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ReassessingInternationalAgriculturalResearch

forFoodandAgriculture

PhilipG.Pardey

PrabhuL.Pingali

March2010

ReportpreparedfortheGlobalConferenceonAgriculturalResearchforDevelopment(GCARD),

Montpellier,France,2831March2010. PhilipPardeyisaprofessorintheDepartmentofApplied

EconomicsattheUniversityofMinnesota,andDirectoroftheUniversitysInternationalScienceand

TechnologyPracticeandPolicy(InSTePP)Center. PrabhuPingaliisaDeputyDirectoroftheGlobal

DevelopmentProgramoftheBillandMelindaGatesFoundation. PartsofthispaperdrawfromPardey

andAlston(2010),althoughthatpaperhasanexplicitU.S.focuswhereasthepresentpaperisoriented

tointernationalresearch. TheauthorsthankConnieChanKang,JasonBeddow,JenniJames,andStan

Woodforespeciallyvaluableinputintothepreparationofthispaper. Fundingtosupportthe

preparationofthispaperwasprovidedbytheGlobalForumonAgriculturalResearch,drawingon

researchfundedbytheBillandMelindaGatesFoundationbywayoftheHarvestChoiceproject(see

www.HarvestChoice.org),andtheUniversityofMinnesota.

Copyright(c)(2010)byPhilipG.PardeyandPrabhuPingali


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ABSTRACT

The20thCenturybeganwitharapidrampingupofnationalinvestmentsinandinstitutions

engagedwithresearchforfoodandagriculture. Privatephilanthropicorganizationslaunched

agriculturalR&Dinitiativesaroundthemiddleofthecenturytospurtechnicalchangeinpoor

countryagriculture. Thisbroadenedtoincludejointlyconceivedpublicandprivateeffortstofund

internationalagriculturalR&Dinthe1970s. Asthe21stcenturyunfolds,theglobalscienceand

agriculturaldevelopmentlandscapesarechanginginsubstantiveways,withimportant

implicationsforthefunding,conductandinstitutionalarrangementsaffectinginternationally

conceivedandconductedresearchforfoodandagriculture. Whilethereisageneralconsensus

thatthepresentandprospectivefutureoftheagriculturalsciencelandscapebearslittle

resemblancetothesituationsthatprevailedintheformativeyearsoftodaysfoodand

agriculturalresearchpoliciesandinstitutions,manyofthesechangesarepoorlyunderstoodor

onlybeginningtoplayout. Inthispaperwereportonnewandemergingempiricalevidenceto

calibratetheprivateandpublicchoicesbeingmadethataffectfoodandagriculturalR&D

worldwide. Weinvestigatetheresearchlag,benefitappropriability,andR&Dspilloverrealities

facinginnovativeeffortintheseareas. WealsodiscusstheeconomiesofsizeandscopeofR&D,

andbroadentheresearchperspectivebeyondinnovationtoencompasstechnology

development,uptakeandregulation. Seeminglyseismicshiftsintheglobalagricultural

productivitylandscapesarealsoquantitativelyexamined,alongwithnewinformationonthe

trendsininvestmentinR&Dthathaveconsequencesforfoodandagriculture.

Keywords:spillovers,public,private,lags,technologyregulation,productivity,spatial


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CONTENTS

1. Introduction

2.

Policy

and

Practical

Realities

of

Food

and

Agriculture

R&D

2.1 ResearchLagLengths

2.2 TheShiftingLocationofAgriculturalProduction

2.3 Appropriability

2.4 R&DSpillovers

Spatial

Disciplinary

2.5

Economiesof

Size,

Scale

and

Scope

2.6 ResearchTechnologyRegulation3.R&DandProductivity

3.1 GlobalProductivityPatterns

3.2 R&DPatterns

4. TheWayForwardLinkingGlobalR&DtoNaonalNeeds


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ReassessingInternationalAgriculturalResearch

forFoodandAgriculture

1. IntroductionInthepasthalfcentury,agriculturalscienceachievedagreatdeal. Since1960,theworldspopulation

hasmorethandoubled,from3.1billionto6.7billion,andrealpercapitaincomehasnearlytripled.

Overthesameperiod,totalproductionofcerealsgrewfasterthanpopulation,from877millionmetric

tonsin1961toover2,351millionmetrictonsin2007,andthisincreasewaslargelyowingto

unprecedentedincreasesincropyields.1 ThefactthattheMalthusiannightmarehasnotbeenrealized

overthepast50yearsisattributableinlargeparttoimprovementsinagriculturalproductivityachieved

throughtechnologicalchangeenabledbyinvestmentsinagriculturalR&D.

Butthereismuchlefttodo. Recentandsubstantialrunupsinglobalcommoditypriceshad

directanddetrimentalimpactsonthenumberofhungrypeopleworldwide,andraisedoldconcerns

abouttheabilityofsustainingincreasesinagriculturalsupplytomeetthefuturefood,feed,fiber,and

fueldemandsplacedonagriculture.2 ThisinturnraisestensionsandpossibletradeoffsintargetingR&D

investmentstoaddressglobalfoodsupplyandsecurityconcernsversusR&Ddesignedtomoredirectly

addressincomedistributionandpovertyconcerns. Compoundingtheseconcernsarethestilllargely

unchartedanduncertainimplicationsofglobalclimatechangesforworldagriculture.

Theimmediacyandimportanceoftheseissues,andtheirimplicationsforfoodandagricultural

R&D,bespeaktheirhistories. Publiclyfundedandconductedresearchforfoodandagricultureonlytook

holdinthemid tolate1800s,butthenpickeduppaceintheearlydecadesofthe20thCenturyasthe

scientificunderpinningsofsoilchemistry,Mendeliangenetics,thepurelinetheoryofJohannson,the

1ObtainedfromUnitedNationsFAO,FAOSTATonlinedatabase,foundathttp://faostat.fao.org. AccessedSeptember

2009.

2InSeptember2008theUnitedNationsFoodandAgricultureOrganizationreleasedaprovisionalsetofestimates(FAO

2008c)indicatingthatthenumberofundernourishedpeoplein2007increasedby75millionoverandaboveFAOs

estimateof848millionundernourishedin200305,withmuchofthisincreaseattributedtohighfoodprices. Thisbrings

thenumberofundernourishedpeopleworldwideto923millionin2007,ofwhich907million[are]inthedeveloping

world. Morerecently,FAO(2009a)estimatedthatanadditional100millionpeoplearenowundernourished,increasing

thetotaltooveronebillion.


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mutationtheoryofdeVries,andPasteursgermtheoryofdiseasebegantorealizetheirpotentials.3

Private,philanthropicorganizationssuchastheRockefellerFoundationlaunchedagriculturalR&D

initiativesaroundthemiddleofthecenturytospurtechnicalchangeinpoorcountryagriculture. This

broadenedtoincludejointlyconceivedpublicandprivateeffortstofundinternationalagriculturalR&D

conductedinpurposebuilt,independentcentersofresearchinthe1960s,whicheventuallygaveriseto

aninstitutionalinnovationtocollectivelyfundthisresearch,namelytheConsultativeGroupon

InternationalAgriculturalResearch(CGIAR)formedin1971.4

Asthe21stCenturyunfolds,theglobalscienceandagriculturaldevelopmentlandscapesare

changinginsubstantiveways,withimportantimplicationsforthefunding,conductandinstitutional

arrangementsaffectinginternationallyconceivedandconductedresearchforfoodandagriculture.

Manyofthesechangesarepoorlyunderstoodandsomeareonlybeginningtoplayout,sothe

magnitudeandevendirectionofthedeparturesfromorthecontinuingpaceofpasttrendsisnot

known. Nonetheless,theserealitieshaveimportantbearingsontheprivateandpublicchoices

presentlybeingmaderegardingresearchthataffectsfoodandagriculture. Assemblingwhatweknow

aboutthesestrategicdevelopmentsandunderstandingtheirlikelyimplicationsarekeytomakingmore

informedand,hopefully,moreefficientuseofscarceresearchresources,andwhereappropriate

mobilizingandprioritizingadditionalresearcheffort.

In

this

paper

we

focus

on

some

of

the

more

important

developments

affecting

(or

being

affected

by)agriculturalR&Dworldwide. Wereexaminewhatweknowaboutresearchlags,andthe

appropriabilityofthebenefitsfromresearch,whichhaveadirectbearingonpublicandprivate

incentivesforinnovationinfoodandagriculture. Apivotaldimensionofinternationallyconceivedand

conductedresearchforfoodandagricultureisthecrossborderpotentialforresearchdoneinonelocale

toaffectproductivitygrowthinanother. Tothatendweprovideentirelynewinformationtobetter

understandtheseresearchspilloverpotentials. WealsodiscussthechangingeconomicsoftheR&D

3VonLiebigsbookOrganicChemistryinItsApplicationtoAgricultureandPhysiologypublishedin1840inbothGermany

andGreatBritaintriggeredwidespreadinterestintheapplicationofsciencetoagriculture. Likeothers,Ruttan(1982)

viewedvonLiebigsbookasthecriticaldividinglineintheevolutionofmodernagriculturalscience.

4TheCGIARhasexpandeditssubjectmatterscopewellbeyonditsinitialfocusonfoodstaplesanditsinstitutionalscope

wellbeyondthatofafinancinginstrumentbyassuminggovernance,representational,andserviceprovisionfunctions.

SeeAlston,DehmerandPardey(2006),PingaliandKelly(2007)andthereferencesthereinfordescriptionsand

interpretationsofthishistory.


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processitself,notablytheeconomiesofsizeandscopeofR&D,andbroadentheresearchperspective

beyondinnovationtoencompasstechnologydevelopment,uptakeandregulation.

Atroot,concernsaboutfoodandagriculturalsuppliesareconcernsaboutthepace,nature,

directionandconsequencesofagriculturalproductivitygrowth,andsowereviewwhatispresently

knownabouttheseproductivitypatterns. SomeoftheimportantR&Dinvestmenttrendsthat

circumscribeproductivitypotentialsarealsointroducedandbrieflydiscussed.

2. PolicyandPracticalRealitiesofFoodandAgricultureR&DInnovationinagriculturehasmanyfeaturesincommonwithinnovationmoregenerally,butalso

someimportantdifferences. Inmanywaysthestudyofinnovationisastudyofmarketfailureandthe

individualandcollectiveactionsnotablyinvestinginagriculturalR&Dtakentodealwithit. Like

otherpartsoftheeconomy,agricultureischaracterizedbymarketfailuresassociatedwithincomplete

propertyrightsoverinventions. Theatomisticstructureofmuchofagriculturemeansthatthe

attenuationofincentivestoinnovateismorepronounced(andparticularlysoinmanyofthepoorest

partsoftheworldwheretheaveragefarmsizeatleastasdenominatedbyfarmedareaissmall,

andgettingsmaller)thaninotherindustriesthataremoreconcentratedintheirindustrialstructure.

