22 Fla. L. Weekly D1903

15
Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597 (1997) 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1903 © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 698 So.2d 597 District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District. Victor BRANCACCIO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. No. 95-4135. | Aug. 6, 1997. | Certification Denied Sept. 15, 1997. Defendant was convicted in the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court, St. Lucie County, Dwight Geiger, J., of first-degree murder and kidnapping, and he appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Klein, J., held that defendant was entitled to jury instruction on his involuntary intoxication defense. Reversed. West Headnotes (1) [1] Criminal Law Intoxication Homicide Involuntary Intoxication Evidence, including that defendant was taking prescription drug used to treat depression, Zoloft, at time of murder, that Zoloft’s infrequent side effects included aggressive reactions, aggravated depression, and hallucinations, and that defendant had experienced personality change since taking Zoloft, entitled defendant to jury instruction on involuntary intoxication, in murder and kidnapping prosecution; although jury was given standard instructions, jurors would not necessarily have known that involuntary intoxication by medication would be defense. 21 Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms *598 Roy Black and Christine M. Ng of Black, Srebnick & Kornspan, P.A., Miami, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sharon A. Wood and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney Generals, West Palm Beach, for appellee. Opinion KLEIN, Judge. Appellant was found guilty of first degree murder and kidnapping and sentenced to life in prison. He had admitted the killing, and the only issue for the jury to determine was whether he had the mental capacity to form the intent necessary to commit the crimes. We must reverse for a new trial because the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on appellant’s primary defense, which was that he was involuntarily intoxicated as a result of the medication he was taking pursuant to a prescription. Appellant, who was 16, gave a statement to the police explaining that he had had a fight with his mother over what they were having for dinner and went for a walk to cool down. He encountered a stranger who asked him to stop cursing and called him low class. He punched her repeatedly, led her to a vacant lot, and continued to punch her and kick her. When a car came along he became frightened and ran home. He returned to the scene the next morning to ask the woman if she needed help, but she did not respond. The medical examiner testified that the woman had suffered at least four severe and potentially fatal blows to her head, as well as massive trauma to her chest, and that she would not have been alive at that point. Appellant then went shopping for car parts, but returned later in the day with newspaper and unsuccessfully attempted to set her body on fire. He then left and returned with spray paint, painting her body red in order to cover up his fingerprints. Appellant’s defense was that the medication he was taking, which was prescribed to him during his recent confinement in a mental hospital, had caused him to lose control. Two months prior to the killing, appellant had been committed to a mental health center pursuant to the Baker Act, § 394.451, Florida Statutes (1995), after threatening to kill his parents and himself. His parents then moved him to the Savannas Mental Hospital for treatment, where appellant was placed on Zoloft, a drug used to treat depression. The hospital also diagnosed appellant as suffering from alcohol abuse, attention deficit disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder. 1 The hospital

Transcript of 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1903

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597 (1997)

22 Fla. L. Weekly D1903

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

698 So.2d 597 District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fourth District.

Victor BRANCACCIO, Appellant, v.

STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 95-4135. | Aug. 6, 1997. | Certification Denied Sept. 15, 1997.

Defendant was convicted in the Nineteenth Judicial

Circuit Court, St. Lucie County, Dwight Geiger, J., of

first-degree murder and kidnapping, and he appealed. The

District Court of Appeal, Klein, J., held that defendant

was entitled to jury instruction on his involuntary

intoxication defense.

Reversed.

West Headnotes (1)

[1] Criminal Law Intoxication

Homicide Involuntary Intoxication

Evidence, including that defendant was taking

prescription drug used to treat depression,

Zoloft, at time of murder, that Zoloft’s

infrequent side effects included aggressive

reactions, aggravated depression, and

hallucinations, and that defendant had

experienced personality change since taking

Zoloft, entitled defendant to jury instruction on

involuntary intoxication, in murder and

kidnapping prosecution; although jury was given

standard instructions, jurors would not

necessarily have known that involuntary

intoxication by medication would be defense.

21 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

*598 Roy Black and Christine M. Ng of Black, Srebnick

& Kornspan, P.A., Miami, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee,

and Sharon A. Wood and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant

Attorney Generals, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion

KLEIN, Judge.

