· 2019-07-23 · Aug 24, 2018 Re-introducing “counter-cyclical factors” Jan 2018 Stopping...
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World Economic Trends II<The 2018 Autumn/Winter Report>
- 'Sophistication of China`s Exports and U.S.-China Trade Tension -
March 2019Cabinet Office
Government of Japan
(Summary)
Contents
■Chapter 1 U.S.-China trade tension and China’s higher value-added economy…P2
Section 1: Background of U.S.-China trade tension
Section 2: Effects of U.S.-China trade tension
Section 3: China’s higher value added exports
■Chapter 2 Economic Trends in Major Regions…P9
Section 1: World Economy
Section 2: U.S. Economy
Section 3: Asian Economy
Section 4: European Economy
1
About “World Economic Trends”This report, published semi-annually since 2002, surveys and analyses the trend of the world economy. This is the 34th issue.
ChinaU.S.
GermanyTaiwan Japan
Korea
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 18,000 36,000 54,000 72,000 90,000 108,000(GDP per capita in dollar terms)
(Ratio of R&D spending to GDP, %)
(Notes) 1. Adapted from “World Economic Outlook Database October 2018” by IMF and from OECD Stat.
2. Based on figures of OECD member countries, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Russia, Argentina, Romania, and South Africa.
3. Ratio of R&D spending to GDP is based on figures of Singapore in 2014, those of New Zealand, Republic of South Africa, and Swiss in 2015, those of China in 1995 to 2016, and those of other countries and regions in 2016.
■Chapter 1 U.S.-China trade tension and China’s higher value-added economy (i)
2
1. Quantitative expansion of Chinese economy(1) Share of major countries and regions in global GDP (2) Share of countries and regions in U.S. imports
2. Efforts to improve the quality of Chinese economy(3) R&D spending in major countries and regions (4) Relationship between R&D spending and GDP per
capita in major countries and regionsChina’s R&D spending continues to increase, approaching that of U.S.
China’s share expanded sharply after joining WTO. At present, the U.S. and China account for about 40% of global GDP.
China has expanded its share to the same level of Japan in the middle of the 1980s.
U.S.$10.6 trillion
31%
China$1.3 trillion
4%
Japan$4.3 trillion
13%
EU$9.0 trillion
27%
Emerging(excluding China)
$5.7 trillion17%
Others$2.6 trillion
8% U.S.$19.5 trillion
24%
China$12.0 trillion
15%Japan
$4.9 trillion6%
EU$17.3 trillion
22%
Emerging (excluding China)
$19.7 trillion25%
Others$6.6 trillion
8%
Global GDP was $34 trillionin 2001 (year when China joined WTO)
Global GDP was $80 trillionin 2017
(Note) Adapted from “World Economic Outlook, October 2018” by IMF.
0
5
10
15
20
25
1980 85 90 95 2000 05 10 15 17
(%)
(Year)(Note) Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce.
ChinaEU
Japan
Japan’s highest share22.4% in 1986
About 40%
0500
1,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,0004,5005,000
1995 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 16
U.S.
Japan
EU
China
($100 million)
(Note) Adapted from OECD Stat.
(Year)
Germany
China expands R&D spending faster than growth in GDP per capita.
(Note) Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China.
Imports of $2.3 trillion(Ratio to GDP, 12.0%)
U.S. GDP of $19.5 trillion
Imports from China (diagonal line part)
$505.5 billion((Ratio to GDP, 2.6%)
Imports of $1.8 trillion((Ratio to GDP, 15.3%)
China’s GDP of $12.0 trillion
Imports from U.S. (diagonal line part)
$155.2 billion(Ratio to GDP, 1.3%)
■ Chapter 1 U.S.-China trade tension and China’s higher value-added economy (ii)
3
3. Background of U.S.-China trade tension (1) Additional tariff measures by U.S. and China (2) Status of US-China trade talks
4. Scale of economy brought by U.S.-China trade tension (3) Share of the U.S. and China’s exports in respective GDP
Effects of exports are relatively great in China. Effects of imports are relatively great in U.S.