Ontheotherhand,unlikemostinnovationsinmanufacturing,foodprocessing,ortransportation,

technologiesusedinproductionagriculturehavedegreesofsitespecificity. Thebiologicalnatureof

agriculturalproductionmeansthattheappropriatetechnologyoftenvarieswith(local,sometimeson

farm)variationinclimate,soiltypes,topography,latitude,altitude,anddistancefrommarkets. The

sitespecificaspectcircumscribes,butbynomeansremoves,thepotentialforknowledgespillovers

andtheassociatedmarketfailuresthatareexacerbatedbythesmallscale,atomisticindustrial

structureofagriculture.

Theseandsomeotherimportantrealitiesofresearchforfoodandagriculturearepoorly

understoodbythosenotfamiliarwiththefacts. Otherrealitieshavechangedinwaysthatwehave

failedtoproperlymeasureoradequatelyinvestigate. Inaddition,importanttechnical,marketand

climatecircumstancesintheyearsaheadmaybedifferentinimportantrespectstoourmeasured

past. Itistosomeofthepastandemergingrealitiesthatmaywellhavestrategicpolicyandpractical

implicationsregardinginternationalresearchforfoodandagriculturethatwenowturn.


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2.1 ResearchLagLengths

Theprojectbasedfundingthatcomesmainlyfromaidagencies(ratherthanscienceoreven

agriculturalministries)andisnowtheprevalentformofsupportforCGIARresearchofteninvolvesup

tothreeor,insomelimitedcases,fiveyearfundingcycles,onlysomeofwhicharerenewedand

sustainedforlongerperiods.5 Impatientorpoliticallyconstrainedfundersalsofrequentlypressurefor

demonstrableevidenceofdevelopmentimpactsattheterminationoftheseprojects,orasa

preconditionforfurtherfunding. Unfortunately,manyoftheseagriculturalresearchinvestment

initiativesaremyopic;fundamentallymisconstruingthenatureandlengthofthelagsbetweenR&D

investmentsandtheeconomicandsocialreturnsrealizedfromthatinvestment. Infact,theselagsare

generallylong,oftenspanningdecades,notmonthsoryears.

Thedynamicstructurelinkingresearchspendingandproductivityinvolvesaconfluenceof

processesincludingthecreationanddestructionofknowledgestocksandtheadoptionand

disadoptionofinnovationsoverspaceandtimeeachofwhichhasitsowncomplexdynamics. The

scienceinvolvedisacumulativeprocess,throughwhichtodaysnewideasarederivedfromthe

accumulatedstockofpastideas. Thisfeatureofscienceinfluencesthenatureoftheresearch

productivityrelationshipaswell,makingthecreationofknowledgeunlikeotherproduction

processes. Theevidenceforlongresearchproductivitylagsiscompelling. Oneformofevidence

stemsfromstatisticaleffortstoestablishtherelationshipbetweencurrentandpastR&Dspending

andagriculturalproductivity. Thedozensofstudiesdonetodateindicatethattheproductivity

consequencesofpublicagriculturalR&Daredistributedovermanydecades,withalagof1525years

beforepeakimpactsarereachedandwithcontinuingeffectsfordecadesafterwards.6

ThestatisticalevidencelinkingoverallinvestmentsinaggregateagriculturalR&Dtoagricultural

productivitygrowtharereinforcedbytheotherevidenceaboutresearchandadoptionlagprocessesfor

particulartechnologies,especiallycropvarietiesaboutwhichwehavealotofspecificinformation. The

developmentanduptakeofvarietaltechnologiesworldwidehasbeenmuchstudied(see,forexample,

5Likewise,counterpartfundingformuchpublicresearchconductedbynationalagencieshasbecomeincreasingly

contestableandprojectbased.

6Alstonetal.(2010seealsofootnote2)reviewedthepriorliterature. Theyalsodevelopedtheirownestimatesusing

newlyconstructedU.S.statelevelproductivityover19492002andU.S.federalandstatespendingonagriculturalR&D

andextensionover18902002. Theirpreferredmodelhadapeaklaggedresearchimpactatyear24andatotallaglength

of50years.


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EvensonandGollin2003),butarguablythemostcomprehensiveevidenceonthesetechnicalchanges

overthepastcenturyormorehasbeenassembledfortheUnitedStatesandisillustrativeofthemore

generalpicture.

Figure1providesnewdataonthreewavesofvarietaltechnologiesintheUnitedStates

beginningintheearly1900s. Hybridcorntechnology,whichtookoffinU.S.farmersfieldsinthe1930s,

haditsscientificrootsinfocusedresearchthatbeganin1918(andarguablybeforethen,atleasttothe

early1890s). ThustheR&Dorinnovationlagwasatleast10yearsandmayhavebeen2030years. The

timepathoftheadoptionprocessesextendsthelaglengthsevenfurther. Iowahad10percentofits

cornacreageplantedtohybridsin1936(with90percentofitscornacreagesoplantedjustfouryears

later),whileittookuntil1948beforeAlabamaastatewithdistinctiveagroecologicalattributes

comparedwiththeprincipalCornBeltstateshad10percentofitscornacreageunderhybrids. By

1950,80percentandby1960,almostallofthecorngrownintheUnitedStateswashybridcorn.

Lookingacrossallthestates,thetechnologydiffusionprocesswasspreadoverabout30years,reflecting

theenvelopeofadoptionprocessesthatweremuchmorerapidinanyindividualstate. Takingthe

entireresearch,development,andadoptionprocessforhybridcornashavingbegunaslateas1918,the

totalprocessthathadbeenaccomplishedby1960tookplaceoveraperiodofatleast40yearsand

possiblydecadeslonger.

The

semi

dwarf

wheat

and

rice

varietal

technologies

that

lay

at

the

heart

of

the

Green

RevolutionalsofoundtheirwayintoU.S.agricultureviaadaptiveresearch. Thefirstcommercially

significantuseofsemidwarfwheatsintheUnitedStatesoccurredin1961. Theearly(andmostrapid)

uptakeofthistechnologywasinCalifornia,withagroecologiesmuchlikethoseinNorthernMexico

whereNormanBorlaugbredmostoftheearly,shortstaturedCIMMYTvarieties. Thelargewheatbelt

statesoftheDakotasandMinnesotahaddistinctiverustandotherdiseaseproblemsthatdelayedthe

entryofsemidwarfnessintotheselocalesuntilresistancetothesebioticconstraintswascrossbred

intoshort

statured

wheats.

Thus

ittook

30

years

before

80

percent

of

the

U.S.

wheat

acreage

was

plantedtosemidwarfvarieties.

Withitsemphasisonvarietalquality,thespreadofhigheryielding(butinitiallyatleast,less

appealingtoeat)semidwarfricevarietiesintheUnitedStateslaggedconsiderablybehindthe

irrigatedareasinAsiawherethepriorityinthe1960sand1970swastoraisecropyieldsandincrease


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riceproduction(HerdtandCapule1983). Beginningin1979,semidwarfricevarietiesgained

acceptanceintheUnitedStates,butby2005only68percenttotheU.S.riceacreagewasplantedto

varietieswiththischaracteristic.

Hasmodern(bio)technologymateriallyspedupthisresearchinnovationadoptionprocess,as

iscommonlysuggested? Geneticallyengineered(GE)cornwasfirstplantedonU.S.farmersfieldsin

themid1990s. TheadoptioncumdiffusionprocessforGEcropsisnotyetcomplete,thetechnology

itselfiscontinuingtoevolve,andthemaximumadoptionratehasnotyetbeenachieved;by2008,80

percentofU.S.cornacreagewasplantedtoGEvarieties. Likehybridcorn,biotechcornhasbeen

adoptedatdifferentratesindifferentstates,butperhapsfordifferentreasons. This,asyet

incomplete,processoverlessthan15yearsrepresentsonlypartoftherelevanttimelag. Tothatwe

mustaddthetimespentconductingrelativelybasicandappliedresearchtodevelopandevaluatethe

technology,andthetime(andmoney)spentafterthetechnologyhadbeendevelopedtomeetthe

requirementsforregulatoryapprovalbyarangeofgovernmentagencies.

ComparedwiththeadoptioncumdiffusionprocessforhybridcornwithintheUnitedStates,

theprocessforbiotechcornappearstohavebeenalittlefaster. Themaindifferencemaybethatall

statesbegantoadopttogether,withouttheslowerspatialdiffusionamongstatesthatcharacterized

hybridcorn,possiblybecauseofimprovedcommunicationsandfarmereducation,perhapsassistedby

public

extension

services.

Thus

biotech

corn

achieved

80

percent

adoption

within

13

years

compared

with19yearsforhybridcornor30yearsforsemidwarfwheat. However,otherelementsofthe

processmaybegettinglonger. Forinstance,theprocessofregulatoryapprovalmayhaveaddeda

further510yearstotheR&Dlag(andthisregulatoryapprovallagforbiotechcropsappearstobe

gettinglonger). Givenarangeof10to20yearsspentonR&Dtodevelopthetechnologiesthat

enabledthecreationofbiotechcrops,andthenthetimespenttodeveloptheinitialvarietiesand

improvethem,theoverallprocessofinnovationinthecaseofbiotechcornmayhavetaken20to30

yearsso

far.

Insum,theseU.S.examplesspanaspectrumofresearchrealities:researchtodevelop

fundamentallynew(bioengineered)traitsforspecificcrops,researchtoadaptandfacilitatespillinsof

semidwarftechnologiesoriginatingelsewhereintheworld,andtheaggregateproductivity

promotingconsequencesofoverallspendingonagriculturalR&D. Thesecaseshelpanchorour


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expectationsabouttheconsiderablelagsinvolvedinrealizingsocialandeconomicvaluefrom

investmentsinR&D,eveninacountrysuchastheUnitedStatesthatisnotundulyconstrainedby

limitedruralinfrastructure,poorcommunications,institutionalinstabilities,andrestrictiveseed

release(andrelated)commercializationpoliciesandpractices. Bythismeasurealone,investmentsin

agriculturalR&Darebestseenasanespeciallyeffectivemeansofachievinglongruneconomic

growthanddevelopmentobjectivesspanningmanydecades,ratherthananinterventioninstrument

toachievenearterm,incomedistributionoreconomicdevelopmentobjectives.

