3. San Luis vs. San Luis

294 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

San Luis vs. San Luis

G.R.No.133743.February6,2007.*

EDGARSANLUIS,petitioner,vs.FELICIDADSANLUIS,respondent.

G.R.No.134029.February6,2007.*

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDADSAGALONGOSaliasFELICIDADSANLUIS,respondent.

Venue; In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals (74 SCRA189 [1976]), we laid down the doctrinal rule for determiningresidence—as contradistinguished from domicile—of the decedentfor purposes of fixing the venue of settlement of his estate.—UnderSection1,Rule73 of theRules ofCourt, thepetition for letters ofadministration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in theRegionalTrialCourtoftheprovince“inwhichheresidesatthetimeof his death.” In the case ofGarcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74SCRA189 (1976),we laiddownthedoctrinalrule fordeterminingthe residence—as contradistinguished from domicile—of thedecedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of hisestate.

Same; For purpose of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, theresidence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation,or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily behis

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*THIRDDIVISION.

295

VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007 295


legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein withcontinuity and consistency.—It is incorrect forpetitioners to arguethat “residence,” forpurposesof fixingthevenueof thesettlementof the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” TherulingsinNuvalandRomualdezareinapplicabletotheinstantcasebecause they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is adistinction between “residence” for purposes of election laws and“residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In electioncases, “residence”and “domicile”are treatedas synonymous terms,that is, the fixed permanent residence towhichwhen absent, onehas the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixingvenueunder theRules ofCourt, the “residence” of aperson ishispersonal,actualorphysicalhabitation,oractualresidenceorplaceof abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence ordomicile provided he resides therein with continuity andconsistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have hisresidenceinoneplaceanddomicileinanother.

Family Code; Marriages; The Court stated that “the severance ofthe marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spousesfrom each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or castobloquy on the other.”—This principle was thereafter applied inPilapil v. IbaySomera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989), where the Courtrecognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the saidcase,itwasheldthatthealienspouseisnotaproperpartyinfilingthe adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that“the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating theformer spouses from each other,hence theactuationsof onewouldnotaffectorcastobloquyontheother.”

Same; Same; Marriage, being a mutual and sharedcommitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive ofany good to the society where one is considered released from themarital bond while the other remains bound to it.—Whentheobjectofamarriageisdefeatedbyrenderingitscontinuanceintolerabletoone of the parties and productive of no possible good to thecommunity, relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage,being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,cannotpossiblybeproductiveofanygoodtothesocietywhereoneisconsideredreleased fromthemaritalbondwhiletheotherremains

bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouseobtainsavaliddivorceabroadagainsttheFilipinospouse,asinthiscase.

296



Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; In Garcia v. Recio, 366SCRA 437 (2001), the Court laid down the specific guidelines forpleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It heldthat presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and thatproof of its authenticity and due execution must bepresented.—Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, thedivorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutelyallowedFelicisimotoremarry,wouldhavevestedFelicidadwiththelegalpersonalitytofilethepresentpetitionasFelicisimo’ssurvivingspouse. However, the records show that there is insufficientevidencetoprovethevalidityofthedivorceobtainedbyMerryLeeaswellasthemarriageofrespondentandFelicisimounderthelawsof theU.S.A. InGarcia v. Recio, 366SCRA437 (2001), theCourtlaid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreignlawand divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of thedivorcedecree is insufficientand thatproofof itsauthenticityanddueexecutionmustbepresented.UnderSections24and25ofRule132, a writing or documentmay be proven as a public or officialrecordofaforeigncountrybyeither(1)anofficialpublicationor(2)a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of thedocument. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copymust be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the properdiplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign servicestationedintheforeigncountryinwhichtherecordiskeptand(b)authenticatedbythesealofhisoffice.

Marriages; Coownership; Property; Any property acquiredduring the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtainedthrough their joint efforts.—Respondent would qualify as aninterestedpersonwhohasadirectinterestintheestateofFelicisimoby virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was notdeniedbypetitioners. If sheproves thevalidityof thedivorceandFelicisimo’scapacitytoremarry,butfailstoprovethathermarriagewithhimwasvalidlyperformedunderthelawsoftheU.S.A.,then

shemaybeconsideredasacoownerunderArticle144oftheCivilCode.Thisprovisiongovernsthepropertyrelationsbetweenpartieswho live together as husband and wife without the benefit ofmarriage,ortheirmarriageisvoidfromthebeginning.Itprovidesthatthepropertyacquiredbyeitherorbothofthemthroughtheirworkor industryor theirwagesandsalaries shallbegovernedbytherulesoncoownership.Inacoownership,itisnotnecessarythatthe property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts andindustry. Any property acquired during the union is prima faciepresumedtohavebeenobtainedthrough

297



their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the coownersshallbepresumedequal,unlessthecontraryisproven.

PETITIONSforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolutionoftheCourtofAppeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.Manuel O. Chan, Jr.forpetitionerEdgarSanLuis.Ariel VistaforpetitionerRodolfoSanLuis. Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for

respondent.

YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:

BeforeusareconsolidatedpetitionsforreviewassailingtheFebruary4,1998Decision

1oftheCourtofAppealsinCA

G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside theSeptember12,1995

2andJanuary31,1996

3Resolutionsof

theRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCity,Branch134inSP.Proc.No.M3708;anditsMay15,1998Resolution

4denying

petitioners’motionforreconsideration.Theinstantcaseinvolvesthesettlementoftheestateof

Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the formergovernor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriagewas with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of whichwerebornsixchildren,namely:Rodolfo,Mila,Edgar,Linda,Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia

predeceasedFelicisimo.

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1Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 4566. Penned by Associate Justice

Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A.

JacintoandRobertoA.Barrios.2Records,pp.335338.PennedbyJudgePaulT.Arcangel.3Id.,atpp.391393.4 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice

ArtemonD.Lunaand concurred in byAssociate JusticesDemetrioG.

DemetriaandRobertoA.Barrios.

298



Fiveyearslater,onMay1,1968,FelicisimomarriedMerryLeeCorwin,withwhomhehadason,Tobias.However,onOctober 15, 1971,MerryLee, anAmerican citizen, filed aComplaintforDivorce

5beforetheFamilyCourtoftheFirst

Circuit,StateofHawaii,UnitedStatesofAmerica(U.S.A.),which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce andAwardingChildCustodyonDecember14,1973.

6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondentFelicidadSanLuis,thensurnamedSagalongos,beforeRev.Fr.WilliamMeyer,MinisteroftheUnitedPresbyterianatWilshireBoulevard,LosAngeles,California,U.S.A.

7Hehad

nochildrenwithrespondentbutlivedwithherfor18yearsfromthetimeoftheirmarriageuptohisdeathonDecember18,1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of theirconjugal partnership assets and the settlement ofFelicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed apetition for letters of administration

8 before the Regional

Trial Court ofMakati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No.M3708whichwasraffledtoBranch146thereof.

Respondentalleged thatshe is thewidowofFelicisimo;that,atthetimeofhisdeath,thedecedentwasresidingat100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs arerespondent as legal spouse, his six children by his firstmarriage,andsonbyhissecondmarriage;thatthedecedentleftrealproperties,bothconjugalandexclusive,valuedat

P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does nothave any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that theconjugalpartnershipassetsbeliquidatedandthatlettersofadministrationbeissuedtoher.

_______________

5Records,p.125.6Id.,atp.137.7Id.,atp.116.8Id.,atpp.15.

299



OnFebruary4,1994,petitionerRodolfoSanLuis,oneofthechildrenofFelicisimobyhisfirstmarriage,filedamotiontodismiss

9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to

stateacauseofaction.Rodolfoclaimedthatthepetitionforletters of administration should have been filed in theProvince of Laguna because thiswas Felicisimo’s place ofresidence prior to his death. He further claimed thatrespondent has no legal personality to file the petitionbecause she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since thelatter,atthetimeofhisdeath,wasstilllegallymarriedtoMerryLee.

OnFebruary15,1994,LindainvokedthesamegroundsandjoinedherbrotherRodolfoinseekingthedismissal

10of

thepetition.OnFebruary28,1994,thetrialcourtissuedanOrder

11denyingthetwomotionstodismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss,respondentfiledonMarch5,1994heropposition

12thereto.

She submitted documentary evidence showing that whileFelicisimo exercised the powers of his public office inLaguna, he regularly went home to their house in NewAlabangVillage,Alabang,MetroManilawhichtheyboughtsometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree ofabsolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the FirstCircuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage ofFelicisimotoMerryLeehadalreadybeendissolved.Thus,sheclaimedthatFelicisimohadthelegalcapacitytomarryherbyvirtueofparagraph2,

13Article26oftheFamilyCode

andthedoctrinelaiddowninVan Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.14

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9Id.,atpp.1024.10Id.,atpp.3035.11Id.,atp.38.12Id.,atpp.39138.13 When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validlycelebratedandadivorceisthereaftervalidlyobtainedabroadby

thealienspousecapacitatinghimorhertoremarry,theFilipinospouse

shallhavecapacitytoremarryunderPhilippinelaw.14G.R.No.L68470,October8,1985,139SCRA139.

