3443-SZ-RT-101_04

SPEEDBIRD HDPE PLANT SAFETY REPORT

Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101

Plant: 320KT/Y HDPE ClientBasell

PolyolefinsLocation: MÜNCHSMÜNSTER Sheet 1 / 37 Issue 04


03 FINAL ISSUE – INCORPORATING TUV COMMENTS MP RIM RIM 16-Apr-2009

03 FINAL ISSUE – AFTER CLOSE OUT SESSION SCF RIM RIM 13-Mar-2009

02 FINAL ISSUE ERM RIM RIM 21-Mar-2008

01 FIRST ISSUE ERM RIM RIM 30-Oct-2007

Issue Description Prepared Checked Approved Date

This document is Tecnimont’s property and cannot be used by others for any purpose without prior written consent


Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF WORK.....................................................81.1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................81.2 OBJECTIVE OF STUDY..............................................................................................................81.3 SCOPE OF STUDY....................................................................................................................9

2 SAFETY STUDY BASIS AND REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION.....................102.1 HAZOP STUDY.....................................................................................................................10

2.1.1 Basis.............................................................................................................................102.1.2 Documentation.............................................................................................................10

2.2 SIL CLASSIFICATION STUDY...................................................................................................112.2.1 Basis.............................................................................................................................112.2.2 Documentation.............................................................................................................11

3 SAFETY STUDY METHODOLOGY.............................................................123.1 HAZOP STUDY METHODOLOGY.............................................................................................12

3.1.1 Nodes for Study............................................................................................................123.1.2 Guidewords/Parameters...............................................................................................123.1.3 Worksheets...................................................................................................................133.1.4 Recommendations........................................................................................................133.1.5 Basis for Review of Equipment in Parallel/Series........................................................13

3.2 SIL CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY......................................................................................133.2.1 Overview.......................................................................................................................133.2.2 Identification of SIFs.....................................................................................................143.2.3 Description of Functions, Initiators and Final Elements...............................................143.2.4 Causes of SIF Demand and Consequences of SIF Failure.........................................153.2.5 SIL Study Guidelines....................................................................................................173.2.6 SIL Classification Worksheet........................................................................................18

4 SAFETY STUDY SESSIONS.....................................................................194.1 HAZOP/SIL STUDY PERIOD..................................................................................................194.2 STUDY TEAM.........................................................................................................................19

5 STUDY RESULTS...................................................................................205.1 RESULTS FOR HAZOP STUDY...............................................................................................20

5.1.1 Main process HAZOP Findings....................................................................................205.1.2 Vendor Packages and Management of Changes HAZOP Findings.............................215.1.3 Close Out Session HAZOP Findings............................................................................245.1.4 HAZOP Follow-up Actions............................................................................................24

5.2 SIL CLASSIFICATION RESULT.................................................................................................255.2.1 Index to SIL Classification Sheets................................................................................255.2.2 SIL Classification for main process..............................................................................255.2.3 SIL Classification for vendor packages and Management of Changes........................295.2.4 SIL Classification for Close Out Session......................................................................345.2.5 SIL Classification for Flare Package............................................................................355.2.6 SIL Classification for Dry Running Pumps and Pumps & Agitator Seal Pots...............36

6 References...............................................................................................................37



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1 – HAZOP NPP Project Worksheet Process

Attachment 2 – HAZOP NPP Project Worksheet Package and Extrusion

Attachment 3 – SIL Classification NPP Project Worksheet

Attachment 4 – Management of Changes NPP Project Worksheet

Attachment 5

Attachment 5.1- Main process HAZOP Team Member ListAttachment 5.2- Main process Node ListAttachment 5.3- Main process HAZOP WorksheetAttachment 5.4- Main process HAZOP Recommendation ListAttachment 5.5- Main process Drawing ListAttachment 5.6- Main process Master Drawing

Attachment 6

Attachment 6.1 – Main process SIL Classification Team Member ListAttachment 6.2 – Risk DiagramAttachment 6.3 – Main process Safety Instrumented Function ListAttachment 6.4 – Main process SIL Classification Worksheet

Attachment 7

Attachment 7.1a- Dryer Package HAZOP Team Member ListAttachment 7.1b- Off-gas Compressor HAZOP Team Member ListAttachment 7.1c- Refrigeration Package HAZOP Team Member ListAttachment 7.1d- Pellet deodorization Package HAZOP Team Member ListAttachment 7.1e- Polybutene Feeding System HAZOP Team Member ListAttachment 7.1f- Flare System HAZOP Team Member ListAttachment 7.1g- Management of Changes HAZOP Team Member List

Attachment 7.2a- Dryer Package Node ListAttachment 7.2b- Off-gas Compressor Node ListAttachment 7.2c- Refrigeration Package Node ListAttachment 7.2d- Pellet deodorization Package Node ListAttachment 7.2e- Polybutene Feeding System Node ListAttachment 7.2f- Flare System Node ListAttachment 7.2g- Management of Changes Node List

Attachment 7.3a- Dryer Package HAZOP WorksheetAttachment 7.3b- Off-gas Compressor HAZOP WorksheetAttachment 7.3c- Refrigeration Package HAZOP WorksheetAttachment 7.3d- Pellet deodorization Package HAZOP WorksheetAttachment 7.3e- Polybutene Feeding System HAZOP WorksheetAttachment 7.3f- Flare System HAZOP WorksheetAttachment 7.3g- Management of Changes HAZOP Worksheet



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Attachment 7.4a- Dryer Package HAZOP Recommendation ListAttachment 7.4b- Off-gas Compressor HAZOP Recommendation ListAttachment 7.4c- Refrigeration Package HAZOP Recommendation ListAttachment 7.4d- Pellet deodorization Package HAZOP Recommendation ListAttachment 7.4e- Polybutene Feeding System HAZOP Recommendation ListAttachment 7.4f- Flare System HAZOP Recommendation ListAttachment 7.4g- Management of Changes HAZOP Recommendation List

Attachment 7.5a- Dryer Package Drawing ListAttachment 7.5b- Off-gas Compressor Drawing ListAttachment 7.5c- Refrigeration Package Drawing ListAttachment 7.5d- Pellet deodorization Package Drawing ListAttachment 7.5e- Polybutene Feeding System Drawing ListAttachment 7.5f- Flare System Drawing ListAttachment 7.5g- Management of Changes Drawing List

Attachment 7.6a- Dryer Package Master DrawingsAttachment 7.6b- Off-gas Compressor Master DrawingsAttachment 7.6c- Refrigeration Package Master DrawingsAttachment 7.6d- Pellet deodorization Package Master DrawingsAttachment 7.6e- Polybutene Feeding System Master DrawingsAttachment 7.6f- Flare System Master DrawingsAttachment 7.6g- Management of Changes Master Drawings

Attachment 8

Attachment 8.1a- Dryer Package SIL Classification Team Member ListAttachment 8.1b- Pellet deodorization Package SIL Classification Team Member ListAttachment 8.1c- Management of Changes SIL Classification Team Member List

Attachment 8.2a- Dryer Package Safety Instrumented Function ListAttachment 8.2b- Pellet deodorization Package Safety Instrumented Function ListAttachment 8.2c- Management of Changes Safety Instrumented Function List

Attachment 8.3a- Dryer Package SIL Classification WorksheetAttachment 8.3b- Pellet deodorization Package SIL Classification WorksheetAttachment 8.3c- Management of Changes SIL Classification Worksheet

Attachment 9

Attachment 9.1- Close Out HAZOP Team Member ListAttachment 9.2- Close Out HAZOP Node ListAttachment 9.3- Close Out HAZOP WorksheetAttachment 9.4- Close Out HAZOP Recommendation ListAttachment 9.5- Close Out HAZOP Drawing ListAttachment 9.6- Close Out HAZOP Master Drawings

Attachment 10

Attachment 10.1- Close Out SIL Classification Team Member ListAttachment 10.2- Close Out SIL Classification Safety Instrumented Function ListAttachment 10.3- Close Out SIL Classification Worksheet



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Attachment 11 - HAZOP Recommendations Follow Up NPP Process

Attachment 12 – HAZOP Recommendations Follow Up NPP Extrusion and Packages

Attachment 13 – HAZOP Recommendations Follow Up HDPE Speedbird Changes

Attachment 14 - Management of Changes Register HDPE Speedbird

Attachment 15 – Flare Risk and SIL Assessment Report

Attachment 16 – SIL Classification for Pumps Running Dry and Seal Pot Agitators

Attachment 17 – Safety Relevant Loop List HDPE Speedbird



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



EXECUTIVE SUMMARYEnvironmental Resources Management (ERM), an independent HSE consultancy, was commissioned by Tecnimont (TCM) to carry out a safety study for the Speedbird HDPE plant. The study consists of the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) studies. The Speedbird high density polyethylene (HDPE) Plant of Basell Polyolefins is to be built in Munchsmunster, Germany.

Speedbird HDPE plant is being developed as “Copy Plant Concept” based on the existing NPP plant, which is located in Plock, Poland and is also licensed by Basell. The design of Speedbird HDPE plant is almost identical to the NPP Plant. Due to this concept, the safety study for the Speedbird HDPE plant was primarily based on the HAZOP/SIL studies and Management of Changes that were conducted by TCM for Poland HDPE plant [Attachment 1, Attachment 2, Attachment 3 and Attachment 4].

The safety study for Speedbird HDPE plant [Attachments from 5 to 12, 15 and 16] concentrated on the additional hazards introduced due to differences from Poland HDPE plant.

The safety study for main process was carried out in September 2007.

The safety study for vendor packages and Management of Changes (MOC) was carried out in March 2008.

A close out session of the safety study for the additional changes identified after March 2008 was carried out by TCM and Basell in February 2009.

Additional SIL Classification for Flare Package was carried out in August 2009 and additional SIL Classification for Pumps Running Dry, Pumps and Agitators SIL pot was carried out in November 2009.

This report presents the details of the three studies, together with the close out of the recommendations and the register of all the changes identified in the Management of Changes for HDPE Speedbird Project.

For ease of completeness, also the following documents are enclosed in Attachment 17:

3443-SK-LE-001 Safety Relevant Loops for Process Plant

3443-SK-LE-002 Safety Relevant Loops for Process Plant

During the sessions a total of 67 HAZOP recommendations and 4 SIL recommendations were identified for resolution or further investigation.


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Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



A summary of the HAZOP and SIL classification study for the changes in HDPE Plant is shown in Table 1.1 below.

Table 1.1 Summary of HAZOP and SIL Classification study for the changes in HDPE Plant

Main Process

Vendor packages and

Management of Changes

Close Out

SessionFlare

Pumps Running Dry and

Seal Pots

Number of P&IDs 29 23 11 - -

Number of Nodes studied 37 13 6 - -

Number of HAZOP recommendations 39 25 3 - -

Number of Safety Instrumented Functions 21 19 7 8 25

SIL - 2 5 0 3 25

SIL a 3 10 7 3 0

SIL 1 7 3 0 1 0

SIL 2 9 1 0 1 0

SIL 3 0 0 0 0 0

Number of SIL recommendations 4 0 0 0 0

Close-out of all recommendations is shown in Attachment 11, 12, 13.


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Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



1 INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF WORK

1.1 Introduction

The Speedbird HDPE plant Hostalen Project involves the construction of a high density polyethylene polymerisation plant with Logistic Facility, Common Utilities and Offsite Facility. The polyethylene complex will be located in Munchsmunster, Germany. The project will include a process plant with capacity of producing 320,000 tonnes of high density polyethylene (HDPE) per year.

Tecnimont S.p.A (TCM) is responsible for the engineering design. The licensor for the HDPE Plant is Basell Polyolefins (Basell). Environmental Resources Management (ERM), an independent HSE consultancy, was commissioned to carry out a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Classification Study.

Speedbird HDPE plant is being developed as “Copy Plant Concept” based on the existing NPP plant, which is located in Plock, Poland and is also licensed by Basell. The design of Speedbird HDPE plant is almost identical to the NPP Plant. Due to this concept, the safety study for the Speedbird HDPE plant was primarily based on the HAZOP/SIL studies that were conducted for Poland HDPE plant [Attachment 1, Attachment 2, Attachment 3 and Attachment 4]. The safety study for Speedbird HDPE plant concentrated on the additional hazards introduced due to differences from Poland HDPE plant.

A Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Classification study was also conducted by ERM, at the end of the HAZOP session, again for the changes from the NPP plant. The result of the SIL Classification Study was also included in this report.

The safety study for main process was carried out in September 2007. The safety study for vendor packages and Management of Changes (MOC) was carried out in March 2008.

A close out session of the safety study for the additional changes identified after March 2008 was carried out by TCM and Basell in February 2009.

According to TUV comments and requirements, additional SIL Classification for Flare Package was carried out in August 2009 and additional SIL Classification for Pumps Running Dry, Pumps and Agitators SIL pot was carried out in November 2009.

This report presents the details of the 4 (four) studies.

1.2 Objective of Study

The HAZOP study for the Speedbird HDPE plant was done with an objective to study and identify additional hazard and operability problems that may be encountered due to the changes from the NPP Plant such that suitable mitigation measures can be incorporated in the design and/or in the operating procedures.


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Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



The SIL Classification was conducted for the Speedbird HDPE plant based on the SIFs introduced additionally or modified in the Logic Diagrams, Cause and Effect Charts and the associated Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs) for the changes from NPP Plant.

For systems with identical configurations, only one system was reviewed as a representative case and the comments shall be applicable for similar systems. The SIL study was conducted in accordance with the General Specification for SIL Classification.(2)

1.3 Scope of Study

Since the Speedbird HDPE plant is being developed as “Copy Plant Concept” based on the existing NPP plant, which is located in Plock, Poland and is also licensed by Basell, the HAZOP and SIL classification study covered only the new aspects of Speedbird HDPE plant which were either previously not covered in the NPP Project HAZOP and SIL Study or have to be revisited due to changes.

Attachment 5.5, Attachment 7.5 and Attachment 9.5 show the P&IDs that have been reviewed for the Speedbird HDPE Plant.

Every process change with respect to NPP Plant is documented in the Management of Change Register (Attachment 14) and procedure for HAZOP/SIL study of the change is integrated in the HSE MOC procedures. The same concept will apply for vendor packages and hence no HAZOP will be done if the vendor is not changed or with respect to NPP Project. Vendor package will be subject to full HAZOP only if the selected vendor for the Speedbird HDPE plant is different or a new package is introduced to Speedbird HDPE plant.



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



2 SAFETY STUDY BASIS AND REFERENCED DOCUMENTATION

2.1 HAZOP Study

2.1.1 Basis

The basis for the HAZOP study was primarily the P&IDs issued for review, marked-up with additional information, where applicable. The HAZOP Master P&IDs, with mark-ups indicating the Nodes, have to be included in the safety report as Attachment 5.6, Attachment 7.6 and Attachment 9.6

2.1.2 Documentation

The following documentation was also made available during the HAZOP study and used as reference during the meetings:

Process flow diagrams

P&IDs (Issued for Design, marked-up incorporating HAZOP actions)

NPP Project main process and Vendor Packages HAZOP reports

Management of Change (MOC) worksheets

Equipment list

Plot plan

Major equipment data sheets (as required)

Interlock Description



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



2.2 SIL Classification Study

2.2.1 Basis

The SIL Classification was conducted for the Speedbird HDPE plant based on the SIFs additionally introduced or modified in the Logic Diagrams, Cause and Effect Charts and the associated Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs) due to the changes from NPP Plant.

2.2.2 Documentation

MuMu Project SIL Classification Methodology (adopted from NPP Project SIL Classification Methodology)

Process flow diagrams

P&IDs (Issued for Design, marked-up incorporating HAZOP actions)

NPP Project SIL Classification report

Management of Change (MOC) worksheets

Interlock Description

Operating sequences (as required)

Alarm philosophy/ Set point (as required)



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



3 SAFETY STUDY METHODOLOGY

3.1 HAZOP Study Methodology

The HAZOP Study was conducted in accordance with the HAZOP General Specifications (1).

3.1.1 Nodes for Study

The Nodes were based on the changes identified as requiring HAZOP study. Attachment 5.2 Attachment 7.2 and Attachment 9.2 includes a list of nodes and their description. The design conditions, the identification numbers of equipment involved in the node and the reference drawing numbers are also included in the node listing. The Nodes are marked on the Master P&IDs, presented in Attachment 5.6, Attachment 7.6 and Attachment 9.6

3.1.2 Guidewords/Parameters

The guidewords and parameters used for the study are based on the HAZOP General Specifications (1) and presented in Table 3.2.

Each node was considered in detail to identify any potential safety or operational problems that may arise due to deviations in the process parameters. The Causes and Consequences of each deviation were identified and the HAZOP team then evaluated the adequacy of existing safeguards, and where necessary, additional safeguards recommended as Actions.

Table 3.2 HAZOP Guidewords/Parameters and Related Deviations

Deviations Guide Word Parameter Comment

No/Less Flow No/Less Flow

More Flow More Flow

Reverse Flow Reverse Flow

High Pressure High Pressure

Low Pressure Low Pressure Includes Vacuum

High Temperature High Temperature

Low Temperature Low Temperature

High Level High Level Includes interface high level

Low Level Low Level Includes loss of level, interface level low and loss of interface level

Contamination/ Additional Phase As well as Composition

Composition Change/ Loss of Phase

Part of Composition/ Phase

Includes loss of stream wherever applicable

Start-up Hazards/ Requirement Others

Shutdown/ Maintenance Hazards/ Requirement

Others Isolation, drain, purge

Utility Failure Others Includes air, power, steam, cooling water, nitrogen

Tube Failure/ Leakage Others



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



3.1.3 Worksheets

The session proceedings were recorded using PHA-Pro 7 (3). The records were projected on a screen for comment and agreement by the team members during the sessions.

While a full recording approach was adopted for all applicable guidewords/deviations listed in Table3.2 whereby every deviation considered by team was recorded even when no significant causes or consequences were found, recording by exception (where an entry is recorded only when the team makes a recommendation or the issue is considered significant) was followed for few nodes as agreed by team,

The completed HAZOP worksheets are included in Attachment 5.3, Attachment 7.3 and Attachment 9.3

3.1.4 Recommendations

A number of recommendations for changes to equipment and procedures were identified during the HAZOP study, which, in the team’s opinion, will improve the safety and/or the operability of the facility. A list of recommendations for the HDPE Plant is included in Section 5.1.1 and shown in Attachment 5.4, Attachment 7.4 and Attachment 9.4

All the recommendations will be reviewed by the licensor and resolved as appropriate.

3.1.5 Basis for Review of Equipment in Parallel/Series

In case of multiple equipments (with duty and standby/spare equipment) inside a unit, the study was conducted for one set of equipment. Similarly, in case of similar equipments in series, such as reactors in series, the study was conducted on one reactor only. The recommendations from this study will therefore apply for such similar systems as well. The study has however, considered the impact of simultaneous operation of systems in parallel or series including the control requirements and the effect of trip of one system on the other.

3.2 SIL Classification Methodology

3.2.1 Overview

The criticality of each SIF in preventing/controlling the hazards is reflected in the performance requirement placed upon each SIF, as defined in the form of a Safety Integrity Level (SIL). There are 4 levels defined in the SIL Classification General Specification (2), each with a target Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) as listed in Table 3.3.



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Table 3.3 Probability of Failure on Demand for SIL

Safety Integrity Level (SIL)* PFD1 10-2 to < 10-1

2 10-3 to < 10-2

3 10-4 to < 10-3

4 < 10-4-

*Additional Classification - : No requirements a : No special requirements (but retained in SIS logic) b : A single Protective Instrument System is not sufficient

The methodology for determining the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) follows the procedure described in SIL Classification General Specification (2) and IEC 61511.

The key steps of the SIL classification are described in the following subsections.

3.2.2 Identification of SIFs

The Interlock Description was first reviewed to identify the SIFs that required SIL classification. These were also confirmed by reviewing the P&IDs and the HAZOP worksheets. Only those functions within the SIS system and initiated by the process to potentially prevent a specific hazardous situation were selected for classification, thus, the following types of functions listed in the SIFs were not classified:

Hand-switch operated functions (operator activated). A default value of SIL1 is assumed;

Basic Process Control System (BPCS) (FIC, TIC reset etc);

Permissive functions; and

Emergency equipment isolation functions. A default value of SIL 1 is assumed.

3.2.3 Description of Functions, Initiators and Final Elements

The SIFs were defined with a function description, design intent, one or more initiator(s) (ie instrument(s) to detect a hazardous situation) and one or more final element(s) (ie elements that act to mitigate the hazardous situation).

The final element(s) of the SIF were chosen as those which directly meet their design intent. Thus, only one or two final elements were usually defined for any function, and where more than one were selected, a success criterion was defined for these final elements. The other elements acted upon by the initiators if assessed to be secondary were left unclassified (they may however, be retained for implementation in the SIS system). Some of these unclassified elements may act as a primary final element for another SIF and assigned appropriate SIL classification. Those final elements not covered under any other SIF as primary final element were checked, where required, to ensure no separate classification was required.

A success criterion was also assigned separately to initiators and final elements. For instances, if three sensors are provided to detect a hazardous situation such as low pressure in pilot gas feed



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



and only two of them functioning is sufficient to activate the SIS sequence then the success criterion would be 2oo3. The same logic applies to final elements as if any valve closing out of 2 valves is sufficient to achieve the SIF design intent the success criterion would be 1oo2.

Independent functions with a common initiator or a common final element shall be classified individually on the basis that all other functions are operating properly. When one initiator is shared by two or more final elements, one additional classification is required which considers failure of the initiator (synergetic consequence).

3.2.4 Causes of SIF Demand and Consequences of SIF Failure

The study team then described the demand scenario (cause of SIF demand) and consequence(s) of failure on demand (CoFoD) and the numerical frequency and consequence ratings were then assigned according to Risk Diagrams as shown in Attachment 6.2.

A demand on a SIF may be caused by instrument malfunction, operator error, or equipment failure to operate such as pump or compressor trip. The frequency of demand was then assessed, i.e. how often is the SIF likely to be activated (Frequency of Demand, W classification), as shown in Table3.4. This forms the base frequency of demand (base W).

Table 3.4 Frequency of Unwanted Occurrence-Demand Rate (W)

Frequency of Unwanted Occurrence Event

W1 A very slight probability that the unwanted occurrence will come to pass and only a few unwanted occurrences are

W2 A slight probability that the unwanted occurrence will come to pass and a few unwanted occurrences are

W3 A relatively high probability that the unwanted occurrence will come to pass and frequent unwanted occurrences are likely

The following aspects were investigated for the consequence of SIF failure:

Potential extent of human injury (S classification);

Potential extent of environmental damage (E classification); and

Potential commercial loss (L classification).

The safety SIL classification accounted for the exposure time in the area occupied during a normal working period (Exposure Parameter, F classification) and the possibility of avoiding the hazardous event if the safety-related system failed to operate (Avoidance Parameter, P classification). The avoidance parameter was also applicable to the environmental consequences.

The avoidance parameter took into account:

Operation of a process, supervised (i.e. operated by skilled or unskilled person) or unsupervised;

Rate of development of the hazardous event (for example suddenly, quickly or slowly);



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Ease of recognition of danger (for example danger seen immediately, detected by technical measures such as critical alarms or detected without technical measures;

Avoidance of hazardous event (for example escape routes possible with sufficient time, not possible or possible under certain conditions); and

Actual safety experience (such experience may exist with an identical or similar equipment under control or may not exist).

Different categories of S, L, E, F and P are defined and presented in Table 3.5 to Table 3.7.

Table 3.5 Definition of Consequences Severity related to Risk Parameter (C)

HEALTH & SAFETY (S) ENVIRONMENTAL LOSSES (E) ECONOMICAL LOSSES (L)

C1 (S1) Minor or no injury. (E1) Inform neighbors or community

(L1) Plant Shutdown, no property damage

C2 (S2) Serious permanent injury to one or more persons, death to one person.

(E2) Contamination on the site (L2) Short term major loss of profit, > Euro 400,000 loss due to property damage or business interruption

C3 (S3) Death to several people.

(E3) Contamination off the site or of the ground water

(L3) Medium term, major loss of profit, > 4,000,000 loss due to property damage or business interruption

C4 (S4) Very many people killed. (Taken to significantly impact the general non-industrial population)

(E4) Major environmental damage of the site

(L4) Long term, major loss of profit, > 40,000,000 loss due to property damage or business interruption

It is highlighted that the criteria for economic losses had been discussed and evaluated during the SIL classification review for the HDPE.

Table 3.6 Exposure Parameter* (F)

Exposure Parameter

Classification

F1 Rare to more often exposure in the hazardous zone. F2 Frequent to permanent exposure in the hazardous zone.

Note:* applicable only to safety consequences.

Table 3.7 Avoidance Parameter* (P)

Avoidance Parameter

Classification

P1 Possible under certain conditions P2 Almost impossible

Note:* applicable only to safety and environmental consequences.

The ultimate consequence for personnel safety was assessed assuming operator present in the vicinity, and exposed to a loss of containment scenario leading to fire and/or explosion. All consequences were classified and the most stringent SIL was selected for that function.



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



As part of the frequency of demand analysis or following the consequence assessment, the risk reduction potential from other safeguards that are independent from the SIF and from the cause of the hazard protected was also reviewed. For each such safeguard identified, a risk reduction factor was determined and applied to the base frequency of demand, exposure parameter, avoidance parameter or consequence severity as appropriate. Likewise, the study took credit for the independent safeguards that mitigate the likelihood or consequence by reducing the classified SIL. Risk reduction credit was given to all safeguards having a low probability of failing simultaneously due to common causes.

3.2.5 SIL Study Guidelines

Since the assessment based on risk diagrams is a qualitative assessment, rule sets shown in Table3.8 were adopted, in assigning the levels for the various parameters shown in the Risk Graphs in Attachment 6.2, in order to ensure some consistency in the assessment, even if such assessment is carried out by the same team.

Table 3.8 Rule Set for Frequency of Demand

Initiating EventInitiating Event Frequency

(per year)Demand

Rate

Control loop failure >1.E-01 W2

Analyser failure (ARAMCO / Dupont) >1.E-00 W3

Pump Failure Loss of Flow (OREDA, conservatively W3) 7.9E-01 W3/ W2

Positive Displacement Pump Trip (OREDA) 1.1E-00 W3

Centrifugal Compressor Trip (OREDA) 2.1.E-00 W3

Single Mechanical Pump Seal Leak 1.E-01 W2

Double Mechanical Pump Seal Leak with announcement 1.E-02 W1

Canned/Magnetic Drive Pump Leak 1.E-02 W1

Loss of electrical power 1.E-01 W2

General Utility Failure 1.E-01 W2

3rd Party Intervention (external impact by vehicle, etc.) 1.E-02 W2

Lightning Strike (when this is the initiating event) 1.E-03 W1

Unloading/Loading Hose Leak Rupture 1.E-01 W2

Piping Leak / Rupture - <100 m Pipe (>20% Cross Section) 1.E-03 / 1.E-04 W1

Piping Leak / Rupture - >100 m Pipe (>20% Cross Section) 1.E-02 / 1.E-03 W1

Atmospheric Tank Failure 1.E-03 W1

Pressure Vessel Failure Significant Release 1.E-05 W1

Heat Exch. tube leak <100 tube 1.E-02 W1

Heat Exch. tube leak >100 tubes 1.E-01 W2

Heat Exch. tube rupture <100 tubes 1.E-03 W1

Heat Exch. tube rupture >100 tubes 1.E-02 W1

Operator Failure (if considered in the analysis) Under stress, emergency, action performed more than once a quarter.Unstressed, action performed more than once a quarter.Under stress, emergency, action performed once/Qtr. or lessUnstressed, action performed once/Qtr. or less

W3W2W2W1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



3.2.6 SIL Classification Worksheet

The PHA-Pro 7 (3) has been used to document the SIL Classification process. The record was projected on a screen for comment and agreement by team members during the sessions.

Preparation for the study was conducted prior to the commencement of the SIL Classification session based on the reference documents as stated in the SIL Classification Methodology.

The completed SIL Classification worksheets are included in Attachment 6.3, Attachment 8.2, Attachment 10.2, Attachment 15 and Attachment 16


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Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



4 SAFETY STUDY SESSIONS

4.1 HAZOP/SIL Study Period

The HAZOP study for main process of Speedbird HDPE plant was held between 10 th and 14th

September, 2007, and the SIL Classification study was conducted on 14 th September at Tecnimont’s office in Milan, Italy. HAZOP of Node number 1 to 34 of main process HAZOP were done with participation of Basell while node number 35 to 37 of main process HAZOP were HAZOPed internally by TCM and then reviewed later in a dedicated meeting with Basell.

Similarly, SIL Classification of SIFs 1 to 4 were done with Basell participation while SIFs 5 to 21 were classified internally and then reviewed later in a dedicated meeting with Basell. Any changes, as considered appropriate, based on feedback from Basell, were incorporated in the worksheets for HAZOP study and SIL classification study for the above nodes/SIFs.

The HAZOP study for vendor packages and Management of Changes was held between 3rd and 10th March, 2008, and the SIL Classification study was conducted after each HAZOP session. All HAZOP and SIL Classification studies were done with Basell participation except SIL Classification of Deodorization System SIFs 3 to 8 and Management of Changes SIFs 11, 12 were classified internally and then reviewed later by Basell.

A close out session of HAZOP study for the additional changes identified after March 2008 was carried out by TCM and Basell on 08th and 09th February, 2009 the SIL Classification study was conducted after each HAZOP session.

Additional SIL Classification Session for Flare Package was carried out on 6 th August 2009 and additional SIL Classification Session for Pumps Running Dry, Pumps and Agitators SIL pot was carried out on 28th November 2009.

4.2 Study Team

HAZOP/SIL Study team comprised of a multidisciplinary team of personnel involved with the Project and having adequate experience of design, instrumentation, operation, maintenance, safety and loss prevention. Representatives from Basell and Tecnimont participated in the HAZOP and SIL Classification sessions. Services of other specialists were called upon as required.

The details (names, company and discipline) of the HAZOP and SIL Classification team members who attended the HAZOP and SIL Classification session are presented in Attachment 5.1 and Attachment 6.1 for main process, in Attachment 7.1 and Attachment 8.1 for vendor packages and Management of Changes and in Attachment 9.1 and Attachment 10.1 for the Close out Session.


<04>


Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



5 STUDY RESULTS

5.1 Results for HAZOP Study

5.1.1 Main process HAZOP Findings

During the main process HAZOP sessions, a total of 39 recommendations, as listed below in Table5.9, were identified for resolution or further investigation.

Table 5.9 HAZOP Recommendation List for main process of HDPE Plant

Recommendations Place(s) Used Responsibility

1. Provide double check valves instead of a single check valve at 1" TEAL start-up line

3.2.1.2 TCM-Process

2. Provide interlock to trip 2P1204 on loss of open condition for 2HV-12110 4.1.1.1 TCM-Process

3. Provide interlock to trip 2P1205 on loss of open condition for 2HV-12210 6.1.1.1 TCM-Process

4. Ensure correct labelling on site of the alignment valves and reactor catalyst lines in order to avoid mis-alignment during changeover.

7.1.1.2 TCM

5. Operating procedure should highlight the consequence of mis-direction of catalyst feeds.

7.1.1.2 Basell

6. P&ID to include note indicating the requirement of elevating the alignment valves relative to the upstream/downstream piping in order to avoid sedimentation inside the valves.

7.2.1.1 TCM/ Basell

7. Provide interlock to trip 2P1302A/B on loss of open condition for 2HV-13103 10.1.2.1 TCM-Process

8. Provide interlock to close each reactor outlet feed to 3rd flash vessel on closed condition of 2HV-12310B depending on the mode of operation. This can be implemented through feedback from manual bypass valves at flash vessel inlet.

8.1.3.2 TCM/ Basell

9. Verify 2PSV-12303-S is sized for 2PIC-12315 failure case. 8.4.1.1 TCM-Process



12. Interlock 2S-33303A is indicated on P&ID but this cause is not included in the interlock description for 2S-33303A. Interlock description to be revised.

20.6.1.1, 20.6.1.2

TCM-Process

13. Operating procedure to mention the requirement of repeating the distillation step in case of accidental opening of 2H/Y-33101/ 33102

20.6.1.1, 20.6.1.2

Basell

14. Interlock 2S-33302 will prevent operational flexibilty of draining the reactor when one of the distillation vessel is under discharge mode (though other distillation vessel is available to accept the reactor drain contents). To facilitate the above operational flexibility, provide open/ close limit switch for manual diversion valves in the reactor drain line (or isolation valves at the reactor) to distillation vessels 2D3303A/B. Interlock can then be modified such that loss of closed position of reactor drain line isolation or diversion valve will prevent opening of the bottom discharge valve of corresponding distillation vessel.

