30 Emptiness in theSatyasiddhi.pdf

8/11/2019 30 Emptiness in theSatyasiddhi.pdf

1/10

C. D. C. PRIESTLEY

EMPTINESS IN THE SATYASIDDHZ

The Satyasiddhi is a handbook f abhidharma written by Harivarman, who (according

to Paramatha) was a follower of the Bahukutiyas. The only surviving version o f it

is Kumlrajivas Chinese translation of 412 A.D.

The Satyasiddhi (,&, pl sm,* * Cheng Shih Lun)l consists of five

sections. The first 2 deals %th the Triratna3 and then goes on to give a

brief account of Buddhist doctrine in general; it describes the Four

Truths, the Five Groups, the Twelve Spheres, and so on4, and then

discusses ertain points of disagreement among the early schools, such

as whether past and future exist, whether there is an intermediate exist-

ence, whether the Four Truths are attained successivelyor simultaneously,

and so on.5 The remaining sections deal respectively with the Four

Truths: sufferings, its origin7, cessation*, and the way.9

Most of the important explanations of the doctrine of emptiness

(&zyatti) in the Satyasiddhi are in the section on cessation (=

,I& q,

Mieh-ti Chii). This is the shortest section of the five; it occupies on y

seven pages n the Taishd edition. Nevertheless, it is central in the work,

for according to Harivarman, there is really only one truth, the Truth of

Cessation; seeing cessation, he says, is called seeing the Noble

TruthslO- and by the one truth is the way attained; the term for it is

cessation.ll He defends this position in a subsection of the section on

the way called Seeing the One Truth (9) - & J, Chien I Ti).12 His

reason for giving cessation pre-eminence among the Four Truths is that

the other three are concerned with things which do not ultimately exist;

he says, The contemplation of such truths as that the Five Groups are

suffering, . . . and that the causeof suffering is desire . . . would not exhaust

the influences (@srava), or they are all mundane truths, not ultimate.ls

The Truth of Cessation, on the contrary, is concerned with the ultimate

nature of things; to understand the truth of cessation is thus also truly

to understand the truths of suffering, its origin, and the way.

Harivarman defines the Truth of Cessation as the extinguishing of

Journal of Indian Philosophy

1

(1970) 30-39. Aii Rights Reserved

Copyright 8 1970 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland


2/10

EMPTINESS IN THE SATYASID DHI 31

three kinds of awareness.14 The three kinds of awareness are awareness

of concepts

(prajiiapti),

awareness of phenomena

(dharma),

and

awareness of emptiness.ls The explanation of these three kinds of

awareness and their extinction comprises the entire section on cessation.

The first part, on awareness of concepts, begins by explaining that con-

cepts are names conventionally attached to associations of phenomena;

the concept of a wagon is thus dependent on the association of wheels,

axles, and so forth, and the concept of a man is dependent on the associ-

ation of the Five Groups. 1s These concepts are unreal, for there are no

entities to which they correspond; but they are useful to us in the ordinary

course of living.17 There follows an account of the two truths, conven-

tional and ultimate. Conventional truth is truth in terms of conceptsls;

ultimate truth is reality: phenomena such as matter, and so on, and

Nirvrina.ls

The section continues with a more detailed discussion of the character

of concepts.20 Concepts have no peculiar characteristic (svalakSana)21;

they are not the source of our knowledge22; they can be doubted2s; and

so on. Concepts can be destroyed according to their constituents, and

their constituents, which are also concepts, can be destroyed according

to the real phenomena on which they depend. Real phenomena can only

be destroyed by emptiness.24

There is then a long discussion of the relationship between the concept

and the real phenomena. Four positions are successively examined and

rejected: first, that a pot is identical with the phenomena of matter, and

so on; second, that the pot exists apart from the phenomena; third, that

it cannot be said either that the pot is identical with the phenomena or

that it exists apart from them; and finally, that the pot does not exist.25

The first three of these are dealt with fairly quickly. If the pot were

identical with the phenomena, the phenomena would be called a pot

even when they occurred separately. 2s If it existed apart from the phe-

nomena, it would occur, and could be apprehended apart from them.27

And the relationship is not indeterminate, for the identity or difference

of real phenomena is not indeterminate.28 In reality there are no inde-

terminate phenomena; only the identity or difference of concepts is said

to be indeterminate.29

The refutation of the fourth position is more complex. It begins with

the observation that if the pot does not exist at all, then there are no


3/10

32 C. D. C. PRIESTLEY

phenomena such as the rewards of guilt and merit or bondage and

release, and that if nothing conceptual exists, the theory of non-existence

is also non-existent, since there is no one to express it and no one to

listen to it.30 Moreover, the pot evidently exists, since it can produce our

awareness of it; and we distinguish it from other things : how can we do

so if neither it nor they exists?

