21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 251-255

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By autbori tY of

C.G., TwentiethA~O cs

)~~~~----- --- -----

(Date) ( n~': ;)_

M I S S I O N NO. 251 -255

FLO W N 6 J U L Y j 4 -5

C O p y N O . 6

HEADQUARTIERS

XXI BOMBER COMMANDAPO 1~4

•'!

'I



READ~U.UlTERS

XX I E lO l~ lB ERO Q v W l .: .N D

. 'J?O 234.

T.~CTIC_J.. MISSIoN REPORT

Field Order No~ 96

Pago

No,.

1

M i a s i o n s N o . . 251, 252. 253 . 254 & 2

Targo t s : Chiba~ .J.li:ashi, S h i m i z u , and Kofu Urban '-.reas, arrl the lfaruzen OR ef in er y, S hi mo ta l' ll .

6 July 1945

Table of C o n t e n t s

Tact ical Narrati ve, e 000 • 0 • · . . ~ . . ..J,:Dl'lOX .l - Cpor-ati'-ns.. 0 Q • ~ • • 0 • • • • 0 • • • • • 11

Part I - Navigat ion Track Chart • • • • • • • 12

Part ~I - Mean Points of Impact • • 0 • • • • 13

Par-t III - B o m b i n g " , , ~ • • 0 '. • • • • • •• 14-Pa:,t IV - PI i ght Engineering Chart. • • • • • 16

FaTt V . - Rad-."ll'0 0 0 ~ 0 , • • • 0 • • • • 0 • • 17Part VI -, Guhnery o • 0 • 0 • • • • • • • • • • • 24,

Part VIr - ;iir-Sea Rescue Chart • • • •• • • •• 25

Li.l'lneX B - \1eather ,: .. • .0 ' i? . . . • 0 • • • • • • ' * " • • •

Facr"t I - ',-leather .3urnm.'3.ry. • • • • • •

Part II - Chart - Fred,i cted VB. Observed .Ieather.

Part iII - .Prognostic :Map

Part IV - Synoptic lVTap•· . •• · . ' . .. . . .. . · . . . . . . . . .•

~mnQX C - O .o mm un i c a tions. • • p • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Part I - R O M • • •

Part II _, Radie • • • • e • • • • • • • • • • • •

. .. • •• ·.. • • • l 1 l i

<..nnox D Intolligencco • , • • • • ••••••••••

Part I - En€lDzy'tir Opposi tioD • • • • • • • • • •

Part II - Enemy .dntiaircraft. • • • • ••••

Part 1 : I I , . . , .ro i Ja~o A ss es sm en t • •• •• •• •• ••

Scction . a . . Ohib'!lo • • • • • • • • • • • 0 •

Section B - .lknshi • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Section C - Shimizu. • ~ • • • • • • • • • •

B e ct ion D K er u ~ • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Section E - lVhruzen Oil Rofinery ••••••

•Ulnex .E OensoliaQted Stntisti.c:ll SUJ:lllnry •••••• • • •

.n.nnex F XXI Bomber OOI l l lU ,nd Field Order. • • • • • • • • •

.~ex G - D i s t r i b u t i o n o ••• ~ •••••••••••• • •

Prep'U'cd by: ;l-2 Sec,\1on

XXI Bomber Colil ll l'1.l ld

2 6

27293531

3 2

3335

383 94 .04 54 54 7495355

59

6 6

7 5



::::::~::;::~:~::::::::

SECRETI By Auth., of t he e.G.:: XXI Bomber Command:

: 6 Jill 4 5 - J . D . < iDate Initials

:::.:!::::::::~::::: :::

HE.illQ,UJ' ..RTERS

X XI 1 1O ll/IS ER O OMM AN D

. \ PO 2 3 4

SUBJECT: Report of Attacks Against 4 Urban Areas and 1 Precision Tar~t. 6 July

194 5

TOe , Conmanding General, ~entieth .;_'l.irForce. r/ashington 25, D.C.

1. IDENrIFIC: lT ION OF M ISSIONS :

, a. Field Order' NUm bet 96, Hea dqua rters XXI Bomber Com man d. da ted 6 July

~9M , ~uected the 58th, 73rd. 313th 314 th and 3l5th Bombardment -.lings t o p art iclp .a t~ ~ n Low and medium altitude night attacks against 4 - urban areas and 1

~~5:ls].on target en Ifunshu in XXI Bomber Command Missions Numbered 251 through

b. Ta~get $peeifi~d:

( 1) , P rim ary Visual and~adar Targets:

Mission Target. ;'ling Forc e " 's s i: :: n

251 Chiba Urban Area 58th 4 . Groups

252 . rl .k a s hir ba n , A re a 73rd 4 . Group~

233 Sh im iz u Urb an Area 313th 4 . Groups

2.54 - Kofu Urban Area 314 th 4 - Groups

255 M aru zen Oil Ref in ery , 315-th 6 0 . . .. . ir cra f

Shimot s u . ( Target 90.25-17 6Ld

(2) No secordary or last resort tareets were named.

2 . STR. : .TEG Y .i .N DP L l. NS OF O PER .ri .TIONS:

a~ $trate,gy: ... a result of cont inuing Ull!avorable 'I7eatherover the

Japanese mainland another series of cities was s elec ted f or n ig ht in cen dia rystrikes. Planning was simi lar to other strikes in i7hich t he 4 rrin_,s(S8th. 73I"l

3l3th and 3l4th) were assigned separate cities which {rere t o be attacked at ni~lThe strike against the Empire by the 315th wing \78S to be its se cozd attackagainst the Maruzen Oil!Refinery at Shimotsu in 17bich a sychronous rad_U" bombing

techni~ue WQuld be employed using APQ-7 radar equipment. Because of the ~devariation in the'velocity and direction of the Hind reported on the 315th wing's

previOUS mi~sion? a B~29 flmm by one of the best radar erews = to ~e?ede themain force 1nto the target area and broadcast the 'l7ind to the ma16 strlk1ng forca t 5 -m in ut e in terva ls . In an attempt to improve bombing accuracy. t he altitude

OJ thiS mission Ras lowered to 10,000 feet.

b. Importance of Targets:

(1) M is sion Nu mb er 251: Tl' l. eit y of ( ,t >ih a .loc a ted s ou th ea s t of

TokYO on the eastern shore of Tokyo Ba y. is the militaty center ot Ch ib a p en in -sulao Its industries include a naval ordnance faotory. and a factory of the



H i tr ~chi Aircraft Company.. It is also an important railroadcenter, uith 1ine~ad~ating northuest to Tokyo, northeast and southeast across Chiba Peninsula,and south to Kisarazu._

of . (2 ) Mis8ion N..unber252 :'rhe ~~ty of .\l(~hi • situated 12 miles ',7e. KObeon the Inland Sea due Borth of ",waJl.Island, 1.5 the location of the mosl.~portant of the Kawasaki Aircraft Companyplants.. This plant produces several:l@~ters, including Tony, Nick aad Lily. and is also engagea in the production1.nl1ne eEgines.

(3) Mission NUmber253:, The city of Shirrtizuis located in central

Hbnshu on the Tokkaido Nail'l.line Railroad, 8miles northeast of Shizuoka on thewest side of Suruga Bay e- This c,ity is an important industrial to-.m and port fo

central Honshu and possesses the only cleep water port for the area in "hich it

located. In pre-I"far, days. the port 8180 served as the outlet for Sbizuoka and

w as Boted as the export center of Japan's tea producti6n. The chief import nasbauxite ore, formerly obtained from the Singapore area. for the Shimzu dluminu

plant and the nearby Kambara .\ltmlinum Plant, both of -:7hichart. the largest ot

their type in Japan., bJ. view of the current shipping attacks, itmay be assum

that ra ilroads are bringing in a fair port ion of the bauxite are. Clust~red in

a fringe along the waterfront in an area shaped roughly like a fish hook, is aline concentration Of industry dominated by the aluminum plants, but including

the port fa6ilities. several small boat building and repair ysrda, oil refinery

and storage. lumber basin and storage, railroad yards, station and narehouses,

and small machine ships, Located array from the naterfront are ~ large light

metals plant •. ail.d an . electri cal equipment plant.

(4) Mission Number 251p Kofu is located in central Honshu on the

Chure Railroad Line, an alternate line nest of Tokyo. to the Tokkaido Railroad.

Kofu is situateda_pproximately 20 miles northuest of Mount Fuji and 35 o.i1e3nOrth of Suruga llay" Xofu is the capitol of Tomanashi Prei"ecture and has a

popuf.at ion. of 102,0.00 (1940 census). It is the largest of 7 som.eahat similar

mountains basin cities in central Honshu ilMre lack of available land limits

§griculture. Koru, primarily a silk center, was revealed by photo coverage to

contain in addition to it s slik industry, same light industry of the'cachine-

snope type.. The city covers an area of approximately 3 square miles, of ~hich

1square milesis compact and congested. On the northrrest portion of the ci~

is the area. of tne 49th Infantry Regiment, a replacement unit. It is also the

site of many schools, ranging from grade schools to a technical coll~e.

(5) Mission :M.unbel"255: The Maruzen Oil Refinery is located nearthe south entrance to O s a k a B a y , 4 1 miles southeast of Kainan and 3 miles nort

east 'of Minoslilima. An important refinety and oil storagt'.l center tOr the Japlme

N a v y , this target produces aviation gas, lubrioation oil, gasoline, and fuel

oil. There are facilities located here for storage of both crude oil and re -fined products. A unit of the plant may be engaged in the manufacture o£ steel

drums.

c. Details of P la nn in g - - Operational:

(1) Bombing Plans:

(a) Determination. of BombLoad:

_l. For use against the Chiba Urban area the 58th "iDsto load 2 Groups (includes 12 Pathfinder B-29's) with 1 1 4 7 inc~i81'7 bCllllbsuuinstantaneous nose and 2 Groups with clusters of' )1)9 incendiary bombs tuaed t.open 5000 feet above the target. Intervalameter settings of' 7 . 5 teet tar ~bombs and 50 feet tor the J4,9 clusters were to be employed. The _1inoeDlb.aI?

bomb and aimable clusters of W,9 bombs were seleoted aa the best available 1a-cendiary weapons for empl.oymentagainst this area which consists prilllaril:r....

r1 I I..

bUildings of' wood and plaster construction. Intervalometer •• ttingG aacl .'specified were selected to insure sufficient tunotion1ag o r ~ muDi11~Ul'e a ;. uniform bombdensity over the tarset area • . . a . deDSi1;,yof qDl'!.~" ••

a o o tons per square mile was considered d.esuable to etteot _.v....lU.



g.,. For use against the .~ashi urban area the 73rd 'Jing VI

~ ~ m ~ : a ~ 4 Gro~ps (includes 12 Eathfinder B - 2 9 ' s )with clusters of M 69 incendiar,yf! uzed to open 2500 feet above the targeto 4n intervalometer setting of _S

feet was to be employedo Since the M 4 7 type incendiary bomb\"las n6t available

M 6 r USe by pathfinder aircraft or the fi~~t par~ of the main force. clusters of? bombswere selected as the most des~rable ~ncendiary weapon available nith

nhlCh to effect destructione Buildings in the target area were of light oon-stru~tion~ requiring only little bombpenetration for maximum. damage. The fuzin

~d llltervalometersetting specified V1ereselected to obtain an even density onhe target and to insure proper functioning of the bomb.

1? For use against the Shimizu urban area the 3l3th :1i.ng

was to. load 2 Groups (includes 12 pathfinder 8-29's) i7ith M 47 incendiary bombsfuzed lnstantaneous nose and 2 groups with Ml7 incendiary clusters ( L 5 0 bombs)

fuz.ed t.o open 3000 feet above the target". Intervalometer settiIL-3Sof 50 feet f

the ~7 bomband 35 feet for the Ml7 clusters nere to be employedA This target

~ea" a lllixed industri aL and residential area with building construction vary_

Ulg from light wccden to steel types was considered. susceptible to successful

~tta?k.by the combination of these 2 n-eapons. The penatrating and fire-settingqu.alltles of these bombfiwere considered SUperior to other available bomls. J.

denSity of approximately 8 tons per acz-e on the target area was expected. and

was believed sufficient to effect destruction of the area. Intervalometer sett

ings and fuzings specified were designed to obtain max imum density on the targe

and to insure proper functioning of bombs and clusters.

1 1 ; . . . For use against the Kofu urban area the 314th 7fil:l& :J

to load 1 Group (includes 12 pathfinder B-29 Is) wi th ~7 incendi.ary bombs fuzed

instantaneous nose and 3 Groups with clusters of M(,9 bombs fuzed to open . 5 0 0

feet above the target" Intervalometer settings of 7 5 feet for the Y~1bombsa50 feet for the clu.sters were to De employed. The area to be attacked :JaB

beli eved to be highly ihi' lemmable t but contai ned sufi' ic ient f ire breaks to caus

small fire divisions. It wasexpeceed that the M 4 7 bcmb dropped by the 1 Jrcup

would CaU5einitial appliance fires and the multiple hitsobtained by the dropp

of clusters of. M B 9 bombs by later formations 'I7ouldinsure fires i7ithin e3.ch fir

division" The intervalometer settings ani fuzings specified 17ere selected to

insure an even density, w'ith maximumconcentration on. the target area being co

sistent with the proper functioning of bombs, to obtain.penetr~tion of strac~~o

in the area.

7 . •

!k For use against the M:iruzen Oil Refiner-;- the 3l5th '1

.78S to load its aircraft with 500-pound general-purpose boI!lbsfuzed .025 secon

delay nose and non-delay tailo. The 500-pound bombm~s selected since the targe

installations i1ere of both storage and refinery type, and 11ell dispe:::-sed ".7ithin

the target areao The larger number of bombhits inflicted by the use of this

.;ize bombvas expected to result in maxiumumdamage to both manufacturi:l,6 and

storage facilities. The .025-second delay fuze was selected as a n alt rnatefuzing since the ~Ol-second delay fUZe was not available. It ~as believed that

o02S-second del~ nose fuze would give bombbursts just above t h e fl~r le:e1

which would be very effective against the refinery and shop installat~ons 1n

this target... The non-delay t.ail f'uze was selected to give ground level bursts

noar miss bombs in order t 6 obtain maxium blast and fragmentution effoct againsthe refinery installations. which constituted the major faoilities inthe targearea". Since the majority of tho storage tanks in the target area nare si3l11~ i

was believed that impact initiation of the non-delay tail fuze T1O:udesult IIIsufficient crushing force to destroy the tanks recoi ving direct hit~ There:f'ore

delay fuzing, whi.ch nOl.l.ld13.110\1penetration into the tanks , \7ascons~dered.un-

necessa:ryo

b. BombingD3.ta: (See Part II •• \nnex A.. for chart on moan poin~s of im

pact.) e- ..\xes of attack. bombing alti tudos. initial points and other perhnent bo

ing data oore to be as follows:.

-3"

il.iIJl



MissionJ : I l u m b e r 'hng

251 58th

252 73rd

253 31.:;Jth 2 7 5

3 1 4 t h 15

315th 4 7

2 5 4

25 5

.')xis of'

~~ttack

(degrees)

3 2 2

3 9

. § ! ! QR~1

Bambing Ini.tia1 Drift Length Time of

.A1titu('ie Point degrees of Ru n Run

(feet ) right (Mile,s) (Min}

10~000 .. 351B30N- 7 27 7~

10,800 1402500E

7;000 .. 3l~1930N- 6 29 7

7,800 13441JOE

7; 000- 345830N- 1 35 loi

7,800 l3907,JOE

13;200- 343bN - 8 7 5 1714.000 13B14E

10 ; 0 0 0 - 335000N- 2 30t 6!10,800 1344430E

(2) Navigatio.n; il.ircraf't t:1ere to 1.1130 too followinz routes:

(a) Mission 251:.

Target

to.

3535 N..1403 1Eto.

. 3 .§20Ni -14045Eto .Iwo Jima to Base

BeaBORS for Selection- -

Tactical llietrine

point on the eastern

s;;lected as the init

en d 0Land IS end.

. ' 1 . 180 degree turn ":7as specified to lan

This dead reckoning point naB selected to keep out of' bo

stream on the approach to the initial point.

Tactical Doctrine

(b), Mission Number 252:

HQute

Base to. Iuo Jima

to351830N-1402500E (IF), Tata Saki Cape. an easily identified

to side of peninsula Gut from Tokyonaa

POh1t.

dhiba urban az-eas

Base t·o 1wo Jima

to

3 3 50N-13 4 4 5E

to341930N-l3441.30E (IP)

toTarget

to

3452N-13505Eto3456N-13440E

to

3333N-13419EtoIUD Jima to Base

l'!.easons for. Selectian-

Tactical Doctrine.

