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Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice / August 2000Arrigo, Williams / THE SEARCH FOR EQUALITY

The (Im)Possibility of Democratic Justice

and the Gift of the Majority

On Derrida, Deconstruction, and the

Search for Equality

BRUCE A. ARRIGOCHRISTOPHER R. WILLIAMS

California School of Professional Psychology

This article conceptually explores the problem of democratic justice in the form of legislated

equal rights for minority citizen groups. Following Derridas critique of Western logic and

thought, at issue is the (im)possibility of justice for under- and nonrepresented constituencies.

Derridas socioethical treatment of justice, law, hospitality, and community suggests that the

majority bestows a gift (ostensiblesociopolitical empowerment);however, the ruseof thisgift is

that the giver affirms an economy of narcissism and reifies the hegemony and power of the

majority. This article concludes by speculating on the possibility of justice and equality

informed by an affirmative postmodernframework. A cultural politics of difference, contingent

universalities, undecidability, dialogical pedagogy, border crossings, and constitutive thought

would underscore this transformative and deconstructive agenda.

The impediments to establishing democratic justice in contemporaryAmerican society have caused a national paralysis; one that has reck-lessly spawned an aporetic1 existence for minorities.2 The entrenched ideo-

logical complexities afflicting under- and nonrepresented groups (e.g.,

poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, crime) at the handsof political, legal, cul-

tural, and economic power elites have produced counterfeit, perhaps even

fraudulent, efforts at reform: Discrimination and inequality in opportunity

prevail (e.g., Lynch & Patterson, 1996). The misguided and futile initiatives

of thestate, inpursuit of transcendingthispublicaffairs crisis, havefostereda

reification, that is, a reinforcement of divisiveness. This time, however,

minority groups compete with one another for recognition, affirmation, and

321

Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 16 No. 3, August 2000 321-343

2000 Sage Publications, Inc.


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identity in the national collective psyche (Rosenfeld, 1993). What ensues bywayof stateeffort, though, is a contemporaneoussense of equality foralland

a near imperceptible endorsement of inequality; a silent conviction that the

majority3 still retains power.4

The gift of equality, procured through state legislative enactments as an

emblem of democratic justice, embodies true (legitimated) power that re-

mains nervouslysecure in thehands of the majority.5The ostensible empow-

erment of minority groups is a facade; it is the ruse of the majority gift. What

exists, in fact, is a simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1981, 1983) of equality (and by

extension, democratic justice): a pseudo-sign image (a hypertext or simula-

tion) of real sociopolitical progress.

For the future relationship between equality and the social to more fully

embrace minority sensibilities, calculated legal reform efforts in thename of

equalitymust bedisplacedand theruleandauthority of thestatus quomustbedecentered. Imaginable, calculable equality is self-limiting and self-referential.

Ultimately, it is always (at least) one step removed from true equality and,

therefore, true justice.6The ruse of the majority gift currently operates under

the assumption of a presumed empowerment, which it confers on minority

populations. Yet, the presented power is itself circumscribed by the stifling

horizons of majority rule with their effects. Thus, the gift can only be con-

strued as falsely eudemonic: An avaricious, although insatiable, pursuit of

narcissistic legitimacy supporting majority directives.

The commission (bestowal) of power to minority groups or citizens

through prevailing state reformatory efforts underscores a polemic with

implications for public affairs and civic life. We contend that the avenir (i.e.,

the to come) of equality as an (in)calculable, (un)recognizable destination

in search of democratic justice is needed. However, we argue that this dis-

placement of equality is unattainable if prevailing juridico-ethico-political

conditions (and societal consciousness pertaining to them) remain fixed,

stagnant, and immutable.

In this article, we will demonstrate how thegift of themajority is problem-

atic, producing, as it must, a narcissistic hegemony, that is, a sustained

empowering of the privileged, a constant relegitimation of the powerful.7

Relying on Derridas postmodern critique of Eurocentric logic and thought,

we will show how complicated and fragmented the question of establishing

democratic justice is in Western cultures, especially in American society. We

will argue that what is needed is a relocation of the debate about justice and

difference from the circumscribed boundaries of legal redistributive dis-

course on equality to the more encompassing context of alterity, undecida-bility, cultural plurality, and affirmative postmodern thought.

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322 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice / August 2000


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JUSTICE, LAW, AND THE LOGIC OF THE GIFT

The distinction between justice and law has significant ramifications for

the logic of thegift andthediscourseon equality in Westerncivilization. Jus-

tice, for Derrida, is not law: Laws are not just as laws. One obeys them not

because they are just but because they have authority (Derrida,1992, p. 12);

Justice is what gives us the impulse, the drive, or the movement to improve

the law (Derrida, 1997, p. 16). Justice functions as the catalyst by which

laws are enacted, amended, or abolished. Thus, we may speak of the law as a

thing: The law is a physical, written, definable, and enforceable governing

force that constitutes the judicial system in all its legality, legitimacy, and

authorization (Caputo, 1997, p. 130).

Conversely, justice is not a thing. It is not an existing reality (such as the

law) but rather an absolutely (un)foreseeableprospect (Caputo,1997, p. 132).It is through justice as an (im)possibility that the law canbe criticized, that is,

deconstructed (e.g.,Balkin,1987;Cornell,Rosenfeld,& Carlson, 1992;Lan-

dau, 1992). The sufferance of critical deconstructive analysis is that a provi-

sional, relational complicity between (majoritarian) rules and the (minority)

transgressions therules formally forbid threaten thevery authorityof the law

itself and are discoverable through (un)foreseeable justice (Derrida, 1992,

p. 4).Revealing theslippagesbetween lawand justicebecomes progressively

transparent andrepresentsincentive toseekjusticeabsentthe imposition of

laws (the [im]possible, just law). It is this activity of displacing or dissoci-

atinglaw and, thus,moving toward justice thatmakes convalescence possible

in the sphere of the legal.9

Moreover, it is through this (im)possibility that

democracy strives for justice when deconstructively examining the law.

