2011- English regions disbanded: European funding and economic regeneration implications - Pugalis...

8/2/2019 2011- English regions disbanded: European funding and economic regeneration implications - Pugalis and Fisher

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English regions disbanded: European funding and economic regeneration

implications

Pugalis and Fisher

Cite as:

Pugalis, L. & Fisher, B. (2011) 'English regions disbanded: European funding and economic

regeneration implications',Local Economy, 26 (6/7), pp. 500-516.

Abstract

The investiture of a UK Coalition Government in 2010 heralded the (ongoing) production ofnew sub-national geographies of governance in England. Of primary concern is the

disbanding of the English regions, outside of London, which were New Labourspreferred

scale for managing economic regeneration during the 2000s. In a bid to rollback the role of

the state as part of their deficit reduction plan, the Coalition embarked on a political rescaling

strategy resulting in various institutional reconfigurations. This rescaling of state power has

significant policy implications in the context of European funding, which is the focus of this

paper. By analysing a field of policy activity during a period of significant motion, the intent

is to highlight some notable dilemmas, aided by posing some practical questions; in order to

prompt some much needed policy discussion and academic deliberation.

Key words: European funding, economic regeneration, sub-national development, state

rescaling, governance, Regional Development Agencies, Local Enterprise Partnerships

Introduction

The present UK Government is a Coalition formed between the Conservatives and Liberal

Democrats. After striking a deal in May 2010 following days of intense negotiations (HM

Government, 2010a), the Coalition made it clear that they wanted to institute a more radical,

new localist approach to the governance and delivery of economic regeneration in

England.1Regions, understood here as a spatial unit for managing sub-national

1

The other parts of the UKScotland, Wales and Northern Irelandare outside the remit of the analysis due to

their unique devolutionary arrangements (see Goodwin et al., 2005).


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development activity, rebuked by government as part of a political rescaling strategy to

demonstrate that a new era had arrived. The Coalition has, in effect, erased the notion of

region from the contemporary English policy vocabulary. To illustrate the death of the

region as an organising principle for policy activity (Bentley et al., 2010), civil servants have

quietly advised prospective funding bidders to drop the word region. It is within this climate

that practitioners sardonically joke about belonging to or representing places formerly

known as regions. Charting the perpetual stream of supposedly innovative remedies for

managing the regional problem, it is observed that sub-national development activity has

undergone intermittent periods of policy upheaval, including the 12 month window of

considerable change since the election of the Coalition that this paper peers through.

Across Europe, sub-national governance reforms over the past decade have enthusiastically

sought out a scalar managementfix for the multi-scalar spatial dynamics of contemporary

society (Gualini, 2006; Haughton et al., 2009; Healey, 2004; Salet et al., 2002). Evans and

Harding (1997), for example, point towards the trends across European countries, including

Italy, France and Spain, to embark on projects of decentralisation to regional tiers of

government. Prior to the election of a New Labour Government in 1997, the UK was

curiously out of sync with a Europe of the Regions (Ibid.). Associated with theories of the

hollowing out of the state (Jessop, 2002) through rescaling upwards (e.g. supranational

organisations such as the EU), downwards (e.g. regional governance) and outwards (e.g. non-

state actors), it is well recognised that the role of the state has changed dramatically over

recent decades. Alongside the shift from government to governance (Davies and

Imbroscio, 2009), para-state actors and agencies now play a much more prominent role in the

policy-making arena; a filling in of state space (Jones et al., 2005; Shaw and MacKinnon,

2011). For some a territorial focus has merit in bringing this heterogeneous array ofactors

together (Albrechts, 2006)a meeting ground for integration through a shared sense of

place (Counsell et al., 2007). What remains more disputed is whether the (ongoing)

reterritorialisation of state power has witnessed a reduced or enhanced role of the state, as

new state spaces are being produced (Brenner, 2004).

In a bid to rollback the role of the state as part of their deficit reduction plan, the Coalition

instigated a series of economic regeneration policy reforms as part of a rescaling of state

power. Of primary concern is the disbanding of the English regions, outside of London,

which were New Labours preferred scale for managing economic regeneration during the


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2000s (Mawson, 1998; Pugalis, 2009; 2011d; Webb and Collis, 2000). Based on careful

monitoring of the (ongoing) production of new sub-national geographies of governance that

have begun to emerge in England over the first 12 months of Coalition rule, this paper

focuses on some of the most significant policy implications in the context of European

structural funding. It draws on a range of sources of qualitatively rich material from local

practitioners, regeneration media and institutional networkswhich has recently been shown

to produce useful insights (Broughton et al., 2011), especially during periods of momentous

policy upheaval (Pugalis, 2011d). In addition, the paper is also informed by the authors

reflections of performing a range of professional economic regeneration roles over the past

decade. Experience includes participating in the production of regional machinery as well as

scalar roles above and below the regional governance terrain.2 This unique position provides

reflections that perceive the regional scale to be neither good/bad or right/wrong, but as an

appropriate spatial unit for coordinatingsome aspects of sub-national development.