Landfall '\18.5 to be the easily identified point just left

0£ I Sh im a.MinotPoiht on the west side of .maji Shilm 7.'hich nad.e t

best approach to the target uas selected as initial poin

•.ocashi urban area.o

This point nas designated to avoid flak.

To avoid flak, a left turn tlas to be made at Hil::leji.

Tactical Doctrineo.

(c) ~saion NUmber 253~

goute

Base to Iuo Jima

to3 .441N-1927Eto

Reasons for Selegtion

Ta ct ic al Doc trin e

This point was the louer tip of 0 Shima and ROuld malco a

easY t urn to the in it ia l p oin t."'1; . • • . , •

..- 4.-



Tactical Dcctrine

'§!QR~!

~4583UN-1390730E (II') A jutting point just east of the city of Ito and nhich ',(a

; 0 · easily identified by radar was selected as tho initiel poiarget Shimizu urban area .•to

;~OlN-138l5E Thia point was designated to avoid flak.

The landfall point selcctca ' :' l'BS ju..t to left af :.!urato

Point, making a straight line to the target through tho

to initial point. .

333000I'I-1344430E .(I~) The jutti.z:lg point of land at the entrance to Osaka Bay,ma~d.M the best approa.oh to the targett :las specified as

th~ initial point.

Maruzen Oil Refinery.

bo Jima. to Base

Base to I ..o Jimato

3 4 3 6 .N-, .13 8 l 4 E (IP)toTargetto

3 51N -19 0 9 Eto

11'10 ·Jima to Base

Base to Irlo J:ima.

to

3322N-l.3403E

Target

t o

33J .5N; -13557Et o

(d) Missian N..unber.254:

Reasons for Selection

Tactical Doctrine

Omai Saki Point,easily id.cntificd for the radar approach

to the target I'ras selected as the intial point.

Kbfu urba:narea.

land.' send.

Ta c tic a l D oc t rin e.

(e) Mission Number 25 5 :.

Reasons for Selootio;g.

T&ctical I:oct;rine·

1wo Jima to Base Tactical Doctrine •.

Land f S end fl.

(3) Flight Engin~eringl.

1.. .....ltitudes and speeds. except for the bccbing run and

compression of tho striking force. oore to be in accordanco 0 1 1 tt:. XXI.Ecobzr O

mand Taciiieal Doctrine. No assemblieS rrere to be effected.

(a) F0r Missions Number 2 5 1 . through .254.; .

~. Fuel reserve data indicatoo. that the 58th, 7]rd. 3lJand 314th ~ving t70uld not require bombbay tanks, and. that a total fuel load ot

approximately 6700 gallons ,lould be carried.

10 No max imum or minimum bomb loads "ere specified. Boo

loa ds . .. .re to bo as folIous:

lUng

58th

73rd3l3 th3l4th

pounds 0

Potep.tialQapaci ty• (Pounds)

17;00017;000

16; 0 0 0

14,000

Expected .:I..vorw.(Pounds)

15;000

15~000

16; 0 0 0

1.4.000

!!.. The ammunition load por aircraft "l7SS estimated :It 300

- 5 -



(b) ~ ssion' NUrnmber 255:

, 1. Except for the .bombing run and compression of the str~ng force, all aircrai't were to fly at speeds and altitudes. nhioh oould a110u

maximum range and safety. ~ peeas would be approximately 5 miles per hour highethan the speeds reco~m~ in the XXI Bomber Command Tactical Doctrine. NOa ss em blies w ere to b e ef fec ted.

2. The expected fuel load was to be carried in full uingand ceuter uing tanks. Estimated bomb load waS to 18,000 pounds.

(4) Radar Mission Plann,ins:

(a) Mission NUmber 251: Chiba is located on the eastern coas

Of Tokyo Bay. giving an excellent radar return.. The approach to the city is

gOVcl'ned by the flak defenses and by the difficulty of choosing initial points.

A good approach would be from the Bouth~est, utilizing check points along the

eastern peninsula in Tokyo Bay., This axis runs the gauntlet of heavy antiair

craft and searchlight def ense s 8 The only other run is from t he southeast, usin

331830N- 14 02500E as the initial po'i rrt and \7 aS selected because this point is

distinctive and had been used successfully on previous strikes in the Tokyo ar

Radar winds could he obtainedf'rom the island chain betrreen 1"0 Jima and OShima

and the point at 34 5~13951E~ Direct synchronous bombing Yas to be employed.

The cross wind run was not expected to cause great cross- trail errors in the

incendiary clusters bacaase the estimated altitude winds ~uld not be strong.

(b) Mission ~ber 2,2: :lkashi is a familiax target area an

the plan was to be simi lar to the one used on the Empire Plan to target 154 7(Kauasaki :drcraft Plant at .\kashi). The bust axis 'ilOuld be fl"om the southeast

striking tho city perpendicular to the longitudinal axis. In this rray all azi

muth errors rrould be in the target area. MQst of tbe present bombing errors

axo in deflection due to poor radar uinds or poor refinement of drift. The ci

is along the coast and can be identified very easily.. The initial point.

341930N-!344130E, is a' prominent' coastal checkpoint on ••waji-Shim9.. Using an

altitudeef 7,000 to 7,800. feet, the bombing was to be by direct synchronous

methode. The maQY peninsulasprior to the initial point offer excellent points

mW(ing radar wind runs.

(c) Mission Number 253: Shimizu is another coastal city rrhcan be easily identified. ~he route to the initial point has'many ideal isl3D

checkpOints for establishing a radar wind. The initial point, 345830N-139073oE

is on the peninsula in the Sagami-Nada. The westorly axis lTas to be perpen-

dicular to the long axis of the city. .1 . distinctive referanee point is the

curved peninsula in the harbor area. The city is built along the coast and si

past errors were greater in deflection, this axis lTas recommended as the best.

(d) Mission Number 2 5 4 : Kofu is ono of the first inland

cities to be attacked by incendiaries at night. With'MOunt Fuji at 12.]88 feet

and a mountain of 10.000 feet to the rrost of the city, it ~ aS felt that the

mission altitude should be higho For this reason, an altituda of 13,200 to

14,000 i'eet was specified.. Most lTings wer-o in favor of a higher alti tude in. o

to accomplish good synchronous release'.. Thit target rrould be an excellent Cl.ty

to compare final results becauso, heretofore, 10,000 - 10,800 feet has been the

highost altitude usedin night incendiary attacks. Tho best axis is from.34 36~

138148 which is the landfall point and also the initial point., MOunt FuJi use

considered to be an idoal referenoe point for loacating the oity signal. From

radar reconnaissance photos, the city stands out as a ~ell defined signal. KDt

has bewn used as an initial :point on most of the missions into the Tokyo aroa.

Direct synchronous release Was to be used.

(0) Mission lfumber 255: This mission to the Maruzon 011 Re -

finory was planned to give the opt imum approach for the . > F Q - 7 equipment. Tho r

quiramantssat up tor' planning vere r 1 0V i drif t f 'a ot ot , gOOd landfall pbint tort h e initial wind run, a ~cf'inite radar initial point, and, It possible, a ... 11. .

- 6 -



turn at the initial point. Based on these requirements for radar navigation, a:o~te was chosen fl'hich approxirmted a straight line frOlll landfall through tho~n~tial point to the target. Landfall was designated as 3322N-13403E. Thispo~nt is t h e promontory on the coast, 10 miles north of tho distinctive point= lan,d at Muroto-S9.kio. Mlroto-·Saki is on the southeast tip of Shikoku umchloa!-.deal for a radar wind run. The initial point is 45 nautical miles from~a~dfall and should be within easy range after making the turn at landfall. Th

lonltialpoint is a d.istinctive peninsula at 335000N-1344430E. The course to~he initial point slides alomg the eastern coast of' Shikoku and will be an aidan establisl::l.ing oourse. and drift. Tlw,. ini tial point turn necessi tatea a very

small correction of only 3 degrees in course. The Naruzen Oil Refinery is onth~ coast with a river running along the northorn side of the'target. It showup oa the dP0-7 as a n exoellent return. On the first mission. a n altit~e of'

15,000 feet was specifiedo The results "/ere'negligible, but II l8.I\y close hitsqere ~do.. Therefore, for the second attack, an altitude of 10,000 feet uasplannedo.

1 . 0 ' Each aircraft uas to carry rope to be dispensed ahan

protection was needed from radar 00 ntrolled flak and searchlights.

2. Since the 315th l'Tingrras not equippBd with HC2'.1quipt

search a nd jam min g could not be conducted.

(6), .lir-Sea Flescue:; (See part. VI,..amex .i, for deta~ls~). The N

was furnished with detai. Is of the'missions and provided the £0 llcn:l ng ·•.lr-se~Rescue facilities: '10 submarines, 10 dumbos. and 4 surface vessels. In add1

to' these facilities, the Navy assigned crash boats in the vicinity of the

COJllDlandases f'or take-ofts and landings.. This Commandassigned 5 supordumbo

orbit the submarine positions.

(a) For Mission 251 through 254:

1. Four special jamming aircraft were recommendedfor

use on the mission to the Chiba Urban .irea because of the searchlight-day figh

combination activity along the approach •. Twoof the special aircraft ~cte toorbit in a 10-dlile radius circle about 3532N-140l0E at an altitude of' 15,000

for one aad 15.500 feet for the other •. The other 2 aircraft IT8rG to Orbit in

lO-mile 'radius arotJ.E.dthe center at 3536N-14008Eat an altitude of 16,000 faet

for one, and 16,500 feet for the other._ These special janming aircraft nere

barrage jam the 190-?lO megacycle and 78 megacycle regions and spot jam any g

laying or searchlight signals appearing outside the barrage. Jdditional quan

tities € I f rope wexe to be carried by these aircraft:.

'~o No special jammi.ng aircraft "lTererecoIl'lr:lendedor

Missiens .Numberedi!52, 253, aM 254 because of mager flak and. searchliGht de

fenses in these areas s. .lll strike ai.rcraft were to carry jamming equip!!l0nt.

Ropo was t o be carried and dispensed in accordance ui th existing regulations.

(b) Mission Number 2'i5:

do Dgtails of Planning--Intelligonce:

(1) Enemy Fighter Reaction:

Estimated NUmberof Enemy Fightera P.robab1a ;~unt of Oppositio

2.5 12.522.532.542 5 5

2 510 to 15J S to 20aO to 2 520 to 25

Negligible to weak.Nil to treak.Nil to negligibleNil to negligibleNb glis ib 1e t o wo ak

- 7 ..



(2) Enemy}.ntiaircrai't:

(a) Mission N~ber 251: The antiaircraft defenses at Chiba

>;l'e~ea s follows: h e a v y guns. 1 0 ; mediumweapons, 4 4 ; and searchlights. lb.Thl.s was a very ma.qgordefense against night at tack, Onlymeager to moderate

flak Was e~ected. but the route necessarily crossed a part of the outer soareh

1igbt de! enso s of Tokyo (Chiba Peninsu la ).. ..:.tthe planned a1titud e of attack,10,000 to 10.800 feet, the medium flak would have slight to nil Elffect on the .

attacking aircraft. It was planned to approach this tarbet from the southeast,

with a 180 degree tuxn follO\ving bombs a'ilay. This route would avoid all otherf·1ak areas and would not expose the aircraft to tpc Tokyo defenses.

(b) Massion Number252: The defenses of :~shi pere as fol-

lows: heavy guns, 19; mediumweapons, 18; and searchlights, 2. This was a ver

uoak. defense against night attack' and flak 'I'ms6xpected to be nil to meager at

the planned altitu.de of attack (7,000 to 7.800 feet). The approach uas planned

From the sotlth'l7est •. avoiding flak ar-oas on Shikoku. .1 left breaka\7ay, avoiding

t he Himeji defenses, was specified.

(c) Mission NUmber253: In the Shimizu-Shizuoka area there

were the following antiaircraft defenses: heavy guns. 20; medium :reapons, 25;

and searchlights, 1estimated 2 to 6 ) . This area ~s very sparsely defended

agains t night attack at the planned a1t i tude (7, 000 to 7,Boofeat). The route

was planned to avoid the defenses of Numazuand Kambaraon the north shore of

Suruga Bayo The breakaway vraa due wost and then southwest to land's and.

Cd) Meager and inaccurate heavy flak habeen encountered over Kofu on daylight missions, horrever, PhotOGraphic recon-

maissanco failed to indicate defenses located there. .1 13.200 to l4,OOO-foot

attack altitud.e flas planned iE. vieQ' of the proximity of the course to Mount Fu

~:..tthis altitude. flak was no problem in planning. Tho route nae just bU'cly

range of the Shizuoka defenses, but only meager and inaccurato flak ~ expect

from tnose defenses.

(e) Meager and inaccurate flak h o o been

encountered at 1,7akayamabut there rrer-e no adequate photographs of the area to

confirm it at the 15,000 to 16.000 foot altitude planned. Flak lTas of minor i

portance. The route was planned to avoid all knOl7ndefenses.

J. EXECUTION OF THE MISSIONS:

a. Take Of.!: Take-offs \7ere accomplished as fo11otT9:

Mission i1iM _?mthfindor Aircraft Strilro Aircraft. _First Take-ott' last 'nlka-

251 58th

252 73;rd

253 313th

254 314th

255 315th

XXI Bomber Command

117 060939Z 06u06z

1 1 9 060B06Z 060912Z

l24 060849Z 06l0J4Z

125 060730Z 0609123

~ 0607002 o60B09Z

545· 060700Z 061106z

12

12

12

13

49

* This total docs not include 4 ROMaircraft and 5 SUpor-Dumbos.

b. Route Out, long range navigation was accomplishod to all targets

by individual aircraft. A total of 8 navigators for. all 5.wings had c6urso er-rors at landfall deamed to be excessive. Corroct or1ontahon tl8S made. h o we f t Z

and no aircraft failed to bombthe primary tarsot booause of navigational or . ror

o. Over Target I

- 8 ..



(1) Prima;ry Tar[':ets: Targot ez-ca nav:Lgation, 'i7ind determination.aM bombing liore accomplished by radar. 'ilind.s in tho target areas varied from

270 to 300 degree.s at 20 to 25 knots respoctively" .'.. total of 570 :8-29'5 dropC

6d4306 tons of inc<lndiary and g£meral PUXP013C bombs en' tho primary targets f

o 14l9Z to Ob1905Zat altitudes ranging from 6,900 1 ;0 17.,100 feet.

(2) Tax/i1:0tS of 0PIl0rtumty: .Five B-29's, 2 of which a13.0bombedprimary targets, droppod 2:3.3 tons of incendiary and general purpose bombs onvarieus targets of o p p o r t t l 1 l i t y o

(3) Remainder of F o r c o ; There wore 21 non-affoctive aircraft.

d . Route B a c k : Returns t o bases ' l 7 t ; J r c s briefed. q i t h the exception21 B-29 '8 "hich landed at bo Jima.

0.. Landing: .<lixcraft la,nded at home bases under good Heather condi.-tions as follows;

Mission YEing First landing last .landing

231 58th 0622512 0702432

252 73rd 0620402 0700012-

253 313th 0621QOZ 062334Z

25 4 314th 062128Z 062352Z

23 5 315th 0621012 062257Z

XXI Bomber Command 0620403 070214.33

f. los se8i One B-29 of the 313t h "ling was los t -:<hen it ran of f the

end of the runway because of brake failure. .nIl cre;nncillhers woz-e saved.

s- Operations Sun:mary:

(1) Navigation (See Part I, ,.i.nnex.~. for Track Chart.) NaTigat

and t i m e c6ntrol as a whole 7Iere considered satisfactory on these missions.There were. howev.er, more individual discrepancies than on previous missions.

These diserepanciGS l 7 0 r e made by approximately 1.3 percent of the aircraft ba

ing thetarget.s and l7ere net considered cxcessiTe.

(2) Bombing: (See Part III. ~.nnex .~, for dct9.ils.) Most of thebombing was accGlUplished by radar.

(3) Flight Engineering: (See Part IV, .mnox _ I . , for Chart, and

Consolidated Stat,istical Summary, .lnnax E, for details.)