2.2 TheShiftingLocationofAgriculturalProduction

PolicymyopiaisoneproblemconfrontingagriculturalR&D. Another,andrelated,problemisa

seeminglywidespreadlackofappreciationofthespatialmobilityofagriculture. Contrarytocommon

perceptions,agriculturemoves,sometimesmarkedly,overthelandscape. Hence,thepresentlocation

ofproductionofaparticularcropmaynotbeagoodindicationofwhereintheworldthatcropwillbe

growndecadesfromnow. Thisideahasimportantconsequencesforfoodandagriculturalresearch.

Theproductivityperformanceofmanyagriculturaltechnologiesissensitivetolocalagroecological

factors(includingclimate,soils,landslopeandelevation,wind,anddaylength),andsotargetingand

optimizingtechnologiesfortheseagroecologicalrealitiesisadistinctiveaspectofinnovationinfoodand

agriculture. Coupledwiththeinherentlylonglagsfrominitiatingresearchtorealizingimpacts,itmay

wellbefollytoprioritizeinvestmentsonR&Dtacklingaparticularprobleminaparticularcrop(or

livestock)commodityassumingthepresentspatialpatternofproductionwillprevail.

Thefactorsaffectingthelocationofproductionarecomplexandchanging. Moreover,

technologiesthemselvesmayshifttheoptimallocationofagriculturalproduction. Pressuresoutside

agricultureandbeyondconsiderationsofagroecologiesarealsoimportant. Climatechange,for

instance,mayhaveabigbearingontheoptimallocationofproduction,orthetechnicalstrategiesbest

suitedtoadaptingtothesechangesinagivenlocale. Investmentsinruraltransport,coldchain,and

communicationinfrastructurealongwiththechangingspatialpatternsof(ruralvsurban)population

densitiescandemonstrablyaffecttheagriculturallandscape. Thusasmarketaccessimproves,local

productionincentivescanbeskewedtowardhighervalued,perishableproduction(suchasfreshfruits

andvegetables,meatanddairyproducts)andawayfromstapleormoretraditionalfoodcrops.

Likewise,investmentsinirrigation,terracingandotheragriculturallandimprovementscanalterthe


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incentivestoproducecertainagriculturalproductsincertainlocations,withsubstantivefollowon

consequencesforR&Dpriorities.7

CroplandMovements

Sowhatevidencedowehaveoftheextentandnatureofthespatialmovementofagricultural

production? Unfortunately,thisaspecthasbeenlittlestudied,butthereisasmallandgradually

growingbodyofevidence,someofwhichisbrieflyintroducedhere. Agriculturetakesupalotofspace:

anestimated40percentoftheworldslandareaispresentlycommittedtocropandlivestock

production(withalmost13percentofthelandbeingincrops). Butthatwasnotalwaysso. Beginning

in1700,agriculturalcroplandoccupiedjust3.5percentoftheworldstotallandarea,withmostofthat

croplandlocatedinAsia(accountingfor48.5percentoftheworldscroppedareaatthattime),Europe

(28.5percent),andAfrica(19.6percent). Notably,thesparselysettledNewWorldsofAustralia,New

Zealand,andtheAmericascollectivelyaccountedforjust3.2percentofthelandworldwideunder

permanentcropsin1700. By2000,theNewWorldsharehadgrownto27.1percentofthetotal

croppedarea.

DrawingonsimulatedSAGEdatadevelopedbyRamankuttyandFoley(1999)andRamnakutty

etal.(2008),Beddowetal.(2010)illustratechangesinthespatialpatternofproductionoverthelong

run. Figure2,Panelsaandbprovidemappedsnapshotsofthelocationofcroppedareain1700and

2000

respectively.

The

net

effect

of

the

movement

of

land

in

and

out

of

cropped

agriculture

means

thatagricultureisgeographicallymobile,asillustratedinFigure2,Panelc,whichusestheSAGEseries

toestimatechangesincroppedareaoverthefourdecadesspanning1960to2000. Itindicatesthe

localizedmovementofacreageinandoutofagriculturesince1960,or,morespecifically,thechange

intheareasharededicatedtocropproductionforeachofthe259,200mappedpixelsforexample,a

valueofminus50percentindicatesthathalftheacreageinthatpixelshiftedoutofcropping

agriculturesince1960. Thedarkertheredshading,thegreaterthepercentdeclineincroppedarea

7Whilegroundingtechnologytargetstolocalproductionconstraintsiscriticallyimportant,thesespatialdynamics

complicatedecisionsaboutwhoseparticularproductionconstraintshavebearing. Isittodaysfarmersgiventodays

productionproblems,ortomorrowsfarmersandtheirprospectiveproblemsthataremostrelevant? Clearlyinsome

casesthetwosetsofproblemsareinessencethesame,butthiswillnotalwaysbeso. Moreover,farmersarenotalways

fullyinformedaboutscientificpotentials,andtotheextentthatlocationandproductionchoicesareendogenously

determinedbytechnicaloptions,scientificopinionisimportantaswell. Forexample,onemightspeculatethattherewas

littleifanyfarmerdemandforsemidwarfnessinwheatorricetechnologies,yettheproductivityboostofthesevarietal

innovationsweregloballytransformative.


12/55

perpixel;thedarkerthegreenshading,thegreaterthepercentincreaseincroppedareaperpixel.

ThecollapseoftheformerSovietUnionisevidentintermsofsubstantialdeclinesincroppedarea

throughoutEasternEurope. TheSAGEdataalsoindicatedeclinesincroppedareainpartsofWestern

Europe,northeastern,southern,andsoutheasternUnitedStates,andsignificantpartsofChina.8

TherewasasubstantialincreaseincroppedareasthroughouttheIndochinaPeninsula,Indonesia,

WestAfrica,Mexico,andBrazil. Theoverallpictureisoneofcontractingareaundercropsin

temperateregionsandincreasingcroppedareaintropicalpartsoftheworldduringthelastfour

decadesofthetwentiethcentury.

Figure2,Paneld providesanindicationofthedistanceanddirectionofthespatialrelocation

ofagriculturegloballyoverthelongrunbyplottingthemovementinthecentroidsorcentersof

gravityofproductionbyregionfortheperiodbeginningin1700(wheneachregionscentroidis

centeredonazerolatitudelongitudegridcoordinate)throughto2000. Eachcentroidisanestimate

ofthegeographiccenter(centerofmass)ofthecroppedareainthecorrespondingregion. The

locationofthecentroiditselfisnotparticularlyenlightening,anditcouldeasilybethecasethata

centroidisinalocationthatdoesnotproduceanycropsatall,orisotherwisenotrepresentativeof

thegeneralagriculturalsituationinacountry. However,movementsinthecentroidarerevealingas

anindicationoftheinfluencesofchangingpatternsofsettlement,infrastructure,andtechnologieson

the

location

of

agriculture.

Accordingtothesedata,NorthAmericaandAfricahaveseenthelargestmovementsintheir

productioncentroids,bothshiftingabout1,300kilometersoverthe300yearperiod. Aswasthecase

withtheothercontinents,mostofthismovementoccurredafter1900. However,theyear2000

centroidsforotherregionsmoreorlessrepresentacontinuationofthetrendfrom1950to1992;the

onlyanomalyseemstobeinAfrica,wherealmostallofthemeasuredmovementinitscentroid

occurredbetween1992and2000.9 TheAsiancentroidmovedtheleast,changingbyonly15

kilometersto

the

east

and

137

kilometers

to

the

south.

8Wood,Sebastian,andScherr(2000,p.28)documentthereductionincultivatedlandinChinaduringthefirsthalfofthe

1990s,largelyattributingthistoexpandedindustrialandurbanusesofland.Zhangetal.(2007)implythatthistrend

continuedintoatleasttheearlypartofthetwentyfirstcentury.Forexample,theauthorsestimatethat 260,000haof

Chinesecultivatedlandwasconvertedtononagriculturalusesbetween1991and2001.

9Itseemsmorelikelythattheyear1992and2000datasetswerenotfullyconformablethanthatamassivestructuralshift

inAfricanproductionoccurredduringthisperiod.However,thenorthwardmovementofagricultureinsubSaharanAfrica


13/55

ExceptinAfricaandAsia,thegeneraltrendfavoredmovementinlongituderatherthan

latitude.ThepronouncednorthwardmovementinAfricawasalmostmatchedbyanequivalentmove

westward,and,whiletheAsiancentroidshowedmuchmoreabsolutemovementalongtheeastwest

axis,thenetmovementovertheperiodwasalmostduesouth. Averagingacrossalloftheregions,the

netlongitudinalmovementwas4.6timesaslargeasthenetlatitudinalmovement.

MovementofCrops

Sometechnologytargeting,andtheirimpliedagriculturalR&Dinvestmentchoices,areusefully

informedbybroadbrushperspectivesonthespatialmobilityofaggregateagriculturalorcropped

land. ButmanyR&Dinvestmentchoiceshingeonmorerefined,cropspecificsensesofthepresent

andchanginglocationofproduction.

Diggingbeneaththeaggregatecropareasjustdiscussed,whatdoweknowaboutchangesin

thelocationofproductionofindividualcrops,especiallyatagloballevelandforthelengthyperiods

requiredfortechnical(andother)changestohaverealizedtheirfullproductionandproductivity

consequences? AppendixTable1revealsanewlycompiledglobalseriesusedbyBeddow(2010)to

examinecountry andcropspecificproductiontrendsstretchingbacktothe1880s. Thetablereports

thelongrunhistoryofcountryspecificproductionbyperiodandthecorrespondingshareof

production(inbrackets)formaize,wheatandrice. Thetabulationincludesthetopfiveproducersfor

these

three

crops

and

how

those

producers

evolved

over

time

relative

to

other

countries.

If

a

country

appearedasatopproducerforacropinanyparticulartimeperiod,thatproducer'srankand

percentageshareareshownforallreportedtimeperiods. Thuswefind,forexample,thatJapanwas

oncethesecondrankedproducerofrice,buthasfalleninrankandshareoverthelongrunandisno

longeramongthetopfive(aviewthatcannotbeobtainedfrommediumrundatalikethoseavailable

fromFAOSTAT).

Thereareseveralstrikingfeaturesinthesedata. First,measuredglobalproductionhasbeen

spatiallyconcentrated,

especially

for

maize

and

rice.

Since

the

beginning

of

the

20

thCentury,

the

top

twoproducingcountrieshavealwaysaccountedformorethanhalftheglobalproductionofmaize

andrice,andoften7080percentoftheworldproductionoccurredinjustfivecountries. Wheat

isconsistentwiththefindingofLiebenberg,Pardey,andKahn(2010)thatthefarmedareainSouthAfricanagriculture

peakedat91.8millionhectaresin1960,thendeclinedsteadilyto82.2millionhectaresby1996,whereithassincebeen

moreorlessstable.