31 And if nothing exists, there can be no

reasons to explain this position; the opposite position, which is supported

by reasons, will naturally be accepted, and this position is then refuted.

If there existed any reason to prove the position, that very fact would

also refute it.32

The nihilist then replies at great length .a3 He argues that all things are

indeed non-existent, since the senses and their objects cannot be grasped;

for no whole can be grasped.34 And parts can be analysed into atoms,

and when the atoms are destroyed, there is nothing.35 He goes on to

attack the relationship between matter and eye-consciousness, and be-

tween matter and mind-consciousnessas, and then the relationships be-

tween sound and the earsr,

scent and the nose, and the other sensations

and their organsa*, and between things and the mind.39 He concludes

with an attack on causation: if there is a result, either the quality exists

previously in the cause and then is produced, or the quality does not

exist previously in the cause and then is produced; but both alternatives

are false.4a Moreover, the cause must occur either before the result, to-

gether with it, or after it; but in none of these cases can it create the

result.41 Furthermore, the cause and the result must be either the same

or different; but both alternatives are absurd.42 And again, the result

must be created by itself, by something else, by both, or by nothing;

but none of these is possible.4s And finally, the result must be created

either intentionally or unintentionally; but it cannot be created inten-

tionally, since an intention in the past does not exist, nor unintentionally,

since its character will be determined by the motives of the person

creating it in the present.44

To this rebuttal, Harivarman replies that the nihilist has failed to

answer his original objection, that if nothing exists, the argument that

nothing exists cannot exist.45 Moreover, this is a matter that is excluded

from the Buddhas sutras, for it is one of the five inconceivable subjects;

these are subjects which can be understood only by the omniscient.46

Knowledge of emptiness is easy to attain, but the wisdom that can dis-


4/10

EMPTINESS IN THE SATYASID DHI

33

criminate rightly among all phenomena arises only with difficulty.47 The

Buddha taught only as much as might lead to the cessation of suffering;

but what he did not choose to speak of may still exist.48 The nihilist is

like a man born blind who denies that there is black or white.49 But the

wise believe the Buddhas; and the Buddha taught that the Five Groups

exist. Like pots and so on, they exist according to conventional truth.50

The second part, on awareness of phenomena, defines this awareness

as the idea that the Five Groups really exist. It is extinguished by the

knowledge of emptiness, which shows us that the Five Groups are

empty.51 The emptiness of the Five Groups is not merely their lack of

a self or any other permanent entity, for then they could still be observed

and so would not really be empty. 5s It is true that the siitras speak of

them as empty in that sense; but this view of them is impure. Viewed

purely, they are extinct.53 The destruction of the notion of beings is thus

conceptual emptiness; the destruction of phenomena such as matter is

phenomenal emptiness.54 The Five Groups, matter and so on, are thus

really non-existent; but according to conventional truth they exist.55 As

the sutra says, the ultimate truth is emptiness.56 In relation to the notion

of beings, the Five Groups are said to be the ultimate truth, but because

some people then think of the Five Groups as real, they are said to be

ultimately empty.57 All contingent things (sa~sk~tadhar~u) change and

thus are deceitful and illusory; they are unreal.58 Cessation is the ultimate

reality, not the Groups; for it is by perceiving the Truth of Cessation that

the Path is attained.59 All contingent things (sq&iru) cease. If they

really existed, there would be no cutting off, separation, or cessation;

