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25 Popular Socialist Democracy of the RDTL 1 1975-1978

Antero Benedito da Silva

Introduction

It is difficult now to imagine that the writings and ideas of Karl Marx, V. Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, Paulo Freire and Amilcar Cabral could have traveled so far to be experimented with by serious young politicians and intellectuals in the tiny and remote half island and former Portuguese colony of Timor-Leste in 1974-1978. At the peak of Indonesian invasion, these young politicians, intellectuals and their leading political movement, FRETILIN (The National Liberation Front of Timor-Leste) proclaimed the Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste (RDTL) unilaterally on 28 November 1975, and for the following three years a revolutionary government was in operation in the still liberated resistance bases. They were determined to defend this extraordinary experiment with high sensitivity to the local context until last bullets hit their bodies. Their deaths further inspired thousands Timorese to resist the occupation of their homeland in order to regain the freedom and dignity of the whole Timorese people.

One can find brief discussion of the RDTL I in the writings of Gusmao (1999), Cabral (2002), CAVR (2002) and Mattoso (2007). Jose Mattoso (2007, 63) particularly characterized the first RDTL as a ‘people’s dictatorship’ state. However, we, and even Timorese politicians, academics and young generation, have not made use of what I would call a popular Socialist State Experiment as an academic and state building reference. The Chega Report (2002) of the Truth, Reconciliation Reception Commission known (CAVR) had also made the mistake of framing the analysis of resistance structures within FRETILIN alone. The CAVR had therefore fundamentally neglected the existence of the Republic Democratic of Timor-Leste as an alternative state experiment. This study aims to correct such narrow analysis by differentiating between the structure of FRETILIN as a political party or a national liberation movement, and the RDTL 1 state structure.

This study is limited to discussing the nature of the RDTL I state from 1975-1978, its structure down to the grass root level, to understand how popular socialism was experimented with and how people participated in state affairs. This article might be a new beginning to break this silence over such extraordinary political experiment of the first generation of the RDTL and Timorese intellectuals and politicians. This study has come about through a systematic investigation drawing on interviews, and other primary and secondary sources. As a young member of Organizacao Popular da Juventude Timor (OPJT) of RDTL until the destruction of the resistance bases, my direct experience and childhood memories are an integral part of this analysis. Theoretical foundation of RDTL 1 Beyond Russian and Chinese state models, the RDTL I developed its own state model and democracy, a popular socialist democratic state. This is similar to a model that the Chinese and Cubans are attempting to develop in the recent decades, an anti-thesis to the ‘top down’ market and state Socialism.

On November 29, 1975 the Central Committee of FRETILIN adopted RDTL first Constitution. Article 6 of the Constitution states:

The Republic Democratic of Timor-Leste is a sovereign nation unitary, anti-colonialism, anti-neocolonialism, and anti-imperialism born out of a strong popular resistance generated from the struggle against the Portuguese colonialism and the imperialism, under a just guidance of the sole and legitimate vanguard of the Maubere People, the Revolutionary Front of the Timor-Leste Independent-FRETILIN (RDTL 1976, 33 - author’s translation).

In the former USSR, the communist Party of Russia was the vanguard of the proletariat and the proletariat

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became a fundamental part of the state apparatus. The use of the Lenin’s concept of the ‘Vanguard Party’ appears to be employed in the Article of RDTL I Constitution. In the resistance bases, FRETILIN political education classes assumed that the fascist state, which referred to Salazar Regime and the Suharto regime of Indonesia, had to be opposed, destroyed and replaced with a new type of state, a proletarian state that was truly democratic. The RDTL I also used concepts such as anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, which made clear reference to Lenin’s ideas. The anti-colonial and anti-imperialism ideas are also exposed in the text of the Unilateral Proclamation of Independence, the RDTL Constitution and are also seen in the RDTL national anthem: “Patria, Patria-Homeland, Homeland.” Some of the lyrics of the anthem say:

Vanquish colonialism, Down imperialism! A country free, A people free! No, no, no to exploitation (Jill Jolliffe 1976, 47).

