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differentiatedand heterogeneity gave rise to conflictingconcerns among different sectors of the population. As

the paradigm expanded further, new charges weremade that functionalism could not accommodate theanalysis of power.

4. Conclusion

The radical antipositivism of the 1960s put function-alism on trial. Functional anthropologists who de-clined to commit anthropology to the scrap heapargued ethnographys value as social history. Othersargued its continued relevance for specific subfieldssuch as ecological and applied anthropology.

It is not likely that future theoretical and researchproblems will follow the trends set by functionalismexcept, perhaps, in re-evaluations of problems in

Foucaults adoption of functional terminology in hisconceptualization of discourse; in the work of an-thropologists who holistically find instancesof culturalresistance to what they perceive to be Gramscian stylehegemony; and in the relationship of anthropologicalfunctionalism to other modernisms (Webster, inManganaro 1990).

The main thrust is likely to be the further under-cutting of the two pluralized concepts integral tofunctionalism: cultures and societies (Wolf 1988,Barth 1992). This new emergent paradigm, NewCritical Theory, retains functionalism on its agenda,albeit in a literary and historical mode. It promises tofurther problematics addressed by anthropologicalhistorical realism (sometimes in the guise of politicaleconomy) and postinterpretive cultural critique. Inboth instances, functionalism, in anthropology, lingerson (just as evolutionism and diffusionism linger on)not just as situated knowledge ever in the making butas historical ethnography of the operations of culture.

See also: Anthropology, History of; Functionalism,History of; Functionalism in Sociology; Malinowski,Bronislaw (18841942); Parsons, Talcott (190279)

Bibliography

Barth F 1992 Towards greater naturalism in conceptualizingsocieties. In: Kuper A (ed.) Conceptualizing Society. Rout-ledge, London and New York

Fox R G (ed.) 1991 Recapturing Anthropology: Working in thePresent. School of American Research Press, Santa Fe, NM

Gellner E 1987 The Zeno of Cracow, or revolution at Nemi, orthe Polish revenge. In: Culture, Identity and Politics. Cam-bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

Malinowski B 1944 A Scientific Theory of Culture, and OtherEssays. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC

Manganaro M (ed.) 1990 Modernist Anthropology: From Field-work to Text. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ

Mead M (ed.) 1937 Cooperation and Competition among Primi-tie Peoples. McGraw-Hill, New York

Mintz S W (ed.) 1985 History, Eolution, and the Concept ofCulture: Selected Papers by Alexander Lesser. CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, UK

Radcliffe-Brown A R 1935 On the concept of function in socialscience. American Anthropologist 37: 394402 (reprinted 1952

in Structure and Function in Primitie Society. Free Press,Glencoe, IL, pp. 17887)Sahlins M D 1976 Culture and Practical Reason. University of

Chicago Press, ChicagoSanjek R (ed.) 1990 Fieldnotes: The Makings of Anthropology.

Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NYStocking G W Jr. (ed.) 1991 Colonial Situations: Essays on the

Contextualization of Ethrographic Knowledge. History ofAnthropology. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI,Vol. 7

Stocking G W Jr. 1992 The Ethnographers Magic and OtherEssays in theHistoryof Anthropology. University of WisconsinPress, Madison, WI

Stocking G W Jr. (ed.) 1996 Volksgeist as Method and Ethic:Essays on Boasian Ethnography and the German Anthro-

pological Tradition. History of Anthropology, Vol. 8. Univer-sity of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI

Thornton R 1985 Imagine yourself set down : Mach, Frazer,Conrad, Malinowski and the role of imagination in eth-nography. Anthropology Today 1(5): 714

Thornton R J, Skalnik P (eds.) 1993 The Early Writings ofBronislaw Malinowski. Cambridge University Press, Cam-bridge, UK

Urry J 1993 Before Social Anthropology. Essays on the History ofBritish Anthropology. Harwood, Chur, Switzerland