20.6.5.1 TCM-Process

15. Provide independent level switch with interlock to close the reactor drain line isolation valves 2HV-33601A/B and trip pump 2P3301A/B on high high level in distillation vessel.

20.11.2.1, 20.11.2.2

TCM/ Basell

16. Push button 2HS-33301A should be located at a safe distance from big bag filling point.




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




17. In case an interlock is provided inside the recycle gas compressor package to trip the compresor on high level in suction damper 2D3206, the interlock 2I-12312 can be deleted and a DCS alarm can be retained.

9.1.1.1 TCM-Process

18. Confirm this safeguard (High Pressure Safeguard 2.1.1) with decanter vendor. 15.1.2.1 TCM-Process

19. P&ID to be updated to indicate the sight glass. 16.1.1.1 TCM-Process

20. Provide check valve downstream of 2FV-22304 16.3.1.1 TCM-Process

21. Locate pump start panel at a safe location from the pit. 22.1.1.1 TCM-Process

22. Provide hydrocarbon detectors inside the pump pit. 22.1.2.1 TCM-Process

23. Waste offgas compressor 2C3402 discharge design pressure is 6 barg and offgas header design pressure is 5 barg. Design parameters to be reviewed to address this discrepancy

23.1.1.1, 23.2.2.1

TCM-Process

24. Confirm 2PSV-41102-B is sized for 2PV-41301A full open case. 24.1.1.1 TCM-Process

25. Note to be included in the P&ID to highlight the requirement of locating check valve as close as possible to the tank 2D4103 nozzle.


26. Delete check valve in the waste offgas inlet to flare knockout drum 2D3402. 28.1.1.1 TCM-Process

27. Provide high pressure alarm with 2PI-62106. 31.1.1.1 TCM-Process

28. Delete check valve in pump 2P6211 suction line as it will not provide protection in case 2PSV-62203-R actuates (will restrict relief of pressure since PSV is routed to pump suction and joins the section between check valve and pump)


29. Provide overflow line for soda process tank 2D6210 routed to safe location. 32.6.1.1 TCM-Process

30. Provide check valve in the caustic dosing line to distillation vessel 2D3303A. 32.7.1.1 TCM-Process

31. Check the possibility of reverse flow from membrane unit 2PK2301 and provide protection measures if required.


32. Provide high pressure alarm at pump 2P6210A/B discharge independent from 2PIC-62201.


33. Provide a local temperature gauge in the caustic circulation line upstream of 2PV-62201.


34. Interlock 2I-62202 should also close DM water inlet to soda process tank 2D6210.


35. Provide suction strainer for pump 2P6211. Consider relocating strainer provided upstream of 2HV-62201 to 2P6211 suction.




38. Consider control of 2PIC-22305 through pressure transmitter located downstream of take-off point for 2FV-22304. To be confirmed with conveying system vendor.



Notes: Place (s) used refer to the HAZOP worksheet. Example, Place(s) Used. 3.2.1.2 refers to node no. 3, deviation no. 2, and associated consequences no. 1.2

5.1.2 Vendor Packages and Management of Changes HAZOP Findings

During the vendor packages and Management of Changes HAZOP sessions, a total of 25 recommendations, as listed below in Table 5.10 to Table 5.16, were identified for resolution or further investigation.



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Table 5.10 HAZOP Recommendation List for Dryer Package


1. Provide a relief valve on each expansion vessel 2D2207A/B sized for N2 fully open case.

1.4.1.1 TCM/ NIRO

2. Provide a relief valve at the hot water inlet of each set of dryer panel sized for pump flow case and set at 6barg.

1.4.2.1 TCM/ NIRO

3. 2PSV-22113S/ 22114S should be sized for DM water full open case. 1.4.3.1 TCM/ NIRO


Table 5.11 HAZOP Recommendation List for Off-gas Compressor Package


1. Consider sizing 2PSV-34104S on separator 2D-3404 for N2 valve full open case.

1.1.1.1 TCM/ NASH

2. Consider providing a PSV on the DM water make up line (inside package battery limit and downstream of isolation valve), sized for DM water valve full open case and set at 6barg.

1.2.1.1 TCM/ NASH


Table 5.12 HAZOP Recommendation List for Refrigeration Package


No Recommendation was made during HAZOP session of Refrigeration Package

Table 5.13 HAZOP Recommendation List for Pellet Deodorization Package


1. Consider tripping the pellet rotary feeder 2RF-5104 on very high level in deodorizer feeding hopper instead of tripping entire pneumatic transport package. This will give operator flexibility to take a decision whether divert it to homogenizer/ recycle bin or trip pneumatic transport.

1.1.1.1 TCM

2. Consider only tripping rotary feeder 2RF-5801/ 5803 and not very low pressure steam on very high level in pellet deodorizer 2D-5801. However, tripping of steam on very high pressure is still to be retained

1.1.2.1 TCM

3. Provide a low temp alarm with 2TI-58102/ 58103 on pellet deodorizer 1.1.2.1 TCM

4. Consider providing a temp indication with high temp alarm on the waste gas outlet of deodorizer condenser 2E-5801

1.8.1.1, 1.8.2.1, 1.8.3.1, 1.14.1.1

TCM

5. Consider relocating the check valve from present location i.e. on the 16" waste gas line from pellet deodorizer to the 4" waste gas line from deodorizer condenser

1.1.2.2 TCM

6. Provide a low flow alarm on 2FIC-58103 1.9.1.1 TCM

7. Consider tripping the pellet water conveying pumps 2P-5802A/B in case of loss of open condition of both bottom HVs of pellet conveying pick up vessel

2.1.1.2 TCM/ Coperion

8. Verify there is an interlock to trip rotary feeder 2RF-5802 on very high level in deodorizer pellet receiver 2D-5806. The set point of very high level trip should be such that deodorizer pellet receiver can receive the pellet content of pellet conveying pick up vessel




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




9. Check the requirement of designing steam ejector downstream piping and pellet conveying pick up vessel for LP steam condition. Consideration may be given to fact that this operation is required only during startup and pellet conveying pick up vessel is open to atmosphere


10. Check the suitability of the type of level instrument used for tripping the conveying water pump considering there will be pellet level in the vessel which may affect the level measurement and thus intended purpose of interlock may not served.

2.9.1.1, 2.9.2.1

TCM/ Coperion


Table 5.14 HAZOP Recommendation List for Polybutene Feeding


1. Confirm that 2FICA-51112 provides alarm in case of high or low flow 1.2.2.1 TCM


Table 5.15 HAZOP Recommendation List for Flare System


1. Check maximum back pressure for all flaring scenarios to be within design pressure drop of 45mbar

1.2.1.1 TCM


Table 5.16 HAZOP Recommendation List for Management of Changes


1. Consider closing the 2HV-12104 on close condition of 2HV-12106 (through 2S-12107)

1.1.1.2 TCM

2. Consider an interlock/ permissive to inhibit starting of hexane unloading pump 2P-4104 on loss of open condition of 2XV-41201

2.1.1.2 TCM

3. Check that design pressure of pump seal pot is equal or more than design pressure of N2 system (8.5barg). If not pressure protection system like a relief valve, need to be provided for pump seal pot

2.4.1.1 TCM/ Basell

4. Confirm hexane truck tank is designed for full vacuum condition 2.5.1.1 Basell

5. Provide a selector switch for selecting the 2HV-41103/ 41105 in line that will trip the mother liquid feed pump 2P-4102A/B on loss of open condition. This is required considering only one of the HVs will be in open condition at a time

3.1.2.3 TCM

6. Provide a selector switch for selecting the 2HV-41102/ 41104 in line that will trip the distilled hexane feed pump 2P-4101A/B on loss of open condition. This is required considering only one of the HVs will be in open condition at a time

3.1.3.3 TCM

7. Consider tripping the hexane feed pumps and flushing hexane pump 2P-1104A/B and 2P-1105 also on loss of open condition of 2HV-41102/ 41104. Also provide a selector switch for selecting the 2HV-41102/ 41104 in line that will trip the pumps

3.1.3.3 TCM

8. Provide a note on P&ID (3443-XZ-DM-001_241) to route the outlet of 2PSV-24101 to safe location

4.1.1.1 TCM




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



5.1.3 Close Out Session HAZOP Findings

During the vendor packages and Management of Changes HAZOP sessions, a total of 3 recommendations, as listed below in Table 5.9 were identified for resolution or further investigation.

Table 5.9 HAZOP Recommendation List for Close Out Session


1. Check with Coperion if it is correct to vent directly from 2D5804 or if the vent shall be relocated to the seal pot, in order to maintain the blanketing function.

2.1.1.1 TCM / Coperion

2. Install an independent low temperature alarm on 2D5804 2.7.1.1 TCM

3. Consider to provide Grounding on the bottom of discharge pipe to be connected to the truck.

3.10.1.1, 3.10.1.2

TCM


5.1.4 HAZOP Follow-up Actions

Proper follow-up and close-out of all recommendations has been monitored through HAZOP Recommendations List Follow Up Sheets and documented in Attachment 11, 12, 13.



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



5.2 SIL Classification Result

5.2.1 Index to SIL Classification Sheets

The list of Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) and the SIL study worksheets are presented in Attachment 6.3 and Attachment 6.4 for main process, Attachment 8.2 and Attachment 8.3 for vendor packages and Management of Changes, Attachment 10.2 and Attachment 10.3 for the Close out Session, Attachment 15 for Flare Package and Attachment 16 for Dry Running Pumps and Pumps and Agitator Seal Pots

5.2.2 SIL Classification for main process

A total of 21 functions were classified in the main process SIL Classification study, the findings of the SIL studies are presented in Table 5.10 and Table 5.11.

Table 5.10 Safety Functions for main process of HDPE Plant Identified

Function InitiatorsPrimary Final

ElementsInterlock

IDComment

Overall SIL

1. On high high temperature in HP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6201 and steam outlet to header are closed

2TAHH-62105 2XV-62105 2S-62101 SIL 1

2TAHH-62106

1oo2

2. On high high pressure in HP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6201 and steam outlet to header are closed

2PAHH-62111 2XV-62105 2S-62101 SIL a

3. On high high temperature in LP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6203 and steam outlet to header are closed

2TAHH-62109 2XV-62109 2S-62103 SIL 1

2TAHH-62110

1oo2

4. On high high pressure in LP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6203 and steam outlet to header are closed

2PAHH-62106 2XV-62109 2S-62103 SIL a

5. High level in separation drum 2D1205 trips compressor 2C3201 and closes 2PV-12315

2LAH-12308 2C3201 stops 2I-12312 SIL a

6. On high high pressure in 2D3303A, reactor drain header is closed

2PAHH-33305A 2HV-33601A 2S-33302A Classification is also applicable to 2S-33302B

SIL 1

2PAHH-33307A 2HV-33601B

1oo2 1oo2

2PAHH-33305A 2FV-33304A 2S-33302A Classification is also applicable to 2S-33302B

SIL a

2PAHH-33307A


<04>


Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




ElementsInterlock

IDComment

Overall SIL

7. On high high pressure in 2D3303A, LP steam to distillation vessel are closed

1oo2

8. On not closed position of HV-33301A, reactor drain header and LP steam to distillation vessel are closed

2HZLL-33301A 2HV-33601A 2S-33302A Classification is also applicable to 2S-33302B If HAZOP recommendation 14 is implemented, the initiator will include an additional tag which will be open/close position of the diversion valve and then the two initiators will be activating interlock in 2oo2 voting.

SIL 2

2HV-33601B

1oo2

9. On not closed position of HV-33302, reactor drain header and LP steam to distillation vessel are closed

2HZLL-33302 2HV-33601A 2S-33302A SIL 1

2HV-33601B

1oo2

10. On high high pressure in 2D3303B, reactor drain header is closed

2PAHH-33305B 2HV-33601A 2S-33302B Classification same as SIF 6

SIL 1

2PAHH-33307B 2HV-33601B

1oo2 1oo2

11. On high high pressure in 2D3303B, LP steam to distillation vessel are closed

2PAHH-33305B 2FV-33304B 2S-33302B Classification same as SIF 7

SIL a

2PAHH-33307B

1oo2

12. On not closed position of HV-33301B, reactor drain header and LP steam to distillation vessel are closed

2HZLL-33301B 2HV-33601A 2S-33302B Classification same as SIF 8

SIL 2

2HV-33601B

1oo2

13. High pressure in 2D3303A, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed

2PAH-33305A 2HV-33302 2S-33303A Classification is also applicable to 2S-33303B

SIL 2

2PAH-33307A 2HV-33301A

1oo2 2oo2

14. On high high temperature in 2D3303A, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed

2TAHH-33304A 2HV-33301A 2S-33303A Classification is also applicable to 2S-33303B

SIL 2

15. On not closed position of HV-33601A/B, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed

2HZLL-33601A/B 2HV-33302 2S-33303A Classification is also applicable to 2S-33303B

SIL 1

1oo2 2HV-33301A

2oo2



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




ElementsInterlock

IDComment

Overall SIL

16. On not closed position of FV-33304A, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed

2FZLL-33304A 2HV-33301A 2S-33303A Classification is also applicable to 2S-33303B

SIL -

17. High pressure in 2D3303B, bottom discharge are closed

2PAH-33305B 2HV-33301B 2S-33303B Classification same as SIF 13

SIL 2

2PAH-33307B

1oo2

18. On high high temperature in 2D3303B, bottom discharge are closed

2TAHH-33304B 2HV-33301B 2S-33303B Classification same as SIF 14

SIL 2

19. On not closed position of HV-33601A/B, 2D3303B bottom discharge are closed

2HZLL-33601A/B 2HV-33301B 2S-33303B Classification same as SIF 15. If HAZOP recommendation 14 is implemented, the initiator will include an additional tag which will be open/close position of the diversion valve and then the two initiators (considering HZLL-33601A/B together as 1oo2) will be activating interlock in 2oo2 voting.

SIL 1

1oo2

20. On not closed position of FV-33304B, 2D3303B bottom discharge are closed

2FZLL-33304B 2HV-33301B 2S-33303B Classification same as SIF 16

SIL -

21. On high high pressure at 2P3301A/B discharge, stop pump

2PAH-33103A 2P3301A stop 2S-33314 SIL 2

2PAHH-33103B 2P3301B stop

1oo2 2oo2

A summary of the results is provided in Table 5.11. The recommendations made during the SIL Classification session, are shown in Table 5.12.

Table 5.11 HDPE Plant main process SIF Classification Summary

Safety Integrity Level SIF Number %

SIL - 2 9.5%

SIL a 5 23.8%

SIL 1 7 33.3%

SIL 2 7 33.3%

Total 21 100%



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Table 5.12 SIL Recommendation List for HDPE Plant main process

Recommendations Place(s) Used

1. Check for protections inside the extruder package. In case independent protections are provided inside the package, W2 can be reduced to W1 for extruder damage. However, W2 can still be considered for piping damage.

CoFoD: 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3

2. Check if there is any other independent safeguards for plate heat exchanger for dryer 2D2201 inside the package and if present, W2 can be reduced to W1. However, for piping damage W2 is still valid.

CoFoD: 3.1.2

3. As per HAZOP Recommendation 17, in case an interlock is provided inside the recycle gas compressor package to trip the compressor on high level in suction damper 2D3206, the interlock 2I-12312 can be deleted and a DCS alarm can be retained.

CoFoD: 5.1.1, 5.1.2

4. Check if there is any other independent safeguards for plate heat exchanger for dryer 2D2201 inside the package and if present, W2 can be reduced to W1 for plate type heat exchanger damage. However, for piping damage W2 is still valid.

CoFoD: 3.1.1

Place(s) Used 1.1.1 means Interlock (Fn) 1, Design Intent 1, Demand Scenario 1.



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



5.2.3 SIL Classification for vendor packages and Management of Changes

A total of 19 functions were classified in the SIL Classification study of vendor packages and Management of Changes , the findings of the SIL study are presented in Table 5.13 to Table 5.18.

Table 5.13 Safety Functions for Dryer package of HDPE Plant Identified


ElementsInterlock

IDComment

Overall SIL

1. On low low flow of hot water to dryer panel, cut the feed to centrifuge 2S2101A/B/C, after a time delay

2FALL-22132 Close 2IV-21101 2I-22101 2I-22101 is presently actuated by 2P-2201A/B stop condition as one of the initiator. Now initiator is changed to very low flow at hot water pump discharge

SIL 1

2FALL-22133 Close 2XV-21102

1oo2 1oo2

Close 2IV-21102

Close 2XV-21104

1oo2

Close 2IV-21103

Close 2XV-21106

1oo2

Overall 3oo3

2. On low speed of rotary feeder 2RF-2201, stop the rotary feeder

2SAL-22101 Stop 2RF-2201 2I-22106 Same classification will be applicable for 2I-22107

SIL a

1oo1

A summary of the results is provided in Table 5.14.

Table 5.14 HDPE Plant Dryer package SIF Classification Summary


SIL - 0 0

SIL a 1 50

SIL 1 1 50

SIL 2 0 0

Total 2 100



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Table 5.15 Safety Functions for Deodorization package of HDPE Plant Identified


ElementsInterlock

IDComment

Overall SIL

1. To stop feed to pellet deodorizer in case of very high level

2LAHH-58101 Stop 2RF-5801 2S-58101 SIL 1

Stop 2RF-5803

1oo2

2. To stop feed to pellet deodorizer in case of very high pressure

2PAHH-58101 Close 2FV-58101 2S-58101 SIL -

Close 2FV-58102

2oo2

3. To stop rotary feeder to pellet deodorizer on low speed

2SAL-58102 Stop 2RF-5801 2I-58102 As per interlock description, low speed of 2RF-5801 or 2RF-5803 is tripping the 2RF-5801. Interlock is now changed to tripping 2RF-5801 on low speed 2RF-5801 and tripping 2RF-5803 on low speed of 2RF-5803

SIL a

4. To stop rotary feeder tp pellet deodorizer on low speed

2SAL-58103 Stop 2RF-5803 2I-58105 Interlock description to be updated

SIL a

5. To stop rotary feeder to pellet conveying pick-up vessel on low speed

2SAL-58101 Stop 2RF-5802 2I-58202 SIL a

6. To stop rotary feeder on very high level in deodorizer feeding hopper

2LAHH-58102 Stop 2RF-5104 2I-58103 As per interlock description, entire conveying package 2PK-5101 is tripped on very high level which now is changed to tripping only rotary feeder 2RF-5104. Interlock description to be revised

SIL a

7. To trip deodorization package in case of high O2 content in the waste gas from deodorizer condenser

2AIAHH-58101 Stop 2RF-5801 2S-58104 SIL 1

Stop 2RF-5803

1oo2

8. To stop pellet feed to pellet conveying pick up vessel in case of very high level

2LAHH-582XX Stop RF-5802 2I-58201 Interlock description including tag no. to be updated

SIL a


Table 5.16 HDPE Plant Deodorization package SIF Classification Summary


SIL - 1 12.5

SIL a 5 62.5

SIL 1 2 25



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




SIL 2 0 0

Total 8 100

Table 5.17 Safety Functions for Management of Changes of HDPE Plant Identified


ElementsInterlock

IDComment

Overall SIL

1. Close ethylene feed to reactor on very high pressure on reactor

2-PAHH-12101 Close 2FV-12103 2S-12101 Classification is also applicable to corresponding SIFs 2S-12201/ 2S-12301 for reactor 2 & 3. The SIF is classified only for one demand scenario where 2FIC-12103 malfunctions, to acknowledge introduction of 2HV-12106 since other conditions are same as for NPP plant

SIL 2

Close 2HV-12106

1oo2

2. To stop unloading pump on loss of suction

2LAL-41201 Stop 2P-4104 2S-41201 SIL a

3. To stop unloading operation on loss of earthing connection

2ZAL-41201 Stop 2P-4104 2S-41201 SIL a

Close 2XV-41201

2oo2

4. To stop unloading operation in case of truck movement during unloading

2ZAL-41202 Stop 2P-4104 2S-41201 Stray movement of truck can lead to spill (if occurring is likely to be upstream of 2XV-41201) which is not protected by stopping the pump or by closing the suction valve. The primary protection is the quick closing type break-away coupling (mechanical safety device). Considering above, this SIF is not discussed further, but can be still be retained as an ESD function.

Close 2XV-41201

2oo2

2LAHH-41105 Close 2XV-41105A 2I-41101 Closing of 2XV-41109 is considered to be a

Close 2XV-41105B



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




ElementsInterlock

IDComment

Overall SIL

5. To stop hexane flow to mother liquor tank in case of very high level in tank

secondary action since the available inventory for pumping is limited as compared to capacity of the mother liquor tank. Primary actions are closing 2XV-41105A and B which is an existing interlock in NPP plant. Hence, this SIF is not discussed further

2oo2

6. To stop catalyst dosing pump on loss of suction valve open condition

2HZSH-11115 Stop 2P-1101A/B (depending on the running pump)

2I-11110 SIL -

7. To stop mother liquid feed pump on loss of suction valve open condition

2HZSH-41103/ 41105 (depending on the valve in line)

Stop 2P-4102A 2S-41106 SIL -

Stop 2P-4102B

2oo2 (Considering auto-start)

8. To stop hexane feed pump on loss of suction valve open condition


Stop 2P-4101A 2S-41105 SIL -

Stop 2P-4101B


9. To stop catalyst feed pump in case of emergency situation

ESD command from 2S-12201/ 12301

Stop 2P-1101A/B (depending on the running pump)

2S-12201/ 12301

Interlock is existing, change is due to introduction of selector switch depending on the reactor feeding the pump. Hence this SIF is not discussed further

10. To trip 1st reactor on emergency shutdown of 2nd and 3rd reactor or very high pressure or very high level in 1st flash vessel

2S-12101/ 2I-12102

The interlock is extended to incorporate flexibility of reactor operation introduced where reactors can be operated independently. Also 1st reactor can now feed directly to 3rd flash vessel. Hence this SIF is not discussed further

11. To close feed valve to 1st/ 2nd flash vessel in case of high pressure or high level in 3rd flash vessel 2D-1203

2S-12302 The interlock is extended to incorporate flexibility of reactor operation introduced where 1st reactor can feed the 3rd flash vessel or 2nd reactor can feed the 3rd flash vessel (corresponding tag no. introduced for each mode of operation). Hence this SIF is not discussed further.



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




ElementsInterlock

IDComment

Overall SIL

12. To close feed valve to 1st/ 2nd flash vessel in case of loss of open condition for 3rd flash vessel feed valve

2HZLH-12310B not active

Close 2LV-12301A 2I-12313 SIL -

Close 2LV-12301B

2oo2

Close 2LV-12101A

Close 2LV-12101B

2oo2

Close 2LV-12201A

Close 2LV-12201B

2oo2

Overall 1oo2 (2 is depending on the mode of operation)

13. To initiate 2I-21104/ 21105/ 21106 on very high level in mother liquor collecting vessel

2I-21104/ 21105/ 21106

Change involves shifting the initiator from level control to dedicated level switch, hence this SIF is not discussed further.

14. To trip Al-alkyl pump 2P-4103A on high bearing temp

2TAH-41310 Stop 2P-4103A 2I-41303 Classification is also applicable to 2I-41304 (for B pump)

SIL a

15. To trip Al-alkyl pump 2P-4103A on low level in suction pipe

2LAL-41312 Stop 2P-4103A 2I-41303 Classification is also applicable to 2I-41304 (for B pump)

SIL a

16. Auto start provision for stand-by condensate pump 2P-5801A/B

2I-58106 Interlock is an auto-start function and considered as a control function rather than safety function, hence not discussed further


Table 5.18 HDPE Plant Management of Changes SIF Classification Summary


SIL - 4 44.4

SIL a 4 44.4

SIL 1 0 0

SIL 2 1 11.1

Total 9 100



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



5.2.4 SIL Classification for Close Out Session

A total of 7 functions were classified in the Close Out Session SIL Classification study, the findings of the SIL studies are presented in Table 5.19 and Table 5.20.

Table 5.19 Safety Functions for Close Out Session of HDPE Plant Identified


ElementsInterlock ID Comment

Overall SIL

1. To stop 2RF 5801 and 2RF 5803 on very high level in 2D5801

2 LAHH-58101 Stop 2RF-5801 2S-58107 Refer to SIF.1 of SIL Classification for Deodorization package.Stop 2RF-5803

1oo2

2. To stop 2RF 5802 on very high level in 2D5806

2LAHH-58205 Stop 2RF 5802 2IS-58204 SIL a

3. To stop pump 2P 5802A on valve 2XV-58207 left inadvertently close

2HZLH-58207 Stop of 2P 5802A 2IS-58205 Same as SIF 4 for Pump P5802B

SIL a

4. To stop pump 2P 5802B on valve 2XV-58206 left inadvertently close

2HZLH-58207 Stop of 2P 5802B 2IS-58206 Same as SIF 3 for Pump P5802B

SIL a

5. To stop rotary feeder 2RF- 5802 on temperature alarm very high in 2D5804

2TAHH-58202 Stop of 2RF 5802 2IS-58207 SIL a

6. To stop rotary feeder 2RF- 5802 on temperature alarm very low in 2D5804

2TALL-58202 Stop of 2RF 5802 2IS-58207 SIL a

7. To close steam valve 2XV58211 on low flow alarm

2FAL-58202 2XV-58211 2IS-58210 SIL a

8. To close 2D4103 inlet on high pressure in 2D4103

2PAH-41303 2XV 41401 2S41301 SIL a

2HV41404

1oo2


Table 5.20 HDPE Plant Close out Session SIF Classification Summary


SIL - 0 0

SIL a 7 100

SIL 1 0 0

SIL 2 0 0

Total 7 100



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



5.2.5 SIL Classification for Flare Package

A total of 8 functions were classified in the Flare SIL Assessment Study, the findings of the SIL studies are presented in Table 5.21 and Table 5.22.

Table 5.21 Safety Functions for Flare SIL Classification


ElementsInterlock ID Comment

Overall SIL

1. Smokeless Steam Supply Loop

5FT-68142

5FT-68135

5PT-68133

5TT-68135

5FV-68142 5FIC 68142 SIL a

2. K.O. Drum Heating Loop High Level

5TT-68132

5LSHH-68139

5TV-68132 5I-68101 SIL a

3. K.O. Drum Heating Loop Low Level

5LSLL-68140 5TV-68132 5TIC68132 SIL a

4. Continuous Pilot Fuel Gas Supply Loop

5PSL-68111 5XV-68122 5IS-68110 SIL 2

5. Water Seal Loop – High Level

5LSHH-68176 5XV-68171 5I-68111 SIL -

6. Water Seal Loop – Low Level

5LSL-68174 5XV-68171 5I-68111 SIL -

7. Water Seal Loop – Wrong Temperature

5TE/TI-68170 5TV-68170 5TIC68170 SIL -

8. Fuel Gas Purge Loop 5PSL-68126 5XV-68127 5I 68126 SIL 1


Table 5.22 Flare Package SIF Classification Summary


SIL - 3 37.5

SIL a 3 37.5

SIL 1 1 12.5

SIL 2 1 12.5

Total 5 100



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



5.2.6 SIL Classification for Dry Running Pumps and Pumps & Agitator Seal Pots

A total of 25 functions were classified in the Dry Running Pumps and Pumps & Agitator Seal Pots SIL Assessment Study, the findings of the SIL studies are presented in Table 5.23.

Table 5.23 Safety Functions for Pump Running dry and Seal Pots


ElementsInterlock ID

Overall SIL

1. 2P1101A Dry Run Protection 2HZLH 11115/18 Stops 2P1101A 2S11110 SIL -

2. 2P1101B Dry Run Protection 2HZLH 11116/17 Stops 2P1101B 2S11111 SIL -

3. 2P1201A/B Dry Run Protection 2LALL 12102 Stops 2P1201A/B 2I12106 SIL -

4. 2P1204 Dry Run Protection 2LALL 12103 Stops 2P1204 2I12108 SIL -






10. 2P2101A/B Dry Run Protection 2HZLH 21204 Stops 2P2101A/B 2I21207 SIL -





15. 2P3301A/B Dry Run Protection 2HZSH 31101 Stops 2P3301A/B 2I31111 SIL -

16. 2P4103A Dry Run Protection 2LAL 41312 Stops 2P4103A 2I41303 SIL -

17. 2P4103B Dry Run Protection 2LAL 41313 Stops 2P4103B 2I41304 SIL -


19. Sealing System Typical 1 - API Plan 52 2LAH11166A; 2LAL11167A Alarm Only N.A. SIL -

20. Sealing System Typical 2 - API Plan 52 2PAH12160A; 2LAL12160A Alarm Only N.A. SIL -

21. Sealing System Typical 3 - API Plan 52 2LAH13160A; 2LAL13161A Alarm Only N.A. SIL -

22. Sealing System Typical 4 - API Plan 52 2PAH31160A; 2LAL31160A Alarm Only N.A. SIL -

23. Sealing System Typical 5 - Ekato 2LAH12166; 2LAL12164 Alarm Only N.A. SIL -

24. Sealing System Typical 6 - Ekato 2PAH13361; 2LAL13361 Alarm Only N.A. SIL -

25. Sealing System Typical 7 - Zucchetti 2LAL111162A Alarm Only N.A. SIL -

All the safety functions for Pumps Running Dry and Seal Pots are not SIL classified (SIL -)



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



6 REFERENCES

1. HAZOP General Specification, 3443-SZ-SG-103 Rev.02

2. General Specification for SIL Classification, 3443-SZ-SG-103, Rev.02

3. Dyadem International Ltd. PHA-Pro 7, HAZOP/SIL Recording Software



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 1

HAZOP WORKSHEET NPP PROJECT PROCESS



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 2

HAZOP WORKSHEET NPP PACKAGE AND EXTRUSION



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 3

SIL CLASSIFICATION WORKSHEET NPP PROJECT



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 4

MOC WORKSHEET NPP PROJECT



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


PolyolefinsLocation: MÜNCHSMÜNSTER Sheet 0/ 34 Issue 04

ATTACHMENT 5

Main process HAZOP STUDY



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 5.1

Main process HAZOP TEAM MEMBER LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Team Members Company Title 1. 10-09-2007 2. 11-09-2007 3. 12-09-2007 4. 13-09-2007 5. 14-09-2007

Sachin Gupta ERM Facilitator Present Present Present Present Present

Daniel Kong ERM Scribe Present Present Present Present Present

Giampietro Orlandini TCM Process Present

Fabio Scarioni TCM HSE Present Present

Simone Villari TCM HSE Present

Maurizio Rigolio TCM HSE Partial

Boris Brat TCM/ TPI Process Present Present Present Present Present

Andreas Heinrich Basell Operations Present Present Present Present Present

Rodrigo Carvajal Basell Process Present Present

Reinhard Kuehl Basell Process Present Partial Present

Guenter Sachs-W Basell Maintenance Partial Partial



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 5.2

Main process NODE LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Nodes Node Intent Design Conditions/Parameters Drawings Equipment ID Comment

1. Catalyst dosing system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0001)

To provide continuous supply of catalyst to any of the three reactors. The catalyst pumps 2P1101A/B take suction from the catalyst suspension vessels 2D1102A/B. At anytime one vessel is under catalyst preparation stage and the other provides the feed to pump.

2P1101A/B: Design flowrate 0.3 m3/hr; Differential P 22.81 bar; Design P 40 barg; Design T 100 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_111A

2P1101A/B, 2D1102A/B

This system is similar to the one considered for NPP HAZOP. The difference is of the individual isolation valves at the pump suction, one for each suspension vessel which is now replaced with a 3-way suction valve.

3443-XZ-DM-001_111C

3443-XZ-DM-001_121A

2. Agitator blade modification (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0002)

Blade modification due to mixing problem. No new HAZOP issues identified.

3. Reactor pre-activation line (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0003)

TEAL is added through this line to reactor 2R1201 in order to prepare the medium for starting the reaction. This will reduce the start-up time.

2P4103A/B: Design flowrate 1.5 m3/hr; Design P 16 barg; Design T 180 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_111B

2P4103A/B System is identical for all three reactors and hence, discussion and recommendations for 2R1201 are also applicable for 2R1202 and 2R1203

3443-XZ-DM-001_121A

3443-XZ-DM-001_413

4. 1st flash vessel bottom outlet (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0004)

To send the slurry from 1st flash vessel to the 2nd reactor. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 1st flash vessel to enable isolation of flash vessel inventory from remote in case of emergency.

2P1204: Design flowrate 120 m3/hr; Design P 30 barg; Design T 230 degC; Differential P 5.12 bar

3443-XZ-DM-001_121B

2P1204

5. 1st flash vessel offgas system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0005)

Separation vessel 2D1204 is provided in the offgas line from 1st flash vessel post-condenser 2E1205 in order to separate out any entrained liquid from offgases before routing to offgas compressor package 2PK3401 or recycle gas compressor package 2PK3201.