(4) Share of the U.S. and China’s imports in respective GDP
U.S. GDP of $19.5 trillion
Exports of $2.3 trillion(Ratio to GDP, 18.8%)
China’s GDP of $12.0 trillion
Exports to U.S. (diagonal line part)
$433.1 billion(Ratio to GDP, 3.6%)
Exports of $1.5 trillion(Ratio to GDP, 7.9%)
Exports to China (diagonal line part)
$129.9 billion(Ratio to GDP, 0.7%)
(Note) Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China.
Date for imposing additional tariffs
(final list release date)
What to do (against China)
Example of items subject to tariffs
Date for imposing additional tariffs
(final list release date)
What to do (against U.S.)
Example of items subject to tariffs
Jul 6, 2018(Jun 15, 2018)
Additional 25% tariffs on $34 billion worth of goods
Industrial machinesElectronic parts
Jul 6, 2018(Jun 16, 2018)
Additional 25% tariffs on $34 billion worth of goods
Agricultural products like soybeans, cars, fishery
products
Aug 23, 2018(Aug 7, 2018)
Additional 25% tariffs on $16 billion worth of goods
Plastic productsIntegrated circuits
Aug 23, 2018(Aug 8, 2018)
Additional 25% tariffs on $16 billion worth of goods
Chemical products, medical facilities, energy
products, cars
Sep 24, 2018(Sep 18, 2018)
Additional 10% tariffs on $200 billion worth of goods (*)
Food productsFurniture
Sept 24, 2018(Aug 3, 2018)
Additional 5-10% tariffs on $60 billion worth of goods
Liquefied natural gas, food products & beverages,
electrical products
The date is undecided Additional 25% tariffs on $257 billion worth of goods (**) -
Dec 1, 2018 US-China Summit
Jan 2019 Ministerial and vice-ministerial level meeting was held
Feb 2019 Ministerial and vice-ministerial level meeting was held
((Notes) 1.* The tariffs were to be raised to 25% at Jan 1, 2019 as of Sept 24, 2018. As a result of the US-China Summit held on Dec 1, 2018, the tariff hike was postponed to Mar 1,2019, and further postponed based on the progress of trade talks (the deadline was not published as of Mar 1, 2019).
2.** In Sep 18, 2018 President Trump announced that the U.S. would impose additional 25% tariffs on $257 billion worth of goods if China should invoke countermeasures.
(U.S.) (China)• Regarding the additional tariff measures
worth $200 billion (as the 3rd round of a series of measures), the U.S. decided to leave tariffs unchanged at 10% after Jan 1, 2019
• Both governments agreed to make effort to conclude negotiations within 90 days
• If they don’t reach an agreement, the U.S. will raise the 3rd round of tariffs to 25%
46
48
50
52
54
56
58
1
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19(Note) Adapted from Markit.
(Month)(Year)
(D.I.)
Developed
EmergingGlobal
5.86.06.26.46.66.87.07.27.4
2015 16 17 18 19
Yuan appreciation
Yuan depreciation
(yuan/US dollar, inverse scale)
(Month)
(Year)
Oct 15, 2015 Requiring financial institutions handling foreign currency forward contracts (involving foreign currency-buying and yuan-selling) to deposit a reserve (foreign exchange risk reserve)
Sept 11, 2017 Stopping requiring financial institutions
to deposit a reserve Aug 6, 2018Re-requiring financial
institutions to deposit a reserve
Aug 24, 2018Re-introducing “counter-
cyclical factors”
Jan 2018Stopping “counter-
cyclical factors”
Aug 11-13, 2015Lowering RMB central parity rate
May 2017Introducing “counter-
cyclical factors”
■Chapter 1 U.S.-China trade tension and China’s higher value-added economy (iii)
4
5. Effects on Chinese financial and capital markets(1) Renminbi exchange rate (2) Foreign reserves
6. Effects on global corporate sentiment(3) Global manufacturing business confidence (4) Global manufacturing new export orders
Declining trend in both developed and emerging markets since the beginning of 2018.
Sharp drop due to intensifying U.S.-China trade tension. Lower than the breakpoint of 50 in both developed and emerging markets
The renminbi depreciatedsignificantly around mid 2018, mainly due to implementation of additional tariff measures by U.S. and China.
46
48
50
52
54
56
58
1
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19(Note) Adapted from Markit.
