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IJRAR1903015 International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR) www.ijrar.org 106

Co-opetition based Strategic decisions

Dr. Sandeep Bhasin

Associate Professor, Amity University Uttar Pradesh

Introduction

Business is all about cooperation when it comes to creating a pie and competition when it comes to

dividing it up1(Nalebuff and Brandendurger, 2002). The current business environment, advances in information

and communication technologies, and the resultant development of network and virtual organizations have led

firms to cooperate and compete simultaneously2 (Preiss et al., 1996). Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) refer

to this phenomenon as co-opetition3. Knowledge (or often just information) is a source of competitive

advantage4 (Simon, 1992), and cooperation, in the form of interorganizational knowledge sharing, has the

potential to increase each partner's knowledge base and, thus, competitiveness5 (Lorange, 1996). However,

even if cooperation increases the total value for the partners and enlarges the "overall pie" for an individual firm,

what ultimately counts is its share of the new pie and, perhaps, what other new pies may be produced by the

knowledge6 (Loebecke and Fenema, 1998). The firms would rather not share (or transfer) knowledge if they

feel that what they gain from cooperation is outweighed by losses from relinquishing their monopoly over the

knowledge7 (Appleyard, 1996). Co-opetition is a double-edged sword that can, if not handled properly, spiral

out of control for the players involved. The dynamism changes completely with a new player enters

theoligopoly with clear disruptive strategies to make space for the self, resulting in the complete

structuralchange of the industry. This willhave a long-term impact on the industry. It is quite interesting to note

that over 50% of new cooperative alliances formed are between competitors8 (Harbison & Pekar, 1998), and

1 Barry J Nalebuff and Adam M Brandenburger, Co-opetition, Hachette, 2002 2Preiss, K., Goldman, S.L., and Nagel, R.N. (1996). Co-operate to Compete, New York: van Nostrand Reinhold. 3Co-Opetition and Knowledge Transfer, Claudia Loebecke et al..,Copenhagen Business School, The data base for Advances in Information

Systems - Spring 1999 (Vol. 30, No. 2) 4 Simon H.A. (1992). Models of Bounded Rationafity: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 5 Lorange, P. (1996). "Strategy at the Leading Edge - Interactive Strategy - Alliances and Partnership," Long Range Planning, Vol. 29, No.

4, pp. 581-584. 6 Loebbecke, C., and van Fenema, P.C. (1998). "Towards a Theory of Inter-rganizational

Knowledge Sharing During Co-opetition," Proceedings of European Conference on Information Systems, Aix-en-Provence, France, pp. 1632-1639. 7Appleyard, M. (1996). "How Does Knowledge Flow? Interfirm Patterns in the Semiconductor Industry," Strategic Management Journal,

Vol. 17, (Winter), pp. 137-154 8 Harbison, J. R., & Pekar, P., Jr. 1998. Smart alliances. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.



that ―the phenomenon in practice is on the rise‖9 (Ketchen, Snow, & Hoover, 2004: 795). Scholars have argued

that ―firms can generate economic rents and achieve superior, long-run performance through simultaneous

competition and cooperation‖10

(Lado et al., 1997: 11) and that co-opetition is ―the most advantageous

relationship between competitors‖11

(Bengtsson & Kock, 2000: 411).

The objective of this paper is to study the impact of co-opetition in an oligopoly and propose possible

solutionsusing scenarios clearly stating certain idealizations to support the arguments and solutions. The

solution attempts to determine of how much each player benefits with Co-opetition and its impact on the new

entrant. In general terms, we idealize the co-opetition problem by assuming that the players operating in

oligopoly are rational, that each player can accurately compare its objectives with other players‘ objectives, that

they equally own the skills to bargain with other players under co-opetition, and that each has full knowledge of

the strategic preferences of the other players operating in the market.I have tried to give a theoretical framework

to co-opetition taking the base of ‗Theory of Games and Economic Behavior‘12

. I have tried to mix it with the

element of ‗anticipation‘, covered through scenario planning and presented in the pay-off matrix.

