2014 ERCOT Operations Training Seminar Texas Reliability Entity Jagan Mandavilli, Bob Collins, Mark...

2014 ERCOT Operations Training SeminarTexas Reliability Entity

Jagan Mandavilli, Bob Collins, Mark Henry

EMS Outages and Lessons LearnedTDSP

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Objectives

Upon completing this course of instruction, you will:

Recognize the typical causes and failure modes for Energy Management Systems (EMS) systems and tools

Identify the importance of some of the tools TDSP’s use Identify the EMS applications critical to your operation Recognize the TDSP operator’s role in identifying

problems and reporting EMS failures Identify components of the procedures for operation of the

system during EMS failures

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Content

● EMS Failures Communication and Control (EMS) Failures

• Inter Control Center Communication Protocol (ICCP) failures• Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) issues

EMS Applications Failures• State Estimator(SE), RTCA, VSAT, TSAT• SCADA

Backup Control center operation Loss of Operator User Interface EMS failures due to database updates Training and Live EMS Screens on same display

● Analysis of Restorations● Contributing & Root causes with examples● Common themes with examples

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Definitions

● SCADA – Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition● EMS – Energy Management System● RTNET– Real Time Network Analysis● RTCA – Real Time Contingency Analysis● VSAT – Voltage Stability Analysis Tool● TSAT – Transient Stability Analysis Tool● ICCP – Inter Control Center Communications

Protocol● RTU – Remote Terminal Unit● EAS – Event Analysis Sub Committee● EMSTF – Energy Management Systems Task Force

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Tools and Their Importance

● SCADA● ICCP● RTNET● RTCA● SCED● VSAT● TSAT

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ERCOT EMS Overview

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EMS Reliability

● EMS are extremely reliable● Extremely high industry wide availability● Systems usually have redundancy● Multiple systems are common, with on-the-fly

failover● Backup centers, sometimes manned● Communications circuits on highly redundant

ring networks● Data handling has built in error detection and

correction● Support staff available 24 x 7

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What do EMS Problems Look Like?

● Trends flatline ● Data no longer updates● Color changes● Alarms● Strange application results● Lockup of applications

● Loss of Visibility

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NERC EMS Failure Event Analysis

● NERC and personnel examined events 81 Category 2b events (Oct 26, 2010 – Sep 3, 2013)

reported 64 events – thoroughly analyzed and reviewed 54 entities reporting - 20 entities experiencing multiple

outages Restoration time for partial outages: 18 to 411 min Restoration time for complete outages: 12 to 253 min Vendor diagnostic failures – Software & Hardware Issues Several noticeable themes

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NERC Lessons Learned from EMS Events #1

● Remote Terminal Units Not on DC Sources The power supply to an RTU for a High Voltage

Direct Current (HVDC) converter station was not designed to be fed from station batteries, resulting in a loss of the RTU when all AC feeds to the substation were lost due to an event.

● Lesson Learned While the availability of multiple AC sources

provides a deep degree of reliability for RTUs, entities should evaluate the practicality and feasibility of powering RTUs needed for control, situation awareness, system restoration and/or post analysis from the station batteries.

Operator Training Seminar2014

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● EMS System Outage and Effects on System Operations An entity’s EMS began to lose data necessary for

visibility of portions of its transmission network causing functionality and/or solution interruptions for some of its EMS operational tools. No loss of load occurred during this event and it was quickly determined to not be a cyber security event.

● Lessons Learned All entities should have a procedure such as

“Conservative Operations” which provides possible steps they may have to take to ensure reliability. Training should be conducted routinely on all procedures especially those related to low-probability, high-impact events regardless of how often the procedures are used.


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● EMS Loss of Operators User Interface Application A control center experienced a loss of control and

monitoring functionality of the EMS due to the loss of the operator’s user interface application between its primary EMS computer/host server and the system operator consoles.

● Lessons Learned Create a ‘save case’ of settings before and after any

change to the system is made. The ‘save case’ will aid in supplying the necessary documentation needed to perform comparisons.

Analyze EMS performance on a periodic basis and evaluate if the system is meeting the needs as designed and intended.