300



Thereafter,Linda,RodolfoandhereinpetitionerEdgarSanLuis, separately filedmotions for reconsideration from theOrderdenyingtheirmotionstodismiss.

15Theyassertedthat

paragraph2,Article26oftheFamilyCodecannotbegivenretroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamousmarriagewithFelicisimobecausethiswouldimpairvestedrightsinderogationofArticle256

16oftheFamilyCode.

OnApril21,1994,Mila,anotherdaughterofFelicisimofromhis firstmarriage, filedamotiontodisqualifyActingPresidingJudgeAnthonyE.Santosfromhearingthecase.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order17

denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled thatrespondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legalstanding to file the petition and that venuewas properlylaid.Meanwhile,themotionfordisqualificationwasdeemedmootandacademic

18becausethenActingPresidingJudge

Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuanpendingtheresolutionofsaidmotion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition19 against Judge

TensuanonNovember16,1994.Onevendate,Edgaralsofiledamotionforreconsideration

20fromtheOrderdenying

their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does notstatethefactsandlawonwhichitwasbased.

OnNovember25,1994,JudgeTensuanissuedanOrder21

grantingthemotionfor inhibition.ThecasewasreraffledtoBranch134presidedbyJudgePaulT.Arcangel.

_______________

15SeeRecords,pp.155158,160170and181192.16 This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not

prejudiceor impairvestedrightsoracquiredrights inaccordancewith

theCivilCodeorotherlaws.17Records,p.259.18Id.,atp.260.19Id.,atpp.262267.20Id.,atpp.270272.21Id.,atp.288.

301



OnApril24,1995,22 the trial court required theparties to

submittheirrespectivepositionpapersonthetwinissuesofvenueandlegalcapacityofrespondentto filethepetition.OnMay5,1995,Edgarmanifested

23thatheisadoptingthe

argumentsandevidencesetforthinhispreviousmotionforreconsideration as his position paper. Respondent andRodolfo filed theirpositionpapers onJune14,

24 and June

20,251995,respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed thepetition for letters of administration. It held that, at thetimeofhisdeath,Felicisimowasthedulyelectedgovernorand a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, thepetition should have been filed in Sta.Cruz, Laguna andnot in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent waswithout legal capacity to file the petition for letters ofadministration because her marriage with Felicisimo wasbigamous, thus, voidab initio. It found that the decree ofabsolutedivorcedissolvingFelicisimo’smarriage toMerryLee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bindFelicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled thatparagraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot beretroactively applied because it would impair the vestedrightsofFelicisimo’slegitimatechildren.

Respondent moved for reconsideration26 and for the

disqualification27 ofJudgeArcangelbutsaidmotionswere

denied.28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals whichreversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in itsassailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositiveportionofwhichstates:

_______________

22Id.,atp.301.23Id.,atpp.302303.24Id.,atpp.306311.25Id.,atpp.318320.26Id.,atpp.339349.27Id.,atpp.350354.28Id.,atpp.391393.

302



“WHEREFORE,theOrdersdatedSeptember12,1995andJanuary31,1996areherebyREVERSEDandSETASIDE;theOrdersdatedFebruary 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and therecords of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for furtherproceedings.”

29

TheappellantecourtruledthatunderSection1,Rule73ofthe Rules of Court, the term “place of residence” of thedecedent,forpurposesoffixingthevenueofthesettlementof his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physicalhabitation,oractualresidenceorplaceofabodeofapersonasdistinguished from legal residence ordomicile. Itnotedthat although Felicisimo discharged his functions asgovernor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,Muntinlupa.Thus,thepetitionforlettersofadministrationwasproperlyfiledinMakatiCity.

TheCourtofAppealsalsoheldthatFelicisimohadlegalcapacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,Article26oftheFamilyCodeandtherulingsinVan Dorn v.Romillo, Jr.

30andPilapil v. IbaySomera.

31Itfoundthatthe

marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validlydissolvedbyvirtueofthedecreeofabsolutedivorceissuedbytheFamilyCourtoftheFirstCircuit,StateofHawaii.Asa result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo wascapacitated to contract a subsequent marriage withrespondent.Thus—

“With the wellknown rule—express mandate of paragraph 2,Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines inVan Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind theenactmentofE.O.No.227,—thereisnojusticiablereasontosustain

the individual view—sweeping statement—of Judge Arc[h]angel,that “Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basicpolicyofourstateagainstdivorceinanyformwhatsoever.”Indeed,courtscannotdenywhatthelawgrants.Allthatthecourtsshoulddoistogiveforceandeffecttotheexpressmandateofthelaw.Theforeigndivorcehavingbeenobtained by the ForeigneronDecember14,

_______________

29RolloofG.R.No.133743,p.66.30Supranote14.31G.R.No.80116,June30,1989,174SCRA653.