Co-opetition and Complementary Businesses

Faster hardware prompts people to upgrade to a more powerful software, and more powerful software

motivates people to buy faster hardware (Nalebuff and Brandendurger, 2002). We can observe this in the

computer hardware industry. Even as the users move to mobile devices from desktops and laptops, one of the

market leaders in mobile telephony handset business recently accepted the strategy of deliberately making the

mobile phones slower and increasing the usage of battery even for regular activities to prompt people to

upgrade to the latest mobile handset. In both the industries discussed above, we observe a deliberate effort by

the marketer to ensure upgradation by the users thus resulting in higher sales through replacements. There is a

complementary arrangement playing a role between the software and the hardware developers here. In the

9 Ketchen, D. J., Snow, C. C., & Hoover, V. L. 2004. Research on competitive dynamics: Recent accomplishments and future challenges.

Journal of Management, 30: 779-804 10

Lado, A. A., Boyd, N. G., & Hanlon, S. C. 1997. Competition, cooperation, and the search for economic rents: A syncretic model.

Academy of Management Review, 22: 110-141 11 Bengtsson, M., & Kock, S. 2000. ―Co-opetition‖ in business networks—To cooperate and compete simultaneously. Industrial Marketing

Management, 29: 411-426 12John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and EconomicBehavior, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944

(Second Edition, 1947)



above example, the hardware industry will need a complementary industry (software developers) to help stay

relevant in the industry for a longer period and those operating in the complementary industry (Software

developers) will need the hardware industry to stay sustainable for a longer period of time. Both these acts must

happen together to ensure success for both the industries.

This phenomenon does not restrict only to the software industry. GM Motors have had trouble selling

the cars in India as the buyers knew they would find it difficult to get the required spare-parts and qualified

mechanics. This also increased the cost of ownership of a GM car in India. Ford, on the other hand, decided to

locally source the spare-parts, ensuring easy availability of spares in the market, including low cost of servicing.

They have survived in a market where one brand (Maruti Suzuki13

) controls over 48% of the market.

… a player is your complementor if its more attractive for a supplier to provide resources to you when it‘s also

supplying the other players than when it is supplying you alone. A player is your competitor if it‘s less attractive

for a supplier to provide resources to you when it‘s also supplying the other player than when its supplying you

alone (Nalebuff and Brandendurger, 2002).

Considering the above statement from the perspective of Co-opetition / Complementary industry, we

can conclude that that the customers and the suppliers play a in harmonic manner and the competitors and

complementors play in duplication. In many instances, we have observed the complementors entering the

market and help expand the market. This helps the incumbent as well as the new complementors expand the

size of the pie instead of fighting for a share in the existing pie. However, the conflict arises when the

incumbent wants a higher share in the new market as well. We can observe this in car rentals and Taxi market

in India. With the presence of players including locally grown Ola and international brand Uber, it has become

very convenient for the commuter to get a cab on demand. However, in the long run, we may have a situation

when these prospective customers (commuters) of car manufacturers may differ their car purchases or

completely avoid buying a new one for the car rentals or taxi services. We may consider the fact that with an

increase in car density and crumpling infrastructure, there is limited motivation for the car owners to drive their

13Maruti Suzuki Motors Limited started as joint venture between Suzuki Motors, Japan and Government of India and launched its first car

in 1983. Today, Suzuki Motors hold over 51% of the shares; Government of India has divested since.



own car or replace an existing one with a new one. As this dynamism holds itself over a period, we may find

large players getting into cab or car rentals services in India to ensure better market share for their brand. We

have witnessed such strategic investments in the US where Ford Motor Company holds a stake in Hertz and

Budget; Chrysler and GM hold a stake in Avis.

Co-opetition and Utility Theory

Utility theory postulated in economics to explain behavior of individuals based on the premise people can

consistently order rank their choices depending upon their preferences. It is based on individual‘s beliefs and

preferences.Each individual show different preferences. It is safe to assume that these individual preferences are

intrinsic. Any theory, which proposes to capture preferences, is abstraction based on certain assumptions.We

use these assumptions to predict the individual‘s behavior under controlled conditions.

I have used the same assumptions used by John Nash in the paper titled ‗The Bargaining Problem‘

(1950)14

, which are reproduced below:

1. An individual offered two possible anticipations can decide which is preferable or that they are equally

desirable.

2. The ordering thus produced is transitive; if A is better than B and B is better than C then A is better than

C.