In this context, a critique of juridical ideology mobilizedby the (im)possi-bilityof justice becomes a tool fora sociopolitical equality, its basisbeing the

desedimentation of the superstructures of law that both hide and reflect the

economic and political interests of the dominant forces of society (Derrida,

1992, p. 13). In other words, the inherent injustice of law as a performative

force becomes the subject of disclosure. Thus, in a sense, deconstruction is

justice. Justice as thepossibility of deconstruction is what makes thespec-

tre of equality (in)calculable, (un)recognizable, and (un)knowable (Derrida,

1992, p. 15).10

Derridas position on the(im)possible, as applied here to justice andequal-

ity, is notso much that it is beyond theexclusionary law-like limitsof thepos-

sible as much as it is within it. The (im)possible both constitutes the out-

side-within of the possible and deconstructively disrupts the seemingly

self-contained but actually haunted or forever aporetic dimension of every-thing that appears as possible. In this way, the (im)possible is never an

Arrigo, Williams / THE SEARCH FOR EQUALITY 323


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end-stateasmuchas itis a forever passingmoment, that is, a materialist tremorand/orpoeticglimpse of an otherwise displacedalterity that itself repetitiously

displaces (but never absolutely replaces) the partial and provisional autho-

rized legalities it opensup.In this sense, there is a spiralingmotiontoDerridas

deconstruction followed by a law-like (although aporetic) reconstruction.

These reconstructions are exemplars of justice and its (im)possibility.

Much of the distinction between law and justice has implications for the

gift (of equality) and the (im)possibility of justice as equality: The gift is

precisely, and this is what it has in common with justice, something which

cannot be reappropriated(Derrida,1997, p. 18).11

Once a gift isgiven, if any

gratitude is extended in return, thegift becomes circumscribed in a moment

of reappropriation (Derrida, 1997, p. 18). Ultimately, as soon as the giver

knows that he or she has given something, the gift is nullified. The giver con-

gratulates him- or herself, and the economy of gratitude, of reappropriation,commences. Once the offering has been acknowledged as a gift by the giver

or receiver it is destroyed. Thus, for a gift to truly be a gift, it must not even

appear as such. Although it is inherently paradoxical, this is the only condi-

tion under which a gift can be given (Derrida, 1991).

This is the relationship between the gift and justice. Justice cannot appear

as such; it cannot be calculated as in the law or other tangible commodities

(Derrida, 1997). Although Derrida acknowledges that we must attempt to

calculate, there is a point beyond which calculation must fail and we must

recognize that no amountof estimation canadequately assignjustice (Derrida,

1997). For equality (like the gift beyond exchange and distribution; Der-

rida, 1992, p. 7) to bepossible,we must go beyond any imaginable, knowable

notion. This iswhythe gift andjusticeareconceptually (im)possible(Desilva

Wijeyeratne, 1998). Theyserve a necessarypurpose in society;however, they

representsomethingto always strivefor, somethingthatmobilizesour desire.

If the impossible was possible, we would stop trying and desire would die.

Justice, and thus democracy, is an appeal for the gift. As Derrida (1992)

notes, this idea of justice seems to be irreducible in its affirmative charac-

ter, in its demand of gift without exchange, without circulation, without rec-

ognition of gratitude, without economic circularity, without calculation and

without rules, without reason and without rationality (p. 25). The gift (of

equality), like justice and democracy, is an aporia, an (im)possibility. Thus,

the use of the gift as a transaction in the name of equality, and equality in the

name of justice and democracy, is truly (un)just, (un)democratic, and

(in)equitable. The gift is a calculated, majoritarian endeavor toward illusive

equality. Equality beyond such a conscious effort (i.e., where the illusion isdisplaced) is open-ended and absent of any obligatory reciprocation. As

Caputo (1997) notes, justice is the welcome given to the other in which I do

not . . . have anything up my sleeve (p. 149).



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With this formula of equality and justice in mind, one may still speculateon the laws relationship to the gift. But again, the law as a commodity, as a

thing to be transacted, eliminates its prospects as something to be given.

The law as law, on the other hand, is no gift, and hence no guarantee of jus-

tice . . . the law is a calculated balance of payments, of crime and punish-

ment, of offense and retribution, a closed circle of paying off and paying

back. When things are merely legal, no more than legal, then they contract

into narrowly contractual relationships with no give, no gifts. (Caputo,

1997, p. 149)

The gift has no idiosyncratic or artful definition that needs to be

addressed. Derridas concept of thegift is simplyas it sounds: Somethingthat

is given to someone by someone else. Gift, however, is a misleading term.Once an award is given to someone, that someone assumes a debt (of grati-

tude or a reciprocation of the gift). The giver of the gift, in return, is con-

sciously andexplicitlypleased with him- or herself for theshow of generos-

ity(Caputo, 1997, p. 141). This narcissistic, self-eudemonical exchange is in

fact in-creased if the receiver is ungrateful or is unable, through theanonym-

ity of the gift, to show gratitude. Thus, the offering that is made without

expectation of explicitgratitudesimply nourishes the narcissism of the giver.

This is theparadoxicaldimension of thegift.Thesender of thegift, instead of

giving, receives; and the receiver of the gift, instead of receiving something,

is in debt (Caputo, 1997).

To avoid mobilizing the circular economy of the gift (the circle of ex-

change, of reciprocation, and of reappropriation), the gift must not appear as

such. Thus, the giver must not be aware that he or she is giving, and thereceiver must not be aware that he or she is receiving. Only under those cir-

cumstances would thegiver notfuel thefireof narcissisticgenerosity, andthe

receiver not assume a debt. As Caputo (1997) notes, the pure gift could take

placeonly if everythinghappened below thelevel of conscious intentionality,

where no one intends to give anything to anyone and no one is intentionally

conscious of receiving anything (p. 147).