303



1992,32 theFilipinodivorcee,“shallxxxhavecapacitytoremarry

underPhilippine laws.”For this reason, themarriagebetween thedeceasedandpetitionershouldnotbedenominatedas“abigamousmarriage.”

Therefore,underArticle130oftheFamilyCode,thepetitionerasthe surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for thesettlementoftheestateofthedeceased.xxx”

33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions forreconsideration

34 which were denied by the Court of

Appeals.OnJuly2,1998,EdgarappealedtothisCourtviatheinstantpetitionforreviewoncertiorari.

35Rodolfo later

filedamanifestationandmotiontoadoptthesaidpetitionwhichwasgranted.

36

Intheinstantconsolidatedpetitions,EdgarandRodolfoinsist that the venue of the subject petition for letters ofadministrationwas improperly laidbecauseat the timeofhisdeath,FelicisimowasaresidentofSta.Cruz,Laguna.They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v.Guray

37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,

38

“residence”issynonymouswith“domicile”whichdenotesafixed permanent residence to which when absent, oneintendstoreturn.Theyclaimthatapersoncanonlyhaveone domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo neverchangedhisdomicile,thepeti

_______________

32 Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded

from amistaken finding of fact because the records clearly show that

thedivorcewasobtainedonDecember14,1973(notDecember14,1992)

andthatthemarriageofGov.SanLuiswithrespondentwascelebrated

on June 20, 1974.These events both occurred before the effectivity of

theFamilyCodeonAugust3,1988.33RolloofG.R.No.133743,p.65.34SeeCARollo,pp.309322,335340,and362369.35RolloofG.R.No.133743,pp.842.36Id.,atp.75.3752Phil.645(1928).38G.R.No.104960,September14,1993,226SCRA408.

304



tion for lettersofadministrationshouldhavebeenfiled inSta.Cruz,Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage toFelicisimowasvoidandbigamousbecauseitwasperformedduringthesubsistenceofthelatter’smarriagetoMerryLee.They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot beretroactivelyappliedbecauseitwouldimpairvestedrightsandratifythevoidbigamousmarriage.Assuch,respondentcannotbeconsideredthesurvivingwifeofFelicisimo;hence,she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters ofadministration.

Theissuesforresolution:(1)whethervenuewasproperlylaid, and (2)whether respondenthas legal capacity to filethesubjectpetitionforlettersofadministration.

Thepetitionlacksmerit.Under Section 1,

39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the

petition for letters of administration of the estate ofFelicisimoshouldbefiledintheRegionalTrialCourtoftheprovince“inwhichheresidesat the timeofhisdeath.” InthecaseofGarcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,

40welaiddown

the doctrinal rule for determining the residence—ascontradistinguished from domicile—of the decedent forpurposesoffixingthevenueofthesettlementofhisestate:

“[T]he term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as

distinguishedfrom“legalresidenceordomicile.”Thisterm“resides,”like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should beinterpretedinthelightoftheobjectorpurposeofthestatuteor ruleinwhichitisemployed.Intheapplicationofvenuestatutesand

_______________

39 SECTION 1.Where estate of deceased persons be settled.—If the

decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,

whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of

administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First

Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,xx

x.(Underscoringsupplied)40G.R.Nos.L40502&L42670,November29,1976,74SCRA189.

305



rules–Section1,Rule73of theRevisedRulesofCourt isofsuchnature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.Evenwherethestatuteusestheword“domicile”stillitisconstruedasmeaningresidenceandnotdomicileinthetechnicalsense.Somecases make a distinction between the terms “residence” and“domicile”butasgenerallyusedinstatutesfixingvenue,thetermsare synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term“inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be viewed orunderstoodinitspopularsense,meaning,the personal, actual orphysical habitation of a person, actual residence or place ofabode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual staythereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in agiven place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that placeandalsoanintentiontomakeitone’sdomicile.Noparticularlengthoftimeofresidenceisrequiredthough;however,theresidencemustbemorethantemporary.”

41(Emphasissupplied)

It is incorrect forpetitioners to argue that “residence,” forpurposesoffixingthevenueofthesettlementoftheestateofFelicisimo,issynonymouswith“domicile.”TherulingsinNuvalandRomualdez are inapplicable to the instant casebecausetheyinvolveelectioncases.Needlesstosay,thereisa distinction between “residence” for purposes of election

laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue ofactions. In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” aretreatedassynonymousterms,thatis,thefixedpermanentresidence to whichwhen absent, one has the intention ofreturning.