3. Any probability combination of equally desirable states is just as desirable as either.

4. If A, B, and C are as in assumption (2), then there is a probability combination of A and C which is just

as desirable as C. This amounts to an assumption of continuity.

5. If 0 < p < 1 and A and B are equally desirable, then pA +(1 - p) C and pB + (1 - p) C are equally

desirable. Also, if A and B are equally desirable, A may be substituted for B in any desirability ordering

relationship satisfied by B.

This utility function is not unique, that is, if u is such a function then so is au + b, provided

14 John F. Nash, Jr, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Apr., 1950), pp. 155-162



a > 0. Letting capital letters represent anticipations and small ones‘ real numbers, such a utility function will

satisfy the following properties:

(a) u(A) > u(B) is equivalent to A is more desirable than B.

(b) If 0 < p <1 then u [pA + (1 - p) B] = pu (A) + (1 - p) u (B).

A probability combination of two two-person anticipations is defined by making the corresponding

combinations for their components. Thus, if [A, B] is a two-person anticipation and 0 < p < 1, then p[A, B] + (1

- p)[C, D] will be defined as [pA + (1 - p)C, pB + (1 - p)D].

Clearly the one-person utility functions will have the same linearity property here as in the one-person case

(Nash, 1950).

Extrapolating the same function to superimpose it on the strategic choices available with individual

companies, considering the sharing the quality of information based on Utility function suggested above, we

get:

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1: 𝑢 𝐴 → 𝑢 𝐵 :𝑢 𝐴 = 𝑢 𝐵

𝑝𝐴 + 1 − 𝑝 𝐵 = 𝑝𝐵 + 1 − 𝑝 𝐴, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 < 𝑝 < 1 …1 …

If the above condition is satisfied, we can conclude that the cooperation between two organizations is

equal as the utility of the information so shared by these two organizations are equal and the probability of

negative impact on the business for both the firms is the same. We find such a scenario when companies share

the information or resources with their competitors to get benefited on the long run purely by playing on their

competitive advantage. One such case in point is Indian carmaker Mahindra & Mahindra entering into a

partnership with American car giant Ford Motors Company. This association is expected to help Mahindra &

Mahindra expand its global outreach, and help Ford Motor Company gain some more market in India,

benefitting from the successful business model of its new partner15

.

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2: 𝑢 𝐴 → 𝑢 𝐵 :𝑢 𝐴 > 𝑢 𝐵

15 Source: Business Today, September 2017: https://tinyurl.com/yd3eu6c9 [http://www.businesstoday.in/sectors/auto/mahindra-and-

mahindra-ford-motor-company-join-hands-to-expand-market-reach-develop-electric-cars/story/260518.html]

https://tinyurl.com/yd3eu6c9



𝑝𝐴 + 1 − 𝑝 𝐵 > 𝑝𝐵 + 1 − 𝑝 𝐴, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 < 𝑝 < 1 … 2 …

If the above condition is satisfied, we can conclude that the cooperation between two organizations is

unequal as the utility of the information so shared by these two organizations are not equal and the probability

of negative impact on the business for either of the firms is the different. We find such a scenario when

companies share the information or resources with their competitors to get benefited on the long run purely by

playing on their competitive advantage but it helps one of the players more than the other. We saw this playing

when in the March of 2017, Tata Motors of India and German brand VW announced a Memorandum of

Understanding (MoU) for a long-term partnership to explore joint development of products for customers in

India and other markets, but was subsequently called off in August 201716

.

u{𝑝𝐴 + 1 − 𝑝 𝐵 = u 𝐶 }

𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 < 𝑝 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐶 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 … 3 …

Complementors and Competitive Advantage

Many companies working as complementors in the Auto Industry benefit from the services they provide

to the competitors, thus helping the competitors secure utility at desired levels. Companies including Sundram

Fasteners, Bosch India, and Sundaram Clayton among others have not only helped the corporates in automotive

industry with easy availability of spares (which happens to be an important factor in buying of cars in India) but

also have helped the competitors in international markets with supplying spares at competitive rates by getting

into Joint Ventures and tie-ups17

.