what ceases, then, is non-existent. All contingent things are thus ultimately

non-existent.60

The third part explains that the cessation of the awareness of emptiness

is achieved in two cases : in mindless contemplation, and at the time when

the stream (su@nna) is cut of f in entering Nirvana without residue.61

In the former case, awareness of emptiness is extinguished because its

cause has ceased; in the latter, it is extinguished because the karma of

that stream is exhausted.62 Harivarman then concludes the section with

an explanation of why the karma of one who has gained release cannot

come to fruition: his old karma is paid off with a token sum (9 )

in the present, and no new karma is created.63 Thus, by extinguishing the

three kinds of awareness, he gains everlasting release from all suffering.64


5/10


Harivarmans doctrine of emptiness can be summarized, then, as fol-

lows. There are two degrees of emptiness, the first resulting from the

destruction of concepts, and the second, from the destruction of phe-

nomena. At each level, emptiness is identified as ultimate truth; the

existence of phenomena such as matter and so on is ultimate truth at the

first level (conceptual emptiness). but conventional truth at the second

(phenomenal emptiness). Emptiness is equivalent to cessation, and thus

to non-existence; to know things as empty is to know them as ceased,

as non-existent. The Truth of Cessation is thus the truth of emptiness.

But although all contingent things are ultimately non-existent, it cannot

be denied that they exist conventionally. Like illusions, they exist to the

extent that we are aware of them.

Certain points in his account of emptiness are ambiguous. In the first

place, he seems generally to understand emptiness as a state in which

nothing exists. The awareness of emptiness is then not simply a philo-

sophical realization of the illusory nature of phenomena, but rather an

awareness of non-existence attained in meditation. Otherwise, he could

hardly say, as he does, that if the Five Groups are observed, they are not

said to be empty.65 Awareness of emptiness, then, seems to be similar to

the meditations described in the

Cii~m&Eatasutta.~~

On the other hand, Harivarmans remark that contingent things do

not really exist, because if they did there would be no cessations, sug-

gests that at that point he regards them as empty in the sense that they

change and so are illusory. On that basis, they could be said to be empty

even when observed, and they would then be empty in a philosophical

sense, as really neither existent nor non-existent. Harivarman seems to be

putting forward two theories of emptiness at once: one, according to

which phenomena exist, but can be made empty through meditation, and

another, according to which even existing phenomena are empty because

their existence is not real existence.

There is a corresponding ambiguity in Harivarmans doctrine of the

two truths. His distinction between conceptual emptiness and phenome-

nal emptiness forces him to decide whether to have one emptiness which

is ultimate and another which is merely conventional, or whether to call

both ultimate and then to say that one is less ultimate than the other.

On the face of it, the former alternative seems easier, since he already

has two kinds of emptiness and two kinds of truth to assign to them.


6/10


But if he chose this alternative, he would have to admit that the Truth

of Cessation is ultimate truth only in part, to the extent that it is con-

cerned with phenomenal emptiness; or he could argue that conceptual

emptiness is not really cessation. In either case, his definition of the

truth of cessation as the extinguishing of three kinds of awareness would

have to be abandoned.

He chooses, then, to distinguish between two degrees of ultimate truth.

He thus keeps cessation intact as ultimate truth, but in so doing weakens

the theory of two truths by admitting an ultimate truth which is, in fact,

only conventionally ultimate. The ambiguity of this conventional ulti-

mate truth, conventional in terms of phenomenal emptiness, but ultimate

in terms of conceptual emptiness, is a further product of what appears

to be Harivarmans confusion concerning the status of the Five Groups.

If the Five Groups really exist, then conceptual emptiness is ultimate

truth; but in that case Nirvana is no more real than SarpsBra. If the Five

Groups do not really exist, San&ha is unreal and the exclusive reality

of Nirvana is preserved; but conceptual emptiness, as distinct from phe-

nomenal emptiness, is only conventionally true. The two degrees of ulti-

mate truth provide Harivarman with a way of ascribing both reality and

unreality to the Five Groups.