2D1204: Design P 25 barg/ FV; Design T 230/ -29 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_121B

2D1204

6. 2nd flash vessel bottom outlet (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0006)

To send the slurry from 2nd flash vessel to the 3rd reactor. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of flash vessel to enable isolation of flash vessel inventory from remote in case of emergency.

2P1205: Design flowrate 240 m3/hr; Design P 30 barg; Design T 230 degC; Differential P 5.13 bar

3443-XZ-DM-001_122B

2P1205

7. Catalyst feed to reactor (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0007)

Interconnection piping has been provided at the discharge of catalyst dosing pump 2P1101A/B to allow flexibility in feeding catalyst to the one or more of three reactors under various modes of operation.

2P1101A/B: Design flowrate 0.3 m3/hr; Differential P 22.81 bar; Design P 40 barg; Design T 100 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_111A

2P1101A/B

3443-XZ-DM-001_123A



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




8. 1st flash vessel bypass during K1 mode (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0008)

Provision to bypass 1st flash vessel to improve flexibility and reliability of the plant as through this provision, three reactors can be operated independently.

2D1203: Design P 6 barg/ FV; Design T 150 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_121B

2D1203 1) The discussion and recommendations in this node shall be applicable to the bypass stream for 2nd flash vessel. 2) During K2 mode (a combination of parallel and cascade mode), all interlocks applicable for both modes are considered to be sufficient.

3443-XZ-DM-001_122B

3443-XZ-DM-001_123B

9. 3rd flash vessel offgas system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0009)

Separation vessel 2D1205 is provided in the offgas line from 3rd flash vessel post-condenser 2E1209 in order to separate out any entrained liquid from offgases before routing to recycle gas compressor 2C3201. The separated liquid is routed to decanter feed vessel under gravity.


3443-XZ-DM-001_123B

2D1205

3443-XZ-DM-001_131

10. Decanter feed vessel bottom inlet and outlet (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0010)

The discharge from 3rd flash vessel is routed to the decanter feed vessel bottom. The slurry from decanter feed vessel is then pumped to decanters. Remote isolation valves are provided at the bottom inlet and outlet of the decanter feed vessel to enable isolation of inventory to prevent accidental draining.

2P1301A/B: Design flowrate 1000 m3/hr; Design P 18 barg; Design T 210 degC; Differential P 5.58 bar. 2P1302A/B: Design flowrate 350 m3/hr; Design P 10 barg; Design T 150 degC; Differential P 3.22 bar

3443-XZ-DM-001_123B

2P1301A/B, 2P1302A/B

3443-XZ-DM-001_131

11. Decanter system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0011)

PSV is provided on the decanters to protect against over pressurization due to excess nitrogen flow.

3443-XZ-DM-001_211A

Refer to Node 13 More Flow Conseq. 2.1.

12. No HAZOP requirements identified in HSE Management of Changes (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0012)

13. Pressure control system for decanter feed vessel and mother liquor collecting vessel (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0013)

To allow operation of decanter feed vessel at as low pressure as possible in order to separate lighters to maximum extent possible. Pressure control loop is provided for mother liquor collecting vessel to allow steady state operation at very low pressure thereby reducing the potential of high pressure in decanters.

2D1301: Design P 6 barg/ FV; Design T 150 degC. 2D2101: Design P 6 barg/ FV; Design T 150 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_131 2D1301, 2D2101

3443-XZ-DM-001_212



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




14. Mother liquor collecting vessel bottom outlet (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0014)

Mother liquor from 2D2101 is recycled back to reactors. Excess mother liquor under level control is routed to hexane distillation system. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 2D2101 to enable isolation of inventory from remote in case of emergency.

2P2101A/B: Design flowrate 240 m3/hr; Design P 20 barg; Design T 150 degC; Differential P 15.87 bar

3443-XZ-DM-001_212 2P2101A/B

15. Decanter system pressure control (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0015)

To prevent operation of decanters at pressure higher than 200 mbarg.

2S2101A/B/C: Design P 0.4 barg; Design T 120 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_222 2S2101A/B/C

16. 1st nitrogen conveying system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0016)

Nitrogen is used as a conveying medium for transporting nitrogen from dryer to powder treatment. Accumulated hexane in the circulation nitrogen is constantly purged under flow control to nitrogen scrubber 2T2201.

3443-XZ-DM-001_222

3443-XZ-DM-001_223


18. Mother liquor feed to hexane distillation system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0018)

Mother liquor from 2D2101 is recycled back to reactors. Excess mother liquor under level control is routed to hexane distillation system. Feed flow to 2E3102 is under cascade control through 2FIC-31101 which controls 2FV-31101B and flow from 2P-4102A/B to hexane distillation system through 2FV-31101A. 2FV-31101B is introduced additional as modification to route the excess mother liquor to tank 2D4102 from downstream of 2LV-21201 (controlled through 2FIC-31101) for better flow control.


3443-XZ-DM-001_212 2P2101A/B

3443-XZ-DM-001_311A

19. Steam jacket for adsorption towers (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0019)

Steam jacket lines deleted on adsorption tower system

No HAZOP issues identified.

20. Modification of wax treatment unit (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0020)

Mother liquor with 15-25% wax content from reboiler bottom 2E3302 is pumped to distillation vessel 2D3303A/B under flow control (through pump stroke). The light components like hexane are stripped off from the contents either by heating (through jacket)

2P3301A/B: Design flowrate 12 m3/hr; Design P 21 barg; Design T 200 degC; Differential P 5.04 bar. 2D3303A/B: Design P 10 barg/ FV; Design T 200 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_311A

2P3301A/B, 2D3303A/B

3443-XZ-DM-001_331

3443-XZ-DM-001_333B



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




or by using LP steam. The lighter components are then routed via condenser 2E3304A/B to separator drum 2D3302 under pressure control of distillation vessel. Wax is solidified as balls by addition of service water. Wax balls are dumped into big bags and water permeates through big bags to trench.

3443-XZ-DM-001_333D

21. Dedicated condenser provided for each distillation vessel (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0021)

To condense offgases from distillation vessels.

Not indicated on P&ID 3443-XZ-DM-001_333A

2E3304A/B New condenser similar to existing one. No new HAZOP issues identified.

22. Firewater collection system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0022)

In case of fire in the plant, the firewater discharged is routed to firewater collection pit instead of routing it to the rainwater channel. Firewater is then pumped to firewater discharge.

2P3307A/B: Design flowrate 1500 m3/hr

3443-XZ-DM-001_333C

2P3307A/B

23. Waste offgas system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0023)

Waste offgases from HDPE plant are compressed through 2C3402 and routed to cracker for utilization as a fuel. The pressure in waste gas header is controlled by 2PIC-34106 by flaring excess gases through 2PV-34106.

Offgas header: Design P 5 barg; Design T 150 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_341A

3443-XZ-DM-001_341B

3443-XZ-DM-001_001

24. Offgases from al-alkyl storage tank to monther liquor tank (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0024)

Offgases from al-alkyl storage tank 2D4103 are routed to mother liquor tank 2D4102 under pressure control of 2D4103. The intent is to route offgases with TEAL content to a safe system. Also, pockets are to be avoided in the offgas piping and hence 2D4102 is considered to be an appropriate receiver for this purpose.

2D4102: Design P 0.1 barg; Design T 100/ -29 degC. 2D4103: Design P 10 barg/ FV; Design T 180 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_411 2D4102, 2D4103

3443-XZ-DM-001_413

25. Al-alkyl pump minimum flow line (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0025)

Check valve provided in the al-alkyl minimum flow line at the al-alkyl storage tank end.


3443-XZ-DM-001_413 2D4103

26. No HAZOP requirement at this stage (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0026)

Change Analyzed in Polybutene package HAZOP – Refer Attachments from 7.1e to 7.6e


Change Analyzed in Deodorization package HAZOP – Refer Attachments from 7.1d to 7.6d



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




28. Low pressure waste offgas flaring (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0028)

In case of compressor trip, low pressure waste offgases are routed to plant flare through dip pot 2D3401. Shutdown valves deleted in the offgas line from dip pot to flare knockout drum 2D3402.

2D3401: Design P 3.5 barg/ FV; Design T 150 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_341A

2D3401



31. LP steam system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0031)

To generate LP steam for various consumers inside HDPE Plant. Instead of LP steam from B/L, now MP steam from B/L is let down to LP steam.

MP steam: Design P 16.5 barg; Design T 300 degC. LP steam: Design P 6 barg; Design T 200 degC. 2J6203: Design P 6 barg; Design T 300 degC. 2D6203: Design P 6 barg/ FV; Design T 300 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_621 2J6203, 2D6203

32. Caustic dosing system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0032)

40% caustic soda is received in IBCs which is unloaded into caustic dosing area. Caustic soda from IBCs is transferred to soda process tank through 2P6211. Caustic soda is then diluted (based on operational requirement) by adding DM water under flow contol. The contents of soda process tank are kept in constant circulation through soda feeding pumps 2P6210A/B. Soda requirement for consumption is withdrawn from discharge.

2P6210A/B: Design flowrate 3 m3/hr; Design P 6 barg; Design T 120 degC. 2P6211: Design flowrate 2 m3/hr; Design P 10 barg; Design T 120 degC. 2D6210: Design P 1 barg; Design T 120 degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_622 2P6210A/B, 2P6211, 2D6210

33. Hexane distillation column bottom outlet (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0033)

Distilled hexane from hexane distillation column is pumped to hexane tank 2D4101 through adsorption towers 2T3102A/B under level control of column. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 2T3101 to enable isolation of inventory from remote in case of emergency.


3443-XZ-DM-001_311B

2P3102A/B



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




34. Mother liquor evaporator discharge to distillation vessel (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0034)

Mother liquor from mother liquor evaporator 2E3102 is pumped to distillation vessel 2D3303A/B under flow control through 2P3301A/B. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 2E3102 to enable isolation of inventory from remote in case of emergency.


3443-XZ-DM-001_311A

2P3301A/B

35. Hexane feed vessel discharge to hexane distillation column (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0035)

Hexane from hexane feed vessel 2D3102 is pumped to hexane distillation vessel 2T3101 under level control of 2D3102. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 2D3102 to enable isolation of inventory from remote in case of emergency.


3443-XZ-DM-001_311A

2P3101A/B

36. Hexane circulation for nitrogen scrubber (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0036)

Refrigerated hexane is circulated through nitrogen scrubber 2T2201 in order to absorb entrained hexane in nitrogen which is used for dryer. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 2T2201 to enable isolation of inventory from remote in case of emergency.

2P2201A/B: Design flowrate 300 m3/hr; Design P 10 barg; Design T 150/ -45 degC; Differential P 2.66 bar

3443-XZ-DM-001_222 2P2201A/B


Change Analyzed in Refrigeration Unit package HAZOP – Refer Attachments from 7.1c to 7.6c



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 5.3

Main process HAZOP WORKSHEET



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101

Plant: 320KT/Y HDPE Client Basell Polyolefins Location: MÜNCHSMÜNSTER Sheet 12 / 34 Issue 04

Node: 1. Catalyst dosing system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0001)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_111A; 3443-XZ-DM-001_111C; 3443-XZ-DM-001_121A

Node Intent: To provide continuous supply of catalyst to any of the three reactors. The catalyst pumps 2P1101A/B take suction from the catalyst suspension vessels 2D1102A/B. At anytime one vessel is under catalyst preparation stage and the other provides the feed to pump.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2P1101A/B: Design flowrate 0.3 m3/hr; Differential P 22.81 bar; Design P 40 barg; Design T 100 degC

Equipment ID: 2P1101A/B, 2D1102A/B

Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendations Responsibility

1. No/ Less Flow 1. Pump suction valve left closed during line-up 1.1. Damage can happen if the pumps continue to run with suction closed for long time

1.1.1. Low flow alarm on 2FIC-11104/ 05 at pump discharge. Operator will have more than 10 minutes to react

1.2. Loss of catalyst feed to reactor will lead to loss of product quality and high pressure in reactor


1.2.2. High pressure alarm through 2PIC-12103-A on reactor. Operator will have more than 10 minutes to react

1.2.3. High high pressure trip provided on reactor with 2PAHH-12101 and 2PAHH-12103-B

1.3. Possible vacuum formation in suction line. This may possibly lead to air ingress into the system, however the quantity of air ingress in this case is not expected to be significant


1.4. Possible backflow of hexane from pump discharge to catalyst suspension vessel


1.4.2. Backflow is not expected as diaphragm pump will act as check valve

2. Running pump trips 2.1. Loss of catalyst feed to reactor will lead to loss of product quality and high pressure in reactor

2.1.1. Pump running indication and alarm provided on DCS. Operator will have more than 10 minutes to react





2.2.1. Pump running indication and alarm provided on DCS. Operator will have more than 10 minutes to react



3. Vessel is empty (runs out of catalyst) 3.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4

3.2. Possible low pressure in the catalyst suspension vessel and air ingress, however this is not considered to be credible since the capacity of the catalyst pump is very low (0.3 m3/hr)

3.2.1. Low level alarm provided on catalyst suspension vessel with 2LI-11101

4. Malfunction of pump (not developing pressure) 4.1. Same as Conseq. 1.2 and 1.4

5. Pump discharge valve left closed during line-up 5.1. Same as Conseq. 1.2

5.2. High pressure in pump discharge. Possible loss of containment 5.2.1. Low flow alarm on 2FIC-11104/ 05 at pump discharge. However operator intervention may not be possible

5.2.2. 2PSV-11106-S provided on the pump sized for blocked discharge

6. Feeding line to reactor 2R1201 blocked 6.1. Same as Conseq. 1.2 and 5.2

2. Reverse/ Misdirected Flow 1. Wrong alignment of pump suction 3-way valve due to operator error during maintenance on one vessel

1.1. During this condition, it is expected that the vessel nozzle will be blinded and suction isolation valve will be closed. Hence consequences are same as No/ Less Flow Cause 1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 2. Agitator blade modification (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0002)

Drawings:

Node Intent:

Design Conditions/Parameters:

Equipment ID:


Node: 3. Reactor pre-activation line (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0003)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_111B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_121A; 3443-XZ-DM-001_413

Node Intent: TEAL is added through this line to reactor 2R1201 in order to prepare the medium for starting the reaction. This will reduce the start-up time.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2P4103A/B: Design flowrate 1.5 m3/hr; Design P 16 barg; Design T 180 degC

Equipment ID: 2P4103A/B


1. No/ Less Flow 1. Hexane inlet to reactor 2R1201 isolation valve closed

1.1. Line subjected to pump 2P4103A/B shutoff pressure. 1.1.1. Line design pressure is 16 barg which is much higher than pump shutoff pressure

2. Reverse/ Misdirected Flow 1. Al-alkyl pump 2P4103A/B trips during TEAL addition along with hexane to reactor

1.1. Possible backflow of hexane through the minimum flow line of 2P4103A/B to al-alkyl storage tank 2D4103. Design pressure for hexane system is 21 barg whereas al-alkyl storage tank is designed for 10 barg

1.1.1. Check valve provided in the TEAL line at the injection point

1.1.2. Pump trip alarm 2EA-41302/ 03 provided on DCS

1.1.3. High pressure alarm provided in pump discharge through 2PIC-41302

1.1.4. Capacity of al-alkyl storage tank is 120 m3. Assuming vessel is operating at LAH which corresponds to 100 m3 of liquid volume, in case of back flow, it will take about 4 hrs to fill the vessel completely which is considered to be sufficient time for operator action.

1.2. Possible overpressurisation of TEAL line as hexane system is designed for 21 barg where TEAL system is designed for 16 barg

1.2.1. Check valve provided in the TEAL line at the injection point 1. Provide double check valves instead of a single check valve at 1" TEAL start-up line

TCM-Process

1.2.2. Pump trip alarm 2EA-41302/ 03 provided on DCS

1.2.3. High pressure alarm provided in pump discharge through 2PIC-41302

2. Misdirected flow of TEAL to hexane line in case of hexane booster pump trip

2.1. No immediate consequences

3. Misdirected flow of TEAL to mother liquor line 3.1. No immediate consequences considering the liquid capacity in mother liquor vessel can accommodate few hours of expected TEAL flow

Node: 4. 1st flash vessel bottom outlet (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0004)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_121B

Node Intent: To send the slurry from 1st flash vessel to the 2nd reactor. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 1st flash vessel to enable isolation of flash vessel inventory from remote in case of emergency.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2P1204: Design flowrate 120 m3/hr; Design P 30 barg; Design T 230 degC; Differential P 5.12 bar

Equipment ID: 2P1204


1. No/ Less Flow 1. 2HV-12110 closes by malfunction or by operation

1.1. Loss of suction to 1st flash vessel pump 2P1204 leading to pump cavitation and possible seal damage. Possible loss of containment.

1.1.1. Double mechanical seal provided for pump 2P1204. 2. Provide interlock to trip 2P1204 on loss of open condition for 2HV-12110

TCM-Process

1.2. Build up of level in 1st flash vessel 2D1201. Potential overfilling and overflow of slurry to 2E1204/ 1205 and possible plugging in exchangers. This may lead to high pressure in 1st flash vessel

1.2.1. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-12103 on flash vessel. However operator may not have sufficient time for intervention since vessel may fill up very quickly (3-4 mins)

1.2.2. Interlock 2I-12102 provided to close the inlet to 1st flash vessel in case of high high level 2LAHH-12103 in vessel

1.2.3. Interlock 2I-12102 provided to close the inlet to 1st flash vessel in case of high high pressure 2PAHH-12104 in vessel



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 5. 1st flash vessel offgas system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0005)


Node Intent: Separation vessel 2D1204 is provided in the offgas line from 1st flash vessel post-condenser 2E1205 in order to separate out any entrained liquid from offgases before routing to offgas compressor package 2PK3401 or recycle gas compressor package 2PK3201.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D1204: Design P 25 barg/ FV; Design T 230/ -29 degC

Equipment ID: 2D1204


1. High Pressure 1. 2PIC-12104 malfunctions to close 2PV-12104 1.1. High pressure in separation vessel and 1st flash vessel 1.1.1. Separation vessel and 1st flash vessel are connected without any isolation valve and design pressure for both vessels is the same as 25 barg

2. High Level 1. Liquid slug carry over from 2E1205 1.1. Possible liquid carry over to compressor (2PK3201) leading to compressor damage

1.1.1. Separation vessel is located higher than 1st flash vessel, with liquid line from separation vessel freely draining towards 1st flash vessel through goose neck and with no isolation valve inbetween.

1.1.2. Suction knockout drum provided for 2PK3201 with high high level in drum tripping compressor

Node: 6. 2nd flash vessel bottom outlet (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0006)


Node Intent: To send the slurry from 2nd flash vessel to the 3rd reactor. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of flash vessel to enable isolation of flash vessel inventory from remote in case of emergency.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2P1205: Design flowrate 240 m3/hr; Design P 30 barg; Design T 230 degC; Differential P 5.13 bar

Equipment ID: 2P1205



1.1. Loss of suction to 2nd flash vessel pump 2P1205 leading to pump cavitation and possible seal damage. Potential loss of containment.

1.1.1. Double mechanical seal provided for the pump 2P1205. 3. Provide interlock to trip 2P1205 on loss of open condition for 2HV-12210

TCM-Process

1.2. Build up of level in 2nd flash vessel 2D1202. Potential overfilling and overflow of slurry to 2E1206/ 1209 and possible plugging in exchangers. This may lead to high pressure in 2nd flash vessel

1.2.1. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-12203 on flash vessel. However operator may not have sufficient time for intervention since vessel may fill up very quickly (less than 2 mins)

1.2.2. Interlock 2I-12202 provided to close the inlet to 2nd flash vessel in case of high high level 2LAHH-12203

1.2.3. Interlock 2I-12202 provided to close the inlet to 2nd flash vessel in case of high high pressure 2PAHH-12204

Node: 7. Catalyst feed to reactor (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0007)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_111A; 3443-XZ-DM-001_123A

Node Intent: Interconnection piping has been provided at the discharge of catalyst dosing pump 2P1101A/B to allow flexibility in feeding catalyst to the one or more of three reactors under various modes of operation.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2P1101A/B: Design flowrate 0.3 m3/hr; Differential P 22.81 bar; Design P 40 barg; Design T 100 degC



1. Reverse/ Misdirected Flow 1. Mis-alignment of catalyst feed to reactors due to operator error

1.1. Reactor receiving less catalyst feed will tend to have offspec product and high pressure




1.2. Reactor receiving more catalyst feed (during parallel mode) will tend to have offspec product and low pressure

1.2.1. High flow alarm on 2FIC-11104/ 05 at pump discharge. Operator will have more than 10 minutes to react


TCM

1.2.2. Low pressure alarm through 2PIC-12103-A on reactor. Operator will have more than 10 minutes to react

5. Operating procedure should highlight the consequence of mis-direction of catalyst feeds.

Basell

2. Others 1. Piping arrangement of alignment valves (valves located at piping level)

1.1. Possible plugging of valves due to sedimentation 1.1.1. None identified 6. P&ID to include note indicating the requirement of elevating the alignment valves relative to the upstream/downstream piping in order to avoid sedimentation inside the valves.

TCM/ Basell



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 8. 1st flash vessel bypass during K1 mode (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0008)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_121B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_122B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_123B

Node Intent: Provision to bypass 1st flash vessel to improve flexibility and reliability of the plant as through this provision, three reactors can be operated independently.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D1203: Design P 6 barg/ FV; Design T 150 degC



1. No/ Less Flow 1. 2LIC-12101 malfunctions to close 2LV-12101A/B

1.1. High level in 1st reactor 2R1201 leading to high pressure 1.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-12101

1.1.2. High pressure alarm provided with 2PIC-12103 and 2PI-12101

1.1.3. High high level trip provided with 2LAHH-12106 to close all feeds to 1st reactor

1.1.4. High high pressure trip provided with 2PAHH-12103B/ 12101 to close all feeds to 1st reactor

2. Manual valve closed at the 3rd flash vessel inlet 2.1. High level in 1st reactor 2R1201 leading to high pressure 2.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-12101

2.1.2. High pressure alarm provided with 2PIC-12103 and 2PI-12101

2.1.3. High high level trip provided with 2LAHH-12106 to close all feeds to 1st reactor

2.1.4. High high pressure trip provided with 2PAHH-12103B/ 12101 to close all feeds to 1st reactor

3. 2HV-12310B malfunctions to close 3.1. High level in 1st and 2nd reactor 2R1201/ 1202 leading to high pressure 3.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-12101/ 12201

3.1.2. High pressure alarm provided with 2PIC-12103/ 12212 and 2PI-12101/ 12203

3.1.3. High high level trip provided with 2LAHH-12106 to close all feeds to 1st reactor and 2LAHH-12206 to close all feeds to 2nd reactor

3.1.4. High high pressure trip provided with 2PAHH-12103B/ 12101 to close all feeds to 1st reactor and 2PAHH-12203/ 12201 to close all feeds to 2nd reactor

3.2. Possible backflow from one reactor to other reactor due to possible difference in operating pressure (depending on system hydraulics) of the reactor

3.2.1. None identified 8. Provide interlock to close each reactor outlet feed to 3rd flash vessel on closed condition of 2HV-12310B depending on the mode of operation. This can be implemented through feedback from manual bypass valves at flash vessel inlet.

TCM/ Basell

4. 1st reactor outer cooler pump 2P1201A/B trips 4.1. Possible backflow from one pump discharge back to reactor through the flash vessel bypass line. Consequence is same as Conseq. 1.1

4.1.1. Pump trip alarm provided

2. More Flow 1. No new issues

3. Reverse/ Misdirected Flow 1. Any one of the isolation valve downstream of 2LV-12101A/B or 2LV-12201A/B is left open due to operator error

1.1. Overfilling of 2D1201/ 1202 and possible high pressure 1.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-12103/ 12203

1.1.2. Operating procedure in place for changeover operations from cascade mode to parallel mode and vice-versa. Also this operation is not expected to be frequent

1.1.3. High high level trip provided with 2LAHH-12103/ 12203 to close all feeds to flash vessels

4. High Pressure 1. 2PIC-12315 malfunctions to close 2PV-12315 1.1. High pressure in 3rd flash vessel, potential loss of containment 1.1.1. High pressure alarm with 2PI-12304 9. Verify 2PSV-12303-S is sized for 2PIC-12315 failure case. TCM-Process

1.1.2. High high pressure trip provided with 2PAHH-12304 to close feed to 3rd flash vessel

1.1.3. 2PSV-12303-S provided on 3rd flash vessel

2. Cooling water to 3rd flash vessel condenser 2E1208

2.1. No significant pressure rise is expected

5. Low Pressure 1. No new issues

6. High Temperature 1. 2TIC-12311 malfunctions to close 2TV-12311 1.1. No immediate consequences

7. Low Temperature 1. 2TIC-12311 malfunctions to open 2TV-12311 more than usual

1.1. No immediate consequences

8. High Level 1. No new issues

9. Low Level 1. No new issues

10. Contamination/ Composition Change

1. Tripping of agitator in 3rd flash vessel 1.1. Possible sedimentation at the bottom of 3rd flash vessel. This may lead to product contamination during product grade change

1.1.1. Low speed alarm provided with 2SE-12302

1.1.2. Agitator trip alarm provided with 2ES-12303

11. Corrosion 1. No new issues



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 8. 1st flash vessel bypass during K1 mode (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0008)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_121B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_122B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_123B

Node Intent: Provision to bypass 1st flash vessel to improve flexibility and reliability of the plant as through this provision, three reactors can be operated independently.




12. Start-Up/ Shutdown Hazards 1. No new issues

13. Maintenance 1. No new issues

14. Others 1. No new issues

Node: 9. 3rd flash vessel offgas system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0009)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_123B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_131

Node Intent: Separation vessel 2D1205 is provided in the offgas line from 3rd flash vessel post-condenser 2E1209 in order to separate out any entrained liquid from offgases before routing to recycle gas compressor 2C3201. The separated liquid is routed to decanter feed vessel under gravity.




1. High Level 1. Liquid slug carry over from 2E1209 (as experienced in Poland plant)

1.1. Possible liquid carry over to compressor (2C3201) leading to compressor damage

1.1.1. Interlock 2I-12312 provided to trip recycle gas compressor on high level in separation vessel 2D1205


TCM-Process

2. Goose neck in the liquid drain line at the inlet of 2D1301 or drain line is plugged

2.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1

Node: 10. Decanter feed vessel bottom inlet and outlet (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0010)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_123B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_131

Node Intent: The discharge from 3rd flash vessel is routed to the decanter feed vessel bottom. The slurry from decanter feed vessel is then pumped to decanters. Remote isolation valves are provided at the bottom inlet and outlet of the decanter feed vessel to enable isolation of inventory to prevent accidental draining.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2P1301A/B: Design flowrate 1000 m3/hr; Design P 18 barg; Design T 210 degC; Differential P 5.58 bar. 2P1302A/B: Design flowrate 350 m3/hr; Design P 10 barg; Design T 150 degC; Differential P 3.22 bar

Equipment ID: 2P1301A/B, 2P1302A/B


1. No/ Less Flow 1. No/ less flow of feed to decanter feed vessel when 2HV-13102 closes by malfunction or by operation

1.1. Closure of 2HV-13102 will lead to running of pump 2P1301A/B under closed discharge condition. This may lead to internal recycle of slurry inside casing and possible damage to the pumps/ seals.

1.1.1. Minimum flow provision for the pump through 2FIC-13101

1.2. Build up of level in 3rd flash vessel 2D1203. Potential overfilling and overflow of slurry to 2E1208/ 1209 and possible plugging in exchangers. This may lead to high pressure in 3rd flash vessel

1.2.1. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-12303 on flash vessel. However operator may not have sufficient time for intervention since vessel may fill up very quickly (4-5 mins)

1.2.2. High pressure alarm provided with 2PIC-12315

1.2.3. Interlock 2S-12302 provided to close the inlet to 3rd flash vessel in case of high high level 2LAHH-12304/ 12307

1.2.4. Interlock 2S-12302 provided to close the inlet to 3rd flash vessel in case of high high pressure 2PAHH-12304

1.3. Exchanger 2E1301 and discharge piping will be subjected to pump shutoff head condition

1.3.1. Exchanger and discharge piping are designed for pump shutoff head condition

1.3.2. Minimum flow provision for the pump through 2FIC-13101

2. No/ less flow of decanter feed vessel bottom outlet when 2HV-13103 closes by malfunction or by operation

2.1. Loss of suction to decanter feed pump 2P1302A/B leading to pump cavitation and possible seal damage. Potential loss of containment

2.1.1. Pump provided with double mechanical seal 7. Provide interlock to trip 2P1302A/B on loss of open condition for 2HV-13103

TCM-Process

2.2. Build up of level in decanter feed vessel 2D1301. Potential overfilling and overflow of slurry to 2E1209/ waste gas system and possible plugging. This may lead to high pressure in decanter feed vessel

2.2.1. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-13101 on decanter feed vessel. Operator will have more than 15 minutes to take action considering that operating level will be about 20%

2.2.2. Interlock 2S-13101 provided to close the inlet to decanter feed vessel in case of high high level 2LAHH-13102 and 2LAHH-13101-A

2.2.3. Interlock 2S-13101 provided to close the inlet to decanter feed vessel in case of high high pressure 2PAHH-13101/ 13102



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 11. Decanter system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0011)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_211A

Node Intent: PSV is provided on the decanters to protect against over pressurization due to excess nitrogen flow.


Equipment ID:


Node: 12. No HAZOP requirement identified in HSE Management of Changes (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0012)

Drawings:

Node Intent:


Equipment ID:


Node: 13. Pressure control system for decanter feed vessel and mother liquor collecting vessel (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0013)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_131; 3443-XZ-DM-001_212

Node Intent: To allow operation of decanter feed vessel at as low pressure as possible in order to separate lighters to maximum extent possible. Pressure control loop is provided for mother liquor collecting vessel to allow steady state operation at very low pressure thereby reducing the potential of high pressure in decanters.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D1301: Design P 6 barg/ FV; Design T 150 degC. 2D2101: Design P 6 barg/ FV; Design T 150 degC

Equipment ID: 2D1301, 2D2101


1. More Flow 1. 2PIC-13102 malfunctions to open 2PV-13102A and close 2PV-13102B

1.1. Possible accumulation of inerts in the system which will be recycled to 1st reactor through recycle gas compressor. This will lead to pressure increase in 1st reactor and potential loss of nitrogen to offgases. No significant operability or safety issues

1.1.1. High pressure alarm provided with 2PI-13101

1.2. Possible overpressurisation of decanter feed vessel. Potential hydrocarbon leak


1.2.2. High high pressure trip provided with 2PAHH-13101 to close feed to decanter feed vessel

2. 2PIC-21203 malfunctions to open 2PV-21203A and close 2PV-21203B (This scenario addresses Node 11 also)

2.1. High pressure in 2D2101. In extreme case this may lead to breaking of hydraulic seal in the liquid lines from decanters to 2D2101. This will lead to overpressurisation and damage of decanters


2.1.2. High high pressure trip provided with 2PAHH-21201 to close all the feed lines to 2D2101 including lines from decanters

2.1.3. 2PSV-21117-S/ 21118-S/ 21119-S provided on decanters 2S2101A/B/C sized for 2PV-21203A failure case

2.2. High pressure in 2D2101 may also lead to liquid carry over to powder side, plugging the dryer due to restriction in liquid flow from decanter to 2D2101



Node: 14. Mother liquor collecting vessel bottom outlet (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0014)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_212

Node Intent: Mother liquor from 2D2101 is recycled back to reactors. Excess mother liquor under level control is routed to hexane distillation system. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 2D2101 to enable isolation of inventory from remote in case of emergency.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2P2101A/B: Design flowrate 240 m3/hr; Design P 20 barg; Design T 150 degC; Differential P 15.87 bar




1.1. Loss of suction to mother liquid pump 2P2101A/B leading to pump cavitation and possible seal damage. Potential loss of containment due to seal leak

1.1.1. Double mechanical seal provided for pump 10. Provide interlock to trip 2P2101A/B on loss of open condition for 2HV-21204

TCM-Process

1.2. Build up of level in mother liquor collecting vessel. Potential overfilling and overflow of mother liquor to the blowdown vessel. Major process upset condition

1.2.1. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-21201 on 2D2101. However operator may not have sufficient time for intervention since vessel may fill up very quickly

1.2.2. Interlock 2I-21104/ 05/ 06 provided to stop feed to all 3 decanters in case of high high level 2LAHH-21201



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 14. Mother liquor collecting vessel bottom outlet (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0014)


Node Intent: Mother liquor from 2D2101 is recycled back to reactors. Excess mother liquor under level control is routed to hexane distillation system. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 2D2101 to enable isolation of inventory from remote in case of emergency.