Taking 1, 2 and 3 above, we get18

:

16Source: Reuters, August 2017: https://tinyurl.com/yc83x36n [https://in.reuters.com/article/volkswagen-tata-motors-

cooperation/volkswagen-group-tata-end-talks-on-emerging-markets-tie-up-idINKBN1AQ12B] 17 Source: The Economic Times, 2015: https://tinyurl.com/ycjj8ndp [https://auto.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/auto-

components/indias-top-5-auto-component-suppliers-set-to-enter-the-global-top-100-list/46270043] 18 Adapted from John F. Nash, Jr, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Apr., 1950), pp. 155-162

https://tinyurl.com/yc83x36n

https://tinyurl.com/ycjj8ndp



Graph 1

Using Utility functions in the equations 1, 2 and 3, we can work out the impact of the utility function on

decision making process under co-opetition and cooperation scenarios. All co-opetitive relationships are

complex as they are built around diametrical different logics of interaction. The idea behind competition, one

part of the co-opetitive relationship, is built on the assumption that individuals act to maximize their own

interest19

. Graph 1 expresses this relationship.

19 Hobbes, Thomas: (1651) Leviathan, London, 1651, 1973

u1=u2

u1axis

u2 axis

u1

+u

2=

u2

u1

u2

=1

u1>u2

u1

u2

> 1

u1+u2=u3 u1

u2

=u

3

1 0 2

-1 -2



A precondition for cooperation is that individuals participate in collective actions to achieve common

goals. However, individuals‘ interests and motives for action are not considered to explain collective action,

rather, it is the social structure that surrounds individuals that is considered to explain why people act

collectively to create a win–win relationship20

.

Table 121

Strategic Decisions, Co-opetition and Competition

Two of the major factors that work towards better clarity on the strategic decisions are Competitive

Advantage and Relative Costs. Table 1 represents three levels of costs on relative basis (High, Equal or Low

cost when compared to that of competition22

) and Competitive Advantage on relative basis (High, Equal or

Low). These relations are purely being looked at from the perspective of the Marketer, i.e., how does the

marketer place the competitiveness of its product/ brand (Competitive Advantage) over the existing competition

20 Axelrod, Robert: The Evolution of Co-operation. Basic Books, New York, 1982 21Adapted from Hunt and Morgan model published in the paper Competing Through Relationships: Grounding Relationship Marketing in

Resource-Advantage Theory, Journal of Marketing Management 1997, 13, 341-445 22High, Medium and Low Competitive Advantage are defied using the following equations:

Relative Advantage

Relat

ive

Cost

Low

Equa

l

High

Low Equal High

Absolute

Competitive

Advantage

Competitive

Disadvantage

Cost Advantage

Cost

Disadvantage

Parity

Competition

Relative

Competitive

Advantage

Parity

Competition

Relative

Competitive

Disadvantage

Parity

Competition



in the marketspace. We use the following equation to calculate the competitive advantage of a brand over other

players in the marketspace:

For equation 1, 2 and 3 above:

C = α0+ α1X1 + α2X2 + α3X3 + α4X4 + α5X5 + α6X6 + α7X7 + ε …4…

where,

C is the Competitive advantage, α0 is the constant, α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, α6, and α7 are the independent

variables for each of the factors that would affect the competitive advantage of the organization. X1, X2, X3, X4,

X5, X6, and X7 are factors such as location, patents, financial advantages, rate of market growth, differentiation,

switching cost, and Infrastructure, and ε is the Standard Error23

. It may be noted that these advantages (X1, X2,

X3, X4, X5, X6, and X7) would change with changes in the industry and the position of the company in relation

to its competition on the PLC.

With every change (in Micro and Macro environment in which a business operates), the dynamism of

the decisions taken for co-opetition and competition would change. In the above equation (equation 4), if X1, X2,

X3, and X4 is minimal for all the players, they have a strong reason to consider co-opetition to ensure their

survival. Once they opt for co-opetition, they may work together to ensure minimizing losses in the short term

to ensure profits in the long term. For example, the telecom service providers in India created a consortium in

1995(Cellular Operators' Association of India (COAI)24

) to represent themselves as a single entity with the

Government to ensure policies in their favor. Over the years, they may have managed to influence the

government,however, with the entry of Reliance Jio, a disruptor in the telecommunications sector, the industry

moved towards co-opetition. COAI, where Jio is one of the core members, represents the telecom service

providers to the Governmentfor preferred policies on the one hand and compete for dominance within to ensure

the relevance of competitive advantage each of the members hold over other players in the marketspace.