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15/55

reducedthedegreedayrequirementsofmaize,allowingfarmerstocompleteaseasonfurthernorth

thanwasotherwisepossible.

In1879,thefirstyearforwhichbothoutputandareadataareavailableatthecountylevelfor

theUnitedStates,therewasaconcentrationofmaizeproductioninthelowermidwest. However,

maizewasproducedfairlyhomogenouslythroughouttheeasternportionsofthecountrysothatin

total,26percentofthecountry'smaizewasproducedintheSoutheastand42percentwasproduced

intheNortheast. By2006,theSoutheasthadlostitsstatusasamajormaizeproducer,whilethe

locusofproductionshiftedtotheNorthCentralregion. Bothtechnologicalandnontechnological

factorsspurredthisrelocation. Someoftheshiftwasmadepossiblebyimprovedtransportation

systems,whichallowedSoutheasterngrowerstoproducemorenonnutritivecropssuchascotton

andtobacco,andlaterbytherapiduptakeofhybridtechnologyintheNorthCentralportionofthe

country.

Thesamespatialprocessesarenodoubtatplayinotherpartsoftheworld,althoughthepace

andspecificsofthelocationalchangeshaveyettobecarefullyassessed. Arguably,therapidpaceof

urbanizationandthepotentialtoradicallyaffecteconomicaccesstomarketsviaimprovementsin

transportationandcommunicationinfrastructurepointstothepossibilityofmajormovementin

Africanagricultureinthedecadesahead. Compoundingthesepressuresforspatialchangein

agriculture

are

the

prospects

of

localized

changes

in

production

potential

attributable

to

changes

in

climate.

2.3 Appropriability

Thepartialpublicgoodnatureofmuchoftheknowledgeproducedbyresearchmeansthat

researchbenefitsarenotfullyprivatelyappropriable. Indeed,themainreasonforprivatesector

underinvestmentinagriculturalR&Disinappropriabilityofsomeresearchbenefits:thefirm

responsiblefordevelopingatechnologymaynotbeabletocapture(i.e.,appropriate)allofthe

benefitsaccruingtotheinnovation,oftenbecausefullyeffectivepatentingorsecrecyisnotpossible

orbecausesomeresearchbenefits(orcosts)accruetopeopleotherthanthosewhousetheresults.

Forcertaintypesofagriculturalresearch,therightstotheresultsarefullyandeffectivelyprotectedby

patentsorotherformsofintellectualpropertyprotection,suchthattheinventorcancapturethe

benefitsbyusingtheresultsfromtheresearchorsellingtherightstousethem;forinstance,the


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benefitsfrommostmechanicalinventionsanddevelopingnewhybridplantvarieties,suchashybrid

corn,areappropriable. Often,however,thosewhoinvestinR&Dcannotcaptureallofthebenefits

otherscanfreerideonaninvestmentinresearch,usingtheresultsandsharinginthebenefits

withoutsharinginthecosts.11 Insuchcases,privatebenefitstoaninvestor(orgroupofinvestors)are

lessthanthesocialbenefitsoftheinvestmentandsomesociallyprofitableinvestmentopportunities

remainunexploited. Theupshotisthat,intheabsenceofgovernmentintervention,investmentin

agriculturalresearchislikelytobetoolittle.

Thetypesoftechnologyoftensuitedtolessdevelopedcountryagriculturehavehithertobeen

ofthesortforwhichappropriabilityproblemsaremorepronouncedtypesthathavebeen

comparativelyneglectedbytheprivatesectorevenintherichestcountries. Inparticular,until

recently,privateresearchhastendedtoemphasizemechanicalandchemicaltechnologies,whichare

comparativelywellprotectedbypatents,tradesecrecy,andotherintellectualpropertyrights;andthe

privatesectorhasgenerallyneglectedvarietaltechnologiesexceptwherethereturnsare

appropriable,asforhybridseed. Inlessdevelopedcountries,theemphasisininnovationhasoften

beenonselfpollinatingcropvarietiesanddisembodiedfarmmanagementpractices,whicharethe

leastappropriableofall. Therecentinnovationsinrichcountryinstitutionsmeanthatprivatefirms

arenowfindingitmoreprofitabletoinvestinplantvarieties;thesamemaybetrueinsomeless

developed

countries,

but

not

all

countries

have

made

comparable

institutional

changes.

2.4 R&DSpillovers

Whilethemostimmediateandtangibleeffectofthenewtechnologiesandideasstemmingfrom

researchdoneinonecountryistofosterproductivitygrowthinthatcountry,newtechnologiesand

ideasoftenspilloverandspursizableproductivitygainselsewhereintheworld. Inthepast,low and

middleincomecountriesbenefitedconsiderablyfromtechnologicalspilloversfromhighincome

countries,inpartbecausethebulkoftheworldsagriculturalscienceandinnovationoccurredinrich

countries. AsPardeyandAlston(2010)observed,increasingly,spilloversfromrichcountriesmaynot

11Forinstance,anagronomistorfarmerwhodevelopedanimprovedwheatvarietywouldhavedifficultyappropriating

thebenefitsbecauseopenpollinatedcropslikewheatreproducethemselves,unlikehybridcrops,whichdonot. The

inventorcouldnotrealizeallofthepotentialsocialbenefitssimplybyusingthenewvarietyhimself;butifhesoldthe

(fertile)seedinoneyearthebuyerscouldkeepsomeofthegrainproducedfromthatseedforsubsequentuseasseed.

Hencetheinventorisnotabletoreapthereturnstohisinnovation.


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beavailabletodevelopingcountriesinthesamewaysortothesameextentforseveralreasons. First,

richcountryR&Dagendashavebeenreorientedawayfromproductivitygainsinfoodstaplestoward

otheraspectsofagriculturalproduction,suchasenvironmentaleffects,foodquality,andthemedical,

energy,andindustrialusesofagriculturalcommodities. Thisgrowingdivergencebetweendeveloped

countryresearchagendasandtheprioritiesofdevelopingcountriesimpliesthatfewerapplicable

technologieswillbecandidatesforadaptationtodevelopingcountries. Second,technologiesthatare

applicablemaynotbeasreadilyaccessiblebecauseofincreasingintellectualpropertyprotectionof

privatelyownedtechnologiesand,perhapsmoreimportantly,theexpandingscopeandenforcement

ofbiosafetyregulations. Differentapproachesmayhavetobedevisedtomakeitpossiblefor

countriestoachieveequivalentaccesstotechnologicalpotentialgeneratedbyothercountries. Third,

thosetechnologiesthatareapplicableandavailablearelikelytorequiremoresubstantiallocal

developmentandadaptation,callingformoresophisticatedandmoreextensiveformsofscientific

R&Dthaninthepast. Therequirementforlocaladaptiveresearchisalsolikelytobeexacerbatedas

changesinglobalandlocalclimatepatternsaddfurthertotheneedforadaptiveresponsesto

changingagriculturalproductionenvironments. Notwithstandingthesedevelopments,itisimperative

thatbothnationalandinternational(spillover)potentialsbeoptimizedinthedecadesaheadifthe

necessaryglobalproductivitygainsaretoberealized.

Spatial

Spillovers

Analysesofagriculturalproductivitygainshaveshownthatspatialspillinsareamajorsourceof

productivitygains,accountingforuptohalfof localproductivity increases. Thepotentialforspatial

spilloversgoestotheheartoftheconceptionofandraisondtreforinternationalagriculturalR&D,

whetherthatbeconducted inthepublicarena(suchasbyCGIARfundedcenters)orbyregionalor

multilateralprivatefirms. Absentthesespatialspilloversthemarketfailurerationale(and,relatedly,

the size and scope rationale discussed below) for internationally conceived or conducted R&D is

severelycurtailed.

What

do

we

know

about

the

likelihood

for

research

or

technologies

to

spill

from

onecountrytoanother?

Because agricultural production is especially dependent on natural inputs such as soil and

climate conditions which affect the performance of particular crops or production practices, the

degreeofagroecologicalsimilarityaffects thedegree towhichspillinscanbeexploited. Countries


18/55

that share agroecological characteristics are likely to have high potential for spilloversi.e.,

technologies or crop varieties developed in one country may be readily adopted in the other.

Similarly,spillinsalsotendtoflowmorereadilyamongcountriesthatproducesimilarcropmixes. On

thecontrary,technologicalspilloverswillbelimitedamongcountriesthataretechnologicallydistant,

ordissimilarintheiragroecologicalcharacteristicsorproductionpatterns.

James, Pardey and Wood (2010) develop and report a range of metrics of the technological

distancebetweencountries. Theirdistancemetricrangesbetweenzeroandoneoneindicatingthat

countriesare technologicalclose (and so thepotential for technologyspilloversarehigh),andzero

indicatingtheyaretechnologicaldistant(with lowornospilloverpotential). InFigure4,distance is

establishedbyassessing thedegreeofconcordance in thecropmixamongcountries. Panela, for

example, shows the concordance in crop area shares for each country relative to a richcountry

averageoftheareasharesplantedtoeachof20crops. Thus,iftheshareofcroppedacreageplanted

toeachof20cropsforaparticularcountrywereidenticaltothecorrespondingareasharesaveraged

among the highincome countries, then the distance metric would take the value 1.0: that is, the

countryinquestionistechnologicalclosetothehighincomecountriesasagroupwhenviewedfrom

theperspectiveofitscroporientation. Byextension,onewouldexpectacountrywhosecropmixis

similar instructuretothemixofcropsproduced inthehighincomecountries,onaverage,tohave

greater

potential

to

capture

technological

spillins

from

the

research

done

in

those

rich

countries.

Figure4,Panelsb, candd report the same cropbaseddistancemetricsusing the croparea

averages forLatinAmerica&Caribbean,AsiaandPacific,andsubSaharaAfrica respectivelyas the

pointof reference. Table1 reports theaveragevaluesof thecropdistancemetric forcountries in

eachregionoftheworldrelativetothesefour,baseregionaverages. Bythismeasure,countries in

subSaharan Africa have comparatively low potential to capture technological spillins from crop

researchdoneintherichcountries(seethedistancemetricvalueof0.40). Onaveragethecropping

patternsinLatin

America

are

closest

to

those

insub

Saharan

Africa,

although

the

concordance

of

crop

mixesisstillquitelowbyinternationalstandards(seethedistancemetricvalueof0.54).