42However,forpurposesoffixingvenueunderthe

RulesofCourt, the“residence”ofaperson ishispersonal,actualorphysicalhabitation,oractualresidenceorplaceofabode,whichmaynotnecessarilybehislegalresidenceordomicile

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41Id.,atpp.199200.42Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supranote38atp.415.

306



provided he resides therein with continuity andconsistency.

43Hence, it ispossiblethatapersonmayhave

hisresidenceinoneplaceanddomicileinanother.In the instant case, while petitioners established that

FelicisimowasdomiciledinSta.Cruz,Laguna,respondentproved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of AbsoluteSale

44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased

purchasedtheaforesaidproperty.Shealsopresentedbillingstatements

45fromthePhilippineHeartCenterandChinese

GeneralHospital for theperiodAugust toDecember 1992indicating the address of Felicisimo at “100 San Juanico,Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa.” Respondent also presentedproofofmembershipofthedeceasedintheAyalaAlabangVillageAssociation

46andAyalaCountryClub,Inc.,

47letter

envelopes48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s

childrentohimathisAlabangaddress,andthedeceased’scallingcards

49statingthathishome/cityaddressisat“100

SanJuanico,AyalaAlabangVillage,Muntinlupa”whilehisoffice/provincialaddressisin“ProvincialCapitol,Sta.Cruz,Laguna.”

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was aresidentofAlabang,Muntinlupaforpurposesoffixingthevenue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the

subjectpetitionforlettersofadministrationwasvalidlyfiledintheRegional

_______________

43SeeBoleyley v. Villanueva,373Phil.141,146;314SCRA364, 368

(1999);Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento,G.R.No.L22795,

January31,1977,75SCRA124,128129.44Records,pp.7678.45Id.,atpp.6075.46Id.,atp.79.47Id.,atp.80.48Id.,atpp.8183.49Id.,atp.84.

307



Trial Court50 which has territorial jurisdiction over

Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed onDecember 17, 1993. At that time,Muntinlupa was still amunicipalityandthebranchesoftheRegionalTrialCourtof the National Capital Judicial Region which hadterritorialjurisdictionoverMuntinlupawerethenseatedinMakati City as per Supreme Court Administrative OrderNo. 3.

51 Thus, the subject petitionwas validly filed before

theRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCity.Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal

personalitytofilethepetitionforlettersofadministration,wemustfirstresolvetheissueofwhetheraFilipinowhoisdivorced by his alien spouse abroadmay validly remarryundertheCivilCode,consideringthatFelicidad’smarriagetoFelicisimowassolemnizedonJune20,1974,orbeforetheFamilyCodetookeffectonAugust3,1988.Inresolvingthisissue,weneednotretroactivelyapplytheprovisionsoftheFamilyCode,particularlyArt.26,par.(2)consideringthatthere issufficient jurisprudentialbasisallowingustoruleintheaffirmative.

_______________

50 The Regional Trial Court and not theMunicipal Trial Court had

jurisdiction over this case because the value of Gov. San Luis’ estate

exceededP200,000.00asprovidedforunderB.P.Blg129,Section19(4).51 SC Administrative OrderNo. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in

part:

PursuanttotheprovisionsofSection18ofB.P.Blg.129,andSection4ofthe

ExecutiveOrderissuedbythePresidentofthePhilippinesonJanuary17,1983,

declaringthereorganizationoftheJudiciary,theterritorialjurisdictionofthe

Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region are hereby

definedasfollows:

xxxx

5.BranchesCXXXIItoCL,inclusive,withseatsatMakati—overthemunicipalitiesofLas

Piñas,Makati,MuntinlupaandParañaque.xxx

308



ThecaseofVan Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.52involvedamarriage

betweena foreignerandhisFilipinowife,whichmarriagewas subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtainedabroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was notvalidunderPhilippinelaw,thealienspouseallegedthathisinterest in the properties from their conjugal partnershipshould be protected. The Court, however, recognized thevalidityofthedivorceandheldthatthealienspousehadnointerestinthepropertiesacquiredbytheFilipinowifeafterthedivorce.Thus:

“In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondentfrom the marriage from the standards of American law, underwhich divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the FederalSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesinAtherton vs. Atherton,45L.Ed.794,799:

“The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of

matrimonybyacompetentjurisdictionaretochangetheexistingstatus

or domestic relation of husband andwife, and to free them both from

thebond.Themarriagetie,whenthusseveredastooneparty,ceases

tobindeither.Ahusbandwithoutawife,orawifewithoutahusband,is

unknowntothelaw.Whenthelawprovides,inthenatureofapenalty,

that the guilty party shall notmarry again, that party, aswell as the

other,isstillabsolutelyfreedfromthebondoftheformermarriage.”