(a) Narrative of Missions as FlOI'nH

1. Cruise to tho Mainland.: IndiTidu.al climbs t7ere mad

imrnediatGly after takG-off to altitudes botn-een 4.000 and 8,000 feet l1here the

initial cruise rras flol7n. N6 assemblies "I1eremade. Compression of the foroes

"\"laseffected by varying crUising altitudes and air speeds.

g. 136mbHUlU Bombing"as conducted by individual air-craft at al titudes bet\,een 6 . f ; m o and 17,100 fect.

j. Return to Base; Return to bases 'lias conducted by in

dividual aircraft >1 ithout difficulty. Min imum fuel was used by airplanes orW.ing at 10,000 t o 12,000 feet and desconding into the traffic pattern. Maximum

rango speeds as specified by this headquarters aavo the best fuol oonsumption.

(b) Comments; No airplanes carried bombbay tanka. ..11 ' 3 1 .

- 9 ..



§~Q1!!X

eXcept th e 315t h. carried ful loads of bombs. Th o 3 l5 th ~ 'lillB .a rry in g 5 00 -po~nd General Purpose bombs. carried an a~Grage of 7 4 percent of f ull load cap -aC1ty a nd la ndod uith an a verage of 1386 gallons of fuol,

(2) Enem.y ;~ntiaire.raft: (See Part II •. innex D. for details.) li

tle antiarcraft opposition w a s encountered on these missions. TWoaircraft ofthe 31jth ,7il'lgsustained flak; damage on Mission N..unber2.53 against Shimizu.

0) Damage l~sessment: (See Part III, .UUle:&: D, for details.) I l !

age to targets as a result of these missions WlS as fo11011s:

(a) Mission M.unbor251. Chiba Urban .>rea: ~.pproximately.86

square miles 0r 43.4 per cent of the built-up portion of the City.

(b) Mis,sion Number252 •• lkashi Urban .lrea: .•pproximatoly .8

square miles or 57 per cent of the city's built-up area.

(c) Mission Number253. Shimizu Urban .\rea' .pproxiIllfltoly .square miles or 50 per cent of the oi ty Is built-up area.

(d) Mission Number254. Kofu Urban .droa: dpproximately 1.3Square miles or 6 5 per Qont of tho city's built-up area.

(e) Mission ffumber255! Maruzon Oil Roi'inerxl ••pproxilllatal.T

409.975 squaro feet or approximatoly 79.1 per cent of the total roof area.

(4) Radar: (See Part V. :mnex ". for details and Radar Charts,).:..11 bombing "as accomplished by radar.

(5) Gunnery: See Part VI, Annex .', for details.

(6) ....r-8ea Rescue: (See Part VII •• snnex "', for details.) Thorewera not di tchings or bailouts, and all aircraft :-I(';ro accounted for.

no Weather: (See .mnex B, for details.) ':Jeather on these I:lissionsWas approximatcly as prcdi cted.

i. Communications:

(1) ROM: (Soe Part I, Annex Ct for details.)

(a) The special jamming aircraft used by the 58th ling on its

mission to Chiba WOIleemployed successfully. ,), total of 15 signals .ver inter-

copted and ja~od. Cloud cover in the Chiba area aided in prevent ina effectiveUse of searchliehts.

(b) The 31.5th 'Jing 'i1hich was not yet equipped :tith eloctronic

jammers, employed repe as a countermeasure with excellent results.

(2) Radio: (See Part II. ;mnex C. for details.) There :lere no

breaches of net discipline or violattons of security reported during tbese cia-

sionso

j. Intelligence Summary:

(1) Enemy .'ar Qbposition: (See Part I, .Ul!lCX D, for details.)

proximately 60 to 70 ehenzy-fighters were sighted on theso missions, ':lith only 5attacks being made against B-29's. NoB-29's were lost or damaged as a res~t

these attackso B-29 crows made no claims.



A

O P E R A T I O N S

Part I ... Navigation 'I'raek Chart

Part II- Mean Points of Iinpact

P a r t I I I . . . o m b i n g

Part IV ...Flight Engineering Chart

P a r t V . . R a d a r a n d R a d a r C h a r t s

Part VI - G u n l i l e r y

P a r t V I I . . . . . .r - S e a R e s e a e C h a r t

Missions No. 251. 2 5 2 , 2 5 3 . 2 5 4 . and 2 5 5

6 Jul3' 1945

......



I

I

AP~ll 1945

130"

S.ECR£TART I NAVIGATION,

1350

I

III

I-----T-

II

II

OKIN. 4WA

LEGEND LAND FA LL

1M lQst------ 5Sth.-061633l OSI747Z------ 73rd.- OSI459l 061S09lI:----313th.- OSI50Sl OSI647l-_x-314th.- OS.1425.l 061611C_-_. 31SItl,- 0613SSi! 061446l

II

II

130. 135"

{ }

I_ - . - . . . 1 - - · · -35

IIII

'-CHICt-l1 JIMA

~•

IWO JIMA

1st. lQst58th.- 0613092 061427173n:1.- 061126l" OSI235Z. - 2313th.- OEiI206l OEiI!4'12314th.- 06 . 063ISth.- 061037l 061130l

TARGET

1st06163ge061515t!061533206,1447i!061419l

LQsr06190Si!-061627lOS1710.Z0616352OGISleZ

TRI Ioex CtilloRT XXI BOMBER COMMAND SECRET



I

MISSilON NO.255WAKAYA~A AREATARGET NO. 90.'25-1;7643!5th. Wing.

R T II

oj IMPACT



§!QBld.!PARr III - llmmL'Il'G

//

1. Mission No. 2..51. Chiba Urban Area:

a. The greatest difficulty enc mntered was a 10/10 undercaBtin t h e target area. Aircraft with inoperative radar h a d difficulty

making visual corrections since only a glcm on the cLcud ccu1d be seen.Three aircraft enccuntered rack mali'ullGtions. One aircraft equipped

with A-2 releases was unable to release banbs by salvo or electrically.The bonbardiera released the bcmbsmanually over water.

b. The initial point and axis or attack were very satisfactOl"3The average drift reported was 30 right. Ca.npressibility far this wingwas 14 6 minutes.

2. Mission No. 252, Akashi Urban Area:

a. An undercast was encQJntered until after ban.bs away. The

aFea immediately over the target wes clear, but the clear area was nat

graa t en cugh t 0 pennit easy vi sual e err-eo t i OIlS forth C6 E : ai reraft with

inoperativeradarc Six aircraft enca.:mtered radar malfuncticns and the

banbs were dropped by dead reckoning navigation methcd. Three aircraft

reported malfunction Of A-2 releases and racks and one malfunction ofunknOlln cause.

be The axis of attack and Initial Point were considered :Jell

selected.. The in1 tial point was easily identified on the r-ader scope

and the axis of atta'ck fran the initial point to the targe1: proved high-

ly satisfaetory. The average drift reported was 50 right. Ccopressi-

bility for this wing was 72 minutes.

J. Mission No. 253-, Shimizu Urban Area.:

a, The difficulties ene cuntered were 9 to 10/10 undercast and

thermalS in the target area. SOIle aircraft were able to make visual

rate corrections when the breaks in the undercast pennitted. Tbe al.r-

craft banbing during the latter part of the strike encwntered hishsmoke columns which to.7ered abore the banbing al ti tude. The t!:.en::als

at the banb release line caused sone aircraft difficulty. Three

aircraft reported malfunction of ~IO shackles.

bo The initial point and axis of attack nere reported as sat-

isfaetory and contributed ccnsiderably to the ease or executiIlo the mis-

sion. The average drift reparted was 2 degrees left. DClll.pressibility

for this wing was 97 minutes.

4. Mission No. 2.54, Kofu Urban Area:

a.. The greatest difficulty enccuntered was tbemals at the

banb release line, for aircraft baubing during the latter part cL the

strike peri ado Sane aircraft were forced to change their axis c :L

attaok t a avoid flying thrwgh high SClolce columns. uhioh t ooered above

the bonbing altitude. Three airoraft reported mal1'unction of :s-10

shackles and 5 aircraft reported mal1'unctions of unknam cause.

b. The ini tiel point and axis of attaok were reported satis-

factory.. The average drift reported TIas 50 right. Canpressibility

for the wing was 108minutes.

5. ~~ss_~~ N0~_~ '?2 'Maruzen Oil lie finery a

a. The banbardier and radar operator had scme diffioulty

synehronizing due to the 10.7 altitude flCJl'lnand the short time alloree!tor synchronization. One airoraf't enoountered difficulty with banb

bay doors and 8800 PQ1nds of banba \"lere jettiscned inel'feotively OFN'

water •

"14-



c . . . 1 3 o p ? . t : I

,LtJ/N;;> /6>000 ., ... '

( )QS)

/f

(.JEt.

"?6S[RY/ /;; 00 .".,..,

( C Y I 9 ~ ) ,/ , t J 0 0

-Y'oo

-7000

6~t)00 ... "

· · · · · 1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · : · · · · · · · · · · ·

. " , , ,. · · . . . . . . .. . . . . .··?..·.... · .................' - " 1 " ' - - '

~ ~ L .

~ l;

" , ~ - ' r . .

h - . . . an' 1 ' , - ~ , ~

·····,·····.-t.·-·~--·d. ._ . . . . - - .

J I , ; ; : l j i ~ { . + - + . . . .

. _ . _ 1 . . • . . • . : . . . •



PilRT V - RAD .'ffi.

1. Badal."Bombing;

(1) Number of sets operative on taka-off: 515.

(2) Of 01./0 bombing - number of sets operative over target:

(3) Percentage 0pers tive over t argots .; 9 6 % .

(4,) Number of sets operative on landing: 487.

(5 ) Total J V C us ing azimuths tab in zation: 379.

(6 ) Percentage of bombing ,Ale us ing az imutb. stab ili zat ion:

(7) iJ,verage maximumr8nc;e in nau.tical miles of targets:

5000-10000 foet - 7 510000-15000 feet - 68

(8) ;l.verMc maximumrange in nautical miles or beacons:

130 at 8,000 feet.

124 from 5,000 - 10,000 feet.

141 at 11,130 feet.

(9) olvera,ge maximum range of Japanese Coast: 55 nautical

miles.

(10) Throe set failures in pathfindor ";0.

(11) Interference varied from light to intense. The r:ain

dHfic\l.lty was tho heavy cloud COVer, thus making landfall difficult.

b. ~:

( 1 ) 6 0 sets operative at t9kc-off.

(2 ) . 5 9 sets opera tive over target.

(3) 58 sets opeTative Oil return to bal!ie.

(4J M9.ximum range of beacons - 100 nautical mil<;;lsat 9,000

feet.

(s)Maximum range of targets - 4 5 nautical miles at 11,000

feet.

(6) Int·erf erence _ ·.leather and stati c oLeetri city.

(7) Coast of Empire pickod up at 6 0 nautical milos.

(8 ) Equipment fa ilures - 1~

(9) Comments on recurring troubles - boacons not proporJ,y

turned, poor range, camera malfunctions.

2. Radar Navigation rlPN-4i APN-9:

a. NUmberot loran fixos reported' 2698.

- 17 -



(1) Ground11ave: 550 533 43 5

b • .m.te.I).na us ed and uaab Lo maximum range:.

Trailing Command

(2) Sky-Wave: 1133 1250 ],220

c. No int·€I,rference was reported except· in electrical storms.

d. Eleven sets Vlere repQrtea as inoperative.

3. IFF - 800-695;

a. Sets turned en and off as per SOP.

b. Sets checkGd on aV0rage of 35 times per "VO.

c. only 2 .sets 'il'cre inoperative.~

4. .'I.b.8011.:lte .•ltimeter - Sc :R-71.S.

a. Sets operative on mi.ssion - 255.

b. Only 1 malfunction was i'epo~ted~

Cormucnts:

Direct radax-bombsiglit bor(lMng :Jas prGdomina.nt > 7 i th some groups

using fixed a ~ g t e r el ea s e.



UF

466.6IF

200

1. No. of A le firing~__ ....... -,

2. Average turret lca.·d:

3. No. Of ' r cunds fCired in CQ1lbat per tur;r-et:

UF UA t. lA IF

0 0 150 0 0

4 . No: . of XOlDdB fireq, in eanbat 150 •

5. No. of ,t'a.ndS used for test firing 5095 •

6. Guns LQaded: 58th ".Hng 73rd ·iling..313th_:;~ipg S.l!t.h_1liM.3.15

Hot Cold Hoi Hot Col

7. Malf'unction~: C.FoGDynamO!;or rut

Tu.rret 1M in tracking

stO;;ing circuit O J . .t

1speed system mt

C..l..L .50 M.G •.ammuni tion jams -2

Guns cut of time ..

bolt switch bac~ard

( .l~l5 MalfunctioIlS- sixteen (16)

8. Equipment ope.rati on (T'otal percentage operative).

D.FCC; ,

9 9 . 8 %

OAt. ..5D.M.G.

9 9 . 7 & 1 .

9. Remarks: A~15 malfun.ctions nere due to lack of knmledgeof set.

* ' Based en ifing Gunnery Officer's Reports.

- 2 4 . -



APRIL 1945PART .JlIL AIR-SEA

. J

I

Ir

I

_._ .- + -IIII

I c r e $ h boots assfgned 10 I

I,'elnlty of l:i)mmcindbask

I~ '0'.·0I1~' I ~ ' ; " " II

e- SUBMARINE

0- SURFACE VESSEL

A~.~AVY DUNBOSUP ER D UNB O

Submarines a Surklce ves were 10 remain allslationfor Ihe entire minI

DUf/lbos a Super-bumbos, leapt thOSI where ·limaon 'stolion is indicated. wer"lta remain on stationfor the passIng of all jke AlC.

II13S-

TRAGIC OHART XXI BOMBER COMMAN!> SECR£T

SE

\_... _\_.

\

I

1

I

-

II

'·CHICHI JIMA II

'.

I-_. --.+_.JIMA I

III



: : : : _ -

B

Pa!IJ:tI-·;Ieather Sur~

Part II - Cha·rt -Forecast vs _Observed ,leather

Rut HI - Pr~nostic Map

Fa.rt rv ,...SYnqptic Map

Missions NO.D 251. 252. 259. 254 & 255

s July 1945



,.

PUNNING FOREC.'lST

Bases: 5-7/10 10v e1cuds. base 1800 ft. topa 10,000 it uith few to

25 .000 it. and light to moderate ah one r-a m .til5/10 miRdle

clcuds. S.t 13.000 ft in morni~. Chud. amamt decreasing grad

ually a.n aft ernoon t0 4/10 ,. base 2000 it. tops 6000 ft.T0 180 N_; as bases.

TOe oast: 4-6/10 leu clruds. base 2000 ft, tcps 6000 itwithfeu tops t0 IB~OOO ft andl7idely scattered shmers.

TokYo: 8-10/10 100 clruda, base 1500 ft,. tope 5000 ft 'I1ith

10/10 middle ?lruds in broken layers fr<lJl 10.000 ft to 16,00

ft amd 7/10 h1gh clouds at 26,000 ft. Slro cIearancc.. in

afternoon to broken 101 and scattered mid.dle clruda.

Reat; 5: 1 flm wi th 6-8/10 100 c1OJ . dB on. l7in.mard elopes and

shores and )-4/10 on lee sides l1ith 5-6/10 llatchy middlecLoa d at 14-16,000. .

ROJ..te:

Targets:

OPEf LT ION l ..L FOREO....s r

Bases at

Take-qff:

R~te;

S~att ered 10fl, mi.ddle and high cloods rd th scattered lightsho;.el"s~

There will be sea.tte.red lOri, middle and high clcuds 17ith

scattered light shmera at smthern end of the zane to 2Jo NFran 23° N to 3J~ there 'd'Ul be scattered to br oken 1m clc

and sCattered middle and high cLcuds, FrQll JJo N to target

there will be Mattered 1m and high eLcuds :'lith scattered

to broken :middle eLcu da,

Rob: .5/10 cumulus, base 1800 it, top 6-10.000 ft; 5/10 alt

stratus in layers between 16,000 it and 18.000 it; 4/10 cirru

at 30.000 ft. ';{inds at 14,000 ft 'I1i11 be 2900 at 20 knots.

Chiba; 6/10 cumulus, base 1800 ft. top 6000 ft; 4/10 alto-

s tr8 tus I bas e 15, 000 ft, top 17,.000 it; 3/10 cirrua at JO,00

ft. ·,/inds at 10.000 £t will be 3000 at 20 kIlots.Shimizu: 6/10 cumulus, base 2000 ft, top 6000 ft; 4 /10 alto

stratus at 15,000 ft; 3/10 cirrus at 30,OCO ft. ./inda at

8000 ftwill be 3000 at 20 knots.

Akashi ~, 4/10 5tt'a toou:mulus, base 2000 ft, top 6000 ft j Ii 1c ir:rus at ,30,000 ft. Winds at B oDO rt 3000 at 15 knots.