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● SCADA Lockup A Transmission Owner (TO)’s control center

experienced a SCADA failure which resulted in a loss of monitoring functionality for more than thirty minutes.

● Lessons Learned It is beneficial that Transmission Operators (TOP) and

TOs install a “heartbeat monitor” alarm to detect stale or stagnant data.

A periodic evaluation of the mismatch thresholds should be conducted for state estimator alarming specific to each operating area, such that it will allow for the optimum sensitivity while minimizing false mismatch alarms.


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● Failure of EMS Due to Over-Utilization of Disk Storage Loss of control functionality due to the hard

disk on the SCADA server being fully utilized.

● Lessons Learned SCADA equipment monitoring should include

monitoring of hard disk storage utilization. Purging processes need to be set up to perform periodic clean up of disk space.


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● Indistinguishable Screens during a Database Update Led to Loss of SCADA Monitoring and Control During a planned database update and failover, an

EMS Operations Analyst inadvertently changed an online SCADA server database mode from “remote” (online) to “local” (local offline copy), which caused a loss of SCADA monitoring and control of Bulk Electric System (BES) facilities.

● Lessons Learned Changing the database mode on a server is not

recommended. A future release of EMS software should eliminate the ability to switch database modes on a server.


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● Inappropriate System Privileges Causes Loss of SCADA Monitoring An entity experienced a loss of SCADA telemetry –

specifically a loss of the channel status indicators – for 76% of its transmission system. This problem occurred during the implementation of a scheduled SCADA database update that caused one of the front-end processors to be in an abnormal state. An incorrect command was used to remedy the situation, which resulted in the channel status indicators being set to a failed state.

● Lessons Learned Entities should consider:

• Reviewing the training with respect to change management to ensure that it includes a checklist of steps required; and

• Educating SCADA support staff on global impact of commands on the entire SCADA system.


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● Loss of EMS – IT Communications Disabled Transmission System Operators lost ability to

authenticate to the EMS system, resulting in a loss of monitoring and control functionality for more than 30 minutes.

● Lessons Learned EMS network design should include, where

possible, a redundant local authentication server on the same internal network as the primary local authentication server.


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● SCADA Failure Resulting in Reduced Monitoring Functionality An entity’s primary control center SCADA Management

Platform (SMP) servers became unresponsive, which resulted in a partial loss of monitoring and control functions for more than 30 minutes. Because this loss of functionality was a result of a conflict between security software configuration changes and core operating system functions, a cyber-security event was quickly ruled out, and no loss of load occurred during this event.

● Lessons Learned Registered entities should consider a “multi-site hosting”

configuration. This configuration provides flexibility and convenience for rapid recovery capability of EMS and SCADA functions.


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● Failure of Energy Management System While Performing Database Update There was a failure of EMS while performing a

database update.

● Lessons Learned When the EMS was purchased, the vulnerability of

an integrated system architecture was unknown. To eliminate this now-exposed vulnerability, it is recommended that functional separation of the Primary from the Backup Control Center be implemented.


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Number of Reports

October 26, 2010 – September 3, 2013

2010 Q4

2011 Q1

2011 Q2

2011 Q3

2011 Q4

2012 Q1

2012 Q2

2012 Q3

2012 Q4

2013 Q1

2013 Q2

2013 Q3

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

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Characteristics of EMS Outages

0102030405060708090

69

1031

12

7150

Nu

mb

er o

f Ev

ents

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Root Causes by Category

A1 – DesignEngineering

16%

A2 – EquipmentMaterial

25%

A3 - Individual Human Per-

formance2%

A4 – Man-agement

Organization30%

A5 - Commu-nication

5%

A6 - Training2%

AZ - Informa-tion LTA

20%

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Contributing Causes by Category

A4 – Man-agement

Organization28%

A2 – EquipmentMaterial

32%

A1 - Design/Engineering18%

A3 - Individual Human Performance9%

A5 - Communication6% AX - Overall Con-

figuration 5%

A7 - Other2%

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Top Root/Contributing Causes (in order)

● Software Failure (A2B6C07)● Design output scope LTA (A1B2C01)● Inadequate vendor support of change (A4B5C03)● Testing of Design/Installation LTA (A1B4C02)● Defective or failed part (A2B6C01)● System Interactions not considered (A4B5C05)● Inadequate risk assessment of change (A4B5C04)● Insufficient Job scoping (A4B3C08)● Post Modification Testing LTA (A2B3C03)● Inspection/Testing LTA (A2B3C02)● Attention given to wrong issues (A3B3C01)● Untimely corrective actions to known issue

(A4B1C08)

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Common Themes

1. Software Failures

2. Software Configuration/Installation/Maintenance

3. Hardware Failures

4. Hardware Configuration/Installation/Maintenance

5. Failover Testing Weaknesses

6. Testing Inadequacies

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Software Failures – What is Affected?

