【Impact】Knowing the risk of landslide and prevention

measures could mitigate the disaster caused by landslide

1-1-4.

Assessment of Supply

Chain and Logistic Route

【Proposal】Prepare to create the disaster preparedness plan by

assessment of supply chain and logistic route status from

each factory to Gemlik port and to Istanbul or Ankara by land.

【Impact】Reducing the impact on the economy in Bursa in

times of disaster by reducing the expected duration the

factory production is stopped.

1-1-5.

Simulation and analysis of

emergency wide area

transportation for province

level

6-7


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 #

Urban Transformation is in progress

according to the law of urban

transformation.

MOEU

/Municip

alities

High High

Seismic strengthening has been

completed for most of schools in Bursa

according to Ministry of National

Education (MONE) Bursa provincial

office.

However, according to MONE most of

school does not meet the standard.

MONE High Med -

According to MONE Bursa provincial

office, seismic strengthening of non-

structural part such as ceiling, wall,

door and window has not been

conducted nor planned.MONE Low Low -

School Campus Project is implemented

as PPP project by MONE which

transfer schools (about 8 schools) to

suburb. High school will be transferred

and remaining building will be used as

primary and junior high school. Urban

Transformation Project includes

development of public facility such as

school.

MONE Low Low -

The water supply pipelines are metal

pipes but whether or not the joint is

seismic resistant is unclear. The

seismic capability of water process

facilities is necessary to be assessed

BUSKI Med Med

The seismic performance of gas

pipelines of Bursa has been considered.

The whole supply area is divided into

159 sub-areas. The shutdown of the

sub-area in case of a disaster or

incident is made manually now.

BursaGa

zHigh Med

Currently, DHC (District Heating

Cooling) plant for smart city is not

constructed in Bursa. Med Med

The guideline of MoH requires that

hospital buildings with 100 or more

beds should be seismically isolated.

Comprehensive and complete design

standards for seismically isolated

buildings are not provided in Turkey.

Types of isolation devices actually

used in Turkey are very limited. MOH High Med

The anti-earthquake measures to non-

fixed component, such as non-structure

elements, medical equipment and

furniture are under examination in

Turkey.MOH High High

Seismic assessment and retrofitting

have been conducted in accordance

with the 2007 seismic design code. MOEU

/Municip

alities

High High

Areas at high risk of flooding are being

identified.

River works are already underway in

Bursa.

DSI Med Med

2 Mitigation of Disaster Risk in Urban Area


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【Proposal】Construction of school in consideration of seismic

resistant structure and non-structural part, plan as evacuation

center, water reservoir and stockpile in School Campus Project

and Urban Transformation Project.

【Impact】Safety of students will be secured in case of disaster

during school activities and neighborhood can evacuate to

school. Redevelopment will be more effective through not only

new construction of residential apartment but also school.

2-3.

Seismic

strengthening of

water supply

facilities,

pipelines and

joints

2-3-1.

Seismic strengthening of

water supply facilities,

pipelines and joints

【Proposal】Seismic strengthening of water process facilities,

pipelines and joints

【Impact】Securing water supply in case of a disaster

2-3-2.

Development of remote

emergency gas shutdown

system

【Proposal】Development of seismic disaster prevention system

based on the real time monitoring and remote shutdown

system of Tokyo gas Co.

【Impact】Real time earthquake disaster assessment and

remote shutdown for affected area.

2-3-3.

Installation of key

facilities for smart city

【Proposal】Optimize energy demand and supply inside district,

and use reserve energy in DHC for emergency case.

【Impact】Diffusion of combination system to achieve energy-

saving and emergency preparation.

Pro jec t Implemen tat ion

Pe r iod

2-1.

Redevelopment

of Risky Area

2-1-1.

Redevelopment of risky

area based on the result of

risk assessment

【Proposal】Urban Transformation includes DMC

【Impact】To improve disaster preventing function of urban area

2-2.

Development of

School

2-2-1.


structural member for

school

【Proposal】Upon confirmation of existing school situation,

seismic strengthening shall be done if necessary by method

which will not interrupt school activities.

【Impact】It is expected that school is recognized as safe space

and utilized as neighborhood disaster management base and

evacuation center.

2-2-2.


non-structural part for

school

【Proposal】Upon confirmation of existing school situation,

seismic strengthening of non-structural part shall be done if

necessary. Strengthening of ceiling and equipment fixing

method done in Japan shall be proposed

【Impact】It is expected to reduce the damage to student and

teacher and school can be utilized as evacuation. Right after

disaster.

2-2-3.

Seismic resistant school

model project

2-4-1.

Enhancing seismic

performance of hospital

buildings by introducing

seismic isolation.

【Proposal】 Realize more reliable seismically isolated buildings

applying the technologies of Japan concerning: earthquake

ground motion simulation; evaluation of performance and

diversification of isolation devices; systematic approach for

inspecting and maintenance activities.; use of non-structural

building components and MEP equipment harmonized with

isolation systems etc.

【Impact】 Promote hospital buildings with enhanced robustness

and high reliability for business continuity.

By constructing a model hospital building focusing medical

activities after disastrous earthquakes in Bursa which is one

of the most risky district for seismic action in Turkey,

facilitate public recognition and activities for developing

disaster management hospitals in the whole country.

2-4-2.

Anti-earthquake measures

for non-fixed components

【Proposal】To provide anti-earthquake measures for non-fixed

components on the basis of Japanese experience and

experiment. To train on the basis of actual situation of each

hospital.

【Impact】Realize the measures on the basis of each hospital

situation and the secondary damage to people and other things

can be prevented.

2-5

Retrofitting of

Existing

Building

2-5-1.

Seismic upgrading of

buildings of central and

local government.

【Proposal】 Introduce products and construction methods

developed in Japan in addition to those existing in Turkey

【Effects】 Facilitate upgrading work by increasing the variety

in adoptable products and construction methods. By providing

an model application in Bursa which is one of the most risky

district for seismic action in Turkey, facilitate the movement in

the whole country.

2-4

Establishment

of Disaster

Base Medical

Center in the

city center

2-4

Establishment

of Disaster

Base Medical

Center in the

city center

2-6.

Anti-flood

measures for

existing rivers

2-6-1.

Maintenance and widening

of existing rivers

【Proposal】Mitigating risks of flooding by creating drainage

channels from flood prone areas

【Impact】Mitigating the damage of flooding in the urban district

and farmland of Bursa

6-8


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 #

There is no urban plan based on the

disaster risk assessment. It is difficult

to expect upgrading urban area's

capacity of the disaster risk

management.

AFAD Med High

There is a plan to establish disaster

and emergency management center in

AFAD Bursa but not yet realized.AFAD High High 14.8

AFAD is currently developing a system

to deliver relief supplies stored in

containers as needed.

A container terminal will be installed

in a suburb of the west.AFAD High High 1.3

There is a simple training facility in

Bursa.

AFAD High High 15.2

Functions of Disaster Base Medical

Centers are not specified as Japanese

ones in Turkey.

MOH Med Med 437.7

Although AFAD is equipped with a

heliport, there are no medical centers

with a heliport (or adjacent to a

heliport).

AFAD High High 2.2

There is no waste incineration plant in

Bursa but landfill.

Metropoli

tan

Municipa

lity

Med High 163.8

It is necessary to secure water supply

for daily life and fire fighting in case of

disasters. Bursa is rich in underground

water. The emergency water supply by

well is a realistic and economic way.

BUSKI

Metropoli

tan

Municipa

lity

High High

Power supply will be automatically

stopped when sensors in transmission

system cached the signal of

earthquake, this will lead to the power

stop of disaster prevention facilities

and hospitals no matter whether the

power system was damaged or not.

AFAD

MOHHigh High

Sports center as disaster management

base in coordination with other

facilities has not been planned.

Metropoli

tan

Municipa

lity

MOYS

Med Med 7.6

Disaster prevention park as regional

disaster management base or wide-

area evacuation place has not been

developed.

MOEU High High 24.3

Several types of disaster related

organizations exist in several levels. AFAD

Police

MOH

Etc.

Med High 6.8

The standard for a disaster medical

base hospital in Turkey has not been

clearly defined as the one in Japan.

MOH Med High 437.7

Although a small wharf exists,

earthquake protection and other

necessary measures are not fully

implemented. MOTMA

CHigh High 101.0

School as disaster management base in

coordination with other facilities has

not been planned.MONE Med Med 2.0

Sports center as disaster management

base in coordination with other

facilities has not been planned.

Metropoli

tan

Municipa

lity

MOYS

Med Med 7.6

3-1

Establishment

of

Regional/Provin

cial Disaster

Management

Complex

3-1

Establishment

of

Regional/Provin

cial Disaster

Management

Complex

【Proposal】Construction of sports center in district DMC

(athletic field, gymnasium and swimming pool)

【Impact】Sports center can be utilized as evacuation place and

storage of relief supply.

3-1-11.

Construction of facilities

related to Disaster Risk

Management

【Proposal】Allocate disaster related facilities (Fire Station,

AKOM, Police Station, 112 Station, Station of Civil Defense,

etc.） in DMC for smooth coordination and collaboration among

them.

【Impact】 Smooth collaboration in relief effort and realize

efficient relief activities.

3-2.

Establishment

of DMC

3-2-1.(1-1-4と同じ）

Disaster medical base

hospital

【Proposal】1. To ensure implementation of disaster medical

base hospital by clearly defining the functions and facility

standards.

2. To collaborate within a group of buildings in the

neighborhood of disaster base hospital in order to enable

effective quick response actions to a disaster.

【Effect】It is meaningful for development of disaster medical

base hospital in Turkey to set a model case of collaboration

within a group of buildings in the neighborhood of the disaster

medical base hospital in the model city, Bursa, and clearly

define their functions.

3-2-2.

Reinforcement of public

port in Gemlik

【Proposal】Widening and earthquake resistance improvement of

public port in the vicinity of the urban district of Gemlik as

well as construction of parks that will serve as bases to

receive aid supplies in the wake of disasters and disaster

prevention parks for Gemlik residents.

【Impact】Establishing bases to receive aid supplies when

incidents related to petroleum or chemicals occur at the side

of commercial port during disasters.

3-2-3.

Seismic resistant school

model in district DMC

【Proposal】Construction of school in consideration of seismic

resistant structure and non-structural part, plan as evacuation

center, water reservoir and stockpile in district DMC.

【Impact】School in district DMC can be utilized as evacuation

center, triage space, ward and storage and distribution of relief

supply in coordination with other facilities.

3-2-4.

Establishment of sports

center in district DMC

3-1-9.

Establishment of sports

center in

regional/provincial DMC

【Proposal】Construction of sports center in regional/provincial

DMC (athletic field, gymnasium and swimming pool)

【Impact】In disaster, sports center can be utilized as

evacuation place and storage of relief supply.

3-1-10.

Development of park/open

space in

regional/provincial DMC

【Proposal】Development of disaster prevention park in

regional/provincial DMC.

【Impact】Open space can be utilized for multipurpose in

disaster.

3-1-3.

Establishment of regional

disaster and emergency

training center for

professional/government

staff

【Proposal】Construction of regional disaster and emergency

training center and development of training program, curriculum

and training material for various disasters.

【Impact】Trainer trained at AFADEM will instruct at each

regional training center and promote disaster prevention

training at regional and provincial level. Training for region-

specific disaster will be conducted effectively.

3-1-4.

Disaster Base Medical

Center

【Proposal】Although it is a new concept in Turkey, introduction

of the concept of "Disaster Base Medical Center" is proposed

and the model hospital will be constructed.

【Impact】By specifying functions and facility content of

disaster base medical center, facility arrangement will be

specified and ensured. By cooperating with non-medical-

related facilities, disaster base medical center will take

measures more effectively and rapidly against disaster in the

Disaster Management Complex.

Construction of medical facility in Bursa, model province for

disaster measures, has great significance as a model case of

cooperation between facilities.

3-1-5.

Heliports for disaster

prevention bases and

medical centers

【Proposal】Building a heliport at disaster prevention bases

【Impact】Since disaster prevention bases will be equipped with

medical centers, rescue efforts using a helicopter will be

possible.

3-1-6.

Waste incineration plant

with power generator

【Proposal】Construction of waste incineration plant with power

generator in DMC instead of landfill.

【Impact】The plant is able to supply electricity to DMC in

disaster.

3-1-7.

Construction of well and

water tank for water

supply in disaster

3-0-1

Formulation of Disaster

Resilient Urban Plan

【Proposal】Formulating a masterplan for urban development

with concept of disaster resilience.

【Impact】Efficient urban development will be implemented to

realize a disaster resilient city.

3-1-1.

Disaster and emergency

management center

【Proposal】Establishment of regional/provincial disaster and

emergency management center as the central facility of

Disaster Management Complex (DMC).

【Impact】Improve of regional response to wide-area disaster.

3-1-2.

Logistics center

【Proposal】In the wake of large scale disasters, a large number

of rescue teams and supplies are sent to disaster affected

areas both from home and abroad. In order to deal with the

situation, a logistics center to supplement AFAD's container

approach will be developed at disaster prevention bases that

are set up at airports, ports, and roadside of emergency

transportation routes.