Vincent J 1986 Functionalism revisited: An unsettled science.Reiews in Anthropology 13: 3319

Vincent J 1991 Engaging historicism. In: Fox R G (ed.)Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present. School ofAmerican Research Press, Santa Fe, NM

Wolf E 1988 Inventing society. American Ethnologist 15(4):75261

J. Vincent

Functionalism in Sociology

Functionalism is a sociological research program ofhistorical and systematic significance. Sociologicalexplanations in terms of functions are teleological:social phenomena are to be explained by their effectsand consequenceschiefly of a beneficial, morallydesired or non-intended characterand\or by a cir-cuit of equilibration (a homeostatic loop) which ismaintaining a certain state of proper functioning. Thenotion of (mono-)functionally specialized subsystems

of society canbe seen as themost importantprecipitateof functionalist thinking in sociology.

1. Basic Extra-disciplinary Orientations ofSociological Functionalism

Beginning with the renaissance, the quest for a trulyempirical analysis in the natural sciences has given theconcept of function a crucial leverage in replacing themetaphysical notion of substance (Cassirer 1980).Substance has been recast as the functional inter-dependence of (minimally two) related variables. In

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sociology functionalist thinking has spread with theworks of Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and E; mile

Durkheim, who drew on contemporary physiologyand evolutionary biology as the disciplines that offeredthe most sophisticated notions of functional inter-dependence so far.

Of crucial significance for the development ofsociological functionalism is the work of HarvardUniversitys biochemist and physiologist LawrenceJoseph Henderson, who played the role of a mediatorbetween physiology and sociology as regards equili-brating processes. In his famous seminar Pareto andthe Methods of Scientific Investigation (193242)Henderson exerted considerable influence on severalgenerations of Harvard sociologists, among themRobert K. Merton and Talcott Parsons, who becameleading figures in the movement of functionalist

thinking in the USA. The basic ideas of a refinedsociological functionalism originate within this con-text.

1.1 System, Interdependence, Equilibrium

A mixture of ice, soda water, and whisky in a tightlystoppered thermos bottle can serve as an example foran isolated system of different components: water,alcohol, and carbon dioxide are its main components.There are three phases: a solid phase (ice), a liquidphase, and a gaseous phase. All three componentsexist in the liquid and the gaseous phase in this system.Concentration, pressure, and temperature form a setof related variables. If one thrusts the stopper moredeeply into the neck of the bottle the pressure willincrease and there will be a movement of componentsfrom the gaseous phase to the liquid phase; there willalso be a change in concentration and temperature. Allvariables that characterize the system stand in arelation of mutual dependency with one another andmake up an equilibrated state (Henderson 1935). Ifthe system exhibits a minimal complexity, its internalprocess cannot be conceptualized as a temporalsuccession of single causeeffect chains any more. Thealternative is the simultaneous variation of interd-ependent, but relatively autonomous, variables. Thetwo single most important sources of Hendersons

analysis of systems are Claude Bernards experimentalphysiologywhich deeply impressed Durkheim aswelland Josiah Willard Gibbs research On theEquilibrium of Heterogeneous Substances (Gibbs1948), which decisively extends the applicability of thelaws of thermodynamics. On the basis of Gibbsinsights, the biochemical equilibrium of a milieu in-teTrieurof the circulation of blood, for examplecan now be given a description in terms of functionalequations (Russett 1966). This homeostatic process,as it has been called by Hendersons colleague WalterB. Cannon, provides the systematic starting point forfunctionalist thinking in sociology. The conceptual

scheme of the social system involves the variation ofheterogeneous, interdependent components that can

be accounted for in a model of equilibriumin theideal case, in the form of a system of functionalequations. The facts, that the variables of a socialsystem are not easily quantifiable, and that the systemcannot be experimentally isolated, do not detractfrom the value and applicability of this conceptualscheme.