',fakayama.: ·4/10 stratccUIllu1us, base 2000 ft, top GoOD ft; l/cirrus at 30,000 ft. ilind.s at 10,000 itwill be 3000 at 15knots.

Targets:

Bases an

:Return; Scattered 10'1, middle and. high clmda.

OBS ER VE D ,1 E:I.T HE R

Bases at 4-6/10 lew cLcuds , base 1800 ft, tops 6000 ft with patches a

Take-off: 6/10 middle eleud estimated 14,000 ft. Visibility unrestrict-

Route to ed. To 20° N: 4-6/10 100 clcuds, base 1500 tcps 5-7000 ft wtarget s : f'e'd' t O]_)S t 0 20.000 it and cecas i(Ilal light niIlB visi ble. oneline of cLcud near 170 Nwith tops to 2.'),000 ft abcut 10 miles tride.

To 32° N; 2...4/10 lew' cLcude, base 2000 re , tops. 4000 ft.jlo ceast: 100 clood increasing rapidly to 6..8/10 with tops 8 to 11,000.;

and half of to]_)s to 17-20.000 ft uith 8/10 middle elcuds at

13,000 ft, to]_)s unkncwn, and scattered high clwds. I

Targets: Ohiba~ 10/10 1~ c1euds, base unknam, tops 6..7000ft. 7/10

thin middle clouds at eatimated 17,000 ft. Visibilityabewe

e1md unrestricted. iUnda at 10.000 it I16re .3000 at 22 knots

Kof'll, 8/10 1017elwds, with tops 8-11,000 tt and 5110 middlecLoada near 11,000 ft, tops 13,000 ft and seoOlldlayer, c: L

middle cLcuds at 18.00Q ft. Few breaks a110R'8d sane V1sual

ehecka OIl banbing. ·,Hnds at J4.000 ft nere 2950 at 25 knots_Shimizu: 4-10/10 107 olwds, tops 7500 it l7ith 6/10 tlliamiddle cloud in soattered layers 11-20,000 ft. Vi81b111t1 10

m1~es. IlindB at BOOOft uere 290° alO 20 lal~~.Akashil 4-8/10 lar olcudS. tapa 7000 tt and 8/10 m144I. olGa

- 27 -



. .



, , - - . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . - ~"I\

- . . .. I



$.

...!

3yNOPr. c MAP

/ o;Z

t:;~6-U4~!._1,!94S

.i ' P A L A u



o

Fart I • Radar Crunter Measu.res

Fast n-Radio

6 July 1 9 4 5 .



p:.m I _ :R O M

10 Bl.rpose:

a. To D/F early rlarning. gunlaying and searchlight radars.

b. To conduct a general search in the 20-3000 me region.

" c. To barrage jam the enenzy-gunlaying and searchlight radarslnvthe 72-84 ll£ and 190-210 me bands and to spot jam any gunlaying orsearchlight signals appearing Oltside the barrage.

d. To confuse enemy searchlight and gunlaying radars by the

use of rope.

20 Method.:

ao Tl7enty-foor R;M observers participated and used the toll-CUing equiPll€!ot to accanplish the search and jamming: 359 - ."..P1'-1,

192 - ;l.I'Q,-2, 12 - . : JQ;- 8. 23 - l.ET- 3 (Modified). 2 4 . . . l.ffi-4, 18 .. .;.,pl.. n,2 - ARB-7t 4 . ,A.Nt . .5 . 6 :~.PA-4 and 1 .. . \ P . . ; s . _ 6.

b. Rope was dispensed at the rate of 3 rund1es per 10 secondswben protection '11aS needed fran searchlights.

c. Four special jamming airplanes'l7ere anplq;red by the 51)th

";'{ing, target Chiba, to circle the target area during the strike.

These special j azmnine ; airI1lanes were equipped to barrage the 72-84 m eand 190-210 me regions and to spot jam allY gunlaying or radar signals

that appeare d <lJ.tside the barrage band. In addi ti em, each strUm air-

plaBe carried fran 1 to 2 jammers tuned to a frequency vithin the

barrage band.

3. Results I

a. The speoial janming airplanes allpeared to be successful.

.A . total of 15 signals with gunlaying and searchlight characterist icswere intercepted and j_ed. CIQl.d cover in the Chiba area prevented

ef fec tiv e u se of searchlights.

b. Seventy intercepts were recorded and are listed at the

end of this section.

c. The 315th 'lUng, target Maruzen Oil Refinery, ass not yetequiPlled aith electrcnio jammers and rOJlElwas the anly 0cuntenaeaaure

emplqyed.

4. Remarke1

a, ROJlElwas dispensed as a defensive meaaure against ~fighters" an 2 CQcasions, the fighters vere level at 6 o'clook aDd.

at 400 yds and when rope vas dispensed, they 118l'8 seen to dive dam.and away fran the airplane. On 2 other oocad ODS the ~igbtere made

several quick changes and then dropped the attaclcS. CJbaervaUczawere made by the to.il gunner either visually or with the Wuo-J5·

b. 1. signal with the characteristics ' jOf:AJ/ ' r /4.5 waa illter-

cepted aver Shik~.

c. The fol101fing unusual sifiPl8.la 1n tJ:Ie JSO., resi«a ....intercepted, 1 6 5 /1 .5 00/ 05 . l SO/ l7 75 /0 4 , 158/1850/01.



§. ~ Y• . R : ~ • . ~

00060 zoco 10 293 0N HI-OOCE 07064 5 2 3 1 0 21 1 21 S E'/ m u000 7 0 2000 1 2. 3 53 0~ T 13930E 070 7 4 5 014 2 21 121 S GL OTAD]

000 7 2 0 4 85 36 3325N 13825E 0 7 0 7 4 5 0125 2 1 12 1 S E'"f 001010202

000 7 5 0 4 95 20 3425111 138228 0 7 0 7 4 5 0115 21 12 1 S E-:r em000 7 6 1500 06 3 5. 3ON 1393~ 0 7 0 7 4 .5 014 1 21 121. S GL OTA03

000 7 8 27 00 4 0 3000N 1393CE 07064 5 231.5 21 12 1 S

00080 0 4 80 3 5 32S01l1 1.3832E 070 7 4 5 0120 2 1 1 2 1 8 - E " T 001010202

00081 0980 3 '0 3305N 139.5Ql::070 7 4 .5 0 4 00 21 12 2 P go; CH I

00081 0 4 80 3 ~ .3 035 u 1394 5E 070 7 4 .5 024 7 21 12 2 P ,~J' CH I

0005a 0500 30 31 30N 13' 7 30E 07064 5 2320 21 121 S E " i 001010202

00090 037 2 34 2638N 1 I f210E 07064 5 1154 21 1 22 P EW 00101020200090 1190 16 35 0OJ.'f 4 0.30E 070 7 ~,5 0231 21 1 22 P E " " " 001010002

00090 0365 3 5 26.3.5N 14055E 07064 5 230 7 21 122 P E " T 001010202

00090 0365 3.3 2950N 1384CE 07064 .5 234 5 21 1 22 P &-r 001010202

0009 2 2000 25 3500N 1.3830E 070 7 4 5 00]9 21 121 S ]i'r

00095 1000 3.5 34 35}1T 1384 5E 07074S m210 2 1 12 2 P E·~ 001010202

00096 1500 30 3.500J3113830E 070 7 4 5 ooa i 21 1 21 S E':7

00096 0363 24 330%1 138JOB 070 7 4 5 0122 21 1 21 S E , . , 001010202

00097 0 7 90 25 3506fi 13830E 070 7 4 5 0030 21 12 1 S E '" 001010002

00098 1090 .30 32~.BN llJi01.5z0 7 0 7 4 5 0337 2 1 12 2 P E......01010002

00098 0 4 50 2l~ 3230N 13·91OE 070 7 4 ..5 0250 21 12 1 S s;-r OC1010202

001 00 1200 10 35 30N 1390CB 070 7 ~5 0130 21 121 S E-r 001010002

00102 1 0 0 0 2.5 3 ~ J ON 1383 0E 0 7 0 7 4 5 0012 21 121 S E''T 001010002

00.102 0500 4 0 3 5 0 O N 1;J90QE: 0 7 0 7 4 .5 014 0 21 12 1 S r 001010202

rf i· 00102 06502.8 3 S 0 S H 1381~OE 0 7 0 7 4 5 0211 21 121 S ~' .. 001010202

."

OOlOS· 0490 24 3~22N l;J:828n;070745 0124 21 121 S " 3 ' " " 1 001010202

001:04 1 0 3 5 13 3 306N 1394£E 070 7 ~.5 011:1.221 122 P " S " ' l " 001010002

0010 4 098 0 15 3.305~T 1395QE 070 7 Lt5 0058 21 122 P ~~r 001010002

00105 109 0 .3 0 354 2l1T 14052E 070 7 L f5 0325 21 122 P ~'!'r 001010002

00105 0575 2 4 . 3135N 13930E 07074.5 0305 21 1 21 S ~ 001030003

100108 0 7 00 20 3S0QH 1390CJl!.;70 7 4 5 0139 21 1 21 S 13 -1 can

00109 07 5 0 17 3.330111137 5:5E 070 7 4 5 0200 21 1 22 p r Clli!

,:J.

00110 1000 30 3 53DN l.393CE 070 7 4 5 01.50 21 121 S t ; " N 001010002

Z a 0 00111 0000 1 5 2917N 1394 ~E 07064 5 2359 21 1 22 P g'"' l" 001010202

t : < l> 'ell 0011.3 1805 8 8 34 l~SN 13920E 0707L~5 014 0 21 1 21 S W

~0c~ 00120 0 4 85 2 2 3400!iI 1381~ 0 7 0 7 4 5 0144- 21 1 21 S E'" !" 001010202

~ \ ) ~ 001/.1.20500 10 3 500N 13900E; 0 7 0 7 4 5 0137 21 121 S E " " ' " 001030003

<>

~~0014 9 0 4 85 08 .304 0H 14 015E 07 0 7 4 5 0015 2 1 12 2 P E1 001030003

<.;0 001.50 1000 07 32001lt lL~200E 070 7 4 5 024 3 2. 1 12 2 P W' 0060 4

(1 00150 1000 05 314 . 5N 14!21OB 070 7 4 5 024 5 2 1 122 P E 1 " ' T00604-

e. . . . . . 00150 0500 06 35301.iI1.390CiE 070 7 4 5 01.36 21 12 1 S E" " ! 001030003

00150 0600 05 3 2 . 3 5 1 ' 1 " 13915E 070 7 4 5 0110 2 1 122 P ' 3 " " " ' " 001030003

00150 17 7 5 0 4 31.52N 1]651$ 0 7 0 7 4 5 0150 21 122 P

00154 0990 04 3312H 139COE 070 7 4 5 0338 2 1 12 2 P " 8 " - 0060 4

00154 0490 1 2 .3J33N 1]820El 070 7 4 5 0134 2 1 121 S E " ' " " r 001030003

00156 0 4 90 06 303DlI 1Lj.005n:0 7 0 7 4 5 0025 21 12 2 P ll:""' 001030003

00157 1000 04 3350N 1394 13E 070 7 4 5 0115 21 12 2 P "E : " 7 0060 4

00158 0990 04 34 00N 14 13$ 0 7 0 7 4 5 0251 21 12 2 P E . , . . . . . . 00601:-

00158 0990 05 3 435N 1384 5E 070 7 4 5 0127 21 12 2 P E-r 0060 4

00158 18.50 07 3150N 1392CE: 070 7 4 5 0300 2 1 121 S

00160 097 0 07 3520N 14 315E 070 7 ! ~.5 0)26 21 1 2 2 P E~ 0060 4

00165 0980 05 3 4 40N 13950E 070 7 ~·5 0226 21 12 2 P E"t',0060 4

00165 1500 05 34 5 7N 13909B 0 7 0 7 4 5 0200 2 1 122 P

00168 1500 10 3.5 30N 13900~0 7 0 7 4 5 01)2 2 1 121 S GL OOl~O3

00190 0740 28 3534N 13817 8 0 7 0 7 4 5 0200 21 121 S C;-. 001020002

00198 0000 03 35001'1 139108 0 7 0 7 4 .5 0205 21 121 .~ 01· 00 4 01

00199 0 9 1 5 0 7 3550N" 1]84 58 0 7 0 7 4 5 0135 21 12 1 S G1 . 00 4 01

00201 2000 06 35]ON 13900g 0 7 0 7 4 5 0130 2 1 12 1 S or. 00403

002?0 307 9 30 3 4 3 4 1 - 1 1380 4E 070 7 4 5 0156 21 12 1 s

00295 0515 10 3 5 3 D l i 1 13920E 070 7 4 5 0205 21 1 21 S

00.3 00 0 4 90 20 3l~30}r 1)802E 070 7 4 5 0155 21 12 1 S

00)09 0500 2 0 3505N 139'OE 070 7 4 5 0210 2 1 12 1 S

00386 0] 7 0 2 7 3 4 3 5 1 Y 1 ) 8 1 5E 070 7 4 5 0127 21 121 S

00 4 -00 0 4 7 5 0 4 34 30N 1392DE 0 7 0 7 4 5 0224 21 12 1 S

00 4 0 7 0 4 60 14 - 34 50N 13925E 070 7 4 5 0219 2 1 121 S

00 4 08 0352 3 6 3500N 1.392.$: 0 7 0 7 4 5 0215 21 12 1 S

(lO?J.O ol.nA 0.3 3232N 138591!: 0707 4 5 0035 21 12 1 S

0564- 01 333BN 13830E 07014 5 0105 1z1 1 5

Q 7 J t . O 02 3 S S S N 1394.5E 0 2 0 $ ,1 2 1 s

~ 33$0)1 l J 4 1 ' O S1 2 1 S



P,;RT II - R.mIO

1. Strike Reports: There \vere 41 Strike Reports transmitted by

aircraft Cl'V'erhe targeto Only 3':1were received. Tuo 3l3th Wing banbsauay messages Gere not received by the grcund station. Fbllauing arethe number of Strike Reports received by each -.Ting; 314th, 11; 73rd,9; 31;3th. 7; _S8th. 7; and 315th, 5$

2. Fox: Transmissions; The 73rd ·,ling reported 98.4 per cent on

124 re..di 0OJi)eraora copied a II D:unmyn Fox ms,asage frau the grcund stati an

T1o"V0 operators did not receive the message OO.causeof (1) guarding dis-tress frequency and (2) navigator was using fixed antenna. for Lorantrailing wire antenna was inoperative. The 58th 'iling station transmitt.

ed (3) Fox messages. The first message was received by 93.5 per cent

of the operat ora; the sec ond by 35.5 per cent and the third by 34.7

per oent, for an average percentage of 54.5 per cent , Tl'lo of the

mess.ages frem the 58th grO.lnd station \7ere "D.lmr:ny'l messages and.1a .stransmi tt ed to the effect t hat the II1 0 JLma haner"!las inoperative.

The 314th ;ling reports that cut of 130 radio operatcrs inte!rcgated, 95

radi 0 operators .received all 3 messages j 23 received 2messages and

9 received only 1message. For all 3 messages, the average percent~

was 33 percent. Reasons given by. the 58th, 313th and 314tb. ";'fings-;lere

dundamentally the samBo These reasons included monitoring distress

frequencies, repairing radi 0 equipnent, I1ork-on banb bay doors. inter-

ference, atmostpherics and enemy. inoperative equipment and eff ~atch

due to other duties over the target •

.3 . Frequencies: Bad weather during these missions caused heavy

atmospheric interference on strike frequencies. 4 1 1 I1ings reportedthat Signal strengthS and readabilities nere 101er than previcus

mlssiODSo FollOiiTing is a percentage breakdam of traffic per frequency:

11 per cent on 3 megacycles, f4 per cent on 7 megacycles, and 25 percent on 11 megacycles.

40 Navigational Aids: Eight HF/DF bearings T7ere requested and

received. TWo'"ere received fran the lilo Jima .'.!..lOS statim. Excellent

reSl:l.lts \vere reported on the bearings. Frur VHF/rIF bearings vere

requested and all uere obtained. Flanges, hcmers and brca.dcast statiQlS

\7ere used nitb. excellent results. The 58th Wing reported 55 per cent

of their aircraft used the 0;11 station, Saipan, repartEng excellent

results up to 1200 miles.

5. Net Discipline and SecuritYI There "I1ereno breaches of net

discipline or violations of security reported during these missicms.

G. Enemy TranSmissions: The follroing incidents of j!!llllling,

enemy transmissions and interference~mre recorded cbring these miss1cm.s

a. 3020 leas:

(1) unidentified Cil, V's and numbers at 1432Z~ JBrt-

ially effective.

