AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

October 4, 2016

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni waters, disrupting shipping routes through the Bab al Mandab Strait.

2. ISIS is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the loss of its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces.

3. Political and military tensions are escalating between the Pakistani and Indian governments in the Kashmir region.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates

Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Pakistan claimed that an “unprovoked” Indian operation killed two Pakistani soldiers along the Line of Control on September 29. India described the attack as “surgical strikes” against Pakistani militants in the area. Militants attacked an Indian paramilitary camp on October 3, and Indian and Pakistani militaries exchanged fire across the Line of Control. Indian security forces are increasing their operations against Pakistani militant groups, especially Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). The escalation began when India blamed JeM for attacks on Indian security forces in Uri, Jammu, and Kashmir.

Outlook: The governments of India and Pakistan will attempt to de-escalate tensions along the Line of Control.

Salafi-jihadi groups may exploit rising tensions in the Kashmir region to bolster recruitment. A Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesman called for attacks on Indian security forces, contradicting a previous statement from the TTP’s Umar Media claiming that the group would stay out of the Kashmir conflict. It is unclear which faction of the TTP has called for attacks on Indian security forces. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) urged Kashmiris to join jihad in order to liberate Pakistan.

Outlook: Elements of the TTP may join the Kashmir conflict, but other TTP factions will continue to focus their military activities within Pakistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

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| ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalRising anti-government sentiment and support for self-determination in southern Yemen are growing challenges to internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government. Southern Movement leaders advanced plans to establish an independent political council. Yemeni protesters demonstrated against unpaid wages and failing government services in southern cities.

Outlook: Southern Yemenis will support Hadi’s government in the short-term as a practical alliance against the al Houthi-Saleh faction and to gain access to international resources funneled through the government.

SecurityThe al Houthi-Saleh alliance escalated tensions in the Bab al Mandab Strait, which may disrupt shipping lanes. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a missile at an Emirati HSV-2 Swift catamaran on October 1, causing significant damage. The catamaran was likely delivering military supplies, despite coalition claims that it was carrying humanitarian aid to Aden. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may also be using a detained American citizen, Peter Willems, to deter Saudi-led coalition airstrikes on the National Security Bureau in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh militants kidnapped Willems in Sana’a on September 20. Separately, Hadi government and allied forces continued shaping operations in Ma’rib and al Jawf governorates as part of an ongoing effort to sever al Houthi-Saleh supply lines in northern Yemen.

Outlook: The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenEfforts to target AQAP and ISIS commanders are not reducing the groups’ attack capabilities in southern Yemen. U.S. airstrikes and Emirati-backed security forces killed or captured multiple AQAP regional commanders, but AQAP retains a strong support base in southern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan assassinated two government security officers in Aden city after a month of inactivity.

Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will persist in the absence of adequate government services, representation, and stability.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 29 SEP: AQAP militants detonated an IED in Bi’r Nasir, northern Lahij governorate.2) 29-30 SEP: ISIS militants assassinated two security officers in al Mansoura district, Aden.3) 01 OCT: Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a missile at an Emirati logistics ship near Bab al Mandab Strait. 4) 01 OCT: Militants detonated a SVEST in Crater district, Aden.5) 03 OCT: Hadi government and allied forces claimed to seize the main road in Sirwah district, Ma’rib.

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PoliticalSomali officials are unlikely to meet new parliamentary and presidential election deadlines. The UN Special Envoy to Somalia indicated that the most recent delays may be politically motivated and that additional postponements are likely. Upper House elections, coordinated by Somalia’s Federal States, have begun in some regions, but face delays in others.

Unrest in Ethiopia may draw Ethiopian forces away from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). A stampede among Oromo protesters in Ethiopia killed at least 52 individuals on October 2. The majority Oromo ethnic group began protesting the planned expansion of Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, into Oromo farmland in late 2015.

Outlook: Somalia will likely have to establish a caretaker administration due to incomplete elections in early 2017.

Security Regional tensions sparked anti-American protests in northern Somalia. U.S. forces conducted an airstrike targeting al Shabaab militants near Galkayo on September 28. Galmudug administration officials claimed that the strike killed local security forces, prompting civilians to burn American flags and images of President Barack Obama. Galmudug officials claimed that Puntland intelligence forces purposefully provided the U.S. with inaccurate intelligence. Puntland and Galmudug forces have clashed over territorial disputes in the past.