(Month)(Year)
(D.I.)
Developed
Emerging Global
2.52.72.93.13.33.53.73.9
1
2015 16 17 18 19
(Month)(Year)
($1 trillion)
(Note) Adapted from the People’s Bank of China.
Foreign reserves decreased significantly when the stock prices fell in 2015, but remain stable in the current phase.
(Notes) 1. Adapted from Bloomberg.2. “Counter-cyclical factors” are an additional item for the method of calculating central
parity rates. The factors are said to prevent currency rates from fluctuating too much by separating from fundamentals.
(4) China’s imports by destination
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
Q3 7 8 9 10 11
2015 16 17 18
(YoY, %)
(Notes) 1. Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce.2. On a customs basis, nominally/not seasonally adjusted.
(Quarter/month)
(Year)
Aircraft
Mineralfuels
Optical devices.
Cars
Soybeans
Others
Exports of goods, YoY(polygonal line)
(monthly)
-20-15-10
-505
1015202530
Q4 7 8 9 10 11 12 1
2015 16 17 18 18 19
アメリカ
EU
日本
香港・韓国・台湾・ASEAN
その他
(YoY, %)
(Monthly)
■Chapter 1 U.S.-China trade tension and China’s higher value-added economy (iv)
5
7. More burden on American producers and consumers(1) U.S. Exports to China (by product) (2) Amount of increase in U.S. tariff revenue
(3) China’s exports by destination
Significant effects of additional tariff measures against imports from China on the increase in tariff revenue.
0
10
20
30
40
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
2018
($100 million)
(Month)
(Year)
Amount of increase in tariff revenue due to additional tariffs on imports from China
Amount of increase in tariff revenue due to additional tariffs on steel and aluminum
(Reference)YoY comparison in total
tariff revenue
(Notes) 1. Adapted from U.S. Department of Treasury, and Department of Commerce.2. Amount of increase in tariff revenue due to additional tariff measures is estimated by Cabinet Office
based on statistic item numbers designated and published as items subject to additional tariff measures.
-20-15-10
-505
1015202530
Q4 7 8 9 10 11 12 1
2015 16 17 18 18 19
アメリカ
EU
日本
系列5
その他
(Quarter/month)
(Year)
(YoY, %) (Monthly)
Hong Kong/Korea/Taiwan/ASEAN
(Quarter/month)
(Year)
Mainly soybeans and cars on which China has imposed additional tariff measures have significantly reduced export growth.
8. Effects of U.S.-China trade tension on China’s exports and imports
Decline in overall import growth, mainly in imports from U.S. since Nov 2018.
(備考)中国海関総署より作成。(備考)中国海関総署より作成。
(Note) Adapted from General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China.(Note) Adapted from General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China.
U.S. Decline in overall export growth, mainly in exports to U.S. since Nov 2018.
Others
Japan
Others
EUU.S.
EU
JapanHong Kong/Korea/Taiwan/ASEAN
■Chapter 1 U.S.-China trade tension and China’s higher value-added economy (v)
6
9. Structural changes in China’s exports and imports(1) China’s exports by production stage (2) China’s imports by production stage
10. China’s higher value added exports (i)(3) Trends in global gross exports and value added exports (4) Share of value added exports in gross exports Global value chain (GVC) development lost momentum after the global financial crisis.
In China, the share of domestic value added in exports rose (dependency on overseas imports in producing exports declined) after the global financial crisis.
The share of consumption goods decreased, while the shares of intermediate goods and capital goods increased.
The shares of consumption goods and raw materials increasedwhile the shares of intermediate goods and capital goods decreased.
0
10
20
30
40
50
2000 05 10 15 16
(Note) Adapted from “RIETI-TID 2016” by Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.(Year)
(Share, %)
Raw materials
Intermediate goodsConsumption goods
Capital goods
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
1990 95 2000 05 10 15 1718
総輸出
付加価値輸出
差(%、目盛右)
($100 million)
(Notes) 1. Adapted from UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database. 2. Figures after 2016 are estimated by the nowcast models created by UNCTAD.3. Difference (%) is a ratio of the difference between the amount of value-added
exports and the amount of Gross exports to the amount of value added exports.