1.2 The Problem of Teleology

Equilibrating processes are not random processes.They are not the result of deterministic causal mech-anisms, and they do not issue from a deterministicprocess of natural selection, from a survival of the

fittest. The internal integration of an organism and itsadaptation to external conditions are based on reci-

procalrelations with the environment: as the organismis adapted to the environment, the environment isadapted to the organism; there is something like thefitness of environment which is based on the inter-nalization of the environments properties within theorganismwater and carbon dioxide, for example,play a very important role for the organism in bothmilieus: the external and the internal (Henderson1913).

At least ex post factum the world seems to be a worldof interdependent functional systems and can bedescribed as a process of negentropy; a process oforganization. This is the basic assumption on whichthe teleological character of functionalism is grou-nded. But commitment to this assumption is not anecessarycondition to make use of equilibrium modelsin sociological functionalism.

2. Structural Functionalism

Structural functionalism marks the phase of domi-nance of functionalism in sociology, especially in theUSA from the 1940s to the 1960s. Structural function-alism does not constitute a single and unified researchprogram. There are simpler versions of functionalismthan the refined functionalism already characterized

above by its extradisciplinary grounding in equilib-rium models. A paradigmatic version of the simplerforms of structural functionalism can be found in thework of British anthropologist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown(1952). The anthropological study of institutions inthe context of a social totality can be seen as ablueprint for the procedure of functionalist research:the careful description of structural patterns, i.e., ofnon-random interrelations between components of asociety or a social system that is at the core of thisprocedure.The functioning of these structural patternssecures the adaptation and\or integration, i.e., thepersistence of thesocial unit in question.The structural

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patterns are explained in terms of their consequences.Such a structural pattern would be, for example, the

repressive law in archaic societies which Durkheimsaw as indicative of a mechanical solidarity. Re-pressive law contributes to the integration of society.Retributive acts revive the feelings on which mech-anical solidarity is based. All sociological researchtends to exhibit the formal characteristics of function-alism in so far as it is pursued carefully (Davis 1959).

2.1 Simple Functional Explanation

A simple functional explanation follows the followingsequence:

(a) A system S is adapted to its environment\isintegrated, if the corresponding functional prerequi-site P is fulfilled;

(b) If the functional prerequisite P is fulfilled,pattern A or its functional equivalents B, C exist;

(c) Patterns B, C do not exist in the system;(d) System S is adapted to its environment\is

integrated, because pattern A exists in the system. Thistype of explanation does not imply an equilibriummodel or a system of variables in the sense ofGibbs\Henderson.

Two questions have to be asked here. First, how canone explain historically that pattern A contributes tothe fulfillment of the functional prerequisite? Thefunctional explanation has to be linked to a theoryadequate to ground the claim that pattern A wouldnot exist at all if it did not make a difference in thefulfillment of the functional prerequisite P or in theadaptation\integration of system S, respectively(Runciman 1990). Second, what is the origin of func-tional prerequisites? Either all consequences of actionare functional prerequisites, or a limited set offunctional prerequisites has to be justified theoreticallyand\or empirically. In the latter case a more refinedversion of functional explanation is called for, whichwill be taken up in the next step. In the first case anencompassing functional unity of society cannot bepresupposed. Here, functionalism advances on aninductive basis. Such a middle-range approach tofunctionalism is presented by Robert K. Merton, whodistinguishes between manifest functions on the basisof intended and recognized consequences of action

on the one hand, and latent functions on thebasis of non-intended and non-recognized conseq-uences of action on the other (Merton 1963).

Since Merton, functionalism has become associ-ated with a concept of (mono-)functional systems thatare the product of an interweaving of non-intendedconsequences of action and have gained substantialautonomy as against the intentions of actors. Thediscrepancy between actors intentions when acting ineconomic systems and the actual outcome of marketprocesses as an aggregated result of these intentionalactions may serve here as an illustration. As Mertondemonstrates, the definition of functions on the basis

of consequences of action does not imply any pref-erencetowards an existing socialorder. It is impossible

to make the disruption of social order the center of afunctional perspective. Mertons repudiation of thecommonplace critique of conservatism proves him tobe one of the liberal representatives of functionalism.