However, a proletarian class was not a significant segment in Timor-Leste society in the 1970s, rather, Timorese society was substantially a subsistence agrarian society. Here comes the second assumption of the nature of the state: instead of a proletariat, the RDTL I was therefore going to be a popular agrarian based state. This was articulated along the lines of Maoism (Julio Fatima, Interview 08/04/ 2010; FRETILIN 1974, 28). Thisarticulation isfurther expressed in the RDTL I Constitution Article 6, which says:

Since Timor-Leste is a peasants state, the basis of the economy of the Republic Democratic of Timor-Leste is agriculture. The attention of the Government of the Republic Democratic of Timor-Leste is to ensure especially the policy of agrarian development, considering, however, the industry as a decisive factor of development (RDTL 1976, 33 - author’s translation).

We have just discussed about the nature of the popular socialist state, which was modeled on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Peoples Republic of China, all of which Adriano Sella named the ‘real socialist’ state (Sella 2002, 96). The Structure and Experiment of Democracy This section outlines the structure and system of democracy of RDTL I which was developed beyond the influence of democratic centralism towards a distinctive combination of democratic centralism and of a popular and participatory democracy. The Political Manifesto of FRETILIN outlined among other political objectives of the Maubere Revolution to goal of totally eradicating and transforming the old colonialist structure, and implementing a new one truly in the service of the people of Timor-Leste (FRETILIN 1974, 25). It is from this perspective that I analyze the structure of RDTL I. The State Structure and Governance On 29 November 1975, FRETILIN adopted the RDTL I Constitution, which has VI Chapters. Chapter III of the Constitution describes the three important organs of the state consist of: first, the Popular Assembly, as the Supreme organ of the state and is the legislative body of the state with its members consisted of the Central Committee of FRETILIN; The Ministers and the Vice Ministers of the Republic; The Regional administrators; The representatives of the Military Units and two representatives of the sub-regional committee. The Constitution (Article 38) states that the President of the Republic would preside over the Popular Assembly at least once a year. The second most important organ of the state is the Council of Ministers presided by a Prime Minister (Article 40) with an executive mandate and under the orientation of the Central Committee and the Executive Committee of FRETILIN. The third important organ is the President of the Republic, who serves as the Head of the State and the symbol of the National Unity.

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Among other mandates, the President of the Republic is to appoint the Prime Minister and the President of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (RDTL 1976, 37-40).

In the days following the adoption of the RDTL I Constitution on 29 November 1975, and in accordance with the Constitution, FRETILIN formed the RDTL cabinet of eleven Ministers and seven Vice Ministers (Jolliffe 1978, 219). The complete list of the Cabinet as follows: Franscisco Xavier do Amaral as President of the Republic; Nicolau dos Reis Lobato (Prime Minister); Mari Alkatiri (Minister of State for Political Affairs); Abilio de Araujo (Minister for Economic and Social Affairs); Jose Goncalves/HelioPina (State Secretaries for Economic Coordination and Statistics); Rogerio Lobato/Guido Soares and Hermenigildo Alves (Defense Ministers); Jose Ramos Horta/Guilhermina dos Santos de Araujo (Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Information); Hamis Basarewan (Minister of Education and Culture); Juvenal Inacio (Ministry of Finance); Vicenti Sahe Reis /Guido Valadares (Ministry of Labor and Welfare); Eduardo Carlos dos Anjos (Communication and Transport) (Jolliffe, 1978, p.219).For nearly three years behind the army lines, FRETILIN experimented an alternative Government aiming not just to liberate the country from the occupation, but also to liberate the people in the long term through the particular formation of the state. The Article 46 of the RDTL Constitution states the RDTL administrative would be organized into regions, sub-regions, villages, hamlets and even area. It follows then according to Gusmao (2002, p.42)the Soibada historic meeting May to June 1976, which I refer to as the Popular Assembly decided the hierarchy of ‘the political administration from aldeia, suco, zona, região, and sector’ (CAVR 2002, 4). The CAVR (2002, 5) CAVR (2002) Report identify following sectors.