(%)
(Year)
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
1990 95 2000 05 10 15 1718
日本 中国 アメリカ ドイツ
(%)
(Notes) 1. Adapted from UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database. 2. Figures after 2016 are estimated by the nowcast models created by UNCTAD.
(Year)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2000 05 10 15 16 (Year)
(Share, %)
(Note) Adapted from “RIETI-TID 2016” by Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
Raw materials
Capital goods
Intermediate goods
Consumption goods
Gross exportsJapan China U.S. Germany
Difference (%, right scale)
Value-added exports
■Chapter 1 U.S.-China trade tension and China’s higher value added economy (vi)
7
11. China’s higher value added exports (ii)(1) Share of domestic value added in U.S. and China’s exports (2) Income elasticity of U.S. and China’s exports
12. China’s higher value added exports (iii)(3) GVC participation rate of U.S.
Mostly “forward participation” in the past, but gradual increase in “backward participation”has been observed..
Along with the increasing share of domestic value added in exports, “forward participation” has been expanding.
(4) GVC participation rate of China
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1995 2000 05 10 18
後方への参加 前方への参加
(%)
(Notes) 1. Adapted from UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.2. Figures for 2018 are estimated by the nowcast models created
by UNCTAD.
(Year)0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1995 2000 05 10 18
後方への参加
前方への参加
(%)
(Notes) 1. Adapted from UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.2. Figures for 2018 are estimated by the nowcast models created
by UNCTAD.
(Year)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
(Year)
Income elasticity (China)
Income elasticity (U.S.)
Income elasticity of China’s exports is on an upward trend reflecting its higher value-added exports.China’s export structure is more subject to sluggish external demand than that of U.S.
Shares of domestic value added in automobile and semi-conductor exports from U.S. are on a downward trend.Share of domestic value added in computer exports from China is on an upward trend.
(Image of GVC participation rate)
(Downstream)
(Upstream)
Country B’s backward
participation rate
Country A’s exports: aCountry A’s value added exports: a
:
Country B’s exports: a + bCountry B’s value added exports: b
Country B’s forward
participation rate
:
Country C’s exports: a + b + + cCountry C’s value added exports: c
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2000 05 10 15 (Year)
Wearing apparel
Electronic computer
(Note) Adapted from UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.
(%)
70
75
80
85
90
95
2000 05 10 15(Year)
(Note) Adapted from UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.
(%)Semi-conductors,
etc.Automobile
Backward participation
Forward participation
Forward participation
Backward participation
(U.S.) (China)
(Note) Adapted from World Bank, BIS, and National Bureau of Statistics of China.
■ Chapter 1 U.S.-China trade tension and China’s higher value-added economy (vii)
8
13. Effects through supply chains (i)
(3) Ratio of value added in semi-conductors, etc. exported from U.S. by country
4. Effects through supply chains (ii)
(1) Foreign value added in U.S. exports: share by country and region
Increasing dependency on imports from China. Decreasing dependency on imports from developed countries.Strengthening GVC ties with ASEAN.
China’s share of value added in U.S. export ofsemi-conductors, etc. is on an upward trend.
(2) Foreign value added in China’s exports: share by country and region
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
2000年 05年 10年 15年
China
Japan
Germany
(Note) Adapted from UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.
(%)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
2000年 05年 10年 15年
U.S.
Germany
Japan
(Note) Adapted from UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.
(%)
(4) Ratio of value added in computers exported from China by countryU.S. share of the value added in China’s computer exports ison a downward trend.
0
20
40
60
80
100
1995 2000 05 10 15 18
日本 EU28 カナダ メキシコ 中国
韓国 台湾 インド ASEAN その他(%)
(Notes) 1. Adapted from UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.2. Figures for 2018 are estimated by the nowcast
models created by UNCTAD.
(Year)
EU & Japan
Canada & Mexico (NAFTA)
Major Asian countries & regions
Others
0
20
40
60
80
100
1995 2000 05 10 15 18
アメリカ 日本 EU28 韓国
台湾 インド ASEAN その他(%)
(Year)(Notes) 1. Adapted from UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.