Similarityincropproductionmixisbutonedimensionoftechnologicalcloseness. Eveniftwo

countrieshadsimilarcroppingshares,itmaybethattheagroecologicalconditionsfacingcrop

productioninonecountryaredissimilartothoseinanothercountry,meaningdifferentcropvarieties,


19/55

cropmanagementpracticesorinputmixesarerequired. Theseagroecologicaldissimilaritieswould

acttounderminethepotentialforresearchspillovers(or,alternatively,raisethecostsoftheadaptive

researchrequiredtoporttechnologydevelopedinonecountrytoanagroecologicallydissimilarother

country). Figure5parallelsFigure4initsconstruction,butthistimetheagriculturalareasineach

countrywereparsedinto26differentagroecologicalclassesandtheconcordanceamong

agroecologieswasassessed. Mostevidently,countriesthroughoutsubSaharanAfricaaremuchmore

distantfromtherichcountriesonaverageintermsoftheiragroecologiesthantheircropmixes(see

thegenerallylightershadingthatislowerdistancemetricvaluesforsubSaharanAfricainPanelaof

Figure5comparedwithPanelaofFigure4). Infact,theagriculturalareasincountriesthroughout

subSaharanAfricaareagroecologicallyclosesttotheagriculturalareasinLatinAmerica(and,

specifically,Brazil). TheyarealsoreasonablyclosetoareasthroughoutSouthandEastAsia,notably

IndiaandpartsoftheIndoChinapeninsular(seethedarkershadedcountiesinFigure5,Paneld,

wheretheaveragecropecologythroughoutsubSaharanAfricawastakenasthepointofreference

forcalculatingdistancemetrics).

Figure6goesonestepfurthertojointlyevaluatetechnologicaldistanceintermsofthe

agroecologicaldifferencesamongcountieswithinspecificcroppingareas. Herethereference

regionistheagroecologiesfoundinthetopfiveproducingcountriesforeachofthefourincluded

crops;

wheat,

rice,

maize

and

soybean.

Thus,

for

example,

countries

throughout

sub

Saharan

Africa

generallyhavequitedissimilaragroecologiescomparedwiththeagroecologiesfoundinthewheat

growingareasoftheworldsleadingwheatproducers(Figure6,Panela). Incontrast,partsofwest,

northcentralandeasternAfricaareagroecologicallyclosertotheworldsprincipalriceproducers

(Figure6,panelc),suggestingthatricetechnologies(e.g.,newvarietiesorcropmanagement

techniques)emanatingfromtheseimportantriceproducingcountrieshavegreaterpotentialtospillin

topartsofAfrica(orrequirelessadaptiveresearchtorealizetheirspillinpotentials).

Carefulanalysis

of

these

types

of

technological

distance

metrics

could

substantially

fine

tune

our

strategicsenseoftechnologicalspillovers,withsignificantimplicationsforinternationalresearch

collaborationsandtechnologytargetinginvolvingpublicorprivateagencies. Ofcourseotherfactors

canhelporhindertherealizationoftheseresearchspilloverpotentials,suchasopennesstotrade(in


20/55

technologies)includingphytosanitaryandbiosafetypolicies,intellectualpropertyrights,andarange

ofmarketrealities.

Disciplinary,AgencyandSectoralSpillovers

LookingforwardforfoodandagriculturalR&D,asharpersenseofspatialspilloverpotentialswill

becriticalformakingmoreinformedstrategicinvestmentandinstitutionalchoices. Butthereare

otherdimensionsofspilloversthatarecriticalaswell. Onedimensionisthe(twoway)spillover

betweenpubliclyandprivatelyperformedR&D. Thisspeakstotheappropriabilityaspectstouchedon

brieflyabove,andareaffectedbythenatureandpracticeofintellectualpropertyrightsandthe

industrialstructureoftheseinnovationmarkets. Another,oftenunderappreciated,aspectof

spilloversinvolvesthetransferofideas,knowhow,andtangibleinnovationsamongdifferentsectors

oftheeconomyanddifferentdisciplinesorfieldsofscientificinquirymoregenerallyconstrued. For

example,innovationsinbiometrics,remotesensing,informatics,imagingtechnologies,plusthebasic

biochemistry,molecularbiology,genomicsandproteomicsciencesareallpivotaltotechnicalprogress

infoodandagriculture,butrarelyconstruedasfoodandagriculturalR&D.12 Forthisreason,

Section3.2belowplacesfoodandagriculturalR&Dinvestmentsinthecontextofglobalpublicand

privatespendingonallthesciences.

2.5 EconomiesofScaleandScopeManytypesofresearchexhibitsignificanteconomiesofscaleorscope,sothatitmakessense

toorganizerelativelylargeresearchinstitutions;butmuchagriculturaltechnologyischaracterizedby

sitespecificity,relatedtoagroecologicalconditions,whichdefinesthesizeoftherelevantmarketina

waythatismuchlesscommoninotherindustrialR&D(AlstonandPardey1999).13 Onewaytothink

ofthisisintermsoftheunitcostsofmakinglocalresearchresultsapplicabletootherlocations(say,

byadaptiveresearch),whichmustbeaddedtothelocalresearchcosts. Suchcostsgrowwiththesize

12

Foranevenmoreconcreteexample,considersignificantpartsofthesciencesupportingadvancesinprecisionagriculture(see,forexample,GebbersandAdamchuck2010)ortheagriboticsresearchunderwayattheDistributed

RoboticsLaboratoryoftheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology(Economist2009). Theamalgamofvisionsystems,laser

sensors,satellitepositioningandinstrumentationtechnologiesbeingbroughttobearonautomatingcropharvestingand

greenhouseproductionsystemswouldrarelyifeverbecountedasfoodandagriculturalR&D. Likewise,thereis(andhas

longbeen)asignificantinterplaybetweenthehealthandagriculturalsciencesinamyriadofareasincludingepidemiology,

basicmolecularbiology,nutritionsciences,andsoon.

13ForadiscussionofthesescopeandscaleideasinthecontextofagriculturalR&DseePardey,RoseboomandAnderson

(1991),ByerleeandTraxler(2001),andJin,Rozelle,Alston,andHuang(2005).


21/55

ofthemarket. Consequently,whileeconomiesofscaleandscopeinresearchmeanthatunitcostsfall

withsizeoftheR&Denterprise,theseeconomiesmustbetradedoffagainstthediseconomiesof

distanceandadaptingsitespecificresults(thecostsoftransportingtheresearchresultsto

economicallymoredistantlocations). Thus,asthesizeoftheresearchenterpriseincreases,unit

costsarelikelytodeclineatfirst(becauseeconomiesofsizearerelativelyimportant)butwill

eventuallyrise(asthecostsofeconomicdistancebecomeevermoreimportant).

Inevaluatingtheneedforandinstitutionalarrangementsconcerninginternationallyconceived

and,possibly,conductedagriculturalR&Ditisimportanttoconsidertheeconomiesofscaleandscope

inknowledgeaccumulationanddissemination. Forinstance,iftechnologicalspilloverscontinuetobe

fairlyavailableandaccessible,astheyhavebeeninthepast,itmightnotmakesenseforsmall,poor,

agrariannationstospendtheirscarceintellectualandothercapitalresourcesinagriculturalscience.

Howeverifspillinsfromdevelopedcountriesdecrease,developingcountrieswillneedtoconduct

moreoftheirownresearch,butmanynationsmaybetoosmalltoachieveanefficientscaleinmany,

ifany,oftheirR&Dpriorityareas. Forexample,40percentoftheagriculturalresearchagenciesin

subSaharanAfricaemployedfewerthanfivefulltimeequivalentresearchersin2000;93percentof

theregionsagriculturalR&Dagenciesemployedfewerthan50researchers. Creativeinstitutional

innovationstocollectivefundandefficientlyconducttheresearchinwaysthatrealizethesescaleand

scope

economies

will

be

crucial.

2.6 ResearchTechnologyRegulationInmanypartsoftheworld,agriculturallyrelatedtechnologiesaresubjecttoanexpanding

rangeofgovernmentregulation,withconsequencesforthenatureandamountofresearcheffortthat

isnowrequiredtorespondtotheseregulatoryrequirements. Theseregulatoryregimescanhave

substantialimplicationsonthepaceandnatureofinnovationandtechnologyreleaseanduptakein

agriculture. Withoutdoubttheyaddtothecostofdevelopinganddeliveringtechnologiestofarmers.

However,comparativelylittle(economic)attentionhasbeengiventostreamliningtheseregulatory

regimes,strivingtomaximizethesocialpayoffstothecostsandcomplianceeffort(onthepartof


22/55

technologydevelopers,suppliers,aswellasfarmers)thattheyincur.14 TheUnitedStateshasarguably

donethemostinthisregard(althoughthetechnicalandadministrativecostsofcomplianceinthe

UnitedStatesarehighandrisingandneedcontinuedvigilance),optingforsciencebasedapproval

approachesthatfacilitateinnovationandtechnicalchangewhileseekingtoobjectivelyassessand

managethehumanandenvironmentalrisksassociatedwiththosechanges. However,manypartsof

thedevelopingworldstillhaveinefficientordysfunctionaltechnologyassessment,releaseand

oversightsystems,whetherthatisinreferencetomodernbiotechnologiesorlesscontentious

technologieslikeconventionallybredcropvarieties. Thereareamyriadofreasonsforthese

institutionalfailures,butonekeyaspectisalackoflocaltechnicalexpertisetoconductorevaluate

thenecessaryprereleasetrialsandstewardthetechnologiesoncetheyareinuse. AsPardeyand

Alston(2010)pointedout,loweringthecostsofaccesstothenecessarytechnical(oftenresearch

informed)informationwouldlikelyplayakeyroleinspurringlocalinnovationindevelopingcountries

andfacilitatethetransferinandadaptationoftechnologiesdevelopedelsewhere.

3. R&DandProductivity15Growthindemandforagriculturalcommoditieslargelystemsfromgrowthindemandforfood,whichis

driven by growth in population and per capita incomes (especially the economic growth of the fast

growingeconomiesofAsia),coupledwithnewdemands forbiofuels. Growth insupplyofagricultural

commoditiesisprimarilydrivenbygrowthinproductivity,especiallyasgrowthintheavailabilityofland

and water resources for agriculture has become more constrained. Productivity improvements in

agriculture are strongly associated with lagged R&D spending, as revealed in a large compilation of

countryspecific studies reported in Alston et al. (2000). Thus, the rate of growth of investments in

agriculturalR&Dandtheusestowhichthoseresearchdollarsareputwillbeapivotaldeterminantoflong

termgrowthinthesupply,availability,andpriceoffoodoverthecomingdecades.