2.2 Refined Functional Explanation

The greatest danger for functional explanation lies inthe arbitrary selection of consequences of action asdefining a functionthis holds true for both simpleand refined functional explanations. A limited set offunctional prerequisites could be gained inductivelyfrom the empirical comparison of singular societies.The alternative is to justify a limited set of functionalprerequisites on theoretical grounds. It has to be

clarified, in which sense functions such as adaptationor integration make sense, not only for the organismsof biology and physiology, but for social systems aswell.

In particular, the question has to be answered,how an essential change of the system can bedistinguished from mere surface variations in itsoperations. What is missing is a clear analogonin sociological functionalism for the concept of thedeath of an organism (Do$bert 1973).

In his version of structural functionalism TalcottParsons has provided a theoretical, normativisticaccount of functional prerequisites: a cultural systemof values that is shared by all members of a societyconstitutes the central criterion for the adaptation andintegration of society. The processes of society arefunctional in so far as they help to realize this commonsystem of values. Parsons cannot introduce this systemof values independently from an analysis of con-temporary society that makes his theoretical ground-ing of functional problems a mere affirmation ofconsequences. At the same time he has to admit, thathe is not able to conceive the equilibrating process ofsociety in terms of a system of functional variables, interms of a Gibbs\Henderson system. In particular, itdoes not seem possible to explain the change of actionsystems in terms of a functionalist analysis of equili-brating processes, especially processes of a moving oreven a dynamic equilibrium.

That leaves Parsons with static, normative stru-ctural categories and little difference compared withthe no frills strategy of simple functional explanation.The concept of function serves for him as a means forthe dynamic interpretation of static categories thatcan eventually explain no more than a static equili-briumthe boundary maintenance of society andsocial systems, as they already exist. Parsons sees theconcept of function as a logical, but not reallysatisfactory, equivalent for a system of simultaneousfunctional equations; structural functionalism there-fore is only the second best type of theory, biased fora normatively defined static equilibrium (Parsons

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1954, 1959). Since an existing system of values is usedhere as the groundinginterpretation for a limited set of

functional prerequisites, the charge of conservatismthat has been brought against Parsons is difficult torepudiate. However, it should be clear that the reasonsfor these shortcomings of Parsons theory are notpolitical or ideological in character, but due totheoretical deficiencies. Finally, Parsons normativeversion of structural functionalism has to be put intothe historical context: it is a reaffirmation of thecultural identity of American society during thedramatic developments on the eve of World War II,when the identity of American society indeed seemedto be at risk (Parsons 1973).

The guiding ideal of a Gibbs\Henderson systemcertainly is an admonition for Parsons to avoid simpleanalogies and to search thoroughly for a system of

interdependent functional equations. This clearly dis-tinguishes Parsons effort from simple forms of func-tional explanation, but it is not the only difference.Formallythe essential difference is marked by Parsonsuse of an equilibrium model (Nagel 1957, 1961). Astate of equilibrium E is dependent on the variablecontributions of several functionsa case of hier-archical or vertical organization of equilibrium: E is asystems overriding concern. The range of variation ofthese functional contributions is large enough toendanger the stability of E. If the stability of E isendangered, certain mechanisms intervene to start aprocess of re-equilibration. A state of equilibrium Ecan be brought about by several different combina-tions of the values of the functional variables, butthere are also combinations that characterize a dis-equilibrium: the loss of stability. In contrast to thehierarchical, vertical organization stands the hori-zontal organization of equilibrium: in a horizontallyorganized equilibrium functional variables are on apar with each other and constitute a mutual equi-librium.