2. Figures for 2018 are estimated by the nowcast models created by UNCTAD.
U.S. & EU & Japan
Major Asian countries & regions
Others
Japan EU28 Canada Mexico ChinaU.S. Japan EU28 Korea
Korea Taiwan India ASEAN Others Taiwan India ASEAN Others
2000 05 10 15 1510052000
404550556065707580
2018 19(Notes) 1. Adapted from Bloomberg.
2. Crude oil prices are WTI futures prices.
(Dollar/barrel)
(Month)
(Year)
Jul 1, OPEC members and non-member stateseased coordinated production cut (agreed upon on Jun 23)
Aug 7, the U.S. re-imposed some of the economic sanctions on Iran
Nov 5, the U.S. re-imposed full-scale economic sanctions on Iran
Jan 1, OPEC members and non-member states expanded coordinated production cut (agreed upon on Dec 7)
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2000 05 10 15 18 (Year)
(%)
U.S.
China
Developed(excluding U.S.)
Emerging & developing(excluding China)
■Chapter 2 Economic Trends in Major Regions (World economy)
9
The world economy has been recovering moderately on the whole. With increasing uncertainty on economic policies, the growth pace in 2019 is expected to be a little slower than that in 2018. Crude oil prices have been on an upward trend in 2019 mainly due to coordinated production cut after a significant drop in 2018.
1. Characteristics in current economic conditions(1) Global real economic growth rate
2. Outlook for world economic growth and crude oil prices(4) Crude oil prices
(2) Global industrial production and Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
Growth in industrial production peaked out in the beginning of 2019.Economic Policy Uncertainty Index hit a record high level.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
(Year)
(YoY, %)
(Notes) 1. Adapted from Economic Policy Uncertainty created by World Bank.2. Long-term averages of real goods export and industrial production are
average values between January 1997 and November 2011, and between January 1997 and December 2018, respectively.
Industrial production(Index)
Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
(right scale)
Industrialproduction (Long-
term average)
(Notes) 1. Adapted from “World Economic Outlook 1, October 2018” by IMF.2. 39 developed countries and 155 emerging & developing countries are classified according to
IMF classification. 3. Contribution of each country and region is estimated based on its weight in the previous year’s
nominal GDP.
3.72.9
6.6
1.80.9
3.5
2.5
6.2
1.61.1
3.6
1.8
6.2
1.7
0.5
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
世界 アメリカ 中国 ユーロ圏 日本
2020
(%)
2019
(Note) Adapted from “World Economic Outlook update, January 2019” by IMF.Figures for 2018, 2019, and 2020 are all predicted.
2018
The world economic growth rate in 2019 is expected to fall slightly compared with 2018.
JapanEurozoneChinaU.S.World
The economy recovered more moderately in 2018 than in 2017.
(3) Outlook for world economic growthSignificant drop in autumn 2018.Upward trend in 2019 mainly dueto coordinated production cut.
■Chapter 2 Economic Trends in Major Regions (U.S. economy)
10
The U.S. economy has been continuing its long-term economic recovery for more than nine and half years since the global financial crisis, with the employment situation improving continuously. FRB raised interest rates four times in 2018. The effect of the partial government shutdown on the economy will be limited in full-year 2019.
1. Current state of U.S. economy(1) Real economic growth rate
2. Movements in U.S. policy(4) Effect of the partial government shutdown on real
economic growth rate
(2) Labor market
(3) Policy interest rates
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Q3
2015 16 17 18
(QoQ annualized rate, %)Real economic growth rate
(Quarter)(Year)
Net export
Inventory investment
Business fixed investment
Private consumption
Government expenditure
(Note) Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce.
Housing investment
1.01.52.02.53.03.5
Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2018 19
Outlook on growth rate without considering the effect of the partial government shutdown(Baseline prediction)
(Quarter)
(Year)
(QoQ annualized rate, %)
Outlook on growth rate in consideration of the effect of the partial government shutdown
The effect of the partial government shutdown on real GDP in full-year 2019 will be minus 0.02%.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2004 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1819(Notes) 1. Adapted from FRB.
2. Policy Interest rate is FF (Federal Funds) target rate.FF rate has been incremented or decremented by 0.25% points since Dec 2008.