1.2.3. Interlock 2S-21201 provided to close all feed lines to mother liquor collecting vessel in case of high high level 2LAHH-21202/ 21203

1.3. Loss of mother liquor recycle flow to reactors. If this continues this can lead to increase in bulk density of reactor mixture. This will cause improper mixing and insufficient cooling by reactor jacket. In worst case it can lead to lump formation inside the reactor

1.3.1. Low pressure alarm provided with 2PI-21204

1.3.2. Low flow alarm provided for the mother liquor flow to each reactor through 2FI-12111/ 12211/ 12311

1.3.3. Interlock 2S-12101/ 12201/ 12301 provided to close feed lines to reactor including the mother liquor line in case of low low pressure 2PALL-21204

1.4. Possible backflow of reactor contents to mother liquor collecting vessel through minimum flow line of mother liquid pumps

1.4.1. Check valve provided in mother liquor feed lines to reactor

1.4.2. Interlock 2S-12101/ 12201/ 12301 provided to close feed lines to reactor including the mother liquor line in case of low low pressure 2PALL-21204

Node: 15. Decanter system pressure control (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0015)


Node Intent: To prevent operation of decanters at pressure higher than 200 mbarg.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2S2101A/B/C: Design P 0.4 barg; Design T 120 degC

Equipment ID: 2S2101A/B/C


1. High Pressure 1. 2PIC-21203 malfunctions to open 2PV-21203A and close 2PV-21203B (on mother liquor collecting vessel)

1.1. High pressure in 2D2101. In extreme case this may lead to breaking of hydraulic seal in the liquid lines from decanters to 2D2101. This will lead to overpressurisation and damage of decanters



1.1.3. 2PSV-21117-S/ 21118-S/ 21119-S provided on decanters 2S2101A/B/C

2. 2PV-22208 fails to open when required 2.1. Overpressurisation and damage of decanters 2D2101A/B/C. Possible blowing out of hood

2.1.1. As per process feedback, the requirement of this pressure controller to act is envisaged only during abnormal operation of decanters. During this period, decanters are not expected to develop pressure higher than 0.4 barg due to intrinsic design

18. Confirm this safeguard (High Pressure Safeguard 2.1.1) with decanter vendor.

TCM-Process

Node: 16. 1st nitrogen conveying system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0016)


Node Intent: Nitrogen is used as a conveying medium for transporting nitrogen from dryer to powder treatment. Accumulated hexane in the circulation nitrogen is constantly purged under flow control to nitrogen scrubber 2T2201.


Equipment ID:


1. No/ Less Flow 1. 2FIC-22304 malfunctions to close 2FV-22304 1.1. Gradual accumulation of hexane in the system which will tend to condense in transport nitrogen suction cooler 2E2203. This hexane may pass on to open trench when accumulated liquid is drained. Potential fire hazard

1.1.1. Sight glass is to be provided on drain line of 2E2203. Any accumulated liquid will be collected in a controlled manner

19. P&ID to be updated to indicate the sight glass. TCM-Process

2. More Flow 1. 2FIC-22304 malfunctions to open 2FV-22304 fully

1.1. Possible pressure loss in transport nitrogen to conveying system which may lead to plugging of conveying system

1.1.1. Low pressure alarm provided with 2PI-22307 on outlet of 2E2204


TCM-Process

3. Reverse/ Misdirected Flow 1. Transport nitrogen system is shutdown or depressurised due to any reason

1.1. Possible backflow of hexane rich gases from dryer system to transport nitrogen system

1.1.1. None identified 20. Provide check valve downstream of 2FV-22304 TCM-Process



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Drawings:

Node Intent:


Equipment ID:


Node: 18. Mother liquor feed to hexane distillation system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0018)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_212; 3443-XZ-DM-001_311A

Node Intent: Mother liquor from 2D2101 is recycled back to reactors. Excess mother liquor under level control is routed to hexane distillation system. Feed flow to 2E3102 is under cascade control through 2FIC-31101 which controls 2FV-31101B and flow from 2P-4102A/B to hexane distillation system through 2FV-31101A. 2FV-31101B is introduced additional as modification to route the excess mother liquor to tank 2D4102 from downstream of 2LV-21201 (controlled through 2FIC-31101) for better flow control.




1. No/ Less Flow 1. 2FIC-31101 malfunctions to close 2FV-31101B 1.1. In extreme case, there will be increase in level in 2E3102/ 2D3101 which then will lead to overflow of mother liquor to 2E3103/ 2D3102

1.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-31101

1.1.2. Interlock 2I-31101 provided to stop feed to 2D3101 and open feed bypass on high high level (2LAHH-31101/ 31102) in 2D3101

1.2. Overfilling of 2D3101 may subject the vessel (design P 10 barg) to pump 2P2101A/B shutoff head (20 barg). Possible loss of containment

1.2.1. High pressure alarm with 2PIC-31101

1.2.2. Interlock 2I-31101 provided to stop feed to 2D3101 and open feed bypass on high high level (2LAHH-31101/ 31102) in 2D3101

1.2.3. Interlock 2I-31103 provided to stop feed to 2D3101, open feed bypass and stop steam to 2E3102 on high high pressure (2PAHH-31101) in 2D3101

2. More Flow 1. 2FIC-31101 malfunctions to open 2FV-31101B 1.1. Shutdown of hexane distillation system. Loss of hexane recovery 1.1.1. Enough buffer volume available in hexane tank 2D4101 to permit running of plant on pure hexane without hexane recovery for a few hours

1.2. Level increase in mother liquor tank 2D4102 1.2.1. High level alarm provided with 2LI-41102 on mother liquor tank 2D4102. Enough buffer volume available in 2D4102 to receive mother liquor from plant without requiring plant shutdown

Node: 19. Steam jacket for adsorption towers (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0019)

Drawings:

Node Intent: Steam jacket lines deleted on adsorption tower system


Equipment ID:


Node: 20. Modification of wax treatment unit (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0020)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_311A; 3443-XZ-DM-001_331; 3443-XZ-DM-001_333B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_333D

Node Intent: Mother liquor with 15-25% wax content from reboiler bottom 2E3302 is pumped to distillation vessel 2D3303A/B under flow control (through pump stroke). The light components like hexane are stripped off from the contents either by heating (through jacket) or by using LP steam. The lighter components are then routed via condenser 2E3304A/B to separator drum 2D3302 under pressure control of distillation vessel. Wax is solidified as balls by addition of service water. Wax balls are dumped into big bags and water permeates through big bags to trench.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2P3301A/B: Design flowrate 12 m3/hr; Design P 21 barg; Design T 200 degC; Differential P 5.04 bar. 2D3303A/B: Design P 10 barg/ FV; Design T 200 degC



1. No/ Less Flow of mother liquor from reboiler

1. Pump 2P3301A/B trips 1.1. No immediate consequences. In the long term, if the flow of wax enriched mother liquor from reboiler to distillation vessel is not resumed, this may lead to shutdown of the hexane distillation system due to increase in wax concentration and thus inability to further evaporate hexane. Shutdown of hexane distillation system may lead to plant shutdown due to lack of sufficient pure hexane and inability to treat mother liquor from plant


1.1.2. Low flow alarm provided with 2FIC-33104

1.1.3. Operator will have sufficient time to start standby pump

1.1.4. Mother liquor tank 2D4102 can accommodate the entire hexane inventory in the plant and the buffer hexane available in hexane tank 2D4101



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101








1.1.5. Buffer supply of hexane in tank is equivalent to about 5 hours of consumption

2. 2FIC-33104 malfunctions to reduce stroke of pump


3. Plugging of pump suction line 3.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1

3.2. No immediate damage to pump expected

4. Plugging of pump discharge line 4.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1

4.2. High discharge pressure in pump discharge line. Possible loss of containment

4.2.1. High pressure alarm provided with 2PI-33103A/B

4.2.2. High pressure trip provided with 2PAH-33103A to stop pump 2P3301A/B

4.2.3. High high pressure trip provided with 2PAHH-33103B to stop pump 2P3301A/B

4.2.4. 2PSV-33102-R/ 33103-R provided at pump discharge sized for blocked discharge case

5. Both 2H/Y-33101 and 2H/Y-33102 left closed due to operator error during vessel changeover

5.1. Same as Conseq. 1.1 and 4.2 5.1.1. Valve open/ close indication available on DCS

2. No/ Less Flow of LP steam to distillation vessel during final distillation step

1. 2FIC-33304 malfunctions to close 2FV-33304 1.1. Residual hexane left inside distillation vessel will not evaporate and will remain in the liquid phase. This may lead to hexane loss to atmosphere during wax ball reclaiming step

1.1.1. Operating procedure in place according to which the distillation step is not considered to be complete till a temperature close to boiling point of water (95 degC) is achieved for the liquid condensate in 2D3303A/B

3. No/ Less Flow of service water to distillation vessel

1. Insufficient flow of service water after the distillation step (manual operation)

1.1. Inadequate cooling of wax which may lead to discharge of hot wax during big bag collection step. Possible injury to personnel due to exposure to hot wax/ water

1.1.1. Operating procedure in place to continue supply of service water till the liquid contents are sufficiently cooled

1.1.2. Interlock 2S-33303A provided to prevent opening of distillation vessel bottom valve 2HV-33301 in case of high high temperature (2TAHH-33304A) in distillation vessel

1.2. Instead of wax balls, it is possible that lumps of wax may be formed due to insufficient suspension phase. This may prevent collection of wax balls into big bags due to plugging of discharge nozzle

1.2.1. Management of entire process including addition of water will be streamlined based on experience

4. More Flow of mother liquor from reboiler

1. 2FIC-33104 malfunctions to increase stroke of pump

1.1. No immediate consequences. In the long term, capacity of hexane distillation system will decrease, leading to lower amount of hexane recovered

1.1.1. High flow alarm provided with 2FIC-33104

5. More Flow of LP steam to distillation vessel during final distillation step

1. 2FIC-33304 malfunctions to open 2FV-33304 more than usual

1.1. Increase in temperature of liquid contents inside distillation column. This may lead to carry over of hydrocarbons to 2E3304A/B and then to separator drum. No significant issue

6. Reverse/ Misdirected Flow 1. Operator error to open valve 2H/Y-33101/ 33102 to the distillation vessel which will be or being discharged

1.1. Discharge of liquid hexane together with water and wax to atmosphere. Possible fire hazard

1.1.1. Interlock 2S-33303A provided to close distillation vessel bottom valve 2HV-33301 in case of loss of open position of 2H/Y-33301/ 33302


TCM-Process


Basell

1.2. If liquid level in distillation vessel is very low, this may lead to violent discharge of hot hexane to atmosphere, causing severe burn injuries to operator handling big bags or present in the vicinity. Possible fire hazard

1.2.1. Interlock 2S-33303A provided to close distillation vessel bottom valve 2HV-33301 in case of loss of open position of 2H/Y-33301/ 33302


TCM-Process


Basell

2. Steam valve opened by mistake during discharge

2.1. Possible burn injuries to operator handling big bags or present in the vicinity

2.1.1. Interlock 2S-33302A provided to close steam valve 2FV-33304A in case of loss of closed position of 2HV-33301

3. Operator error to open distillation vessel bottom valve before wax ball preparation is completed

3.1. Possible burn injuries by exposure to hot water or liquid wax to operator handling big bags or present in the vicinity

3.1.1. Interlock 2S-33303A provided to prevent opening of distillation vessel bottom valve 2HV-33301 in case of high high temperature (2TAHH-33304A) in distillation vessel



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101








4. Operator error to open service water before distillation is completed

4.1. Residual hexane left inside distillation vessel will not evaporate and will remain in the liquid phase. This may lead to hexane loss to atmosphere during wax ball reclaiming step

4.1.1. Operating procedure in place according to which the distillation step is not considered to be complete till a temperature close to boiling point of water (95 degC) is achieved for the liquid condensate in 2D3303A/B

5. Operator error to open the distillation vessel drain valve during reactor draining

5.1. Violent discharge of hot hexane to atmosphere, causing severe burn injuries to operator handling big bags or present in the vicinity. Possible fire hazard

5.1.1. Interlock 2S-33302 provided to isolate reactor drain header by closing 2HV-33601A/B on loss of closed position of 2HV-33301


TCM-Process

7. High Pressure 1. Same as No/ Less Flow of mother liquor from reboiler Cause 4

2. Reactor (design P 18 barg) draining or flash vessel (design P 30 barg) draining to distillation vessel (design P 10 barg)

2.1. Possible overpressurisation of distillation vessel. Potential loss of containment leading to fire and explosion

2.1.1. 2PSV-33305A provided on distillation vessel. However it is not sized for this case

2.1.2. Interlock 2S-33302A provided to isolate reactor drain header by closing 2HV-33601A/B on high high pressure (2PAHH-33305A/ 33307A) in distillation vessel


9. High Temperature 1. Same as More Flow of LP steam to distillation vessel during final distillation step Cause 1

2. Possible exothermic reaction due to carry over of excess TEAL with wax

2.1. Design temperature of distillation vessel can be exceeded leading to failure of vessel

2.1.1. Operating procedure in place to decompose TEAL by addition of TEAL to water (instead of water to TEAL)

10. Low Temperature 1. No new issues

11. High Level 1. Continuous feed of mother liquor to distillation vessel

1.1. High level in distillation vessel and possible overflow through condensers 2E3304A/B to separator drum. Process upset condition

1.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LI-33304A. Operator will have more than 1 hour for intervention

2. Continuous reactor draining to distillation vessel 2.1. Overflow of liquid containing polymer and hexane to condensers 2E3304A/B and then to separator drum. Major operational upset condition requiring long clean-up time. Shutdown of distillation system needed

2.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LI-33304A. However operator may not have sufficient time to react


TCM/ Basell

2.2. Possible carry over of hexane from separator drum to waste water pit. However, waste water pit is designed to handle hexane

2.2.1. High level alarm provided with 2LI-33304A. However operator may not have sufficient time to react


TCM/ Basell

3. Addition of service water in excess to distillation vessel due to operator error

3.1. Overflow of polymer powder (if distillation in performed after reactor draining), water and wax balls to condensers 2E3304A/B and then to separator drum. Major operational upset condition requiring long clean-up time. Shutdown of distillation system needed

3.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LI-33304A. As per operating procedure, operator presence is necessary during water filling operation. Also overflow is not expected to occur immediately

12. Low Level 1. No new issues


1. No new issues

14. Corrosion 1. Catalyst decomposition 1.1. Possible corrosion of distillation vessel 1.1.1. Material of contruction for distillation vessel is SS 304

1.1.2. Regular NDT on distillation vessel



17. Others 1. Accidental discharge of contents from distillation vessel which are not sufficiently treated

1.1. Discharge of liquid hexane together with water and wax to atmosphere. Possible fire hazard

1.1.1. Operator can close valve through push button on detecting hexane content in discharge

16. Push button 2HS-33301A should be located at a safe distance from big bag filling point.

TCM-Process



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 21. Dedicated condenser provided for each distillation vessel (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0021)


Node Intent: To condense offgases from distillation vessels.

Design Conditions/Parameters: Not indicated on P&ID

Equipment ID: 2E3304A/B


Node: 22. Firewater collection system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0022)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_333C

Node Intent: In case of fire in the plant, the firewater discharged is routed to firewater collection pit instead of routing it to the rainwater channel. Firewater is then pumped to firewater discharge.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2P3307A/B: Design flowrate 1500 m3/hr



1. Others 1. Fire in the waste water basin area 1.1. Operator unable to start 2P3307A/B 1.1.1. Manual local start/ stop button for 2P3307A/B located outside the pit at ground level

21. Locate pump start panel at a safe location from the pit. TCM-Process

2. Hydrocarbon vapour carry over to pit area 2.1. Heavier hydrocarbon vapour (e.g. hexane) will tend to accumulate inside the pit. Potential fire hazard

2.1.1. None identified 22. Provide hydrocarbon detectors inside the pump pit. TCM-Process

Node: 23. Waste offgas system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0023)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_341A; 3443-XZ-DM-001_341B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_001

Node Intent: Waste offgases from HDPE plant are compressed through 2C3402 and routed to cracker for utilization as a fuel. The pressure in waste gas header is controlled by 2PIC-34106 by flaring excess gases through 2PV-34106.

Design Conditions/Parameters: Offgas header: Design P 5 barg; Design T 150 degC

Equipment ID:


1. No/ Less Flow 1. 3XV-00111 provided in waste offgas line at B/L, malfunctions to close

1.1. Overpressurisation of compressor 2C-3402 discharge and waste offgas header. Possible loss of containment

1.1.1. Pressure control provided on offgas header through 2PIC-34106 to flare offgases and is sized for compressor discharge flow


TCM-Process

1.1.2. High pressure alarm provided with 2PIC-34106

1.1.3. Interlock 2I-34101 provided inside 2PK3402 to trip compressor on high high discharge pressure (2PAHH-34114)

2. Header isolated at the cracker end due to any reason


2. High Pressure 1. Same as No/ Less Flow

2. 2PIC-34106 malfunctions to close 2PV-34106 when required to open

2.1. Overpressurisation of compressor 2C-3402 discharge and waste offgas header. Possible loss of containment

2.1.1. High pressure alarm provided with 2PIC-34113 at compressor discharge


TCM-Process

2.1.2. Interlock 2I-34101 provided inside 2PK3402 to trip compressor on high high discharge pressure (2PAHH-34114)

3. Low Pressure 1. 2PIC-34106 malfunctions to open 2PV-34106 1.1. Potential depressurisation of waste offgas header to cracker due to reverse flow from cracker side, leading to disturbance in cracker

1.1.1. Check valve provided in waste offgas header to cracker at B/L

2. Higher consumption of offgases/ low pressure in offgas header caused by the cracker

2.1. No significant consequences inside HDPE Plant

Node: 24. Offgases from al-alkyl storage tank to monther liquor tank (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0024)


Node Intent: Offgases from al-alkyl storage tank 2D4103 are routed to mother liquor tank 2D4102 under pressure control of 2D4103. The intent is to route offgases with TEAL content to a safe system. Also, pockets are to be avoided in the offgas piping and hence 2D4102 is considered to be an appropriate receiver for this purpose.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D4102: Design P 0.1 barg; Design T 100/ -29 degC. 2D4103: Design P 10 barg/ FV; Design T 180 degC



1. High Pressure 1. 2PIC-41301 malfunctions to open 2PV-41301A fully or during high pressure condition in al-alkyl storage tank

1.1. Possible overpressurisation of mother liquor tank which is designed only for 0.1 barg. Potential tank failure

1.1.1. High pressure alarm povided with 2PI-41106 24. Confirm 2PSV-41102-B is sized for 2PV-41301A full open case.

TCM-Process

1.1.2. Interlock 2I-41102 provided to close hexane inlet to tank on high high pressure 2PAHH-41106 in mother liquor tank



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 24. Offgases from al-alkyl storage tank to monther liquor tank (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0024)


Node Intent: Offgases from al-alkyl storage tank 2D4103 are routed to mother liquor tank 2D4102 under pressure control of 2D4103. The intent is to route offgases with TEAL content to a safe system. Also, pockets are to be avoided in the offgas piping and hence 2D4102 is considered to be an appropriate receiver for this purpose.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D4102: Design P 0.1 barg; Design T 100/ -29 degC. 2D4103: Design P 10 barg/ FV; Design T 180 degC



1.1.3. 2PSV-41102-B provided on mother liquor tank

Node: 25. Al-alkyl pump minimum flow line (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0025)


Node Intent: Check valve provided in the al-alkyl minimum flow line at the al-alkyl storage tank end.




1. High Pressure 1. External fire 1.1. Overpressurisation of tank 2D4103 and the TEAL pumping line through pump minimum flow line. Possible piping failure and loss of containment

1.1.1. Check valve provided in minimum flow line 25. Note to be included in the P&ID to highlight the requirement of locating check valve as close as possible to the tank 2D4103 nozzle.

TCM-Process

Node: 26. No HAZOP requirement at this stage (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0026) - Change Analyzed in Polybutene package HAZOP – Refer Attachments from 7.1e to 7.6e

Drawings:

Node Intent:


Equipment ID:


Node: 27. No HAZOP requirement at this stage (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0027) - Change Analyzed in Deodorization package HAZOP – Refer Attachments from 7.1d to 7.6d

Drawings:

Node Intent:


Equipment ID:


Node: 28. Low pressure waste offgas flaring (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0028)


Node Intent: In case of compressor trip, low pressure waste offgases are routed to plant flare through dip pot 2D3401. Shutdown valves deleted in the offgas line from dip pot to flare knockout drum 2D3402.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D3401: Design P 3.5 barg/ FV; Design T 150 degC



1. No/ Less Flow 1. Check valve in offgas line from dip pot to flare knockout drum plugged

1.1. Possible overpressurisation of dip pot, waste offgas header and upstream equipment.

1.1.1. None identified 26. Delete check valve in the waste offgas inlet to flare knockout drum 2D3402.

TCM-Process



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Drawings:

Node Intent:


Equipment ID:



Drawings:

Node Intent:


Equipment ID:


Node: 31. LP steam system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0031)


Node Intent: To generate LP steam for various consumers inside HDPE Plant. Instead of LP steam from B/L, now MP steam from B/L is let down to LP steam.

Design Conditions/Parameters: MP steam: Design P 16.5 barg; Design T 300 degC. LP steam: Design P 6 barg; Design T 200 degC. 2J6203: Design P 6 barg; Design T 300 degC. 2D6203: Design P 6 barg/ FV; Design T 300 degC

Equipment ID: 2J6203, 2D6203


1. High Pressure 1. 2PIC-62105 malfunctions to open 2PV-62105 fully

1.1. Overpressurisation of LP steam system (2D6203 and upstream/ downstream piping). Possible loss of containment

1.1.1. Interlock 2S-62103 provided to close MP steam inlet to 2D6203 in case of high high pressure 2PAHH-62106 in 2D6203

27. Provide high pressure alarm with 2PI-62106. TCM-Process

1.1.2. 2PSV-62103-AS/ BS provided on 2D6203, together sized for 2PV-62105 full open case

1.2. Condensate flow from 2D6202 to 2D6203 inlet will be restricted leading to potential condensate carry over with MP steam. Possible hammering in MP steam header.

1.2.1. 2PSV-62103-AS/ BS provided on 2D6203, together sized for 2PV-62105 full open case and set at 6 barg which is lower than operating P of MP steam

2. High Temperature 1. 2TIC-62103 malfunctions to close 2TV-62103 1.1. 2D6203 may be subjected to high temperature leading to material failure 1.1.1. 2D6203 is designed for MP steam design conditions

1.1.2. High temperature alarm provided with 2TI-62109/ 62110

1.2. LP steam header downstream of 2D6203 may be subjected to high temperature. Excess thermal expansion can lead to dislocation of piping from supports. There can be flange leaks. In extreme case, displacement of piping can lead to piping failure.

1.2.1. High temperature alarm provided with 2TI-62109/ 62110

1.2.2. Interlock 2S-62103 provided to close MP steam inlet to 2D6203 and isolate LP steam header from 2D6203 in case of high high temperature 2TAHH-62109/ 62110 downstream of 2D6203

Node: 32. Caustic dosing system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0032)


Node Intent: 40% caustic soda is received in IBCs which is unloaded into caustic dosing area. Caustic soda from IBCs is transferred to soda process tank through 2P6211. Caustic soda is then diluted (based on operational requirement) by adding DM water under flow contol. The contents of soda process tank are kept in constant circulation through soda feeding pumps 2P6210A/B. Soda requirement for consumption is withdrawn from discharge.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2P6210A/B: Design flowrate 3 m3/hr; Design P 6 barg; Design T 120 degC. 2P6211: Design flowrate 2 m3/hr; Design P 10 barg; Design T 120 degC. 2D6210: Design P 1 barg; Design T 120 degC

Equipment ID: 2P6210A/B, 2P6211, 2D6210


1. No/ Less Flow of soda from IBCs to soda process tank

1. Caustic soda unloading pump 2P-6211A/B trips 1.1. No immediate consequences

2. 2HV-62201 malfunctions to close 2.1. Overpressurisation of pump discharge piping. Possible loss of containment

2.1.1. 2PSV-62203-R provided at pump discharge sized for blocked discharge case


TCM-Process

2. No/ Less Flow of soda to consumers 1. Caustic soda unloading pump 2P-6211A/B trips 1.1. If caustic supply is stopped during catalyst neutralisation inside distillation vessel 2D3303A, it can lead to delay in operation


1.1.2. Low pressure at pump discharge 2PAL-62202 initiates auto-start of standby pump

1.1.3. Low pressure alarm provided with 2PIC-62201



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 32. Caustic dosing system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0032)


Node Intent: 40% caustic soda is received in IBCs which is unloaded into caustic dosing area. Caustic soda from IBCs is transferred to soda process tank through 2P6211. Caustic soda is then diluted (based on operational requirement) by adding DM water under flow contol. The contents of soda process tank are kept in constant circulation through soda feeding pumps 2P6210A/B. Soda requirement for consumption is withdrawn from discharge.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2P6210A/B: Design flowrate 3 m3/hr; Design P 6 barg; Design T 120 degC. 2P6211: Design flowrate 2 m3/hr; Design P 10 barg; Design T 120 degC. 2D6210: Design P 1 barg; Design T 120 degC

Equipment ID: 2P6210A/B, 2P6211, 2D6210


1.2. In the long term, hydrochloric acid in membrane unit 2PK2301 may remain untreated leading to damage of liquid ring compressors


1.2.2. Low pressure at pump discharge 2PAL-62202 initiates auto-start of standby pump

1.2.3. Low pressure alarm provided with 2PIC-62201

3. No/ Less Flow of DM water 1. 2FIC-62201 malfunctions to close 2FV-62201 during dilution operation

1.1. Delay in caustic solution dilution step of caustic solution preparation and possibility of sending concentrated caustic to users which is not of significant consequence

1.1.1. Dilution operation is monitored and as per procedure, caustic in tank is first diluted with DM water and then concentrated caustic is received in soda process tank

4. More Flow of soda from IBCs to soda process tank

1. No cause identified

5. More Flow of soda to consumers 1. No cause identified other than more consumption of caustic soda at user end

6. More Flow of DM water 1. 2FIC-62201 malfunctions to open 2FV-62201 more than usual during dilution operation

1.1. Possible overfilling of 2D6210 leading to caustic spill in area through vent line. Potential injury to operator present in the caustic dosing area

1.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LI-62201 29. Provide overflow line for soda process tank 2D6210 routed to safe location.

TCM-Process

1.1.2. Interlock 2I-62202 provided to trip the unloading pump 2P6211 and close fresh caustic inlet in case of high high level 2LAHH-62202 in 2D6210

34. Interlock 2I-62202 should also close DM water inlet to soda process tank 2D6210.

TCM-Process

7. Reverse/ Misdirected Flow 1. Reverse flow from user end in case caustic soda unloading pump trips

1.1. Possible reverse flow of hydrocarbon gases from distillation vessel to soda process tank which will be relieved from atmospheric vent in the caustic dosing area. Potential fire hazard

1.1.1. None identified 30. Provide check valve in the caustic dosing line to distillation vessel 2D3303A.

TCM-Process


TCM-Process

8. High Pressure 1. 2PIC-62201 malfunctions to close 2PV-62201 in the caustic recirculation line

1.1. Pump 2P6210A/B discharge piping may be subjected to pump shutoff pressure condition

1.1.1. Pump discharge piping is designed for pump shutoff head condition

1.2. Pump may be damaged due to running with discharge less than the minimum flow

1.2.1. None identified 32. Provide high pressure alarm at pump 2P6210A/B discharge independent from 2PIC-62201.

TCM-Process


10. High Temperature 1. Cooling water failure to jacketed pipe 1.1. No significant consequences

11. Low Temperature 1. Steam tracing failure 1.1. Possible freezing of caustic soda, though it is expected immediately. 1.1.1. None identified 33. Provide a local temperature gauge in the caustic circulation line upstream of 2PV-62201.

TCM-Process

12. High Level 1. Operator error in transferring more caustic to soda process tank than it can accommodate

1.1. Same as More Flow of DM water Conseq. 1.1

1.2. Caustic cannot be diluted with DM water as not enough space is available inside tank

1.2.1. As per procedure, caustic in tank is first diluted with DM water and then concentrated caustic is received in soda process tank

13. Low Level 1. Failure to make up fresh caustic soda 1.1. Pump 2P6210A/B may run with loss of suction leading to possible pump damage

1.1.1. Low level alarm provided with 2LI-62201. Operator will have sufficient time to react


1. No new issues

15. Corrosion 1. No new issues



18. Others 1. Debris carry over from IBCs along with caustic soda

1.1. Plugging of pump 2P6211 suction line or possible damage to 2P6211 1.1.1. None identified 35. Provide suction strainer for pump 2P6211. Consider relocating strainer provided upstream of 2HV-62201 to 2P6211 suction.

TCM-Process



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 33. Hexane distillation column bottom outlet (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0033)


Node Intent: Distilled hexane from hexane distillation column is pumped to hexane tank 2D4101 through adsorption towers 2T3102A/B under level control of column. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 2T3101 to enable isolation of inventory from remote in case of emergency.





1.1. Loss of suction to pump 2P3102A/B leading to pump cavitation and possible seal damage. Potential loss of containment due to seal leak


TCM-Process

1.2. Build up of level in hexane distillation column. Potential overfilling and overpressurisation of column

1.2.1. There will be a small flow through minimum flow line of 2P3102A/B. However this flow may be insignificant in maintaining the column bottom level

1.2.2. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-31106 at column bottom. Operator will have sufficient time to react

1.2.3. Interlock 2I-31102 provided to stop feed to distillation column in case of high high level 2LAHH-31106/ 31107

Node: 34. Mother liquor evaporator discharge to distillation vessel (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0034)


Node Intent: Mother liquor from mother liquor evaporator 2E3102 is pumped to distillation vessel 2D3303A/B under flow control through 2P3301A/B. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 2E3102 to enable isolation of inventory from remote in case of emergency.





1.1. No immediate consequences. In the long term, if the flow of wax enriched mother liquor from reboiler to distillation vessel is not resumed, this may lead to shutdown of the hexane distillation system due to increase in wax concentration and thus inability to further evaporate hexane. Shutdown of hexane distillation system may lead to plant shutdown due to lack of sufficient pure hexane and inability to treat mother liquor from plant


1.1.2. Mother liquor tank 2D4102 can accommodate the entire hexane inventory in the plant.

1.1.3. Buffer hexane available in hexane tank 2D4101. Buffer supply of hexane in tank is equivalent to about 5 hours of consumption

1.2. No immediate damage to pump expected. However pump performance may be affected if it continues to run with loss of suction

1.2.1. None identified 36. Provide interlock to trip 2P3301A/B on loss of open condition for 2HV-31101

TCM-Process

Node: 35. Hexane feed vessel discharge to hexane distillation column (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0035)


Node Intent: Hexane from hexane feed vessel 2D3102 is pumped to hexane distillation vessel 2T3101 under level control of 2D3102. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 2D3102 to enable isolation of inventory from remote in case of emergency.





1.1. Loss of suction to hexane column feed pump 2P3101A/B leading to pump cavitation and possible seal damage. Potential loss of containment due to seal leak


TCM-Process

1.2. Build up of level in hexane feed vessel. Liquid can continue to build up and flood 2E3103 leading to loss of heat transfer across 2E3103. This will lead to overpressurisation of 2D3101 and possible loss of containment

1.2.1. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-31103

1.2.2. Interlock 2I-31101 provided to close feed to 2D3101 and open diversion to 2D4102 on high high level 2LAHH-31103 in 2D3102

1.2.3. Interlock 2I-31101 provided to close feed to 2D3101 and open diversion to 2D4102 on high high level 2LAHH-31101/ 31102 in 2D3101

1.2.4. Interlock 2I-31101 provided to close feed to 2D3101 and open diversion to 2D4102 on high high pressure 2PAHH-31101 in 2D3101

1.3. Build up of level in 2E3104 leading in loss of heating capacity in the reboiler. No significant issue because column feed is already stopped by closure of 2HV-31102

1.4. Loss of pre-heater 2E3101 leading in feeding of cold mother liquor to evaporator 2E3102 increasing the steam supply to 2E3102. No significant issue

1.5. Build up of level in 2E2201 leading in feeding of cold Nitrogen to the Drier 2D2201

1.5.1. Low temperature alarm provided with 2TI-22101



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 35. Hexane feed vessel discharge to hexane distillation column (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0035)


Node Intent: Hexane from hexane feed vessel 2D3102 is pumped to hexane distillation vessel 2T3101 under level control of 2D3102. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 2D3102 to enable isolation of inventory from remote in case of emergency.