This doctrine amounts to an imperfectly formulated theory of three

truths: conventional truth, which is truth based on concepts; conven-

tional ultimate truth, which is based on phenomena; and ultimate truth,

which is the truth of Nirvana. Awkward as this theory no doubt is, it is

by no means unparalleled in Buddhist thought: the three truths corre-

spond rather closely to the Three Natures of the Vijiianavada; and the

ambiguity of the conventional ultimate truth in this theory is more than

matched by the ambiguity of the VijEnavadins dependent nature (para-

tantrasvabhdva). There is no need, of course, to assume any influence of

either philosophy on the other; the two theories are probably similar

attempts to deal with the same problem. They agree that all things except

Nirvana are unreal; nevertheless, some must be more unreal than others :

if the Five Groups were real, release would be impossible; but if they

are entirely unreal, release ought to be unnecessary. The Madhyamikas

deal with this problem by rejecting the opinions that create it: they deny

that there is any difference between Saqrs&a and Nirvanas*, and admit

that neither Nirvana nor release is possiblejs; for if Samsara does not


7/10


exist, neither does Nirvana. Harivarman and, in a more sophisticated

way, the Vijfilnavadins try to deal with it by making the Five Groups

a kind of half-reality, real by comparison with concepts, but unreal by

comparison with Nirvana.

Harivarmans position admittedly is similar to that of the Madhya-

mikas in certain respects. Like them, he says that concepts are not utterly

non-existent, since they are the basis for conventional truth; and, as noted

above, he implies at one point that the Five Groups are empty even before

they have been extinguished. But at all other points, his conception of

emptiness is fundamentally different from the Madhyamikas. For Nagar-

juna, emptiness is conditioned origination (prutityasamutpcZda).70 Hari-

varman, on the other hand, defines emptiness as cessation.Tl Nagarjuna

accordingly regards existence and non-existence as equally unreal72; but

Harivarman identifies non-existence with ultimate truth. The result is that

Harivarman has to argue that the cessation of the Five Groups is ulti-

mately real, but that the Five Groups that cease are only conventionally

real. Now to the extent that he admits that the Five Groups are indeed

unreal, he undermines the reality of their cessation; but to the extent that

he maintains their reality, he contradicts his original position. In practice,

he seems to waver between these two alternatives, accepting the former

when he wants to maintain the supremacy of Nirvana and the latter when

he wants to emphasize the reality of the cessation by which Nirvana is

attained.

Since Harivarman is what Nagarjuna would call a nihilist (n&fika), it

is rather ironic that many of the arguments that Harivarman ascribes to

the nihilist &, & 5 ) are similar to Nagarjunas. It is possible, of

course, that his attack on nihilism is indeed an attack on the Madhyamika,

although if it is, he has seriously misunderstood the Madhyamika posi-

tion. But it is perhaps more likely that Harivarman, like the Madhyamikas,

realized that his own views might be mistaken for nihilism, and so

hastened to attack nihilism in order to establish his own position among

the righteous.

The fact remains, however, that Harivarman is not only attacking

nihilism; he is also, at least by implication, attacking the method by

which the nihilist arrives at his conclusions. Harivarman evidently thinks

that the

prasaiga73

of the nihilist leads him to a denial of conventional

truth; and as Harivarman and NBgSrjuna both realize, conventional truth


8/10

EMPTINESS IN THE SATYASIDDHI

37

cannot consistently be denied, since the denial itself must have at least

conventional existence. The prusuliga, then, seems to be too wholesale in

its effect: although it certainly can put an end to the depredations of

heterodoxy, it is liable to devour also the domestic concepts of Buddhism

which it was meant to protect. Nagarjuna is of course not unaware of

this danger; his V~grahavydvartani contains a detailed reply to what is

essentially Harivarmans objection. But even if Harivarman had seen and

accepted Nagarjunas defense, he would still have been obliged to reject

the

prusufigu.

For in trying to maintain simultaneously the reality of

cessation and the reality of non-existence, he involves himself, as we have

seen, in precisely the kind of inconsistencies that the prusmigu is designed

to expose.

It appears, then, that the ambiguity of Harivarmans conception of

emptiness, his half-formulated doctrine of three truths, his uncertainty

concerning the reality of the Five Groups, and even his rejection of the

prusuliga can all be traced, at least in part, to this conviction of his that

both cessation and non-existence are real. A conviction so impossible in

its implications is not, perhaps, what one would expect to find at the

bottom of a philosophical system. But the conviction is there; and that

Harivarman clung to it, even though he could see the difficulties to which

it led, requires explanation.