【Impact】Smooth, quick, and accurate temporary storage and

shipping of emergency aid supplies (e.g. medicines, papers,

blankets, other daily necessities, food, water).

【Proposal】Construction of wells around disaster prevention

facilities, hospitals and tent cities and underground water tank

for densely populated area .

【Effects】Securing water supply in case of a disaster.

3-1-8.

Securing power supply by

emergency power

equipment for wide area

disaster mitigation

facilities

【Proposal】Preparation of emergency power generation

equipment for disaster prevention facilities and hospitals.

【Impact】Securing continuous functioning of disaster

prevention facilities and hospitals by emergency power

generation equipment in case of a disaster.

3. Disaster Resistance Urban structure


Imple

me

nti

ng

Org

an

izati

on

Urg

en

cy

Impo

rtan

ce

Ro

ugh

Esti

mate

Co

st

US

$

P ro jec t Implemen tat ion

Pe r iod

3-0.

Formulation of

Disaster

Resilient Urban

Plan

6-9


The development status of parks and

Mahalle centers differs depending on

each Mahalle.

However, there is an insufficient stored

supply of water and food and an overall

insufficient number of secured open

space and other evacuation sites where

a large number of people can evacuate.

Municipa

litiesMed High

Traffic congestion happened in 1999

Kocaeli earthquake on the road to

disaster area. There is not a concrete

system to securing the smooth traffic

during disaster.

Metropoli

tan

Municipa

lity

High High 3.9

There are a number of narrow road in

central area of bursa and the

possibility of blockage due to the

collapse of buildings.

High High

The degradation of pier of the bridge on

Ankara – Izmir road can be confirmed

by eye-inspection. There needs seismic

assessment for the bridges,

intersections and retaining walls on the

emergency road and the seismic

strengthening, if necessary.

Metropoli

tan

Municipa

lity

Med Med 1.3

The landslide possibility within Bursa

city is considered small. Some of the

roads to neighbor cities are in the

mountain areas. The assessment of

landslide possibility along the road is

necessary

High Med

Some of the roads around Component

C are narrow and many on-road

parking, which may lead to difficulties

of emergency vehicles during a

disaster

High High

The access to the main road (Ankara-

Izmir road, Mudanya road) is limited

Med Med

The roads for access to the slopes of

the city generally do not have adequate

width for traffic demand from the city,

and have been chronically congested.

Metropolitan

Municipality

Med High 0.4

The number of roads that can be used

for emergency supplies and evacuation

routes is limited

Municipalities Med Med 21.9

Public transportation is especially

important during disaster because the

road damage and the limitation of road

use for general vehicles.

High High

Bursa bus terminal has a large building

and large parking space. The bus

terminal is the transportation center for

neighboring cities. The terminal building

and parking space can be used as the

base for receiving and distributing the

support materials

Med Med

Many Industrial parks in Bursa do not

have a BCO. Therefore industrial park,

supporting BCP is needed. AFAD

MOSITMed Med 2.0

For the handling of hazardous materials

such as gas, chemicals, and poison,

etc., it is managed by the provisions of

the Ministry of Labor and Social

Security. However there is no plan to

measure of secondary disasters in

factory.

AFAD

MOSITMed Med 1.0

Radio system is used for internal

communication of province section

(AFAD, MOH, Municipality and etc.) AFAD High High 2

Bursa has a high seismic risk and the

earthquake alarm is impotent for

disaster mitigation. Although AFAD has

a pilot project for earthquake early

warning, the development of whole

system for turkey needs a long time.

AFAD Med Med

【Proposal】seismic assessment for the bridges, intersections

and retaining walls on the emergency road and the seismic

strengthening

【Impact】Securing the function of emergency road

3-4-4.

Landslide prevention for

emergency road network

【Proposal】Landslide susceptibility assessment for wide area

emergency road and widening or construction of retaining walls

in the case of necessity


3-4-5.

Road widening and seismic

strengthening of buildings

for the emergency road

around DMC

【Proposal】Estimating traffic volume around DMC during

disaster and road improvement to secure the access to DMC

(widening, seismic strengthening of buildings along road)

【Impact】secure the access to DMC

3-4-6.

Improvement of emergency

road network by increasing

grade crossing and

crossing

【Proposal】Improvement of the access among emergency road

and the other road to secure the access to emergency in case

of disaster


3-3.

Establishment

of Neighborhood

DMC

3-3-1.

Establishment of

evacuation sites at the

neighborhood level and

Storage of survival

equipment and supplies

【Proposal】 Building neighborhood parks and Mahalle centers

(including a supply warehouse) at each Mahalle. If there is

Kulliye in the neighborhood, open spaces and meeting spot are

established around the Mosque.

【Impact】Raising awareness towards disaster prevention at the

Mahalle level and using the facilities as disaster prevention

bases. The facilities will function as convention facilities at

the neighborhood unit level during normal times and as

disaster prevention bases (evacuation centers, logistics

centers, information hubs) during disasters.

Securing bases for systemic disaster prevention activities

(rescue, evacuation) in the wake of large scale disasters.

3-4-1.

Development of emergency

road network and operation

regulations for province

level

【Proposal】Development of emergency road network by

specifying the emergency road which connects important

disaster prevention facilities and operation regulations for the

network

【Impact】Securing the smooth traffic of vehicles for search and

rescue, ambulance, firefighting.

3-4-2.

Seismic strengthening and

set-back of buildings

along emergency road

【Proposal】Seismic performance assessment and strengthening

of building along the emergency road to prevent the collapse

【Impact】Avoiding blockage of emergency road

3-4-3.

Seismic performance

upgrading for bridges,

intersections and retaining

walls

3-5.

Seismic

performance

assessment of

main facilities

3-5-1.

Seismic performance

assessment and

strengthening of subway

station and tunnel


of subway station and tunnel

【Impact】The improvement of public transportation system will

provide efficient transportation means for general public in

disasters

3-5-2.

Seismic performance

assessment and

strengthening of bus

terminal


of bus terminal

【Effects】Smoothing the transportation, store and distribution

of emergency materials in case of the large scale disaster

3-6

Assessment of

Infrastructure

3-6-1.

Support for creation of the

BCP plans at industrial

park

【Proposal】Create a Business continuity planning (BCP) for

each industrial park.

【Impact】Reducing the impact on the economy in Bursa by

reducing the impact of stopping the factory production and

supply chain disruptions is expected.

3-6-2.

Introduction of the Fast

Response Equipment

against Quake Load

(FREQL) system

【Proposal】Introduction of FREQL system which is combined

alarm and sensor function. This system when it was sensing a

shake, alert without waiting for the information from the state.

【Impact】By BCP a measure in factory is possible to quickly,

minimizing the impact of production activities is expected.

Further, to minimize the effects of secondary disasters in

factory that is handling gases, chemicals, and toxins.

3-7

Establishment

of Disaster ICT

Network

3-7-1.


network

【Proposal】Establishment of information network connected to

AFAD satellite communication system and early warning

system that are developing.

【Impact】Prior to all provinces, establishment of early warning

system in Bursa.

3-8

Establishment

of Early warning

system

3-8-1.

Introduction of independent

earthquake alarm

equipment for critical

facilities

【Proposal】Introduce independent earthquake early warning

equipment (FREQL) for hospital, school as well as important

disaster management facilities

【Impact】Disaster mitigation by evacuation, emergency stop of

dangerous material processing facilities

3-4-7.

Redevelopment of existing

roads and establishment of

round roads in the sloped

urban area

【Proposal】Espansion of the width and linearity in the sloped

urban area of the city. Development of round roads. Removal

of dead end roads.

【Impact】Improvement of smoothness and capacity of the

emergency vehicle traffic.

3-4-8.

Introduction of a

transportation system to

the sloped urban area

【Proposal】Introduction of the slope car or mini monorail in the

sloped urban area

【Impact】In the event of disaster, it is utilized to transport

emergency relief supplies and the ill and injured.

3-4.

Establishment

of emergency

road network

6-10


Roles of each hospital and cooperation

system of hospitals during disasters

are not clear.MOH Med Med

Back up of medical information such as

electronic medical records are kept in

the same hospital or at a data center

nearby. MOH Med High

It is possible for MOH and the

provincial DOH to check the vacancy

and capacity of each hospital's room

including ICU and CT through internet.

However, in case of disaster, they

cannot have information especially

related to each hospital's damage level.MOH Med Med

Wide-area evacuation place has not

been designated. MOEU

Municipa

lity

High High

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 #

Organizational structure of AFAD has

been modified. Strengthening of the

cooperation system between AFAD and

ministries, provincial governorates,

related authorities, and municipalities is

necessary

AFAD High High

Disaster response activities are

planned basically to be provided by the

government in Turkey. There is no code

of conduct in the event of disaster in

Turkey. It is said that public awareness

on disaster prevention and mitigation is

relatively low.

Med High

Some of medical and industrial

facilities (e.g. large plants, port

facilities) have developed disaster

prevention plans and taken action for

BCP. However, these are self contained

plans and lack collaboration or mutual

support with neighboring facilities.

AFAD Med High

Action guidelines for disasters are not

published. High High

Evacuation routes during disasters

have not been identified. Whether

buildings located alongside roads that

can be used as evacuation routes are

earthquake resistant or not is unclear. AFAD High High

There is no plan to assessment for

current status confirmation of the

supply chain and logistic route in

disasterMOSIT Med Med 2.0

There is no plan to create of

Sustainable Supply chain and Logistic

Plan and BCP for each factoryMOSIT Med Med 2.0

Use of commercial ports for the

purpose of disaster prevention

activities during disasters is stipulated

under the law. Three out of six

commercial ports in Gemlik can be

used for disaster prevention / rescue

activities during disasters,

Med High

Operation system of school as

evacuation center has not been

established.MONE Low Low -

3-9

Arrangement of

disaster

medical

information

system

3-9-1.

Improvement of hospital

disaster plan

【Proposal】To specify roles of each hospital and propose

stockpile plan, patient transfer method, staff training and

cooperation with related facilities based on damage estimation.

【Impact】Application of facility plan and training by making a

healthcare plan become concrete in preparation for disaster.

And cooperation of each institution can be strengthened.

3-9-2.

Prevention of medical

information system's

functional decline and

shutoff

【Proposal】Build the backs up system of medical information

such as electronic medical record, etc., bilaterally by each

hospital or the remote place, so that the function of each

hospital may not decline or shutoff in cease of disaster.

【Impact】Medical services will be continued in damaged area

by protecting necessary medical information including patient

information.

3-9-3.


medical information

system

【Proposal】To develop medical information sharing system in

case of disaster through website such as Japanese EMIS.

Concretely, the function below need to be added.

①To provide citizens with information through portal website

②To provide with each hospital' information specialized in

case of disaster

Additionally, backup system at the national level needs to be

provided .

【Impact】By sharing information among all hospitals and each

UMKE, provision of information will be fast and counter

measure against disaster will be faster. In daily use, local

medical information to citizens can be provided through portal

website. By information backup system, information loss by

any possibility can be prevented.

3-10

Designation and

development of

evacuation

space

3-10-1.

Designation and

development of

regional/provincial level

evacuation place

【Proposal】Designation of several parks as wide-area

evacuation place and install necessary facility such as storage

for stockpile and seismic resistant water reservoir

【Impact】temporary evacuation place for neighborhood from

building collapse, fire, flood, etc. will be secured.

4. Disaster Management System Development


Imple

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4-1.

Institutional

Capacity

4-1-1.

Institutional development

for strengthening disaster

management system

【Proposal】Strengthening provincial AFAD, establish a system

to coordinate with neighboring provincial governorates and

related organizations.

【Impact】 Smooth operation of disaster response activities

will be realized.

4-1-2.

Legislative Arrangement

【Proposal】Establish legislative code of conduct for

government and citizens.

【Impact】 Relief activities by the self-help and mutual-

support will be implemented legally in order to cover the

portion that can not be covered by the government like AFAD.

4-1-3.

Development of guidelines

for disaster prevention

activities

【Proposal】Developing guidelines for disaster prevention /

mitigation with eyes to regional disaster prevention activities

including mutual support at local communities to supplement

public support provided by the government including the

handling of people who are unable to go home and assisting

disaster victims.

【Impact】Stockpiling by medical and industrial facilities and

temporary use of facilities will increase the capacity of

emergency response to disaster victims in surrounding urban

areas.

【Proposal】Preparation of operation and management manual

for school as evacuation place

【Impact】Confusion of evacuation place can be avoided

4-1-4.


evacuation plans and

【Proposal】Developing action guidelines for disasters

【Impact】Presenting appropriate action guidelines for disasters

will mitigate the damage during evacuation.

4-1-5.

Identification of safe

evacuation routes

【Proposal】Designating roads with a low risk of fire or building

collapse that lead into evacuation sites as evacuation routes

during disasters. Securing safety of roadside buildings

including their earthquake resistance.

【Impact】Raising awareness towards evacuation routes during

disasters will mitigate the damage during evacuation.

Reducing the danger of obstruction of evacuation routes will

increase the safety of evacuation and certainty of rescue

efforts.