Phenomenologists remind us, following Aristotles (1925) notion of act

and intentionality, that the agent always acts for its own good. The agent

always intends to act for its own good; otherwise, it will not act at all

(e.g., Heidegger, 1962; Husserl, 1983). Thus, there are always degrees of

intentionalityexpectation, reciprocation, and reappropriationon the part

of the giver. The giving of the gift serves a purpose. It can be traced to narcis-

sism masked by a facade of generosity, or it can be linked to anticipation of

something that will come back at some point some time in the future

(Derrida, 1997). This is where the notion of economy arises. What fuels the



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economy are entities determined and exchanged, of calculation and bal-anced equations, of equity and sound reason, of laws and regularities

(Caputo, 1997, p. 146). It is the gift that the community has an affinity for in

the name of democratic justice. The justice that the gift does, however,

authenticates the reality of a pseudo-democracy. An imitation (i.e., illusion)

of justice that, as an artifact of simulation, is more real that reality itself; one

that is (im)possiblein thecommunity that werefer toasdemocratic society.12

SOCIETY AND THE

POSSIBILITY OF DEMOCRACY

For Derrida (1989, 1997), democracy is a receptacle for difference. It rep-

resents a nonexclusive heterogeneity under which thewe (majority) is nei-

ther protected from nor disturbed by the other (minority). The presence ofthe other is, thus, eudemonic; the other benefits or improves the social

well-being of everyone. Furthermore, the we must not only harmonize its

existence with the other but also actively (consciously and unconsciously)

prepare for the coming, or the arrival, of the other. A democratic society

would be fully integrated when it encompassed and lived, perhaps insatiably,

off of the heterogeneity that diversity and difference embody.

Democracy, then, as a deconstructive initiative, must strive to embrace the

multiplicityof races,ethnicities, andgenders in short differences that consti-

tutethewholeof a given society. AlthoughWestern culturesacknowledge the

physical presence of these others, such citizen groups are all too often

regarded as superfluous or, worse, as an obstruction to our (read majority)

pursuit of a safe, civil nation. Thus, democratic society must embody diver-

sity en esprit, welcoming the beneficence of alterity. As Derrida (1997)

reminds us, pure unity . . . is a synonym of death (p. 13). In other words,

democracy cannot flourish (mature or evolve) without attending to the com-

ing of difference.

Society andits institutionsareanalogical toDerridas notionof community.

Derrida, however, asserts an aversion to the word community as well as to the

thing itself. His primary concern for the word relates to its connotations of

fusionand identification (Weber,1995). Caputo(1997) elucidates these mean-

ings with reference to Derridas etymological examination of community.

Communiois a word formilitary formationand a kissing cousinof theword

munitions: to have a communio is to be fortified on all sides, to build a

common (com) defense (munis), as when a wall is put up around thecity to keep the stranger or the foreigner out. The self-protective closure of

community, then, would be just about the opposite of . . . preparation for

theincoming of theother, openand porous to theother. . . . A universal



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community excluding no one is a contradiction in terms; communitiesalways have an inside and an outside. (p. 108)

Thus, thewordcommunity hasnegative connotations suggestinginjustice,

inequality, and an us versus them orientation. Community, as a thing,

would constitute a binary opposition with the aforementioned concept of

democratic society. The latter evolves with, not against, the other. Although

the connotations may be latent and unconscious, any reference to a commu-

nity or a derivative thereof connotes the exclusion of some other. A demo-

craticsociety, then, must rejectthe analogical conceptions of communityand

present itself as a receptacle for receiving difference, that is, the demos (the

people) representing a democratic society.

It is not, however, a cursory or laissez-faire reception of the other that

wouldprecede democratic justice. To genuinelyreceive the other, the societyor community, as a receptacle, must be hospitable. Hospitality is what

Derrida (1991,1997) refers to as thewelcoming of theother; it is an invita-

tion to the stranger (Derrida, 1997, p. 110). Although Derridas explications

on hospitality typically concentrate on the individual, the philosophical

notion is equally applicable to a more macro sociopolitical level of con-

sciousness. Hospitality on the level of the state involves, among other things,

the invitingor welcoming of immigrants, foreign languages, minority ethnic

groups, and so forth (Derrida, 1997).

An etymological problem akin to that of the word community is also dis-

cernible with the word hospitality. Caputo (1997) again provides insightful

elucidation on Derrida: The word hospitality derives from theLatin hospes,

which is formedfrom hostis, which originally meant a strangerand came to

take on themeaning of theenemyor hostile stranger(hostilis),+pets(potis,

potes, potentia), to have power (pp. 110-111).

The implications, then, of Derridas deconstructive analysis are profound.

The word hospitality and, thus, the function of hospitality becomes a display

of power by the host (hospes). Being hospitable is an effort to welcome the

other while maintaining or fortifying the mastery the host has over the

domain. Thus, the host is someone who welcomes the other and gives to the

other while always sustaining control.

Thehost isalwayssomeonewhopossesses thepower towelcome someone

or something. Ifonedidnot enjoysome control, some dominanceoverthesitu-

ation, one would not be a host at all: One would be on equal terms with the

other (actually, there would be no other), and neither would constitute the

host or guest. A display of hospitality, then, does not endanger the inherentpower that the host experiences. The power, control, and mastery of the host

andthealterityof thestrangeror other arenot disruptedby thedisplay of hos-

pitality. As Caputo (1997) notes, there is an essential self-limitation built



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right into the idea of hospitality, which preserves the distance between onesown and the stranger (p. 110).

The notion of giving while retaining power is embodied in the concept of

hospitality: A host isonlya host if he owns the place, and only if heholds on

to his ownership; [that is,] if one limits the gift (Caputo, 1997, p. 111). The

welcoming of the other into and onto ones territory or domain does not con-

stitute a submission of preexisting power, control, mastery, or identity. It is

simply, as Derrida (1997) describes, a limited gift.

The hospes, then, is theoneengaged in an aporetic circumstance. Thehost

must appear to be hospitable, genuinelybeneficent, andunboundedby avari-

cious narcissism while contemporaneously defending mastery over the

domain. Thehost must appealto thepleasureof theotherby giving or tempo-

rarilyentrusting (consigning) somethingowned to thecare of theother while

not giving somuch as to relinquish the dominance that he or she harbors. Thehost must feign to benefit the welfare of the other but not jeopardize the wel-

fare of the giver that is so underwritten by the existing circumstances

whether they be democratically and justly legitimated or not.

Thus, hospitality isnever true hospitality, andit isnever a true gift because

it is always limited. Derrida (1997) refers to this predicament as theim-pos-

sibility of hostil-pitality (p. 112, italics added). True hospitality can only be

realizedby challenging thisaporia, ascendingthe paralysis, andexperiencing

the (im)possible. The inherent self-limitation of hospitality must be van-

quished.Hospitalitymustbecome a giftbeyondhospitality (Caputo,1997).