3. In January, FOMC also made another statement that it would review its balance sheet normalization program.
(Month)(Year)
(%)
From Dec 20, 2018 onwardsFF target rate
(upper limit of 2.50%)
34567891011
-90
-60
-30
0
30
60
(Year)
Unemployment rate (right scale)4.0% in Jan 2019
MoM change in employment304 thousand people in Jan 2019
(MoM, in 10 thousand people)
(Notes) 1. Adapted from U.S. Department of Labor.2. Nonfarm employment.
(%)
Increase in employment and downward trend in unemployment.Robust private
consumption and business fixed investment supported high growth.
The FOMC said in its January statement that it would be patient in adjusting interest rates in the future.
(Notes) 1. Adapted from “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2019 to 2029 (Jan 28, 2018)” and “The Effects of the Partial Shutdown Ending in January 2019 (Jan 28, 2019) created by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
2. The period of the partial government shutdown was 35 days from Dec 22, 2018 to Jan 25, 2019.3. The effect of the partial government shutdown includes delay in expenditure for the purchase of
goods and service by the federal government, but does not include indirect effects due to failure of businesses to obtain authorization from the federal government, for instance.
0
5
10
15
2015 16 17 18
(YoY, %)
(Month)(Year)
Nominal
Real
(Notes) 1. Adapted from National Bureau of Statistics of China.2. Real growth rates in Mar 2017, Jan-Feb 2018, and Dec 2018 are not published.
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1
2015 16 17 18 19
(YoY, %)
Taiwan
Korea
(Month)
(Year)
Thailand
(Note) Adapted from National Bureau of Statistics of China.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
12
2015 16 17 18
(YTDoYTD cumulative total, %)
(Month)(Year)
Overall fixed asset investment
Manufacturing investment
Real estate development investment
Infrastructure-related investment
(2) Fixed asset investment
■Chapter 2 Economic Trends in Major Regions (Asian economy)
11
The Chinese economy has slowed down moderately. This is because growth in infrastructure investment has fallen due to effectscaused by efforts to reduce debt, and growth in consumption has somewhat fallen since autumn in 2018. Against the background of the slowdown of the Chinese economy, growth in exports to China has fallen in Asian countries.
(1) China’s real economic growth rate
(3) Consumption (4) Exports to China from Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand
1. Slowdown of Chinese economy
2. Slowdown of Chinese economy and its spillover effects
Growth rate in 2018 fell gradually.
Growth in consumption has been on a downward trend. Slowdown of Chinese
economy had spillover effects on Asian countries.
Growth in infrastructure-relatedinvestment, which had fallensignificantly in early 2018, beganto bottom out around the autumn.
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
201516 17 18 Q42015 16 17 18
(Quarterly series)
(Quarter)(Year)
(YoY, %)
(Year)
Capital formation
Final consumption
Net export
Real economic growth rate
(Note) Adapted from National Bureau of Statistics of China.
(Notes) 1. Adapted from Korea Customs Service, Ministry of Finance, R.O.C.(Taiwan)and Ministry of Commerce, Thailand.
2. U.S. doller-based, 3-month moving averages, including exports to Hong Kong.
(3) Manufacturing production in Germany
-4-3-2-101234
2017 18
(Month)
(Year)(Notes) 1. Adapted from Federal Statistical Office.
2. WLTP (Worldwide harmonized Light vehicles Test Procedure) is a globally harmonised test procedure for measuring CO2 emissions and fuel consumption from cars and vans in conditions close to actual running.
3. The share of road transport vehicles, etc. in manufacturing industry is 17.7% (2015).4. 3-Month moving averages.
(MoM, %) Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
Manufacturing production
WLTP applied to all new car registration.
-12-10
-8-6-4-202468
10
Q42015 16 17 18
Business sector
(QoQ annualized rate, %)
Public sector
Private dwellings
Gross fixed capital formation
Others
(Quarter)
(Year)(Note) Adapted from Office for National Statistics.
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Q42015 16 17 18
Eurozone0.8% in Oct-Dec*
Germany0.1% in Oct-Dec*
UK0.7% in Oct-Dec*
(QoQ annualized rate, %)
(Quarter)
(Year)
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2008 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Germany3.3% in Dec
(%)
France9.1% in Dec
UK4.0% in Dec
Italy10.3% in Dec
Eurozone7.9% in Dec
(Month)
(Year)(Note) Adapted from Eurostat.