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is nolongerthehusbandofpetitioner.Hewouldhavenostandingtosue

inthecasebelowaspetitioner’shusbandentitledtoexercisecontrolover conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his owncountry’sCourt,whichvalidly exercised jurisdictionoverhim,andwhose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his ownrepresentation before said Court from asserting his right over theallegedconjugalproperty.”

53

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52Supranote14.53Id.,atpp.139,143144.

309



AstotheeffectofthedivorceontheFilipinowife,theCourtruledthatsheshouldnolongerbeconsideredmarriedtothealienspouse.Further,sheshouldnotberequiredtoperformhermaritaldutiesandobligations.Itheld:

“To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under ourlaws, petitioner has to be considered still married to privaterespondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations underArticle 109,et seq.of the Civil Code cannot be just.Petitionershould not be obliged to live together with, observe respect andfidelity,andrendersupporttoprivaterespondent.Thelattershouldnotcontinuetobeoneofherheirswithpossiblerightstoconjugalproperty.She should not be discriminated against in her owncountry if the ends of justice are to be served.”

54 (Emphasis

added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v.IbaySomera

55wheretheCourtrecognizedthevalidityofa

divorceobtainedabroad.Inthesaidcase, itwasheldthatthealienspouseisnotaproperpartyinfilingtheadulterysuit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that “theseverance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociatingthe former spouses from each other,hencetheactuationsofonewouldnotaffectorcastobloquyontheother.”

56

Likewise,inQuita v. Court of Appeals,57theCourtstated

thatwhereaFilipinoisdivorcedbyhisnaturalizedforeignspouse,therulinginVan Dornapplies.

58Althoughdecided

on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was

obtainedin1954whentheCivilCodeprovisionswerestillineffect.

ThesignificanceoftheVan DorncasetothedevelopmentoflimitedrecognitionofdivorceinthePhilippinescannotbe

_______________

54Id.,atp.144.55Supranote31.56Id.,atp.664.57G.R.No.124862,December22,1998,300SCRA406.58Id., atp. 414;SeealsoRepublic v. Orbecido III,G.R.No. 154380,

October5,2005,472SCRA114,121.

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denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severingmarital ties between parties in a mixed marriage andcapacitatingtheFilipinospousetoremarryasanecessaryconsequenceofupholdingthevalidityofadivorceobtainedabroad by the alien spouse. Inhis treatise,Dr.ArturoM.Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that “if the foreignerobtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shallhavecapacitytoremarryunderPhilippinelaw.”

59InGarcia

v. Recio,60theCourtlikewisecitedtheaforementionedcase

inrelationtoArticle26.61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,62 the

historical background and legislative intent behindparagraph2,Article26oftheFamilyCodewerediscussed,towit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into lawExecutive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the “Family Code,”whichtookeffectonAugust3,1988.Article26thereofstates:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordancewiththe laws in force inthecountrywheretheyweresolemnized,andvalid thereas such, shallalsobevalid in this country, exceptthoseprohibitedunderArticles35,37,and38.

OnJuly17,1987,shortlyafterthesigningoftheoriginalFamilyCode, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,

amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A secondparagraphwasaddedtoArticle26.Assoamended,itnowprovides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines inaccordancewith the laws in force in the countrywhere theyweresolemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in thiscountry, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and(6),36,37and38.

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59 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the

Civil Code of the Philippines,Vol.I,1990ed.,p.263.60G.R.No.138322,October2,2001,366SCRA437.61Id.,atp.447.62Supranote58.

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Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner isvalidly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtainedabroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, theFilipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippinelaw.(Emphasissupplied)

xxxx

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberationsshowed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according toJudge Alicia SempioDiy, a member of the Civil Code RevisionCommittee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipinospouseremainsmarried to thealienspousewho,afterobtainingadivorce,isnolongermarriedtotheFilipinospouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its originto the 1985 case ofVan Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.TheVan Dorncase involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and aforeigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decreevalidly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in thePhilippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse iscapacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

63 (Emphasis

added)

Assuch,theVan Dorncaseissufficientbasisinresolvinga

situationwhereadivorceisvalidlyobtainedabroadbythealienspouse.With theenactmentof theFamilyCodeandparagraph2,Article26thereof,ourlawmakerscodifiedthelawalreadyestablishedthroughjudicialprecedent.

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated byrendering its continuance intolerable to one of thepartiesandproductiveofnopossiblegoodtothecommunity,reliefin some way should be obtainable.