Table 1 – FRETILIN regional structure from May 1976

Sectors Districts Commissar Ponta-Leste (Eastern End) Lautém and Viqueque Juvenal Inácio (Sera Key) Centro Leste (Central East) Baucau Vicente dos Reis (Sahe) Centro Norte (Central North) Manatuto, Aileu, and Dili João Bosco Soares Centro Sul (Central South) Manufahi and Ainaro Hamis Bassarewan (Hata) Fronteira Norte (Northern Frontier)

Ermera, Liquiça and some parts of Bobonaro

Hélio Pina (Maucruma)

Fronteira Sul (Southern Frontier)

Covalima and some parts of Bobonaro

César Lebre ( Mau Laka)

Source: CAVR 2002

The political commissar was the supreme leader in each sector with responsibility for both political and military matters, and that all political commissars were members of the FRETILIN Central Committee (CAVR 2002, 5). While acknowledging this administrative structure from aldeia up to regions only, and the separate sectors, as CAVR (2002, 5-6) did, the administrative structure of RDTL I is best analyzed as a totality to understand the practice of democratic governance of RDTL I in the resistance bases. Initially, under the Sectors there were four other levels of the administrative structure: Region, Zone, suco (Village) and Aldeia (CAVR 2002, 5-6). Instead of eliminating and transforming the old Salazar fascist state structure, the new RDTL structure admitted the ‘suco’ level, which was inherited from fascist state. This new RDTL structure which had five levels, not including the Council of Ministers, was still too elongated (Interview Daniel Guterres 08/07/2009). We will now compare the Salazar fascist administrative structure with the Soibada formulated structure, which has appeared as the only structure in the CAVR report:

The Republic of Portugal RDTL Provincia Ultramarino Sector Conselho Region Posto Zone Sucos Suco

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Povoacao Aldeia

As the comparison indicates clearly that the structure is exactly the same length, and both have suco in it. This new administrative structure then appears to be the copy carbon of the Portuguese colonial administration system, and therefore there was no change at all as the Political Manifesto of FRETILIN claimed. In fact, according to Daniel Guterres (Interview 08/07/2009) people continued to hold on to their Portuguese inherited suco and it was difficult to mobilize them. In August 1977, the Central Committee of FRETILIN meeting then formulated a new structure. Suco was eliminated to make the structure leaner, less bureaucratic and more popular. This had also resulted in some cases the breaking down of the Posto (sub-district) of the colonial government. Ossu Sub-district under fascist administration, for example, had now broken down into two zones: Posteira Weste (Liaruka) and Posteira Leste (Boilo);and Venilale had two zones in Liz Weste and Liz Leste. The Commissariat (Commissariado) was to become both the centre for administration and politics. There was one Commissar and a few secretaries in each Commissariado. Based on previous studies provided by Estevao Cabral (2002, 243-246) and CAVR (2002, 5-6), and discussions with two former FRETILIN political cadres (mainly Daniel Guterres and Adelino de Jesus, a former political assistant in Centre South Sector), we can conclude that the RDTL I from 1977-1978 was as follows:

RDTL I1

State Structure (1977-1978)

POPULAR ASSEMBLY FRETILIN PR

PM

CCF (DOPI)

Minister of Defense Council of Ministers ODM2 (FALINTIL) Sector/Regions Sector Command (COMSEC) Zones (Comite da Zona) Regional Command Aldeia (CDR)3

There was a change in the structural position after the detention of President Franscisco Xavier do Amaral in September 1977. Vicente dos Reis became National Commissar replacing Antonio Carvarinho who by then elected to become Prime Minister of the Republic. In the Central South Sector, Guilherme dos Santos known as ‘Lere’ took the post of Hamis Bassarewan ‘Hata’as Commissar and Hata remained Minister of Education and Culture (Adelino de Jesus, Interview 26/03/2011). According to CAVR the Political commissars worked with assistant commissars. Assistant commissars were each responsible for organizing specific tasks such as healthagriculture, education, the women’s organization and political propaganda. The secretariat of the administrators was called the Commissariat. Sectors were divided into smaller administrative units (CAVR 2002, 5). The centre of each sector was to be called Commissariat Politic of the Sector (CPS) and each of the these sector were headed by one Political Commissar, one sector commander known as (COMSEC) and or few secretaries, and they were all members of the Central Committee of FRETILIN (Mattoso 2005, 63; see also Cabral 2002, 243; Gusmao 2000, 42). The Political and Military Structure were created alongside at all levels (CAVR 2002, 243) with the exception of the Village Level (Aldeia), which had no military structure. Internal security was more in the hands of popular security and guerrilla units.