Appellant was found guilty of first degree murder and

kidnapping and sentenced to life in prison. He had

admitted the killing, and the only issue for the jury to

determine was whether he had the mental capacity to

form the intent necessary to commit the crimes. We must

reverse for a new trial because the court erred in refusing

to instruct the jury on appellant’s primary defense, which

was that he was involuntarily intoxicated as a result of the

medication he was taking pursuant to a prescription.

Appellant, who was 16, gave a statement to the police

explaining that he had had a fight with his mother over

what they were having for dinner and went for a walk to

cool down. He encountered a stranger who asked him to

stop cursing and called him low class. He punched her

repeatedly, led her to a vacant lot, and continued to punch

her and kick her. When a car came along he became

frightened and ran home.

He returned to the scene the next morning to ask the

woman if she needed help, but she did not respond. The

medical examiner testified that the woman had suffered at

least four severe and potentially fatal blows to her head,

as well as massive trauma to her chest, and that she would

not have been alive at that point. Appellant then went

shopping for car parts, but returned later in the day with

newspaper and unsuccessfully attempted to set her body

on fire. He then left and returned with spray paint,

painting her body red in order to cover up his fingerprints.

Appellant’s defense was that the medication he was

taking, which was prescribed to him during his recent

confinement in a mental hospital, had caused him to lose

control. Two months prior to the killing, appellant had

been committed to a mental health center pursuant to the

Baker Act, § 394.451, Florida Statutes (1995), after

threatening to kill his parents and himself. His parents

then moved him to the Savannas Mental Hospital for

treatment, where appellant was placed on Zoloft, a drug

used to treat depression. The hospital also diagnosed

appellant as suffering from alcohol abuse, attention deficit

disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder.1 The hospital

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597 (1997)

22 Fla. L. Weekly D1903

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2

noted a change in appellant’s personality after he was

placed on Zoloft, in that appellant became more irritable,

loud, had increased energy and was given to angry

outbursts. Appellant had apparently attempted suicide

while at the hospital by holding his breath.

A psychiatrist testifying for the defense, Dr. Wade Myers,

testified that Zoloft may have had a reaction which was

opposite to what it was supposed to have had in appellant,

causing hypomania.2 The medical warnings for the drug

state that the following side effects are infrequent but

possible: “aggressive reactions, amnesia, anxiety,

delusions, depersonalization, depression, aggravated

depression, emotional instability, ... *599 hallucinations,

neurosis, paranoid reaction, suicidation and suicide

attempts.” “Infrequent” is medically defined as occurring

between 1 in 100 and 1 in 1000 patients.

Dr. Myers examined appellant after his arrest and

concluded that he suffered from major depression,

possible bipolar disorder, alcohol abuse, a learning

disability, and a probable brain injury. Appellant had been

born prematurely and spent seven days in intensive care

for oxygen deprivation. Also, at the age of two, he had

nearly drowned and had to be resuscitated. His IQ is just

above retarded.

Dr. Myers concluded that appellant did not have the

ability to form the intent to commit first degree murder

based on his mental deficiencies and his involuntary

intoxication by the Zoloft.

Another expert who testified for the defense, Dr. Peter R.

Breggin, testified that in his opinion, Zoloft could have

had amphetamine like effects, and could have “pushed

him over.” Under the Freedom of Information Act, Dr.

Breggin was able to obtain information reported by

doctors and pharmacists regarding reactions to the drug.

Dr. Breggin found 22 reports tying the drug to hostile

reactions, 57 reports linking the drug to an aggravation

reaction, 55 suicide attempts, and 64 reports linking the

drug to increased agitation. These reports suggest that the

drug can cause a loss of impulse control. He opined that

the hospital records from the mental hospital where

appellant was confined indicate that he was experiencing

a similar reaction to the drug. Dr. Breggin diagnosed

Brancaccio with substance induced mood disorder

brought on by Zoloft.

The State rebutted appellant’s experts with experts of its

own, who testified that appellant was capable of forming

the intent to commit murder and kidnapping. They did

agree that he suffered from major depression, but were of

the opinion that he was not involuntarily intoxicated

because of the Zoloft.

The jury found appellant guilty of first degree murder

(felony murder), and kidnapping. His primary argument

on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct

the jury on his theory of defense, involuntary intoxication.