1.6. Build up of pressure in 2E2205. 1.6.1. 2PSV-31101-S provided on 2D3101, limiting the pressure to 10 barg

Node: 36. Hexane circulation for nitrogen scrubber (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0036)


Node Intent: Refrigerated hexane is circulated through nitrogen scrubber 2T2201 in order to absorb entrained hexane in nitrogen which is used for dryer. Remote isolation valve provided at the bottom of 2T2201 to enable isolation of inventory from remote in case of emergency.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2P2201A/B: Design flowrate 300 m3/hr; Design P 10 barg; Design T 150/ -45 degC; Differential P 2.66 bar




1.1. Loss of suction to nitrogen scrubber pump 2P2201A/B leading to pump cavitation and possible seal damage. Potential loss of containment due to seal leak


TCM-Process

1.2. Refrigerated hexane circulation through nitrogen scrubber will stop leading to untreated nitrogen flow to dryers. This may eventually lead to product quality issues



1.2.3. Interlock 2I-22101 provided to close feed to dryer on low low flow of liquid hexane 2FALL-22101 to 2T2201

Node: 37. No HAZOP requirement at this stage (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0037) - Change Analyzed in Refrigeration Unit package HAZOP – Refer Attachments from 7.1c to 7.6c

Drawings:

Node Intent:


Equipment ID:




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 5.4

Main process HAZOP RECOMMENDATION LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Provide double check valves instead of a single check valve at 1" TEAL start-up line Consequences: 3.2.1.2

TCM-Process

2. Provide interlock to trip 2P1204 on loss of open condition for 2HV-12110 Consequences: 4.1.1.1

TCM-Process

3. Provide interlock to trip 2P1205 on loss of open condition for 2HV-12210 Consequences: 6.1.1.1

TCM-Process


Consequences: 7.1.1.2

TCM

5. Operating procedure should highlight the consequence of mis-direction of catalyst feeds. Consequences: 7.1.1.2

Basell

6. P&ID to include note indicating the requirement of elevating the alignment valves relative to the upstream/downstream piping in order to avoid sedimentation inside the valves.


TCM/ Basell

7. Provide interlock to trip 2P1302A/B on loss of open condition for 2HV-13103 Consequences: 10.1.2.1

TCM-Process

8. Provide interlock to close each reactor outlet feed to 3rd flash vessel on closed condition of 2HV-12310B depending on the mode of operation. This can be implemented through feedback from manual bypass valves at flash vessel inlet.


TCM/ Basell

9. Verify 2PSV-12303-S is sized for 2PIC-12315 failure case. Consequences: 8.4.1.1

TCM-Process


TCM-Process


TCM-Process


Consequences: 20.6.1.1, 20.6.1.2

TCM-Process


Consequences: 20.6.1.1, 20.6.1.2

Basell



TCM-Process


Consequences: 20.11.2.1, 20.11.2.2

TCM/ Basell

16. Push button 2HS-33301A should be located at a safe distance from big bag filling point. Consequences: 20.17.1.1

TCM-Process



TCM-Process

18. Confirm this safeguard (High Pressure Safeguard 2.1.1) with decanter vendor. Consequences: 15.1.2.1

TCM-Process

19. P&ID to be updated to indicate the sight glass. Consequences: 16.1.1.1

TCM-Process

20. Provide check valve downstream of 2FV-22304 Consequences: 16.3.1.1

TCM-Process

21. Locate pump start panel at a safe location from the pit. Consequences: 22.1.1.1

TCM-Process



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




22. Provide hydrocarbon detectors inside the pump pit. Consequences: 22.1.2.1

TCM-Process


Consequences: 23.1.1.1, 23.2.2.1

TCM-Process

24. Confirm 2PSV-41102-B is sized for 2PV-41301A full open case. Consequences: 24.1.1.1

TCM-Process

25. Note to be included in the P&ID to highlight the requirement of locating check valve as close as possible to the tank 2D4103 nozzle.


TCM-Process

26. Delete check valve in the waste offgas inlet to flare knockout drum 2D3402. Consequences: 28.1.1.1

TCM-Process

27. Provide high pressure alarm with 2PI-62106. Consequences: 31.1.1.1

TCM-Process



TCM-Process

29. Provide overflow line for soda process tank 2D6210 routed to safe location. Consequences: 32.6.1.1

TCM-Process

30. Provide check valve in the caustic dosing line to distillation vessel 2D3303A. Consequences: 32.7.1.1

TCM-Process



TCM-Process

32. Provide high pressure alarm at pump 2P6210A/B discharge independent from 2PIC-62201.


TCM-Process

33. Provide a local temperature gauge in the caustic circulation line upstream of 2PV-62201. Consequences: 32.11.1.1

TCM-Process

34. Interlock 2I-62202 should also close DM water inlet to soda process tank 2D6210. Consequences: 32.6.1.1

TCM-Process

35. Provide suction strainer for pump 2P6211. Consider relocating strainer provided upstream of 2HV-62201 to 2P6211 suction.


TCM-Process


TCM-Process


TCM-Process



TCM-Process


TCM-Process



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 5.5

Main process DRAWING LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Drawing Description Unit Rev No. Place(s) Used

3443-XZ-DM-001_001 HDPE Plant B/L (Raw Material & Process) 0000 2 Nodes: 23

3443-XZ-DM-001_111A THS Conditioning and Metering 1100 2 Nodes: 1, 7

3443-XZ-DM-001_111B Activator Metering 1100 2 Nodes: 3

3443-XZ-DM-001_111C Hexane Distribution 1100 2 Nodes: 1

3443-XZ-DM-001_121A Polymerization Reactor I 1200 2 Nodes: 1, 3

3443-XZ-DM-001_121B Flash and Cooling Slurry - Reactor I 1200 2 Nodes: 4, 5, 8

3443-XZ-DM-001_122B Flash and Cooling Slurry - Reactor II 1200 2 Nodes: 6, 8

3443-XZ-DM-001_123A Polymerization Reactor III 1200 2 Nodes: 7

3443-XZ-DM-001_123B Flash and Cooling Slurry - Reactor III 1200 2 Nodes: 8, 9, 10

3443-XZ-DM-001_131 Decanter Feed Vessel 1300 2 Nodes: 9, 10, 13

3443-XZ-DM-001_211A Powder Separation I 2100 2 Nodes: 11

3443-XZ-DM-001_212 Mother Liquor System 2100 2 Nodes: 13, 14, 18

3443-XZ-DM-001_222 Powder Drying II (Scrubber) 2200 2 Nodes: 15, 16, 36

3443-XZ-DM-001_223 Powder Pneumatic I 2200 2 Nodes: 16

3443-XZ-DM-001_311A Hexane Wax Separation 3100 2 Nodes: 18, 20, 34, 35

3443-XZ-DM-001_311B Hexane Distillation System II 3100 2 Nodes: 33

3443-XZ-DM-001_331 Wax Recovery 3300 2 Nodes: 20

3443-XZ-DM-001_333A Hexane Recovery 3300 2 Nodes: 21

3443-XZ-DM-001_333B Waste Water Pre-Treatment I 3300 2 Nodes: 20

3443-XZ-DM-001_333C HDPE Waste Water Basin 3300 2 Nodes: 22

3443-XZ-DM-001_333D Waste Water Pre-Treatment II 3300 2 Nodes: 20

3443-XZ-DM-001_341A Off Gas System I 3400 2 Nodes: 23, 28

3443-XZ-DM-001_341B Off Gas System II 3400 2 Nodes: 23

3443-XZ-DM-001_411 Hexane/ Mother Liquor System 4100 2 Nodes: 24

3443-XZ-DM-001_413 Al-Alkyl Receiver 4100 2 Nodes: 3, 24, 25



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



3443-XZ-DM-001_621 Steam Supply and Condensate System 6200 2 Nodes: 31

3443-XZ-DM-001_622 NaOH Process Storage 6200 2 Nodes: 32



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 5.6

Main process MASTER DRAWINGS



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 6

Main process SIL CLASSIFICATION STUDY



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 6.1

Main process SIL CLASSIFICATION TEAM MEMBER LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Team Members Sessions

Full Name Company Department 1. 14-09-2007

Sachin Gupta Facilitator ERM Present

Daniel Kong Scribe ERM Present

Fabio Scarioni HSE TCM Present

Boris Brat Process TCM/ TPI Present

Andreas Heinrich Operations Basell Present

Rolf Kiessling Instrumentation Basell Present



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 6.2

RISK DIAGRAM



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Risk Graph for Health and Safety (S)

In this graph both the personnel exposure risk parameter (F) and the hazard avoidance parameter (P) are used.

Notes to Risk Graphs

Reference Description

--- No requirements

a No special requirements

1, 2, 3, 4 Safety Integrity Level

b A single Protective Instrument System is not sufficient


a

1

2

3

4

b

a

1

2

3

4

-

a

1

2

3

-

-

W3 W2 W1

Starting Point

ParametersS= Consequence of the hazardous situationF = Probability of personnel exposureP = Probability of avoiding the hazardous eventW = Probability of the unwanted occurrence

S4

S3

S2

S1

F1

F2

F2

F1

P2

P1

P1

P2

P2

P1


Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Risk Graph for Environmental Loss (E)

In this graph, only the hazard avoidance parameter (P) is used.



--- No requirements





a

1

2

3

4

b

a

1

2

3

4

-

a

1

2

3

-

-

W3 W2 W1

Starting Point

ParametersE = Consequence of the hazardous situationF = not usedP = Probability of avoiding the hazardous eventW = Probability of the unwanted occurrence

E3

E2

E1

P2

P1

P1

P2

P2

P1

P2E4


Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Risk Graph for Economic Losses (L)

In this graph neither the personnel exposure risk parameter (F) nor the hazard avoidance parameter (P) are used.

W3 W2 W1

L1 1 a -

L2 2 1 a

L3 3 2 1

L4 4 3 2



--- No requirements






Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 6.3

Main process SAFETY INSTRUMENTED FUNCTION LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Function Initiators Primary Final Elements Other Final ElementsUnit ref.

Overall SIL

PIDsInterlock

IDComment SIF Source

1. On high high temperature in HP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6201 and steam outlet to header are closed

2TAHH-62105 2XV-62105 2PV-62101 6200 SIL 1 621 2S-62101 1. Interlock System Description2TAHH-62106

1oo2

2. On high high pressure in HP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6201 and steam outlet to header are closed

2PAHH-62111 2XV-62105 2PV-62101 6200 SIL a 621 2S-62101 1. Interlock System Description

3. On high high temperature in LP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6203 and steam outlet to header are closed

2TAHH-62109 2XV-62109 2PV-62105 6200 SIL 1 621 2S-62103 1. Interlock System Description2TAHH-62110

1oo2

4. On high high pressure in LP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6203 and steam outlet to header are closed

2PAHH-62106 2XV-62109 2PV-62105 6200 SIL a 621 2S-62103 1. Interlock System Description

5. High level in separation drum 2D1205 trips compressor 2C3201 and closes 2PV-12315

2LAH-12308 2C3201 stops 2PV-12315 1200 SIL 1 123B 2I-12312 1. Interlock System Description

6. On high high pressure in 2D3303A, reactor drain header is closed

2PAHH-33305A 2HV-33601A 3300 SIL 1 333B 2S-33302A

Classification is also applicable to 2S-33302B

1. Interlock System Description2PAHH-33307A 2HV-33601B

1oo2 1oo2

7. On high high pressure in 2D3303A, LP steam to distillation vessel are closed

2PAHH-33305A 2FV-33304A 3300 SIL a 333B 2S-33302A


1. Interlock System Description2PAHH-33307A

1oo2

8. On not closed position of HV-33301A, reactor drain

2HZLL-33301A 2HV-33601A 2FV-33304A 3300 SIL 2 333B 2S-33302A

Classification is also applicable to

2HV-33601B



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL

PIDsInterlock


header and LP steam to distillation vessel are closed

2S-33302B. If HAZOP recommendation 14 is implemented, the initiator will include an additional tag which will be open/close position of the diversion valve and then the two initiators will be activating interlock in 2oo2 voting.

1. Interlock System Description

1oo2

9. On not closed position of HV-33302, reactor drain header and LP steam to distillation vessel are closed

2HZLL-33302 2HV-33601A 2FV-33304A 3300 SIL 1 333B 2S-33302A

1. Interlock System Description2HV-33601B

1oo2

10. On high high pressure in 2D3303B, reactor drain header is closed

2PAHH-33305B 2HV-33601A 3300 SIL 1 333B 2S-33302B

Classification same as SIF 6

1. Interlock System Description2PAHH-33307B 2HV-33601B

1oo2 1oo2

11. On high high pressure in 2D3303B, LP steam to distillation vessel are closed

2PAHH-33305B 2FV-33304B 3300 SIL a 333B 2S-33302B


1. Interlock System Description2PAHH-33307B

1oo2

12. On not closed position of HV-33301B, reactor drain

2HZLL-33301B 2HV-33601A 2FV-33304B 3300 SIL 2 333B 2S-33302B


2HV-33601B



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL

PIDsInterlock


header and LP steam to distillation vessel are closed


1oo2

13. High pressure in 2D3303A, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed

2PAH-33305A 2HV-33302 3300 SIL - 333B 2S-33303A


1. Interlock System Description2PAH-33307A 2HV-33301A

1oo2 2oo2

14. On high high temperature in 2D3303A, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed

2TAHH-33304A 2HV-33301A 2HV-33302 3300 SIL 1 333B 2S-33303A



15. On not closed position of HV-33601A/B, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed

2HZLL-33601A/B 2HV-33302 3300 SIL 1 333B 2S-33303A


1. Interlock System Description1oo2 2HV-33301A

2oo2

16. On not closed position of FV-33304A, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed

2FZLL-33304A 2HV-33301A 2HV-33302 3300 SIL - 333B 2S-33303A



17. High pressure in 2D3303B, bottom discharge are closed

2PAH-33305B 2HV-33301B 3300 SIL - 333D 2S-33303B


1. Interlock System Description2PAH-33307B

1oo2



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL

PIDsInterlock


18. On high high temperature in 2D3303B, bottom discharge are closed

2TAHH-33304B 2HV-33301B 3300 SIL 1 333D 2S-33303B



19. On not closed position of HV-33601A/B, 2D3303B bottom discharge are closed

2HZLL-33601A/B 2HV-33301B 3300 SIL 1 333D 2S-33303B

Classification same as SIF 15. If HAZOP recommendation 14 is implemented, the initiator will include an additional tag which will be open/close position of the diversion valve and then the two initiators (considering HZLL-33601A/B together as 1oo2) will be activating interlock in 2oo2 voting.

1. Interlock System Description1oo2

20. On not closed position of FV-33304B, 2D3303B bottom discharge are closed

2FZLL-33304B 2HV-33301B 3300 SIL - 333D 2S-33303B



21. On high high pressure at 2P3301A/B discharge, stop pump

2PAH-33103A 2P3301A stop 3300 SIL 1 331 2S-33314 1. Interlock System Description2PAHH-33103B 2P3301B stop

1oo2 2oo2



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 6.4

Main process SIL CLASSIFICATION WORKSHEET



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 1. On high high temperature in HP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6201 and steam outlet to header are closed

Interlock ID: 2S-62101

Primary Final Elements: 2XV-62105 Unit ref.: 6200

Initiators: 2TAHH-62105; 2TAHH-62106; 1oo2 PIDs: 621

Design Intent Demand Scenario CoFoD Existing Safeguards Risk Graph CommentsSIL Selection

RecommendationsS/E/L F P W Target SIL

1. To prevent very high temperature in HP steam header

1. 2TIC-62101 malfunctions to close to 2TV-62101

1. Design temperature of piping will be exceeded. Piping may leave the supports possibly due to thermal expansion beyond design limits leading to piping failure. Major piping rupture may not take place, however, flange leak etc can occur.

1. None W2 assumed for control loop failure. S2 assumed for major injury to operator due to exposure with high temperature and high pressure steam. F1 assumed as operator may not be present in the area of leak.

S2 F1 P1 W2 (F1, P1)

a

2. Possible damage to extruder die plate and/ or product degradation. Damage to piping due to displacement from supports caused by excess thermal expansion.

1. None identified L2 assumed considering the repair may take 3-4 days leading to production loss during this time.

L2 W2 SIL 1 1. Check for protections inside the extruder package. In case independent protections are provided inside the package, W2 can be reduced to W1 for extruder damage. However, W2 can still be considered for piping damage.

2. 2PIC-62101 malfunctions to open 2PV-62101 fully and 2TV-62101 may not be able to supply sufficient DM water for desuperheating due to control valve capacity limitation.

1. Same as above 1. Same as above. W2 assumed for control loop failure. S2 assumed for major injury to operator due to exposure with high temperature and high pressure steam. F1 assumed as operator may not be present in the area of leak.

S2 F1 P1 W2 (F1, P1)

a

2. Same as above. 1. Same as above. L2 assumed considering the repair may take 3-4 days leading to production loss during this time.


3. DM water supply failure due to condensate pump 2P6201A/B or booster pump 2P6202A/B trip

1. Design temperature of piping will be exceeded. Piping may leave the supports possibly due to thermal expansion beyond design limits leading to piping failure. Major piping rupture may not take place, however, flange leak etc can occur.

1. None W2 considered as pump provided with auto-start provision.S2 assumed for major injury to operator due to exposure with high temperature and high pressure steam. F1 assumed as operator may not be present in the area of leak.

S2 F1 P1 W2 (F1, P1)

a

2. Possible damage to extruder die plate and/ or product degradation. Damage to piping due to displacement from supports caused by excess thermal expansion.

1. None L2 assumed considering the repair time may take 3-4 days leading to production loss during this time.




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 2. On high high pressure in HP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6201 and steam outlet to header are closed



Initiators: 2PAHH-62111 PIDs: 621



1. To prevent overpressurisation of HP steam header and equipment at the downstream user end.

1. 2PIC-62101 malfunctions to open 2PV-62101 fully

1. Possible failure of piping leading to release of high pressure and high temperature steam.

1. 2PSV-62101-S provided on 2D6201 sized for full open case of 2PV-62101

W2 assumed for control loop failure. W reduced by one level to W1 considering PSV. S2 assumed for injury to person due to exposure to high temperature and high pressure steam. F1 assumed as operator may not be present in the area.

S2 F1 P1 W1 (F1, P1)

---

2. Possible damage to extruder die plate

1. 2PSV-62101-S provided on 2D6201 sized for full open case of 2PV-62101

L2 assumed considering the repair time may be more than one day leading to production loss during this time.

L2 W1 a

SIF: 3. On high high temperature in LP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6203 and steam outlet to header are closed






1. To prevent very high temperature in LP steam header

1. 2TIC-62103 malfunctions to close 2TV-62103

1. Design temperature of piping will be exceeded. Piping may leave the supports possibly due to thermal expansion beyond design limits leading to piping failure. The temperature difference in design T for MP steam from B/L and design T of LP steam header is about 100 degC. Hence piping failure is considered to be credible.

1. None W2 assumed for control loop failure. S2 assumed for major injury due for exposure steam. F1 assumed as operator may not be present in the area of leak.

S2 F1 P1 W2 (F1, P1)

a

2. Possible damage to plate heat exchanger for dryer 2D2201 and pre-heater 2E3107. Piping damage due to displacament from supports caused by excess thermal expansion.

1. None L2 assumed considering the repair time may be take 2-3 days leading to production loss during this period.

L2 W2 SIL 1 4. Check if there is any other independent safeguards for plate heat exchanger for dryer 2D2201 inside the package and if present, W2 can be reduced to W1 for plate type heat exchanger damage. However, for piping damage W2 is still valid.

2. DM water supply failure due to condensate pump 2P6201A/B trip

1. Design temperature of piping will be exceeded. Piping may leave the supports possibly due to thermal expansion beyond design limits leading to piping failure. The temperature difference in design T for MP steam from B/L and design T of LP steam header is about 100 degC. Hence piping failure is considered to be credible.

1. None W2 assumed considering pump has auto-start provision. S2 assumed for major injury due for exposure steam. F1 assumed as operator may not be present in the area of leak.

S2 F1 P1 W2 (F1, P1)

a



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 3. On high high temperature in LP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6203 and steam outlet to header are closed






2. Possible damage to plate heat exchanger for dryer 2D2201 and pre-heater 2E3107. Piping damage due to displacament from supports caused by excess thermal expansion.

1. None L2 assumed considering the repair time may be take 2-3 days leading to production loss during this period.

L2 W2 SIL 1 2. Check if there is any other independent safeguards for plate heat exchanger for dryer 2D2201 inside the package and if present, W2 can be reduced to W1. However, for piping damage W2 is still valid.

SIF: 4. On high high pressure in LP steam header, steam inlet to 2D6203 and steam outlet to header are closed



Initiators: 2PAHH-62106 PIDs: 621



1. To prevent overpressurisation of LP steam header and equipment at downstream user end.

1. 2PIC-62105 malfunctions to open 2PV-62105 fully

1. Possible failure of LP steam piping leading to release of steam to atmosphere

1. 2PSV-62103-AS/ BS provided on 2D6203 together sized for full open case of 2PV-62105

W2 assumed for control loop failure. W reduced by one level to W1 considering PSV. S2 assumed for injury to person due to exposure to steam. F1 assumed as operator may not be present in the area.

S2 F1 P1 W1 (F1, P1)

---

2. Possible damage to plate heat exchanger for dryer 2D2201 and pre-heater 2E3107

1. 2PSV-62103-AS/ BS provided on 2D6203 together sized for full open case of 2PV-62105

L2 assumed considering the repair time may be more than one day leading to production loss during this time.

L2 W1 a

SIF: 5. High level in separation drum 2D1205 trips compressor 2C3201 and closes 2PV-12315

Interlock ID: 2I-12312

Primary Final Elements: 2C3201 stops Unit ref.: 1200

Initiators: 2LAH-12308 PIDs: 123B



1. To prevent damage to compressor 2C3201 due to liquid carry over

1. Plugging of goose neck at inlet of decanter feed vessel 2D1301 in the liquid outlet of 2D1205

1. Possible damage to compressor 2C3201 due to liquid carryover (reciprocating type compressor)

1. None W2 assumed for likelihood of plugging the liquid outlet line of 2D1205. L1 assumed as plant shutdown may not be required. Loss will be due to machine repair cost.

L1 W2 a 3. As per HAZOP Recommendation 17, in case an interlock is provided inside the recycle gas compressor package to trip the compresor on high level in suction damper 2D3206, the interlock 2I-12312 can be deleted and a DCS alarm can be retained.



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 5. High level in separation drum 2D1205 trips compressor 2C3201 and closes 2PV-12315


Primary Final Elements: 2C3201 stops Unit ref.: 1200

Initiators: 2LAH-12308 PIDs: 123B



2. Possible liquid slug carry over from post-condenser 2E1209

1. Possible damage to compressor 2C3201 due to liquid carryover (reciprocating type compressor)

1. None W2 assumed for likelihood of plugging the liquid outlet line of 2D1205. L1 assumed as plant shutdown may not be required. Loss will be due to machine repair cost.

L1 W2 a 3. As per HAZOP Recommendation 17, in case an interlock is provided inside the recycle gas compressor package to trip the compresor on high level in suction damper 2D3206, the interlock 2I-12312 can be deleted and a DCS alarm can be retained.

SIF: 6. On high high pressure in 2D3303A, reactor drain header is closed

Interlock ID: 2S-33302A

Primary Final Elements: 2HV-33601A; 2HV-33601B; 1oo2 Unit ref.: 3300

Initiators: 2PAHH-33305A; 2PAHH-33307A; 1oo2 PIDs: 333B



1. To prevent overpressurisation of distillation vessel 2D3303A

1. Reactor drain opened by operator in error for the reactor which is in operation.

1. Distillation vessel will be subjected to pressure higher than design pressure which is 10 barg. Possible failure of distillation vessel and connected piping. Loss of containment leading to fire/ explosion

1. 2PSV-33305A provided on distillation vessel. However it is not sized for this case hence, no credit taken.

F2 assumed considering operator may be present in the area. W1 assumed based on likelihood of operator error during reactor draining operation which is expected once or twice every year and is a planned operation. P2 assumed considering that rise in pressure and failure may be immediate.

S2 F2 P2 W1 (F2, P2)

SIL 1

2. Drain valve is locked close, no credit taken.

2. Same as above 1. 2PSV-33305A provided on distillation vessel. However it is not sized for this case hence, no credit taken.

E2 assumed considering that release may need to be reported to authorities. P1 assumed considering spill can be contained within plant boundary.

E2 P1 W1 (P1) a

3. Same as above 1. 2PSV-33305A provided on distillation vessel. However it is not sized for this case hence, no credit taken.

L3 assumed for major damage to equipment requiring long shutdown to repair.

L3 W1 SIL 1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 7. On high high pressure in 2D3303A, LP steam to distillation vessel are closed


Primary Final Elements: 2FV-33304A Unit ref.: 3300

Initiators: 2PAHH-33305A; 2PAHH-33307A; 1oo2 PIDs: 333B



1. To prevent back flow from distillation vessel to LP steam header in case of very high pressure in distillation vessel 2D3303A

1. Reactor drain opened by operator in error for the reactor which is in operation.

1. Potential back flow of mother liquor/reactor contents to LP steam system through LP steam injection connection provided for distillation vessel. This may occur during the final treatment step when LP steam is directly injected into distillation vessel.

1. Check valve provided but since single check valve is there, no credit taken as a conservative case.

W1 assumed based on likelihood of operator error during reactor draining operation which is expected once or twice every year and is a planned operation. L2 assumed for LP steam clean up which may require plant shutdown for 1-2 days period.

L2 W1 a

2. Same as above. 1. Same as above. W1 assumed based on likelihood of operator error during reactor draining operation which is expected once or twice every year and is a planned operation. E1 assumed considering the disposal requirement of additional effluents.

E1 P1 W1 (P1) ---

SIF: 8. On not closed position of HV-33301A, reactor drain header and LP steam to distillation vessel are closed



Initiators: 2HZLL-33301A PIDs: 333B



1. To prevent release of reactor effluents to atmosphere through distillation vessel bottom discharge

1. Distillation vessel bottom discharge valve, for wax ball loading to big bags, is opened due to operator error for the distillation vessel which is receiving reactor drain.

1. Release of reactor mixture to atmosphere through bottom discharge valve. There can be severe injury to the operator present near the discharge point for big bag operation.

1. None F2 assumed considering operator will be present at location for discharge operation. Escape for the operator may not be possible in this case, hence P2 assumed.

S2 F2 P2 W2 (F2, P2)

SIL 2

2. Same as above. 1. Same as above. 1. None. E2 assumed considering that release may need to be reported to authorities.

P1 assumed considering environmental impact can be avoided by containing the release and treating it before disposal.

E2 P1 W2 (P1) SIL 1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 9. On not closed position of HV-33302, reactor drain header and LP steam to distillation vessel are closed



Initiators: 2HZLL-33302 PIDs: 333B



1. To prevent back flow high pressure of distillation vessel contents to waste water vessel 2D3304.

1. Transfer valve 2HV-33302 between the waste water vessel 2D3304 and distillation vessel 2D3303A opened due to operator for transferring the HC content layer to 2D3303A during the period when reactor draining is being done to 2D3303A.

1. High pressure contents will back flow through the transfer line to 2D3304. Since 2D3304 is connected from bottom to atmosphere through a hydraulic seal, the material will release to the drain and to atmosphere after breaking the seal.

1. None Severe injury is not likely, however minor injury can happen to operator, hence S1 assumed.

S1 W2 ---


P1 assumed considering environmental impact can be avoided by containing the release and treating it before disposal.

E2 W2 (P1) SIL 1

SIF: 10. On high high pressure in 2D3303B, reactor drain header is closed

Interlock ID: 2S-33302B


Initiators: 2PAHH-33305B; 2PAHH-33307B; 1oo2 PIDs: 333B



SIF: 11. On high high pressure in 2D3303B, LP steam to distillation vessel are closed


Primary Final Elements: 2FV-33304B Unit ref.: 3300

Initiators: 2PAHH-33305B; 2PAHH-33307B; 1oo2 PIDs: 333B



SIF: 12. On not closed position of HV-33301B, reactor drain header and LP steam to distillation vessel are closed



Initiators: 2HZLL-33301B PIDs: 333B





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 13. High pressure in 2D3303A, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed


Primary Final Elements: 2HV-33302; 2HV-33301A; 2oo2 Unit ref.: 3300

Initiators: 2PAH-33305A; 2PAH-33307A; 1oo2 PIDs: 333B



1. To prevent release of distillation vessel contents at high pressure to atmosphere

1. Operator error to open bottom discharge valve when distillation is not complete or system is under pressure.

1. Possible injury to operator, present for big bag operation or 2D3304 transfer operation, due to exposure to distillation vessel effluent. Release of untreated material to trench.

1. None F2 assumed considering operator will be present at location for discharge/transfer operation.

S2 F2 P2 W2 (F2, P2)

SIL 2


P1 assumed considering environmental impact can be avoided by containing the release and treating it for disposal.

E2 P1 W2 (P1) SIL 1

SIF: 14. On high high temperature in 2D3303A, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed


Primary Final Elements: 2HV-33301A Unit ref.: 3300

Initiators: 2TAHH-33304A PIDs: 333B



1. To prevent release of distillation vessel contents at high temperature to atmosphere

1. Operator error to open bottom discharge valve when distillation is not complete or system at high temperature (last step involves cooling the contents with service water)

1. Possible injury to operator, present for big bag operation, due to exposure to distillation vessel effluent.

1. None F2 assumed considering operator will be present at location for discharge operation.

S2 F2 P2 W2 (F2, P2)

SIL 2

SIF: 15. On not closed position of HV-33601A/B, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed



Initiators: 2HZLL-33601A/B; 1oo2 PIDs: 333B



1. To prevent accidental release of reactor effluent to atmosphere.

1. Operator error to open the reactor drain to distillation vessel which either is under discharge mode or receiving the contents from waster water tank, 2D3304.

1. Release of reactor mixture to atmosphere through bottom discharge valve or hydraulic seal of 2D3304

1. None F2 assumed considering operator will be present at location for discharge operation. Escape for the operator may be possible in this case, hence P1 assumed.

S2 F2 P1 W1 (F2, P2)

SIL 1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 15. On not closed position of HV-33601A/B, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed



Initiators: 2HZLL-33601A/B; 1oo2 PIDs: 333B



2. Same as above. 1. Same as above. 1. None E2 assumed considering that release may need to be reported to authorities. P1 assumed considering environmental impact can be avoided by containing the release and treating it for disposal.

E2 P1 W2 (P1) SIL 1

SIF: 16. On not closed position of FV-33304A, connection between 2D3303A & 2D3304 and 2D3303A bottom discharge are closed


Primary Final Elements: 2HV-33301A Unit ref.: 3300

Initiators: 2FZLL-33304A PIDs: 333B



1. To prevent exposure of operator to LP steam

1. LP steam to distillation vessel opens due to operator error during discharge operation

1. Possible injury to operator due to exposure of LP steam

1. None S1 W2 ---

SIF: 17. High pressure in 2D3303B, bottom discharge are closed


Primary Final Elements: 2HV-33301B Unit ref.: 3300

Initiators: 2PAH-33305B; 2PAH-33307B; 1oo2 PIDs: 333D



SIF: 18. On high high temperature in 2D3303B, bottom discharge are closed



Initiators: 2TAHH-33304B PIDs: 333D





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 19. On not closed position of HV-33601A/B, 2D3303B bottom discharge are closed



Initiators: 2HZLL-33601A/B; 1oo2 PIDs: 333D



SIF: 20. On not closed position of FV-33304B, 2D3303B bottom discharge are closed



Initiators: 2FZLL-33304B PIDs: 333D



SIF: 21. On high high pressure at 2P3301A/B discharge, stop pump


Primary Final Elements: 2P3301A stop; 2P3301B stop; 2oo2 Unit ref.: 3300

Initiators: 2PAH-33103A; 2PAHH-33103B; 1oo2 PIDs: 331



1. To prevent overpressurisation of pump discharge piping

1. Plugging of pump discharge line

1. Potential failure of discharge piping leading to loss of containment and fire/ explosion

1. 2PSV33102-R on 2P3301A F2 assumed considering operator may be present in the area of impact as area may be significantly large.