■ Chapter 2 Economic Trends in Major Regions (European economy (i))
12
The Eurozone economic growth rate fell as the economy of Germany had remained at a standstill since the latter half of 2018, dueto temporary factors including a slowdown in the pace of expansion in external demand and the introduction of WLTP. Uncertaintyover Brexit weighed down capital investment, resulting in weaker recovery.
(1) Real economic growth rates in major European countries (2) Unemployment rates in major European countries
(4) UK Business fixed investment
1. Trends in European economy
2. Weaknesses in German and UK economiesBusiness investment has been declining for 4 consecutive quarters due to uncertainty related to Brexit.
The Eurozone economy has recovered moderately, with weaknesses seen in some countries like Germany. The UK economic recovery has been weak.
The rate has been generally on a downward trend since 2013.
Signs of improvement have appeared recently despite a drop in production mainly of road transport vehicles in 2H of 2018.
(Note) Adapted from Eurostat, the Federal Statistical Office and Office for National Statistics.
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Q4
200708 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
純輸出
在庫・誤差脱漏
総固定資本形成
政府消費
個人消費
実質経済成長率
(YoY, %)
(Note) Adapted from Italian National Institute of Statistics.
(Quarter)
(Year)
(Quarter)(QoQ annualized rate, %)
15
17
19
21
23
25
65
66
67
68
69
70
1992 95 98 01 04 07 10 13 1617
生産年齢人口の総人口に占める割合
移民就業者の全就業者に占める割合
(目盛右)
(%)
(Year)
(%)
16.1
21.1
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.901.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
2
2018 19
(%)
(Month)
(Year)
Dollar/euro rate(right scale)
Yield spread between Italian and German government bonds
Euro appreciation
Euro depreciation
(Dollar/euro, inverse scale)
(Notes) 1. Adapted from Bloomberg.2. Yield spread between Italian and German government bonds is calculated by subtracting
the German 10-year bund yield from the Italian 10-year bond yield.
Sep 27Ministers agreed on the Economic
and Financial Document
Jun 6New administration in Italy
Mar 4Italian general
election
Nov 21European
Commission gave an opinion to
Italy’s budget plan
Dec 19EU and Italy
made an agreement
■ Chapter 2 Economic Trends in Major Regions (European economy (ii))
13
In Germany and UK, the number of immigrants has been increasing with the tight labor supply-and-demand situation continuing.Increased political and policy uncertainty in Italy, including an ongoing conflict with EU over Italy’s expansionary budget plan, hascaused the financing environment to deteriorate, showing Italy has entered into a recession.
(1) Working age population and immigrants in Germany (2) Net immigration to UK
(3) Italy’s real economic growth rate (4) Italy’s fiscal risk premium
3. Utilization of immigrants in Germany and UK
4. Weaknesses in Italy
Immigrant workers have partially offset the decrease in labor force population.
Minus growth for two consecutive quarters.
UK’s referendum on Brexit held in June 2016 has reduced the number of immigrants from EU.
The risk premium has been widened since June 2018 due to concerns over fiscal management.
0
10
20
30
40
6 6
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
(10,000 people)
EU(Month)
(Year)
Non-EU
Overall
(Notes) 1. Adapted from Office for National Statistics.2. Figures for 2018 are provisional.3. Number of net increases in the past year until the time of publication (by quarter).4. Immigrants are those who are defined by UN (as those who move to countries other
than that of their usual residence for a period of at least 12 months).
(Notes) 1. Adapted from World Bank, Federal Statistical Office.2. The working age population is defined as those aged 15 to 64.3. 1% point on the left longitudinal axis shows about 827 thousand people, while 2%
points on the right longitudinal axis show about 883 thousand people.4. Immigrants are defined as those who have moved to live in the territory of the current
Federal Republic of Germany since 1949 (See text for details).
Share of working age population in the total population
Share of immigrant workers in total employment (right scale)
Net export
Household consumption
Chang in inventories, acquisitions less disposals of valueables
Gross fixed capital formation
Government consumption
Real economic growth rate