The defense of involuntary intoxication has been

explained in an article which collects cases from various

states which permit it as follows:

Generally speaking, an accused may be completely

relieved of criminal responsibility if, because of

involuntary intoxication, he was temporarily rendered

legally insane at the time he committed the offense. And

again speaking generally, the courts have considered one

to be involuntarily intoxicated when he has become

intoxicated through the fault of another, by accident,

inadvertence, or mistake on his own part, or because of a

physiological or psychological condition beyond his

control.

The practice of relieving one of criminal responsibility for

offenses committed while in a state of involuntary

intoxication extends back to the earliest days of the

common law. Involuntary intoxication, it appears, was

first recognized as that caused by the unskillfulness of a

physician or by the contrivance of one’s enemies. Today,

where the intoxication is induced through the fault of

another and without any fault on the part of the accused, it

is generally treated as involuntary. Intoxication caused by

the force, duress, fraud, or contrivance of another, for

whatever purpose, without any fault on the part of the

accused, is uniformly recognized as involuntary

intoxication. This is often stated in an exclusive form, that

is, that the intoxication is involuntary only if induced by

the fraud, etc., of another. Although this implies that

intoxication from any other cause is not involuntary, the

courts making such a statement do, in fact recognize that

intoxication caused in other ways can be involuntary.

* * * * * *

Because a patient is entitled to assume that an intoxicating

dose would not be prescribed or administered by a

physician, where intoxication results from medicine

which has been prescribed (and taken as prescribed) or

administered by a physician, such intoxication is

generally considered involuntary.

*600 Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, When Intoxication

Deemed Involuntary so as to Constitute a Defense to

Criminal Charge, 73 A.L.R.3d 195 (1976) (footnotes

omitted).

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597 (1997)

22 Fla. L. Weekly D1903

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3

This court recognized the defense of involuntary

intoxication in the case of Boswell v. State, 610 So.2d 670

(Fla. 4th DCA 1992). In a case with similar facts to our

own, Boswell was charged with shooting a police officer.

He defended on the theory that he became very inebriated

as a reaction to taking the prescribed medications Xanax

and Prozac.3 Boswell had cirrhosis of the liver which led

to a toxic level of Prozac building up in his body. Experts

testified that the anti-depressants can cause side effects

such as paranoid reactions and hallucinations and that

Boswell was suffering from hallucinations when he

“heard a shot.” Boswell, 610 So.2d at 672. This court held

that the trial court erred in failing to give the involuntary

intoxication instruction, reiterating that “[a] party is

entitled to have the jury instructed upon the law which is

applicable to his theory of the case, if there is any

competent evidence adduced that could support a verdict

in his favor.” Boswell, 610 So.2d at 673.

The State, apparently recognizing the validity of the

defense argues that the instruction should not have been

given here, only because there was no evidence to support

it. The state first argues that the evidence did not show

that appellant was taking Zoloft at the time of the murder.

In his taped statement to the police, which was taken three

days after the killing, appellant was asked whether he was

on any medication and replied that he was taking Zoloft.

Appellant had also told one of his medical experts that he

thought that he had taken his medicine on the day of the

killing. In addition, a friend of appellant had testified that

on the day of the killing he had observed appellant’s

mother make him go into the house in order to take his

medication.

The only other argument advanced by the State is that

there was no evidence that Zoloft had an adverse reaction

on appellant; however, that argument ignores the expert

testimony, the mental hospital records, and testimony of

people who knew the appellant and observed a personality

change in him. We therefore reject the state’s arguments

that the instruction should not have been given under

these facts.

We were recently compelled to reverse another murder

conviction for a new trial, because of the court’s failure to

give a specific instruction on insanity induced by the long

and continued use of intoxicants, in Brunner v. State, 683

So.2d 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In that case, defendant

had a severe thyroid disorder known as Graves disease,

which causes emotional problems, and defendant had

used alcohol and drugs excessively over a long period of

time to cope with the psychological problems associated

with the disease. In reversing, we noted that the fact that

insanity can be caused by the use of intoxicants over a

long period of time is “not something which would

necessarily be understood by jurors who have only been

read the standard instruction on insanity.” Id. at 1131.

Similarly, in the present case, the jurors would not

necessarily have known, after having been given the

standard instructions, that involuntary intoxication by

medication would be a defense.