1 The President of the Republic (PR); The Prime Minister (PM); the Central Committee of FRETILIN (CCF); Department of Political and Ideological Orientation (DOPI). 2Organizacao das Massas (ODM) consisting of Organzacao Popular da Mulher Timor (OPMT); Organizacao Popular da Juventude Timor (OPJT); Organizacao Popular de Trabalhador Timor; Organizacao Popular da Seguranca (OPS); But the latter is more seen as part of FALINTIL. 3Conselho Democratico Revolucionario (CDR).

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In 1981, Ma’hodu Ran Kadalak provided some details of the civilian and military leadership of each Sector as seen in figure:

Table 2 – List of RDTL Leadership in Sector 1978

No Sector Name Positions 01 South Border CezarLebre ‘Mau Laca’ Commissar 02 Paulo Rodrigues Secretary 03 Feliciano Fatima CCF 04 To Barbosa CCF 05 Antonio Padua CCF 06 Joaquim do Nascimento ‘GariBuhana’ CCF 07 North Border HelioPina ‘Mau Kruma’ Commissar 08 FilomenoPaixao ComSec 09 Antonio Carvalho ‘FeraLafaek’ 10 Ali Alkatiri 11 RuiFernandes 12 Centre North AlaricoFernandes Minister 13 Joao Bosco Commissar 14 Mantalvao “Lais” Secretary 15 AfonsoRedentor Secretary 16 Antonio Pinheiro Secretary 17 Centre South Nicolau dos Reis Lobato President of RDTL 18 DomingosRoibeiro “Bere Manu Koko” Chief of Staff 19 SebastiaoSarmento Shock Brigade 20 Guido Soares Sock Brigade 21 HamisBassarewan ‘Hatta” Minister of Education 22 Guilhermi dos Santos ‘Lere’ Commissar 23 Valente Soares ‘Mau Luli’ ComSec 24 Eduardo dos Anjos ‘Kakuk’ CCF 25 NatalinoLeitao ‘Samoxo’ CCF 26 ManecasCruz ‘Secar’ CCF 27 Jose Maria ‘Mausiri’ OPJT 28 ArturNascimento CCF 29 Maria Jose ‘Soimali’ OPMT 30 Centre East Antonio Carvarinho ‘ Maulear’ Prime Minister 31 Vicente Reis ‘BiekySahe’ National Commissar

Possibly for security reasons, this list however does not include the Eastern Tip Sector which leaders were Juvinal Inacio Serakey (Commissar), Jose Manuel da Costa ‘Ma’Huno (Secretary), Juvinal Fonseca ‘Solan’ (Secretary), Jose Alexandre Gusmao ‘Xanana’ and Fernando do Nascimento ‘Txai’ (Secretary). There was a group of the leaders that, according to Ma’Hodu, had been involved in the promotion of the skylight operation, and had surrendered to the Indonesian forces namely Alarico Fernandes, Joao Bosco, Mantalvao, Afonso Redentor, and Antonio Pinheiro (Kadalak 1981). Julmira Sirana who was present in Aileu, recalled that Afonso Redentor, Mantalvao and Pinheiro were all executed by Indonesian forces (Julmira Sirana, Interview 21/10/2009). Others suspected to have joined the Skylight operation and had also surrendered to the occupying forces were Filomeno Paixao, Ali Alktiri, Rui Fernandes, To Barbosa, Feliciano Fatima and Paulo Rodrigues (Kadalak 1981). However, Rui Fernandes, Filomeno Paixao, Ali Alkatiri and Feliciano Fatima were active again in political underground activities opposing the Indonesian forces, and with the exception of Rui Fernandes, the rest are still alive in Dili. On 10 February 1979, the External Delegation of FRETILIN/RDTL created a new Cabinet of RDTL, and the list of the new Cabinet is seen in the Table