Co-opetition and Competition

23The formula for calculating Error is [ 𝜀 =

# 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 −# 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙

# 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙∗ 100 ]

24 Details here: https://tinyurl.com/y8y3x47w [https://www.gadgetsnow.com/tech-news/Airtel-Vodafone-Idea-engaging-in-cartelisation-

through-COAI-Reliance-Jio/articleshow/54519449.cms]

https://tinyurl.com/y8y3x47w



To offer a theoretical treatment to the problem of Co-opetition (assessing the situations when

Cooperation is desired as compared to Competition, and where Competition is the choice as compared to

Cooperation), we can abstract from the equations mentioned above and develop the theory. To cover the issues

in a holistic manner, we create different scenarios with Utility, Competitive Advantage(s) and position of the

organization in the market. The same has been captured in the following table based on assumptions mentioned

below:

‒ We have assumed that the players have a clear Competitive Advantage over others and have a

measurable Utility with clear lead over other players.

‒ The Relative Utility Score will give the advantage to the players for Short-Term

‒ The Relative Competitive Advantage will give the advantage to the players for Long-Term

‒ The Calculation of Utility is based on the equations 1, 2, and 3 and the representation of the

same in the graph 1

‒ The calculation of Competitive Advantage is based on the equation 4 mentioned above. We take

the final score for the same instead of individual variables in the equation

‒ The weightage given to Competitive Advantage and the Utility is equal



Player B Relative Competitive Advantage / Relative Utility

+ / + + / - - / + - / -

Pla

yer

A

Rela

tive

Co

mp

etit

ive

Ad

va

nta

ge /

Rela

tiv

e U

tili

ty

+ / + Not Applicable Compete/ Co-

operate

Compete/ Co-

operate

Compete/ Co-

operate

+ / - Co-operate/

Compete Not Applicable Co-operate

Compete/ Co-

operate

- / + Co-operate/

Compete Co-operate Not Applicable

Compete/ Co-

operate

- / - Co-operate/

Compete

Co-operate/

Compete

Co-operate/

Compete Co-operate

Table 2: The Players‘ First Strategy

The above grid may be attributed to the ‗Stag Hunt‘ strategic problem25

. The players need to take a

strategic call about when to compete and when to cooperate. The above grid captures the dimensions of relative

utility and relative competitive advantage for each of the players. If the player has no relative competitive

advantage and / or relative utility, she would prefer to cooperate. This would ensure her survival for a bit longer.

If the player has a clear advantage over its competition, ceteris paribus, she must compete rather than

cooperate.On the other hand, if the player has no clear advantage, she must opt to cooperate thus buying more

time towards building a sustainability plan.

The strategic decisions need to be taken at two levels to build a sustainability plan: first, at the industry

level, where the players together work towards ensuring the sustainability of the industry and second, at the

company level to ensure expected returns to the stakeholders. The Table 1 above tries to capture both these

aspects and the implication of the strategies put in place26

.

Conclusion:

25 Each group of hunters works with two options: either to work together to get the Stag, which would then get divided into the group or

independently work on hunting for the hare, which would belong to the hunter alone. If the hunter devotes the energies to hunt the hare, the stag

escapes. This could also be connected to the problem of Tragedy of the Commons, where the hunter may prefer to work with the group to begin with

but is more concerned about his own benefit rather than that of the group. 26 Competitive Advantage is calculated as mentioned in the equation number 4,

C = α0 + α1X1 + α2X2 + α3X3 + α4X4 + α5X5 + α6X6 + α7X7 + ε, whereC is the Competitive advantage, α0 is the constant, α1, α2, α3, α4, α5,

α6, and α7 are the independent variables for each of the factors that would affect the competitive advantage of the organization.X1, X2, X3, X4, X5,

X6, and X7 are factors such as location, patents, financial advantages, rate of market growth, differentiation, switching cost, and Infrastructure, and ε

is the Standard Error.