● Application Software Bug/Defect Base System – Alarms/Health Check/Syncing etc. Front End Processing Supervisory Control Applications (SCADA) ICCP User Interface (UI) Relational Database Management Systems (RDBMS) Build Process Scripts Miscellaneous Scripts

● Communication Equipment Firmware/Software Bug/Defect RTUs Switches Modems Routers Firewalls

● Operating System Software Bug/Defect Unix/Linux/Windows

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Hardware Failures

● Application Servers/Nodes Network Interface cards Server hard drive control board Aux Power regulator control

● Communication Equipment RTU Switches Routers Firewalls Fiber Optic Cables Time source

● Power Sources Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) External Generators Power Cables

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Failover Testing Weaknesses

● Improper settings preventing the failover● Improper procedure to failover● System setup issues preventing failover● Improper patch management between

primary/spare/backup servers● Primary server issues reflected on

spare/backup as well – No Isolation● Improper failover configurations settings● Improper network device configuration

settings for failover● Design requirements not considering failovers

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Testing Inadequacies

● Inadequate testing● Improper procedures to test● Incomplete scope● Not engaging all the parties involved

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Software and Hardware Categories and Restoration Times

Hardware C/I/M

Hardware Failure -

Com

Hardware Failure - Power

Hardware Failure - Server

Software Failure - App

Software Failure -

Com

Software C/I/M

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

0

5

10

15

20

25

86

131

91

66

100

152

94

13

78

2

20

4

19

Mean Outage Restoration Time (Mins) Event Count

Rest

orati

on T

ime

in M

inut

es

Even

t Cou

nt

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Historical Failure Restoration Data

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 770

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

Complete Outage Restoration Time Partial Outage Restoration TimeMean Complete Outage Restoration Time Mean Partial Outage Restoration TimeMean Outage Restoration Time

Mean Complete Outage Restoration Time: 56 MinutesMean Partial Outage Restoration Time: 43 MinutesMean Total Outage Restoration Time: 99 Minutes

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Lessons Learned

● Publish information about problems and solutions

● NERC continues review of events with a working group of stakeholders and Regional personnel

● Situational Awareness workshop held in June 2013 with future workshops planned

● Dialogue with vendors to inform and improve

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Reporting Requirements – NERC Standard EOP-004-2

● Complete loss of voice communication capability affecting a Bulk Electric System (BES) control center for 30 continuous minutes or more (same as Category 2a of EAP)

● Complete loss of monitoring capability affecting a BES control center for 30 continuous minutes or more such that analysis capability (i.e., State Estimator or Contingency Analysis) is rendered inoperable (similar to Category 2b of EAP)

● Report to ERCOT, TRE, NERC and DOE per TRE web link: http://www.texasre.org/Reliability/EOP-004disturbancereports/Pages/Default.aspx

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Reporting Requirements – NERC Events Analysis

● Category 1f - Unplanned evacuation from a control center facility with Bulk Power System (BPS) SCADA functionality for 30 minutes or more

● Category 1h - Loss of monitoring or control, at a control center, such that it significantly affects the entity’s ability to make operating decisions for 30 continuous minutes or more. Examples include, but are not limited to the following: Loss of operator ability to remotely monitor, control BES

elements, or both Loss of communications from SCADA RTUs Unavailability of ICCP links reducing BES visibility Loss of the ability to remotely monitor and control generating

units via AGC Unacceptable State Estimator or Contingency Analysis solutions

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What Can Operators Do?