Outlook: The Galmudug-Puntland conflict is unlikely to escalate further, but may harm coordination against al Shabaab.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab is conducting a wave of attacks targeting Somalia’s intelligence services. Militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) targeting Somali National Intelligence and Security (NISA) forces at a restaurant in Mogadishu on October 1. Militants also conducted a grenade attack targeting the Jubbaland Administration’s intelligence building in Kismayo, Lower Jubba region on October 4.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to target intelligence forces throughout Somalia.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

1) 28 SEP: A U.S. airstrike killed nine al Shabaab militants near Galkayo, Mudug region.2) 29 SEP: U.S.-backed Somali SOF raided an al Shabaab position in Kalishunba, Lower Jubba region. 3) 01 SEP: Al Shabaab militants detonated a SVBIED at a restaurant frequented by intelligence officials in Mogadishu. 4) 02 OCT: SNA and AMISOM forces raided an al Shabaab training camp near Dinsoor in Bay region.

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PoliticalLibyan National Army (LNA) Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar is growing more powerful as the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) weakens. Haftar, who does not recognize the GNA’s authority, controls several of Libya’s recently reopened oil ports and is expanding his military rule in eastern Libya. Haftar rejected the GNA’s attempt to include him in a unified Libyan army. The GNA’s willingness to negotiate with Haftar risks alienating the GNA’s support base, which includes militias that view Haftar as an enemy.

Outlook: Haftar’s rise will increase political polarization and further delegitimize the GNA.

SecurityThe LNA may be committing human rights violations against civilians in Qanfouda, Benghazi. Amnesty International reported that fighting between the LNA and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC), an Islamist militant group with ties to al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, has trapped more than 100 families inside Qanfouda. The LNA denied allegations that it prevented families from leaving Qanfouda. The LNA has rejected plans to allow civilians to leave Qanfouda in the past, citing security concerns.

Outlook: The LNA will continue to besiege Qanfouda. The BRSC will build popular support by positioning itself as the protector of the civilian population.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS is reconstituting its attack capabilities outside of Sirte, its former stronghold. ISIS maintains forces and ammunition in the desert east of Sirte, from which it ambushed GNA-allied militias behind the Sirte city frontline on October 2.

Outlook: ISIS will launch attacks from behind the frontline, which may prolong U.S.-backed militias’ efforts to clear Sirte city and allow ISIS militants currently trapped in Sirte city center to escape.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 28 SEP: U.S. airstrikes hit an ISIS resupply base in Sirte, Libya. 2) 29 SEP: ISIS militants detonated an IED targeting a military vehicle west of Sirte city.3) 30 SEP: The LNA besieged the BRSC in Qanfouda district, Benghazi, where 130 families are trapped. 4) 02 OCT: ISIS militants ambushed GNA-allied militias in Siwawah, Sirte district.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)Tunisian, Algerian, and Moroccan security forces continued to crack down on potential ISIS cells. Moroccan authorities disrupted an all-female ISIS cell, some of whose members are related to militants fighting in Iraq and Syria.

Outlook: Familial networks and returning foreign fighters may facilitate Salafi-jihadi attacks in Morocco, despite the country’s strong security apparatus.

Uqba ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)Tunisia and Algeria remain on high alert for militants attempting to cross over the Libyan border. Algerian forces interdicted multiple convoys and arms caches near the Libyan and Nigerien borders. The Tunisian military has conducted almost 40 raids in the past month in Kasserine Governorate, a rumored safe haven for ISIS militants formerly based in Libya .

Outlook: Salafi-jihadi militants will attempt to infiltrate the Tunisian-Algerian border region from southwestern Libya.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)The collapse of the Algiers peace accord, which ended hostilities in northern Mali in 2015, raises concerns for renewed conflict throughout northern Mali. Local support is growing for GATIA, a pro-government militia coalition that is currently inciting conflict between Algiers signatories. Defections from within a former separatist coalition, which also participated in the Algiers accord, may also exacerbate tensions.

Secular insurgencies and humanitarian crises may undermine the Nigerian military’s recent successes against Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. A Fulani herdsman insurgency is challenging the state in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, and the Niger Delta Avengers group is targeting hydrocarbon infrastructure in the south. The Nigerian government is ill-equipped to manage famine, drought, and other crises in formerly Boko Haram-held terrain.

Outlook: The Nigerian army will struggle to maintain its advances against Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB

1) 29 SEP: The Algerian army killed five militants in Tazoult, Batna, Algeria.2) 30 SEP: The Algerian army detained five suspected militants in Illizi province, Algeria.3) 03 OCT: Tunisian border forces clashed with a Libyan militia near Ras Jedir border crossing.

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1) 27 SEP: Boko Haram militants overran two villages near Chibok town in Borno State, Nigeria.2) 27 SEP: ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, also known as Boko Haram, detonated a SVBIED in Abadam village, Borno State, Nigeria. 3) 30 SEP: Ansar al Din fired rockets at French barracks in Abeibera, Mali. 4) 03 OCT: Suspected Ansar al Din militants fired mortars at a MINUSMA camp in Ageulhoc, Kidal, Mali.

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569