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Table 3 –

No Name Membership

Ministerial position

01 CCF President of the Republic 02 Antonio Carvarinho CCF Prime Minister 03 Ministry of State and Political Affairs 04 AbilioAraujo CCF Ministry of state for economic and Social Affairs 05 Rogerio Tiago Lobato CCF Ministry for National Defence 06 Ministry of Information and National Security 07 Mari Alkatiri Ministry for External Relation 08 Hamis Bassarewan CCF Ministry of Education and Culture 09 Antonio Carvarinho CFF Ministry of Justice 10 Vicenti Reis Sahe CCF Secretary of State for Labour, Health and Welfare 11 Juvenal Inacio CCF Secretary of State for Finance 12 Eduardo dos Anjos CCF Secretary of State for Transport and Communication 13 Helio Pina CCF Secretary of State for Agriculture, Forestry and

Fishery 14 Secretary of State for Public Works and Housing

Source: CIET Sydney, 10 February 1979 (CPDM-CIDAD TL6606)

The table shows that Jose Ramos Horta is no longer in the Ministerial post because he was at that time alleged to be a Central Intelligence of America (CIA) Agent (Ramos-Horta, 1996, p.157) but he remained a member of the Central Committee and assumed a new post as Roving Ambassador, and Director of Information and Public Relations. Alarico Fernandes was not included in the list of Ministerial post because he was already captured. Nicolau Lobato, the former Prime Minister who assumed the post President of the Republic in 1977 had been killed in 31 December 1978, and Former President Franscisco Xavier do Amaral had been captured by the occupying forces. In the External Delegation, Jose Luis Guterres had now assumed membership of the Central Committee of FRETILIN and as Coordinator for Diplomatic Font of FRETILIN and Representative of RDTL to Mozambique. Roque Rodrigues became FRETILIN Representative to the People’s Republic of Angola and Algeria. Guilhermina dos Santos remained a member of Central Committee of FRETILIN (CPDM-CIDAC TL.6606). By April 1979, nearly all the members of the CCF, which assumed the Ministerial posts inside the country had been either killed in battle or were executed after being captured.4 The only surviving members of the Central Committee and Sector Secretarias that were still active in the guerrilla zones were Xanana Gusmao, Ma’Huno, and Fernando Txai. All of them were Secretaries in the Matebian, the last resistance base. However, Txai was also later killed in a combat by the Indonesian forces in Laga in 1980 (Aurelio Freitas Ribeiro, Personal Com. 15/03/2011). The Practice of Popular Democracy

• The Popular Assembly Neither Xanana’s auto-biography edited by Sara Niner (2008), nor the CAVR (2002) Chega Report mentioned the termPopular Assembly, but throughout the three years resistance from December 1975-December 1978, FRETILIN leadership conducted at least four national meetings that would had been called popular Assembly: in Barique in April 1976, in Soibada May 1976 and Laline 1977 (Gusmao, 2000, p.41,42, 47) and, according Adelino de Jesus another meeting was held in October 1976, in place called Aidila-Oan, in Fatuberliu, Center South Sector (Adelino de Jesus, Interview 26/03/2011).

4 The surviving members of the Members of CCF were Jose Manuel da Costa ‘Ma’Huno’, Jose Alexandre Kay RalaXananaGusmao, and Fernando Teles do Nascimento ‘Txai’. But in 1980, Txai was also killed in a battle in Atelare, Laga in Baucau.

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The most fundamental thesis developed out of the Soibada Popular Assembly May-June 1976 was their affirmation of the Maubere Revolution: Guerra popular, Guerra prolongada e Guerra sustentada pelas proprias forcas- a people’s war, self-reliance, long and protracted war (Mattoso 2007, 63). Years later Gusmao called this decision “the true pillar of the liberation of homeland” (Mattoso 2007, 63; Gusmao 2000, 42). Soon after the Soibada meeting the Prime Minister, Nicolau Lobato delivered a speech transmitted via Radio Maubere on July 28, 1976.