4-1-6.

Creation of Sustainable

Supply chain and Logistic

Plan and Manual

【Proposal】Create a plan and manual for securing the supply

chain and logistic route in disaster.





Pe r iod

4-1-7.

Assessment of industrial

area in terms of disaster

management, and

improvement. And creation

of BCP

【Proposal】Create a disaster preparedness plan and BCP for

each factory.




4-1-8.

Rescue activity plans for

ports operated by

companies

【Proposal】Evaluating the danger of three commercial ports in

Gemlik and developing plans for the use of the ports during

disasters.

【Impact】Clarification of facilities owned by private commercial

ports and cooperation plans for disasters will enable smooth

action during disasters.

4-1-9.

Preparation of manual for

school as evacuation place

6-11


As mentioned above, progress has been

made in the removal of debris as part

of rescue efforts. However, no

measures have yet to be taken for a

large volume of debris caused by large

earthquakes.

MoEU Med Med

There does not seem to be much

encouragement for people to make

voluntary efforts to stockpile water /

food. Since a large number of houses

are expected to collapse in the wake of

large earthquakes, even if progress has

been made in the voluntary stockpiling

of water / food, it is unlikely that the

stock can be utilized.

AFAD Med Med

There does not seem to be a

framework to centrally manage

information on disasters. AFAD Low Med

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 #

Disaster Prevention Education for

Citizens is planned and conducted by

AFAD Search and Rescue Team.

AFAD High High

Training programs of governmental

staff of municipality is planned and

conducted by AFAD Search and

Rescue Team.

AFAD Med High

Med High

Disaster education and training at

mahalle level is made by mahalle AFADAKOM

Med High

As training programs and activities for

bringing up disaster prevention leaders

at community level are prepared by

each districts, implementation status

are different from each district.

AFADAKOM

Med High

As formulation　conditions of disaster

prevention structure are different from

each district, capacity for disaster

management is not enough. AFADAKOM

Med Med

5-3.

Enhancement of

Community

Resistance to

Disaster

through Social

Education

5-3-1.

Development of

Community Level

Education and Training

【Proposal】Disaster education and training programs at

community level planned by province level.

【Impact】Capacity building of disaster risk management of

community can be developed.

5-3-2.

Development of Training

Programs for Community

Leaders

【Proposal】Making plan and training program for disaster

prevention community leaders and practice in a strategic way.

【Impact】Disaster prevention community leaders are selected

and grow up. Therefore, disaster prevention activities in

community are forwarded.

5-3-3.

Enhancement of the

Community Capacity for

Disaster Management

【Proposal】Preparation support for construction of disaster

prevention structure and disaster management manual.

【Impact】

Disaster management in mahalle level can achieve disaster

mitigation by formulating disaster prevention structure in

community level and performing preparation activity of the

evacuation planning and the disaster management.


Pe r iod

5-1-1.

Preparation of Disaster

Prevention Education

Facilities and Materials for

the Disaster Risk

Management Training

Center

【Proposal】Preparation support for disaster prevention program

and curriculum which offered in Education Center for Disaster

Prevention in Bursa.

【Impact】Enhancement of disaster prevention consciousness

will be achieved through Education Center for Disaster

Prevention and schools in Bursa.

5-2.

Creation of

Leaders for

Disaster Risk

Management in

the Society

5-2-1.

Development of Training

Programs of Governmental

Staff of Municipality

【Proposal】Training programs of governmental staff of each

municipalities which revised in cooperation with AFADEM are

conducted

【Impact】Governmental staff of municipality who can manage

disaster risk will be made.

5-2-2.

Training Governmental

Staff and Community

Members through the

P

【Impact】Governmental staff of province, metropolitan and

district municipality can be trained.


Imple

me

nti

ng

Org

an

izati

on

Urg

en

cy

Impo

rtan

ce

Ro

ugh

Esti

mate

Co

st

US

$

5-1.

Development of

Disaster

Prevention

Educational

Facilities

5. Enhancement Awareness on Disaster Management

4-2.

Emergency

Response Plan

4-2-1.

Development of a debris

removal management

system

【Proposal】Engaging in coordinated and systematic processing

of debris through predetermined methods with eyes to the

recycling of debris. (development of plans for debris removal

and system for managing the plans)

【Impact】Early removal and processing of debris is expected to

speed up the recovery.

4-2-2.

Stockpiling emergency

food and daily necessities

【Proposal】Simultaneously achieving: (1) improvement of

earthquake resistance of houses, (2) promotion of stockpiling

of water / food at the household and corporate level, and (3)

stockpiling of water / food in the public sector to the extent

possible. Stockpiling a large volume of emergency food by

creating stock warehouses at disaster prevention bases.

Installing disaster prevention well to ensure water supply in

disasters (private power generator, purification equipment).

【Impact】Stockpiling water / food in preparation for disasters

will prevent unnecessary panic during disasters, facilitating

calm evacuation and survival of disaster victims.

4-3.

Provision of

Disaster

Information

4-3-1.

Prevention of information

overload through use of

mass media

【Proposal】Central information management by the Control

Center installed at DMC.

【Impact】Delivering accurate information on disasters to

reduce confusion at disaster affected areas.

Projects with high emergency and importance are shown in red.

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6.2. Selection of Priority Projects Projects highlighted in red in Table 6.1.1 (high emergency and importance)were evaluated and prioritized according to the following criteria: (1) their expected contribution to disaster resilient urban planning and (2) their relative feasibility. These criteria were applied in two areas as detailed below: [1]nationwide projects and [2]projects in Bursa.

Table 6.2.1 Criteria for Shortlisted Project

(1) Expected Contribution to Resilient Urban Planning

Effectiveness :Expected to contribute to the formulation of disaster resilient urban plans. Collaboration with other projects or contribution to the realization of disaster resilient urban plans.

Urgency: Necessity to be implemented in the earliest stage, at the earliest time.

(2) Feasibility of the Project

Implementation Agency: Implementation agency and its capability: availability of human resources and technical level

Maturity of the Project Maturity of the project, intentions of the Turkish side, and consistency with AFAD’s plan.

Project Cost: Approximately estimated project cost Technical Feasibility:

Availability of technology or knowledge in Turkey or Japan.

(1) Expected Contribution to Disaster Resilient Urban Planning

1) Effectiveness

This criterion assesses the degree of contribution to the Disaster Resilient Urban Planning in Turkey for [1] nationwide projects and [2] case study projects in Bursa:

[1] Nationwide Projects

a) Projects expected to contribute to strengthening the disaster and emergency management system targeted in the TAMP (Turkey Disaster Response Plan). In particular, projects expected to support AFAD’s role of coordination with the relevant authorities at the national and provincial levels, gathering information, providing instructions, and managing activities for search and rescue and recovery is important.

b) Projects expected to contribute to strengthening the function of the provincial level AFADs which were transferred from provincial governorship to AFAD through the revision of Law No.5902.

[2] Case Study in Bursa

a) Projects expected to support the strengthening of disaster & emergency management systems, including the cooperation systems among relevant authorities in Bursa Province.

b) Projects expected to be effective and have a ripple effect in making Bursa City more resilient.

2) Urgency

Projects studied herein need to be promptly implemented because either a potential risk in the event of disaster is great, these projects are expected to help directly in the disaster response, or these projects are supposed to implemented prior to other projects.

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Data Collection Survey For Disaster Resilient Urban Plan in Turkey (2) Feasibility of the Project

1) Implementation Agency

The implementation agency is the agency that will be in charge of the implementation. Its capacity is based on the availability of human resources and their technical level.

Nationwide projects that will be implemented by AFAD appear more feasible than projects implemented by various government agencies or ministries, as AFAD is the body for disaster preparedness and response, and as a single agency, internal coordination is seamless. Because there is difficulty in coordination among the different ministries, as determined by the study of the organizations, their roles, and the collaboration systems for disaster management of the relevant authorities, nationwide projects that will be implemented by AFAD were selected for the priority projects.

Similarly, for Bursa, implementation of projects involving multiple agencies will likely take more time and effort than projects run entirely by one organization. We propose to start with a limited number of organizations, only AFAD and Bursa Metropolitan Municipality at first, both of which will be key players for the establishment of DMCs, with the expectation of gradual involvement of other agencies in the future.

2) Maturity of the Project:

The maturity of a project is assessed based on the intention of the implementation agency, consistency with the plan of the AFAD (or plan in Turkey), financial status in Turkey, etc.

3) Estimated Project Cost:

One of the indicators for the possibility for implementation is project cost.

The costs of proposed projects were estimated according to the unit cost of each facility set based on the construction costs in Turkey and Japan.

The methodology used to estimate project costs is described in 6.5.

4) Technical Feasibility

As one of the purposes of this study, the possibility and likelihood of introducing technologies and utilizing experiences of Japan to projects are evaluated. Particularly in prioritizing projects, this study focuses on projects that would benefit the most from Japanese technologies.

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6.3. Priority Nationwide Projects Nationwide projects are expected to cover the whole country, to be executed in all provinces in Turkey, or to contribute to national-level activities. Projects of facitiy development and ICT in high priority are selected in accordance with the ciriteria above and analyzed based on their functional aspects

(1) Assessment of projects with a criteria of expected contribution to Disaster Resilient Urban Planning

As discussed in Chapter 2.2.3, a disaster response system is planned for the national level in the TAMP and includes establishment of a AFAD Disaster and Emergeny Management Center (AADYM), coordination with Ministries’ disaster and emergency management centers, and establishement of a,command system of disaster response activities for the operation service groups. At the provincial level, the establishment of Provincial Disaster and Emergency Management Center (VALI) which will coordinate with the national level organization is also planned. However, the construction of the system seems still on the way and not complete yet.

AFAD developed a plan for the disaster response system of national/provincial in TAMP (Figure 2.2.3). To achieve disaster resilient urban planning, the Study Team proposes several systems including the establishment of DMCs with the regional disaster operation center, a collaboration system with back-up supports and relevant ministries, and an information gathering system that will function when a disaster strikes.

The DMC proposed herein is the main base to respond to large scale disasters, consisiting of the disaster operation center in its heart and additional relevant facilities. It is a hub for rescue activities, information, relief supplies, and volunteers.

This study proposes that DMCs should be established at all of the national/regional/provincial levels. Regional DMCs established in the 15 logistic zones of AFAD are expected to be the bases responding to large scale disasters hitting across provinces. The location of the 11 search and rescue teams is also proposed to match the location of the regional DMCs.

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Note) Number in the figure is reffered following items

Figure 6.3.1 Develop the Disaster Response System

(2) Proposal in functional aspects

（a）Proposal for the disaster countermeasure coordination system

a-1 Enhancing the function of the National Disaster and Emergency Management Center (AADYM): The disaster and emergency management center, empowered by the prime minister or deputy prime minister and chaired by the AFAD president, plays a central role in the disaster response system proposed by TAMP. Enhancement of its capacity in information analysis, countermeasure evaluation, decision making, and commanding are crucial.

a-2 Prompt information gathering capacity in the event of disaster:

In order to perform appropriate countermeasures in the event of disaster, immediate collection of data and information is necessary. For this purpose, establishment of the data collection system including other ministries, is required.

a-3 Strengthening collaboration among national, regional, and provincial disaster and emergency management centers as well as relevant ministries:

Strengthening the collaboration system among relevant authorities, which corresponds to the triangle collaboration system proposed by TAMP: national level/ministries/provincial level.

a-4 Emergency support system by region:

The backup support from DMC outside disaster area is effective and helpful in the event of a disaster. Mutual supporting systems among neighboring provinces are stated in TAMP. However in the case of serious disasters beyond provincial boundaries, collaboration among regional level DMCs is required.

a-5 Upgrading disaster response capacity of search and rescue teams:

6-16


11 search and rescue teams have key roles in the disaster response activities. Upgrade of these teams will enhance the capacity of disaster response activities.

a-6 Enhancement of disaster prevention capacity of personnel in AFADs (national/provincial): For the purpose of enhancing the capacity of the disaster and emergency headquaters, capacity building of AFAD staff for disaster response as well as disaster prevention and mitigation is required.

a-7 Enhancement of disaster prevention capacity of personnel in relevant institutions: For information gathering and effective response, collaboration among relevant institutions is vital. Therefore, capacity enhancement of AFAD’s own system and collaboration system with relevant institutions is also indispensable.

（b）Proposal for the functions and roles of provincial AFADs

With revision of Law No. 5902, provincial AFADs came under the authority of Central AFAD, and the capacity of provincial AFADs now needs to be enhanced.

b-1 Enhancing the functions of Disaster and Emergency Management Centers at the regional/provincial level:

Disaster and emergency management centers at the regional/provincial level are expected to perform as front-line bases for disaster response. Their role includes information gathering, negotiation with the national level disaster and emergency operation center, instruction of measures and management of activities. It is necessary to enhance capacities through the establishment of a collaborative system with relevant institutions.

b-2 Disaster prevention capacity of personnel in provincial AFADs:

To strengthen disaster response systems at the provincial level, human resource development and capacity building of provincial AFADs is requird. Staff of provincial AFADs now work under the oversight of Central AFAD. A national level effort for human resource development is required.

b-3 Awareness of disaster prevention for the public:

AFAD has been working on education of disaster preparedness, through cooperation with MONE. However, further efforts are required to enhance public awareness of disaster prevention.