Hospitality is. . . thatto which I havenevermeasured up. I amalways . . . too

unwelcoming, too calculating in all my invitations, which are disturbed

fromwithinby all sorts of subterranean motivationsfromwanting to show

off what I own to looking for a return invitation. (Caputo, 1997, p. 112)

Thus, hospitality, like the gift (the gift of hospitality), is always limited by

narcissistic, hedonistic cathexes. Avaricity governs the Western capitalistic

psyche and soma. As the (im)possibility of hospitality and the gift denote,

one will never fully compromise that which belongs to the self.

The conceptualunderpinnings of hospitality and communityweredeliber-

ately juxtaposed. If the notion of community is constructed around a com-

mon defense that we (the majority) fashion against them (the minority), then

it isdesignedaroundthenotion of inhospitality or hostil-pitality. Community

and hospitality are similarly and equally subject to self-limitations. These

intrinsic liabilities are largely unconscious. Notwithstanding the mythical,

spectral foundations (Derrida, 1994) on which American societys thoughts

and actions are grounded, the detrimental consequence of our economy of

narcissism is revealed. In offering hospitality to the other, the community



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must welcome and make the other feel at home (as if the home belongsequally to all) while retaining its identity (that of power, control, and mas-

tery). As Caputo (1997) notes, If a community is too unwelcoming, it loses

its identity; if it keeps its identity, it becomes unwelcoming (p. 113). Thus,

theaporia, theparalysis, the impossibility of democratic justice through hos-

pitality and the gift is our community.

THE RUSE OF THE MAJORITY GIFT

Derridas explication of the gift provides an insightful metaphor with

whichto analyze thecurrent state of sociopolitical affairsregarding tradition-

ally subjugated populations. The advances made by the state regarding

minority citizen groups, particularlywithin the context of employment (eco-

nomic)andeducation (social),aregifts.13 Legislative enactments designed tofosterthe growthofequalityandtherebydemocratic justice (i.e., standardsof

what is right and fair) produce hegemonic effects constitutive only of nar-

cissistic power.14

These effects areeclipsed by counterfeit, although impactful,

offerings.

The omnipotence of majority sensibilities in Western cultures,particularly

in the United States, has produced an exploitative and nongiving existence

for under- andnonrepresented citizen groups. Despite themany rights-based

movements during the past several decades that have ostensibly conferred to

minorities such abstract gifts as liberty, equality, and freedom, there remains

an enduring wall dividing the masses from those on whom such awards are

bestowed.This fortified separation is mostprominent in the (silent) reverber-

ations of state and federal legislative reforms.15

Relying on Derridas (1991, 1992, 1997) critique, we can regard such stat-

utory reform initiatives as gifts; that is, they are something given to non-

majority citizens by those in power; they are tokensandemblems of empow-

erment in the process of equality and in the name of democratic justice. The

majority is presenting something to marginalized groups, something that the

giver holds in its entirety: power.16

The giver or presenter of such power will

never, out of capitalistic conceit and greed, completely surrender that which

it owns. It is preposterous to believe that the narcissisticmajority would give

up so much as to threaten what they own; that is, to surrender their hospice

and community while authentically welcoming in the other as stranger. This

form ofopen-ended generosity hasyet tooccur inWesterndemocraticsociet-

ies and, perhaps, it never will.

Thus, it is logical to assume that, although unconscious in some respects,the efforts of the majority are parsimonious and intended to secure (or

accessorize) their own power.17

The following two means by which a gift

enables self-empowerment were already alluded toby Derrida (1997): (a)the



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giver (i.e., thesenderor majority)either bestows to show offhisor herpoweror (b)gives tomobilize a cycleof reciprocation inwhich thereceiver(i.e.,the

minority)will be indebted. It is for these reasons that themajority gives.This

explanation is not the same as authentically supporting the cause of equality

in furtherance of a cultural politics of difference and recognition.

To ground these observations about gift sending and receiving, the analo-

gous example of a loan may be helpful. Let us suppose that we have$100.00

and that you have$1.00. If we were togiveyou some of our money (less than

$49 so as not to produce pecuniary equality), we would be subtlely engaged

in a number of things. First, following Derrida (1997), we would be showing

off our power (money) by exploiting the fact that we have so much more

money than you do that we can give some away and remain in good fiscal

standing. Second, we would be expecting something in returnmaybe not

immediately, but eventually. This return could take several forms. Althoughwe may not expect financial reciprocation, it would be enough knowing that

you knowthat we have given currency to you. Thus, you are now indebted to

us and forever grateful, realizing our good deed: our gift.

Reciprocation on your part is impossible. Even if one day you are able to

return our monetary favor twofold, we will always know that it was us who

first hosted you; extended to and entrusted in you an opportunity given your

timeof need. As the initiatorsof sucha charity, we are always in a position of

power, and you are always indebted to us. This is where the notion of egoism

or conceit assumes a hegemonic role. Bygiving toyou, a supposedactof gen-

erosity in the name of furthering your cause, we have not empowered you.

Rather, we have empowered ourselves. We have less than subtlely let you

knowthat wehavemore thanyou.Wehave somuchmore, infact, that wecan

afford togiveyou some. Our giving becomes, not an act of beneficence, but a

show of power, that is, narcissistic hegemony!

Thus, we see that the majority gift is a ruse: a simulacrum of movement

toward aporetic equality and a simulation of democratic justice. By relying

on the legislature (representing the majority) when economic and social

opportunities are availed to minority or underrepresented collectives, the

process takes on exactly the form of Derridas gift. The majority controls the

political, economic, legal, and social arenas; that is, it is (and always has

been) in control of such communities as the employment sector and the edu-

cational system. The mandated opportunities that under- or nonrepresented

citizens receive as a result of this falsely eudemonic endeavor are gifts and,

thus, ultimately constitute an effort to make minoritypopulations feel better.

There is a sense of movement toward equality in the name of democratic jus-tice,albeit falselymanufactured.

18In returnforthis effort, themajorityshows

off its long-standing authority (this provides a stark realization to minority



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groups that power elites are the forces that critically form society as a com-munity), forever indebts under- andnonrepresented classes to thegenerosity

of the majority (after all, minorities groups now have, presumably, a real

chance to attainhappiness), and, in a more general sense, furthers thenarcis-

sism of themajority (its representativeshave displayedpower andhave been

generous). Thus, the ruse of the majority gift assumes the form and has the

hegemonical effect of empowering theempowered, relegitimating the privi-

leged, and fueling the voracious conceit of the advantaged.