Credit to be taken to PSVs, sized for plugging line scenario. Hence Overall SIL to be reduced to SIL 1

S2 F2 P2 W2 (F2, P2)

SIL 2 Remark: Interlock Tag (Logic Solver) Changed in 2S33104

2. 2PSV33103-R on 2P3301B


SPEEDBIRD HDPE PLANT VENDOR PACKAGES SAFETY REPORT

Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7

Vendor Packages and Management of Changes

HAZOP STUDY



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.1a

Dryer Package HAZOP TEAM MEMBER LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Team Members Company Title 1. 3/3/2008

Sachin Gupta ERM Facilitator Present

Jack Liu ERM Scribe Present

Boris Brat TCM Process Present


Luca Viola TCM Process Present


Fiupro Posocco TCM Package Present

Ardreas Heinrich Basell Process Present

Rodnigo Carvajal Basell Process Present



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.1b

Off-gas Compressor HAZOP TEAM MEMBER LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101









Anirudha Datey TCM Rotating Engineer Present

Virendra V Kshirsagar TCM Project Engineer Present

Guenter Sachs-W Basell Construction Manager Present

Richard Schulz Nash Project Manager Present

Harm Van Meurs Nash Project Engineer Present

Andrea Lo Cascio Ravizza & C s.r.l Present



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.1c

Refrigeration Package

HAZOP TEAM MEMBER LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101










Cristina Chiusolo TCM HSE Present

Anirudha Datey TCM Rotating Engineer Present

Guenter Sachs-W Basell Construction Manager Present

Claudio Maciga GEA Dept Head Present

Michele Zanolini GEA Project Engineer Present

Pierpaolo Pistilli GEA Process Present



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.1d

Pellet Deodorization Package




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101








Cristina Chiusolo TCM HSE Present

Ardreas Heinrich Basell Process Present



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.1e

Polybutene Feeding System




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Andrew Walton ERM Facilitator Present



Luca Viola TCM Process Partial

Faibo Scarioni TCM HSE Partial

Mudit Ashtana Basell Project Engineer Present



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.1f

Flare System




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Andrew Walton ERM Facilitator Present


Boris Brat TCM Process Partial

Gianpietro Orlandini TCM Process Present

Fiupro Posocco TCM Package Present

Mudit Ashtana Basell Project Engineer Present

Claudio Ghezzi ITAS Sales Manager Present

Luigi Galletti ITAS Contract Engineer Present



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.1g





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



Team Members Company Title 1. 3/4/2008 2. 3/5/2008

Sachin Gupta ERM Facilitator Present Present

Jack Liu ERM Scribe Present Present

Boris Brat TCM Process Present Present



Maurizio Rigolio TCM HSE Partial

Cristina Chivsolo TCM HSE Present

Guenter Sachs-W Basell Construction Manager Present Present



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.2a

Dryer Package NODE LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Hot water circuit for the powder drying

Hot water is circulated through the dryers (in two chambers, back mixer chamber and plug flow chamber) to remove residual hexane as well as to heat the polymer powder. Water is heated against low pressure steam in hot water heater. Hot water is circulated in a closed loop using hot water pumps, 2P2207A/B/C. A and B pumps circulates water through back mixer chamber and plug flow chamber respectively. C pump is common stand-by for A and B pumps

Hot water pump 2P2207A/B/C rated capacity: 320m3/hr (approximately),delta P: 5bar, Shutoff head: 6.2barg

3443-XZ-DM-001_221 Hot water heater 2E2207A/B, Hot water pump 2P2207A/B/C

In NPP plant, drying was done directly using very low pressure steam. 3443-XZ-DM-

001_221A

2. LP steam circuit for powder drying LP steam is used to heat water in plate type heat exchangers. Flow of the steam is based on dryer panel temperature control, which in cascade controls the temperature of hot water supply to dryer panel

LP steam supply pressure 3.5barg, 148degC. Design pressure and temperature are 6barg, 200degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_221 Hot water heater 2E2207A/B3443-XZ-DM-

001_221A



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.2b

Off-gas Compressor NODE LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Off-gas compressor (2PK-3402) Off gas compressor is used to pressurize the off gases from extrusion, polymerization and conveying section. The pressurized gas is routed to cracker plant. The header pressure is maintained by 2PIC-34106 and excess gases can be routed to flare. Water is used as a liquid medium for the liquid ring of compressor.

Design capacity 670m3/hr (at inlet condition), Design pressure 10barg/ FV, design temp 150degC.Separators 2D-3404 and 2D-3405 design pressure and temp: 6barg/FV, 200degC. Plate cooler 2E-3412 design pressure and temp (hot side and cold side): 10barg, 175degC. Plate cooler 2E-3402 design pressure and temp (hot side and cold side): 10barg, 60degC.

3443-XZ-DM-001_341A

Plate coolers: 2E-3402/ 2E-3412, Liquid ring pump 2C-3402, Separators: 2D-3404/ 2D-3405

Design and interlocks of off-gas compressor package are same as that for NPP plant and only capacity has been increased to meet the new requirements.

3443-XZ-DM-001_341B

3443-GP-VD-038 Sheet 1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.2c

Refrigeration Package NODE LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Refrigeration unit Refrigeration unit is provided to meet the refrigeration requirement for N2 scrubber and for chilling down hexane. Propylene is used as the refrigerant. Main modification done w.r.t to NPP plant is introduction of hot gas bypass from oil separator outlet to the remote chiller/ evaporator. The intent of this modification is to enable running of compressor below normal turn down of 10%. The flow of hot gas bypass is on compressor suction pressure control. Other modification is introduction of remote isolation valve in the propylene inlet line of remote chiller/evaporator.

Compressor duty 39440 kg/hr, suction pressure 1.7barg, discharge pressure 15.1barg. Design pressure 20barg. Chiller design temperature (shell side/ tube side) -45/ 120degC, -45/ 230degC, design pressure 20barg/ FV. Condenser inlet 62degC

3443-GY-VD-006 Sheet 1

Condenser 2E-6102, Remote chiller 2E-2206



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.2d

Pellet Deodorization Package NODE LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Pellet deodorization system The pellet deodorization system is provided to remove components responsible for unwanted odors in the polymer product. Deodorization is done by using very low pressure steam which is on flow control. The effluent steam containing removed components is condensed in the deodorizer condenser against cooling water. The uncondensed vapour which is predominantly N2 and some HC, is routed to waste gas system. Condensate from condenser is collected in condensate collector 2D-5803 and then pumped to separation drum 2D-3104

2D-5801 design pressure and temp: 400mbarg, 150degC. 2D-5803 design pressure and temp: 3.5barg, 150degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_581 2D-5802, 2RF-5801/ 5803, 2D-5801, 2D-5803, 2E-5801

3443-XZ-DM-001_582

3443-XZ-DM-001_513

2. Deodorized pellet dryer system The wet pellets from pellets deodorizer are fed to deodorizer pellet receiver. DM water/ recycle water is added from conveying water buffer vessel for pellet transportation and cooling of pellets. Pellets are pumped to the dryer through conveying water pump 2P-5802A/B. Pellets are dried against cross current flow of air. The dried pellets are routed to deodorizer pellet receiver from where it is fed to homogenizer. Separated water from pellet dryer is filtered in elbow sieves 2F-5801A/B/C. Filtered water is routed back to conveying water buffer vessel under gravity

2D-5804 design pressure and temp: XX barg, 120degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_582 2D-5805, 2E-5802, 2D-5804, 2P-5802A/B, 2S-5801, 2F-5801A/B/C, 2P-5802



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.2e

Polybutene Feeding System NODE LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Offspec product recycling and polybutene addtive system

Intermediate pellet bin 2D-5102 has been modified to accomodate polybutene dosing.

2D-5102 volume 120m3, polybutene feed rate 500 to 1500 kg/hr, re-pellet feed rate 500 to 11000kg/hr

3443-XZ-DM-001_511C

2D-5102

2. Additive feeding 2PK-5202 Additive feeding system 2PK-5202 has been modified to increase range of feed flow in some instances. The additive density has also changed in some cases and/or additional additives will be processed. No HAZOP issue is foreseen by the team.

3443-XZ-DM-001_521A

3443-XZ-DM-001_521B

3443-XZ-DM-001_521C



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.2f

Flare System NODE LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Flare system Two modifications have been made to the flare system. A provision for additional 8" line from the cracker unit has been provided to be used during shutdown condition. The 24" inlet pipling has been increased to 28" to maintain very low back pressure in polymerization unit. (less than 60mbarg)

KOD 5D-6801 design pressure and temp: 3.5barg, (-)29/250degC.Water seal 5PK-6801, design pressure and temp: 3.5barg, (-)29/250degC.

3443-XZ-DM-001_681 KOD 5D-6801, Water seal 5PK-6801

3443-WB-YO-005-001



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.2g

Management of Changes NODE LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Ethylene feed to reactor no. 1, 2, 3 (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0045)

To provide ethylene feed to each reactor. Remote isolation valve added in the ethylene feed line to reduce the sizing of PSV on the reactor.

Reactor design pressure and temp:18barg, 210degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_121A

Reactor 2R-1201

Discussion is done for reactor no. 1. The discussion and recommendation is applicable for reactor no. 2 and 3 also. 3443-XZ-DM-

001_122A

3443-XZ-DM-001_123A

2. Hexane unloading system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0051)

Hexane unloading facility is provided to unload hexane from truck tanker into the mother liquor tank 2D-4102 through hexane unloading pump 2P-4104

Pump 2P-4104 design capacity: XXX design pressure and temp: XXX

3443-XZ-DM-001_003B

Check the requirment for fusible plug for SDV

3443-XZ-DM-001_411

3443-XZ-DM-001_412

3. Catalyst supply to reactor (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0052)

Catalyst is pumped to reactor from catalyst suspension vessel using catalyst dosing pumps (positive displacement type). Each pump has a provision to take suction from either of the catalyst suspension vessels. Remote isolation valve is added under each catalyst suction line from catalyst suspension vessel. Node also includes the mother liquor line from mother liquor tank and hexane line from distilled hexane tank. Remote isolation has been added at each liquid oultet nozzle from tank.

3443-XZ-DM-001_111A

2P-1101A/B, 2D-1102A/B

Discussion is done for one remote isolation valve (2HV-11115) and it should be applicable for other three remote isolation valves (2HV-11116/ 11117/ 11118) also

4. Gas holder (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0053)

Gas holder is used as a buffer storage for N2 supply to vacuum breakers. Part of modification includes relocating the pressure/ vacuum relief valve 2PSV-24101 from tank shell to inlet/ outlet nozzle

2D-2402 design pressure and temp: 0barg (to be confirmed), 100degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_241 2D-2402



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.3a

Dryer Package HAZOP WORKSHEET



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 1. Hot water circuit for the powder drying


Node Intent: Hot water is circulated through the dryers (in two chambers, back mixer chamber and plug flow chamber) to remove residual hexane as well as to heat the polymer powder. Water is heated against low pressure steam in hot water heater. Hot water is circulated in a closed loop using hot water pumps, 2P2207A/B/C. A and B pumps circulates water through back mixer chamber and plug flow chamber respectively. C pump is common stand-by for A and B pumps

Design Conditions/Parameters: Hot water pump 2P2207A/B/C rated capacity: 320m3/hr (approximately),delta P: 5bar, Shutoff head: 6.2barg

Equipment ID: Hot water heater 2E2207A/B, Hot water pump 2P2207A/B/C


1. No/Less Flow 1. Running hot water pump trips 1.1. Failure in removing residual hexane from the polymer powder. Hexane will be carried over to the downstream powder treating vessel where it is likely to be removed. However, in extreme case hexane removal in doenstream section may not be complete leading to product quality issue. Loss of sufficient temperature may also lead to formation of wet cake in dryer causing plugging.

1.1.1. Pump running indication with alarm provided.

1.1.2. Low flow alarm provided with 2FI-22132/ 22133 for each hot water circuit.

1.1.3. Common stand-by pump available. Operator will have sufficient time to start stand-by pump.

1.1.4. Low temperature alarm provided with 2TIC-22106 on back mix chamber.

1.1.5. Low pressure alarm provided with 2PI-22120/ 22121 at the hot water outlet of dryer panels.

1.1.6. Interlock 2I-22101 to stop feed to centrifuges in case very low flow of hot water.

1.2. Failure in heating the polymer powder to a specified temperature can lead to condensation of steam in the downstream powder treatment vessel. Possibility of forming HCL which can pose material issue in the further downstream section.

1.2.1. Pump running indication with alarm provided.

1.2.2. Low flow alarm provided with 2FI-22132/ 22133 for each hot water circuit.

1.2.3. Common stand-by pump available. Operator will have sufficient time to start stand-by pump.

1.2.4. Low temperature alarm provided with 2TIC-22106 on back mix chamber.

1.2.5. Low pressure alarm provided with 2PI-22120/ 22121 at the hot water outlet of dryer panels.

1.2.6. Interlock 2I-22101 to stop feed to centrifuges in case very low flow of hot water.

2. More Flow 1. Stand-by pump started inadvertently 1.1. Increased flow through one or both loops depending on hydraulic pressure drop of the system. No significant consequence since flow through loop in on temperature control.

3. Reverse Flow 1. No issue

4. High Pressure 1. N2 to expansion vessel left open 1.1. High pressure in expansion vessel (design pressure for N2 supply is 8.8barg and design pressure for expansion vessel is 6barg)

1. Provide a relief valve on each expansion vessel 2D2207A/B sized for N2 fully open case.

TCM/ NIRO

2. Blocked discharge for hot water pump (pump started with dryer panel outlet valve in close condition).

2.1. Dryer panel will be subjected to pump shutoff condition (design pressure of dryer panel is lower than shutoff pressure of the pump)


TCM/ NIRO

3. DM water make up kept full open (e.g. during initial fill)

3.1. High pressure in hot water circuit (design pressure of DM water system is higher than design pressure of hot water circuit)

3.1.1. 2PSV-22113S/ 22114S provided in the DM water make up line. 3. 2PSV-22113S/ 22114S should be sized for DM water full open case.

TCM/ NIRO

5. Low Pressure 1. No new issue

6. High Temperature 1. Refer to LP steam node

7. Low Temperature 1. Refer to LP steam node

8. High Level 1. One of the running pump trips 1.1. Possible draining of dryer panel outlet line to expansion vessel (dryer panel is at the highest point on the circuit) leading to overfilling of expansion vessel.

1.1.1. Expansion vessel is kept under N2 pressure

2. DM water left open during make-up 2.1. High level in expansion vessel to the extent when pressure (vessel under N2 blanketing and thus rise in level will compress the vapor space) in the vessel becomes equal to DM water supply pressure. No significant consequence.

2.1.1. High level alarm 2LAH-22104/ 22109 provided on expansion vessels.

9. Low Level 1. Failure in making up water to the system (to account for system losses)

1.1. No immediate consequence. However, if loss continues without make-up, eventually water circulation may be affected as a long term effect.

1.1.1. Low level alarm 2LAL-22104/ 22109 provided on expansion vessels.

10. Contamination/ Additional Phase 1. No issue

11. Composition Change/ Loss of Phase

1. No issue



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 1. Hot water circuit for the powder drying


Node Intent: Hot water is circulated through the dryers (in two chambers, back mixer chamber and plug flow chamber) to remove residual hexane as well as to heat the polymer powder. Water is heated against low pressure steam in hot water heater. Hot water is circulated in a closed loop using hot water pumps, 2P2207A/B/C. A and B pumps circulates water through back mixer chamber and plug flow chamber respectively. C pump is common stand-by for A and B pumps

Design Conditions/Parameters: Hot water pump 2P2207A/B/C rated capacity: 320m3/hr (approximately),delta P: 5bar, Shutoff head: 6.2barg

Equipment ID: Hot water heater 2E2207A/B, Hot water pump 2P2207A/B/C


12. Start-up Hazards/ Requirement 1. No new issue

13. Shutdown/ Maintenance Hazards/ Requirement

1. No issue

14. Utility Failure 1. No issue

15. Tube Failure/ Leakage 1. No issue



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 2. LP steam circuit for powder drying


Node Intent: LP steam is used to heat water in plate type heat exchangers. Flow of the steam is based on dryer panel temperature control, which in cascade controls the temperature of hot water supply to dryer panel

Design Conditions/Parameters: LP steam supply pressure 3.5barg, 148degC. Design pressure and temperature are 6barg, 200degC

Equipment ID: Hot water heater 2E2207A/B


1. No/Less Flow 1. LP steam supply failure 1.1. Failure in removing residual hexane from the polymer powder. Hexane will be carried over to the downstream powder treating vessel where it is likely to be removed. However, in extreme case hexane removal in doenstream section may not be complete leading to product quality issue. Loss of sufficient temperature may also lead to formation of wet cake in dryer causing plugging.

1.1.1. Low temperature alarm provided with 2TIC-22106/ 22102 on back mix chamber.

1.1.2. Low temperature alarm provided with 2TIC-XXXXX/ YYYYY on hot water line to dryer panel

1.1.3. Low flow alarm provided with 2FI-22102 upstream of 2XV-22106

1.2. Failure in heating the polymer powder to a specified temperature can lead to condensation of steam in the powder treatment vessel. Possibility of forming HCL which can pose material issue in the downstream section.

1.2.1. Low temperature alarm provided with 2TIC-22106/ 22102 on back mix chamber.

1.2.2. Low temperature alarm provided with 2TIC-XXXXX/ YYYYY on hot water line to dryer panel

1.2.3. Low flow alarm provided with 2FI-22102 upstream of 2XV-22106

2. 2XV-22106 malfunctions to close 2.1. Same as Consequence 1.1, 1.2 of No/Less Flow Cause 1

3. 2TV-22102 or 2TV-22016 malfunctions to close due to 2TIC-XXXXX/ 2TIC-YYYYY malfunction

3.1. Same as Consequence 1.1, 1.2 of No/Less Flow Cause 1 3.1.1. Low flow alarm provided with 2FI-22102 upstream of 2XV-22106

3.1.2. Low temperature alarm from 2TIC-22102 or 2TI-22106 (on chamber side)

2. More Flow 1. 2TV-22102 or 2TV-22016 malfunctions to open fully due to 2TIC-XXXXX/ 2TIC-YYYYY malfunction

1.1. Possible melting of polymer across dryer panel leading to fouling of dryer panels. Eventually there will be no heat exchange across the dry panels. The plant needs to be shutdown to clean dryer panels

1.1.1. High flow alarm provided with 2FI-22102 upstream of 2XV-22106

1.1.2. High temperature alarm from 2TIC-22102 or 2TIC-22106 (on chamber side)


4. High Pressure 1. No issue


6. High Temperature 1. No new issue

7. Low Temperature 1. No new issue

8. High Level 1. Not applicable

9. Low Level 1. Not applicable



1. No issue

12. Start-up Hazards/ Requirement 1. No issue


1. No issue

14. Utility Failure 1. Instrument air failure 1.1. 2XV-22106 and 2TV-22102/ 22106 are AFC type. No additional consequence




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.3b

Off-gas Compressor HAZOP WORKSHEET



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 1. Off-gas compressor (2PK-3402)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_341A; 3443-XZ-DM-001_341B; 3443-GP-VD-038 Sheet 1

Node Intent: Off gas compressor is used to pressurize the off gases from extrusion, polymerization and conveying section. The pressurized gas is routed to cracker plant. The header pressure is maintained by 2PIC-34106 and excess gases can be routed to flare. Water is used as a liquid medium for the liquid ring of compressor.

Design Conditions/Parameters: Design capacity 670m3/hr (at inlet condition), Design pressure 10barg/ FV, design temp 150degC.Separators 2D-3404 and 2D-3405 design pressure and temp: 6barg/FV, 200degC. Plate cooler 2E-3412 design pressure and temp (hot side and cold side): 10barg, 175degC. Plate cooler 2E-3402 design pressure and temp (hot side and cold side): 10barg, 60degC.

Equipment ID: Plate coolers: 2E-3402/ 2E-3412, Liquid ring pump 2C-3402, Separators: 2D-3404/ 2D-3405


1. High Pressure 1. N2 valve left open during initial purging 1.1. Possible high pressure in compressor piping/ equipment (separator design pressure is 6barg, N2 design pressure is 8.8barg)

1.1.1. 2PSV-34104S provided on separator 2D-3404 1. Consider sizing 2PSV-34104S on separator 2D-3404 for N2 valve full open case.

TCM/ NASH

2. High Level 1. DM water make up valve left open during initial fill

1.1. Potential overfilling of separator leading to high pressure (separator design pressure is 6barg while DM water design pressure is 10barg)

1.1.1. 2PSV-34104S provided on separator 2D-3404 2. Consider providing a PSV on the DM water make up line (inside package battery limit and downstream of isolation valve), sized for DM water valve full open case and set at 6barg.

TCM/ NASH



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.3c

Refrigeration Package HAZOP WORKSHEET



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 1. Refrigeration unit

Drawings: 3443-GY-VD-006 Sheet 1

Node Intent: Refrigeration unit is provided to meet the refrigeration requirement for N2 scrubber and for chilling down hexane. Propylene is used as the refrigerant. Main modification done w.r.t to NPP plant is introduction of hot gas bypass from oil separator outlet to the remote chiller/ evaporator. The intent of this modification is to enable running of compressor below normal turn down of 10%. The flow of hot gas bypass is on compressor suction pressure control. Other modification is introduction of remote isolation valve in the propylene inlet line of remote chiller/evaporator.

Design Conditions/Parameters: Compressor duty 39440 kg/hr, suction pressure 1.7barg, discharge pressure 15.1barg. Design pressure 20barg. Chiller design temperature (shell side/ tube side) -45/ 120degC, -45/ 230degC, design pressure 20barg/ FV. Condenser inlet 62degC

Equipment ID: Condenser 2E-6102, Remote chiller 2E-2206


1. No/Less Flow 1. Normally there is no flow through bypass. No/ less flow during turn down operation due to malfunction of 2PIC-61227-2 to close 2PV-61225

1.1. Loss of suction pressure to the compressor leading to surging of compressor. Possible damage to compressor

1.1.1. Low suction pressure alarm provided with 2PI-61227

1.1.2. Interlock 2IS-61150 provided to trip the compressor on very low suction pressure (2PALL-61226-1)

2. Hot gas bypass line manual block valve kept closed due to operator error during startup

2.1. Loss of suction pressure to the compressor leading to surging of compressor. Possible damage to compressor

2.1.1. Low suction pressure alarm provided with 2PI-61227

2.1.2. Interlock 2IS-61150 provided to trip the compressor on very low suction pressure (2PALL-61226-1)

3. No flow of propylene to remote chiller/ evaporator due to malfunction of 2HV-22203 (new remote isolation valve) to close

3.1. No chilling in remote chiller/ evaporator. The operation of N2 scrubber will be affected

3.1.1. Valve close indication and alarm provided on DCS

3.1.2. High temperature alarm provided on process outlet of remote chiller/ evaporator through 2TIC-61238

3.2. No significant consequence is expected on compressor operation other than reduction in load of compressor

2. More Flow 1. 2PIC-61227-2 malfunctions to open 2PV-61225 during normal operation

1.1. Reduction in chilling capacity of remote chiller/ evaporator. The operation of N2 scrubber will be affected to some extent depending on operation margin in remote chiller/ evaporator

1.1.1. High temperature alarm provided on process outlet of remote chiller/ evaporator through 2TIC-61238

1.2. Increase in compressor capacity and compressor suction pressure/ temp. Consequent increase in compressor discharge pressure/ temperature

1.2.1. High temperature alarm provided on compressor discharge through 2TI-61215

1.2.2. High pressure alarm provided with 2PI-61228-1

1.2.3. Interlock 2IS-61150 provided to trip the compressor on very high discharge temperature through 2TI-61216-1

1.2.4. Interlock 2IS-61150 provided to trip the compressor on very high discharge pressure through 2PI-61229-1

2. 2PIC-61227-2 malfunctions to open 2PV-61225 full (more than required) during turn down operation

2.1. Increase in compressor suction pressure/ temp. Consequent increase in compressor discharge pressure/ temperature

2.1.1. High temperature alarm provided on compressor discharge through 2TI-61215

2.1.2. High pressure alarm provided with 2PI-61228-1

2.1.3. Interlock 2IS-61150 provided to trip the compressor on very high discharge temperature through 2TI-61216-1

2.1.4. Interlock 2IS-61150 provided to trip the compressor on very high discharge pressure through 2PI-61229-1

2.2. Remote chiller/ evaporator may be subjected to high temperature condition

2.2.1. Remote chiller/ evaporator shell side is designed for 120degC and tube side is designed for 230degC


4. High Pressure 1. No new issue


6. High Level 1. Accumulation of condensate in the compressor suction line during shutdown condition (expected during winter condition)

1.1. Possible damage to compressor when started due to liquid carryover 1.1.1. Operating procedure to check that there is no level in the liquid trap before starting the compressor

1.1.2. Interlock provided to inhibit start of compressor in case of high level in liquid trap (2LAH-61229)

7. Low Level 1. No issue


9. Low Temperature 1. No issue

10. Start-up Hazards/ Requirement 1. No significant issue


1. No significant issue

12. Utility Failure 1. Instrument air failure 1.1. 2HV-22203, 2PV-61225 are of AFC type, no additional consequence

13. Tube Failure/ Leakage 1. No new issue

14. Others 1.1. Possible low temperature condition in the refrigeration circuit 1.1.1. Equipment and piping designed for -45degC



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 1. Refrigeration unit

Drawings: 3443-GY-VD-006 Sheet 1

Node Intent: Refrigeration unit is provided to meet the refrigeration requirement for N2 scrubber and for chilling down hexane. Propylene is used as the refrigerant. Main modification done w.r.t to NPP plant is introduction of hot gas bypass from oil separator outlet to the remote chiller/ evaporator. The intent of this modification is to enable running of compressor below normal turn down of 10%. The flow of hot gas bypass is on compressor suction pressure control. Other modification is introduction of remote isolation valve in the propylene inlet line of remote chiller/evaporator.

Design Conditions/Parameters: Compressor duty 39440 kg/hr, suction pressure 1.7barg, discharge pressure 15.1barg. Design pressure 20barg. Chiller design temperature (shell side/ tube side) -45/ 120degC, -45/ 230degC, design pressure 20barg/ FV. Condenser inlet 62degC

Equipment ID: Condenser 2E-6102, Remote chiller 2E-2206


1. Blowdown valve (2HV-22204 or 2HV-61201 provided on receiver and remote chiller/ evaporator respectively) opened by mistake during normal operation

1.2. Forced shutdown of the refrigeration unit. No further consequence



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.3d


HAZOP WORKSHEET



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 1. Pellet deodorization system

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_581; 3443-XZ-DM-001_582; 3443-XZ-DM-001_513

Node Intent: The pellet deodorization system is provided to remove components responsible for unwanted odors in the polymer product. Deodorization is done by using very low pressure steam which is on flow control. The effluent steam containing removed components is condensed in the deodorizer condenser against cooling water. The uncondensed vapour which is predominantly N2 and some HC, is routed to waste gas system. Condensate from condenser is collected in condensate collector 2D-5803 and then pumped to separation drum 2D-3104

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D-5801 design pressure and temp: 400mbarg, 150degC. 2D-5803 design pressure and temp: 3.5barg, 150degC

Equipment ID: 2D-5802, 2RF-5801/ 5803, 2D-5801, 2D-5803, 2E-5801


1. No/Less Flow 1. No pellets feed to pellet deodorizer due to tripping of rotary feeder 2RF-5801 or 2RF-5803

1.1. Build up of pellet in deodorizer feeding hopper followed by build up of level in pellet receiver 2D-5104. Possible pellet carryover to condenser. Shutdown of deodorizer may be required to clean up condenser

1.1.1. Very high level alarm provided on deodorizer feeding hopper 2D-5802 with 2LI-58102


TCM

1.1.2. Interlock 2I-58103 provided to trip the pellet pneumatic transport package

1.1.3. High level alarm provided on pellet receiver 2D-5104 with 2LSH-51302

2. No pellets discharge from deodorizer to pellet conveying pick up vessel due to tripping of rotary feeder 2RF-5802

2.1. Build up of level in pellet deodorizer. Overfilling of pellet deodorizer can subject it to very low pressure steam condition (pellet deodorizer is designed for 0.4barg where as very low pressure steam is normally at 0.5barg)

2.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LIC-58101 on pellet deodorizer 2D-5801


TCM

2.1.2. Interlock 2S-58101 provided to trip rotary feeder 2RF-5801/ 5803 and stop very low pressure steam to deodorizer on very high level in pellet deodorizer through 2LAHH-58101

3. Provide a low temp alarm with 2TI-58102/ 58103 on pellet deodorizer

TCM

2.1.3. Interlock 2S-58101 provided to trip rotary feeder 2RF-5801/ 5803 and stop very low pressure steam to deodorizer on very high pressure in pellet deodorizer through 2PAHH-58101

2.1.4. 2PSV-58103 provided on pellet deodorizer sized for very low pressure steam full open case.

2.2. Possibility of reverse flow from waste gas header to pellet deodorizer 2.2.1. Check valve provided on the waste gas line from pellet deodorizer to deodorizer condenser


TCM

3. No flow of very low pressure steam to pellet deodorizer due to failure in steam supply from network

3.1. Same as No/ Low Flow, Consequence 2.1

2. More Flow 1. More pellets discharge from deodorizer to pellet conveying pick up vessel due to increase speed of rotary feeder 2RF-5802 (more than required)

1.1. Depletion of pellet level in pellet deodorizer leading to lack of contact between pellets and very low pressure steam. This may result into poor deodorization and product quality issue. No further consequence

1.1.1. Low level alarm provided with 2LSL-58104 on pellet deodorizer

2. More flow of very low pressure steam to deodorizer

2.1. Increase in pellet temp, no significant impact considering LLS is at 115DegC.

2.2. Possible overpressurization of pellet deodorizer to steam pressure condition.

2.2.1. Interlock 2S-58101 provided to trip rotary feeder 2RF-5801/ 5803 and stop very low pressure steam to deodorizer on very high pressure in pellet deodorizer through 2PAHH-58101

2.2.2. 2PSV-58103 provided on pellet deodorizer sized for very low pressure steam full open case.

3. Reverse Flow 1. Failure of very low pressure steam supply 1.1. Potential for back flow of pellets and condensate into very low pressure steam header. However, considering that for back flow, condensate need to be built up in vessel which may not happen if steam is stopped. Hence this scenario is not considered credible and thus not discussed further


5. Low Pressure 1. Shutdown condition 1.1. Possible vacuum condition in pellet deodorizer due to condensation of steam.

1.1.1. Vacuum relief valve 2PSV-58104 provided on pellet deodorizer



8. High Level 1. High level in condensate collector 2D-5803 due to tripping of condensate pump 2P-5801A/B

1.1. Overfilling of condensate collector followed by flooding of deodorizer condenser 2E-5801. Failure in condensing the steam leading to carryover of steam to waste gas network.