The defense submitted several different forms of jury

instructions on involuntary intoxication, and there was

extensive discussion on whether the instruction should be

given; however, the court concluded that the standard

instruction on insanity was sufficient, and rejected the

involuntary intoxication instructions.4 It is unfortunate

that the State *601 did not recognize that involuntary

intoxication is a defense in the trial court, as it now

recognizes on appeal, because if it had agreed that the

instruction should be given, we would not have to reverse

this otherwise well-tried case for a new trial.

WARNER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.

Parallel Citations

22 Fla. L. Weekly D1903

Footnotes 1 The condition of Oppositional Defiant Disorder is defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Third

Ed.-Rev.1987, p. 56) as follows:

The essential feature of this disorder is a pattern of negativistic, hostile, and defiant behavior without the more serious violations of

the basic rights of others that are seen in Conduct Disorder. The diagnosis is made only if the oppositional and defiant behavior is

much more common than that seen in other people of the same mental age.

Children with this disorder commonly are argumentative with adults, frequently loose their temper, swear, and are often angry,

resentful, and easily annoyed by others. They frequently actively defy adult requests or rules and deliberately annoy other people.

They tend to blame others for their own mistakes or difficulties.

2 Dr. Myers explained that hypomania, as a side effect of Zoloft, produced an amphetamine like effect which manifested itself in the

appellant by causing him to have trouble concentrating, difficulty sitting still, an increased energy level, irritability, and anxiety.

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597 (1997)

22 Fla. L. Weekly D1903

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4

3 One of the defense experts testified that Zoloft works in a manner almost identical to the manner in which Prozac works.

4 Florida does not have a standard jury instruction on involuntary intoxication. Other states, such as Missouri, do, and if the

following paraphrased portion from Missouri’s Standard Criminal Instruction 310.52 were read as part of Florida’s standard

instruction on insanity, it would sufficiently explain appellant’s defense:

An intoxicated condition is involuntarily produced when it is brought about by the introduction into his body of any substance

which he does not know and has no reason to know has a tendency to cause an intoxicated or drugged condition.

The second sentence of Florida’s insanity instruction 3.04(b) would also have to be amended to read: “A person is considered to be

insane when: 1) He had a mental infirmity, disease, defect or was involuntarily intoxicated.”

End of Document © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5

Filings (4)

Title PDF Court Date Type

1. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Victor BRANCACCIO, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. 2001 WL 34115629

U.S. Jan. 01, 2001 Petition

2. Docket 01-490 VICTOR BRANCACCIO v. FLORIDA

— U.S. Sep. 21, 2001 Docket

3. Docket SC01-360 VICTOR BRANCACCIO v. STATE OF FLORIDA

— Fla. Feb. 08, 2001 Docket

4. Docket 4D08-2664 VICTOR BRANCACCIO v. STATE OF FLORIDA

— Fla.App. 4 Dist.

Jul. 1, 2008 Docket

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6

Negative Treatment

Negative Direct History

The KeyCited document has been negatively impacted in the following ways by events or decisions in the same litigation or proceedings:

There is no negative direct history.

Negative Citing References (2)

The KeyCited document has been negatively referenced by the following events or decisions in other litigation or proceedings:

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Distinguished by

1. Cobb v. State

884 So.2d 437 , Fla.App. 1 Dist. CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Intoxication. Voluntary overdose of prescription and over-the-counter medicines precluded defense of involuntary intoxication.

Oct. 01 , 2004 Case 1

So.2d

Distinguished by

2. People v. Hari

355 Ill.App.3d 449 , Ill.App. 4 Dist. CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Instructions. Adverse reaction to antidepressant medication required involuntary intoxication instruction.