64 Marriage, being a

mutual and shared commitment between two parties,cannot possibly be productive of any good to the societywhere one is considered released from the marital bondwhile the other remains bound to it. Such is the state ofaffairswherethealienspouse

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63Id.,atpp.119121.64Goitia v. Campos Rueda,35Phil.252,254255(1916).

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obtainsavaliddivorceabroadagainsttheFilipinospouse,asinthiscase.

PetitionersciteArticles1565and17

66oftheCivilCodein

statingthatthedivorceisvoidunderPhilippinelawinsofarasFilipinosareconcerned.However,inlightofthisCourt’srulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouseshould not be discriminated against in his own country ifthe ends of justice are to be served.

67 In Alonzo v.

Intermediate Appellate Court,68theCourtstated:

“Butashasalso beenaptly observed,we test a lawby its results;andlikewise,wemayadd,byitspurposes.Itisacardinalrulethat,in seeking themeaning of the law, the first concern of the judgeshould be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.Unquestionably,thelawshouldneverbeinterpretedinsuchawayastocauseinjusticeasthisisneverwithinthelegislativeintent.Anindispensablepartof that intent, in fact, forwepresumethegoodmotivesofthelegislature,istorender justice.

Thus,weinterpretandapplythelawnotindependentlyofbutinconsonancewith justice. Law and justice are inseparable, andwemust keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while

generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particularcase because of its peculiar circumstances. In sucha situation,wearenotbound,becauseonlyofournatureand functions, toapplythemjustthesame,inslavishobediencetotheirlanguage.Whatwedo instead is find a balance between the word and the will, thatjusticemaybedoneevenasthelawisobeyed.

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65 ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the

status,conditionandlegalcapacityofpersonsarebindinguponcitizens

ofthePhilippines,eventhoughlivingabroad.66ART. 17. x x xProhibitive laws concerningpersons, their acts or

property, and those which have for their object public order, public

policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or

judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed

uponinaforeigncountry.67Supranote14atp.144.68G.R.No.L72873,May28,1987,150SCRA259.

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As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must notunfeelinglyapplythelawasitisworded,yieldinglikerobotstotheliteral command without regard to its cause and consequence.“Courtsareapttoerrbystickingtoocloselytothewordsofalaw,”so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, “where these wordsimportapolicythatgoesbeyondthem.”

xxxxMorethantwentycenturiesago,Justiniandefinedjustice“asthe

constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due.” ThatwishcontinuestomotivatethisCourtwhenitassessesthefactsandthelawineverycasebroughttoitfordecision.Justiceisalwaysanessential ingredientof itsdecisions.Thuswhenthefactswarrants,we interpret the law in away thatwill render justice, presumingthat itwas the intention of the lawmaker, to beginwith, that thelawbedispensedwithjustice.”

69

Applyingtheabovedoctrineintheinstantcase,thedivorcedecree allegedly obtained byMerry Lee which absolutelyallowedFelicisimotoremarry,wouldhavevestedFelicidadwith the legal personality to file the present petition as

Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records showthatthereisinsufficientevidencetoprovethevalidityofthedivorce obtainedbyMerryLeeaswell as themarriage ofrespondentandFelicisimounderthelawsoftheU.S.A.InGarcia v. Recio,

70theCourtlaiddownthespecificguidelines

forpleadingandprovingforeignlawanddivorcejudgments.It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree isinsufficient and that proof of its authenticity and dueexecutionmustbepresented.UnderSections24and25ofRule132,awritingordocumentmaybeprovenasapublicorofficialrecordofaforeigncountrybyeither(1)anofficialpublication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officerhaving legal custody of thedocument. If the record isnotkeptinthePhilippines,suchcopymustbe(a)accompaniedbyacertificateissuedbytheproperdiplomaticorconsularofficerinthePhil

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69Id.,atpp.264265,268.70Supranote60.

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ippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country inwhichtherecordiskeptand(b)authenticatedbythesealofhisoffice.

71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimoallegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submittedphotocopies of theMarriageCertificateand theannotatedtext

72oftheFamilyLawActofCaliforniawhichpurportedly

showthattheirmarriagewasdoneinaccordancewiththesaid law. As stated inGarcia, however, the Court cannottakejudicialnoticeofforeignlawsastheymustbeallegedandproved.

73

Therefore,thiscaseshouldberemandedtothetrialcourtfor further reception of evidence on the divorce decreeobtainedbyMerryLeeandthemarriageofrespondentandFelicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated tomarry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that thelatterhasthelegalpersonalitytofilethesubjectpetitionfor

letters of administration, as she may be considered thecoowner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that wereacquired through their joint efforts during theircohabitation.