Unity is the foundation of our revolution. We have to learn to indulge in criticism and self-criticism, in order to solve the problem that arises out of our contradictions. Open debate is another way to reconcile our differences. The Central Committee of FRETILIN is not authoritarian, and is open to any constructive criticism. The fighting goes on without vacillation. Victory is Certain (Denis Freney:CIET.MS.9535/3/9, Box 6).

The last Popular Assembly in the resistance baseswas held in Laline, May-June 1977, and it wasin this meeting that the Party adopted Marxist-Leninism as its political ideology, though FRETILIN never publicly pronounced such ideology. The delegates of the meeting composed of the members of the Central Committee, the Ministers, and the commanders of FALINTIL. FRETILIN from now on was Partido Marxista-Leninista-FRETILIN (PML-FRETILIN) until 1984.

• Council of Minister and Political Commissariat

After each Popular Assembly session, the rest of the decisions were made within the Political Commissariat in each region. Aside from having a Commissariat, there were Secretaries, Ministers, Sector Commanders and Vice Commanders, political Assistants and representatives from each zone. The zone officers were composed of one Secretary and Vice Zone Secretaries, and two military Officers. They were assisted by Delegate Commissars assigned from the Sector Commissariats. In the Zone 1975 of Bautae, the military officer was known Quilo Bravo (literally mean Brave Unit), with main tasks as liaison officer between civilian and military and as political educators within the companies of the FALINTIL. Most of the decisions later decided in meetings in the Political Commissariat in each region. These decisions could be particularly sensitive decision, which should be implemented accordingly. This was true, for example, for security related decisions (Interview, Madalena da Silva Fernandes 05/02/2010).

• Zone Committee

There were mechanisms used for decision-making in Zone level. The Zone Committee consisted of two Bureaus: Political Bureau and Zone Commander, usually from one military company commander of the zone. The Political Bureau was composed of an Information Section, a Popular Health and Hygiene Section, an Economic Section (SECAE) and the Unit of Esclarecemento (clarification) (Interview Daniel Guterres08/07/2009). Madalena da Silva Fernandes (Interview 05/02/20100) provides the structure of Zone called ‘1975 Bautae’ of Uato-Lari, as follows:

ZoneSecretary: Antonio Espirito Santo ‘Uato-Mau’ Vice Secretary I: Jeremias Guterres (Amzet) Vice Secretary II (Quilo Bravo): Bernardo Quintao ‘Romit’ Justice Section: Anzelmo no AdelinoMatahoi Education Section: Braz Rangel/DelfinQuintao Health Section: Unidentified. Section for Control of Economic Affairs (SECAE): Luis Amaral ‘Siul’/Tomas da Silva Security and Communication Section: Jose Barros Secretariat Section: Gastao Sousa ‘Badulau’/Madalena F. da Silva/Miguel Amaral Mass Organizations: OPMT – OPJT

OPMT and OPJT were umbrella organizations of FRETILIN cadres and members of the local population behind the lines, ODM (Organizações Democrática de Massa) (Cabral, 2002, p.244).Unlike the Village Committee, which was elected, the Commissariado meetings appointed people to be in the posts based on

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the political performance and loyalty to the party and state and the ideas of independence. The participants of the regular meetings of Zone Committee went beyond the political Bureau to include political activists, delegates of Commissariats known as DK (Delegadu Komissariadu), and heads of villages (Aldeias) within each zone. With the exception of military matters, the decision-making practices in the bases de apoio were more or less democratic. Most decisions were decided collectively in the zone committee meetings (Madalena da Silva Fernandes, Interview 5/2/2010; Daniel Guterres).