TOWARD AN AFFIRMATIVE RE-PRESENTATION

OF JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

With regard to the(im)possibility of a legally imposed equality in searchof

a transformative justice, we (as social and political beings) must go beyondwhat is consciously imaginable, calculable, and knowable. We must go

beyond the realm of recognized possibility. This article does not assume the

position, as some critics of Derrida may suggest, that, given the ruse of the

gift, affording minority populations opportunity to attain equality should

therefore be discarded entirely (see Rosenfeld, 1993, on the dilemmas of a

Derridean and deconstructive framework for affirmative action). This article

is far from a right-wing cry for cessation of those undertakings that would

further the cause of equality in American society. This article is also not a

statement of despair, a skeptical and nihilistic pronouncement on the

(im)possibilityof justice (Fish, 1982) in which we areall rendered incapable

of establishing a provisional, deconstructive political agenda for meaningful

social change and action.

What we do suggest, however, is simply the following: That political

and/or legislative attempts at empowerment (as they currently stand) are

insufficient to attain the deconstructive and discursive condition of equality

for minority citizen groups (Collins, 1993). More significant, we contend

that constructionof these initiatives as Derrideangifts advance, at best, fleet-

ing vertiginous moments of inequality and injustice. Still further, we recom-

mend the(im)possible; that which,at firstblush, admittedly deliversno prag-

matic value for social analysts. Our invitation is for a fuller, more complete

displacement of equality and initiatives pertaining to it such that there would

be no giving for its own sake; that giving would not be construed as giving,

but as thewayof democratic justice (i.e., its foreseeability would be [un]con-

scious, its recognizability would be with[out] calculation). If we are able to

give without realizing that we have done so, the possibility of reciprocation,reappropriation, and the economy of narcissism and representation are

abruptly interrupted and perhaps indefinitely stalled. This form of giving



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more closely embodies the truth of human existence; that which betters lifefor all without regard for differential treatment, neither promoting nor limit-

ing those who are other in some respect or fashion.

This re-presentation of equality, this justicebothof andbeyond thecalcula-

ble economy of the law (Derrida, 1997), requires a different set of principles

by which equality is conceived and justice is rendered. What would this dif-

ference entail? Howwouldit be embodied incivic life? In theparagraphs that

remain, our intent is to suggest some protean guidelines as ways of identify-

ingthe work that lies ahead forthe (im)possibilityof justice andthe searchfor

aporetic equality.

A cultural politics of difference grounded in an affirmative postmodern

framework wouldnecessarily prevail (Arrigo, 1998a; Henry& Milovanovic,

1996). In this more emancipatory, more liberatory vision, justice would be

rooted in contingent universalities (Butler, 1992; McLaren, 1994). Provi-sional truths, positional knowledge, and relational meanings would abound

(Arrigo, 1995). New egalitarian social relations, practices, and institutions

would materialize, producing a different, more inclusive context within

which majority and minority sensibilities would interact (Mouffe, 1992). In

other words, themultiplicityof economic,cultural, racial, gender, andsexual

identities that constitute our collective society wouldinteractivelyand mutu-

ally contribute to discourse on equality and our understanding of justice.

Thesepolyvalent contributionswouldsignify a cutin thefabricof justice, a

text that pretends to be a whole (i.e., the whole of democratic justice)

(Derrida, 1997, p. 194). Equality on these terms would become an ethical,

fluid narrative: an anxiety-ridden moment of suspense (Derrida, 1997,

pp. 137-138) cycling toward the possibility of justice. For Derrida (1997),

this is the moment of undecidability. The cacophony of voices on which this

aporetic equality would be based would displace any fixed (majoritarian)

norms that would otherwise ensure an anterior, fortified, anchored justice.

Instead, the undecidable, as an essential ghost (Derrida, 1994), would be

lodged in every decision about justice and equality (Desilva Wijeyeratne,

1998).For Derrida (1997), this spectral haunting is the trace, thedifferance.19

It is the aveniror that which is to come. The aveniris the event that exceeds

calculation, rules, and programs: It is the justice of an infinite giving

(Desilva Wijeyeratne, 1998, p. 109). It is the gift of absolute dissymetry

beyond an economy of calculation (Derrida, 1997). This is what makes jus-

tice, andthesearchforequality, an aporia: It is possible only as an experience

of the impossible. However, it is the very (im)possibility of justice itself that

renders theexperience, andthe quest forequality, a movement toward a desti-nation that is forever deferred, displaced, fractured, and always to come

(Derrida, 1997).



13/23

This justice that is to come, this equality as an aporetic destination, residesin discourse. The production of provisional truths and knowledge requires

that the voice(s) of alterity emerge to construct new visions of relational and

positional equality and justice. Thus, the undecidability of interactionthe

inclusion of minority discourse with majoritarian discourse as differance

represents a radically democratic in-road producing multilingual, multicul-

tural,and multiracial effects forequality. This iswhat Caputo(1997) refersto

as a highly miscegenated polymorphism (p. 107). For Derrida (1991,

1997), a radical democracy is constituted by preparedness for the incoming

of the other. Derrida (1997) advocates highly heterogenous, porous, self-

differentiating quasi-identities, [and] unstable identities . . . that . . . do not

close over and form a seamless web of the selfsame (p. 107). In short, a

receptacle for difference that receives the provisional truths, positional

knowledge, and supplemental processes of meaning making is necessary inthe struggle for (im)possible equality.

This interaction would reflect a differentcontext forpolicy formation, pro-

gram evaluation, and practical decision making. A hermeneutical appeal to

dialogical pedagogy (Freire, 1972; Laclau, 1991) would be essential. In this

framework, speaking true words20

(dialogical encounters) (Freire, 1972,

pp. 57-67) would matter: Giver and receiver of the gift would actively and

reflectively speak alternatively from within each others subject position

thereby promoting a revolutionary, more participatory cultural ethos.21

Linking both action and reflection, gift givers and receivers would repre-

sent active agents in the process of becoming equitable citizens (Freire,

1972).22

For minority groups, the goal would be conscientization, that is,

exercising theirright to participate consciously in the socio-historical trans-

formationof their society (Freire, 1972, p. 50). This right is rootedin concrete

historical struggles of injustice wherein the multiple, contradictory, and

complex subject-positions people occupy within different social, cultural,

andeconomic relations arespoken (Giroux, 1992, p. 21). This ismeant tobe

both a politics and a pedagogy for change. It is in this context that the gift, as

anemblemof eudemonicjusticeandaporeticequality, isdecoded asa ruse.