It is necessary to point out that the Coalitions approach remains fluid with many key

decisions yet to be taken. It is within this context that analytical observations presented are

necessarily exploratory and, thus, remain provisional. Writing in June 2010, Harding noted

that The crystal ball is still a little murky, but not to such an extent that it should prevent

us from start tracing in the broad contours of future change (Harding, 2010, p. 8). Whilst the

crystal ball remains shadowy, the implications of doing away with regional policy

architecture remain profound (Pugalis and Townsend, 2012). In light of Walburns caution,

that [p]ublic policy is now preparing to abandon the experience of recent years, including the

groups practitioners involved, and embark on new initiatives without relying on any clear

evidence base (Walburn, 2011, p. 76), it is crucial to ask: is it all worth it? By analysing a

field of policy activity amidst the throes of significant flux, the intent is to highlight some

notable dilemmas, aided by posing some searching questions; in order to prompt some much

needed policy discussion and academic deliberation. The remainder of this paper is organised

into four sections. Firstly, a brief historical review outlines the contours of the trajectory of

English regional policy development. Secondly, the emergent post-regional geography of

governance is elaborated on in comparison to previous arrangements. Thirdly, some of the

key European funding and economic regeneration policy implications that have arisen from

2

The authors combined professional practice includes over a decade employed by a Regional Development

Agency, alongside time spent at a Government Office Region and national and local government.


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this politically-induced upheaval are examined. Fourthly, concluding remarks are presented

alongside posing some unanswered questions.

Regional policy pre and post European Integration

Regional policy has an extensive lineage, with some important international strands

producing dissimilar trajectories, theoretical divergence and practical departures, alongside

some more characteristic strands of commonality and convergence. The recent demise ofthe

region from policy discourse aside, most scholars would agree that English regional policy

came to prominence during the 1930s (see, for example, McCrone, 1969). A fuller historical

overview, of what has been described as a topsy-turvy course (Walburn, 2011) that has

ebbed and flowed (Pugalis, 2011d), particularly over more recent decades, is beyond the

scope of this paper (see, for example, Albrechts et al., 1989; Pike et al., 2006, for a detailed

account). Nevertheless, it is important to point out that English regional development policy

was not a sole outcome of European integration. For example, the establishment of the nine

Government Office Regions (GORs) (Mawson et al., 2008; Mawson and Spencer, 1997), in

1994, under a Conservative Government, partly to satisfy some European environmental and

funding requirements, was not a radically new step. For several decades, England had been

organised into regional units for statistical purposes. Also, regional administrative outposts of

Whitehall had been a common feature since 1945. See Figure 1 fora map of Englands

standardised regions.

Figure 1. Englands standardised regions


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Following the election of a Labour Government in 1997, Regional Development Agencies

(RDAs) were established in the form of QUANGOs (Deas and Ward, 1999; Fulleret al.,

2002; Liddle, 2001; Pearce and Ayres, 2009; Pugalis, 2010). They were tasked with

providing strategic direction and delivery capabilities to support the development of regional

economies. The responsibility for the management and administration of EU structural

funding at the regional level was subsequently transferred from GORs to RDAs. Regional

oversight of European programmes remained with the RDAs for more than a decade;

delivered within a regional governance framework with agreed priorities, such as those set

out in Regional Economic Strategies (RES). The Coalitions rejection of regions as a scalar

platform for governance and spatial unit for managing economic regeneration interventions

resulted in some crucial upward and downward state rescaling strategies. Notably, this

included the centralisation of regional grant apparatus and the creation of a centrally-

administered funding pot, curiously named the Regional Growth Fund (RGF). Other

elements, including planning, are expected to be localised (subject to legislation).