Jan. 05 , 2005

Case 1

So.2d

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7

Appellate History (6)

Direct History (6)

1. Brancaccio v. State 698 So.2d 597 , Fla.App. 4 Dist. , Aug. 06, 1997 , certification denied ( Sep 15, 1997 )

Review Denied by

2. State v. Brancaccio 705 So.2d 10 , Fla. , Nov. 19, 1997

AND Appeal After New Trial

3. Brancaccio v. State 773 So.2d 582 , Fla.App. 4 Dist. , Nov. 22, 2000 , rehearing denied ( Jan 04, 2001 )

Review Denied by

4. Brancaccio v. State 791 So.2d 1095 , Fla. , Jun. 20, 2001

AND Certiorari Denied by

5. Brancaccio v. Florida 534 U.S. 1022 , U.S.Fla. , Nov. 13, 2001

AND Denial of Post-Conviction Relief Affirmed by

6. Brancaccio v. State 27 So.3d 739 , Fla.App. 4 Dist. , Feb. 10, 2010

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 9

Citing References (49)

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Distinguished by

1. Cobb v. State 884 So.2d 437, 439+ , Fla.App. 1 Dist.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Intoxication. Voluntary overdose of prescription and over-the-counter medicines precluded defense of involuntary intoxication.

Oct. 01, 2004 Case 1

So.2d

Discussed by 2. Brancaccio v. State 27 So.3d 739, 740+ , Fla.App. 4 Dist.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Intoxication. Evidence regarding drug’s side effects would not have resulted in acquittal of defendant based on involuntary intoxication defense.

Feb. 10, 2010 Case 1

So.2d

Discussed by 3. Sluyter v. State 941 So.2d 1178, 1180+ , Fla.App. 2 Dist.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Mental Capacity. Evidence did not support finding that defendant knew right from wrong regarding his actions.

Oct. 20, 2006 Case 1

So.2d

Discussed by 4. Lucherini v. State 932 So.2d 521, 522+ , Fla.App. 4 Dist.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Evidence. Prescription-medication evidence would be admissible in murder trial in support of involuntary-intoxication defense.

Jun. 21, 2006 Case 1

So.2d

Discussed by 5. Jurisdictional Brief of Respondent Myra VAIVADA, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. 2004 WL 1436987, *1436987+ , Fla.

Jun. 21, 2004 Petition —

Discussed by 6. Jurisdictional Brief of Petitioner Myra S. VAIVADA, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. 2004 WL 1305349, *1305349+ , Fla.

May 2004 Petition —

Discussed by 7. Brief of Petitioner, Appellant Richard SHUMAN, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Louis SPENCER, Superintendent, Respondent, Appellee. 2009 WL 6836008, *6836008+ , 1st Cir.

Dec. 29, 2009 Brief 1

So.2d

Discussed by 8. Amended Supplemental Brief of Appellee Julio MORA, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee. 2001 WL 34114499, *34114499+ , Fla.

Jun. 05, 2001 Brief 1

So.2d

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Discussed by 9. Brief and Argument for Defendant-Appellant PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David A. HARI, Defendant-Appellant. 2005 WL 4814869, *4814869+ , Ill.

May 04, 2005 Brief 1

So.2d

Distinguished by

10. People v. Hari 822 N.E.2d 889, 898 , Ill.App. 4 Dist.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Instructions. Adverse reaction to antidepressant medication required involuntary intoxication instruction.

Jan. 05, 2005 Case 1

So.2d

Cited by 11. Troy v. State 948 So.2d 635, 645+ , Fla.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Intoxication. Statute eliminating voluntary intoxication as defense to criminal charges did not violate defendant’s right to due process.

Oct. 19, 2006 Case 1

So.2d

Cited by 12. Barrett v. State 2 So.3d 370, 371 , Fla.App. 4 Dist.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Postconviction Relief. Record did not refute ineffective assistance claim thereby precluding summary denial of motion for postconviction relief.

Dec. 24, 2008 Case 1

So.2d

Cited by 13. Montero v. State 996 So.2d 888, 891 , Fla.App. 4 Dist.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Intoxication. Defendant’s use of prescription hydrocodone and alprazolam did not establish involuntary intoxication defense to burglary.

Nov. 19, 2008 Case 1

So.2d

Cited by 14. Miller v. State 805 So.2d 885, 887+ , Fla.App. 2 Dist.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Instructions. Jury instruction on involuntary intoxication was warranted.

Oct. 12, 2001 Case 1

So.2d

Cited by 15. Brancaccio v. Mediplex Management of Port St. Lucie, Inc. 711 So.2d 1206, 1207+ , Fla.App. 4 Dist.

LITIGATION - Witnesses. Dismissal of civil action was not warranted despite plaintiff’s failure to provide deposition based on Fifth Amendment privilege.