Of crucial importance for equilibrium models andfor the development of functionalist thinking are themechanisms that regulate the processes of (re)equili-bration. There are three different mechanisms:

(a) Compensatory mechanisms. The interdependenceof the functional variables is based on direct relationsbetween them: a decreasing contribution of the func-

tional variable A directly causes the compensating,increased contribution of the functional variable B.The limits of compensation are given in the functionalvariables range of variation. Increasing the pressurein the thermos bottle illustrates a process of re-equili-bration on the basis of compensatory relations be-tween pressure, concentration, and temperature.

(b) Mechanisms of a central control of equilibrium.The cybernetic self-regulation of machines can provideanexampleforthiskindofre-equilibratingmechanism.The thermostat of a refrigerator is an instance of acentral re-equilibrating control.

(c) Mechanisms of reflexie control. In this case the

system must be able to observe its own operations andto decide on re-equilibration on the basis of a con-

scious or self-referential act of taking these observedoperations into account.

3. Systemic Functionalism

Parsons systemic functionalism exemplifies an equi-librium model characterized by a central control.Systemic functionalism replaces the deficient struc-tural functionalism and develops an equivalent to theGibbs\Henderson system. This theory claims to beable to explain the change of action systems in terms ofa model of a moving or even a dynamic equilibrium.Parsons makes temporal process a constituent of hisfunctional variables. The standard reproach directedagainst this type of functionalism concerns its de-ductive character. It may be deductive, but the theoryis nevertheless empirically grounded in the empiricalstudies of small groups and interaction processes byRobert F. Bales, who collaborated with Parsons indeveloping the so-called four-function scheme (ad-aptation, goal attainment, integration, latent patternmaintenance: AGIL). These four basic functions ofsocial systems are derived from the analyses ofprocesses of problem solution in small groups (Bales1950, Parsons et al. 1981).

Parsons conceives of society as a functionallydifferentiated unity consisting of four subsystems:economy, polity, societal community and the cultural,

fiduciary subsystem. Parsons reconstructs the inter-dependence of these functional subsystems in terms ofcommunication or interchange.

Each subsystem has a specialized language ofcommunication at its disposalgeneralized media ofcommunication or interchange: money, power, infl-uence and moral appeals (see Fig. 1). In this scheme of

Figure 1Parsons four-function scheme, the functionalsubsystems of society, and the societal media ofinterchange

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interchange relations between the subsystems in termsof these media, Parsons has constructed his final

equivalent to a system of functional equations in thesense of Gibbs and Henderson. Moving and evendynamic equilibrium now can be explained in terms ofthis communicative interchange. An empirical appli-cation of this scheme can be found in the study ofParsons and Gerald Platt on the system of highereducation in the USA (Parsons and Platt 1973).

All functional processes are regulated in the finalinstance by a central control mechanism: the top systemof a cybernetic hierarchy which Parsons has integratedinto his four-function scheme since the 1960s. This topsystem is culture oron the level of societal sub-systemsthe fiduciary subsystem. This is a theoreticalassumption that perpetuates the cultural determin-ism of Parsonian theory.

4. Functional Structuralism

The theory of German sociologist Niklas Luhmannoffers an outstanding example for the reflexive con-trol of the equilibrium process. Although Luhmannstheory has been referred to as a second encoding ofParsons functionalism, it is really an inversion ofParsons structural functionalism. Therefore it may becalled functional structuralism: Luhmann is notas isParsonsprimarily interested in the function of givenstructures. His inverted theoretical perspective ischaracterized by the search for equivalent solutions ofproblems, i.e., for equivalent structures that fulfillgiven functional prerequisites. The basic assumptionof his theory is that for almost all problems there arealso other solutions than the ones already selected;every solution is a contingent one. This perspectivebrings ever-new potentialities and the continuingchange of systems into view. The basic functionalproblem is not the boundary maintenance of systemsbut the functioning of systems in the face of con-tingency. There is no culturally defined structure, noprogram, no code that has to be maintained, executed,or realized to preserve the identity of the system.Luhmann shifts Parsons problem of the boundarymaintenance of systems radically into the dimensionof time, shaking off all the normative connotations ofParsonian theory. This leaves only the continuity of

the system over time as a problemand as a radicallypurged understanding of persistence in an overlycomplex world of other possibilities, of other equiva-lent solutions (Luhmann 1970).