3.1

Global

Productivity

Patterns

14See,forexample,Frisvold,HurleyandMitchell(2009),andthearticlestheyintroduce,forasuiteof(economic)analyses

ofanotableandregulatedbioengineeredtechnology;specificallyherbicideresistantcrops. SeealsoJust,Alstonand

Zilberman(2006).15ThissectiondrawsonAlston,BeddowandPardey(2009)andAlston,PardeyandBeddow(2010),whoprovideadditional

informationbeyondthehighlightsincludedhere.


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Conventionalmeasuresofproductivitymeasurethequantityofoutputrelativetothequantity

ofinputs. Ifoutputgrowsatthesamepaceasinputs,thenproductivityisunchanged:iftherateof

growthinoutputexceedstherateofgrowthintheuseofinputs,thenproductivitygrowthispositive.

Partialfactorproductivitymeasuresexpressoutputrelativetoaparticularinput(likelandorlabor).16

Multifactorproductivitymeasuresexpressoutputrelativetoamoreinclusivemetricofallmeasurable

inputs(includingland,laborandcapital,aswellasenergy,chemicals,andotherpurchasedinputs).

Measuresofagriculturalproductivitygrowthbetheycropyields,otherpartialfactorproductivity

measures(forexample,measuresoflandandlaborproductivity),orindexesofmultifactor

productivityshowgenerallyconsistentpatternsintermsofsecularshifts,includingindicationsofa

recentslowdowningrowth.

CropYields

Thelongresearchlagsandinherentlyspatialnatureofagriculturalproductionmeansthereis

valueintakinganexplicitlylongtermandgeospatialperspectiveoncropyields. Figure7plotsthe

distributionofaveragenationalcropyieldsworldwideformaize,wheatandriceforselectedperiods

beginninginthemid1800s. Thereareseveralstrikingfeaturesofthesecropyielddistributions. The

rightwardmovementinthemodeofthedistribution(andimplicitlytheaverageaswell)isconsistent

withanincreaseinaveragecropyieldsworldwide. However,thepaceandtimingofthatrightward

shift

occurred

at

different

times

and

at

different

rates

among

the

different

crops,

but

notably,

as

the

centerofgravityofeachdistributionshiftedtotherightthevariancearoundthatcenterofgravity

alsoincreasedinallthreecases. Thusasglobalmeanyieldsgrewovertime,thevariationofyields

amongcountriesalsobecamemorepronounced.

Figure8givesamappedsense(atroughlya10kmby10kmpixelresolution)ofthespatial

variationincropyieldsforthesethreecrops(plussoybeans)in2000. Thelightertheshadingthe

lowerthecropyieldsrelativetothehighestyieldingpixels(indicatedbydarkblue). While37percent

oftheworldsmaizeproductioncomesfromthe20percentofcroppedmaizeareareportingthe

highestyields,only24percentoftheworldssoybeanproductioncomesfromthehighestyielding

areasforthatcrop. However,therewassubstantiallylessspatialvariationinsoybeanyieldsthanin

16Cropyieldsrepresentaparticularpartialproductivitymeasurewhereinthephysicaloutputforaparticularcropis

expressedrelativetolandinput.


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cornyields. Theratioofaverageyieldsinthe20percentofareasowntosoybeansreportingthe

highestyieldswas1.76timesgreaterthantheyieldsinthecorresponding20percentofarea

reportingthelowestyields. Formaizetheaverageyieldratiobetweenthehighestandlowestyielding

areaswas4.41.

GlobalannualaverageratesofyieldgrowtharereportedinTable2,whichincludesseparate

estimatesforhigh,middle,andlowincomecountriesandtheworldasawhole,fortwosubperiods:

19611990and19902007. Thereisaslowdownevidentfortheglobalaverage,althoughbeginning

fromcomparativelylowyields,lowincomecountrieshadincreasingratesofgrowthinwheatandrice

yieldssince1990. Thuslowincomecountriesgainedsomegroundsince1990,howevertherebound

inyieldgrowthinthispartoftheworldfailedtofullymakeupforthecomparativelylowgrowthrates

theyexperiencedin19611990. Consequently,significantyieldgapspersists,andasAlston,Pardey

andBeddow(2010)report,thelowincomecountryversusworldrelativitiesofaveragemaize,wheat,

andriceyieldsin2007havefallenbelowthecorresponding1961relativities. Lowincomecountries

hadaveragesoybeanyieldsthatwereabout50percentoftheworldaveragein1961,andthatsame

gappersistedthroughto2007.

Forallfourcommodities,inbothhigh andmiddleincomecountriescollectivelyaccounting

forbetween78.8and99.4percentofglobalproductionofthesecropsin2007

averageannualrates

ofyieldgrowthwerelowerin19902007thanin19611990. Thegrowthofwheatyieldsslowedthe

mostand,forthehighincomecountriesasagroup,wheatyieldsbarelychangedover19902007.

Globalmaizeyieldsgrewatanaveragerateof1.77percentperyearduring19902007comparedwith

2.20percentperyearfor19611990. Likewisericeyieldsgrewatlessthan1.0percentperyearduring

19902007,lessthanhalftheiraveragegrowthratefor19601990. Moreover,theslowdownincrop

yieldsisquitepervasive. Inmorethanhalfofthecountriesthatgrewthesecrops,yieldsforrice,

wheat,maize,andsoybeansgrewmoreslowlyduring19902007thanduring19611990(Table3).

Morecritically,theslowdownwasgenerallymorewidespreadthanamongthetoptenproducing

countriesworldwide.

Theslowdownisalsopervasiveandevenmorepronouncedwhencountriesareaggregatedin

termsofharvestedarea. Lookingattheperiodafter1961,thegrowthinyieldsofwheat,rice,and

soybeansslowedafter1990incountriesaccountingformorethan70percentoftheworlds


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harvestedarea;forcornaround65percentofharvestedareawasincountrieswithsloweryield

growthafter1990. LatinAmericaistheonlycontinentwherecountriesaccountingformorethanhalf

theharvestedareaforallfourcropshadyieldsgrowingatmorerapidratesafter1990thanbefore.

Notably,countriesaccountingformorethan90percentoftheharvestedareaamongthehighincome

countriessawthepaceofgrowthofmaizeandriceyieldsslowafter1990,whileallofthehighincome

countrieshadwheatandsoybeanyieldsgrowingataslowerrateinthemorerecentperiod.

LandandLaborProductivity

Movingbeyondcropyieldstomorebroadlyconstruedproductivitymeasures,global

productivitytrendsshowa2.4foldincreaseinaggregateoutputperharvestedareasince1961,

equivalenttoannualaveragegrowthof2.0percentperyear. Accompanyingthisincreaseinland

productivitywasa1.7foldincrease,or1.2percentperyeargrowth,inaggregateoutputper

agriculturalworker(Table4). Theseproductivitydevelopmentsreflectglobalagriculturaloutput

growingrelativelyquicklycomparedwiththegrowthintheuseofagriculturallandandlabor0.3

percentand1.1percentperyear,respectively.

Inparallelwiththeglobalcropyieldevidencepresentedabove,thelongerrungrowthinland

andlaborproductivitymasksawidespreadalbeitnotuniversalslowdownintherateofgrowthof

bothproductivitymeasuresduring19902005comparedwiththepreviousthreedecades. Chinaand

Latin

America

are

significant

exceptions,

both

having

considerably

higher

growth

rates

of

land

and

laborproductivitysince1990. Amongthetop20producingcountriesaccordingtotheir2005valueof

agriculturaloutput,landandlaborproductivitygrowthwassubstantiallyslowerin19902005thanin

19611990oncethelarge,andinmanyrespectsexceptional,caseofChinaissettooneside. After

settingasidethetop20producingcountries,onaverageacrosstherestoftheworld,theslowdownis

evenmorepronounced:forthisgroupofcountries;landproductivitygrewby1.83percentperyear

duringtheperiod19611990,butbyonly0.88percentperyearthereafter;laborproductivitygrewby

1.08percent

per

year

prior

to

1990,

but

barely

budged

during

the

period

1990

2005.

After1990,theglobalgrowthrateoflandproductivityslowedfrom2.03percentperyearto

1.82percentperyear,whereasthegrowthrateoflaborproductivityincreasedfrom1.12percentper

yearfor19611990to1.36percentperyearfor19902005. Onceagaintheseworldtotalsare

distortedbythesignificantandexceptionalcaseofChina. NettingoutChina,globallandandlabor


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productivitygrowthhasbeenslowersince1990thanduringthepriorthreedecades. Thesame

periodrelativitiesprevailiftheformerSovietUnion(FSU)isalsonettedout,althoughthemagnitude

oftheglobalproductivityslowdownnetofChinaandtheFSUislesspronouncedbecausebothpartial

productivitymeasuresfortheFSUactuallyshrankafter1990.

Insummarizingtheexistingevidenceonpartialandmultifactorproductivitytrendsin

agricultureworldwide,Alston,BabcockandPardey(2010)concludethat.eventhoughwehave

manyreasonsforbeingcautiousinthisarea,wefinditdifficulttoreachanyconclusionotherthan

thatweareseeingevidenceofaslowdowninglobalagriculturalproductivitygrowth,especiallyinthe

worldsrichestcountries. Comingtoaconsensusonthestructureandextentofaproductivity

slowdownisdifficult,buthelpful. Drawingpolicyimplicationsfromthisevidenceisdoublydifficult.

Alston,BabcockandPardeywentontoobservethattheAustralian[productivity]slowdownhas

beenobservedduringthemostsevereandextendeddroughtinthatcountryshistory. Other

countries,too,mayhavebeenaffectedbyarunofunusuallyfavorableorunfavorableseasons. Andit

ishardalsototellthedifferencebetweensustainedchangesingrowthandthemultiyeareffectsofa

changethatisreallyepisodicinnature(e.g.,themassiveinstitutionalreformsinChinaandtheformer

SovietUnion). Notwithstandingtheproblemsofproductivitymeasurementandinterpretation,the

apparentandapparentlypervasiveslowdowndoesraisequestionsastowhetherthecurrentglobal

investment

in

agricultural

R&D

will

be

sufficient

to

enable

the

development

of

innovations

and

productivitysuchthatagriculturalsupplywillgrowfastenoughtokeeppacewiththeinevitable

growthindemand. ItistotheR&Dinvestmentevidencethatwenowturn.