Apr. 30, 1998 Case 1

So.2d

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Cited by 16. Carter v. State 710 So.2d 110, 111 , Fla.App. 4 Dist.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Driving While Intoxicated. Involuntary intoxication instruction should have been given in DUI prosecution.

Apr. 15, 1998 Case 1

So.2d

Cited by 17. Troy v. Secretary of Dept. of Corrections 2013 WL 24212, *11+ , M.D.Fla.

John Troy, a State of Florida inmate under sentence of death, seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and challenges the validity of his state conviction for...

Jan. 02, 2013 Case 1

So.2d

Cited by 18. Corp v. Sec., Fla. Dept. of Corr. 2010 WL 3469506, *6+ , M.D.Fla.

Petitioner John D. Corp, who is proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) (Doc. # 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 12,...

Aug. 31, 2010 Case 1

So.2d

Cited by 19. State v. McKeon 38 P.3d 1236, 1239 , Ariz.App. Div. 1

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Intoxication. Erroneous instruction on voluntary intoxication was harmless, in murder prosecution.

Jan. 24, 2002 Case 1

So.2d

Cited by 20. People v. Allen 2009 WL 738354, *8+ , Cal.App. 1 Dist.

Torrell Allen appeals from a conviction of attempting to commit a lewd act upon a child. He contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the...

Mar. 23, 2009 Case 1

So.2d

Cited by 21. People v. Eisiminger 2004 WL 114682, *7 , Cal.App. 4 Dist.

A jury convicted Wesley Richard Eisiminger (defendant) of first degree murder (Pen.Code, § 187, subd. (a), 189; all further statutory references are to the Penal code), and found...

Jan. 26, 2004 Case 1

So.2d

Cited by 22. Com. v. Shuman 836 N.E.2d 1085, 1091 , Mass.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Trial. Evidence linking Zoloft to violence did not warrant new trial for murder based on newly discovered evidence.

Nov. 08, 2005 Case 1

So.2d

Cited by 23. Petition for Writ of Certiorari du Pont v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 2006 WL 598176, *598176+ , U.S.

Mar. 09, 2006 Petition 1

So.2d

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Cited by 24. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Victor BRANCACCIO, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. 2001 WL 34115629, *34115629 , U.S.

2001 Petition 1

So.2d

Cited by 25. Petition for Review THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Duane A NASON, Defendant and Appellant. 2004 WL 2097973, *2097973+ , Cal.

Jul. 19, 2004 Petition —

Cited by 26. Petition for Leave to Appeal PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. David A. HARI, Petitioner-Appellant. 2005 WL 4814566, *4814566 , Ill.

Feb. 09, 2005 Petition —

Cited by 27. Appellant’s Brief Katrina D. ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALABAMA, Appellee. 2010 WL 5167519, *5167519+ , Ala.Crim.App.

Nov. 09, 2010 Brief —

Cited by 28. Answer Brief of Appellee John TROY, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee. 2005 WL 1351566, *1351566+ , Fla.

May 2005 Brief 1

So.2d

Cited by 29. Reply Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee John TROY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. State of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 2005 WL 2211496, *2211496+ , Fla.

2005 Brief 1

So.2d

Cited by 30. Appellant’s Supplemental Brief Julio MORA, Appellant/Defendant, v. State of Florida, Appellee/Plaintiff. 2001 WL 34114500, *34114500+ , Fla.

Jun. 15, 2001 Brief 1

So.2d

Cited by 31. Reply Brief for the Defendant-Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Appellee, v. Richard SHUMAN, Defendant, Appellant. 2005 WL 3543193, *3543193 , Mass.

Sep. 02, 2005 Brief 1

So.2d

Cited by 32. Commonwealth’s Brief COMMONWEALTH, Appellee, v. Richard SHUMAN, Defendant-Appellant. 2005 WL 3543192, *1+ , Mass.

May 2005 Brief 1

So.2d

Cited by 33. Letter Brief COMMONWEALTH, v. Piere KEATON. 2009 WL 4321366, *4321366+ , Pa.Super.

Jun. 04, 2009 Brief —

Cited by 34. Defendant’s Proposed Preliminary Jury Instructions STATE OF CONNECTICUT, v. Randy KIRSCH. 2000 WL 35932667, *1 , Conn.Super.