(3) Proposal for Disaster Information System

When a large scale disaster strikes across provinces, it is especially important to promptly gather information from stricken areas as well as quantitative information from relevant institutions including the metrological agency, DSI, and seismometers. Information should be analyzed and utilized to estimate the damage and decide on an appropriate disaster response.

According to TAMP, a collaboration system has been planned so that, in the event of a disaster, relevant ministries and response members in stricken areas will take measures in collaboration led by the disaster and emergency management center. The disaster and emergency management center may request support from outside of the stricken provinces and call for appropriate measures to counterparts (including other ministries). The disaster managemnt center at the national level serves as a base for this collaboration and its

6-17


construction is already in progress. For a sound judgement and decision making, a set of systems to gather, analyze and broadcast precise information is also vital.

Regional DMCs in the stricken area are front-line bases for collaboration. They collect and share bottom-up disaster information and evaluate measures in collaboration with the national level DMC and organizations. They are also the hub for relief supplies and volunteers from outside the stricken area.

Meanwhile, DMCs outside the stricken area are bases for logistics supports; accepting injured individuals and sending relief supplies and volunteers as needed.

For these collaborative disaster response systems to work, it is essential to build a secure communication network which is accessible at the time of disaster. AFAD has been already working on such a network. Particularly, satellite fixed stations to connect relevant national and provincial organizations are essential. Additionally, visual images of the stricken area would be very effective to get a specific and precise understanding of the situation and of the disaster damage. Hence, equipping each province with portable satellite facilities that are capable of sending visual images in real time has significant importance.

Information gathered via the above technologies is also effective to alert and prevent secondary damage.

In addion, to fulfill the capacity of these disaster response systems, regular base activities are also important such as research and development to enhance the functional capacity of the disaster management center, training for search and rescue teams and municipality personnel, and activities for public awareness of disaster prevention.

Facilities and infrastructures shown in the above table are proposed for these reasons. The results of an evaluation of the effectiveness of the following facilities are also shown in the table: disaster operation center, provincial search and rescue team center, disaster prevention education center, R&D center, and VSAT (for the disaster information system).

6-18


Table 6.3.1 Proposed projects with high effectiveness

Proposed project components

Criteria and key points

Disaster & Em

ergency M

anagement Center, Logistic

Center, and Heliport

Training Center for Search &

Rescue:

ー

Education Center for Disaster Preparedness

R & D Center

Satellite Netw

ork (VSAT)

Information Gathering &

Dissemination System

National Level

(Under Construction)

Regional Provincial Level

National Level

Regional Level

National Level

Regional Level

National Level

(a) Projects expected to contribute to strengthening the disaster and emergency management system targeted in the TAMP.

a-1. Strengthening IAADYM’s function, such as (data collection, analysis, coordination with AADYM, ordering relief activities)

◎ ◎ ◎ ◎

a-2. Support data collection, discussion of countermeasures, and decision making of AADYM.

◎

a-3. Support coordination between AADYM and IAADYM

◎ ◎ ◎ ◎

a-4. Strengthening the mutual support system among neighboring provinces

◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎

a-5. Upgrading capacity of Search & Rescue Teams ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ a-6. Support capacity building of AFAD ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ a-7. Upgrading DRM capacity of relevant authorities ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ (b) Projects expected to contribute to

strengthening the function of the provincial level AFADs

b-1. Capacity Building of provincial AFADs ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ b-2. HR Development of provincial AFAD ◎

b-3. Upgrading disaster education of provincial AFAD ◎

AFAD Strategic Plan Goal 2 2.3

Goal 2 2.3

Goal 2 2.4

Goal 2 2.4

Goal 4 4.2

Goal 4 4.2

Goal 1 1.4

Goal2 2.6

Goal 2 2.6


Notes: Disaster and Management Center in the national level is listed because it is one of the key facilities although this cannot

be a proposed project as it is under construction now.

(4) Outline of the proposed projects and proposed planning level

Outlines of the above listed project components are summarized as follows. These proposed facilities and Disaster Information System are core facilities and systems of the Disaster Management Complex as shown below.

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Table 6.3.2 Outline of the Project Components (1) (facilities)

Disaster & Emergency Management Center

Training Center for Search & Rescue

Education Center for Disaster Preparedness

Research & Development Center

The center which has the functions of data collection, decision making, command for relief activities, management of support items/personnel etc.

Training center for experts in search and rescue. It will become a center for search and rescue activities in the event of disaster.

Education center which will provide education programs for the general public, students, leaders of the community etc. It will be used as a center for volunteer activities in the case of disaster.

R&D center to support AFAD’s policy making, strategy for disaster response. Having experimental research facilities for seismic engineering, and disaster management archive system.

【Main facilities】 Operation room (large screen), meeting room, office space for relevant authorities, data room, dormitory, AFAD office, heliport, storage, etc.

【Main facilities】 Lecture room, auditorium, training facilities (rubbles, climbing, fire, transportation accidents, CBRN, etc.), library, dormitory etc.

【Main facilities】 Exhibition of disasters in Turkey, scientific information, experiencing simulation, prevention measures, workshop, library, education material development room, etc.

【Main facilities】 Archive center, research laboratory for disaster risk management policy, seismic engineering experimental apparatus, etc.

【Planning Level】 Required in national, regional and provincial levels. Focusing on regional and provincial levels in this project, as the national level center is now under construction. Regional Level Provincial Level

【Planning Level】 Because AFAD’s search and rescue teams are currently stationed in 11 provinces, and the number of trainers is limited, it is proposed to upgrade the national level training center and establish regional level training centers. National Level Regional Level

【Planning Level】 With consideration of operation and maintenance cost and limited number of trainers, it is proposed to establish education centers at the national and regional levels in the beginning. Provincial level centers will be developed in the future. National Level Regional Level

【Planning Level】 In order to operate efficiently with a limited number of researchers and experimental apparatus, the R&D center is proposed in the national level only National Level

Concept of DMC


6-20


Table 6.3.3 Outline of the Project Components (2) (Disaster Information System)

Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) Prompt information gathering/alerting system

By introducing fixed stations of satellite communication, it will become possible to promptly share visual images of the stricken area among emergency response headquaters of the national/provincial level. This information will help to understand the precise extent of disaster damage and hence contribute to taking effective measures.

By building an information-sharing network with relevant ministries, it will become possible to take appropriate measures. Broadcasting of this information will also help for public bodies and residents to make a sound judgement of whether to evacuate and hence contribute to mitigating secondary damages.

Satellite Network / Information Gathering & Dissemination System


(5) Priority Projects

Among projects that are judged as “high” in emergency and priority in the long list, components of high priority are selected in accordance with 6.2 and analyzed by 6.3.Evaluation results are shown below.

Based on the prioritization of projects using the abovementioned criteria, the nationwide priority projects are shown below. These are core facilities of the Disaster Management Complex. In this project, the facilities under AFAD management were prioritized with consideration of ease in the implementation; however, the remaining facilities such as hospitals or schools are also expected to be developed in the future. Result of assessment is marked as A (high), B (medium), and C (low).

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Table 6.3.4 Summary of Priority Nationwide Project

1) Training Center for Search & Rescue: 11,700 m2 A A AFAD A 15.6 ○2) National Education Center for Disaster Preparedness:12,000 m2 A A AFAD A 22

3) Research & Development Center: 10,000 m2 A B AFAD B 20 ○4) Satellite Network (VSAT) A A AFAD A 50 ○5) Information Gathering & Dissemination System A A AFAD B 150 ○6) Development of a network at each level of distaster management plans A AFAD 50

7) Establish data base and archive system A AFAD 50

8) Establishment of R&D institute for policy making A AFAD 19.4

1) Disaster & Emergency Management Center, Logistic Center, and Heliport: 6,000 m2 A A AFAD A 14.8 ○2) Training Center for Search & Rescue: 11,700 m2 A A AFAD A 15.6 ○3) Education Center for Disaster Preparedness (Regional level): 6,000 m2 A A AFAD A 11

4) Seismic risk assessment for buildings and utility infrastructure A AFAD

5) Seismic performance assessment and strengthening of dam A DSI

6) Redevelopment of risky area based on the result of risk assessment AMOEU

/Municipalities7) Anti-earthquake measures for non-fixed components A MOH

8) Seismic upgrading of buildings of central and local government. AMOEU

/Municipalities9) Logistics center A AFAD 1.3

10) Heliports for disaster prevention bases and medical centers A AFAD 2.2

11) Construction of well and water tank for water supply in disaster ABUSKI

MetropolitanMunicipality

12) Securing power supply by emergency power equipment for wide area disaster mitigationfacilities

AAFADMOH

13) Development of park/open space in regional/provincial DMC A MOEU 24.3

14) Reinforcement of public port in Gemlik A MOTMAC 101

15) Development of emergency road network and operation regulations for province level AMetropolitanMunicipality

3.9

16) Seismic strengthening and set-back of buildings along emergency road A17) Road widening and seismic strengthening of buildings for the emergency road aroundDMC

A

18) Seismic performance assessment and strengthening of subway station and tunnel A

19) Disaster Information network A AFAD 2

20) Designation and development of regional/provincial level evacuation place AMOEU

Municipality21) Institutional development for strengthening disaster management system A AFAD

22) Development of emergency evacuation plans and guidelines A

23) Identification of safe evacuation routes A AFAD

1) Disaster & Emergency Management Center, Logistic Center, and Heliport: 6,000 m2 A A AFAD A 14.8 ○2) Development of park/open space in regional/provincial DMC A MOEU 24.3

3) Designation and development of regional/provincial level evacuation place AMOEU

Municipality

National Level

Regional Level

Provincial/ District Level

Project

Effe

ctiv

enes

s &

Effic

ienc

y

Urg

ency

Impl

emen

tati

onAg

ency

Tech

nica

lFe

asib

ility

Mat

urit

y

Appr

ox. C

ost(

100

mill

ion

Yen)

(6) Projects with Potental Support from the JICA scheme

Based on the above discussions, possible projects to be supported by the JICA scheme in the disaster risk management sector are discussed in this section.

Two criteria under “Effectiveness” for the selection of priority projects related to nationwide expansion or coverage were considered in the formulation of projects as discussed above (see 6.2.1.(1)).

6-22


For the purpose of making a good example of a DMC network from the national level to the provincial level, the following three nationwide package projects were prepared:

Packages Scenario

PackageA Establish a DMC network from national Level to regional Level as one package. Provincial level and lower level will be developed later.

PackageB Establish 6 core-regional DMCs and a provincial DMC in the zone where core-regional DMCs will be developed. (6 Core-regional DMCs will also function as back-ups for national level.)

PackageC Develop an example of national-regional-provincial network of DMCs in the 3 prioritized zones. (Establish model of DMC network within a zone)

An outline of the proposed project packages, including conceptual distribution of DMCs, listing of facility components, and estimated project costs are summarized in the following table. The proposed components at the national level are common for all three packages.

These packages were compared in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, cost, and feasibility. The characteristics and the pros and cons of each package are also summarized in the following tab le.

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Table 6.3.5 Summary of Proposed “Nationwide” Project Packages

Package A Package B Package C

General Description

DMC network from national to regional level will be established by construction of Regional DMCs (one Regional DMC in each logistic zone) and nationwide satellite communication system.

6 core-regional DMCs and one provincial DMC per each Regional DMC. One Regional DMC and four Provincial DMCs (all provincial DMCs in zones) in each of the three prioritized zones.

Expected

Results

Pros.

Disaster management system with DMC will be established from national to regional levels. Training centers for search and rescue teams will be developed in all regions (logistic zones).

Higher-ranked Regional DMC may be a back-up for the national level DMC in the event of a disaster in Ankara. Model of National-Regional-Provincial DMC will be established.

Model of DMC network from national to provincial levels will be established in 3 zones, which can be examples for other zones. Logistic zones which have high risk can be selected as model zones.

Cons. Since DMC at provincial and lower levels are not included, strengthening of the provincial level disaster management system will be limited.

Training center for search & rescue teams will be limited to 6 centers. One regional DMC and one provincial DMC will be developed in each logistic zone. Difference between targeted zone and others will be significant.