The explanation seems to be this. The word nirodhu ($&, cessation),

as Harivarman uses it, is ambiguous: like the English word extinction,

it means both becoming non-existent and being non-existent. The

reality of

nirodhu,

then, is the reality of cessation and non-existence, and

by maintaining the reality of

nirodhu

without qualification, Harivarman

commits himself to the absurdities noted above. It is unlikely that

Harivarman was more than dimly aware of this ambiguity, if he was

aware of it at all; but it would have been difficult in any case for him to

restrict the meaning of nirodhu to either cessation or non-existence, for

it was well established in the Buddhist tradition that the virtually syn-

onymous word nirv@zu meant both an event and a state. The incon-

sistencies in Harivarmans philosophy are thus not altogether his own

creation; they spring ultimately from a problem that is at the very root

of Buddhism, in the doctrine of Nirvana.

University of Toronto


9/10


BI?L;IJqRAPHY

Harivarman Cheng

Sbik Lun (& * A

mm Satyasiddhi).r. Kum8rajiva.T1646.

Ia

WI& Pdussin, ouisde,

MrilamadhyantakakririkrSs de N&irjuna avec la Prasanna-

padti de Candrakfrti (Bibliotheca uddhica,Vol. IV). ImperialAcademyof Sciences,

St. Petersburg,913. photographicallyeprinted;no publisher r date).

Majhimanikaya, Vol. III., ed. by Lord Chalmers. xford University Press, ondon

(for the PaliText Society),195 .

NOTES

1 T1646.All referencesot otherwisemarkedare o thiswork.

a pp. 139a-26Oc.

3 pp. 139a-24lb.

4 pp. 247b-253~.

5 pp. 253c-260~.

f) pp. 26Oc-289~.

7 pp. 289c-327a.

8 pp. 327a-334b.

0 pp. 334b-373b.

10p, 362c, .1.

11p. 363a, .28.

la pp. 362c-364a.

18p. 363a, .21.

l4 p. 327a, .8.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., 1.15.

17 Ibid., 1.24.

18 Ibid., 1.21.

19 Ibid.

20pp. 327c-328~.

a1p. 328a, .27.

2ap. 328b, .15.

23 Ibid., 1.19.

24p. 328c, .15.

a5

Ibid,

1.18.

26 Ibid., 1.27.

p. 329b, .9.

28p. 33Oa, .18.

28 Ibid.,

1.29.

8Op. 33Ob, .2.

*l Ibid., 1.9.

aa Ibid., 1.20.

88pp. 33ob-332a.

a4p. 33Ob, .26.

86p. 33Oc, .9.

86 Ibid., 1.22.

sr pp. 331a-331b.

** p. 331b.


10/10


39 pp. 331b-331c.

40 p. 331c, 1.3.

41 Ibid.,

1.25.

42 p. 332a, . 1.

43 Ibid., 1.4.

44 Ibid., 1.14.

45 Ibid., 1.25.

46 Ibid., 1.28.

47 p. 332b, 1.6.

48 Ibid., I. 11.

49 Ibid., 1.16.

50 Ibid., 1.19.

51 p. 332c, I. 6.

52

Ibid., 1. 8.

53 Zbid., 1.14.

54 p. 333a, 1.1.

55 Ibid., 1.8.

56 Ibid., 1.10.

57 Ibid., 1.13.

58 p. 333b, 1.1.

59 Ibid., 1.5.

60 p. 333c, 1.14.

61 Ibid., 1.21.

62 Ibid., I. 23.

63 p. 334a, I. 28.

64 Ibid., 1.29.

85 p. 332c, I. 12.

66 Mujjhimaniktiya, 121.

67 p. 333c, 1.14.

68 Nlg rjuna, Mrilamadhyarnukak ik~, XXV , 19.

69 Ibid., XVI, 4,5.

70 Ibid., XXIV, 18.

71 p. 335c, I. 2.

72 NSgIgarjuna, iilamadhyamakaktirikrf, XV, 10.

79 The prusarigu is a mode of argument characteristic of the MSidhyamikas. It is a

reductio ad absurdum,

by which an opponents position is shown to contradict itself

according to principles which the opponent himself accepts.

30 Emptiness in theSatyasiddhi.pdf

Documents

Transcript of 30 Emptiness in theSatyasiddhi.pdf