From the 1980s on, Luhmann began to rethink thedistinction between system and environment, drawingon the works of Argentinian biologists F. J. Varelaand Humberto Maturana and on the so-called secondcybernetics developed by researchers such as Heinrichvon Foerster and Ernst von Glasersfeld. At the core ofthis process of rethinking stands the concept of theautopoiesis (self-creation) of systems. Even before thisrearrangement of theoretical concepts, Luhmann de-

veloped the notion of a self-referential system. Self-referentiality took the strategically important place

which the top system of the cybernetic hierarchy,culture, held in Parsons theory. This was a first step tointroduce a reflexive control of equilibrium process.Even more significant is the concept of autopoieticsystems. Autopoietic systems repeat the difference ofsystem and environment internally, within the system.Autopoietic systems use this difference to observe (andto regulate, to condition) their own operations. Thedistinction between system and environment is trans-formed, the difference of identity (what belongsrightfully to the system makes up its identity), anddifference (what does not belong to the system, what isforeign to it) forms the basis for the systems opera-tions.

Autopoietic systems produce the typical ele-

ments they consist of on their own by observingthemselves in the process of production, by using thedifference of identity and differencein a metaphor-ical sense one could call this the self-consciousness ofthe system. Autopoietic systems are closed, andoperate only under the condition of self-contact,whereas Parsons postulated open systems engaged inprocesses of mutual interchange. The only way forautopoietic systems to influence each other is in amanner that Luhmann calls the structural couplingof systems: mutual irritations and resonance effectswhich the operations of one system have in the other.In a sense, autopoietic systems discover their ownfunctionality and internalize the process of the searchfor equivalent solutions (Luhmann 1984). Luhmannstheory can eschew Anthony Giddens criticism thatequilibrium process, the self-regulation of systems,eludes an analysis in terms of reflexiity (Giddens1977).

For Luhmann, social systems consist of communi-cations as elements. The differentiation of societyinto (mono-)functionally specialized subsystemstheeconomic system, the political system, science, art,religion, love, etc.is based on the development ofgeneralized media of communication. These spec-ialized types of communications form the elementswhich autopoietic systems have to reproduce endl-essly. The economy, for example, is made up of moneycommunications: payments.

It is observing itself in terms of the differencepayment\non-payment (or liquid\broke). The main-tenance of liquidity is the single most importantfunctional prerequisite which has to be fulfilled tosecure the continuity of the economic systemsoperations (Luhmann 1988).

5. Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism is a research program that has beenfounded on the basis of a thorough critique ofParsonian theory, in particular by Jeffrey C. Alexander(Alexander 1985, 1998). Although the name suggests a

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close relationship with other forms of functionalism,the central criterion for belonging to the class of

functionalist approaches is clearly not satisfied: neo-functionalism does not provide simple or refinedfunctional explanations in terms of the teleologicalinterpretation of consequences of action or in terms ofequilibrium models. The only reason that the labelneofunctionalism is justified at all can be seen in itsrenewal of Davis assertion, that all careful socio-logical analysis is (neo)functional analysis. As amovement of theory and empirical research, neofunc-tionalism is a reorientation of sociological analysisfrom systems and equilibrium to concrete actors andinterpretative processes.