1.1.1. High level alarm provided on condensate collector with 2LIC-58105


TCM

1.1.2. Pump running indication with alarm provided on DCS

1.1.3. Stand-by pump kept on auto-start

2. High level in condensate collector 2D-5803 due to malfunction of 2LIC-58105 to close 2LV-58105



TCM



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 1. Pellet deodorization system

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_581; 3443-XZ-DM-001_582; 3443-XZ-DM-001_513

Node Intent: The pellet deodorization system is provided to remove components responsible for unwanted odors in the polymer product. Deodorization is done by using very low pressure steam which is on flow control. The effluent steam containing removed components is condensed in the deodorizer condenser against cooling water. The uncondensed vapour which is predominantly N2 and some HC, is routed to waste gas system. Condensate from condenser is collected in condensate collector 2D-5803 and then pumped to separation drum 2D-3104

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D-5801 design pressure and temp: 400mbarg, 150degC. 2D-5803 design pressure and temp: 3.5barg, 150degC

Equipment ID: 2D-5802, 2RF-5801/ 5803, 2D-5801, 2D-5803, 2E-5801


3. High level in condensate collector 2D-5803 due to malfunction of 2FIC-58103 to open 2FV-58103


3.1.1. High level alarm provided on condensate collector with 2LIC-58105


TCM

9. Low Level 1. Low level in condensate collector 2D-5803 due to malfunction of 2LIC-58105 to open 2LV-58105

1.1. Possible damage to condensate pump 2P-5801A/B due to loss of suction.

6. Provide a low flow alarm on 2FIC-58103 TCM

10. Contamination/ Additional Phase 1. No new issue


1. No issue



1. No issue

14. Utility Failure 1. Cooling water failure 1.1. Carryover of steam to waste gas network 4. Consider providing a temp indication with high temp alarm on the waste gas outlet of deodorizer condenser 2E-5801

TCM

2. Instrument air failure 2.1. 2FV-58101/ 58102 and 2LV-58105 are of AFC type. 2FV-58103 is of AFO type. No additional consequence

15. Tube Failure/ Leakage 1. Deodorizer condenser tube failure 1.1. Cooling water will leak into steam condensate, no significant consequence as finally this condensate is routed to waste water sewer



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 2. Deodorized pellet dryer system


Node Intent: The wet pellets from pellets deodorizer are fed to deodorizer pellet receiver. DM water/ recycle water is added from conveying water buffer vessel for pellet transportation and cooling of pellets. Pellets are pumped to the dryer through conveying water pump 2P-5802A/B. Pellets are dried against cross current flow of air. The dried pellets are routed to deodorizer pellet receiver from where it is fed to homogenizer. Separated water from pellet dryer is filtered in elbow sieves 2F-5801A/B/C. Filtered water is routed back to conveying water buffer vessel under gravity

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D-5804 design pressure and temp: XX barg, 120degC

Equipment ID: 2D-5805, 2E-5802, 2D-5804, 2P-5802A/B, 2S-5801, 2F-5801A/B/C, 2P-5802


1. No/Less Flow 1. No flow of pellets from pellet conveying pick up vessel to pellet dryer due to malfunction of receiver bottom valve to close

1.1. Build up of level in pellet conveying pick up vessel. However liquid level will be maintained by 2LRC-58204. Build up of pellets in pellet conveying pick up vessel followed by pellet/ water overflow to waste water pit outside extrusion building

1.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LRC-58204 on pellet conveying pick up vessel

1.1.2. High level alarm provided with independent fork type level measurement

1.1.3. Interlock 2I-58201 provided to stop feed to pellet conveying pick up vessel by stopping rotary feeder 2RF-5802 through very high level LAHH-58204 in pick up vessel

1.2. Possible damage to conveying water pump due to dry run condition 7. Consider tripping the pellet water conveying pumps 2P-5802A/B in case of loss of open condition of both bottom HVs of pellet conveying pick up vessel

TCM/ Coperion

2. No flow of pellets from pellet conveying pick up vessel to pellet dryer due to tripping of conveying water pump

2.1. Build up of level in pellet conveying pick up vessel. However liquid level will be maintained by 2LRC-58204. Build up of pellets in pellet conveying pick up vessel followed by pellet/ water overflow to waste water pit outside extrusion building

2.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LRC-58204 on pellet conveying pick up vessel

2.1.2. High level alarm provided with independent fork type level measurement


2.1.4. Stand-by pump available on auto-start

3. No flow of pellets from pellet conveying pick up vessel to pellet dryer due to malfunction of conveying water pump discharge valve to close


4. No flow of dry pellets from deodorizer pellet receiver to homogenizer due to malfunction of 2XV-58201 to close

4.1. Build up of pellet level in deodorizer pellet receiver 2D-5806 4.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LSH-58201 on deodorizer pellet receiver


TCM/ Coperion

5. No flow of dry pellets from deodorizer pellet receiver to homogenizer due to tripping of rotary feeder 2RF-5804


6. No flow of exhaust air from pellet dryer due to tripping of pellet dryer fan 2C-5802

6.1. Drying efficiency will be affected. No significant consequence other than product quality issue

6.1.1. Fan running indication with alarm provided in DCS

2. More Flow 1. No cause identified


4. High Pressure 1. No issue

5. Low Pressure 1. No issue

6. High Temperature 1. Start up condition when water is being heated by injecting low pressure steam and flow of water is stopped to steam ejector (e.g. due to depletion of level in 2D-5805)

1.1. Ejector, downstream piping and pellet conveying pick up vessel may be subjected to low pressure steam condition (vessel is designed for 120degC where as normal temp of LP steam is 148degC)


TCM/ Coperion

7. Low Temperature 1. No supply of LP steam or LP steam supply disrupted to steam ejector during start up

1.1. Poor or less efficient drying of pellets. Product quality issue. No further consequence when hot pellet feed is available from deodorizer, steam heating is not required

8. High Level 1. High level in conveying water buffer vessel due to malfunction of 2LV-58201

1.1. Potential overfilling of buffer vessel 1.1.1. Overflow line provided on buffer vessel

2. High level in pellet conveying pick up vessel due to malfunction of 2LV-58204

2.1. Potential overfilling of pellet conveying pick up vessel 2.1.1. High level alarm provided with 2LRC-58204 on pellet conveying pick up vessel


2.1.3. Overflow line provided for pellet conveying pick up vessel

9. Low Level 1.1.1. Independent low level alarm provided on buffer vessel TCM/ Coperion



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 2. Deodorized pellet dryer system


Node Intent: The wet pellets from pellets deodorizer are fed to deodorizer pellet receiver. DM water/ recycle water is added from conveying water buffer vessel for pellet transportation and cooling of pellets. Pellets are pumped to the dryer through conveying water pump 2P-5802A/B. Pellets are dried against cross current flow of air. The dried pellets are routed to deodorizer pellet receiver from where it is fed to homogenizer. Separated water from pellet dryer is filtered in elbow sieves 2F-5801A/B/C. Filtered water is routed back to conveying water buffer vessel under gravity

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D-5804 design pressure and temp: XX barg, 120degC

Equipment ID: 2D-5805, 2E-5802, 2D-5804, 2P-5802A/B, 2S-5801, 2F-5801A/B/C, 2P-5802


1. Low level in conveying water buffer vessel due to malfunction of 2LV-58201 to close

1.1. Depending on the system losses, there will be a slow drop in buffer vessel level. Eventually there can be loss of water make up to pellet conveying pick up vessel and there by increasing the pellet density inside the pick up vessel. Chances of damaging the conveying water pump due to running on pellets without sufficient water


1.1.2. Low level alarm provided on pellet conveying pick up vessel with 2LRC-5804

1.1.3. Interlock provided to trip the conveying water pump on low level in pellet conveying pick up vessel

2. Low water level in pellet conveying pick up vessel due to malfunction of 2LV-58204 to close

2.1. Gradually there will be a transfer of water from pick up vessel to buffer vessel. Eventually there will be increase in pellet density inside the pick up vessel. Chances of damaging the conveying water pump due to running on pellets without sufficient water

2.1.1. Low level alarm provided on pellet conveying pick up vessel with 2LRC-5804


TCM/ Coperion

2.1.2. Interlock provided to trip the conveying water pump on low level in pellet conveying pick up vessel

2.1.3. Low flow alarm provided on water flow from buffer vessel to pick up vessel



1. No issue

12. Start-up Hazards/ Requirement 1. No specific issue


1. No specific issue

14. Utility Failure 1. No new issue




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.3e

Polybutene Feeding System HAZOP WORKSHEET



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 1. Offspec product recycling and polybutene addtive system


Node Intent: Intermediate pellet bin 2D-5102 has been modified to accomodate polybutene dosing.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D-5102 volume 120m3, polybutene feed rate 500 to 1500 kg/hr, re-pellet feed rate 500 to 11000kg/hr

Equipment ID: 2D-5102


1. No/Less Flow of recycle pellets 1. 2XV-51104 malfunctions and closes 1.1. Loss of pellet recycling, no significant issue

2. Screw motor 2MW-5102A trip 2.1. Loss of pellet recycling, no significant issue

2. No/Less Flow of polybutene pellets 1. Pellet bin empty due to operator error 1.1. Offspec product 1.1.1. 2LAL-51103 provided on pellet bin

1.1.2. 2LALL-51106 provided on pellet bin

1.1.3. 2FICA-51112 provided on weighing station

1.1.4. Downstream product quality checking provided

2. 2XV-51104 malfunctions and closes 2.1. Offspec product 2.1.1. Limit switch 2XZLL-51104 provided with alarm on DCS 1. Confirm that 2FICA-51112 provides alarm in case of high or low flow

TCM

2.1.2. 2FICA-51112 provided on weighing station


3. Screw motor 2MW-5102A trip or flow controller (2FICA-51112) failure

3.1. Offspec product 3.1.1. 2EA-51105A provided on screw motor

3.1.2. 2FICA-51112 provided on weighing station (may not give an alarm since this is not independent from cause)


3. More Flow 1. Weighing station error leading to high flow of polybutene

1.1. Offspec product 1.1.1. 2FICA-51112 provided on weighing station (may not give an alarm since this is not independent from cause)


4. Reverse Flow 1. Reverse flow of N2 from downstream blanketing

1.1. Release of N2 from metering station 1.1.1. Extractor fan provided

2. Possible reverse flow of N2 from extruder feed degassing filter 2F-5102 if blower 2C-5102 trips

2.1. Possible asphyxiation hazard 2.1.1. O2 analyser provided in the vicinity

2.1.2. Maintenance procedure to close manual butterfly valve on extractor hood when carrying out maintenance on the weighing station

5. High Pressure 1. No significant issue

6. Low Pressure 1. No significant issue

7. High Temperature 1. No significant issue

8. Low Temperature 1. No significant issue

9. High Level 1. Loss of recycling due to weighing station trip or 2XV-51104 malfunctions and closes while filling with pellets

1.1. High level of pellet in intermediate pellet bin 2D-5102 leading to eventual extruder shutdown

1.1.1. High level alarm 2LAH-51108 provided on intermediate pellet bin 2D-5102

1.1.2. High high level alarm 2LAHH-51104 provided on intermediate pellet bin 2D-5102 which will stop the pellet conveying

2. Overfilling of polybutene product due to operator error

2.1. Spillage of pellets. No significant issue 2.1.1. High level alarm 2LAH-51108 provided on intermediate pellet bin 2D-5102

2.1.2. High high level alarm 2LAHH-51104 provided on intermediate pellet bin 2D-5102

10. Low Level 1. Same as No/ Less Flow

11. Contamination/ Additional Phase 1. Polybutene pellets remain in pellet bin 1.1. Offspec product 1.1.1. Operating procedure to empty polybutene pellets from 2D-5102 before taking in offspec pellets

2. Recycle pellet remain in pellet bin 2D-5102 when polybutene pellets added

2.1. Offspec product 2.1.1. Operating procedure to empty offspec pellets from 2D-5102 before taking in polybutene pellets



13. Start-up Hazards/ Requirement 1. Inadvertent opening of 2ZV-51101 when loading truck is not in position

1.1. Spillage of pellets 1.1.1. Local display for 2ZAL-51105

1.1.2. Limit switch 2HZLH-51101 provided with alarm on DCS

2. Inadvertent opening of 2ZV-51101 when loading truck is not connected to earth

2.1. Static discharge. No significant safety issue since truck loading is for pellet not powder

2.1.1. Local display for 2ZAL-51105

2.1.2. Limit switch 2HZLH-51101 provided with alarm on DCS





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 1. Offspec product recycling and polybutene addtive system


Node Intent: Intermediate pellet bin 2D-5102 has been modified to accomodate polybutene dosing.

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D-5102 volume 120m3, polybutene feed rate 500 to 1500 kg/hr, re-pellet feed rate 500 to 11000kg/hr



15. Utility Failure 1. No significant issue

16. Tube Failure/ Leakage 1. Not applicable

Node: 2. Additive feeding 2PK-5202

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_521A; 3443-XZ-DM-001_521B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_521C

Node Intent: Additive feeding system 2PK-5202 has been modified to increase range of feed flow in some instances. The additive density has also changed in some cases and/or additional additives will be processed. No HAZOP issue is foreseen by the team.


Equipment ID:




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.3f

Flare System HAZOP WORKSHEET



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 1. Flare system

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_681; 3443-WB-YO-005-001

Node Intent: Two modifications have been made to the flare system. A provision for additional 8" line from the cracker unit has been provided to be used during shutdown condition. The 24" inlet pipling has been increased to 28" to maintain very low back pressure in polymerization unit. (less than 60mbarg)

Design Conditions/Parameters: KOD 5D-6801 design pressure and temp: 3.5barg, (-)29/250degC.Water seal 5PK-6801, design pressure and temp: 3.5barg, (-)29/250degC.

Equipment ID: KOD 5D-6801, Water seal 5PK-6801


1. No/Less Flow 1. No flow from cracker tank farm 1.1. Normally no flow from cracker tank farm. No significant issue

2. More Flow 1. More flow of propylene from refrigeration package 2PK-6101 due to operator open the valve to flare inadvertently

1.1. Possible flow of 47-50 t/hr of propylene (100%) compares to design flow of 45t/hr hexane. Possible increase in back pressure


TCM

3. Reverse Flow 1. Reverse flow from KOD 5D-5801 into 8" line to cracker unit

1.1. 28" line and 8" line are separated, reverse flow is not possible.

4. High Pressure 1. Loss of steam heating 1.1. Freezing of water seal, pressure increase 1.1.1. 5TAL-68171 provided on water seal

1.1.2. Water seal is insulated

1.1.3. Steam control valve is of AFO type

1.1.4. Suitable pressure protection provided in cracker unit and tank farm

5. Low Pressure 1. No significant issue

6. High Temperature 1. High flow of MP steam (e.g. TV-68170 fails open)

1.1. Boiling of water seal leading to loss of seal and possible high temp 1.1.1. 5TAH-68171 provided on water seal

1.1.2. Steam operating temp is 260degC while flare stack is designed for 250degC. However, given flow rates of steam and gas, it is not possible to exceed design temp

1.1.3. Continuous water makeup on level control provided


8. High Level 1. No new issue

9. Low Level 1. No new issue



1. No issue



1. No issue

14. Utility Failure 1. No issue




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.3g

Management of Changes HAZOP WORKSHEET



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 1. Ethylene feed to reactor no. 1, 2, 3 (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0045)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_121A; 3443-XZ-DM-001_122A; 3443-XZ-DM-001_123A

Node Intent: To provide ethylene feed to each reactor. Remote isolation valve added in the ethylene feed line to reduce the sizing of PSV on the reactor.

Design Conditions/Parameters: Reactor design pressure and temp:18barg, 210degC

Equipment ID: Reactor 2R-1201


1. No/Less Flow 1. No flow of ethylene feed to reactor no.1 due to malfunction of 2HV-12106 to close

1.1. Loss of pressure in reactor. Eventually loss of reaction and loss of production. (Refer Table no.1 of NPP project process HAZOP worksheet)

1.1.1. Valve close indication and alarm provided on DCS panel


1.2. Possible reaction in ethylene feed piping downstream of 2HV-12106 due to back mixing of reaction mixture leading to plugging of piping.

1.2.1. Procedure in place to flush the line downstream of 2HV-12106 and close manual block valve at the inlet of reactor

1. Consider closing the 2HV-12104 on close condition of 2HV-12106 (through 2S-12107)

TCM

2. More Flow 1. Malfunction of 2FIC-12303 to open 2FV-12303 full

1.1. High pressure in reactor (design pressure for reactor is 18barg where ethylene feed design pressure is 25barg). Potential loss of containment

1.1.1. 2PSV-12101-S provided on reactor, however it is not sized for 2FV-12103 full open case

1.1.2. Interlock 2S-12101 provided to stop ethylene feed to reactor by closing 2HV-12106 on very high pressure in reactor

3. Reverse Flow 1. No new issue





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 2. Hexane unloading system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0051)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_003B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_411; 3443-XZ-DM-001_412

Node Intent: Hexane unloading facility is provided to unload hexane from truck tanker into the mother liquor tank 2D-4102 through hexane unloading pump 2P-4104

Design Conditions/Parameters: Pump 2P-4104 design capacity: XXX design pressure and temp: XXX

Equipment ID:


1. No/Less Flow 1. Normally no flow. No flow during unloading due to malfunction of 2XV-41201 to close

1.1. No consequence in terms of dispruption of unloading operation other than delay.

1.2. Potential damage to pump due to dry run condition. Seal damage leading to loss of containment

1.2.1. Unloading operation is a manual operation and is to be supervised till unloading is completed


TCM

1.2.2. Interlock 2S-41201 provided to trip the pump in case of dry run condition as indicated by 2LAL-41201

1.2.3. Pump provided with double mechanical seal. However, there is no annunciation on primary seal damage hence no credit taken.

1.2.4. Gas detector provided in the unloading pump area.

2. No flow due to manual isolation valve in the pump suction left closed

2.1. Potential damage to pump due to dry run condition. Seal damage leading to loss of containment

2.1.1. Unloading operation is a manual operation and is to be supervised till unloading is completed

2.1.2. Interlock 2S-41201 provided to trip the pump in case of dry run condition as indicated by 2LAL-41201

2.1.3. Pump provided with double mechanical seal. However, there is not annunciation on primary seal damage

2.1.4. Gas detector provided in the unloading pump area.

3. Unloading pump trips while unloading 3.1. Possibility of back flow from mother liquor tank to hexane tanker due to Siphon effect

3.1.1. Check valve provided at hexane unloading pump discharge

3.1.2. Vent hole provided on dip pipe in the mother liquor tank to break siphon.

4. Discharge valve left closed/ 2XV-41109 malfunctions to close

4.1. Pump discharge piping will be subjected to pump shutoff pressure 4.1.1. Pump discharge piping is designed for shutoff pressure condition

2. More Flow 1. Operator error to unload hexane into mother liquor tank more than required

1.1. Potential overfilling of mother liquor tank 1.1.1. Level indication for mother liquor tank provided locally at the unloading station.

1.1.2. Inventory in truck tanker is limited as compared to capacity on mother liquor tank (even after considering normal liquid level in mother liquor tank).

1.1.3. High level alarm provided on mother liquor tank with 2LI-41104

1.1.4. Interlock 2I-41102 provided to close the hexane inlet valve to mother liquor tank in case of very high level in tank

3. Reverse Flow 1. No new issue

4. High Pressure 1. 2PCV-41203 malfunctions to open full (N2 supply to pump seal pot)

1.1. Potential overpressurization of pump seal pot 3. Check that design pressure of pump seal pot is equal or more than design pressure of N2 system (8.5barg). If not pressure protection system like a relief valve, need to be provided for pump seal pot

TCM/ Basell

5. Low Pressure 1. Vapour line isolation valve left closed during unloading due to operator error

1.1. Possible vacuum condition in truck tanker 1.1.1. Unloading operation is governed by specific operating procedure which includes line up of both vapour and liquid line

4. Confirm hexane truck tank is designed for full vacuum condition

Basell

1.1.2. Vacuum breaker valve provided on truck tanker (based on operational feedback)

6. High Temperature 1. No issue

7. Low Temperature 1. No issue

8. High Level 1. No new issue

9. Low Level 1. No issue

10. Contamination/ Additional Phase 1. No issue as the product certificate is to be checked before accepting the product from tanker


1. No issue

12. Start-up Hazards/ Requirement 1. Unloading preparation - earthing connection not made

1.1. Potential for static charge generation leading to fire (if there is HC leak at the same time)

1.1.1. Interlock 2S-41201 provided to inhibit start of unloading pump if earthing connection is not made


1. No issue



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 2. Hexane unloading system (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0051)

Drawings: 3443-XZ-DM-001_003B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_411; 3443-XZ-DM-001_412

Node Intent: Hexane unloading facility is provided to unload hexane from truck tanker into the mother liquor tank 2D-4102 through hexane unloading pump 2P-4104

Design Conditions/Parameters: Pump 2P-4104 design capacity: XXX design pressure and temp: XXX

Equipment ID:


14. Utility Failure 1. Instrument air failure 1.1. 2XV-41201 and 41109 are of AFC type


16. Others 1. Stray movement of tanker during unloading 1.1. Possible spillage of hexane, potential fire hazard 1.1.1. Interlock 2S-41201 provided to stop unloading pump and close 2XV-41201, however, this may not provide protection for spill upstream of unloading arm

1.1.2. Unloading arm is provided with quick closing type break-way coupling

1.1.3. Melting connection provided for the truck securing point which on melting/ rupturing, activates unloading system shutdown



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 3. Catalyst supply to reactor (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0052)


Node Intent: Catalyst is pumped to reactor from catalyst suspension vessel using catalyst dosing pumps (positive displacement type). Each pump has a provision to take suction from either of the catalyst suspension vessels. Remote isolation valve is added under each catalyst suction line from catalyst suspension vessel. Node also includes the mother liquor line from mother liquor tank and hexane line from distilled hexane tank. Remote isolation has been added at each liquid oultet nozzle from tank.


Equipment ID: 2P-1101A/B, 2D-1102A/B


1. No Flow 1. No flow of catalyst to reactor due to malfunction of 2HV-11115

1.1. Potential damage to catalyst dosing pump though immediate damage may be unlikely considering the pump is membrane type


1.1.2. Interlock 2I-11110 provided to trip catalyst dosing pump on loss of open condition for 2HV-11115

1.1.3. Valve closed indication with alarm provided on DCS

1.2. Loss of catalyst feed to reactor will lead to loss of product quality and high pressure in reactor





1.3. Possible vacuum formation in suction line. This may possibly lead to air ingress into the system, however the quantity of air ingress in this case is not expected to be significant







2. No flow of mother liquor from mother liquor 2D-4102 due to malfunction of 2HV-41103 or 41105 to close

2.1. Loss of level in mother liquor collecting vessel. Eventually there will be loss of mother liquor recycle flow to reactors. If this continues this can lead to increase in bulk density of reactor mixture. This will cause improper mixing and insufficient cooling by reactor jacket. In worst case it can lead to lump formation inside the reactor. The consequence and safeguards are same as that for NPP plant, hence is not discussed further

2.2. Loss of level in mother liquor collecting vessel. Possible backflow of reactor contents to mother liquor collecting vessel through minimum flow line of mother liquid pumps. The consequence and safeguards are same as that for NPP plant, hence is not discussed further

2.3. Possible damage to mother liquid feed pump 2P-4102A/B due to loss of suction. Possible seal damage leading to loss of containment

2.3.1. Interlock 2S-41106 provided to trip mother liquid feed pump 2P-4102A/B on loss of open condition for 2HV-41103/ 41105


TCM

2.3.2. Double mechanical provided for mother liquid feed pump 2P-4102A/B

3. No flow of distilled hexane from distilled hexane tank 2D-4101 due to malfunction of 2HV-41102 or 41104 to close

3.1. Loss of distilled hexane to users. The consequence and safeguards are same as that for NPP plant, hence is not discussed further

3.2. Loss of suction to hexane feed pumps and flushing hexane pump (2P-1104A/B and 2P-1105). Possible damage to pumps. The consequence and safeguards are same as that for NPP plant, hence is not discussed further

3.3. Possible damage to distilled hexane feed pump 2P-4101A/B due to loss of suction. Possible seal damage leading to loss of containment

3.3.1. Interlock 2S-41105 provided to trip mother liquid feed pump 2P-4101A/B on loss of open condition for 2HV-41102/ 41104


TCM

3.3.2. Double mechanical provided for distilled hexane feed pump 2P-4101A/B


TCM



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


Node: 4. Gas holder (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0053)


Node Intent: Gas holder is used as a buffer storage for N2 supply to vacuum breakers. Part of modification includes relocating the pressure/ vacuum relief valve 2PSV-24101 from tank shell to inlet/ outlet nozzle

Design Conditions/Parameters: 2D-2402 design pressure and temp: 0barg (to be confirmed), 100degC



1. Others 1. Any reason leading to opening of relief valve 1.1. Potential safety issue due to relief valve discharge (nitrogen) as relief valve will be located at grade level


TCM



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.4a

Dryer Package

HAZOP RECOMMENDATION LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Provide a relief valve on each expansion vessel 2D2207A/B sized for N2 fully open case. Consequences: 1.4.1.1

TCM/ NIRO



TCM/ NIRO

3. 2PSV-22113S/ 22114S should be sized for DM water full open case. Consequences: 1.4.3.1

TCM/ NIRO



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.4b

Off-gas Compressor




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Consider sizing 2PSV-34104S on separator 2D-3404 for N2 valve full open case. Consequences: 1.1.1.1

TCM/ NASH

2. Consider providing a PSV on the DM water make up line (inside package battery limit and downstream of isolation valve), sized for DM water valve full open case and set at 6barg.


TCM/ NASH



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.4c

Refrigeration Package




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




No Recommendation was made during HAZOP session of Refrigeration Package



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.4d





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101






TCM



TCM

3. Provide a low temp alarm with 2TI-58102/ 58103 on pellet deodorizer Consequences: 1.1.2.1

TCM


Consequences: 1.8.1.1, 1.8.2.1, 1.8.3.1, 1.14.1.1

TCM



TCM

6. Provide a low flow alarm on 2FIC-58103 Consequences: 1.9.1.1

TCM

7. Consider tripping the pellet water conveying pumps 2P-5802A/B in case of loss of open condition of both bottom HVs of pellet conveying pick up vessel


TCM/ Coperion



TCM/ Coperion



TCM/ Coperion


Consequences: 2.9.1.1, 2.9.2.1

TCM/ Coperion



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.4e

Polybutene Feeding Package




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Confirm that 2FICA-51112 provides alarm in case of high or low flow Consequences: 1.2.2.1

TCM



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.4f

Flare System




Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101






TCM



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.4g





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Consider closing the 2HV-12104 on close condition of 2HV-12106 (through 2S-12107) Consequences: 1.1.1.2

TCM



TCM

3. Check that design pressure of pump seal pot is equal or more than design pressure of N2 system (8.5barg). If not pressure protection system like a relief valve, need to be provided for pump seal pot


TCM/ Basell

4. Confirm hexane truck tank is designed for full vacuum condition Consequences: 2.5.1.1

Basell



TCM



TCM



TCM



TCM



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.5a

Dryer Package DRAWING LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




3443-XZ-DM-001_221 UNIT 2200 POWDER DRYING I 2200 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1, 2

3443-XZ-DM-001_221A UNIT 2200 HOT WATER LOOP 2200 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1, 2



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.5b

Off-gas Compressor DRAWING LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




3443-XZ-DM-001_341A UNIT 3400 OFF GAS SYSTEM I 3400 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1

3443-XZ-DM-001_341B UNIT 3400 OFF GAS SYSTEM II 3400 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1

3443-GP-VD-038 Sheet 1 OFF-GAS COMPRESSOR 2PK3402 3400 ISSUE 4 Nodes: 1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.5c

Refrigeration Package DRAWING LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




3443-GY-VD-006 Sheet 1 REFRIGERATION UNIT 2PK6101 2PK6101 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.5d

Pellet Deodorization Package DRAWING LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




3443-XZ-DM-001_581 UNIT 5800 PELLET DEODORIZING I UNIT 5800 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1

3443-XZ-DM-001_582 UNIT 5800 PELLET DEODORIZING II UNIT 5800 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1, 2

3443-XZ-DM-001_513 UNIT 5100 PELLET PNEUMATIC TRANSPORT FROM EXTRUSION UNIT 5100 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.5e

Polybutene Feeding System DRAWING LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




3443-XZ-DM-001_511C UNIT 5100 POLYBUTENE & REPELLET FEEDING 5100 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1

3443-XZ-DM-001_521A UNIT 5200 PELLETIZING ADDITIVE FEEDING I 5200 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 2

3443-XZ-DM-001_521B UNIT 5200 PELLETIZING ADDITIVE FEEDING II 5200 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 2

3443-XZ-DM-001_521C UNIT 5200 PELLETIZING ADDITIVE FEEDING III 5200 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 2



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.5f

Flare System DRAWING LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




3443-XZ-DM-001_681 UNIT 6800 FLARE SYSTEM 6800 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1

3443-WB-YO-005-001 FLARE SYSTEM UNIT 6800 6800 ISSUE 2 Nodes: 1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.5g

Management of Changes DRAWING LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




3443-XZ-DM-001_003B UNIT 000 PLANT INTERCONNECTING (RAW MATERIALS & PROCESS)

UNIT 000 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 2

3443-XZ-DM-001_111A Nodes: 3

3443-XZ-DM-001_121A UNIT 1200 POLYMERIZATION REACTOR I UNIT 1200 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1

3443-XZ-DM-001_122A UNIT 1200 POLYMERIZATION REACTOR II UNIT 1200 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1

3443-XZ-DM-001_123A UNIT 1200 POLYMERIZATION REACTOR III UNIT 1200 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 1

3443-XZ-DM-001_411 UNIT 4100 HEXANE/ MOTHER LIQUOR UNIT 4100 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 2

3443-XZ-DM-001_412 UNIT 4100 HEXANE UNLOADING UNIT 4100 ISSUE 3 Nodes: 2

3443-XZ-DM-001_241 Nodes: 4



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.6a

Dryer Package MASTER DRAWINGS



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.6b

Off-gas Compressor MASTER DRAWINGS



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.6c

Refrigeration Package MASTER DRAWINGS



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.6d

Pellet Deodorization Package MASTER DRAWINGS



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.6e

Polybutene Feeding System MASTER DRAWINGS



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.6f

Flare System MASTER DRAWINGS



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 7.6g

Management of Changes MASTER DRAWINGS



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 8

Vendor Packages and Management of Changes

SIL CLASSIFICATION STUDY



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 8.1a

Dryer Package

SIL CLASSIFICATION TEAM MEMBER LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Full Name Company Department 1. 3/3/2008


Jack Liu Scribe ERM Present

Boris Brat Process TCM Present

Simone Villari HSE TCM Present

Luca Viola Process TCM Present

Giampietro Orlandini Process TCM Present

Fiupro Posocco Package TCM Present

Ardreas Heinrich Process Basell Present

Rodnigo Carvajal Process Basell Present

Rolf Kiessling Instrument Basell Present



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 8.1b





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Full Name Company Department 1. 3/3/2008


Jack Liu Scribe ERM Present

Boris Brat Process TCM Present

Luca Viola Process TCM Present

Cristina Chivsolo HSE TCM Present

Ardreas Heinrich Process Basell Partial



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 8.1b





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Full Name Company Department 1. 3/4/2008 2. 3/5/2008 3. 3/6/2008

Sachin Gupta Facilitator ERM Present Present Present

Jack Liu Scribe ERM Present Present Present

Boris Brat Process TCM Present Present Present

Simone Villari HSE TCM Present

Luca Viola Process TCM Present Present

Maurizio Rigolio HSE TCM Partial

Cristina Chivsolo HSE TCM Present Present

Guenter Sachs-W Construction Manager Basell Present Present Partial



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 8.2a

Dryer PackageSAFETY INSTRUMENTED FUNCTION LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL

PIDs Interlock ID Comment SIF Source Date

1. On low low flow of hot water to dryer panel, cut the feed to centrifuge 2S2101A/B/C, after a time delay

2FALL-22132 Close 2IV-21101 2PK2201

SIL 1 3443-XZ-DM-001_211A

2I-22101 2I-22101 is presently actuated by 2P-2201A/B stop condition as one of the initiator. Now initiator is changed to very low flow at hot water pump discharge

1. Interlock Description

1. 3/3/2008

2FALL-22133 Close 2XV-21102 3443-XZ-DM-001_211B

1oo2 1oo2 3443-XZ-DM-001_211C

Close 2IV-21102 3443-XZ-DM-001_221

Close 2XV-21104 3443-XZ-DM-001_221A

1oo2

Close 2IV-21103

Close 2XV-21106

1oo2

Overall 3oo3

2SAL-22101 Stop 2RF-2201 SIL a 2I-22106



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


2. On low speed of rotary feeder 2RF-2201, stop the rotary feeder

2PK2201

3443-XZ-DM-001_221

Same classification will be applicable for 2I-22107


1. 3/3/2008

1oo1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 8.2b

Pellet Deodorization Package SAFETY INSTRUMENTED FUNCTION LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


1. To stop feed to pellet deodorizer in case of very high level

2LAHH-58101 Stop 2RF-5801 Close 2FV-58101 2PK-5802

SIL 1 3443-XZ-DM-001_581

2S-58101 1. Interlock Description

1. 3/3/2008

Stop 2RF-5803 Close 2FV-58102

1oo2

2. To stop feed to pellet deodorizer in case of very high pressure

2PAHH-58101 Close 2FV-58101 Stop 2RF-5801 2PK-5802

SIL - 3443-XZ-DM-001_581


1. 3/3/2008

Close 2FV-58102 Stop 2RF-5803

2oo2

3. To stop rotary feeder to pellet deodorizer on low speed

2SAL-58102 Stop 2RF-5801 2PK-5802

SIL a 3443-XZ-DM-001_581

2I-58102 As per interlock description, low speed of 2RF-5801 or 2RF-5803 is tripping the 2RF-5801. Interlock is now changed to tripping 2RF-5801 on low speed 2RF-5801 and tripping 2RF-5803 on low speed of 2RF-5803


1. 3/3/2008



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


4. To stop rotary feeder tp pellet deodorizer on low speed

2SAL-58103 Stop 2RF-5803 2PK-5802

SIL a 3443-XZ-DM-001_581

2I-58105 Interlock description to be updated


1. 3/3/2008

5. To stop rotary feeder to pellet conveying pick-up vessel on low speed

2SAL-58101 Stop 2RF-5802 2PK-5802

SIL a 3443-XZ-DM-001_581

2I-58202 1. Interlock Description

1. 3/3/2008

6. To stop rotary feeder on very high level in deodorizer feeding hopper

2LAHH-58102 Stop 2RF-5104 2PK-5802

SIL a 3443-XZ-DM-001_582

2I-58103 As per interlock description, entire conveying package 2PK-5101 is tripped on very high level which now is changed to tripping only rotary feeder 2RF-5104. Interlock description to be revised


1. 3/3/2008

7. To trip deodorization package in case of high O2 content in the waste gas from deodorizer condenser

2AIAHH-58101 Stop 2RF-5801 Close 2FV-58101 2PK-5802

SIL 1 3443-XZ-DM-001_582


1. 3/3/2008

Stop 2RF-5803 Close 2FV-58102

1oo2



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


8. To stop pellet feed to pellet conveying pick up vessel in case of very high level

2LAHH-582XX Stop RF-5802 2PK-5802

SIL a 3443-XZ-DM-001_582

2I-58201 Interlock description including tag no. to be updated


1. 3/3/2008



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 8.2c

Management of Changes SAFETY INSTRUMENTED FUNCTION LIST



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


1. Close ethylene feed to reactor on very high pressure on reactor

2-PAHH-12101 Close 2FV-12103 Close 2HV-12104 Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0045

SIL 2 3443-XZ-DM-001_121A

2S-12101 Classification is also applicable to corresponding SIFs 2S-12201/ 2S-12301 for reactor 1 & 2. The SIF is classified only for one demand scenario where 2FIC-12103 malfunctions, to acknowledge introduction of 2HV-12106 since other conditions are same as for NPP plant


1. 3/4/2008

Close 2HV-12106 Stop 2P-1101A/B 3443-XZ-DM-001_122A

1oo2 Close 2FV-12101/ 12102

3443-XZ-DM-001_123A

Close 2FV-12104

Close 2FV-12112

Close 2FV-12113

Close 2FV-12106

Close 2FV-12105

Close 2FV-12120

Stop 2P-1102A/B

2. To stop unloading pump on loss of suction

2LAL-41201 Stop 2P-4104 Close 2XV-41201 (Change Ref. No. 3443-

SIL a 3443-XZ-DM-001_411


1. 3/4/2008



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


T-MF-0051)

3443-XZ-DM-001_412

3. To stop unloading operation on loss of earthing connection

2ZAL-41201 Stop 2P-4104 (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0051)

SIL a 3443-XZ-DM-001_411


1. 3/4/2008

Close 2XV-41201 3443-XZ-DM-001_412

2oo2

4. To stop unloading operation in case of truck movement during unloading

2ZAL-41202 Stop 2P-4104 (Change Ref. No. 3443-

3443-XZ-DM-001_411

2S-41201 Stray movement of truck can lead to spill (if occurring is likely to be


1. 3/4/2008

Close 2XV-41201



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


T-MF-0051)

3443-XZ-DM-001_412

upstream of 2XV-41201) which is not protected by stopping the pump or by closing the suction valve. The primary protection is the quick closing type break-away coupling (mechanical safety device). Considering above, this SIF is not discussed further, but can be still be retained as an ESD function.