National Level • Training Center for Search & Rescue • Education Center for Disaster Preparedness • Satellite Network (VSAT) • Information Gathering and Dissemination System • R&D Center

• Training Center for Search & Rescue • Education Center for Disaster Preparedness • Satellite Network (VSAT) • Information Gathering and Dissemination System • R&D Center

• Training Center for Search & Rescue • Education Center for Disaster Preparedness • Satellite Network (VSAT) • Information Gathering and Dissemination System • R&D Center

Regional Level

Regional DMC (13 centers*1) • Disaster & Emergency Management Center (Including Operation Center,

AFAD office, Logistic Center, Heliport) • Training Center for Search & Rescue • Education Center for Disaster Preparedness

Regional DMC (5 centers*2) • Disaster & Emergency Management Center (Including Operation

Center, AFAD office, Logistic Center, Heliport) • Training Center for Search & Rescue • Education Center for Disaster Preparedness

Regional DMC (3 centers*3) • Disaster & Emergency Management Center (Including Operation

Center, AFAD office, Logistic Center, Heliport) • Training Center for Search & Rescue • Education Center for Disaster Preparedness

Provincial Level ― Provincial DMC (5 Provinces surrounding Regional DMC ) • Disaster & Emergency Management Center (Including Operation Center,

AFAD office, Logistic Center, Heliport

Provincial DMC (12 Provinces surrounding Regional DMCs) • Disaster & Emergency Management Center (Including Operation Center,

AFAD office, Logistic Center, Heliport)

Facilities Level Quantity Unit Unit Cost (100 million Yen)

Total (100 million Yen) Level Quantity Unit Unit Cost (100

million Yen) Total (100

million Yen) Level Quantity Unit Unit Cost (100 million Yen)

Total (100 million Yen)

1) Disaster & Emergency Management Center: 6,000 m2

Regional 13 Center 14.8 192.4 Regional 5 Center 14.8 74.0 Regional 3 Center 14.8 44.4 Provincial 0 Center 14.8 0 Provincial 5 Center 14.8 74.0 Provincial 12 Center 14.8 177.6

2) Training Centre for Search & Rescue: 11,700 m2

National 1 Center 15.6 15.6 National 1 Center 15.6 15.6 National 1 Center 15.6 15.6 Regional 13 Center 15.6 202.8 Regional 5 Center 15.6 78.0 Regional 3 Center 15.6 46.8

3) Education Centre for Disaster Preparedness:12,000 m2

(National), 6,000 m2

(Regional )

National 1 Center 22.0 22.0 National 1 Center 22.0 22.0 National 1 Centre 22.0 22.0 Regional

13 Center 11.0 143.0

Regional

5 Center 11.0 55.0 Regional 3 Center 11.0 33.0

4) Satellite Network (VSAT) National 1 Set 50.0 50.0 National 1 Set 50.0 50.0 National 1 Set 50.0 50.0 5) Information Gathering & Dissemination System

National 1 Set 150.0 150.0 National 1 Set 150.0 150.0 National 1 Set 150.0 150.0

6) Research & Development Centre: 10,000m2

National 1 Center 20.0 20.0 National 1 Center 20.0 20.0 National 1 Center 20.0 20.0

Total 795.8 Total 538.6 Total 559.4 *1：One DMC for each AFAD Logistic Zone= 15 DMCs minus 2 existing DMCs (Ankara and Istanbul). *2: Higher-ranked Regional level DMCs are proposed to be in the following 7 provinces: Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, Samsun, Adana, and Erzurm, excluding Ankara and Istanbul. * Tentatively proposed at Bursa in the Western part of Turkey, Adana in the South-Eastern part of Turkey, and Erzurm in the Eastern part of Turkey. *4: Location of Regional DMC: provinces having the largest population in each logistic zone are selected as the location of the Regional level DMC.

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6-25

6.4. Priority Projects for the Case Study of Bursa Priority projects selected for the case study in Bursa are shown below.

(1) Assessment of projects with a criteria of expected contribution to Disaster Resilient Urban Planning

Effectiveness respect to the contribution to the disaster resilient urban planning, is assessed based on two criteria. A criteria “Projects expected to contribute to countermeasures and collaboration system of provincial AFAD” is set based on necessity of strengthening provincial AFAD in association with the revision of AFAD law as well as from “Disaster Management System Development” countermeasures discussed in 4.2.2. (4). Another criteria “Projects expected to be effective and have a ripple effect in making Bursa City more resilient” is also set based on selected challenges from 4.2.2. a. Projects expected to support the strengthening of disaster & emergency management

systems, including cooperation system among relevant authorities in Bursa Province : With consideration of necessity to strengthen the provincial AFAD according to the revision of Law No.5902, and expected function of Bursa DMC as a regional center of the South Marmara region, necessity of stregtheing the Bursa AFAD was recognized. The following two points were considered as criteria.

a-1. Support to establish provincial disaster and emergency management center with a collaboration system with relevant authorities to collect data and manage disaster relief activities.

a-2. Capacity building of Provincial AFAD

b. Projects expected to be effective and have a ripple effect in making Bursa City more resilient: Challenges in facility development for disaster resilient urban planning in Bursa are as summarised in 4.4.2. In order to improve the situation, the following points were considered as criteria to select priority projects, which will contribute to construct disaster resilient urban structure by the deployment of a structured DMC and infrastructure which support the DMCs function. Point b-6 is added from the view point of which has possibility to introduce concept of disaster management to the Urban Transformation project that has been promoted in nation wide.

b-1. Establishment of Disaster Management Bases

b-2. Security of Road Network for Evacuation and Implemenation of the Disaster Response Activities

b-3. Ensuring Evacuation Points in the Neighbourhood Level

b-4. Emergency Medical System and Enhancement of its Functions in the Populated Area at the time of Disaster

b-5. Enhancement of Public Awareness regarding Disater Risk Management

b-6. Collaboration with regeneration of Vulnerable Residential Area (Urban Transformation Project)

Become an example of an urban transformation project with consideration of DRM

In general, projects related to development of the DMC and its network were prioritized. The result of the assessment is summarized below.


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Table 6.4.1 Proposed projects with high effectiveness & efficiency

Proposed project components

Criteria and key points

Component A

Component b

Component C

Component D

Component E

Component F

(a) Projects expected to support the strengthening of disaster & emergency management systems, including cooperation system among relevant authorities in Bursa Province.

a-1. Support to establish IAADYM with a system to collect data and manage disaster relief activities.

◎

a-2. Capacity building of Provincial AFAD ◎ (b) Projects expected to be effective and have a ripple effect in making Bursa City

more resilient

b-1. Establishment of Disaster Management Bases ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ b-2. Security of Road Network for Evacuation and Implemenation of the Disaster

Response Activities ◎ ◎

b-3. Ensuring Evacuation Points in the Neighbourhood Level ◎ ◎ ◎

b-4. Emergency Medical System and Enhancement of its Functions in the Populated Area at the time of Disaster

◎ ◎

b-5. Enhancement of Public Awareness regarding Disater Risk Management ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎ ◎

b-6. Collaboration with regeneration of Vulnerable Residential Area (Urban Transformation Project)

◎ ◎


(2) Outlines of the proposed projects and proposed planning level

Outlines of the proposed projects are described in 4.3.3 to 4.3.8. and summarized below.

Table 6.4.2 Outline of the proposed projects

Components Outline Components

Component A

Develop Regional Level DMC to cover Bursa and surrounding provinces. It will help AFAD to coordinate with other relevant authorities.

1) Disaster & Emergency Management Centre, Logistic Centre, and Heliport: 6,000 m2

2) Training Centre for Search & Rescue: 11,700 m2 3) DRM related facilities (Fire Dept. /AKOM/112 etc.): 6,000 m2 4) Disaster Base Hospital: 140,000 m2 (700 beds) 5) Park/Open Space: 10ha 6) Waste Incineration Plant: 22,500 m2

（3,000t/day) 7) Seismic strengthening of bridge: main road 100m

Component B

DMC for Osmangazi District.Disaster management center at district level, sports facilities and schools will be developed with disaster prevention facilities.

1) Disaster & Emergency Management Centre, Logistic Centre, Heliport: 6,000 m2

2) Sports Centre (Gymnasium, pool): 7,500 m2 3) Park/Open Space: 10ha 4) School: 3,500m2

Component C

DMC for Yuldirim District, with A-1 class disaster management hospital and several community facilities.

1) Disaster & Emergency Management Centre, Logistic Centre, and Heliport: 6,000 m2

2) Renovation work for Şevket Yılmaz Hospital: 180,000m2 (900 beds)3) Extension work for Şevket Yılmaz Hospital: 30,000m2 (150 beds) 4) Park/Open Space: 10ha

Component D Seaside DMC at Gemlik port. It will be a base to receive support from outside.

1) 1) Seaside Disaster Management Complex: Gemlik port 10ha2) Disaster & Emergency Management Centre, Logistic Centre, and

Heliport: 6,000 m2 3) Park/Open Space: 10ha

Component E Secure emergency access 1) Emergency Road Network：20km

Component F Improvement of the mountainous area.

1) Road Network：5km2) Park/ Open Space:2500 ㎡ 3) Stockpile Storage 4) Mini Monorail:250m



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(3) Proposed Projects for JICA Scheme

The expected effects on disaster resilient urban planning from the implementation of these projects are summarized as follows:

- Through the process of developing DMCs, the coordination system between AFAD and related organizations is expected to be established, which will help smooth collaboration in the event of a disaster.

- DMCs will be a place to receive, sort, and distribute supporting goods and human resources from outside. By defining this role of the DMC, confusion will be avoided by outside institutions who are willing to support the disaster-struck areas and of recipients who are waiting for support.

- Construction of DMCs in the city will inform the general public about government efforts in disaster prevention. Parks in DMCs and education/training in DMCs will also help inform people about the roles and functions of the DMCs. This will be effective in enhancing public awareness for disaster preparedness.

- This set of projects in Bursa will showcase an example of a DMC through the planning process and promote it to the whole country.

- In collaboration with the Turkish Government’s efforts for urban transformation, there is a potential to promote and disseminate the idea of creating DMCs nationwide.

As a result of the study, priority is shown in [ ] in the following table.


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Table 6.4.3 Summary of Priority Projects ( Bursa)

Project

Effe

ctiv

enes

s &

Effic

ienc

y

Urg

ency

Impl

emen

tatio

n Ag

ency

Mat

urity

Appr

ox. C

ost

(100

mill

ion

Yen)

Japa

nese

te

chno

logy

Component A [I]1) Disaster & Emergency Management Center,

Logistic Center, and Heliport: 6,000 m2A A AFAD A 14.8 ○

2) Training Center for Search & Rescue: 11,700 m2 A A AFAD A 15.6 ○

3) DRM related facilities (Fire Dept. /AKOM/112 etc.): 6,000 m2

A B AFAD/Bursa Metropolitan Municipality

B 6.8

4) Disaster Base Hospital: 140,000 m2 (700 beds) A B MOH B 437.7 ○

5) Park/Open Space: 10ha A A Bursa

Metropolitan Municipality

A 24.3 ○

6) Waste Incineration Plant: 22,500 m2（3,000t/day)）

B B Bursa Metropolitan Municipality

B 513.0 ○

7) Seismic strengthening of bridge: main road 100m

B A Bursa Metropolitan Municipality

A 1.3 ○

Component B [III]1) Disaster & Emergency Management Center,

Logistic Center, Heliport: 6,000 m2 A A Osmangazi A 14.8 ○

2) Sports Center (Gymnasium, pool): 7,500 m2 B B MOYS B 12.7 3) Park/Open Space: 10ha A A Bursa

Metropolitan Municipality

A 24.3

4) School: 3,500m2 B B MONE B 1.5

Component C [II]1) Disaster & Emergency Management Center,

Logistic Center, and Heliport: 6,000 m2A A Yildirim A 14.8 ○

2) Renovation work for Şevket Yılmaz Hospital: 180,000m2 (900 beds) B B MOH B 89.9 ○

3) Extension work for Şevket Yılmaz Hospital: 30,000m2 (150 beds) B B MOH B 95.3 ○

4) Park/Open Space: 10ha A A

Bursa Metropolitan Municipality

A 24.3

○

Component D [II]1) Seaside Disaster Management Complex: Gemlik

port 10ha A B Gemlik

B 101.0 ○

2) Disaster & Emergency Management Center, Logistic Center, and Heliport: 6,000 m2 A A

AFAD/ Bursa Metropolitan Municipality

A 14.8 ○

3) Park/Open Space: 10ha A B

Bursa Metropolitan Municipality

A 24.3 ○

Component E [I]

1) Emergency Road Network: 20km A A AFAD/ Bursa Metropolitan Municipality

B 3.9

Component F [III]

1) Improvement of Mountainous Area A A Osmangazi B 24.3 ○

Details of each priority project are described in the form of project profile summary sheets, which are attached.


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6.5. Implementation Body of Proposed Projects Each DMC proposed in this study, both for the nationwide and the case study in Bursa, consists of a complex containing several facilities related to disaster management. A multi-sectoral approach and coordination among the relevant authorities are essential to realizing the concept of DMC. The table below shows the authorities expected to be involved with each component of a DMC.