Since the policy recognition of the so-called regional problem in the 1930s to date,3 new

policy remedies have been sought and administered to cure the problem. A regular feature

of the highly centralised system of government operating in England, almost unparalleled

across much of Europe, has been the institutional reworking and rescaling strategies of an

incoming government. Typically, the pots of public funding shrank under a Conservative

Government, therefore reducing the size and scale ofassisted areas supported by the

regional policy of the previous Labour Government. Based on this understanding, the

Coalitions commitment to disband Englands regional machinery which had been

incrementally strengthened, though not without some significant setbacks (Rallings and

Thrasher, 2006; Shaw and Robinson, 2007; Valler and Carpenter, 2010), and developed

under 13 years of Labour Government between 1997 and 2010is not uncharacteristic.

Although perhaps less characteristic, particularly in an international context, is the speed and

manner of change. Whilst critiques of an almost amnesic state of policy development have

lambasted change for changes sake, the implications of this state reterritorialisation project

warrants closer consideration. Nonetheless, it is necessary to briefly sketch out what new

policy remedy has been designed to combat what the Coalition considered to be ineffective

3Regional differences in terms of GDP per capita are more pronounced in the UK than in any other EU country

(European Commission, 2007).


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and laborious regional programmes reliant on dense policy and top-down managerialism (see

Pugalis, 2011a for a more detailed discussion).

A post-regional geography of governance

In the lead up to the last general election in May 2010, it was clear that failing a Labour

victory, the status afforded to regions as a scalar platform for governance and spatial unit for

managing economic regeneration interventions would retract. Indeed, the pledges and

manifestoes of both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats proposed (in outline) to replace

Englands nine statutory RDAs with more locally accountable governance ensembles (see

Figure 2). Yet, these initial proposals indicated that at least some of the new scalar remedies

under the guise of a Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) would reflect standardised regions

in terms of units for spatial organisation.

Figure 2. Election pledges

Adapted from Pugalis (2011a).

What subsequently transpired was, what was popularly termed a bonfire of the QUANGOs,

as the Coalition systematically set about stripping away, almost entirely without consultation,


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what they considered to be little more than bureaucratic machinery. Consequently, alongside

the abolition of RDAs (subject to legislation), GORs were rapidly axed (by March 2011) and

statutory regional plans such as the Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS) revoked (again subject to

legislation) (Bentley et al., 2010; Pugalis, 2011c). In turn, state funding for Regional

Observatories, Regional Leaders Boards and Regional Select Committees was withdrawn as

their functions were considered largely defunct (CLG, 2010). Importantly, the act of

deconstructing Labours top-down regional policy architecture, see Table 1, created space,

sub-nationally, which prepared the foundations for a new political project; that of Local

Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) (Cable and Pickles, 2010; HM Government, 2010b; Pickles

and Cable, 2010; Spelman and Clarke, 2010).

Table 1. Defunct regional policy functions

Policy function Overriding remit Coalition rationale forabolition/withdrawing funding

Regional

Development

Agencies

To create sustainable

economic growth in each of

the nine English regions

Rejection of regions and specifically RDAs on

grounds of being unelected, expensive and

unaccountable which fail to represent functionaleconomic geographies

Government Office

Regions

Implementation and

monitoring of national policy

and the regulatory

management (budget andcontractual) of spending

programmes of sponsoringgovernment departments

Lack democratic accountability, create burdens and

bureaucracy for local councils and impose arbitrary

administrative boundaries overreal communities

Regional Spatial

Strategy/Regional

Economic

Strategic/Regional

Strategy

Provide regional level

planning, economic and

spatial frameworks in

collaboration with regional

stakeholders

Such regional plans and processes were considered

to be cumbersome, unresponsive, top-down and

expensive

Purported to go against the grain of localism

RegionalObservatories

Formed by regionalorganisations to provide

independent, impartial

analysis of data to support

decision-making and policydevelopment at a sub-national

level

No longer a mandate for Regional Observatories toprovide a function at the regional level

Some functions considered to be overlay onerous

and duplicitous

Valuable activities to be carried forward andundertaken by other bodies, such as local

authorities or LEPs

Regional LeadersBoards

Responsibility forrepresenting local authorities

in the production of Regional

Strategies. Other functions

included: regional funding

allocations and local authority

cross-boundary issues

Unelected to perform a regional roleThe Coalition pointed towards an annual public

saving of 16m as further rationale for their

termination

Regional SelectCommittees

Established to scrutinise andmonitor RDAs and the

delivery of services in the

regions to ensure

complementarity and

Closure of RDAs and with no manifestoauthorisation Regional Select Committees had no

further mandate


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accountability with National

Select Committees and

Government departments

At the heart of the Coalitions new model for sub-national development was the incremental

state sanctioning of more than 30 (larger than local or sub-regional) LEPs (see Figure 3).