Consistent with this radical pedagogical practice, citizen activism would

require bordercrossings(Giroux, 1992; seealso JanMohamed, 1994; Lippens,

1997). Border crossings are a deliberate attempt to displace established

parameters of meaning, forms of consciousness, sites of knowledge, and loci

of truth. Conventional boundaries are transgressed, resisted, debunked, and

decentered. Border crossingswould require that oneembrace theconfluence

of multiple languages, experiences, and desires as folded into the polyvocal,multilayered, and transhistorical narratives that are reflective of a society of

difference (Giroux, 1992; Irigaray, 1993).23

Thus, the gift of equality would



14/23

be imbued with pluri-significant, contradictory, incomplete, effusive, frag-mented, and multiaccentuated expressions of giving and receiving. These

borderlands, as languages of possibility rather than as technologies of disci-

pline (Henry & Milovanovic, 1996), would be seen as sites for both critical

analysis and . . . a[s] potential source[s] of experimentation [and] creativity

(Giroux, 1992, p. 34).

The (im)possibility of democratic justice would acknowledge that minor-

ity citizens themselves (and others supportive of meaningful social change),

are constituted by difference, struggle, and discontinuities. Furthermore,

such collectives would be understood to exhibit an inexorable connection to

thevery systems (e.g., legal, political, andeconomic spheres of influence) of

which such citizens area part (Henry& Milovanovic, 1996). In this constitu-

tivearrangement,both agencyand structurewouldbe regardedas fused.As a

result, a coproduction of meaning, truth, knowledge, power, desire, identity,and so forth would unfold, giving rise to only circumscribed expressions of

justice.

To emancipate both agency and structure, an affirmative postmodern per-

spective would require that subjects themselves be deconstructed and recon-

structed, that is, function as subjects-in-process or as emergent subjects

(JanMohamed, 1994; Kristeva, 1986). Under- and nonrepresented groups

would actively engage in the task of uncovering, recovering, and recoding

their identities (e.g.,Collins, 1990; hooks,1989) in ways that are less encum-

bered by prevailing (majority) sensibilities regarding their given constitu-

tions. The economy of narcissism would, more likely, be suspended, and the

culture of difference would, more likely, be positionally and provisionally

realized.

CONCLUSION

This article was less a condemnation of existing legislative reform than it

wasa critique of Westernculture in general andAmerican society in particu-

lar. We contend that revisions in the name of equality, and equality in the

name of justice, aspresentlyconstructedarenot only inadequate butalsodet-

rimental to and countertransformative for those very (minority) groups who

are purportedly benefiting from such initiatives. Derridas socioethical

exploration was instructive, directing us to the limitations of the gift of the

majority in relation to law, hospitality, community, and the (im)possibility of

justice. The work that remains is to displace the aporia located in Derridas

critiquewithsupplemental processesof understandingandsensemaking.Anaffirmative postmodern framework, as we have loosely sketched, identifies

some protean areas of potential exploration and worth. We submit that it is



15/23

time to move to a new plateau in understanding alterity; one that more com-pletely embraces racial, cultural, sexual, gender, and class differences. We

contend that it is time to transformwhat is andmore fullyembodywhat could

be. The search for equality realized through a radical and ongoing

deconstructive/reconstructive democracy demands it. We also contend that

by examiningseveral supplemental notions foundin affirmative postmodern

thought, important in-roads for the aporia of justice and the destination of

equality are within (in)calculable, (un)recognizable reach.

NOTES

1. The term aporia, as employed hereafter, is suggestive of an impossibility or

an experience of a nonroad; that is, something that does not allow [direct] passage

(Derrida, 1992,p. 16;1987,p. 27).It isthe not knowingwhere togo thatis the experi-ence of minority citizen groups (Derrida, 1993). In short, it is the perplexity that

results from a necessarypassage,yet onethatis notfullyrealizablefor thepasser.(See

Cornell, 1991, for a feminist deconstructive analysis of this point.) Accordingly, any

seemingly fully meaningful statement about justice and equality contains in it an

unacknowledged aporetic moment as a condition of its possibility. Derrida himself

uses the term aporia in a variety of contexts throughout his works (see, e.g., Derrida,

1982) and generally (Derrida, 1993) for a discussion of his various uses of aporia.

When used in this article, however, we are referring to his more traditional, logico-

philosophical treatment.

2. Forthe purposesof this article, minority or minoritypopulations refer to those

citizen groups traditionally designatedas discriminated constituenciesor regarded as

objects of marginalization (Young, 1990). Thus, gender, ethnic, racial, and sexual

minoritiesas wellas thosepopulationsencompassing thediseased,mentallydisabled,

homeless, women, and so on are the subjects of inquiry here. Our analysis, therefore,assumes somethingof a monolithic dimension. Theprimary reasonfor theadmittedly

unjustaggregationof under-andnonrepresented collectivesis that each uniquepopu-

lation endeavors to achieve a similar goal: improved social standing in the political

economy. We contend that a monolithic analysis of minority populations does not

jeopardize the substance of our argument.

3. In this article, the term majority refers to two separate but interwoven mean-

ings. First, it includes all the baggage implied in and endorsed through the capitalist

politicaleconomy(Currie, MacLean, & Milovanovic,1992). Second, it denotes a cer-

tain logic contained in Western philosophical and theoretical discourses that denies

and represses difference (i.e., minority sensibilities). Several commentators have

varyingly described this phenomenon. See Adorno (1973) on the logic of identity,

Derrida (1976, 1978, 1981) on the metaphysics of presence, and Irigaray (1985) on

the phallic economy of sameness. For a justice-based application of these concepts,

see Arrigo (1992).4. In this article, we do not comment on the sociological problems or solutions

identified by social movement critics where justice and equality are denied minority



16/23

groups because of intra- and intergroup power blocks (e.g., Jessop, 1990; Schehr,1997). Instead, we draw attention to language, deconstruction, and discourse analysis.