See also: Control: Social; Differentiation: Social;Integration: Social; Labor, Division of; Luhmann,

Niklas (192798); Parsons, Talcott (190279); System:Social; Values, Sociology of

Bibliography

Alexander J C (ed.) 1985 Neofunctionalism . Sage Publications.Beverly Hills, CA

Alexander J C 1998 Neofunctionalism and after. Blackwell,Oxford, UK

Bales R F 1950 Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for theStudy of Small Groups Addison-Wesley, Cambridge, MA

Cassirer E 1980 Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. Untersu-chungen uWber die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik. Wissen-schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, Germany

Davis K 1959 The myth of functional analysis as a specialmethod in sociology and anthropology. American SociologicalReiew 24: 75772

Do$bert R 1973 Systemtheorie und die Entwicklung religioWserDeutungssysteme. Zur Logik des sozialwissenschaftlichenFunktionalismus. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, Main, Germany

Gibbs J W 1948 The Collected Works of J Willard Gibbs. YaleUniversity Press, New Haven, CT

Giddens A 1977 Studies in Social and Political Theory. Hutchin-son, London

Henderson L J 1913 The Fitness of Enironment. Macmillan,New York

Henderson L J 1935 Paretos General Sociology. A PhysiologistsInterpretation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

Luhmann N 1970 Soziologische AufklaWrung 1. AufsaWtze zurTheorie der Gesellschaft. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen,Germany

Luhmann N 1984 Soziale Systeme. Grundri einer allgemeinenTheorie. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, Germany

Luhmann N 1988 Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp,Frankfurt, Germany

Merton R K 1963 Social Theory and Social Structure, rev. edn.The Free Press, Glencoe, IL

Nagel E 1957 Logic Without Metaphysics, and Other Essays inthe Philosophy of Science. The Free Press, Glencoe, IL

Nagel E 1961 The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic ofScientific Explanation. Harcourt, New York

Parsons T 1954 Essays in Sociological Theory, rev.edn.The FreePress, New York

Parsons T 1959 The Social System. The Free Press, Glencoe,IL

Parsons T 1993 Talcott Parsons on National Socialism. AldineDe Gruyter, New York

Parsons T, Bales R F, Shils E A 1981 Working Papers in theTheory of Action. Greenwood Press, Westport, CTParsons T, Platt G M 1973 The American University, Harvard

University Press, Cambridge, MARadcliffe-Brown A R 1952 Structure and Function in Primitie

Society. Cohen & West, LondonRunciman W G 1990 A Treatise on Social Theory. Vol. I: The

Methodology of Social Theory. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge

Russett C E 1966 The Concept of Equilibrium in American SocialThought. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT

Sztompka P 1974 System and Function. Toward a Theory ofSociety. Academic Press, New York

Wenzel H 1991 Die Ordnung des Handelns. Talcott ParsonsTheorie des allgemeinen Handlungssystems. Suhrkamp, Frank-furt am Main, Germany

H. Wenzel

Fundamental Rights and ConstitutionalGuarantees

Fundamental rights are typically the protections ofindividual (and sometimes group) liberties in modernconstitutions. International human rights law providesa baseline of minimum protections that all members ofthe international community ought to observe. Manyconstitutional orders supplement these minimumprotections with additional guarantees.

1. Types of Fundamental Rights

Fundamental rights developed in three stages. Initiallygovernments committed themselves to protect a set ofbasic civil and political rights, and later began to treatsocial welfare rights as fundamental. In the later partof the twentieth century, rights to cultural and en-vironmental protection came to be understood asfundamental as well.

The idea that people have constitutional rightsmakes sense only in the context of accounting for why

some exercises of power are arbitrary and unjustified.Postmedieval Western political theory abandonedaccounts in which sovereign power was by definitionunlimited, and replaced them with accounts of sov-ereign powerusually the power of governments, butsometimes the power of individuals over othersaccording to which there were limits on the justifiedexercise of power. Initially, the accounts defined a setof rights, which came to be described as civil rights,that people had simply by virtue of the fact that theylived in an organized society (rather than in a state ofnature). At the core of this set were the right to ownproperty, the right to dispose of ones property

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