The Utility and Competitive Advantage (of the product or services offered) are the two most important

factors while building the sustainability plan for the organization.In this paper, I have presented the role the

Utility function and Competitive Advantage plays in choice of strategy implemented by the players. I have

looked at how the decisions at two levels, viz., Industry and Organization, impact the sustainability plan.

For a strategic decision of more than two players, the analysis will be much more complicatedas the

number of coalitions would increase exponentially. As a potential future research, we need to work on clearly

defining Utility and Competitive Advantage mathematically. This paper can be used as a basis for further study

of the concept of game based decision making using both, utility and competitive advantage.

References:

1 Barry J Nalebuff and Adam M Brandenburger, Co-opetition, Hachette, 2002

2Preiss, K., Goldman, S.L., and Nagel, R.N. (1996). Co-operate to Compete, New York: van Nostrand Reinhold.

3Co-Opetition and Knowledge Transfer, Claudia Loebecke et al..,Copenhagen Business School, The data base

for Advances in Information Systems - Spring 1999 (Vol. 30, No. 2) 4 Simon H.A. (1992). Models of Bounded Rationafity: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization,

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 5 Lorange, P. (1996). "Strategy at the Leading Edge - Interactive Strategy - Alliances and Partnership," Long

Range Planning, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 581-584. 6 Loebbecke, C., and van Fenema, P.C. (1998). "Towards a Theory of Inter-rganizational

Knowledge Sharing During Co-opetition," Proceedings of European Conference on Information Systems, Aix-

en-Provence, France, pp. 1632-1639. 7Appleyard, M. (1996). "How Does Knowledge Flow? Interfirm Patterns in the Semiconductor Industry,"

Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 17, (Winter), pp. 137-154 8 Harbison, J. R., & Pekar, P., Jr. 1998. Smart alliances. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

9 Ketchen, D. J., Snow, C. C., & Hoover, V. L. 2004. Research on competitive dynamics: Recent

accomplishments and future challenges. Journal of Management, 30: 779-804 10

Lado, A. A., Boyd, N. G., & Hanlon, S. C. 1997. Competition, cooperation, and the search for economic

rents: A syncretic model. Academy of Management Review, 22: 110-141 1 1

Bengtsson, M., & Kock, S. 2000. ―Co-opetition‖ in business networks—To cooperate and compete

simultaneously. Industrial Marketing Management, 29: 411-426 12

John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1944 (Second Edition, 1947) 14

John F. Nash, Jr, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Apr., 1950), pp. 155-162 18

Adapted from John F. Nash, Jr, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Apr., 1950), pp.

155-162 19

Hobbes, Thomas: (1651) Leviathan, London, 1651, 1973 20

Axelrod, Robert: The Evolution of Co-operation. Basic Books, New York, 1982 21

Adapted from Hunt and Morgan model published in the paper Competing Through Relationships: Grounding

Relationship Marketing in Resource-Advantage Theory, Journal of Marketing Management 1997, 13, 341-445



Newspaper References

15

Source: Business Today, September 2017: https://tinyurl.com/yd3eu6c9

[http://www.businesstoday.in/sectors/auto/mahindra-and-mahindra-ford-motor-company-join-hands-to-expand-

market-reach-develop-electric-cars/story/260518.html] 16

Source: Reuters, August 2017: https://tinyurl.com/yc83x36n [https://in.reuters.com/article/volkswagen-tata-

motors-cooperation/volkswagen-group-tata-end-talks-on-emerging-markets-tie-up-idINKBN1AQ12B] 17

Source: The Economic Times, 2015: https://tinyurl.com/ycjj8ndp

[https://auto.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/auto-components/indias-top-5-auto-component-suppliers-set-

to-enter-the-global-top-100-list/46270043] 24

GadgetsNow.com: https://tinyurl.com/y8y3x47w [https://www.gadgetsnow.com/tech-news/Airtel-Vodafone-

Idea-engaging-in-cartelisation-through-COAI-Reliance-Jio/articleshow/54519449.cms]

https://tinyurl.com/yd3eu6c9

https://tinyurl.com/yc83x36n

https://tinyurl.com/ycjj8ndp

https://tinyurl.com/y8y3x47w

2018 IJRAR July 2018, Volume 5, Issue 3 (E ...ijrar.org/papers/IJRAR1903015.pdfFaster hardware...

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