• The Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR): The Village Committee The Aldeia was the lowest structure in the administration in the RDTL I administration. The Conselho Democratico Revolutionario (CDR) members consisted of Responsible Principal (RP) which was the head of the Village, Secretary of Village, SECAE (Economic Section), Security Section, Justice Section, and two representatives of popular organizations each representing OPMT and OPJT. They were directly elected from popular meeting conducted specifically for this purpose. The election committee came from a combination of some members of the Zone Committee and the Delegate Commissariat and who would organize an election. People were asked to nominate candidates from area that were part of the Aldeia, and they would be elected by acclamation, and the majority would lead the Aldeia or become the prime responsible (Xefe Aldeia), and the Vice would be the head of Economic Section (SECAE), and so forth. Leoneto do Rego, a Catholic priest who had been in the resistance bases until the end of 1978, gave an interview later in Portugal stating that there was a political school training political leaders, and“people held meetings with and sometimes without political assistance to program the way of life and solve all the problems of the camps, from latrines to housing the pigs and other animals…That is how things worked. They were conscious of what they were fighting for-independence” (Taylor 1999, 82; Padre Leoneto do Rego, Interview 1980).

The Chief of the Aldeia held esclarecemento (clarifications) to present proposals of the Village Committee or the Zone Committee to the people and this normally encouraged counter-proposals, which then generated debates. There were particular decisions that were made by the Political Commissariat usually it was related to the security situation; for example, moving the resistance bases to other places. This kind of decision was supposed to be implemented accordingly (Madalena da Silva Fernandes, Interview 05/02/20100).

At the village level, the head of village would also discuss the decisions (other than highly sensitive security matters) all over again and a final decision would be taken in the popular meetings, in which people participated and spoke out with freedom. When they made mistakes, they were expected to make self-criticism, and when they were criticized or proved to have committed a mistake, they needed to apologize to the assembly immediately. This aimed to conscietiacise people about the decision, part of building a mass participation political culture. These were sometimes decisions that had already been made in the Zone Committee, but were again put in the agenda and subject to popular discussion. This process made people aware, and better able to implement the final decisions.

The chief of the village was seen as the most active one in daily governance. Since he/she was elected, she/he had the legitimacy to mobilize people in the village level including her/his family members to work and to go to school, to work in the collective farms and get involved in any other activities under the village, to set an example for others. Family connections were also a principal means for mobilization. There was no unemployment. Everyone was active in doing something (Interview Madalena da Silva Fernandes 5/2/2010; Interview Daniel Guterres, Interview 08/07/2009; Domingos Sibikinu 20/03/2011).

End Notes The Casa dos Timores had envisioned a destruction of the old colonial structure through a revolution. In the bases de apoio, FRETILIN indeed formed a new state structure of the Republic Democratic of Timor-Leste, under the intense pressure of the invading forces of Indonesian regime from 1976-1978.

The popular Socialist model refers to a model of socialism promoted from the community

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level with the participation of the people with some degree of centralism. Most decisions were made collectively at all levels, with exception to issues related to security that was generally made in the leadership level. The RDTL 1 Constitution used the term Assembleia Popular (Popular Assembly) to describe the Legislative organ of the RDTL. The Membership of the Popular Assembly was composed all the members of the Executive Body and the RDTL Administration to the sub-district level, and some representatives of the military.

The Popular Assembly was not supposed to have weekly hearings as the National Parliament does nowadays. There were at least four National Meetings between 1976 and 1978. These meetings were crucial to developing strategies for resistance in the bases de apoio and beyond. The Commissariado Politica in each Sector made lower level decisions, and were the Executive Body of the RDTL Government. This is interesting because the key decisions were made nationally but were implemented locally through Commissariats.

Below the Commissariat there were Zone Committees. The Zone Committee was appointed through the Commissariat meeting and the Democratic Revolutionary Committee (known as CDR – Conselho Democratico Revolucionario) at the village level was a popularly elected body, with one woman representing the women organization and one representative of the youth. It played a crucial role in promoting food production, education, conflict resolution/justice, health and providing logistical support for the Armed Forces. It was also responsible also for popular security in the villages. The existence of CDR is just another proof of active participation of the people, which often does not exist in a representative democracy.

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