(2) SteadY Cil Signal at 1 4 4 5 Z -ass e1'fective.

tn Several statiOM an frequencie8 betlreen 1 4 4 5 Z and

l715Z were partially effeotive to effective.

(4) Buzzsaw jamming fran l700Z to l7.3OZaseffective.

b. 6615 KeSI

(1) cr.l IlUmbersand letters, li15Z, VW tqI]. RB{5Z. trca

1120Z to 1223Z ttere partially effective.

(2) 0\1code grQlPS and Via "itA oall atsZl sa' HtWeII1.34$ and 1700Z and 1400Z and 2200Zwere partiallY etteo



(6) Steai3y note fran Saipan to 1tlo 'flaS partiallyeffectiv

ICes)

§'1ll. .Q!i~I.(3) Unintelligibl$ Q';Iat 1830ZIV8.1i effectiv·e, ..

c. 10,05 Xc.§!: Negligible .•

d. 3145 Kc51 (This frequency ha.s been replaced 't'Iith 3160

(1) Jap stations, operati.ng fran 0900Zto 2000Z'I1ere

inet'tective to effective.

(8) EnemyC it trOD.Target to Ii'lo uas partially effee.tive ..

(::n Jap voice at 0945Zwas partially effective.

e. 6055 Kcs I

(10 Sera tchy noise beit,leen IVI0 and Traget l1as part ia1ly

efreetive~

(2) Unidentified C O i f at 1530Z \las effective~

(J) (Jil fr an (J) stati ons at 1245Z " " w a s . efU:e'bi va...

( l . j . ) Jap voice at 1545Zwas partiallY e.ffective.

(5) Unkn(lan stat ions ending date time gr oops and JlIJ.IIiber

no aathenticati0ll9 at 134% rras effective.

r, l08BoKcs:

(1) G',[ fr.an < :! or 3 statioos bet\.een 1610Z and 17Q4Z "ilaa

part ially e;ffect ive.

(2.) steadY tone and 0:-1transmissions bet-:7een 1600z and

1630Ztiera partially effect· ive..

g. ~41Dl 7310 KCB : Negligi bla.

h. 11160 Kes I (This has been replaced with 10125 Kcs)~

(1) Keyed C " i l signals betrreen 0945Z and 12002 rrere .ineff-

ee,t lVe to very effect ive.

(2) mlbetuee.n 1;10.53and 1500Z. uss ineffect ive.

G) 1. varying tens signal bet1"l6en 1700Z and 18302 uas

effective.

i. 3 9 9 0 l{b.s: m r c o d e and dashes at 1804Z"ere very effect-

ive.

j. 7415Kcs: CWcode and dashes at 17262. were very ai'fec.tj\ ~

k. 10820 l(C5: Negligible.

10 3810ks: CJ signal at 12002 rras effective.

m. 6640KesI Intermittent C :{ fran 1200Z';las partiallY efff'ct.

ive.

n. 10965 Kes I J'ap ( 1 < 1 transmissions fran o~5Z to 1l/j.7Z lm.S

ine£:feetive.

7. ]2i§!~~' Only distress traffic recorded by the ';ling s r~nd!Stations was fran (2) aircraft at' the 58th ",ling. 3lV668 report~ 1118

OlIn ship on f'i;roe and gave his pceiti en at 1l10Z.. 26v669 trallSlllltted

t110 messages saying he had t\·/O engines rut I pOSitiOll and tbat he ....

e'ltpecting to ditela.



S-::i:CRET--- . . . . . . . ~-

D

DIT3LLIGENCE

Part I - Enem,v Air Ol?Position

"Part n- Ene.ny Antiaircraft

Missions No. 2 5 ~ , 2 5 2 , 2 5 3 . 2 2 4 . and 2 5 5

6 July ~_%5



P.- .RT I

1. The Japanese Air. Porce dispo.tched 60 - 70 o.ircr::l.ft against

the ni.ght strikes en 6 July 1945. Only 5 attacks resulted with nodamage or loss to B-29' s, B-29 crews made no claims.

2. i,.':ission No. 251. 58th ~Jing. Ohib::u

0.. .h . total of 18 aircroft were S'HHl but there VIas only 1

uttac.k: from a. p robabIe Tony.

b. It is believed that jammer B-2gs have 0. decided effecton enemy night fighters as well as on enemy ground defenses,

3. Mission No. 252, 73rd.Wing. J.ko.shi: There were no atto.cks

and only :3 enemy a.ircroft (with 'Iring tip lights) we r-e seen, HeClVY

undercast m ay have restricted enemy activity.

4. Mission No. 253. 3l3tll ~Ving.Shimizu:

a, ~ maxim~ of 12 enemy aircraft wore sighted on this mis-

sion and 4 attacks were reportGd.

b, Just after land's end an enemy aircraft was seen to re-

Lease 0. ephe r f cal glowing Object which descended gro.dually for about

3000 feet before it Was lost from sight. Five minutes later 2 more

of these objects were seen, presumably supported by bo.lloons or po.ro.-

chutes, The Crewwas under the impreSSion that oJl 3 were released by

the acme enemy aircraft. None of these objects W0.J3 closer than 600

y~rds to our aircraft and gave no indication of pursuit.

a, One of the crews reported being picket up by 5 enemy~ir-cr~t 150 nautical miles from landfall. the encmy aircraft st~ng

;7ith the 8-29 until it Vias 50 miles from land IS end, for 0. period of

one hour ~d 20 minutes.

S, Mission No. 2a4., 314th -~Hng, KQfu: .LI'l estimated 20 - 22 air-

craft were seen but no attacks were reported,

6, Mission No. 255, :nSth '.fing. Mo.ruy.en:

b , The 3 - 2 9 wo.spic~ed Up by 5 enemy aircraft which stayed

'VIih tho B-29 until the initial point was roached. During this period.

some 15 to 20 passes were made o.t the B-29. :.11 of the enemy o.ircraft

had running lights and landing lights on. n70 of the enemy aircraft

were roughly abreas t; of the B-29 and criss-crossed from starbo::Lrd to

port and from port to starboard, weaving under the B-29. One of the

enemy 0.1rcra.ft WaS stationed at 4 - 5 0' cLock high, and made 0. pass o .t

the B - 2 9 , which took evo.siva action and lost th~ aircraft, On pulling

out of the evnsive action, o.nother enemy o.ircrQft WOosoted on the

opposIte side at 7 o'clock Oondstill anothar eno~ o.ircro.ft come In

from below, turned right nnd broke o.wny down~.rd o.t approximo.t~ly 3 0 0

yards.

c. On the to.rget run. tho Crawso.wgroen lights, ona on the

right o.nd one 01'1. the left, I1t the semo o.ltitude o.s the 8-29, 10.800

fect. They were Il.hel1dQnd coming townrds the 8_29. One ooae in low

aoross the B . 2 9 o.bout 1,000 to 1,500 feet b~low. Th&other enam¥air-oraft at 10 o'clock, turned in towurds the B-29 but o.t 9 o'olook. o.t

o.oout 600 yo.rds, broke o.way to the right.



d. Shortly after bombs o.way, the Cl'e~; ~'el?0rta that 2 enemy

aircr:l.ft with lal 'lding lights or navigation U[o h t . . on in front of the

B-2S and high, 1 at 1 o'clock, and 1 tl.t 11 o'clock, started pursuit

~:trves. Within a mo.tter of a minu'te "fightors wer0 coming :\11 over".

11').0 erew reports that 12 to 15 defhlite passes were made with 3 closing

ill 'GO less thcln 100 yo-rels. Two p Lane s were reported making pl:lrsuit

CUrves clOSing in to less tpan 3 00 yards v n t h 1 enemy aircraft o.t 4

o'c10Ck cuttiilg off its landing lights. One of the Crew members stMtedthat 12 enemy aircr:J.ft wore sighted from 00::\0:; aY!o.y to past b,nd's ond

for a period o r 35 minutes.

e. SeveFo.l possible Lrrte nded rrunmLl::;s were ropor ted, ;;_B-29

eren reiJorted 8. single-engin.a rac~io.l fighter tho.t ceme in from 9 0clock

level T;ith its guns bearing 900 to the to-ii. Evv.sive action token w:!s

a violont tl:lrn and 0.i% -to thG right. The C;-,G;.!y aircraft mtS reported

as C10sing into within 25 ynrds. ;. twin-a.l.;L1C enemy o.1rcr::.ft come

ill fr-om 12 o'clock. The 3-29 pl:lllec. up in ~ Climbing turn to the left

and 'cho aircr~ft went under the wing. It "'o.S reported as close as 100

fOGt from the tail and below the B-2~.

f. SeveraI crews reported the possibility of airborne r~.d~

ill '.;he 0netny aircraft. One enemy o.ircraft followed thG B-29 through

cLouds and was lost when windo'w 1'1,".s dropped, The Crew believed that

the enemy af rc r af t could not have f'oLIowed t;18 B-29 visually. jj't0r

l::n!.G.'s end 2 enemy aircraft cppoarcd en the sccpe for 7 or 8 minutes.

RO]?0 Was dd.spenaed and the pLane s disappeared.

g. One enemy aircrOtft rras dcscrib€G, as having an elliptic:J.

"irillg, somawhat Similar to the wing of a Spit!'irc. One pLane il:lS re-

~10t't0d us having a diamond-shaped i~!ing, thickor tho.n the usur.L s ingla-

engi116 aircraft wing, but no positivG identific;;:.tion wc.s mad,e. One

enemy aircruft WaS r@ported as ho;,.ing its la;1(,in5 lights o.ppllNntly

built into the wing in such u manner that tho landing lights pointed

diroctly ahead, OnG crew identifiod an enetiy drcr:::.ft which it be-

liGV0d to be 0. Sally, having 6 form.::ttion lights (possibly n Din::.h).

SO;"-0 of the enemy aircraft haC! 0. green light G In the port s Ide , and rod

on the stur~oard Side, while others were rOFortod as h~ving thoir li6h tsdisposod just OPFositely •

.. . _ . " ..i'A RT II - E NE kiY _ ." :.! \,T I.:" IR CR ..FT

1. Mission No. 251. Chibc. _Urbt\n ...reg. (;Iight)

0., The primary target was bombed by 124 ;.f0 of th3 58th '!:lag

botwoen 163cpZ- 1905Zfrom 9900 - 11, SOOfeet. ;';';:is of Ootttlckvo.ri5d

from 3020 - 3400• ',leather over the to.rget VIM re:Jortecl as 10/10 under-

o~st.

b. Enroute to the tnrgot flak was e,lcountered AS tabu1o:te4

LOC....I'ION

Haruto

COCFJ) IN. :_T&S

3 53 GN . .. 4 02 4E



d. Shertly after bombs :>,-,"ay,the er-evr ~'eports that 2 enemy

airor:U't with landing lights or navigation. H:;1!ts on in front of the

B-29 arid higla, 1 at 1 0clock. and 1 at U. 0clock, started pur suf,t

~.tl"ves. Within D. matter ef D. minute "fightors were coming 1),11 over".

111.0Crew reports tha.t 1 2 to 1 5 definite passes Vlere m:.de with 3 clOSing

in 'co Lcs s than 100 yur-ds , Two pLcne s Vlere reported mc.king: pursuit

curves Closing in to IG5s than 300 yards with I enemy. a1rcre.i't at 4

0'c1001<: cutti\1g off its landing liGhtG. One of 'Ghc crew membe rs statedthut 12 enemy airor::..ft wore sightod fr(')jn bo~;,.;,)savray to past l::.nd's and

for G \ pCH'iod of 35 minutes.

e. Seve r-aI pos si bIoi ntended rammi i!,ss We ; re reports d. ~~B-29

cr-evr ropoFted a si ngle -engi ne rn.dio.l fi.ghter tj_l;:'.t came in from 9 0Iclock

lev0'l with its guns bea!'i ng 900 to the tuil, Evusi ve acti on tr..ken '1c.S

I.\. violent turn and, Iii YC to the! ri ght, Tho ei'lC'.l~r (lircroJ't was z-epor-tod

as closing il'l to within 25 yards, 1. twin-e.1Gi'!e enemy a.ircr;:.ft came

in. fro;',1 12 0Clock, The 8-29 pulled up in t: Climbing turn to the left

:md the aircr:::.ft 'front under the wing, It wc,s reported as close as lQO

feet i'1'0m the ta.ll and below the B-29.

f. Sove rnI crews I'cport0d the possibility of nirborne r['.d~

Ln tho enemy aircraft. One enemy aircraft follorad the B-29 through

clouds and was lost wheN.wjmdo~v 1 f I r : : , s dropped, The crew believ&d th:l.tthe enemy aLr-eraf t could not have followed t~lcB-29 vi sue l Ly, ..:.fur

Lo.ndIS end 2 enemy ai;rcrai't o.ppoarcd on the> s ccpe for 7 or 8 minut&9,

R01)C WIlS dispensed aM the planes dLs appe are d;

g. One enemy aircraft rras describec1 as having an elliptic::J.

"{ring, sQJL),6whatimilo.r to the wing of a Spitfir::. One pLxne was re-

:'1orte0. o.s having a diamond-shaped '..1ng. thick r ·chi:!.n the usur.L ;; ingla-

engL10 aircraft wing, but no positive identifio:::.tion was made. One

enemy aircraft WaS rop~rted as hnving its lo.'Kciilg lights app:.rently

built into the wing in such 0. manner that tho landing lights pointed

directlv ahead. One crew identified an enczrv circrn.ft which it be-

li-cved t o be a Sally, h!l.vi11g 6 forna.tion lights (possibly:::. Din:.h).

SOi:V~ of the enemy o.ircraft had 0; green light en the port side. and rod

on the stare,oo.:rd side. while others were roportod as hllving tho1r l1,shtsdis pos od ju st op pos it ely .

" ' .....

1. Missifm No. 251" Chib ...J[rbnn ....eil" ( ;1Uh:tl

u, 'lho pr1mo.ry target Y!ns bombed by 124 .;./e of the 58th "1~

botwoen l639Z - 1905Z from 9900 - 11,.500 feet. A;:is of attack varied

trot!. 3020 - 3400• '.i[eo.ther over the to.rgat VJr.S re~lorted a6 10/10 under-o

Oc.st.

b. Enroute to the targGt flak 'Wa.se:'1countered a.S talmlated

below!

LOC_"T10llJ

Naruto

C.OCF.DIN.; .T SS

3536N - 1403'S



LOCATION COORDINiln:S

Mohars.lifJeagos ,am inG.ClctiDatO.",

medium..

l"redicted concentrat-'

i'on of 8 heavybursts.

accurate.

o~ i 3532N - 14020E Moager and inac.curate,

modium.

. c; Over th.o target area flaK was described as nil to meager.

~nac~urate, heavy and medium. Four ReM A lG orbited the target area .

Jmrm.~ng tho. GLR and SLGRf'roquon"y- bands d1,.l;tingthe Bntire attack.

HOMoperators reported GLRand SLCRsignals, despite the intensive

j~ing aetivity, during th.e entire att"lck. From 1 to 4 searchlights

C~nEiffccti ve ) "1101'0 roported in the target area.

d. O n witl'ldrr:mal flak was enco1.Ul.tered at Kashima A/F (35 ,BN -

14036E h Intensity, accuracy artltype of weapon was not specified.

e. No J-/C were lost or damaged as a reault of flak on this

missione.

2. Missi on Noa 252 'I Aka.shi Urban .Area:

a D The primary t.arget was bombedby 123 . A l O of the 73rd .iiQg

between 151.52. _ Ib27Z fromb900 to 8200 feet. .<\,xisof attack was 35°.',7eather was reported as 7/10-10/10 undercast with winds of 20 knots

from ';00°.

b. Enroute to the target fl.3ck was encountered as tabl.llated

below:

Location Coordinates Rema . r ka .

K us h im o to3330N - 1.J547E

.Meager and i=ceur~te

to accurato, heavy,10/10 clouds.

Tomioka 3 3 4 9N - 134J.t.4EM e a g e r and inaccurate,

heavy am medium.

Tolru5hima 3405N .. 13432EMeager a n d inaccurate

barrages, heavy and

medi\l.!il..

HilI;eta 3415N - 13425EMc~or and iDSGcuraife,

hGsvy.

c. OII"ortho target aroa. flak t"l"GS described as speradi,,". moagor.

inaccurate am medium. Only- a fow heavy bursts "r1orereported. Threoinei'focti ve se3I'chllght s were roported in tho target area.

d. Onwithdrawal 1 AjO reported a meager, in'lccurato• !le:lvy'

bar.rage at Eimcji. ( 3450N - l3440E).

e. NOlI.jGwere lost or damaged 35 a. result of flak on this

mission.

f.During tho'inithl Wlnsoof tho raid stroet lights in

northorn i\kashi wore on, however thoy wore turned off in quick order.