Table 6.5.1 Priority projects and responsible authorities

Priority Projects

Nat

iona

l Lev

el D

MC

Regi

onal

Lev

el D

MC

Prov

inci

al L

evel

DM

C

Dist

rict L

evel

DM

C

Responsible Authorities

AFAD

Met

ropo

litan

M

unic

ipal

ity/

Mun

icip

ality

MO

H

MO

NE

Oth

ers

1) Disaster & Emergency Management Center ● ● ● 〇〇

2) Training Center for Search & Rescue ● ● 〇

3) Education Center for Disaster Preparedness ● ● 〇

4) Research & Development Center ● 〇

5) Disaster Risk Management Related Facilities (AKOM/Fire/Police/112 etc.) ● ● ● 〇〇

○

AKOM/

Fire

○

112/

UMKE

6) Disaster Base Hospital ● ● ● 〇〇

7) Park/Open Space ● ● ● ● 〇

8) Sports Facilities 〇〇〇 ○

MOYS

9) Waste Incineration Plant ● ● 〇

10) School 〇〇〇 ● 〇

11) Emergency Road Network ● ● ● ● 〇

12) Satellite Network (VSAT) ● ● 〇

13) Information Gathering & Dissemination System

● 〇


Coordination with Relevant Authorities

In the event of a disaster, coordination with the relevant authorities is one of AFAD’s missions. To enhance the involvement of several authorities such as MOEU, MOH and MONE, which is critical for implementation of disaster prevention, the possibility to establish a cross-ministerial project implementation committee to materialize the idea of DMC was studied at the beginning of this project.

Through the survey, it was recognized, however, that a cross-ministerial effort will take time especially during the project formulation stage, and delay the much needed implementation of the projects. In addition, keeping AFAD as the main leader of the projects will allow continuity and consistency throughout each province as well as throughout the country, and


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will allow for easier efficient and timely project completion, since AFAD is the expert disaster management body in Turkey.

Therefore, it was recommended to start with the projects which can be completed by AFAD or by a combination of AFAD and the metropolitan municipality.

As shown in the table above, the main DMC facilities are under AFAD responsibility. Facilities under the metropolitan municipality or the municipality responsibility are also critical.

For all DMC projects, securing land for the DMC facilities as well as for the essential large open space adjacent to the facilities is the very first step, and requires collaboration with MOEU, the metropolitan municipality and provincial directorate.

The participation of the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, which is a key player in the establishment of the foundation for DMC, shall be effective for the formulation of a resilient city.

Other facilities under the responsibility of other ministries can be developed later.

Facilities under AFAD

The revision of Law No. 5902 stipulated the transfer of the disaster & emergency management center, training center, and education centers to the provincial level and for them to be under AFAD. This will likely make project implementation easier, although it also raises the possibility of some difficulties in coordinating with other agencies at the provincial level.

6.6. Challenges Regarding Project Implementation The following describes the challenges for realization and implementation of proposed projects through the consultation with relevant agencies of this study.

Way forward

During this survey, due to the limited opportunity to discuss matters with the director of AFAD, it was difficult to confirm the intentions of AFAD regarding the implementation of the proposed packages, though they have expressed their positive opinions for our proposals.

Further discussion with AFAD is necessary on the proposed project packages and on the contents of the projects. The project proposal and feasibility study should be prepared and submitted to the Ministry of Development (MOD) for approval to request a Japanese ODA loan.

Initiatives of AFAD

The development of DMCs for wide areas, the main proposal of this study, requires the cooperation of various ministries including AFAD and local governments.

As a result, this study proposes starting with an improvement of AFAD facilities during the first stage; however, it is important to engage other related authorities and make them understand the importance and advantage of joining the DMC and allocating their facilities or resources to the DMC in the future. Through this process, it is also important to form a cooperative framework with relevant ministries that can be implemented in a disaster.

Through the study, some personnel, being familiar with the idea of disaster prevention, stated their expectations for stronger initiatives from AFAD, whereas others complained about the bureaucratic sectionalism during consultation with other organizations. For pervasion of the idea of disaster prevention and mitigation, a further strengthened initiative


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by AFAD is required to overcome such bureaucratic sectionalism. Disaster complex bases for wide areas might be the first step for the breakthrough.

Adjustment with Bursa City

It was difficult to advance concrete discussion with the Bursa side because of upcoming local elections and some confusion with the study of technical cooperation. However, being listed in the program and vision of the new mayor will be effective to advance the projects. Hence this election would be a good opportunity for local cities to consider the concept of disaster resilient urban planning and disaster prevention.

The Bursa Metropolitan Municipality has experience implementing various urban development projects and at the end of March 2014 their autonomy was expanded to the boundary of the province. Therefore, it is essential to cooperate with the Bursa Metropolitan Municipality and the provincial directorate of MOEU regardless of whether land is secured for the projects.


In the study, the Deputy General Director of Health Services showed a certain understanding of the importance of the disaster base hospital in Japan. At the same time, however, due to shortage of their own funds, the construction of the Cekirge hospital in Bursa, which is proposed to be constructed in this project, will be implemented through PPP. Consultation with the Department of Health Investment office needs to be held for this issue.

PPP is to be used for hospital construction projects, but most of the projects have not yet proceeded due to financial problems. Since the prime minister is still promoting those City Hospital-PPP projects, it is an absolute must for the MOH to make progress on these PPP projects.

In the City Hospital-PPP configuration, the private company owns the hospital for the first 25 years and lends it to the Minister of Health. However, in the case of Japanese ODA loans, the owner shall be the MOH and the operation of hospital facilities can be run by a private company. Introduction of a combination of Japanese ODA loan and PPP in the operation stage may attract the MOH.

Attitudes from relevant ministries toward disaster prevention

It was a frequent comment from institutions that sufficient measures for disaster preventions were already in place or in the planning phase, while academics as well as those who experienced past great earthquakes agreed with the importance of further measures.

In this regard, it is essential to increase opportunities to share past experiences in Japan and Turkey and emphasize the importance of further measures.

Possibility to introduce Japanese technology

Through the study, the competitive advantage of Japanese technology to meet the needs for Turkey as identified and the possibility of introduction of that technology in Turkey were examined. However, it is likely that European products will be more attractive, especially because of the lower cost and the geographical vicinity.

It may take time for Turkey to understand the value of certainty and comprehensive approaches, which are the advantages of Japanese technology. Further promotion activities, such as an inspection tour in Japan, would likely benefit the adoption of Japanese systems.


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Necessity for phased and strategic plan in consideration of disaster risk analysis

Through the study of technical cooperation, Turkey attempts to understand future disaster risks and develop appropriate associated management plan. This study, on the other, is based on available information up to this point and examined only feasible high priority projects that are expected to be implemented immediately and have certain outcomes. For comprehensive resilient urban planning, however, diversified, local, and long-term approaches would also be necessary.

In parallel with the implementation of these proposed projects, resilient urban planning based on the disaster risk assessment should also be considered for more comprehensive planning. This approach is expected to promote appreciation and understanding of Japanese technology and knowledge.

“The effort for cooperation of Japan and Turkey on disaster prevention” were stated by the Vice Prime Minister of Turkey and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of Japan during the Turkish Prime Minister’s visit to Japan in January 2014. Based on that, we invited the AFAD director general and hosted a workshop in April 2014, as to introduce the disaster prevention system of Japan. In turn, a workshop in Ankara is planned in June 2014 as to introduce the disaster prevention system of Turkey to Japanese side.

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6.7. Roughly Estimated Cost for Project Implementation The method of calculation for cost of the proposed project is “Total floor area (m2)×Building cost per m2 + Equipment cost + Other expenses”.

It should be noted that estimated costs in this chapter are nothing more than preliminary. It will be reviewed and revised through detail designing process.

Total floor area (m2): If available, use the total floor area of a similar facility in Turkey. If this information is not available, assume the floor area of a similar facility in Japan.

Building cost per unit area: Use the cost per m2 of public buildings in Turkey. Add the cost of the heliport and/or seismic isolation costs as needed.

Equipment cost: If available, use equipment costs in Turkey. If this information is unavailable, assume the cost of the equipment in Japan.

Other expense: Include indirect costs (incl. design fee), escalation and tax. Exclude contingency.

The currency rate used the average of the Telegraphic Transfer Selling (TTS) rate of Japanese MUFG bank on January 2014. The currency rate is shown below.

1.0TL = 46.85 Yen, 1.0USD = 104.61 Yen

Where “TL” is Turkish Lira, “Yen” is Japanese Yen, “USD” is US Dollar

6.7.1. Disaster & Emergency Management Center (1) Total floor area

Currently, AFAD has a plan to develop DMCs of the three following floor areas; A: 6,000 m2, B: 5,250 m2, C: 4,500 m2. This estimate was set for total floor area of 6,000 m2; the largest one.

(2) Analysis and estimate of building cost per unit area (m2)

1) Comparison of the building costs of Turkey and Japan

a. Public Building cost per unit area in Turkey

Every year the public building cost per unit area is estimated from the fixed property tax imposed by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Environment and Urbanization. Public building costs per unit area for major buildings in 2014 are shown in the table below. The original table is attached as Annex A-5-1.

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Table 6.7.1 Cost per unit area of selected Public Buildings in (TL/ m2) 2014

Building Steel Building Framework Concrete Framework Brick Masonry Building

Min Max Ave. Min Max Ave. Min Max Ave.

Factories and Plant Buildings

Grade B 679.16 755.69 717.43 560.06 615.35 587.71 384.24 470.73 427.49

Grade C 426.79 468.59 447.69 358.70 374.34 366.52 227.57 275.04 251.31

Grade D 320.45 362.97 341.71 253.08 272.24 262.66 140.39 183.62 162.01

Grade E 182.20 199.19 190.70 141.79 172.94 157.37 75.15 90.76 82.96

Hotel Building

Grade A 1687.92 1812.71 1750.32 1410.75 1532.67 1471.71 1240.59 1363.24 1301.92

Grade B 1215.09 1312.21 1263.65 981.14 1077.55 1029.35 860.62 915.21 887.92

Grade C 818.10 878.37 848.24 655.76 696.16 675.96 530.97 602.57 566.77

Grade D 637.32 701.83 669.58 456.51 514.66 485.59 346.67 412.60 379.64

Theatre Building

Grade A 1883.84 2023.13 1953.49 1527.01 1629.08 1578.05 1384.60 1521.48 1453.04

Grade B 1356.12 1464.52 1410.32 1095.02 1136.18 1115.60 960.51 1021.43 990.97

Grade C 913.06 980.33 946.70 731.88 776.97 754.43 592.61 672.51 632.56

Grade D 711.30 783.32 747.31 509.50 574.39 541.95 386.90 460.51 423.71

Grade E - - - - - - 98.11 117.90 108.01

Hospital-Clinic Building

Grade A 1793.19 1912.22 1852.71 1441.18 1542.35 1491.77 1188.64 1307.67 1248.16

Grade B 1284.72 1384.20 1334.46 1037.28 1079.80 1058.54 906.37 967.58 936.98

Grade C 866.39 927.63 897.01 688.70 733.77 711.24 561.14 636.82 598.98

Grade D 674.25 741.42 707.84 482.90 546.70 514.80 367.32 435.32 401.32

Grade E - - - - - - 90.12 108.86 99.49

Administration Building

Grade A 1459.66 1554.65 1507.16 991.06 1090.30 1040.68 778.39 886.86 832.63

Grade B 900.32 985.39 942.86 679.16 755.69 717.43 520.35 592.64 556.50

Grade C 574.23 611.82 593.03 448.72 468.59 458.66 349.48 374.34 361.91

Grade D 402.63 455.82 429.23 306.25 362.97 334.61 246.70 272.24 259.47

Grade E 182.20 221.90 202.05 108.49 133.28 120.89 57.43 75.15 66.29

School Building

Grade C 641.41 698.62 670.02 398.14 471.86 435.00 316.35 340.30 328.33

Grade D 442.36 492.00 467.18 306.25 362.97 334.61 253.08 272.24 262.66

Grade E 182.20 199.19 190.70 90.76 105.63 98.20 57.79 75.15 66.47

Swimming Pool

Grade B 918.61 1044.56 981.59 611.73 677.32 644.53 341.33 438.11 389.72

Grade C 530.97 596.90 563.94 370.75 398.40 384.58 227.57 292.09 259.83

Grade D 385.64 442.36 414.00 236.80 272.24 254.52 111.29 144.61 127.95

Buildings in an Exhibition Market Place

Grade D 306.25 362.97 334.61 197.78 249.54 223.66 165.88 183.62 174.75

Grade E 199.19 233.21 216.20 90.76 105.63 98.20 75.15 90.76 82.96

Storage /Cold storage

Grade C 499.48 551.95 525.72 358.25 422.81 390.53 324.92 396.06 360.49

Grade D 364.39 402.63 383.51 271.51 320.45 295.98 194.26 236.80 215.53

Grade E 141.79 182.20 162.00 122.64 141.79 132.22 75.15 90.76 82.96Source: JST Note: Costs don’t include the cost for hydronic panel heating, air conditioning or elevator facilities. Hence, 8% for the air conditioning and the heating and 6% for the elevator will be added as needed.

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The maximum building cost per m2 for the Disaster & Emergency Management Center is assumed based on the maximum Grade A Administration Building cost per m2 in Turkey, increased for air conditioning, heating, and elevators. According to Table 6.7.1, the unit cost is 1,090.30 TL/m2, and with the additional 8% for air conditioning and heating and 6% for the elevator, the building cost is 1,242.94 TL/m2 (58,000 yen/m2).