Jun. 07, 2000 Jury Instruction 1

So.2d

Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 13

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Mentioned by 35. Mora v. State 814 So.2d 322, 329+ , Fla.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Death Penalty. Waiver of possible mitigation without full investigation of all possible mitigation is allowable.

Jan. 24, 2002 Case 1

So.2d

Mentioned by 36. People v. Holloway 2010 WL 5142380, *9 , Cal.App. 5 Dist.

After we reversed and remanded for a new trial, defendant Ricky Jay Holloway was convicted a second time of driving under the influence and causing bodily injury, driving with a...

Dec. 20, 2010 Case 1

So.2d

Mentioned by 37. People v. Holloway 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 770, 782 , Cal.App. 5 Dist.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Driving While Intoxicated. Whether defendant knew or had reason to anticipate that medication could cause intoxicating effects was for the jury.

Jun. 26, 2008 Case 1

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Mentioned by 38. People v. Garcia 113 P.3d 775, 781 , Colo.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Defenses. Involuntary intoxication by hypoglycemia may constitute an affirmative defense.

Jun. 13, 2005 Case 1

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— 39. When intoxication deemed involuntary so as to constitute a defense to criminal charge, 73 A.L.R.3d 195

This annotation collects and organizes the cases which have dealt with the question as to when the intoxication of an accused is deemed involuntary so as to constitute a defense to...

1976 ALR — 1

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— 40. 11/15/2012 Florida Bar News, The 26, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS Florida Bar News, The

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases submits the following amended and new instructions to the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal...

2012 Other Secondary Source

— 1

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— 41. 11 Florida Practice Series s 1:14, Involuntary intoxication Florida Practice Series

Under some circumstances, the accused might argue that he or she was unknowingly impaired by a substance and should be entitled to an instruction on involuntary intoxication....

2012 Other Secondary Source

— 1

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Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 14

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

— 42. 14A Mass. Prac. Series s 7.274, Intoxication Mass. Prac. Series

Involuntary intoxication. Intoxication caused by the force, duress, fraud, or contrivance of another, without any fault on the part of the defendant, is involuntary intoxication....

2012 Other Secondary Source

— 1

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— 43. Substantive Criminal Law s 9.5, Intoxication Substantive Criminal Law

One who is charged with having committed a crime may claim in his defense that, at the time, he was intoxicated (by alcohol or by narcotic drugs) and so is not guilty. If the crime...

2012 Other Secondary Source

— 1

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— 44. s 576. Intoxication, Fla. Jur. 2d Criminal Law Substantive Principles and Offenses s 576 Fla. Jur. 2d Criminal Law Substantive Principles and Offenses

The defense of voluntary intoxication was abolished effective October 1, 1999. For offenses committed prior to that date, Florida law recognizes voluntary intoxication as a defense...

2013 Other Secondary Source

— 1

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— 45. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS, 30 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 678, 739

A Delaware trial court ruled after a Daubert hearing that Pediatric Condition Falsification (PCF)—a diagnosis derived from the umbrella diagnosis of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy...

2006 Law Review — 1

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— 46. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY/MITIGATION IN SENTENCING, 26 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 232, 247

The Tennessee supreme court, in a new rule to be applied retroactively, decided that compelling evidence showed that executing persons with mental retardation violates evolving...

2002 Law Review — 1

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— 47. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, 21 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 574, 579

The District of Columbia federal court refused to grant insanity acquittee John W. Hinckley, Jr. conditional release from commitment because he did not prove that he was no longer...

1997 Law Review — 1

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Brancaccio v. State, 698 So.2d 597

© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 15

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

— 48. Complete Manual of Criminal Forms 3d s 100:17.1, Petition for writ of certiorari-Alternate form Complete Manual of Criminal Forms 3d

Whether this Court should resolve the longstanding conflict among state and federal courts over whether the Fifth Amendment permits the introduction of a criminal defendant’s...

2011 Other Secondary Source

— 1

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— 49. 42 MO Practice Series s 24:9, Involuntary intoxication in other states MO Practice Series

At one end of the spectrum is a Texas case of Brown v State, which held that involuntary intoxication is not a defense in a DUI case involving both alcohol and Ambien. The court...

2012 Other Secondary Source

— 1

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