- 4 1 . -



location. Ceordinates Remarks

3 . Wdssion No~ 253. Shimiza Urban Arca:

a. The prim:lFY target \18S bombed by 133 A /e of the 313th - ,1ing

bctvlecn 1533Z _ 171012 frO'm 71QO to' 8.300 feet. .tG:.isof att9.ck varied from26.50' t.o 2870'. .11 290her was reported as 8/10 t·Q 10/10 under cast with winds

of 20 kno't s fr om290°. --

b. En Foute to' tho tlJ.rg-et flak was encountered 8.8 tabulated

Deo lo :v 7 ;

'0 Shima 3 4 4 2N - 13 9 24 E Meager and inaccurate,

heavy.

3 k55N - 1.3909EMeager and inaccurate,

medium.

Teri Shima JjO :)ON - 1401.5 E Jrl)cagcrto' intense a..nd

inaeeUI:l..tC. he 3.vy •

Smith lshnd

( S l . :l .m i S 1 J . limo.)

3 307 N ... 14002E Mo'lger < > . . n a . inaccurste.

hoavy.

Flachioji ShimaMaager and inaccurate,

heavy.

3405N - Ij931EMoager ::ud inaccur:!.to,

heavy.

c; Over the target area flalt was described as meager and

inaceurate, medium. and heavy. ROMoperators reperted .2 GLR signals.

d. On t'(i thdrawal meager and inaccurat.e medium f12k 1'l' .:l.S reported

at land jsend (Gm<iGsaki).

e.. No Aje ucre 10m to' flak on this mission and of -133 4 G

bombing only 2 or 1,,50% sustained flak damage.

f.- Searc\lligbts ucre reported as tabuhtcd beleTI':

lOcationCoordiMtes ~gr

Tateyama 3.500N - 13952E 3

Vicinity o f Ito 3458N - 13907E 2 - 4

Target (Shimizu) 3500N - 1_3829E 3 - 4

Yokesuka 3411N - 13 800E2

":'ji,ro 3502N - 13906E2

Kanibara 3506N - 13!- l36E :3

Numn'Zu 3507N - 1SS5lE1

Qiswarll. 35J.4N - 13910E2

Ose-Saki .3502N - lS848E1

dll searehlights uare rendered quito ineffecti~o by the cloud cover.

-42"



Remarks

g o One A l e repo;rted ground to air rockets over the targets.

There d t 6t soeme ° bG 2. batteri os. launching. 5- 1'0 ckot ~ oach simul tanoously.was. further reported. that ;;l.f'tor reachH),g the '011l,tud<:l of the .../e

(7800 feet) the Z'ocl~et trajoctories would level 01'1' for a tinwporiod.

ap;proxim~telyt'ili Of) the time period of ascent.

4. Mission No.. 254, Kefu Urban Area P'light ):

a. The primary target wasbombM by 131 4C of tho 314th ]ing

between 1441Z to Ib35Zfrom 1l,.200 to 17,000 foct. ·":us of attack varied

from 00 to 490~" 'Joather waS reported as 8/10 to 10/10 undcrcast W'i th

wind·s of 30 knots from 3000• .

below:

b•. En route to tho target flak \79.8 enc-ountered as tabulated

N~agcr ~nd inaccur~te.

heavy and medium.

Msager and inoccur:lte,

medium.

Meager and inflccur:\tc,

heavy and medium.

JIi::Ja,gor and inaccur:lto •

m c d i u m . .

c. Oveil:" the target axea flak was described as meager. in!lccur.9.tc

and heavy by onlY I A/O.. 36 A le reported lllcdiUIil. fl3.k as meager and in~

accurate. Tho remainiQg A/e found flak to be nil.

d. On withdra'l1al flak was observod as t.:tbul~tod belOiT:

Remarks

il!lcagei" ' : ' 1 m a ccur ate Ih(n.VY:) hio1orate . :md

inaccurate. mJdium.

liIeager and i!l3.CcuratoJl

modium.

Moagor ?J1d i~ccur::ltElI

hoo.vy and medium.

e,. No Aje \'101'0 lost or d 1ID'Igcd 3S a result of flak.OIl this

mission.

IDcationCoordiBatQ.i &n'rks

Target Jirea 3540N .. 1383 . 5 : i~ tow inatfectivo boaIDII

Cda~tara.3514N .. 13910E

2-5

Hirasuk"l.35l9N - 13920E

3 -5

N L U n a z u.3507N.. 1385lE

4

.. 4 3 ..

Loc.ation Coord inn tQS

Shi'2tllOka 3 458N ._ 13 823E

Shimizu 3501,N .. 13830E

.Mouth of Fuji Gavta 3S08N - 13838E

1 .0 os.:tiOll.COordinate§.

3514N .. 1 3910E

OShima

Nil Sh im a 3 423 N .. 139l6E



2

.1.oc.ation Coora.inates

Mouth of Fuji Gawa 3508N - 138_38E

OShima .3442N- 13924E

2 - 4

50 M!is.sioRNo~255, Maruzen Oil Rei'inory at Shiofsu (Night);

, 8 The primary target was bombed by 59 A le of the 315 to .Ji.ngbetween 1416Z to 1518 ' :2 . from 10,200 to 11,500 feet. J..xis of attackaverafied 45. .loathor rl'CS reported. as 5110 to 10/10 undercast.

b. E n routs to tho target flak was nil.

c. Over tho target flakllo,s' dcscribod as mcar;-::r. inaccurat.e,

heavy, and mediumo One $sarchlight'l73S observed in the t3I'got area.

d~ 00 wi thdr317al meager and ina ccura te heavy f1a le ';1M eneount--

ered at Tana'be, KUshimoto, Ukui (J3 40 l'l - 13600E) and aso C3420U- 13625£).

1m inaccUTate predicted. concentration of 15 to 17 heavy bursts -;rag also

reported at 3 3 4 JN - 13548E.•

e. No A le were lost or d,amagedas a result of fl'!k on this

mission ..

f. One s€[email protected] "as reported e.t lendfa.ll (3322N.. 13403E)

a:nd one ncar I&P. ( 3 3 49N:" 13~42E).

g. Onefree balloon (25 feet in diamc-ter) "I1::l.S observed in the

targetaroa at n.600 i'oot. The balloon "as dragging 1 ' 1 . . 100 foot cable

to which 'l7a.sattached abaskct, shaped object.

"44-



P.1IRT III - SECTION A - GRIM CITY - DilMR.GEASSES3VlENl'' '

1. Summary:

a. Chiba City damage resulting from XXI Bomber CommandNussion

No~ 25.1 of 6/7 July 1945 is .86 stl. mi. or about 43.4 par cent of the

bU~lt-up portion of the city (1.98 sq. mi. as determined from photos).

b. Damage is concentrated in the central port of the city; from

the W6,St shoreline extending cast to tho end of thenatn

part of thoi;)utilt-up aroa.

Co· Li tt 10 or no d·3.lTIages in the north· portion of tho built-up

area along the west coast and inland about 1500', and in the south portion

along the shoreline and inl::ind about 3200 '.. No nwnbered targets or

im porta nt in dus tria l a rea s are in these aroaa.

2. Itemization of Area DamagQ:Sq~ Mi. Sq. Mi. Per cent of

= - o- ~o~f~~=tr~o~a~~Dama~~~ g~e~~D~ama~~ g~e~__

Tho bui~t up ·~ban area (rcsidcnti~l

am commercial concontration) runs

aleIlg t he coa:rDine for about two

miles and ex·;;gnd8inJand NE about 6200'" 1.98 . .6

3. ~g:i.a~lClllent of Damage Assos.smcnt Report 135

XXI BornComMission 251, Chiba - 90.14-Urban. 6/7 JulY 1945

~-, Targets ',]it.hin Bui.lt-up Area:

NUm borc d t arg ot s: Non e

Other tqrgets:

RR Jun ct ion ~ St ~t ion , Ya rds , Roun dh ous oMil~tary Depot A Foa ( Qrdn ~n cc )RR Rog im en t ~ a rc h ou s cs

Minor d:moge

4 0% dcstroyed

Minor d:lllln.ac, 2

buildings destroyed

25% dcstroyedNone visible

5 5 % destroyed

5 % des t r oy a dNone visible

func visiblo

Infantry Sehool

Powder Magazine

RR Regimc'nt

'.1o.TohOU908furbor Ir.stall8.tions

<ns Pl'mt

b.. Tnr.gets Outside Built-up ilI'Cnl (m. thin 5 mila r:uliusot

oonter of city)~

NUmbered Targets:

90.l~-2llj.590.14-1470

Hitn'chi i.../C Co•• ChibQ Pl'"!nt

Shimoshizu Airfield

None visible

None visible

Other Targets:

TokyO Centrnl Tclegraph Co .Military C:unp

Nono visibleNone visible

InclOSl:lTe: Semi-controlled mos'lic shoi1ing d~.

• Based on :m B.C. o ro D•• 1 .e Roport No. 135.

- 45-



. -;... "



PART III - SECTION B - ilKASHI - D . ; w r l 1 W E ~SESSMENT*

a. Built-up area: Sq . Mi. total - 1 . 4 2 ; Sq. Nn . destroyed: 0 . 8 1Fer cent destroyed - 5 7 .

O. Pl~nned targe~ area: 008 sq. m i. Per cent destroyed: 101

c~ Total d1ffilc3.gee date: 0.9 sq. mi. Por cent of built-uparea: 6 3 . 5 .

d. T~gets dam~gcd by current strike: 0 Numbered; 3 othor~

Nbte: PrCV'lous dCUllr-l.goo the city resulted f rom s trik es D.G1.instT~rgct1j47 (by b om bs f :: 11 1in g ou t a i. de th"lt tlll'getarea).

2. Damage wi thin limii.ts of bui.lt -up 'lI'C3:

Dcstroycl

S9. bh. Per cent. ar-ea damage frorD. current strike: Sq. Mi.

0.69

0.12

0.81

Built-up uron (Urban)

Built-u~ area (Industrial)

Euilt-up area (Total)

55

75

5 7

b. ..:.rea dam"lue ["00 all strikes:

Built-up area (Urban)

B uilt - up a rea ( In du st ria l)Built-up area (Total)

0.745

0.155

0.90

e. Damage tID Taxgets:

Number Total Dl::ngp

Un:Hlcntified !ndustrio.1 .\reas (3) 1.2 sq. mi. 9 7 %

Damage out_slde built-up aorea: (within 5 milo radius of conter

of c ity )

90.2.5-1.547 Kawasaki . V C ~Co•.

90.23-1724 Kawasaki A/C Co.

None

None N o n e

Inclosure: ]lbs:1ic Qnnot~tcd to show d"W"Igo.

'" Based on XXIB.C. c ro D.:I.. Report No. 15,3.



CONFIDENTIAL

-t"nk S .'1rC und1n'\.;tJd.

6000



P~iRT III - SEmI ON C - SHHIlIZU - D,J\!l...GE;~SSES5'JliNl'*

1. . sumri laI 'Y:

~. Shimizu City dam~ge resulting from XXIBomberCommL~ndMission 253 of 6/7 July 1945 totals, .•71 sq. mi. or about, 50 per cent

of the city's buiLb-eup area.

bo NolV and ola damage cover .74 squ,re mile or 52 per cent

of t he built-up area.

c. Shimiz.u City's totl'l1 built-up iU'cn (as datormined from

photos) covers 1041 squ~rc miles. It h3 S two distinct divisions:

(1) Tho built-up industri,31 arna 11.1ongShimizu furbor tot he eastj about .53 squ3ro mile_

(2) The bui.L-up commorci,,"l-rosidcnti~l area i about .88

sqill'll'e ::Iile.

d. An earlier XXI Bomber C o m m . "I D .d miss ion left .03 square olIoof d~a£e in both aroas.

c. N~s8ion 2 5 3 completely destroyed . 5 8 aqu~c mile or 3bout

6 5 peF cent of the commerci,1-residential area and left l .I.." ' ld31!n.aoo only

s~~ll portions in the extreme north and south sections of the city.

f. D.~m!?Lgon tho built-l:lp industrial arc"! tobla .13 squ-ir-emile or about 2 5 per cent of the "I1.ottcrfrontimmediately :mj:lcoot to

the city and north of tho mouth of tho rivor.

g. In addition to tho daiuage in the built-up ar-ea......bout .20

squ1re malo of d·~~gc is v is ib le in ouulaying rc s idon t i~ l . .. ..d minor

industrial sections not .includGd in thct-lrget area.

h. Th o following numbered t3rgets in the built-up i::Jdustri"1l

area .. ere affected by IVlissieI)5 3 (soc ovor-Lry shouing nurilb.:red:lI'SCts):

(1) Target 1178. Shimhu Docks: These docks arc north aDd

south of theriver

mouth. ;Il.l new d'un""\geis c on f in ed'

to the north area,

'i1here51 of 81 buildings 1Jndu'lrehouscs arc destroyed, :md representdestruction of about 60 per cent of the north aroa, or "1bout 40 per cent

of 'lll dock buildings in the t"l10 aronso

(2) Target XXI 6000. Shimizu Plant of Fuji Engingering

Co~p~y: 'Five of 10 medium sized buildings and threc of seven scall

buildings, or 40 per cent of t arg ot , des troy ed.

(3) Target XXI 60 0 2. Shimizu Rnilroad station lad Tr"UlS-

Shipm6nt Dopot: Six of tho eight buildings north and cast of the main

depot , but not including tho main railrO'ld dopot nor the t\70 largofreight uarchouses. h ,vo boon dostroyod. T3rgct 30 pGr cont dostroyod.

(4) Tnrget XXI 6080. Honan VqRatqb1e Oil Phnt: NLno or17 larger buildinBs ~d 10 of 18 ffin~llcr bui1din;s arc dostro,yod.

TarBct 55 per cent destroyed. Tho six small storago tanks nrc und~

Inclosure: Annotated mosaic (3 l 'R4M 2-3: 3. 4 ) showing damage.

iii Eaaed on XlC! S. C. CIUD.,A. Roport No. 132.



(1) N~lAbered Torgets

9 0~ lS- 21 50 Toa Oil Refinery

90 •IS-XXI 6000 Fuji En"ineerinp Company,.

Shkdzu Plant

90.1$-XXI 6001 ~.1achine Shop and 1;Joodworkin,:Pl<.ln:t Arca90.18-XXI6002 Railroad: St<=.t~.on,~nd Tr.~ns-

shipment Docks9O.1$-XXI 6076 Tokai Boatyar<l

90.18-XXI 6080 Honan Vs(,etable Oil Plant·

(2) Unnumbered r....,!ets

Damarte

2. SPECIAL SUPPL:EM3NT

a. Within Urban Area:

40%destroyed

None visible

Minor dama,- ;e

3~ destroyed

None visible

55% dama. ::ed

Small Seaplane Hc.i'l:;or ':';)Q R : W l. p

Military Camp

Two barracks Areas

Three Lit;ht Industries

'l\t/O Li;;nt Industrie,SOriental Can G o@p an y

Small Cn.ritleries Are<l

None visible

None visibleNone visibleMeine visible

100; ' , destroyed1001 ctcstroyedl!inor dJ,.:;..'l-e

b . Outside O r b an A r e a:

(Within 5 miles of center of city)

(1) Nu;,1.bere:dT..r:;ets

90.1s--.1178 Dock Area90.18-1176 J",pan Li(,ht Metal s Alumina Pl",n~90.18-1185 Kw.1.zashi BOH.tbui1d.in·~ and Rnpau-

Y a r d

90.18-2023 Sur.'litoIDO Li,;ht Met:"'J.s, Shi,,;:lzU. F'knt

90:1$-XXI 6003 Koito !}:";ineer~f' Works _.90.1S-XXI 6004 L8L P". \nd, 8,1'::: ' ;, .11 c-.nd Lu;dber

, Stor ..;;e

9O.1s.-XX1 0005 Boatbuildin.; Y:. e .90~13--XXI6006 Ito Seisakusho qron Works)

90 lO-XXI 6007 Steam pO',, 'er Pl~'l'(,90" la-XXI 6008 Boatbuildin.~ Yard90:1S-XXI 6077 BODtbu~ld0G Yard90.ls.-XXI 60n2 Boatbul.ld:wg Yard

90.18-XXI f . : I J 7 8 Sm a 11 Shipyard

(2) Unnumbered Targets

4 C ; t . . destroJed

Non e v is ib le

NO:lC ....isihle

None visibleNon.} visible

NCl1e visibleNo--!,.!visih1:!