This unit cost includes the cost for construction work, electrical work, mechanical work and temporary site expenses, but doesn’t include the design fee or costs associated with site procurement. This unit cost is used in the bid evaluation of the governmental construction project for comparing with the bidding cost.

b. Unit cost in Japan

The building cost per m2 of Administration Building in Japan in 2012 was 220,000 yen/m2 (in-house office building) and 283,000 yen/m2 (rental office building) according to JBCI 2012 (Japan Building Cost Information; Construction Research Institute in Japan). The unit cost in Turkey (58,000 yen/m2) is approximately 1/5 of the unit cost in Japan (283,000 yen/m2).

c. The comparison of combined cost of major construction materials

We compared the material cost plus labor cost (combined cost) of construction materials in Turkey and Japan. The unit cost of concrete work in Turkey (9,384 yen/m3) is approximately 4/5 of the Japanese unit cost (11,980 yen/m3), and the unit cost of re-bar work in Turkey (73,656 yen/ton) is approximately 3/5 of the Japanese unit cost (114,000 yen/ton). Details are included in the table below.

Table 6.7.2 Comparison of the combined costs of major construction materials (Unit: Yen)

Item Spec Q’ty Unit Turkey JapanSand for concrete(Material cost） 0-5mm 1 m3 2,067 3,900

Concrete work (Combined cost) 21N SL=18cm 1 m3 9,384 11,980

Form work （Combined cost）

Standard Plywood t=12mm 1 m2 4,911 4,000

Re-bar work （Combined cost） D10 ～ D16 1 ton 73,656 114,000

Brick work （Combined cost） Single Lay 1 m2 2,067 4,410

Source: Turkish information by Bosphorus Project, Japanese information by Construction & Material Costs in Japan and Building cost information

d. Comparison of the labor cost

Labor cost in Turkey and Japan are compared below. In general, Turkey’s unit cost is approximately 1/10 of the Japanese unit cost.

Table 6.7.3 Comparison of the labor cost (Unit: Yen) Description Q’ty Unit Turkey Japan

Carpenter 1 day 2,399 22,800Mason 1 day 2,399 23,100

Tile Worker 1 day 2,399 21,700Interior Finish Worker 1 day 2,399 21,300

Plaster Man 1 day 2,399 22,300Glazer 1 day 2,399 19,800

Plumber 1 day 2,399 19,500Driver 1 day 2,436 16,700

Driver(Heavy Vehicle) 1 day 2,773 20,200Source: Construction and Installation Analysis and Unit Cost 2013 by MOEU, Japanese information by Construction & Material Costs (Dec. 2013)

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(3) Disaster and Emergency Management Center as a DMC Facility

The Disaster and Emergency Management Center proposed in this project is designed as a seismic isolation structure (including seismic isolation devices) and the design incorporates a heliport both on the roof and the ground. These costs were calculated based on the Japanese examples.

- Cost for heliport: The cost of a rooftop heliport is estimated at 100 million yen (steel framed construction) and the cost of a heliport on the ground level is estimated at 20 million yen. Total cost is 120 million yen.

- Cost for the seismic isolation structure (including seismic isolation devices): 15,000 yen/m2

(the cost of the seismic isolation devices amounts to approximately 5% of the total construction costs in Turkey).

(4) Approximate cost estimate for Disaster & Emergency Management Center

The table below shows the estimate of the unit cost for the Disaster & Emergency Management Center based on the assumptions presented above.

Table 6.7.2 Estimated Construction Unit Cost of Disaster & Emergency Management Center

Description Note

① 6,000m2×58,231 yen/m2=349,386,000 yen Building cost per m2 based on public buildings in Turkey

② 120,000,000 yen Adding a heliport cost ③ 6,000m2×15,000 yen/m2＝90,000,000 yen Adding a seismic isolation structure cost ①+②+③ =559,386,000 yen ④ 559,386,000 yen/6,000m2＝93,231 yen/m2 Building cost per m2

Building cost per m2 of Disaster & Emergency Management Center is calculated at about 93,231 yen/m2.

(5) Equipment cost

The cost for the network system necessary for the Disaster and Emergency Management Center was assumed based on the cost of equipment in the main building of the Japanese Ariake no Oka DMC. The total unit cost of the equipment by area of the Ariake no Oka Building (9,411m2) was calculated and assumed for the proposed 6,000 m2 Disaster and Emergency Management Center:

429,000,000 yen×0.6387 (6,000m2÷9,411 m2)= 274,002,000 yen

Major equipment that is included in this equipment cost, Private Branch exchange system, Audio/Visual system, Public address system, Common Antenna Television system, CCTV system, room access control system, Fire alarm system, and emergency power supply.

Detailed information regarding the main building of the Ariake no Oka disaster prevention complex is as follows; the building area is 6,110 m2, the total floor area is 9,411 m2, the structure is reinforced concrete and steel frame (seismic isolation structure), there are two stories in the main building and one story in the tower building, construction started in March 2006 and lasted 25 months, for a total project cost of approximately 4.8 billion yen before taxes (including the cost of network facilities of 0.4 billion yen).

(6) Other necessary expenses: indirect cost, consumer price variation and VAT

1) Indirect cost

Indirect costs for this project are assumed based on the Japanese experience that indirect costs represent approximately 30% of the total costs for building construction and equipment purchase.

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2) Design fee

Based on a survey of local architectural offices in Turkey, the design fee of an architectural office in Turkey is approximately 3% or 4 % of total construction costs (see annex A-5-5). Therefore, the design fee of a few percent is included in the indirect cost.

3) Setting of the coefficient of consumer price variation

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), consumer prices have shown an upward trend every year in Turkey due to inflation, and this trend is expected to continue in the future. Assuming the project is complete by April 2016, the calculated inflation coefficients from February 2014 to April 2016 are shown below:

Based on the inflation rates shown in table 6.5.5:Year 2014 : 6.491%×11 months÷12 months=5.95%

Year 2015 : 6.041%×12 months÷12 months=6.041% Year 2016 : 6.041%×4 months÷12 months＝2.014% Total= 14.005% Therefore, the coefficient of consumer price variation was set at 14.0％

Table 6.7.3 Inflation and average consumer prices in Turkey

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Gross domestic product, current prices (GDP) (USD billions)

774.775 788.299 821.798 851.434 941.925 1042.781 1155.239 1279.825

Inflation, average consumer prices

(Index) 189.95 206.84 222.78 237.24 251.58 266.77 282.89 299.98

Inflation, average consumer prices (%)

6.47 8.89 7.71 6.491 6.041 6.041 6.04 6.04

source：IMF：World Economic Databases, Oct, 2013

Coefficient of consumer price variation applies to construction material costs as well as labor costs.

4) Value added tax (VAT)

Based on our survey in Turkey, we expect that an 18 % VAT will be imposed on this project.

The approximate complete cost estimate for the Disaster & Emergency Management Center is calculated below:

6,000 m2 × 93,000 yen/m2 + 274 million yen (equipment cost) + 517 million yen (expenses) = 1,349 million yen.

In addition, a stockpile storage facility (adding 130 million yen) is proposed to be included in the Disaster & Emergency Management Center.

6.7.2. Disaster Base Hospital

The method of calculation of the approximate cost estimate for the Disaster Base Hospital is “Total floor area (m2)×Building cost per m2 + Medical Equipment cost + Other expenses”

(1) Total floor area

According to the MOH, the floor area per bed in a new hospital in Turkey is 200m2. The Disaster Base Hospital proposed in this report is based on the scale of Çekirge Hospital in Bursa, which has a total of 700 beds.

6-38

The total floor area of the model of the Disaster Base Hospital is 200m2/bed×700bed＝140,000m2.

The details of the model of the Disaster Base Hospital are shown in the Table below.

Table 6.7.4 Details of the Model Hospital

Condition Çekirge Hospital (virtual model）

1) Number of Beds 700 beds

2) Total floor area 140,000m2 (200m2/bed)

3) Ratio of single rooms 50％

4) Number of beds for standard patient rooms 1 bed~2 bed

5) Standard nurse unit 10 beds

6) Intensive care section

(ICU, CCU, NICU, etc.) Approximately 90 rooms

7) Outpatient consultation rooms 100 rooms

8) Operating rooms 18 rooms

9) Radiodiagnosis rooms 16 rooms

10) Angiography rooms 3 rooms

11) Radiotherapy rooms 3 rooms

(2) Analysis and setting of building cost per unit area (m2)

1) Comparison of the building costs of Turkey and Japan

a. Public Building cost per unit area in Turkey

The building costs per unit area in 2014 for public Hospital-Clinic buildings are shown below:

Table 6.7.5 Public Building cost per unit area (extract) (TL/ m2) ver. 2014

Building Steel Building Framework Concrete Framework Brick Masonry Building

Min Max Ave. Min Max Ave. Min Max Ave.

Hospital-Clinic building

Grade A 1793.19 1912.22 1852.71 1441.18 1542.35 1491.77 1188.64 1307.67 1248.16

Grade B 1284.72 1384.20 1334.46 1037.28 1079.80 1058.54 906.37 967.58 936.98

Grade C 866.39 927.63 897.01 688.70 733.77 711.24 561.14 636.82 598.98

Grade D 674.25 741.42 707.84 482.90 546.70 514.80 367.32 435.32 401.32

Grade E - - - - - - 90.12 108.86 99.49Note: Costs don’t include the cost for hydronic panel heating, air conditioning, or elevator facilities. Hence, 8% for the air conditioning and the heating and 6% for the elevator will be added as needed.

This building cost per m2 is used to estimate the cost for the Disaster Base Hospital in Turkey. According to Table 6-3-7, the maximum unit cost for a Hospital-Clinic Building, Steel Frame, Grade A, is 1,912.22 TL/m2 or 2,179.93 TL/m2 (102,000 yen/m2) with air conditioning, heating and elevator. This is consistent with the unit cost range provided by MOH in Bursa: 900 USD to 1,000 USD (94,000 yen/m2 to 105,000 yen/m2), including construction work, electrical work, mechanical work and temporary site expenses. This cost does not include the design fee or site procurement.

b. Unit cost in Japan

The Building cost per m2 of hospital building in Japan ranges from 215,000 yen/m2 for a general hospital to 262,000 yen/m2 for a high performance hospital, according to JBCI 2012 (Japan Building Cost Information; Construction Research Institute). The unit cost for the Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital is 274,000 yen/m2. The unit cost in Turkey (105,000 yen/m2) is approximately 1/3 of the unit cost in Japan (274,000 yen/m2).

6-39

(3) Analysis of Hospital construction costs in Turkey and Japan

Hospital construction cost information in Turkey and Japan was compared and analyzed.

Table 6.7.6 Comparison of Hospital construction cost in Turkey and Japan Country Turkey JapanProvince Sakarya Istanbul Bursa Istanbul MiyagiName of Hospital

SAKARYA HOSPITAL

SEYRANTEPE HOSPITAL

İNEGÖL HOSPIT

AL

SANCAKTEPE HOSPITAL

Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital

Total floor area

67,693 m2 169,760 m2 51,000 m2 53,335 m2 32,486.82 m2

Structure RC Frame RC Frame RC Frame RC Frame Steel and RC frame with Seismic

isolation structure Stories Underground 1F,

above ground 6F Underground 4F, above ground 3F Underground 1F, above ground 18F

Underground 1F, above ground 3F



Period 2008 (contract year)

2010(contract year) 2011(contract year)

2011(contract year)

Aug.2004～Feb.2006

Beds 400 beds 600 beds 400 beds 400beds 392 bedsTotal 4,334,890,000 yen

（100%） 8,488,049,000 yen

（100%）

2,631,283,000 yen

（100%）

3,113,183,000 yen （100%）

9,003,694,000 yen（100%）

Architectural Work

2,232,468,000 yen （51.5%）

4,524,130,000 yen（53.3%）

1,407,737,000 yen

（53.5%）

1,654656,000 yen （53.2%）

5,240,000,000 yen（58.2%）

Electrical Work

565,703,000 yen （13.0%）

1,243,499,000 yen（14.7%）

335,489,000 yen（12.8%）

499,043,000 yen （16.0%）

1,200,000,000 yen（13.3%）

Mechanical Work

994,857,000 yen （23.0%）

2,134,744,000 yen（25.2%）

703,868,000 yen（26.8%）

766,777,000 yen （24.6%）

2,470,000,000 yen（27.4%）

Elevators 346,791,000 yen （4.5%）

118,833,000 yen（1.4%）

26,313 ,000 yen（1.0%）

67,382,000 yen（0.7%）

Landscape 64,037,000 yen （8.0%）

466,843,000 yen（5.5%）

157,877,000 yen（6.0%）

192,706,000 yen （6.2%）

26,312,000 yen（0.3%）

Total cost /total floor

area

64,037 yen/㎡ 50,000 yen/㎡ 51,594 yen/㎡ 58,370 yen/㎡ 274,265 yen/㎡

Source: local architectural office

A comparison of the breakdown of the construction costs of the Turkish and Japanese hospitals shows that building construction costs in Japan are approximately 5% more expensive than in Turkey and the landscape cost in Turkey is approximately 6% more expensive than in Japan. Overall, the total of building construction, electrical and mechanical work, and landscape costs are similar in Japan and Turkey.