We argue that the binary tensions embedded in such constructs as law, community,

hospitality, and the like inform the meaning of justice as a possibility for under-

represented constituencies, displacing, in their discursive wake, the socioethical

legitimacy of the gift-giving process (i.e., legislated equal rights).

5. Following Derrida (1993), majoritarian power is not completely secure;

rather, the powerful arehaunted to the extent of paranoia by thejustice they deny oth-

ers. Indeed, there is an active, material force of supplemental hauntings or ghostly

spectres that operate within the deconstruction of power (Derrida, 1992). Thus, the

majoritarianbestowal of thegift, and thedemocratic systemon which it is based,rep-

resent an uneasy, excitable, and tense-filled process.

6. We are preliminarily delineating the limits of prevailing thought regarding

equality and justice. In subsequent sections, we intend to outline an affirmative,

deconstructive agenda that more completely and authentically embodies the fullmeaning of these terms with implications for minority groups.

7. The (in)calculable deconstructive displacement or moment of impossibility

through which minority interests are ostensibly realized may be necessary in the

struggle for justice. Indeed, Derridasadvocacy of deconstruction as an ethico-political

method acknowledges that reconstructive replacements (i.e., the prevailing gifts of

themajority) arethe subject of futuredisplacements insearchof justice asan(im)pos-

sibility. Narcissistic hegemony, then, is itself an aporetic dimension of justice.

8. Affirmative postmoderndiscourseis reconstructive, prospective,andemanci-

patory. It includes a constitutive methodology that fosters liberatory and productive

outcomes (see, e.g., Borgman, 1992; Giddens, 1984). Forapplications to justice stud-

ies highlighting these themes, see, for example, Milovanovic and Henry (1991),

Henry and Milovanovic (1991), and Arrigo (1995). For a gendered discussion con-

cerning the integration of a social politics of redistribution and a cultural politics of

difference with relevant applications, see Fraser (1997).9. Indeed, following deconstructive legal criticism, the question becomes what

modes of (law-based) restrictive gift exchange are best allied with the deconstructive

demands for ongoing, periodic alterity? This matter is provisionally explored in the

last section of this article.

10. The spectre assumes a significant role for Derrida and deconstructive analy-

sis. It is that which is deniedor repressed(i.e., equality in this context) that will return

to dislodge or create tension in the existing system of legalistic self-enclosure. The

ghostly spectre haunts the system and, thus, creates a nervous system. Given the

presence of the spectre of equality and the role of deconstruction in revealing this

inequality that is based on mythical foundations (Derrida, 1992), we can perceive

deconstruction as a spectre that haunts the prevailing system of domination: It forces

injustice to the fore and, thus, presents a threat to the established order of inequality

(see, e.g., Derrida, 1994).

11. The theme of the gift and itslogic have an extensive history in Western litera-ture and philosophy. For example, Emersons (1844/1983) short essay titled, The

Gift, alludes to theproblem of thegift,notingthat it represents a threatto onesinde-



17/23

pendence, the contraction of a debt, and engenders feelings of inferiority in thereceiver and dependence on the giver. The gift is also a dominant theme in Nietzsche

(1995) and, elsewhere, appears in the context of gratitude and revenge (Nietzsche,

1996, p. 46). Perhaps the most celebrated and influential of discussions concerning

the gift is Mauss (1990). Mauss establishes a sociohistorical link between giving and

the obligation to reciprocate, which is governed by rules and contracts. In short, the

history of givingand receivingpracticesreveals thepresenceof a systemof exchange

(see also, Simmel, 1950). Morerecent, Bataille (1988) hasaddressed thegift withina

general economy of representation and what amounts, throughits calculated interest,

to a restrictive economy. Although Derridas notion of the gift follows the traces of

these andother similar works,we will not discuss thehistorical literature. Instead, we

concentrate specifically on Derridas (1991,1997) explications. For a historical over-

view of the gift, including Derridas treatment of it, see Schrift (1997).

12. This is a reference to Baudrillards (1981, 1983) critique of image andreality,

form and substance, and the counterfeit and the authentic. For applications to justicestudies, see Arrigo (1996a).

13. A representativeexample of legislated employmentand educational opportu-

nity is affirmative action. Although affirmative action is currently under siege (e.g.,

Miller, Reyes,& Shaffer, 1997), itspresencestillhauntsthe economic andsocial sec-

tors today. The abolitionof affirmative action programs, as witnessed,for example, in

the state of California following Proposition 209, was a response to perceived prac-

tices of reverse discrimination and a contradiction of the value of meritocracy (Cose,

1995). What is not fully articulated and what remains unexamined in affirmative

action literature are the implications of such programs for purposes of gift giving.

Although the current debate principallyaddresses the unfair legislative reforms of the

majority (e.g., hiring and/or promotion of unqualified and underqualified minorities,

educational quotas, set asides), questions remain about the unfair or unjust treatment

of minority constituencies themselves for the reasons described in this article. And,

although such programs liein a state of limbo,they nonetheless (fornow)collectivelyremain a significant force in American society.

14. For the remainder of this section, the phrase democratic justice will not be

used in referenceto theDerridean notionof justice as the(im)possible. Instead, it will

be used in theconventional sociolegal context of what is right andfair. We realize that

the terms justice and democracy retain certain porous meanings within a Derridean

framework. In this section of thearticle, we do notintend to conflate thetwo butrather

to employ the phrase democratic justice in reference to the social (i.e., democratic)

ideal of justice as represented by equality.

15. Consider,for example,the dominanceof self-interested (i.e., narcissistic)giv-

ing practices that currently (and historically) govern political discourse. Examples

include foreign-aid decisions that are made in light of national interests, the percep-

tion of welfare as a gift that must be replaced by a more contractual agreement where

repayment is assured, and, perhaps more indicative of prevailing societal conscious-

ness in general, the notion of charitable donations. Donations are intended to assistthose populations that are less fortunate. However, the primary motivation for donat-

ing oneself or ones material assets is often narcissistic. Charity becomes merely a



18/23

strategy to avoid taxes, and taxes are often perceived as unjust extortion rather thangenerosity in the name of humanity (Schrift, 1997). Schrift (1997) aptly summarizes

the economy of narcissism and the gift through the following illustration:

One must wonder what sorts of assumptions regarding gift giving and

generosity are operating in a society that views public assistance to its

least advantaged members as an illegitimate gift that results in an unjus-

tifiable social burden that can no longer be tolerated while at the same

timeviewingcorporatebailoutsand taxbreaks for itswealthiestcitizens

as legitimate investments in a nations future. (p. 19)

16. Following Derrida (1993, 1994), we note that the giver who hosts power also

relationally depends on that which parasites or guests on it. In this instance, then, the

extent to whichminoritycollectives feedoff of the self-interestsof majoritarian direc-

tives is the extent to which majoritartian power, justice, and equality are sustained.