3.2 R&DPatterns17

In2000,globalinvestmentinfoodandagriculturalR&Dtotalled$36.2billion(2005prices).18

Around67percentoftheresearchwasperformedbypublicagencies,andtheremaining33percent

byfirmsinthefood(processing,transport,andstorage),beverage,chemical,andmachinerysectors

17TheresearchanddevelopmentestimatesreportedheredrawinpartfromestimatesmadebyDehmerandPardey

(2010)andPardeyandChanKang(2010)thatarestillconsideredpreliminary. TheyexcludetheFormerSovietUnionand

EasternEuropeancountriesduetolackofdata.

18 Year2000isthelastyearforwhichinternationallycomparabledataonagriculturalR&Dinvestmentsarepresently

available. Thesedatawereconvertedtointernationaldollarsusingpurchasingpowerparity(PPP)indexes. UsingPPPsto

convertlocalcurrenciestoanumerairecurrencyresultsinsignificantlylargersharesoftheglobalresearchtotalbeing

attributedtolowerincomecountriesthanifmarketexchangerateswereusedforthecurrencyconversion.


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servicingfoodandagriculture. Figure9,Panelabreaksdownthepublicplusprivatefoodand

agriculturalR&Dspendingaccordingtothehighincomeandlow andmiddleincomecountrieswhere

thisresearchisperformed. Almost70percentofthatpublicandprivateresearchtookplaceinhigh

incomecountries,andaroundhalftherichcountryresearchwasconductedbyprivatefirms. In

contrast,foodandagriculturalresearchconductedinlowandmiddleincomecountrieswas

overwhelminglycarriedoutbypublicagencies(privatefirmsaccountedforjustover6percentofthe

estimated$10.8billionspentonfoodandagriculturalR&Dinthesecountries).

PublicspendingonagriculturalR&Dishighlyconcentrated,withthetopfivepercentofcountries

inthedataset(i.e.,6countriesinatotalof129)accountingforapproximatelyhalfofthespending. The

UnitedStatesaloneconstitutedaround16percentofglobalspendingonpubliclypreformedagricultural

research. TheAsiaandPacificregionhascontinuedtogainground,accountingforaneverlargershare

oftheworldanddevelopingcountrytotalsince1981(20.3percentoftheworldtotalin2000,upfrom

12.5percentin1981). In2000,justtwocountriesfromthisregion,ChinaandIndia,accountedfor29.1

percentofallexpenditureonpublicagriculturalR&Dbydevelopingcountries(andmorethan14

percentofpublicagriculturalR&Dglobally),asubstantialincreasefromtheir15.6percentcombined

sharein1981. Instarkcontrast,subSaharanAfricacontinuedtolosegrounditssharefellfrom17.9

percentofthetotalinvestmentinpublicagriculturalR&Dbydevelopingcountriesin1981to12.2

percent

in

2000.

Private

spending

is

also

geographically

concentrated

with

around

72

percent

of

the

worldsprivatefoodandagriculturalR&Dconductedinjust5countries.

ThesignificantinterdisciplinaryandcrosssectoralspilloversbetweenfoodandagriculturalR&D

andresearchdonebyothersciencesandinothersectorsindicatesthatameaningfulappreciationofthe

sourcesofinnovationinfoodandagriculturemustbecognizantofthemagnitudeandchangingnature

oftotalinvestmentsinR&D. Figure9,Panelb,showsthatin2000,foodandagriculturallyorientedR&D

accountedforonly5percentoftheestimated$782.7billioninvestedinallformsofR&Dworldwide

(increasingto

$970.6

billion

in2006).

Collectively,

the

high

income

countries

(whose

average

per

capita

incomesexceeded$11,906)accountedfor85percentoftheworldsR&Dspendingin2000(80percent

in2006). Thedevelopingcountryshareoftheworldtotalhasgrownovertimefrom5percentin1980

to15percentin2006(DehmerandPardey2010). Notably,China,IndiaandBrazilaccountforagrowing


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andnowdominantshareofthisdevelopingcountrytotal61percentofthedevelopingworldstotal

R&Dspendingin1980,increasingto83percentin2006.

ThedynamicsbetweenfoodandagriculturalR&Dandsciencespendinggenerallyarelikelyto

continuechanginginfutureyears,mostnotablyforthoselow andmiddleincomecountrieswith

growingsciencesectors. Figure10showsthatforthepastseveraldecadesatleast,spendingonfood

andagriculturalR&Dinhighincomecountrieshasbeenlessthan5percentoftotalsciencespending.

Onaverage,researchdirectedtowardfoodandagriculturalR&Dinthelow andmiddleincome

countrieswasaround20percentofthetotal(publicandprivate)researchconductedinthatpartofthe

worldduringthe1980s,butbythemid1990sthatsharestartedtodeclineandnowaveragesnearer10

percent.

Therecontinuestobeahugegapbetweenrichandpoorcountriesintermsoftheintensitywith

whichtheyinvestinfoodandagriculturalR&D. Figure11,Panela,showsthatthepublicagricultural

researchintensity(ARI)forlow andmiddleincomecountriesbarelybudgedduringthe1980sand

1990sandwaslessthanhalfthecorrespondingrichcountryfigureduringthisperiod. Moreover,the

intensitywithwhichhighincomecountriesinvestinfoodandagriculturalR&Dhastrendedupwards

sincethe1970s;andaveraged$2.95ofR&Dspendingforevery$100ofagriculturalGDPduringthe

period20002007. Theintensitygapbetweenricherandpoorercountriesisevenmorepronouncedin

terms

of

public

plus

private

spending

(Figure

11,

Panel

b).

Onaverage,theprivateshareoftotalfoodandagriculturalR&Dinrichcountieshastrended

upwardsfromaround36percentintheearly1970sto50percentin2007(Figure12,Panela). About60

percentofthisresearchrelatestofoodprocessingandbeverageproducts,ratherthanchemical,

biologicalandmachineryrelatedR&Dthathelpsspurfarmproductivity. Infact,researchintendedto

maintainorenhancefarmproductivityhasbeenagenerallydecliningshareofpubliclyperformedR&D

intheUnitedStates(wheredatawereavailabletoassessthistrend)(Figure11,Panelb). By2006,less

than57

percent

of

all

R&D

conducted

by

the

state

agricultural

experiment

stations

had

afarm

productivityorientation. IndicationsarethatthisU.S.trendmirrorsdevelopmentsinotherhighincome

countries.

Notonlyhasrichcountryresearchshiftedawayfromproductivityorientedendeavors,the

overallrateofgrowthofreal(i.e.,inflationadjusted)spendinghassloweddramatically;fromaround3


29/55

percentperyearduringthe1970stobarely1peryearforthepastseveraldecades(Figure13). While

therateofgrowthofspendinginlow andmiddleincomecountriesishigher,ittoohassuccessively

slowed,atleastuntiltheendofthe1990s. Ifthesespendingtrendspersist,itraisesrealquestionsasto

whetherthegrowthinagriculturalproductivityrequiredtosustainablymeetbasicfoodrequirementsin

thedecadesaheadwillberealized.

4. TheWayForwardLinkingGlobalR&DtoNationalNeeds19Thedemandfor(public)internationalagricultureresearch(IAR)continuestobestrong. Moreover,as

thecostsofinternationalcollaborationdecline(astravelandcommunicationscostsfall)andscaleand

scopeeconomiesbecomemoreprominent,supplysidedevelopmentswillcontinuetopushformore

notlessIAR. TheroleandcontributionsofIARtodevelopingcountryagriculturewillvarysignificantly

amongcountriesaccordingtotheirrespectivestageofdevelopmentandthesize,structureand

sophisticationoftheirnationalsciencecapacities. Forcountriesatthelowendofthestructural

transformationprocess,mostlycountriesinsubSaharanAfrica,thetraditionalfocusonfoodstaples

willcontinuetobeespeciallyimportant. Broadbasedproductivitygainsinstaplecropscanhavefar

reachingimpactsontheruralpoor(BinswangerandMcCalla2010). Thetaskcontinuestobedaunting

giventheheterogeneityofcropsandproductionenvironments,substantialexposuretoclimaterisks

(whichmaygetworse),historicallyandcontinuinglylowlevelsofinvestmentininfrastructureand

agricultureresearchcapacity,andapoorenablingenvironmentforenhancingproductivitygrowth.

Foremergingeconomies,ontheotherhand,IARcouldcapitalizeonthegrowingstrengthofnational

publicinstitutionsandprivatefirmsthatinvestintechnologygenerationanddeliveryandfocusits

effortsinareaswhereitcanprovideuniqueinternationalpublicgoods. Inthecaseoffavorable

productionenvironments,prebreedingmaterialsforshiftingyieldfrontiersforthemajorstaples,

managingtransboundarypests,andsustainingintensiveproductionsystems,aresomeoftheareas

whereinternationalagricultureR&Dcouldcontinuetobeanimportantandcosteffectiveoption.

Focusedresearchonstressproneenvironments(forexample,droughtandhightemperature)may

alsohaveimportantinternationalresearchcomponents..

ThesupplyofpubliclyprovidedIARtodevelopingcountryresearchprogramsishowever,

becomingincreasinglyconstrainedbyvariabledonorsupport,agrowingdisconnectwithprivate

19ThissectiondrawsonPingali(2009).


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sectorpriorities,apushtowardsdownstreamproductadaptationanddisseminationactivitiesrelative

toinnovationandproductdevelopment,andalackofclearlinksbetweeninternationalpublicgood

researchandnationalagriculturedevelopmentpriorities. Countryleveldonorcoordinationand

alignmentmechanisms,asspecifiedintheParisDeclarationonAidEffectiveness,donotexplicitly

accountfortheroleofinternationalagricultureresearchinthedevelopmentprocess. Thissection

presentssomeoptionsforrebuildingsynergiesbetweeninternationalpublicgoodresearchand

nationalagriculturedevelopmentpriorities.

FindingSynergiesbetweenPublicandPrivateR&D

Asdocumentedabove,privatesectorinvestmentinagricultureR&Dhasincreasedinrichcountries

andfortheincreasinglymarketorientedpartsoftheproductionsystemsinemergingeconomies.