None ....sibleNone vi5ir.leNone v~~ibleNone visibleNone visibleNone visible

Revetted Storage AreaReported Infantry VlorkshopS

Barracks Area

Non e vis ibleNone visible

None visible



P..;RT 111 - SECTION D - KOFU - D_.M.~GE.'1.8SESOONI'*

1. Sum:nary~

,a. Ib.nngo . to tho oi ty Of' Kefu rosul ting from' XXI Bomber

COlTl1nana Mission 254,$/7J'Uly 1945. tota-ls 1.3 sq. r.li 0 , \1hich z-eprcsoate-

~bo'"'t 65% of the bl:l:i1t-up portiou of the oi ty (2.0 sq. mi.).

,b. Thoro wore no mlLlberod targets in the areas damaged.

Co The major porti,oEl. of tho d').Ill3.L-'enflicted i7as in the

rosil::!.ential nndoommoreia 1 ar-ea s, '111th the-sou th0rn 11.:3.11'1' the oi ty

being '1lmost complotely destroyed, and the northern section shol"ling

damage scatt'ercd, throughout.,

d. The . prin c ipa1 marshillling y.<t!'da, in the con tel' of the oi ty,

;'l(~Fcnot d-'JTh1;god,but about 50% of tho buildings in the Ul'3l"sh3.11ing

ya:cd just S0\1th of the city wez-e destroyed.

20 Special Sl!l:pplomcnt:,

ao The ipstall'1tions covorocl by this supplement had not

been da)l.lO.gc!'1,rior to XXI Bomber Command Mission 254 .

(1) "Jithi.nCity .Area:

All unnum:boFca.targets

~6sci Electric Railroad .BridgeMinobu. EloetrieRailroad Line

(2) Outside Urban ~'IJ':'Q3,: (r/i thin 5 milo r~di us of oenter

:None visible

Minor dcoagc

50~ dcstr(lyod3 0 % of buildiilgs

destroyad

100% destroyed

100~ u0stroycd

10010 destroyed

100:' destroyed

100;; destroyed

1 0 ( 1 % dcstroyoo

2~ of buildin6~

destroyudNone visible

!'bile vi sible

49th Inf8.l'l.try 1l.cgimcnt;'tl .\rca

Nb.rUI: la $ilk Mill

Gas Department

Ksfu R:i.i.lr0ad Station

Six :',laFchouses

Ri ae rfJaiket

Silk Mill

Electric Sub-station

Kaneb0 Silk Millrfeathcil:' Station

~fu-Minamiguohi Railroad Station

of ci ty ), Non".,

• Based on XXI BoC . . C IU D..A., Report N oo 134.

Inclosuro: Pr0-striko mosaio



• I MILE

D amage To Ko fu

90.16 Urban

Dama ge A sses:sm .= rn

Report 134X X180m.Com. 1Ul1or1 ........ , M I iI . , . . ,',_1<..I""I'I

6-7 July 1945c.tU . X-X I Bo rn . COlT'.



G)ltted6 2 0 .•1

P rlRT III - SEOT ION E .. , IV L.lRU'Z EN OIL REFIN ERY - D .::'M .iI.GE.I.SSESS1f!l,!{ t' ''

1,.S i . : tm m ary ;.

8q. floot damage from Mission Number 24.5 is 54..245 squ.3.re

feot or 10.35 per oorrt of tho t'o·tal roof urea. Trro Sffi3.11banks T10re

destroyed and the large storo.ge tanks in the southsGction of t he

plant t/ere smoke covor-od , ind.ic;:tting damage in the area. Damage in

tho s00.th aecb i.on is not aser.a scd boe.~uscof to o smoko.

b• . Roof' dQ)ll3go from Mission li1unbor 255 is 409.975 square.

f0Gt or 97~1 per cent of tho total roof area. Tank cap3.city destroyed

totals 525.000 barrels; tank capacity"dam.god totals .:375.000barrels.

Capacity de stroyed/ damagod total s 900.000 b= cl.s, or 88.5 per cent of

the total plant cepo.city 0

c, Total "b.:.."'Qf'damagein the refinery is 472.050 squ:rrc fect

or 87.1 p0r cent of tho refinery's original roof area.

(t. Five of s:b:: ro f iaery unit s arc s evcre ly d"'.m:l~ed or destroyedTho sixth u.nit is app.J.rently undnma.,ed., ':"11ethor install9.tioDS, .

including the two briilbcs connecting th.o t'dO sect ions of the plant" arc

either ilo.m0.god or destroyoB. The open stores 'll'C:l in the north section

of' tho plant reco;LvGd 27 sca.ttered hits and mien of the 1$ltcri::l..l sterad

in this area is destrGzy"od.

Building anl tank mc.:;.sure:o.cntsnrC! baaed on em data.

3. Statistieal.s1:J.!!l!I!aU of Damgge:

a.. Roo,! dapali!jG from. .Mission Numbor 2'iS:

Square /o('t

of roaf

.*PQr cont a r orig-

inal reef "U"q

Destroyed7 9

Stru:ctUFD.ldaUlD.@;e

S\lpcrifcial

Total damage

**Total roof area: 519.848 sq_ ft.

'" Based on :XXI B.C. eIU D••~. Report NO•. l42

PHM2,c8 1.1 ' . 15c• annotatod sho\7ingInclosuro: Enlargora::nt from.3 l5 ~ -'I-'"'; ' . . . J

damag(h

"5,5- ,



CONFIDE~ITIAL

D/A nepert 142~ Cont'd.

Roof d"-~ '. ._""" .....$0 from ~t.SSl on 245:

Destroyed

StrU.c·l;ural drunage

Supa.r.ficial:

1. Gutted2. hlnol' roef da ma ge

Totul doonag~

S qu a . re f e e ' \;

of roof

21,700

2) .375

Perc en'\; of

originul roof ~rec4 . 1

3.:1

7",1505 ,000

5 4,2 2 5

1 .4.£15

1 0.3 5

Total'roof 2runnille to dute ~

D'estr-oyed

Si;):"ue'\;ural dwnage

Su.perfi ciall10 Gu.tteu2. lIiinor roo f' drunr:q,;o

**Toto.l dOJllO.ge

',,:31,055 0 3. 1

20,375 3.')

020 .1

152,050 37.1

*"'This fi~ure does not represent the sum of d'"l.l1'.o.f;oran the t,:ro strike mssi-;r:s

in that! '\;'110 buildings super;f'ici~l1y dt.mnc.ed by ruissicn 245 'rere ecnplet:cly

destroyeCi. by mission 255.

Totfl-l tunk damage to dnte:Volune inCubic fcet

rercen"t t)f tcU " _ l r,_..ri~tJry

t~ cc.;'lcity

Destroyed

Dmnul5edTO'InLl

525~OOO ( u p p 1 ' o x )

375,000 (0.22ro< : : )SOG.OOO

51.53 7

Tot.al tank cap~city: 1,022, QOOblJls., (a.pprox)

ITEI,aZ.,iTlON O F D ; I N ; I . G , E _ !·~ssio~ 2S5

D . ; J , L 1 G E HI SQU :.n E F E E T

Number

Forcont

(Re:f.*) :i1ooT 0 . . 1 ' 0 0 - Destroyed Gutted Tot'll of TI.·]of ccr:ncnt

10 '12400 1,,400 1 , 4 0 0 1 00

1 3 1,720 1,720 .i,720 11)0

14 1 ; 7 20 1 ~ 7 2 0 1,720 10)

15 1;720 1,720 1 , 7 2 0 1,]0

16 1,720 1,720 1,720 10::'

17625 1325 625 100

18 4;,950 ,1:,050 .1 " : : > 5 0 IN

1911,5)0 11,500 11,50;) 1 ( 1 8

20 G.300 6 ,3 00 G.3CJ 100

12j,400 12; 40') 12, ·r.'f' 1:)0

2 110;.400 10,400 10, ·IDO h'-J

22]8,200 I e, 2 0 0 n,2::lJ ico

2 32 ;2 5 0 2,250 -2,25J lOd

247;100 7 , 1 0 0

7 , io o 100

2 5 2 0,000 20,8,)0 IJV

262 0,000

1 2 ;05 0 1 2 ,05 0 12,050 100

27 ,..&b3 .1 5 0 3 ,1 5 0 3 ;1 5J 10 0

2 01~;100 l a, 1 00 1 6 , 1 0 0 100

2 910,1300

I o , n o o 10,'::OC 100

SO1 1 ;2 00 ll,200 11,200 1 00

3l3.440

3,440 3 , 4 4 0 1 : > 0

5 4 , 2 0 0 5 4,2 00 1 0064,200

1 4 , 6 0 0 U.OOO 1 0014:.600 1007-150 7 , 1 5 0 7,160

G,OOO 6,000 1001 ,000 1 00

l l . S O O 100

~ ~



CONFIDENT 1.\1,

D/A Report HZ., 0 9n t' d •

ITEhttZATION OF DAliI[I:GE!; Mission 255 (Cont' d.)

D .ld I! fl.G E I N S c ;,U _\ T1 E F EE TN~be:r-t R ' . . . . ' )...b,.:4~:'·*

Percent

of roof

; . , .Root' area Totalestroyed COD\ll\On1;

7.,900

G~OOO

2..620O~400

15; 0 0 01;'<140

5~' 20 010;'000

13: '· :1:50

5~9qO

<j,,100

3; 150

1, 20 0

11;'500

4 , 0 0 01;/1004 , 20 0

12;000

2, 0 0 0

2;'HlO

24i~~00

2:,120

2:1720

2,200

2 , ( ) O O

1, 0 50

2,27 0

7.0006,000

6201,200

15,000

1. ' .1:405;200

10 , 0 0 0

15~450

5, 950

4 . 10 03, ;'50

1,200

11,500

2:.000

1, 4 004 , 20 0

12,0002, 0 80

' 2, 10 0

24 , 4 0 0

2, 7 20

2, 7 20

2, 20 0

2,1300

1, 0 502,270

1001 0 0

2525

1 0 0100

100

100

190

10 01 0 0

100

l e e1 0050

100

100

100100

100

100

100

1 00

100

100

100

100

7 . 0 0 01;),. nr)Q2

4145

46

404 956

57

se59

60

69

7176

7179

8 00 2038 69 9::'00

101102

103

1,04

1' 3201, 20 0

15,000

I , · 14 0

5~200

10,000

13. 4 505, 950

4~1003 , 4 5 0

1, 20 0

11,500

2~OOO1, 4 0 04;200

12, 0 0 02,0<30

2 1 00,24,400

2 , 7 2 0

2,720

2,200

2 , G OO

1 . 0502 . 2 7 0

3 bomb holDs in roo£

G2009,355

ITE~~JZATIONOF M IrA GE - H i. ssion 245

Dl'J"l"I.GE nr SQU J .:a : F E E T

Numbor SUi>EnFICL\.L Fercent

(Ref c*) Roof areo. Dostroye¢i Structural Guttorl. lfi!iorTotd of roof : Cott:l.cut- " ~ _ 2 0 ' ' 5 00" 5 0('0 -r 10 Do,str,-,:'rcd 1y" "is33 54~ , ,"" , -' _ ..-'sion 255

Destroyad by ~&-

sior.. 2557,150 1007,150

7,1503$

100100

5 01 0 0

100,:n100

100

54 5; 4 0 0 5, 4 0 05, .w o

6 2 1 ) . 7 5 Q8,750 a, 7 5 0

G3 5 . 2 0 0 2 .. < 30 02,600

G ~ 5,·WO6, 10 0 5.~OO

3 , ( 3 2 53,625 3. 0 25

(3616.960 13.500

13.500

0 ; 41, 60 0 1.<3.00

1.GOO

6J D .1 , 2 0 0 1,200 1, 20 0

S O o b 21,700 2(\,375 7,150 5,000 5 4 , 2 2 6T 6 T ; . J 7 "

....Al'lnoto. ted prin-t, . . ~. .. . . . ~. T _

_ _1



.E

Missions NO. 251, 2 5 2 . 2 5 3 . 2 5 4 & 255

6 July 1945



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\ MISSIONS 251 - 255

DATE 6 July 1945

FL IG HT D ATA &FUEL CONSUMPTION

M I SS I O N N U M B E R #251 # 252 # 253 #254 #255

U N I T 5 8TH W ING 7 3RD W ING3 13 TH m NG 3 14 TH W ING 3 1 5TH \ UI £

A IRCRAFT CONSIDERED 112 1.22 131 128 59

A V E R A G E F L Y I N G ' l ' I M E 14:25 13:45 12:56 14:20 14 : 21

F UE L CO NSU M ED

Average 5542 5823 5589 5859 5394

- Maximum 6 2 0 0 6396 6250 6315 5965Minillltml 4910 5255 5127 5424 5122

F U E L R EM A I N I N G

A v e r a g e 842 778 1103 ?B) 1386

MaxinlUDl 1490 1 2 6 4 1 5 9 3 1231 166)

Minimum 400 254 470 285 820

AVG. GALS. U SE D . P ER H OU R 384.3 423.5 432.3 408.9 375.9

TOTAL U SE D O N A I R B O R N E - A lc 732138 748122 754244 796106 324725

N O. A IRC RA FT A IR BORN E 129 1 3 1 1 3 6 138 60

A V G . BASIC V I T . O F A IR CR AFT 74 B79 7 5 0 1 5 7 4 9 5 9 7 5 6 1 4 7 1 5 5 9

A V E R A G E USEFUL L O A D 5 8 6 2 6 6 1 5 1 4 6 0 2 7 5 60658 6 1 8 0 1

Ava. NO. OF BOM BS L OAD ED Mixed L o a d Mixed L o a d ML'<:ed L o a d Mixed Load 28 y64(T i

2 ..4(G O IIIP B )

A V G . W T . O F B O M B S L O A D E D 1 4 9 7 4 1 6 9 5 9 1 5 0 5 3 1 5 7 5 7 1 6 0 7 1

A V E R A G E F U E L L O A D E D 6 3 8 1 6 5 9 8 6 6 9 1 6 6 3 9 6 7 8 5

A V G . WT. O F FUEL L O A D E D 3 8 2 8 6 3 9 5 8 8 4 0 1 4 6 3 9 8 3 4 4 0 7 1 0

A V O . MI SC . W E I G H T 5 3 6 6 4 9 6 7 5 0 7 6 5 0 6 7 5 0 2 0

A V G . G R O S S W T . A T T A K E O F F 1 3 3 5 0 5 1 3 6 5 2 9 1 3 5 2 3 4 . 1 3 6 2 7 2 1 3 3 3 6 0•

B o m b W e i g h t s ; A N ~ 7 A 2 - 7 0 I b s .

E - 4 6 - 4 2 5 I b s .

T4E4 - 425 Lbs ,A N - M 1 7 A l - 465 L b s ,

A N - M 6 4 ( T N T ) - 5 3 5 l b s .

A N - M 6 4 ( C o m p B ) - 5 5 0 l b s .M - l6 P h n tofla a h - 5 2 I b s .



ANNEX

X X I B O M B ER _ G O M I V L ' i l l ] ) F I E L D O R D E R

6 .July 1 9 4 - 5

MiSSiOIlB N0~ 251 .. 252. 253. 254 _& 255

.. 68 ..



9 6

SECREl '

Auth : GGW i,lJi,Initials: 11/'/2. .Date: 6 ' " i ' J u l ~ ' : - Y " - " " ' l , 9 = - 4 - , 2 , - · · . - -

X XI BO]flER C 01,W tJ\N DGU,'.},i .

6 July 194 5 - 0300K

FIELD OOD ERS

Maps: Japan Aviation Chart 1:218 B80 . .

1. Omtted.

2. XXI Bomber Commandattacks G!'lTI3A, .;U{f"SHI SHand tarset 90-25 - 1764 OF! 6/7 July 1%5: . JlIIZU and KOFUURBANAREl..S

3. a . 58th Wing:

(1) Primary visblal and radfl!' tarcet: CHIDAilllBf.N [.HE!

M PI FORCE REQUIRED

086094 Normal Effort

MPI Reference: zx r I3omGomLitho-Mosaic CHIBA ARFJ~. No.

90.14- 2145.

(2) Route:

Base

!wo J'ima

3 51 A].O N .., 14025E ( IF)

Tars ·c r t180 degree rimt turn to ..1andsend

3535N - 140]LE3520N .., 14045E: E w o Jirra

Base.

(3) Altitudes:

(a) Enr oute to target: 4,000 - 4,000 ft., 7,OCYJ- 7,800 ft.

