TOP SEC-RE-T t/IF—qa t i/lj • Event: Charlie Allen

Type of Event: Interview

Date: September 22, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Gordon Lederman

Team Number: 2

Location: George Bush Center for Intelligence

Participants — non-Commission: Charlie Allen, Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency [CIA])

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Office of Congressional

Participants — Commission: Lloyd Salvetti, Col. Lorry Fenner, Christine Healey, Gordon Lederman

(U) BACKGROUND

M He has worked at the CIA for over four decades, including as the National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism (NIO/T) under Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Casey, as National Intelligence Officer for Warning (NIO/W), and since June 2, 1998 as Assistant DCI for Collection (ADCl/C). As ADCl/C, he is responsible for developing cross-collection strategies.

(U) During the interview, Mr. Allen objected to limitations that the CIA placed on the content of this interview. He stated that the CIA was preventing him from talking in this interview about certain aspects of foreign-intelligence collection.

(U) THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (IC) AFTER THE COLD WAR

(FS Larry Kindsvater has documents showing the cut 01 ((including military billets) from the IC. The Directorate of Science & Technology was eviscerated in the 1990s -I [Very stringent FYDP personnel levels were set by the Office of Management and Budget: There were $25,000 incentive's for people to leave the IC. Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Woolsey fought to preserve the IC, but he had no access and no success and sOthe resigned. Snakes are harder to keep track of, yet the IC was depleted. DCI Deutch did 'not resist the cuts. The Future Imagery Architecture program was a financial calamity,'but CIA bought into it. The 1990s was a "dismal" time for the IC.

(S) As to whether there is an imbalance in technical versus HUMINT collection, the balance is not skewed, rather resources were lacking. The shrinkage of the CIA

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Directorate of Operations (DO) was a mistake. There has been an unbelievable shrinkage of attaches.

(U) WARNING

(R) Andrea Lugao was the last NIO/T. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) wanted to tighten the NIC's portfolios. Accordingly, DO Judge Webster and Deputy DCI (DDCI) Dick Kerr concurred with dropping the NIO for Counternarcotics and the NIO/T. Eliminating the position of NIO/T was a "fundamental mistake." Centers such as the DCI's Counterterrorist Center (CTC) inevitably become CIA-centric and do not focus on strategic assessments, instead focusing on operational matters. CTC was supposed to do strategic warning but failed to do so. Someone in the NIC needs to ensure that National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are done. The CIA Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) oversaw CTC, but analysis is not the DDO's forte.

($1 When he was NIO/WI 9/11 Classified Information I The analysts at CTC were junior and inexperienced. CTC did not get detailees from other agencies. CTC grew ti land CTC spent most of its time on liaison briefings.

(S) When DCI Gates formed a working group on warning, Charlie Allen wanted to be a member but was not allowed to be. The report was the best report on warning ever written. There were arguments at the National Foreign Intelligence Board about who should do warning: The Deputy Director of Intelligence argued that regional analysts should do warning, while DCI Gates responded that recognizing "abrupt discontinuity" is not the/strength analysts (regional analysts think too regionally and linearly, yet there is abruptldiscontinuity). There was a report done by the NIC a year later concerning implethentation of the Gates report.

(8) DCI Woolsey was not interested in warning. The Gates report's recommendations just "drifted off." There is a warning staff) I Former DDCI Gen. Gordon said that, in the two years he served as DDCI, nothing from the NIO/W's office changed his opinion of an issue — as a result, Mr. Allen believed that the IC was not being well-Served by the NIO/W's office.

( After the East African embassy bombings, one lesson for CTC was to have a very strong warning cell to study terrorism, but the cell did not develop. What did develop was a strong Community Counterterrorism Board t release warnings affiliated with the IICT, which Mr. Allen founded in 1995. The head, is retiring. The IICT is a mechanism for releasing and disseminating warnings.

(Si) Concerning the immediate period after 1993, the National Security Council staffer Dick Clarke at that time was not critical of CTC. Later, Clarke :became critical of CTC's warning function.

(g) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) put out a warning: brief regarding the Khobar Towers attack beforehand which showed the vulnerabilities, but CTC never followed-up.

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r■ a-1 (U) With respect to his authority to reallocate, reallocation is really "done by negotiation." He once ordered someone to "eat" the cost of hosting a satellite program. He is very tired of iron colonels and majors telling him what to do. He is able to negotiate with DoD. He meets every Friday with Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Cambone. Most people in CIA have no idea how to deal with DoD — but he does. The dollars do not belong to DoD. He does not really need more authority — he gave the example of deciding on space-based radar.

(S)' In 1998, the DCI asked him to form a community management task force, which issued a report in Spring 1999 (on issues more than counterterrorism), and there was a working group formed afterward to monitor implementation. There were current, mid-term, and long-term problems.

(U) COLLECTION

06 Al Qa'ida had a very good vetting process. KSM was working on anthrax, but some top people in al Qa'ida did not even know it. Al Qa'ida operations are done in a very cellular structure.

(1)4 I If we had better HiDINT_ could we have prevented 911 9 1,

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(Si He He opposed the decision of the National Security Agency (NSA) decision to close certain(Sites. 'MINT was tightly wound with HUMINT.

(1) Lessons-learned 'ere not done in a single document after the East African embassy bombings. Collection obviously needed to be improved after those bombings. We needed to do better against al Qa'ida.

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() There is a much better loop between analysts and collection due to the hard targets boatd, which Tenet as DDCI ran, but the feedback loop can be improved.

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(U) FOREIGN LIAISON

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(U) THE DCI'S DECLARATION OF WAR MEMORANDUM

(S15 Mr. Allen held some meetings' after the memorandum was issued. The memorandum stated that no resources should be spared. Mr. Allen's job, then, was to do synergy and guidance. There were bud et constraints — the IC was pressed hard for funds. Speaker Gingrich supported th supplemental.

(U) OPEN SOURCE

(SI) CIA has done a grave disservice on open source intelligence (OSINT). Mr. Allen fought all of the budget cuts against OSINT. OSINT forms the tapestry for background. FBIS was "shredded," and the ADCl/Analysis & Production Mark Lowenthal agrees.

(U) ACCOUNTABILITY

(S4 The fault of 911 is everywhere — Presidents, CIA, Congress (which cut from IC budgets since 1993). CIA did not do HUMINT well enough.,--Analysis was insufficient; there needs to be significantly expanded analysis — the - DCI lost' people. ,,CIA and FBI failed to share data. He knows the FBI„well — the -FBI is not configured for counterterrorism. We also lacked a unified-liOmeland'defense.

(4-1 If the IC had received additions money, he,w6uld have set up additional collection platforms) Also,, he Would have hired more linguists — NSA is short of linguists, and there is only bne go'04 Ilinguist. But more resources is not a panacea.

(U) MANAGEMENT

(%) There are now missionnianagers 9/11 Classified Information to look broadly at all the capabilities regarding how well-

postured we are, 'The mission managers advise the DC1 and can advocate and provide

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• guidance. However, the mission managers do not have authority. Counterterrorism has received extra money from supplementals.

(S-' We need more analysts and more interaction between agencies. He is working on a project to improve connectivity between DoD and the IC, and DHS needs to be added to it. Indeed, we have not thought through how to integrate DHS. He has sent someone to TTIC to work collection issues.

(U) SUGGESTIONS FOR THE COMMISSION'S FOCUS

(S) He suggested that we look at warning and the NIC's role on warning and terrorist analysis. We should press Amb. Hutchings (Chairman of the NIC) on this issue. Mr. Allen has a real problem with how warning is currently being done.

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