According to a local Electrical & Mechanical (M&E) office we visited in Turkey, the unit cost per m2 of M&E is approximately 300 USD/m2 (see detailed costs in Annex A-5-4).

In conclusion, with regard to the comparison of the construction costs of Turkey and Japan, it was confirmed that construction costs in Turkey are less than in Japan; with Turkey’s construction materials cost and labor costs approximately 1/3 and 1/10, respectively, of those in Japan.

(4) Design Differences between General Hospital and Disaster Base Hospital

The main difference in the design of a general hospital and a disaster base hospital is that the disaster base hospital is designed with two heliports (one on the rooftop and one on the ground) and a seismic isolation structure including seismic isolation devices.

6-40

These costs were calculated based on Japanese examples:

Cost for Heliport: The rooftop heliport cost is 100 million yen (steel framed construction) and the cost of a heliport on the ground is 20 million yen. The total cost is thus 120 million yen.

Cost for the seismic isolation structure (including seismic isolation devices):

15,000 yen/m2 (which is approximately 5% of the total construction costs in Turkey)

(5) Approximate cost estimate for Disaster Base Hospital

The table below shows the estimate of the unit cost for the Disaster Base Hospital based on the assumptions presented above.;

Table 6.7.7 Setting of construction unit cost of Disaster Base Hospital Description Note ① 140,000m2×102,130 yen /m2=14,298,200,000 yen Building cost per m2 in Turkey ② 120,000,000 yen Adding a Heliport cost

③ 140,000m2×15,000 yen/m2＝2,100,000,000 yen Adding a Seismic isolation structure cost (incl. Seismic isolation devices)

①+②+③ =16,518,200,000 yen ④ 16,518,200,000 yen/140,000m2＝117,987 yen/m2 Building cost per m2

Building cost per m2 of Disaster Base Hospital is calculated at about 117,987 yen/m2

(6) Medical Equipment

The equipment cost for the Disaster Base Hospital is estimated based on the following assumptions.

Çekirge hospital in component A will be re-constructed as a new hospital of 700 beds and established as a district Disaster Base Hospital to support advanced medical treatments.

About Şevket Yılmaz hospital in component C, the existing hospital will be renovated and an extension hospital of 150 beds will be constructed in the adjacent land, and will be able to perform advanced medical support as a unit by the combination of existing building and extension building. It is considered as a district Disaster Base Hospital to back up Çekirge hospital.

Medical equipment costs were estimated based on the example of various services of advanced medical hospitals in the latest newly emerging country. The medical equipment cost computed per 100 beds and the percentage according to each service is shown below.

6-41

Table 6.7.8 Estimated costs for Medical Equipment (per 100 beds)

Item Department Approx. cost per 100 beds

（in 1,000 US$） Rate（%）

Medical Equipment Outpatient 736 5.79

Emergency 779 6.13

Examination 204 1.60

Intensive Care 1,416 11.15

Ward 1,123 8.84

Operation 1,206 9.49

Radiation 5,225 41.14

Clinical Examination 1,228 9.67

Endoscopy 259 2.03

Dialysis 233 1.83

Rehabilitation 37 0.29

CSSD 137 1.07

Pharmacy 125 0.98

Sub total 12,708 100.00

Transportation, installation, procurement management fee

635 5%

Consumables, spare parts, etc., 127 1%Accessary fee 1,270 10%

Total 14,740 -

In total, medical equipment costs are estimated to be approximately 15 million yen per bed for the proposed hospital. As a reference, in Japan, medical equipment costs are approximately 22 million yen to 25 million yen per bed. In addition, required costs such as transportation costs, installation costs, procurement management fees are assumed as 5%, consumables and spare parts costs are assumed as 1%, and accessories such as fixtures and fittings costs are assumed as 10% of each of the equipment cost as shown inTable 6.7.8.

According to the example of the latest public hospital in Turkey, the relation between the number of beds and the number of operating rooms is as follows.

National hospital: 648 beds /16 rooms = 40.5 beds (one operating room per 40.5 beds)

Using this result for the calculation on the scale of Çekirge hospital, it will become 700 beds /40.5 beds = 17.3, assume approximately 18 rooms.

The number of special treatment rooms such as ICU, radiodiagnosis room, and radiotherapy room, depends on the grade of the hospital, and the following example will be assumed.

6-42

Table 6.7.9 Details of Çekirge Hospital (model)

Details Hosopital case designed in Japan (Example)

Çekirge Hospital (virtual model)

1) Number of bed 1,000 bed 700 beds

2) Total floor area 100,000m2

(100m2/bed) 140,000m2 (200m2/bed)

3) Ratio of single rooms 20% 50%

4) Number of beds per standard patient

room 4bed 1bed~2bed

5) Standard nurse unit 40 - 44 beds 10 beds

6) Intensive care section

(ICU, CCU, NICU, etc.) 75 beds 90 beds

7) Outpatient consultation room 130 rooms 100 rooms

8) Operating room 20 rooms 18 rooms

9) Radiodiagnosis room 18 rooms 16 rooms

10) Angiography room 4 rooms 3 rooms

11) Radiotherapy room 3 rooms 3 rooms

Table 6.7.10 Example of main medical equipment classified by deprtment

Hospital (1) Core district Disaster Base Hospital

Hospital (2) The hospital having disaster-measures function

Number of bed About 450 beds About 500 beds Main equipment according to main department

Radiographic examination (In accordance with medical treatment, 30 to 40 percent of the total cost is common)

CT (two sets), MRI (two sets), Gamma camera (one set) Angiography (three sets), Mammograpy (one set), General photography (five sets), Fluoroscopy (six sets), etc.

CT (three sets), MRI (two sets), PET-CT (one set) Angiography (three sets), Fluoroscopy (six sets), Mammograpy (two sets), General photography (five sets), etc.

Radiotherapy Linear accelerator (one set) Linear accelerator (one set) Outpatient Ultrasound, Endoscope,

Lithotriptor, Laser surgery, etc. Ultrasound, Endoscope, Lithotriptor, Laser surgery, etc.

Surgery Nine operating rooms Anesthesia equipment, Operating microscope, X-ray television, Heart-lung machine, Medical laser, etc.

Eleven operating rooms Anesthesia equipment, Operating microscope, X-ray television, Heart-lung machine, etc.

Ward (including intensive care unit, casualty department)

A patient monitor, Respirator, Ultrasound, Body temperature maintenance equipment, etc.

A patient monitor, Respirator, Ultrasound, Delivery stand, Incubator, etc.

Dialysis Dialysis system (for 20 persons) Dialysis system (for 42 persons) Sample inspection Full automatic inspection

equipment (immunity, blood coagulation, biochemistry, and blood gas, etc.) etc.

Full automatic inspection equipment (immunity, blood coagulation, biochemistry, and blood gas, etc.) etc.

Biopsy Ultrasound, Electrocardiograph, Electroencephalograph, etc.

Ultrasound, Pulmonary function test equipment, Electrocardiograph, Electroencephalograph, etc.

Dentistry Dental X-rays etc. Dental X-rays etc. (Notes: Since the project is the move / integrated matter, the part of equipment transferred from old hospital is also included)

6-43

Şevket Yılmaz hospital assumes supplying advanced medical equipments by renovating an area of 900 beds in the existing hospital.

With 4,130 million yen of construction costs, and 4,860 million yen of advanced medical equipment cost, CT x 2, MRI x 2, PET x 1, the linear accelerator x 2, can be introduced satisfactorily, in addition, renewal of equipment, upgrade of operating room, etc. are possible.

About the extension of 150 beds hospital, since it is established newly, about 15 million yen per one bed for the cost of medical equipment of Çekirge hospital can be used.

(7) Other necessary expenses：indirect cost, consumer price variation and VAT

In the same manner as in 6.3.1 Disaster & Emergency Management Center, indirect costs are assumed as 30%, the coefficient of consumer price variation as 14%, and VAT as 18%.

(8) Approximate cost estimate of the Disaster Base Hospital

The approximate cost estimate for the disaster base hospital is calculated below;

140,000 m2 × 118,000 yen/m2 + 10,500 million yen (equipment cost) + 16,751 million yen (expenses) = 43,771 million yen.

According to a local architectural office in Istanbul, the public unit cost is lower than the market cost. According to other local architectural offices in Turkey, the approximate unit cost of a hospital is 1,500 USD/m2 (157,000 yen/m2).

The assumed building unit cost of a disaster base hospital in this report is 191,000 yen/m2 (excluding medical equipment costs). As a comparison, the unit cost provided by a local architectural office was 1,500 USD/m2 (157,000 yen/m2), approximately 34,000 yen/m2 less than our estimate. The difference is considered to be acceptable.

Note: The building unit cost of a disaster medical hospital (excluding medical equipment costs) is calculated below:

140,000m2×118,000 yen/m2 + 10,242,400,000 yen (expenses) = 26,762,400,000 yen ÷140,000m2＝191,000 yen/m2

6.7.3. Approximate cost estimate of other DMC facilities The approximate cost of other DMC facilities was estimated based on the total floor area of a similar facility in Turkey if available. If we could not verify that the Turkish facility had similar components as the proposed facility, costs were estimated based on the costs of a similar facility in Japan.

Building cost per unit area assumes the public building cost per m2 in Turkey as presented in able 6.7.1. Costs for the heliport and/or seismic isolation were added as needed. The equipment cost was assumed from information in Turkey if available, or assumed as 10 to 30% of the construction costs based on the Japanese example.

As mentioned before, we estimated indirect cost as 30%, coefficient of consumer price variation as 14% and VAT as 18% of Construction and Equipment cost.

The cost of IT systems was estimated based on the information received from Japanese companies: the cost of a Satellite Network (VSAT) is 5,000 million yen to 6,500 million yen (see Annex A-5-6), and the cost of an Information Gathering & Dissemination System is 12,000 million yen to 15,000 million yen. Details of both IT systems are described in Chapter 3.

The estimated costs of DMC facilities are shown in the table below.


6-44

Tabl

e 6.

7.11

Es

timat

ed c

osts

of D

MC

faci

litie

s

ACEV

（JY

15,0

00/㎡

）ro

ofto

p JY

100m

il,G

roun

d.JY

20m

il）

(8%

)(6

%)

TL32

0.17

/㎡（

TL)

Dis

aste

r & E

mer

genc

ym

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emen

t Cen

ter

6,00

01,

090.

3087

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65.4

21,

242.

9432

0.17

2,56

1,36

6.06

1,99

0.01

11,9

40,0

42.6

15,

848,

501.

60JY

429m

il×0.

6387

17,7

88,5

44.2

15,

336,

563.

262,

490,

396.

193,

201,

937.

9628

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,441

.62

13.5

Trai

ning

Cen

ter f

or S

earc

h &

Res

cue

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iona

l Lev

el, 8

0 si

ngle

dorm

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se fi

eld,

trai

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65.4

21,

242.

942,

561,

366.

061,

461.

8617

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3,42

0,75

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20%

20,5

24,5

44.9

56,

157,

363.

492,

873,

436.

293,

694,

418.

0933

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15.6

Educ

atio

n C

ente

r for

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aste

rPr

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atio

nal L

evel

12,0

0029

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.00

8,70

0,00

0.00

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0.00

5,22

0,00

0.00

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80,0

00.0

022

.0

Educ

atio

n C

ente

r for

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aste

rPr

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edne

ssR

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nal L

evel

6,00

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0,00

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h &

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men

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1,27

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101.

6076

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1,44

7.80

320.

172,

561,

366.

062,

024.

1120

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.64

6,07

2,32

2.09

30%

26,3

13,3

95.7

37,

894,

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723,

683,

875.

404,

736,

411.

2342

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late

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n et

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87.2

265

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1,24

2.94

1,24

2.94

7,45

7,65

2.00

1,49

1,53

0.40

20%

8,94

9,18

2.40

2,68

4,75

4.72

1,25

2,88

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0,85

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8

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r Bas

e H

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tal

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ds,

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r Fac

ility,

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r14

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912.

2215

2.98

114.

732,

179.

9332

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352,

575,

584.

1522

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173,

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534.

3780

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103,

805,

120.

6293

4,24

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5.59

437.

7

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ical

Inst

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200

beds

, (77

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r Fac

ility,

48.

6fo

r Equ

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912.

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2.98

114.

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179.

9332

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102,

565,

428.

3764

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mil/b

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9.92

49,9

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150

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, (58

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mil/b

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5,59

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6.45

37,6

77,0

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2.86

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ople

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047

1.86

37.7

550

9.61

509.

611,

783,

630.

8017

8,36

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1,96

1,99

3.88

588,

598.

1627

4,67

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353,

158.

903,

178,

430.

091.

5

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rage

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061

5.35

49.2

366

4.58

664.

581,

594,

987.

2015

9,49

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1,75

4,48

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526,

345.

7824

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315,

807.

472,

842,

267.

191.

3

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ts C

ente

r (G

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riage

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8020

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4,30

8.24

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960,

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602,

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4.2. Proposal for Improving Bursa’s Resiliency to Natural Disasters … · Balıkesir, Yalova,...

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