Section 6,74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that

letters of administrationmay be granted to the survivingspouseofthedecedent.However,Section2,Rule79thereofalsoprovidesinpart:

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71Id.,atpp.448449.72Records,pp.118124.73Supranote60atp.451.74SEC.6.When and to whom letters of administration granted.—Ifx

xxapersondiesintestate,administrationshallbegranted:

(a)Tothesurvivinghusbandorwife,asthecasemaybe,ornextof

kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such

survivinghusbandorwife,ornextofkin,requeststohaveappointed,if

competentandwillingtoserve;xxx.

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“SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.—Apetitionforlettersofadministrationmustbefiledbyaninterestedpersonandmustshow,asfarasknowntothepetitioner:xxx.”

An“interestedperson”hasbeendefinedasonewhowouldbebenefitedbytheestate,suchasanheir,oronewhohasaclaim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interestmust be material and direct, and not merely indirect orcontingent.

75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as aninterestedpersonwhohasadirectinterestintheestateofFelicisimoby virtue of their cohabitation, the existence ofwhich was not denied by petitioners. If she proves thevalidityofthedivorceandFelicisimo’scapacitytoremarry,but fails toprove thathermarriagewithhimwasvalidlyperformed under the laws of theU.S.A., then shemay beconsidered as a coowner under Article 144

76 of the Civil

Code.Thisprovisiongovernsthepropertyrelationsbetweenpartieswholivetogetherashusbandandwifewithoutthe

benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from thebeginning.Itprovidesthatthepropertyacquiredbyeitheror both of them through their work or industry or theirwages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In a coownership, it is not necessary that thepropertybeacquired through their joint labor, effortsandindustry.Anypropertyacquiredduringtheunionisprimafacie presumed to have been obtained through their jointefforts.Hence,theportionsbelongingto

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75Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116Phil.1193,1195;6SCRA874,876877

(1962).76 Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full: When a man and a

womanlivetogetherashusbandandwife,buttheyarenotmarried,or

their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by

either or both of them through theirwork or industry or theirwages

andsalariesshallbegovernedbytherulesoncoownership.

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thecoownersshallbepresumedequal,unlessthecontraryisproven.

77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity ofboththedivorceandthemarriage,theapplicableprovisionwouldbeArticle148oftheFamilyCodewhichhasfilledthehiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expresslyregulatingthepropertyrelationsofcoupleslivingtogetheras husband andwife but are incapacitated tomarry.

78 In

Saguid v. Court of Appeals,79 we held that even if the

cohabitationor theacquisitionofproperty occurredbeforethe Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.

80 The

Courtdescribedthepropertyregimeunderthisprovisionasfollows:

“The regime of limited coownership of property governing theunion of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry eachother, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,appliestopropertiesacquiredduringsaidcohabitationinproportiontotheirrespectivecontributions.Coownershipwillonlybeuptotheextent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or

industry.Absentproofoftheextentthereof,theircontributionsandcorrespondingsharesshallbepresumedtobeequal.

xxxxIn the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,

which involvedthe issueof coownershipofpropertiesacquiredbythepartiestoabigamousmarriageandanadulterousrelationship,respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in theacquisitionofthepropertyisessential.xxx

As inothercivilcases, theburdenofproofrestsuponthepartywho, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved bycompetentevidenceandreliancemustbehadonthestrengthoftheparty’sown

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77Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297; 260

SCRA221,228(1996).78Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation,G.R.

No.151967,February16,2005,451SCRA494,506.79G.R.No.150611,June10,2003,403SCRA678.80Id.,atp.686.

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evidenceandnotupontheweaknessoftheopponent’sdefense.xxx”

81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legalcapacity to file the subject petition for letters ofadministrationmayarisefromherstatusasthesurvivingwifeofFelicisimoorashiscoownerunderArticle144oftheCivilCodeorArticle148oftheFamilyCode.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIED.TheDecisionofthe Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming theFebruary28,1994OrderoftheRegionalTrialCourtwhichdenied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24,1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion forreconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case beREMANDEDtothetrialcourtforfurtherproceedings.

SOORDERED.

AustriaMartinez, Callejo, Sr. and ChicoNazario,JJ.,concur.

Petition denied, case remanded to trial court for furtherproceedings.

Notes.—Under the property regime of coownership,properties acquired by both parties during their union intheabsenceofproof to thecontraryarepresumedtohavebeen obtained through the joint efforts of the parties andwill be owned by them in equal shares. (Gonzales vs.Gonzales,478SCRA327[2005])

Under the Family Code, if the properties are acquiredduring the marriage, the presumption is that they areconjugal. (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 427 SCRA 439[2004])

——o0o——

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81Id.,atpp.679,686687.

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