Acting at the institutional interface between national government and individual localities,

LEPs were formed to replace RDAs. Considering that many LEPs, whilst still formative,

have a small fraction of the RDAs financial draw, is one of several key features which

illustrate that LEPs are not necessarily a suitable replacement for RDAs.

Locally constituted cross-sectoral economic regeneration configurations, LEPs vary in terms

of their geographical scope, governance, organisational form and priorities (see Table 2).

Whilst national policy rhetoric suggests that LEPs have the autonomy to intervene in matters

to enable local growth, the freedom of LEPs is significantly curtailed by the lack of state

funding. Confirming suspicions that the Coalitions discourse of localism is a thinly veiled

disguise for the (re)centralisation of powers (Bentley et al., 2010; Pugalis, 2010; 2011d), the

Local Growth White Paper set out permissive guidance on what policy areas LEPs may

choose to engage with (i.e. additional responsibilities without additional powers/resources)

and also regional policy activities transferred to Whitehall (HM Government, 2010b). Also,

it has been observed that fiscal restraint measures are resulting in more centralised

commissioning powers wherein decisions are moving up the local chain of command

(Broughton et al., 2011, p. 88). The research goes on to note that [w]hile more powers may

be devolved to local authorities, the real power to decide resource allocation is being

centralized within thema sort of centralizedlocalism (Ibid.).


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Figure 3. Englands emergent landscape of LEPs, July 2011

Functions, such as, business support, innovation, international investment and business

finance provide an indication of some significant policy areas previously delivered at a

regional scale that are undergoing recentralisation to Whitehall. For instance, in the case of


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business finance, the RDAs Grant for Business Investment (GBI) and Research &

Development (R&D) grant have been subsumed into the Department for Business, Innovation

& Skills (BIS) national Technology Strategy Board (TSB) and substantially reduced funding

amalgamated into the 1.4bn RGF. The RGF was initiated as the Coalition Governments key

financial policy tool designed help rebalance the economy by leveraging private sector

investment (HM Government, 2010b; HM Treasury, 2011). Recognising that the

rebalancing trope is multidimensional and permits different interpretations, one key aspect

is the geographical facet (i.e. the need to support the regeneration and development of

particular places such as those located within the assisted areas of Europe).

Table 2. Common characteristics of LEPs

Key themes Common characteristics Examples

Role Most LEPs consider the principal role to bethat of strategic leadership

Terminology such as influencing,

advocacy, support and enabling has been

frequently mentioned

Majority of LEPs, such as NorthEastern, have continued a

commitment to provide a strategic

advisory role rather than a

dedicated delivery capability

Scope and

priorities

Most LEP proposals tended to reflect theenterprise brief set out in the CablePickles

letter, although addressing locally specific

priorities featured prominently in many bids

Some proposals used the governmentslanguage of rebalancing the economy to

frame their priorities

New Anglia LEP has prioritised sixpolicy themes and activities:

business start-up and growth;

growth sectors and business

clusters; infrastructureimprovements; lobbying and

negotiation; business and

community engagement; and skills

and workforce development

Form The proposed form of LEPs tend to be eitheran informal partnership arrangement, often

supported by a LA acting as accountable body,or an entity with a legal personality, such as a

company limited by guarantee

The Black Country LEP formed as

an informal partnership. Several

LEPs are also considering theoption of a community interest

company

FunctionsBeyond those functions identified by Cable

and Pickles, such as housing, planning andtransport, other functions including access to

finance, supporting business start-ups and

developing a low carbon economy were

frequently identified in bids

Functions identified by government to be

delivered nationally, particularly inwardinvestment, were considered crucial to the

workings of LEPs in many cases

Cumbrias LEP intends to: drive

enterprise, innovation and growth inthe Cumbrian economy; stimulate

job growth within the private,

community and third sectors;

provide economic and business

intelligence; strengthen Cumbrias

social fabric through pursuing thebig society agenda; and

influencing the key activities of

housing and planning, transport and

infrastructure, employment and

skills, business and enterprise

development, transition to the low

carbon economy and support for

tourism and other key sectors


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Governance The majority of LEP bids largely mirrored theCablePickles guidance by proposing a

private-sector chair and equitable board

representation across the public and private

sectors. In numerical terms, private sector

interests tend to dominate, particularly incomparison to voluntary and sector interests

represented at board level

Cornwall and Isles of Scilly LEP

have recruited six private sector

members and five public sector

members

Geography Almost all LEP submissions were composedof at least two upper-tier authorities, with

frequent claims of territories matching natural

economic areas

A single upper-tier bid was

successful in Cumbria

Funding and

other sources

of finance

Consistent calls for accessing the RegionalGrowth Fund. Several bids suggested that they

would consider pooling public-sector

resources and there was significant interest in

place-based budgeting

Greater Birmingham and SolihullLEP have indicated that they intend

to borrow money through Tax

Increment Financing aligned with a

proposed Enterprise Zone inBirmingham city centre.