17. Instrumental Marxists have made similar claims about majoritarian decisionmaking and manipulation (see, e.g., Miliband, 1969). What we draw attention to,

however, is the sociopsychological and ethical roots of the problem. We contend that

Derridas deconstructive linguistic analysis, applied to the overall process of gift giv-

ing and receiving (i.e., legislated rights for minority constituencies), considerably

advances our understanding of justice, law, equality, and their intersections.

18. The false or counterfeit sense of movement is akin to Marxs (1967) own cri-

tique of capital logic. Unlike Marx, who offers much more of a grounded argument

within the political economy of state-regulated capitalist societies, we are examining

the socioethical dimensions by which this false consciousness is conceived, articu-

lated, reproduced, and relegitimated (Rossi-Landi, 1977, 1983).

19. According toDerrida (1992), thenotion ofdifferance impliesa binary opposi-

tionregardinghierarchies, formsof logic, and metaphysical underpinnings of various

texts: Each of the terms in the hierarchy lies in opposition where differences give

them their respective coherence (Henry & Milovanovic, 1996, p. 83). Some values,forms of consciousness, belief systems, and so forth are privileged over others (e.g.,

majority/minority, man/woman, White/Black, objective/subjective). The termsdiffer

from one another considerably. However, the second term in each binary opposition,

thetermthat isdevalued, remains concealed andmust wait foror defer to thepresence

of the other privileged term. In addition, though, each term, whether in the privileged

or deprivileged position,retains thetraceof theother; that is,each leaves themark of

the other (Henry & Milovanovic, 1996, p. 83). This is what Derrida (1976, 1981)

terms the metaphysics of presence.

20. Speaking true words is not synonymous with speaking the truth or the just.

Consistent with Derrida, the deconstruction we have in mind, as an ethico-political

method, entails ongoing self-critique in what we say or do. All forms of ordering,

includingdialogical pedagogy, retain somematerialandsymbolic aspects of violence

that must be decentered.

21. This is a reference to Lacans (1991) emphasis on the four discourses and thecontext in which the discourse of the analyst along with the discourse of the hysteric,



19/23

when combined, provide the psychic wherewithal to transform reality and conceiveof alternative forms of knowledge. Forapplications to gender, race, andclassdynam-

ics, see Arrigo (1996b), Arrigo and Young (1998), and Cornell (1993). For various

other applications to law and justice, see Milovanovic (1992, 1997), Arrigo (1996c,

1998b), and Arrigo and Schehr (1998).

22. For a feminist analysis of dialogical pedagogy, education, and the politics of

representation and difference, see Weiler (1994) and Brady (1994).

23. A recentAustralian case demonstrateshow difference andthe absence of bor-

der crossings produced inequality and injustice. The incident is known as the Hind-

marsh Islandaffair. At issue wasthe constructionof a bridgeand marinain south Aus-

tralia and the implications these initiatives would hold for the aboriginal women of

Hindmarsh Island. The indigenous women(the Ngarrindjeri) argued that the territory

was the site of secret womens business and that the sacredness of this island could

not be communicated tomen.Furthermore, theNgarrindjeri claimedthatany sitecon-

struction would destroy the fertility of the aboriginal women residing there. Whitemale lawyers mandated that the aboriginal spiritual beliefs be formally proved

through legal evidentiary procedures (Stacy, 1996, p. 284). This example demon-

strates how the gender (and race) differences of the Ngarrindjeri, as potential border

crossings for newknowledge,werenot folded into the Australiantribunals discourse

on law, justice, and equality.

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BruceA. Arrigo, Ph.D., is a professor of criminology andforensicpsychology andthe directorof

theInstituteof Psychology,Law, andPublic Policy at theCalifornia Schoolof ProfessionalPsy-

chology in Fresno. Prior to his career in academe, he was a community organizer and social

activist for the homeless, mentally ill , working poor, frail elderly, decarcerated, and the chemi-

cally addicted. Dr. Arrigo received his doctorate from Pennsylvania State University, and he

holds masters degrees in psychology andin sociology. He is theauthor of more than 70 journal

articles, academic bookchapters,and scholarlyessaysexploringtheoretical andapplied topics

in criminology, criminal justice and mental health, and the sociology of law. His recent articles

haveappeared in Criminal Justiceand Behavior; Crime,Law, andSocial Change; JusticeQuar-

terly; International Journal of Law and Psychiatry;Critical Criminology; Theoretical Criminol-

ogy; Journal of Offender Rehabilitation; Social Justice; Law and Psychology Review; Deviant

Behavior; Theory and Psychology, and the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law. Dr.Arrigo is theauthor, coauthor, or editorof fivebooks,whichincludeMadness,Language,and the

Law (1993), The Contours of Psychiatric Justice (1996), Social Justice/Criminal Justice: The

Maturation of Critical Theory in Law, Crime, and Deviance (1998), The Dictionary of Critical

Social Sciences (with T. R. Young, 1999), andIntroduction to Forensic Psychology (2000). Dr.

Arrigo is also theeditor ofHumanity & Society andthefoundingandacting editorof theJournal

of Forensic Psychology Practice. He is currently completing a book on social justice, critical

criminology, and existentialism.

Christopher R. Williamsreceivedhis doctoraldegree from the CaliforniaSchool of Professional

Psychology in Fresno where he specialized in law and policy. His articles have appeared in

Social Justice, Theoretical Criminology, American Journal of Criminal Justice, New England

Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement, andHumanity & Society. He is the coauthor (with

B.A. Arrigo) ofLaw, Psychologyand Justice: ChaosTheoryand theNew(Dis)Order (inpress).


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