● Watch for failures and unexpected situations● Determine the criticality and impact to the

reliability of the grid● Promptly report the failures● Log the date/time of the failure, a description

of alarms/events, time of system/function restoration

● Expect the EMS failure and prepare to react● Have the necessary back up procedure in

place and be familiar with them

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ERCOT Procedures

● Analysis Tool Outages section from the ERCOT Transmission and Security Desk Procedures (Section 3.3)

● Respond to Miscellaneous Issues section from the ERCOT Transmission and Security Desk Procedures (Section 10.1)

● Telemetry and Communications (Operating Guide Section 7)

● Failover procedure● Loss of ICCP

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ERCOT Procedures on Telemetry

Sect 10.1, Transmission & Security Desk (Feb. 2014)

Telemetry Issues that could affect SCED and/or LMPs

IF: There is a telemetry issue;THEN: Ensure the appropriate Control Room personnel are aware of the issue, and Instruct the TO/QSE to correct the issue.

IF: The TO/QSE cannot fix the issue in a timely manner;THEN: Ask the TO/QSE to override the bad telemetry.

IF: For some reason, the TO/QSE cannot override the bad telemetry;THEN Notify the Operations Support Engineer to work with the TO/QSE and/or the ANA

group to override the bad telemetry.

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ERCOT Transmission Desk Procedures for Loss of SE/RTNET (Summary Section 3.3, Feb. 2014)

1. If SE/RTNET has not solved within last 15 thru < 30 minutes then: Continue to monitor system, Notify Operations Support Engineer (OSE) and Refer to Desktop Guide Trans. Desk 2.1 and run through checklist

2. Must complete within 30 minutes of “tool outage”: Notify two master QSEs that represent Nuclear Plants that ERCOTs SE not functioning and expected functional within approximately [# minutes]

3. If NOT solved within last 30 minutes, Advisory Hotline call to TO’s

4. Notify Real-Time operator to make hotline call to QSEs.

5. If unavailable for extended period of time or topology changes occur, request OSE run manual studies to ensure system reliability.

6. Post Advisory message on MIS Public.

…and LOG…

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ERCOT Procedures for Loss of Analysis Tools

Tool Less Than Time Limit

Greater than Time Limit

Notes:

SE/RTNET 15 thru 30 30 RTCA 15 thru 30 30 TSAT 15 – 20 30 - 35 Manual studies, notify

Oncor, no general advisory issued

VSAT 15- 20 30 -35 Manual studies, advisory to TO’s, request topology change notification

Similar procedures are followed for other tools, per Transmission Operations Desk Procedure (Feb 2014)

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Other References

● ERCOT Nodal Protocols, Sect 3.10● ERCOT Nodal Operating Guides, Sect 7● ERCOT State Estimator Standards● ERCOT Telemetry Standards● ERCOT Operating Procedure Manual, Shift

Supervisor Desk, Sect 10● NERC Events Analysis Process● NERC Standard EOP-004-2● NERC EMS Task Force

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Credits

Much of the information contained in this presentation was previously published by North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) in a variety of publications. It is the result of extensive review of actual power system events over a 2 year period by the EMS Event Task Force.

Questions?

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EXAM

Please turn your iClicker on and answer each of the following questions.

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1. Which of the following Operator tools can lead to EMS failures?

a) SCADA

b) ICCP

c) RTNET

d) All of the above

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2. What is the top root/contributing cause of EMS failures?

a) Inadequate vendor support

b) Hardware failure

c) Inadequate testing

d) Software failure

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3. What action should ERCOT take for a loss of State Estimator solution longer than 30 minutes?

a) Monitor frequency and hope for the best

b) Make a Hotline call to issue an Advisory to the TOs

c) OOME Up units

d) RUC units off line

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4. Which of the following steps should an Operator take during an EMS failure?

a) Promptly report the failures

b) Determine the criticality and impact of the failure to the reliability of the grid

c) Log the date/time of the failure

d) Implement backup procedures

e) All of the above

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5. What is the NERC Standard that requires reporting of EMS failures?

a) NERC Events Analysis Process

b) NERC Standard TOP-001-1

c) NERC Standard EOP-004-2

d) NERC EMS Task Force

2014 ERCOT Operations Training Seminar Texas Reliability Entity Jagan Mandavilli, Bob Collins, Mark...

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