2oo2

5. To stop hexane flow to mother liquor tank in case of very high level in tank

2LAHH-41105 Close 2XV-41105A Close 2XV-41109 (Change Ref. No. 3443-

3443-XZ-DM-001_411

2I-41101 Closing of 2XV-41109 is considered to be a secondary


1. 3/4/2008

Close 2XV-41105B



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


T-MF-0051)

3443-XZ-DM-001_412

action since the available inventory for pumping is limited as compared to capacity of the mother liquor tank. Primary actions are closing 2XV-41105A and B which is an existing interlock in NPP plant. Hence, this SIF is not discussed further

2oo2

6. To stop catalyst dosing pump on loss of suction valve open condition

2HZSH-11115 Stop 2P-1101A/B (depending on the running pump)

(Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0052)

SIL - 3443-XZ-DM-001_111A


1. 3/4/2008

7. To stop mother liquid feed pump on loss of

Stop 2P-4102A (Change

SIL - 3443-XZ-


2. 3/5/2008

Stop 2P-4102B



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


suction valve open condition


Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0052)

DM-001_411


8. To stop hexane feed pump on loss of suction valve open condition


Stop 2P-4101A (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0052)

SIL - 3443-XZ-DM-001_411


2. 3/5/2008

Stop 2P-4101B


9. To stop catalyst feed pump in case of emergency situation

ESD command from 2S-12201/ 12301

Stop 2P-1101A/B (depending on the running pump)


3443-XZ-DM-001_111A

2S-12201/ 12301

Interlock is existing, change is due to introduction of selector switch depending on the reactor feeding the pump. Hence this SIF is not discussed further


2. 3/5/2008



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


10. To trip 1st reactor on emergency shutdown of 2nd and 3rd reactor or very high pressure or very high level in 1st flash vessel


3443-XZ-DM-001_121A

2S-12101/ 2I-12102

The interlock is extended to incorporate flexibility of reactor operation introduced where reactors can be operated independently. Also 1st reactor can now feed directly to 3rd flash vessel. Hence this SIF is not discussed further


2. 3/5/2008



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


11. To close feed valve to 1st/ 2nd flash vessel in case of high pressure or high level in 3rd flash vessel 2D-1203


3443-XZ-DM-001_121B

2S-12302 The interlock is extended to incorporate flexibility of reactor operation introduced where 1st reactor can feed the 3rd flash vessel or 2nd reactor can feed the 3rd flash vessel (corresponding tag no. introduced for each mode of operation). Hence this SIF is not discussed further.


3. 3/6/2008

12. To close feed valve to 1st/ 2nd flash vessel in case of loss of open condition for 3rd flash vessel feed valve

2HZLH-12310B not active

Close 2LV-12301A (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0056)

SIL - 3443-XZ-DM-001_121B


3. 3/6/2008

Close 2LV-12301B

2oo2

Close 2LV-12101A

Close 2LV-12101B



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


2oo2

Close 2LV-12201A

Close 2LV-12201B

2oo2

Overall 1oo2 (2 is depending on the mode of operation)

13. To initiate 2I-21104/ 21105/ 21106 on very high level in mother liquor collecting vessel


3443-XZ-DM-001_212

2I-21104/ 21105/ 21106

Change involves shifting the initiator from level control to dedicated level switch, hence this SIF is not discussed further.


2. 3/5/2008

14. To trip Al-alkyl pump 2P-4103A on high bearing temp

2TAH-41310 Stop 2P-4103A (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0056)

SIL a 3443-XZ-DM-001_413

2I-41303 Classification is also applicable to 2I-41304 (for B pump)


2. 3/5/2008



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101




Overall SIL


15. To trip Al-alkyl pump 2P-4103A on low level in suction pipe

2LAL-41312 Stop 2P-4103A (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0056)

SIL a 3443-XZ-DM-001_413

2I-41303 Classification is also applicable to 2I-41304 (for B pump)


2. 3/5/2008

16. Auto start provision for stand-by condensate pump 2P-5801A/B


3443-XZ-DM-001_581

2I-58106 Interlock is an auto-start function and considered as a control function rather than safety function, hence not discussed further


2. 3/5/2008



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 8.4a

Dryer Package

SIL CLASSIFICATION WORKSHEET



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 1. On low low flow of hot water to dryer panel, cut the feed to centrifuge 2S2101A/B/C, after a time delay


Primary Final Elements: Close 2IV-21101; Close 2XV-21102; 1oo2; Close 2IV-21102; Close 2XV-21104; 1oo2; Close 2IV-21103; Close 2XV-21106; 1oo2; Overall 3oo3

Unit ref.: 2PK2201

Initiators: 2FALL-22132; 2FALL-22133; 1oo2 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_211A; 3443-XZ-DM-001_211B; 3443-XZ-DM-001_211C; 3443-XZ-DM-001_221; 3443-XZ-DM-001_221A

Comment: 2I-22101 is presently actuated by 2P-2201A/B stop condition as one of the initiator. Now initiator is changed to very low flow at hot water pump discharge



1. To prevent plugging of dryer 1. Hot water pump trips 1. Plugging of dryer leading to plant shutdown (approximately 3 days)

1. TAL-22106/ 22102 provided on dryer chamber side

L2 assumed based on 3 days production loss.Base W is W3 for pump trip with no auto-start, W3 reduced to W2 considering alarm and sufficient time for operator intervention

L2 W2 SIL 1

SIF: 2. On low speed of rotary feeder 2RF-2201, stop the rotary feeder


Primary Final Elements: Stop 2RF-2201 Unit ref.: 2PK2201

Initiators: 2SAL-22101; 1oo1 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_221

Comment: Same classification will be applicable for 2I-22107



1. To protect running of rotary feeder under abnormal condition

1. Blockage in the rotary feeder 1. Mechanical damage to the rotary feeder

1. None L1 assumed based on incremental consequence if rotary feeder is not stopped (approximately 2hr of production loss and cost of feeder repair)W2 assumed based on chances of blockage

L1 W2 a



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 8.4b

Pellet Deodorization Package SIL CLASSIFICATION WORKSHEET



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 1. To stop feed to pellet deodorizer in case of very high level


Primary Final Elements: Stop 2RF-5801; Stop 2RF-5803; 1oo2 Unit ref.: 2PK-5802

Initiators: 2LAHH-58101 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_581

Comment:



1. To prevent overfilling of pellet deodorizer

1. Tripping of rotary feeder 2RF-5802

1. Build up of pellet in pellet deodorizer. Possible pellet carryover to condenser. Shutdown of deodorizer may be required to clean up condenser

1. None L1 assumed considering maintenance cost for cleaning the condenser including cost due to product quality issue.

L1 W3 SIL 1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 2. To stop feed to pellet deodorizer in case of very high pressure


Primary Final Elements: Close 2FV-58101; Close 2FV-58102; 2oo2 Unit ref.: 2PK-5802

Initiators: 2PAHH-58101 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_581

Comment:



1. To prevent overpressurization of pellet deodorizer

1. Malfunction of 2FIC-58101 or 2FIC-58102

1. Overpressurization of pellet deodorizer. Potential leak from flange connections/ joints. Potential for injury to operating personnel.

1. 2PSV-58103 provided on pellet deodorizer sized for steam valves full open case

S1 assuming operator may present near the leak point and is injured due to exposure with high temp steam. W2 assumed for control failure, which is reduced to W1 considering the PSV.

S1 W1 ---



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 3. To stop rotary feeder to pellet deodorizer on low speed


Primary Final Elements: Stop 2RF-5801 Unit ref.: 2PK-5802

Initiators: 2SAL-58102 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_581

Comment: As per interlock description, low speed of 2RF-5801 or 2RF-5803 is tripping the 2RF-5801. Interlock is now changed to tripping 2RF-5801 on low speed 2RF-5801 and tripping 2RF-5803 on low speed of 2RF-5803



1. To stop feed from upstream on low speed of rotary feeder

1. Possibility of lump carryover or mechanical damage to rotary feeder

1. Damage to rotary feeders blades

1. None L1 assumed for cost of repairing the feeder. W2 assumed considering mechanical damage of rotary feeder and possibility of lump carryover

L1 W2 a



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 4. To stop rotary feeder tp pellet deodorizer on low speed




Comment: Interlock description to be updated







L1 W2 a



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 5. To stop rotary feeder to pellet conveying pick-up vessel on low speed




Comment:







L1 W2 a



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 6. To stop rotary feeder on very high level in deodorizer feeding hopper



Initiators: 2LAHH-58102 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_582

Comment: As per interlock description, entire conveying package 2PK-5101 is tripped on very high level which now is changed to tripping only rotary feeder 2RF-5104. Interlock description to be revised



1. To prevent overfilling of deodorizer feeding hopper

1. Tripping of 2RF-5801 or 5803 1. Deodorizer feeding hopper will be overfilled followed by overfilling of pellet receiver 2D-5104. Independent high level trip is provided for 2D-5104. However, even after considering that on overfilling 2D-5802 may be shutdown manually, but this may require additional down time of deodorizer system as compared to tripping on high level in deodorizer feeding hopper.

1. None Base W is W3 for rotary feeder trip, however it is reduced to W2 considering operator will have enough indication like no product flow to homogenizer before there can be significant build up of level in deodorizer feeding hopper that require extended downtime

L1 W2 a



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 7. To trip deodorization package in case of high O2 content in the waste gas from deodorizer condenser


Primary Final Elements: Stop 2RF-5801; Stop 2RF-5803; 1oo2 Unit ref.: 2PK-5802

Initiators: 2AIAHH-58101 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_582

Comment:



1. To prevent high O2 content in waste gas header

1. Operator error to stop N2 supply upstream of rotary feeder 2RF-5803

1. Possibility of forming a flammable mixture in the waste gas header. Potential safety hazard

1. None W3 assumed as base W for operator error. W3 reduced to W2 considering there is a N2 connection downstream of 2RF-5803 and also considering the content of HC in waste gas is very low together with likelihood of ignition

S2 F1 P2 W2 (F1, P2)

SIL 1

2. Same as above 1. Damage to waste gas header and nearby equipment

L2 assumed considering waste gas header replacement cost. Production loss is not considered as a consequence in this case

L2 W2 SIL 1



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 8. To stop pellet feed to pellet conveying pick up vessel in case of very high level


Primary Final Elements: Stop RF-5802 Unit ref.: 2PK-5802

Initiators: 2LAHH-582XX PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_582

Comment: Interlock description including tag no. to be updated



1. To prevent overflow of pellet conveying pick up vessel

1. Malfunction of level control 2LRC-58204

1. Build up of level in pellet conveying pick up vessel. Build up of pellets in pellet conveying pick up vessel followed by pellet/ water overflow to waste water pit outside extrusion building (no environmental issues)

1. None L1 assumed considering equivalent cost due to product quality issue (product will no longer be deodorized due to shutdown of deodorizer system during this period)

L1 W2 a

2. Malfunction of bottom HVs to close

1. Build up of level in pellet conveying pick up vessel. Liquid level will be maintained by 2LRC-58204. However, build up of pellets in pellet conveying pick up vessel can still occur followed by pellet/ water overflow to waste water pit outside extrusion building (no environmental issues)

1. None L1 assumed considering equivalent cost due to product quality issue (product will no longer be deodorized due to shutdown of deodorizer system during this period)

L1 W1 ---

3. Conveying water pump trips 1. Same as above. 1. None L1 assumed considering equivalent cost due to product quality issue (product will no longer be deodorized due to shutdown of deodorizer system during this period). W2 assumed considering stand-by pump is on auto-start

L1 W2 a

4. Conveying water pump discharge HV malfunctions to close

1. Same as above. 1. None L1 assumed considering equivalent cost due to product quality issue (product will no longer be deodorized due to shutdown of deodorizer system during this period)

L1 W1 ---



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 8.4c


SIL CLASSIFICATION WORKSHEET



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 1. Close ethylene feed to reactor on very high pressure on reactor


Primary Final Elements: Close 2FV-12103; Close 2HV-12106; 1oo2 Unit ref.: Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0045

Initiators: 2-PAHH-12101 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_121A; 3443-XZ-DM-001_122A; 3443-XZ-DM-001_123A

Comment: Classification is also applicable to corresponding SIFs 2S-12201/ 2S-12301 for reactor 1 & 2. The SIF is classified only for one demand scenario where 2FIC-12103 malfunctions, to acknowledge introduction of 2HV-12106 since other conditions are same as for NPP plant



1. To prevent overpressurization of reactor

1. 2FIC-12103 loop malfunctions to open 2FV-12103 fully

1. Overpressurization of reactor (design pressure for ethylene supply is 25 barg while design pressure for reactor is 18 barg) leading to loss of containment. Potential fire/ explosion hazard

1. 2PSV-12101-S provided on reactor, however it is not sized for this case. Hence no credit taken.

W2 assumed for control loop failure. S3 assumed considering vessel failure, F1 assumed considering presence of operators in field, P2 assumed considering escape may not be possible on occurrence of such an event

S3 F1 P2 W2 (F1, P2)

SIL 2

2. Same as above 1. Same as above 1. Same as above L3 assumed for vessel and damage due to following fire/explosion.

L3 W2 SIL 2



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 2. To stop unloading pump on loss of suction


Primary Final Elements: Stop 2P-4104 Unit ref.: (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0051)

Initiators: 2LAL-41201 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_411; 3443-XZ-DM-001_412

Comment:



1. To prevent running unloading pump under dry run condition

1. Operator error in continuing the unloading operation with no level in truck tanker or manual isolation valve closed in the suction line while starting the unloading operation

1. Potential seal damage leading to HC leak/ fire

1. Pump provided with double mechanical seal but no credit taken since there is no annunciator/ alarm on primary seal damage

S1 assumed considering operator is present near the pump

S1 W3 a



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 3. To stop unloading operation on loss of earthing connection


Primary Final Elements: Stop 2P-4104; Close 2XV-41201; 2oo2 Unit ref.: (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0051)

Initiators: 2ZAL-41201 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_411; 3443-XZ-DM-001_412

Comment:



1. To prevent potential for ignition 1. Operator error to disconnect earthing connection during unloading or physical breakage of connection

1. Potential fire hazard due to static charge generation.

1. Gas detector provided in the unloading area

Base W assumed as W2 considering maintaining earthing connection is part of unloading procedure. W2 reduced to W1 considering leak in unloading area during unloading operation and consequent generation of static charge. S2 assumed considering injury to operator caught in fire. F2 assumed considering operator will be present in the area during the unloading operation. P1 assumed considering any leak will be noticed by the operator immediately and thus escape is possible may be possible.

S2 F2 P1 W1 (F2, P1)

a

2. Unloading operation is a manned operation



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 4. To stop unloading operation in case of truck movement during unloading


Primary Final Elements: Stop 2P-4104; Close 2XV-41201; 2oo2 Unit ref.: (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0051)

Initiators: 2ZAL-41202 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_411; 3443-XZ-DM-001_412

Comment: Stray movement of truck can lead to spill (if occurring is likely to be upstream of 2XV-41201) which is not protected by stopping the pump or by closing the suction valve. The primary protection is the quick closing type break-away coupling (mechanical safety device). Considering above, this SIF is not discussed further, but can be still be retained as an ESD function.





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 5. To stop hexane flow to mother liquor tank in case of very high level in tank


Primary Final Elements: Close 2XV-41105A; Close 2XV-41105B; 2oo2 Unit ref.: (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0051)

Initiators: 2LAHH-41105 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_411; 3443-XZ-DM-001_412

Comment: Closing of 2XV-41109 is considered to be a secondary action since the available inventory for pumping is limited as compared to capacity of the mother liquor tank. Primary actions are closing 2XV-41105A and B which is an existing interlock in NPP plant. Hence, this SIF is not discussed further





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 6. To stop catalyst dosing pump on loss of suction valve open condition


Primary Final Elements: Stop 2P-1101A/B (depending on the running pump) Unit ref.: (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0052)

Initiators: 2HZSH-11115 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_111A

Comment:



1. To prevent loss of suction to catalyst dosing pump

1. Malfunction of 2HV-11115 1. Potential damage to catalyst dosing pump due to loss of suction

1. None. W1 assumed for malfunction of shutdown valve. L1 assumed considering consequences will be limited to cost of repairing the pump

L1 W1 ---



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 7. To stop mother liquid feed pump on loss of suction valve open condition


Primary Final Elements: Stop 2P-4102A; Stop 2P-4102B; 2oo2 (Considering auto-start) Unit ref.: (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0052)

Initiators: 2HZSH-41103/ 41105 (depending on the valve in line) PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_411

Comment:



1. To prevent loss of suction to mother liquid feed pump

1. Malfunction of 2HV-41103/ 41105

1. Potential damage to mother liquid feed pump due to loss of suction. Possible loss of containment

1. None. W1 assumed for malfunction of shutdown valve. S1 assumed considering operator is present in the vicinity of the pump

S1 W1 ---



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 8. To stop hexane feed pump on loss of suction valve open condition


Primary Final Elements: Stop 2P-4101A; Stop 2P-4101B; 2oo2 (Considering auto-start) Unit ref.: (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0052)

Initiators: 2HZSH-41102/ 41104 (depending on the valve in line) PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_411

Comment:



1. To prevent loss of suction to hexane feed pump

1. Malfunction of 2HV-41102/ 41104

1. Potential damage to hexane feed pump due to loss of suction. Possible loss of containment

1. None. W1 assumed for malfunction of shutdown valve. S1 assumed considering operator is present in the vicinity of the pump

S1 W1 ---



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 9. To stop catalyst feed pump in case of emergency situation

Interlock ID: 2S-12201/ 12301

Primary Final Elements: Stop 2P-1101A/B (depending on the running pump) Unit ref.: (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0056)

Initiators: ESD command from 2S-12201/ 12301 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_111A

Comment: Interlock is existing, change is due to introduction of selector switch depending on the reactor feeding the pump. Hence this SIF is not discussed further





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 10. To trip 1st reactor on emergency shutdown of 2nd and 3rd reactor or very high pressure or very high level in 1st flash vessel

Interlock ID: 2S-12101/ 2I-12102

Primary Final Elements: Unit ref.: (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0056)

Initiators: PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_121A

Comment: The interlock is extended to incorporate flexibility of reactor operation introduced where reactors can be operated independently. Also 1st reactor can now feed directly to 3rd flash vessel. Hence this SIF is not discussed further





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 11. To close feed valve to 1st/ 2nd flash vessel in case of high pressure or high level in 3rd flash vessel 2D-1203



Initiators: PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_121B

Comment: The interlock is extended to incorporate flexibility of reactor operation introduced where 1st reactor can feed the 3rd flash vessel or 2nd reactor can feed the 3rd flash vessel (corresponding tag no. introduced for each mode of operation). Hence this SIF is not discussed further.





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 12. To close feed valve to 1st/ 2nd flash vessel in case of loss of open condition for 3rd flash vessel feed valve


Primary Final Elements: Close 2LV-12301A; Close 2LV-12301B; 2oo2; Close 2LV-12101A; Close 2LV-12101B; 2oo2; Close 2LV-12201A; Close 2LV-12201B; 2oo2; Overall 1oo2 (2 is depending on the mode of operation)

Unit ref.: (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0056)

Initiators: 2HZLH-12310B not active PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_121B

Comment:



1. To prevent backflow from one reactor to another

1. Malfunction of 2HV-12310B 1. Potential mixing of content from one reactor to another reactor due to difference in operating pressure. Product quality issue

1. None L1 assumed considering extended downtime due to mixing of reactor contents

L1 W1 ---



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 13. To initiate 2I-21104/ 21105/ 21106 on very high level in mother liquor collecting vessel

Interlock ID: 2I-21104/ 21105/ 21106


Initiators: PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_212

Comment: Change involves shifting the initiator from level control to dedicated level switch, hence this SIF is not discussed further.





Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 14. To trip Al-alkyl pump 2P-4103A on high bearing temp


Primary Final Elements: Stop 2P-4103A Unit ref.: (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0056)

Initiators: 2TAH-41310 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_413

Comment: Classification is also applicable to 2I-41304 (for B pump)



1. To prevent running of pump with high bearing temp

1. Wear-tear of the bearing 1. Possible damage to the pump. Loss of containment is not expected in this case

1. None. L1 assumed considering cost of repairing the pump. Production loss is not expected because stand by pump is available. W2 assumed for bearing damage

L1 W2 a



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 15. To trip Al-alkyl pump 2P-4103A on low level in suction pipe


Primary Final Elements: Stop 2P-4103A Unit ref.: (Change Ref. No. 3443-T-MF-0056)

Initiators: 2LAL-41312 PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_413

Comment: Classification is also applicable to 2I-41304 (for B pump)



1. To prevent running of pump with low suction level

1. Failure in making up level in Al-alkyl storage tank 2D-4103 due to operator error

1. Possible loss of suction to pump leading to pump damage

1. Low level alarm provided on al-alkyl storage tank. Operator will have sufficient time to take action

L1 assumed considering cost of repairing the pump. Production loss is not expected because stand by pump is available. W2 assumed considering make-up of al-alkyl is covered by operating procedure and considering independent low level alarm

L1 W2 a



Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101


SIF: 16. Auto start provision for stand-by condensate pump 2P-5801A/B



Initiators: PIDs: 3443-XZ-DM-001_581

Comment: Interlock is an auto-start function and considered as a control function rather than safety function, hence not discussed further





CLOSE OUT SESSION Identification Code

3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 9

CLOSE OUT SESSION

HAZOP STUDY

This document is Tecnimont’s property and cannot be used by others for any purpose without written without prior written consent



3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 9.1

CLOSE OUT HAZOP

TEAM MEMBER LIST




3443-SZ-RT-101



Team Members Company Title 1. 09-02-2009 2. 10-02-2009

Maurizio Rigolio TCM Facilitator / HSE Present Present

Boris Brat TCM/ TPI Process Present Present

Andreas Heinrich Basell Operations Present Present

Mudit Ashtana Basell Process Present Present




3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 9.2

CLOSE OUT HAZOP

NODE LIST




3443-SZ-RT-101



Nodes Node IntentDesign

Conditions/ParametersDrawings Equipment ID Comment

1. Updating of piping and instrumentation on pellet deodorizing unit

Revision of Node 1 of Deodorization Package HAZOP (Attachment 7.3d of current document) to include the modification of piping and instrumentation (Refer to changes 3443-T-MF-0081 and 3443-T-MF-0100).

2D-5801 design pressure and temp: 400mbarg, 150degC.

2D-5803 design pressure and temp: 3.5barg, 150degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_581 2D-5802,

2RF-5801

2RF 5803,

2D-5801,

2E-5801

3443-XZ-DM-001_582

2. Updating of piping and instrumentation on deodorized pellet dryer system

Revision of Node 2 of Deodorization Package HAZOP (Attachment 7.3d of current document) to include the modification of piping and instrumentation (Refer to changes 3443-T-MF-0081 and 3443-T-MF-0100).

2D-5804 design temperature, 120degC

3443-XZ-DM-001_582 2D-5804

2D-5805,

2D5806

2RF5802

2P-5802A/B

2C5802

2S-5801

2E-5802,

3. Addition of knife valve and modification of logic downstream 2D 5102

Revision of Node 1 of Polybutene Package HAZOP (Attachment 7.3e of current document) to include the instrumentation modifications (Refer to change 3443-T-MF-0088).

2D-5102 volume 120m3

Polybutene feed rate 500 to 1500 kg/hr,

Re-pellet feed rate 500 to 11000kg/hr

3443-XZ-DM-001_511C 2D-5102

4. Addition of pressure transmitter and interlock on waste gas line of D4103

Updating of TEAL Metering HAZOP to include the backflow protection logic of TEAL Cylinder (Refer to change 3443-T-MF-0108).

2D4103 design press 10 barg; design temp 120degC;

3443-XZ-DM-001_413 2D4103

5. Addition of flare dip pot discharge 5D 6802 and pumps 5P 6801 A/B

Updating of Flare System HAZOP to include added flare dip pot discharges provision, required by German authority to avoid water seal overfilling (Refer to change 3443-T-MF-0122).

5D 6802 and 5P 6801 A/B: design press 10 barg; design temp 120degC;

3443-XZ-DM-001_681 5D-6802

5P-6801A/B3443-XZ-DM-001_681A

3443-XZ-DM-001_333B

6. Refrigeration Unit - Addition of 2nd Evaporator and 3rd Pump on cold hexane distribution system

Updating of refrigeration system HAZOP to include future provision for 2nd

Evaporator and 3rd Pump requested by Client to increase the refrigeration capacity necessary for some specific product grades.

2E6101B and 2P6101C: design press 12 barg; design temp 180degC;

3443-XZ-DM-001_614 2E6101B

2P6101C3443-XZ-DM-001_612A

3443-XZ-DM-001_612

3443-XZ-DM-001_611




3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 9.3

CLOSE OUT HAZOP WORKSHEET




3443-SZ-RT-101






3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 9.4

CLOSE OUT HAZOP RECOMMENDATION LIST




3443-SZ-RT-101




1. Check with Coperion if it is correct to vent directly from 2D5804 or if the vent shall be relocated to the seal pot, in order to maintain the blanketing function.

2.1.1.1 TCM / Coperion

2. Install an independent low temperature alarm on 2D5804 2.7.1.1 TCM

3. Consider to provide Grounding on the bottom of discharge pipe to be connected to the truck.

3.10.1.1, 3.10.1.2

TCM





3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 9.5

CLOSE OUT HAZOP DRAWING LIST




3443-SZ-RT-101




3443-XZ-DM-001_581 Pellet Deodorizing I 5800 5 Nodes: 1

3443-XZ-DM-001_582 Pellet Deodorizing II 5800 5 Nodes: 1, 2

3443-XZ-DM-001_511C Polybutene & Repellet Feeding 5100 5 Nodes: 3

3443-XZ-DM-001_413 Al-Alkyl Receiver 4100 5 Nodes: 4

3443-XZ-DM-001_333B Waste Water Pre-Treatment 3300 5 Nodes: 5

3443-XZ-DM-001_681 Flare System 6800 5 Nodes: 5

3443-XZ-DM-001_681A Flare System 5PK-6801 6800 5 Nodes: 5

3443-XZ-DM-001_611 Cold Hexane Distribution 6100 5 Nodes: 6

3443-XZ-DM-001_612 Hexane Refrigeration Unit 6100 5 Nodes: 6

3443-XZ-DM-001_612A Refrigeration Unit 2PK-6101 6100 5 Nodes: 6

3443-XZ-DM-001_614 Refrigeration Unit Future Expansion 6100 5 Nodes: 6




3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 9.6

CLOSE OUT HAZOP MASTER DRAWINGS




3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 10

CLOSE OUT SESSION

SIL CLASSIFICATION STUDY

This document is Tecnimont’s property and cannot be used by others for any purpose without written without prior written consent



3443-SZ-RT-101



ATTACHMENT 10.1

CLOSE OUT SIL CLASSIFICATION

TEAM MEMBER LIST




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Team Members Company Title 1. 09-02-2009 2. 10-02-2009

Maurizio Rigolio TCM Facilitator / HSE Present Present

Boris Brat TCM/ TPI Process Present Present

Andreas Heinrich Basell Operations Present Present

Mudit Ashtana Basell Process Present Present




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ATTACHMENT 10.2

CLOSE OUT SIL CLASSIFICATION

SAFETY INSTRUMENTED FUNCTION LIST




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ElementsInterlock ID P&ID

Overall SIL

Comment SIF Source

1. To stop 2RF 5801 and 2RF 5803 on very high level in 2D5801

2 LAHH-58101 Stop 2RF-5801 2S-58107 581 Refer to SIF.1 of SIL Classification for Deodorization package.

1. Interlock System DescriptionStop 2RF-5803

1oo2

2. To stop 2RF 5802 on very high level in 2D5806

2LAHH-58205 Stop 2RF 5802 2IS-58204 582 SIL a 1. Interlock System Description

3. To stop pump 2P 5802A on valve 2XV-58207 left inadvertently close

2HZLH-58207 Stop of 2P 5802A 2IS-58205 582 SIL a Same as SIF 4 for Pump P5802B


4. To stop pump 2P 5802B on valve 2XV-58206 left inadvertently close

2HZLH-58207 Stop of 2P 5802B 2IS-58206 582 SIL a Same as SIF 3 for Pump P5802B


5. To stop rotary feeder 2RF- 5802 on temperature alarm very high in 2D5804

2TAHH-58202 Stop of 2RF 5802 2IS-58207 582 SIL a 1. Interlock System Description

6. To stop rotary feeder 2RF- 5802 on temperature alarm very low in 2D5804

2TALL-58202 Stop of 2RF 5802 2IS-58207 582 SIL a 1. Interlock System Description

7. To close steam valve 2XV58211 on low flow alarm

2FAL-58202 2XV-58211 2IS-58210 582 SIL a 1. Interlock System Description

8. To close 2D4103 inlet on high pressure in 2D4103

2PAH-41303 2XV 41401 2S41301 413 SIL a 1. Interlock System Description2HV41404

1oo2




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ATTACHMENT 10.3

CLOSE OUT SIL CLASSIFICATION WORKSHEET




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FOLLOW UP Identification Code

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ATTACHMENT 11

HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOW UPNPP PROCESS




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ATTACHMENT 12

HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOW UPNPP EXTRUSION AND PACKAGES




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ATTACHMENT 13

HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOW UPHDPE SPEEDBIRD PLANT



MANAGEMENT OF CHANGES Identification Code

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ATTACHMENT 14

MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE REGISTERHDPE SPEEDBIRD PLANT



FLARE SIL CLASSIFICATION Identification Code

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PolyolefinsLocation: MÜNCHSMÜNSTER Sheet 1 /9 Issue 04

ATTACHMENT 15

FLARE SIL CLASSIFICATIONHDPE SPEEDBIRD PLANT



PUMPS RUNNING DRY AND SEAL POTS SIL CLASSIFICATION Identification Code

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ATTACHMENT 16

PUMPS RUNNING DRY AND SEAL POTS SIL CLASSIFICATION

HDPE SPEEDBIRD PLANT



SAFETY RELEVANT LOOP LIST Identification Code

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ATTACHMENT 17

3443-SK-LE-001 SAFETY RELEVANT LOOP LIST PROCESS PLANT

3443-SK-LE-002 SAFETY RELEVANT LOOP LIST FLARE

HDPE SPEEDBIRD PLANT


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