(h) Of attack: 10,000 - 10,800 ft.

( c) Withdrawal fro r.l target: Above 12,000 ft.

(4) Bombin.f, Airspeed:. ens 215 MPH•.

( 5)

2 Groups:

~t-4 IDs fuaed instantaneous nose,

intervalOP.l.eter setting - 75 ft.,

clusters containing u-69 bows' fused

to open 5,000 ft. abovetar~et, in-

tervalometer settine - 50 ft.

DOr. !b Load: 2 G rou ps;

(6) Takeoff: 0619JOK •.

b. 7 3rd Win g:

(1) . Prir.tary visual sn.d radar target: AKASHI lffiBi.N AREA

FORC!!: RmUIRED

Normal Effort

UPI Reference: XXI BomComLith~c AK'ASHIA R E A ,KAWASW A le co., No. ')O.~ - U41 ...



3 Groups

F .0 .• #96

(2) Route:

Base

Iwo Jii:na

3350N - 13445E341930N - 1344130E (IF)To.rgq,t

J452IlJ - 13505E3 4 58N -" 13440ELeft turn to Landaend

3 3 3 3 N - 13419EIwo Jima

Dase.

()) Altitud0S:

(a) Bnrout e to tarcct: 4,000 - 4,800 ft •., 7,0CJ0 - 7,800 ft.

Cb ) Or attack: 7,000- 7,800 ·ft.

(e) Withdraw1;\l from target: JAinimumof 10,000 ft.

(4 ) Bombing Airspeed: eIAS 19 5 ;tW H•.

(5) Bomb L0ad: Clusters 'containing M--69 beno e fused to opm

2,,500 it.above target, intervalometer set ti ng -

50 ft.

(6) RClI{ 4 . speoial j a r n r n i r J e aircraft will orbit the tarGet area

and the appr-oach to the tarE;<9t area. 'TWoairplanes will

orbit an area in a ten .Illie radiusairole with tl'e cent er

at 3532N- 14010E at altihdes of 15,000 and 15,500 ft.Two a.dd.itiona1 airplanes will orbit an area in a ten rueradius circle with the center at 3536N - 14008E at cititu:ies

of 16;000 and Ib ,~OO ft. .

( 7 ) Takeoff: 0 6 1 8 0 0 K .

c. 313th Wing:

(1) Primary vi sua1 and radar target: SHlliIZU U~".N ..R.Ei~

~

061097

OAP

1 440 90

M PI and OAPRcferenc.e; "XXIBomComLith~osai~ SHI1f1ZlJ

A R E A , N o . 90.18 - Urban.

(2) Route:

BaseIw o Jima

3 4 4 1N - 13 9 27 E3 4583 0N - 13 9D 73 0E (IF)Target.

. 3 5 0 l N - l . 3 8 1 5 E

Loft turnlwo JlmaBaae , ,

,

(a) Enrout.e to targets 3,,000 - 3,800 ft., 6..000 - 6,800 ft.

Altit.udes: '



F.•O. #96

(b) Of attack~ 7;000 - 7,$00 1't.

(c) lqithdrawa.l from targ€t:: Min imum 10,000 ft .•,

mximurn 15,000 ft.

BorohioB Airspeed"! em s 205 lJ:PF...

BombLoad.: 2 GrQups.: ~-47 IBs fused instantaneous nose,

mtervalomet er setting·_ 50' it •111-17 !Ba fused to open at 3,000 £t.above tllrget., intervalol!eter setting _35 ft.

(6) TamaH: 061900K ..

d. 3J.4th Wing~

(1) Prirrary vi .sual and radar target ': [UFU URBAN-A r f E A

M PI FORC E P .:l:Q U IRED

062085 Normal Effort

M PI R efer enee:. XX I BomComLitho-:I[osaic KO: r u / ; . R E J . . 90.16 - Urban.

(2) Route:

Base

Iwo Jirre

3436N - 13Sl4E (IF)Target

Rirj:lt tum

3S14N- 13909EIW0 Jirra

Base,

(3) Altitudes:

(a) Enroute to target: 5,000 - 5,000 ft., 9,000 - 9,800 ft.(b) or atta~k: 1),200 - 14~OOO ft.

(~) Withdrawal from target.: Minimum15,000 ft.

(4 ) Bomb ing Air spe red : C l11 .S 205 M PH.

Benb load: 11-47IBs fused instantaneous nose,

intervalor..eter setting; - 75 ft.Clusters lcont&.ining M-69 b o r n sfused to open 5,000 ft.above the

tar7et intcrvalometer settin{; - 50 ft.'" ,

1 Group:

3 Groups:

(6~ Takeoff: 061800K.

eil 315th Wing:

(1) PrillQry visual and radar targ8t: 90.25 - 1764, MARLJZmOILREFINmY

M ll

126093

MPI Reference: XX[ BomCbm Litho-Mosaic WAKAYAMA.REA,

MAI l IJZEN OIL REFINmY, 90.25 - 1764.



F.O. #96

( : 2 " ) Rout e:

BaseIwo Jima

3 322N l3 i1 f.l3 E3350N 1344430E (lJ?)

Target

H3'5N - 13557EIwo JimaBase.•

(3) Altitudes":

( . 8 0 ) En:route .to 'tar get: 5,O~O ....5)800 It .•, 7,000 ....7J800 ft.

(b) Of at tack: 15 J 000 - 16.,000 ft"

Dtl.c.b Load:500 Lh GPs fused 1/40 nose am ncn-dal.ay tail.

18,000 lbs lJJr A/e, minimum load.

Takeoff: 061700K.

x, (1) Method of Attack: 'b y individua 1 A l e with ma:in face pre cededby 12 pa:tbfl,ooer A/C.

(2) Fir'.st 12 A l e will be designated pathfimers flcr.m by best

radar bOJIDJn[; ~rews.

4. Tactical Miss ion Nwnbers:

CHIBA No. 251AKASBI No. 252SW ThII:!ZU No . 253KOFU No. 25 490.25 ... 1764 - No •. 255

5~ a. (1) The special jamming 8. lrcraft for the 73rd Wing will be

e~uipped to barrage jam the regions 190-210 and 72-84 mega-

cycles. Spotja:lJIming will be conducted over the fre~ency

:ranges 18Q-,190 -and 210-2Xl megacycl.es as desired by the

Wing eommander and as governed by the capacit.;y of each wing.In addition, all strike aircraft will be equipped with one

jarrtl'OOrwithin the barrage band listed above providi.n.:; suf-

ficient equipment is available.

(2) All winge, except the 7,rd Wing, wUl be equipped to barra~e

jam tbe region 190-210 mee;acycles. Spot jamming will be

cord uc ted over the frequency ranges 1SQ-.190, 21Q-2Xl, and

72-84 megacycles a.s desired by the Wing CO!!lIll8.I'l.dernd as

::,overned by the oquipnerJt available.

Observations of the extent and reliability of ttl:: barr3!i6

will be made while over t.h.e tar}et.

Jammers will be kept in operation at all t:iJ;les when closer

than 50 mil~s to the J:lainlanl, and will be turn off at alother times, except far prefliGht and postfl:4:;ht frequeooyeheuks , vmich ar e to be made on tl"e grourrl while the jamaers

are instal·led 'inthe airplanes .•

b. Oommand Post: Hq., XXI BonCom, GUAM.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR G~ LelIA Y:

QFFICIALI/,

/.&t t .l C/ . - t!? /"/11// 1/. 1 6 Im B M O N }'O O M E R Y /Cu1ou~1,G. a. O.D c i s , Operations

A W KISSNER

Drigadier General, USA

Chief of Sbft



JOtI BQ®ER CiJIIlM!,Ji ID

GlL'l.M

6 July 1945 - 0400K

FIELD ORDERS )

Nl.JMEER ')6 )

Cbange s 0 mllGh o r paragraph 3. e. (1) that realia: nFore E o required 3Grw~" to read: "Force' required 4 Gr~p.sn.

C'ha1'lge $0mu c h of paragraph 3. o , (5) that reads: uIGr~p M-17 !Cs·

to read~ 1 1 2 STrops l\!i-17ICB".

I .. J KISSNER

Brigadier Ge nez-a L, US.:..

Chief of Staff

OFFICllL:



FIEID Q oRD ERS )

J I I ' U M B O O 96 )

S : E C ' R E T

l\.uth; CG,rJ:l ilomber Comnand

Ini t131317.......' t ( ~ !' I . . . ; , . , ; V ,. . . , r . " . . . . . . " . _

Date; 6 J u l y 1945

XXI B01lBER CQWW[)

GUAM6 J u l y 1945 - 0300K

Change paragraph .3 . c. (5) to read as follows;

(5) Bomb Load : :; 2 Groups~M-47 lBs fused. instantaneous nose

inteI'va10fileter .setting - 50 ft. '

2 Groups·: M-17 105 fused to open 2,500 ft.

above tari3et, intarva10meter

setting - 35 ft·.

Ohange paragraph 3.. e. (3) (b) to r-ead t

(b). Of Attacl(.: 10,000 ft·~

B Y C QM bLA Nl'l OF MA JO R G E l N E R f . L LeMAY:

A V 1 K I5 Sl:\1 "E R

Ilrigadier General, USA.

Chief of staff

OFFICIAL:

I/) ..1; '.' ._ L

Y : r . ~"~{"':1{A"''ii/.1'.' ." _ fEN.'l~~L ' ~ RYG -

colone]" G.$.C.

D G i S , ·Operations

D IS 'IR lBU T IO N :2 -CO, 58th BomblUng

2 - eG; 73rd BombWing

2 - CG, 313th BombWing

2 - CG, 314th BombWing2 - CG, 315th BombWing

1 - CGJ VfI Fighhr command1 - CO, 3rd Photo Recon Squadron

6 - l\.-3 Tac tic s , XXI Bomber COjl 'l l i\B.nd

2 - 33rd SCU , XXI 130mber Comman d1 _ Commun ica t i on s , XXI B o.n ille r C o mm an d

1- DAS. XXI Bonber' Comman d

2 .. cro, XXI Bomber Comma:nd1 - A -2 Reporting, 1::Xl Bom ber C om mand

4 - A -2, :;c{ I Bom b er C omm and



G

6 July 1945

.75 -



COPY No..

1

2

- '4-.56 .

7e910

11

12

1 .3lll,

1 51 6

171 8

1 920212223 ... 242 526 ..272 8

29 - 333 4

35

3 6

.3 7

36 6 7

68 - 6 9

7 0

717273

7 47 57 61 77879 - Be

DISl 'E IBUTION

T.! I .C:1 ' IP4L MISSION REPORT

OOmrneRd.ing_aeneral ~ Arrrw Air ForcesCQl!1!llMld~nSe~ralj U.S. A rmy Strategic Air Forces (ReEll: ')

eo~ndJ.ng General. U.S. ilrmy Strat eai e Air 'Far eea (Guam)

Gin.ef' of' Staff. U.S• .!ttly Strategic '4r Forces {Guam)

Commanding General; Twentieth Air ForceCommandiBg General ~ Eighth Air Ji'Ol'c-e' (Okinawa)

C01'WDsndern Chief', U.S. Arrrty ferces., .. Pacific

Chief' of Naval Operations, OP-16-V

Oommanderin Chi.af; Pacific Fleet (Adv Hq)

Commander ill, Qhief,. 'Pac Hi c Fleet (Rear Hq)

Commander' Air .Ferce, Pacific Fleet

Commander.;Third FleetCermnander; Fifth FleetCemmander; First Carrier Task Ferce

Co!!llll.a1l.der, :MarianasCon:m.ru'l.;tingGeneral; U.S., Army Forces ,.'Midd1e Pacific

Commanding Gl'lneral; Allied .Air Forces. S\1PA

Command:ingGenerali FSl1 East .M.r FercesCOllll1lEadil8 General~ U • .8. strategic .\ir Forces in Furope

00l111:nandingGaneral~ Medi1;,erranean Allied Air Forces

Commanding General, Fifteenth Air FarceC0mmam!iicng Generai; Seventh Air Force

Cbmmar.ding General;. VU Bomber CommandCortman:l.ingGeneral~ VII Fighter Col!lI !lS.nl

Command iog Ge:ne:ral; Eleventh Air Foz-ce

Commanding'General. 30lst Figl'ioter Wing

Command . Hg_, Allied Air Forces, SFA'

ATTN: Senior Intelligence Officer.' R.A.A.F .•

Commander in Ghief~ u.S• .i\rtily Forces,. Pacific

NITN: ~H 2 ( :For 5eo:;tion 22. R()Ii)

Officer in CharE¢. :feint Intelligence CenterPacifi-e Ocean AreasCommamiag "Gener!!.l, flrm,y Ai.r 'Forces

A'l"I'N: A-C/).S1nte11 igenee

C o r n m a n d i n g General. Army A i r ForcesATTN: ::'0/A S, Intelli!;',ence. Collection Jivision

ColIll1WD.ding General, U.. S.. A : r r 1 : f ; { Strategi<J Air Forees (Guam)

ATTN : !ntelligenbeConJlllB!l.dingGenera,!. U~S. krmy Strategic lir .Forces (Guam)

ATTN : Oommunicat ionsFOR: Counter MeaSures .'dr Analysis CenterC0mmanding Officer,. Ti/entieth .Air Force Lead CrewSchool

Brigadier Ge'netal. H.S. Hansell~ Jr.Chief of Staff. Twentieth .lir Force

Deputy 0/5, Opns. Twentieth Air Force

..\.C of S , . . \ .H2, ~entieth Ai.r Fo rceChemical' Warfare' Officer. Tflen.tiath Air Force

Ordnance Offioer, TWentietb Air ForceDirector of Tactics, A-3, Twentieth Air Force

Historical Officer. Twentieth Air Force



818283

848 586

8?88

90

91929394959 6

979899

100

101-1 0 2lO_3

104

195106

107108

109l i D

111

112US1 1 4115116117 ... 130

Conmand.ing General, .5 8th Batnbardmen:t Wing

OOtrJma1ding Gel'l.eral~ 1Jt'd Bombardment ,ling

Oommanding Genera.l; 313th Bombardment ' ''' ing

Command ingGen.e1'al; 314t h Bombardment WingCamml;l.nding General; ,l15th Bombardment 11ingCommandin.g OfficeF; _3rd Photo. Raco.nnai.ssan.ce Sq

G0mmandi~ Officer; 41st Photo Reconnaissance Set

CojWlanding Oi'fieer., 55th Reconnaissance Sq., Long Range

:ifeather

COlJllll'3.nd.ingQffi car ,Twentieth Air Force Combat Staging

Center (Provisional)Cou:ananding Officer; 33rd Statistics.l Control Unit

C o . l I 1 l U a n d i.ng OHi eel' i6th Bomb Group (VB)

Commanding Officer; 9th BombGroup (VB)

Colllmandillg Ofri·cer; 16th BombCroup (VH)

C0llDUanding Officer~ 19th Bomb Group (VB)

Comma.ndi~ Officer; 29th Bomb Group (Va)

CormJ)anding Officer; 39th Bomb Group (VR)

ColllIll,8;Bd,ing orficer~ 40th Bomb Group (VH)

Commanding Off iO'er; 330th Bomb Group (VH)

COl!llI@ndl'lg Ot' f ieel' ; .33113t Bomb Group (VH)

Commanding Qfficer; 444th Bomb Group (VB)

Cammanding Off ieer ~ 462!)'d Bomb Group (VB)

C9mmanding Offic.e:r; M8th Bomb Gr0Up (VB)

C o m m a n d i n g Qfficer; 4 9 7 t h B o m b Group ( V B )

CoIOlllanding Officer; 498th Bomb Group (VR)

Commanding Officer; 499th Bomb Group (VE)

Connnanding Officer~ 500th Bomb Group (VH)

Commending (}ff'i O'er~ 501st Bomb (,.'roup. (VE)

Commanding Officer; 502nd Bomb Group (VH)

Commanding Oi'riaer; 504th Bomb Group (VR)

Golilmaniling Officer; 505th Bomb Group (lrd)

Commanding Officer ~ 509th Composite Qroup

CorOlnallding Officer; 15th Fighter GroupC'VlR)CoIlllll8nd~ng Offi cer ; 21st Fighter Group (VIR)

lJ.::>rmQatld.lngfr:i:cer; 4I4th Fight,er GroUP (VlR)

Commanding Officer. '506th Fighter Group (VLR)

Report ing Unit; A-2; Tvtant ieth Air For ce (File Copy)

Reporting Unit, ,A...2. ~entieth Air Force

21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 251-255

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Transcript of 21st Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report 251-255