Largemultinationalcorporationspartneringwithnationalagribusinessfirmsarebecomingaviable

alternativetopublicsectortechnologydelivery,mostnotablyinthecaseofhighvalueagriculture

(cotton,vegetables,andlivestock),hybridsofstaplecropssuchasmaize,andpestanddisease

managementandmachinerytechnologies. Postfarmprocessingtechnologiesarealsolargelyinthe

privaterealmandmakinginroadsinselectedemergingmarkets. Theabilitytocapturetherentsfrom

agricultureR&Dinvestments,throughtheuseofintellectualpropertyrightsandothermeanshas

increasedtheprivatepresenceininnovationintensivemarketsrelatedtofoodandagriculture,but

only

in

certain

segments

of

those

markets

and

with

an

emphasis

on

certain

countries

(Pingali

and

Traxler2002;PardeyandAlston2010). Thisexpandedprivatepresencehasoccurredatthesame

timeasgrowthinpublicR&Dspendinghasstalledorstumbled,shiftingtheoveralltrajectoryof

innovationinfoodandagriculturefurtherinthedirectionofcommercialfarmerswithsignificant

productivitygrowthpotentialandincreasinglyintegratingproductionagriculturewiththerapidshifts

inpostfarmfoodprocessingandmarketingoperations.20 Thispresentsadilemmaforthenational

andinternationalnonprofitsectorshouldtheyusetheprivatesectortoleveragetheirown

investmentsinbreadbasket

areas

or

should

they

redeploy

resources

to

protect

poor

farmers

growingorphancropsinmarginalareasfromdeterioratingtermsoftrade? Whileoneperspectiveis

thatpublicresearchshouldemphasizetheinterestsofmarginalfamers,therecentcrisishasbrought

20 Notablehereistherapidriseofsupermarketsinmanydevelopingcounties,aswellastheincreaseddemandforfood

consumedawayfromthehomeandconveniencefoodsconsumedinthehomeaspercapitaincomesriseforcertain

segmentsofcertainmarkets,particularlyinAsiaandLatinAmerica.


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renewedappreciationoftheeffectivenessofR&Dasaninstrumenttomoderateupwardpressureon

staplefoodcommodityprices. Thismayencouragegovernmentstoreorientresourcestoward

productive,commercialfarmerswiththegreatestpotentialimpactonmoderatingfoodprices

(althoughtheevidencefrompastspikesinglobalfoodpricesisthatthesetypesofresponseshave

beenshortlived).

Anenablingpolicyenvironmentthatincludesappropriateintellectualpropertyprotection,

reducedtradebarriers,andatransparentbiosafetyprocedurewillleadtofurtherprivateresearch

investmentsforcommercialproductionsystemsintheemergingeconomies. However,many

developingcountries,especiallyinsubSaharanAfrica,remainoutsidetheorbitofprivatesector

interests. Theprivatesectorisalsounlikelytoinvestmuchinresearchfortraditionalcropsgrowingin

especiallydifficultenvironments,suchasdroughtprevalentorhightemperatureenvironments,even

intransformingeconomies.21 Theprivatesectorsrecordindeliveringnaturalresourcemanagement

(NRM)technologiesisalsolimited,eveninadvancedcountryagriculture. Publicresearchinvestments

couldbejudiciouslyandcreativelydeployedtoleverageprivatetechnologydevelopmentanddelivery

capacitiestohelpmeettheneedsofthepoor(FAO2004).

ChangingAidArchitecture

Thenatureofoverallaidsupplytodevelopingcountrieshasbeenchangingdramaticallyoverthepast

decade

in

terms

of

the

quantities

provided,

the

plurality

of

funding

sources,

and

donor

coordination

andalignmentmechanisms. ThesechangeshavesignificantimplicationsforthewayIARisconducted

andtransferredtodevelopingcountries. ArecentOverseasDevelopmentInstitute(ODI)report

indicatesthattotalaidvolumeshaverisenfromaround$60billionperyearinthe1990stoaround

$100billionin2005andareanticipatedtoriseto$130billionby2010(BurallandMaxwell2006).

AveragedacrossOECDcountries,overseasdevelopmentassistance(ODA)asapercentageofgross

nationalincomehasrisenbackto0.33in2006afterhavingdroppedtoalowof0.22in1997

(OECD/DAC2006).

New

donor

countries,

such

as

China,

India,

Korea,

as

well

as

private

foundations

(suchastheGatesFoundation)andmultilateralfunds(GEF),haveaddedtotheoverallaidtotals.

21Thisiscertainlynottoarguethattheprivatesectorwillnecessarilyignoresuchresearch. Witness,forexample,the

partnershipbetweenCIMMYT,MonsantoCorporationandmanyotherstodevelopwaterefficientmaizevarietiesfor

Africansmallholderfarmers(seewww.monsanto.com/droughttolerantcorn/WEMA.asp).


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Growthinthevolumeofaid,thenumberofdonors,andmultiplicityofagendashasspurredcallsfor

greatercoordinationandalignmentofdonorsupportatthecountrylevel.

TheParisDeclarationonAidEffectiveness,sponsoredbytheDevelopmentAssistance

Committee(DAC)oftheOECD,hasbeenasignificantstepinthedirectionofenhancingdonor

coordination. Donorswhosignedontothedeclarationagreedtofollowgovernmentplansand

priorities(alignment)andtoworktogetherinthatprocess(harmonization). TheParisDeclaration

emphasizesbudgetsupporttopriorityprogramsatthecountrylevelratherthansupportfordiscrete

projectsthatmayormaynotbepartofthegovernmentplansandpriorities.

Dotheaboveeffortscontributetothepromotionoftransnationalpublicgoodresearchand

strengthentheR&Dpipelineforfarmlevelimpact? Thereareseveralreasonstobeconcerned. First,

therearenoobviousmechanismsfornationalplansandprioritiestoberesponsivetoemergingglobal

agricultureR&Dopportunities. Second,nationalprioritiestendtofocusondownstream,highly

adaptiveactivities,ratherthaninternationalpublicgoodresearch. Third,scaleeconomiesin

technologygenerationmaybelostifcountriesembarkonunnecessarilyduplicativeeffortsaround

similarproblems. Fourth,theCGIARitselfhasmovedmoredownstream(playingadevelopmentrole)

inseveralcountriesinresponsetodonorsupportforcountryspecificactivities,weakeningits

traditionalroleasasourceofinternationalR&Dspillovers. Finally,currentparalleleffortstowards

increased

harmonization

of

IAR

(including

the

CGIAR

reform)

do

not

take

into

account

donor

efforts

to

alignwithandsupportnationalplansandpriorities. So,whilethemovementtowardsnational

ownershipofdevelopmentagendasanddonoralignmentaroundthemisunquestionablygood,an

unintendedconsequencecouldbeadisruptionintheR&Dpipelinethatsuppliespublicgoodresearch

andtechnologiesforenhancingproductivitygrowthindevelopingcountryagriculture. Thelonglags

inherentinmovingfromR&Dinputstothetechnologiestakenupbyfarmersmakestheebbandflow

(andfaddishness)ofdonorfundingespeciallyproblematic.

Technology

Demand

AssessmentBeyond

Farmers

Voices

Muchofthediscussiononassessingtechnologydemandandpreferenceshasfocusedatthe

communitylevelusingavarietyofparticipatorymethods(seePingali,RozelleandGerpacio2001;

McIntyreetal.2009). Farmerassociationshavealsobeeninvolvedinmakingdecisionsonthe

allocationofresearchfunds,asintheYaquiValleyofMexico. Elicitingfarmervoiceinprioritysetting


33/55

isimportantatthemoreappliedandadaptiveendoftheresearchpipelineandforelicitinglocal

preferencesontechnologydesign. However,aggregatingacrossfarmerpreferencesandeliciting

informationonstrategic,longertermresearchprioritiesischallengingifthereisanexclusivereliance

onparticipatorymethods.

Thereareotheremergingtoolsandapproachesthatcanhelpassesstechnologydemandat

thenationalandregionallevelandbeaffectivelyusedbytheinternationalagricultureresearch

communityforsettingprioritiesandtargetingitsglobalpublicgoodresearchefforts. TheWorld

BanksLivingStandardsMeasurement(LSMS)groupisembarkingonamassivehouseholdpanel

surveyacrosssubSaharanAfrica,withafocusonruralhouseholds. Thisnationallyrepresentative

householdsurveywillprovideawealthofinformationonthestateofAfricanfarmingsystems,

technologyuse,andconstraintstoenhancingproductivitygrowth. TheLSMSdatacanbeinvaluable

ingeneratinganalysisanddiscussionsonnationallevelresearchprioritiesandtechnologydemands.

SincetheLSMSsurveysarestandardizedacrosscountries,aggregationatregionallevelsisalso

possible,hencetheabilitytoderivetransnationalresearchdemands. TheHarvestChoicedata

platformbeingjointlydevelopedbyIFPRIandtheUniversityofMinnesotaandawholeraftof

collaboratorsprovidesspatiallydisaggregateddataonavarietyofvariablesthatareimportantfor

assessingtechnologydemand.22 Agroclimatic,biophysicalandsocioeconomicdatacanbeoverlaidto

identify

priority

constraints

at

the

sub

national,

national

and

regional

levels,

and

to

target

technology

diffusionappropriately. TheHarvestChoiceplatformallowsforanexanteassessmentofpotential

technologyinterventionsatthenationalandsubnationallevels. InformationfromtheHarvestChoice

analysiscanbeusedforanexanteassessmentofpotentialtechnologiesatthegloballevelandover

timebyusingIFPRIsIMPACTmodelwhichisalsobeingrevampedtobetterservethisrole. The

challengeliesinincorporatingtheseimprovedanalyticaltoolsintotheshiftingpoliticaleconomies

thatshape(strategic)prioritiesforinternationalagriculturalresearch.

Improving

the

Links

between

International

R&D

and

National

Strategies

Thechallengeforthenewaidarchitectureistocreatemechanismsthatimprovethelinksbetween

internationalR&Dandnationalagriculturedevelopmentstrategies. Evenwithinacountry,the

processforidentifyingtechnologyneedsandprioritizingthemforbudgetsupportisdifficultand

22Formoredetailsseewww.HarvestChoice.org.


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uncertain,andR&Dcontinuestobeundervaluedinnationalstrategiesanddonorpriorities. More

thantwodecadesago,VernonRuttanbroachedtheideaofformingNationalResearchSupport

Groupstohelpassessandprioritizeresearchdemandsandchampiontheirsupplyatthenational

level(Ruttan1987). Thesesupportgroupscouldalsobeaconduitforbetterlinkingnationaland

internationalR&D. DataandanalysisgeneratedthroughtheLSMS,HarvestChoiceandother

initiativesdiscussedabovecouldstrengthentheabilityofnationalresearchgroupstoidentifypriority

problemsandtoidentifypotentialsolutionsontheglobalR&Dpipeline,andcoordinatetheir

adaptationanddiffusionatthenationallevel. Finally,theresearchsupportgroupscouldachievea

regionalandcontinentalvoicebyworkingcollectivelyinregionalgroupingssuchastheSouthern

AfricanDevelopmentCommunity(SADC)orECOWAS,theEconomicCommunityforWestAfrican

StatesandwithglobalalliancessuchasGFAR.


35/55

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