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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: -

(FBI New York Field Office Language Specialist) Interview

Type of event: Interview

Date: September 3, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Lance Cole

Team Number: 6

Location: FBI Washington Field Office

Participants -'Non-Commission: FBI Assistant General Counsel Randy Blair

Participants - Commission: Lance Cole and Mike Jacobson

Backgroundl iis a Supervisory Language Specialist

("SLS") in the FBI's New York Field Office ("NYFO"). He was born in 1957 in Tehran, .

Iran. He came to the United States in 1979 on a student visa to attend graduate school at •

St. Louis UniverSity. He earned a Masters of Business Administration degree from St.

Louis University and then worked part-time for the University in its computer

department. He obtained his "green card" in 1984 and became the director of a non-

profit burial insurance 'Company in St. Louis. In 1991 he joined the FBI as a language

specialist ("LS"). He learned of the opportunity for employment with the FBI when he

attended a career fair in h6pes of finding a position as a computer analyst and was

recruited by an FBI agent. He had a choice of going to Washington, D.C. or New York,

and he chose New York.

FBI Work Experience.) 'did not receive any language training when he

joined the FBI. In addition to English, he speaks Farsi, Kurdish, Aramaic, some French,

and a little Hebrew. Most of the assignments he received were for Farsi translations.

Prior to the 9/11 attacks there were two Farsi LSs in the New York office. They "worked

a lot of lines" and "never caught up" — they always had a backlog. About 90% of their

time was spent on foreign counterintelligence ("FCI") work, with a few criminal [Title • III] assignments. The FISA FCI work they did was foi I)ersonnel.

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After the 9/11 attacks) 'worked as an interpreter for interviews of detainees

from Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern countries. Although the language was not \ \ exactly the same, he was able to manage in the interviews. Since the 9/11 attacks he has

• •worked Onmore criminal cases, such as interviewing Middle Eastern people held on drug

\ Charges tolearn if they have any terrorist connections. They are picking up more people

With possibleCT ties for minor-criminal violations. The FBI was not involved in these

kii4kof cases pre,9/11. Things likessomeone videotaping a facility wouldn't have raised

suspicions pre 9/11.'',.TheFBI is looking at,people in new ways. Most of the questions

asked. in ..these interviews were pre-determined.s - rlis not aware that any of the post-

9/11 detainee interviews Or.thestriminal cases involving Middle Eastern persons has led

to any teiTorism charges or cases.

Siiperiisory Responsibilitiesf—lbecame a supervisor about two months

ago. He supervises the Spanish, Faisi, and French linguists. There are 27 Spanish LSs,

of which 14 are permanent employees and 13 are contract employees. There are seven

tarsi LSs, one . of whom is permanent and the other six are contract employees. There are

seven French Las, four or whom are permanent and three of whom are contract

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Working Relationships Between Agents and LSS:I Thad a good

experience working wit.1 the squad supervisor on thel 'Supervisory Special

Agen 1 I 'prior t6 promotion to a supervisOry position. The LSs

were included in squad meetings and their input was sought by the c ase agents. Before

SSAntook over the squad there was much less contact between agents and LSs.

!said he hopes that in the future other agents will move away frOm the "aura of

superiority" that some agents diSplay when dealing with LSs and will be willing to work

more closely with LSs on investigations.

Workload and Resources.] 'does not think there is necessarily a shortage

of LSs. He thinks the problem is more a lack of clerical support. Too mu6h of the LSs'

time is spent on typing up translations and other clerical work. The bulk orthe LSs' time

is spent on clerical work. It would be more efficient for the LSs to dictate their reports

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and have someone else type them up. That would free up LS,resourceS and cut down on

the backlog of work.

The Farsi group does not have a backlog, but overall

oup does have a

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work. The SLSs report monthly statistics on counterterroriSrnr("CT"),Work to the

Language Services Division at FBI headquarters; all other work is.fej3orted on a quarterly

basis.

I 'believes that the FBI's hiring practices. for LSs eould be improved.

Traditionally, the FBI has sought to hire native speakers to serve as LSs. 'thinks

it would be preferable to focus/ an whether,People'have the 134.sic i linguistic ability that is

required and have an interest in the work, rather than whether or not they are native

speakers. In' View the firS1/2riority is whether the LS has the "core language

skills" and the next priority is whether they "are interested in intelligence work." They

must follow current events,,,iiolitical deVelopments, etc. in the country they are working —

in other words, they must - be "into it7in order to do a good job as an LS. The third

priority, in tii*, is whether or not the LS' has linguistic ability — for example, a

• background and education in linguistics. That means itis not a good idea to "hire

housewives" as LSS just because they are nativefspeak,ers.

thinks that Using more contractlinguiSts has been "a good business

decision" by the FBI because the agency is not committed to permanently employee

those people. I 'believes the problem/facingThe agency is that it has hired LSs in

other offices, away from New York, where the cost of living is lower, which makes the

positions more attractive than in New YOrk where the cost of living is higher. Those

offices are also less busy than New York, so the LSs there have less to do. This is more

of a post-9/11 phenomenon. J thinks it/is a mistake to send the translation work of

the NYFO out to other field offices just becaUse they have excess LS capacity. For

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1 9/11 Classified Information believes the FBI should "bring the people

here" to New York to do the work. It is important that the LSs have face-to-face contact

with the case agents and understand the nature of the case they are working. That doesn't • 3

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happen when work is sent out to other ,offices. would not be in faVor of LSs

working at home, for the same - reasons.

Chas worked mostly with agents and some with analysts, but mostly with

agents. He believes that it is important to have interaction between the"LSs and the case

agents.

A database of old surveillance "cuts" is maintained by the "Spider Net" system

that is now in use in the NYRO. In the old "Double Dagger" system that was in use

before the Spider Net system was implemented, it was possible to' do key word searches

in the database. 9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive t now is necessary to

obtain legal department approval before retrieving an old cut (by date). I Jis not

sure why this new rule has been put in place, but he knows it Creates problems for the

case agents.

With regard to the "TEC Cuts" they are considered/the property of the operational

squad. When the LSs type up a summary, one copy goes/to the ELSUR unit, one to the

case agent, and they keep one copy. The analysts are all6wed to go look at the case

agents' files. The new policy is that the LSs can only hold onto their copy for 60 days.

Working Conditions for NYRO LSs. E-mail access is a "big problem" for the

LSs in the NYRO. There are not enough terminals t'o go around, so the LSs do not have

access to their FBI e-mail accounts. Management ''`on the MIS side" has not been

responsive to the need to address this problem. 9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

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These

problems have caused LSs at the Washington Meld Office to leave the FBI to work for

the NSA. They also make more money at the NSA, which also makes it hard for the FBI

to retain them.

The working conditions for the LSD in the NYRO are not good. They are

overcrowded because since the 9/11 attacks the squad has doubled in size but it still

occupies the same floor space. I believes the LS squad in the NYRO badly needs

better facilities and more clerical support.

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