Adapted from Pugalis (2011d).

Politically-induced upheaval: policy implications

In view of regions performing a key role in the administration of European funding, owing to

the fact that they form the basis for the EUs territorial cohesion policy, a (provisional)

analysis of the dilemmas introduced and anticipated policy implications arising from the

politically-induced disbanding of regions is all the more intriguing. The European question

of the UK Governments reterritorialisation project has not bypassed the attention of

practitioners and scholars alike. Soundings from workshops held in Leeds, Birmingham and

London throughout March 2011 gauged particular concern surrounding the future

management of European funding (Mott MacDonald, 2011). Indeed, concerns emanating

from sub-national policy circles led Pugalis (2011b) to question How will ERDF be

managed and by whom?.

Firstly, in the short-term, what are the anticipated arrangements for the management of

European funding? The abolition of Englands RDA network as a preferred delivery vehicle

for European funding witnessed a transfer of management arrangements to alternative

organisations with different scalar remits. For example, ERDF is now managed at the

regional scale by self-contained Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG)

units, which is akin to centralised regionalism. European venture and loan capital

programmes (i.e. JEREMIE and JESSICA) are to be transferred to Whitehall, whilst the


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management of the Rural Development Programme for England (RDPE) is now delivered

nationally by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and

administered locally by Local Action Groups. During this transitional period, there was a loss

of human resources and tacit knowledge accumulated during years of practice. Combined

with a lack of policy clarity, the viability of delivering European-funded projects pre and post

2013 has been called into question. One former RDA European manager interviewed,

believed that the inability of European teams to allocate financial resources in line with

targeted regional policy interventions may have a longer-term negative impact upon local

and regional economies in the future. The inference was that the pipeline of projects

focussed on longer-term, strategic interventions could be significantly disrupted or even

broken beyond repair.

Secondly, what impact will the delivery of European funding from a fractured array of

institutional organisations have on regional priorities? The transition from a regionally

integrated and embedded (strategic) delivery structure to a more fractured array of disparate

management bodies is likely to create a disconnect between strategic priorities and projects

that receive European funding (Marks, 1997; Pearce, 2001). Indeed previously, European

funding was commonly aligned with regional economic priorities and RDA funding.

Assuming regional policy and strategy continues to take precedence in the immediate future

how will current and future European projects correlate with the priorities of LEPs and other

local and sub-regional stakeholders? Moreover, what will constitute regional priorities post

2013?It would be reasonable to envisage that in lieu of a regional policy-framework, LEPs

and other sub-national entities will be directly competing for what limited economic

regeneration funding remains.

Thirdly, in the absence of RDA support services where and from whom will European

funding teams garner support from? The wrap-around support provided by RDAs,

particularly in the provision of policy, economic and spatial strategy, legal advice, business

finance, and marketing assistance is no longer available. Without the in-house support and

central hub provided by the RDAs, European projects will be difficult to coordinate

independently and time-consuming to develop, monitor and deliver ERDF funded projects,

argued another interviewee. Retreating from the co-alignment of policy practices, could give

rise to further fragmentation, overlaps, duplications and inefficiencies (Healey, 2006). Devoid

of assistance from the RDA, project bidders and European funding teams will have to procure


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support services from elsewhere, which is anticipated to have ramifications on the ability to

deliver projects and may result in inefficiencies.

Figure 4. European structural funding for England, 2007-2013


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Fourthly, to what extent were European funded projects contingent on RDA Single

Programme finance to deliver projects? Indeed, who will fill the funding void left by the

demise of RDAs? In addition to the coordination and delivery of regional economic

development programmes, RDAs were responsible for providing match funding to

European programmes. For instance, in the past four years, the RDA for the North East of

England, contributed approximately 320m or 80 percent of Single Programme matched

funding to ERDF projects, according to one officer. Closure of the RDA network is of

particular concern for the West Midlands, North West, North East, and Yorkshire and the

Humber which received over4bn in EU funding allocation for 2007-2013 (see Figure 4).

Without the security and match-funding of the RDA Single Programme the ability of those

regions to identify co-funding partners and expedite approximately1.4bn in ERDF projects

is severely diminished.

Fifthly, in recognition that LEPs are to receive limited state funding, who will plug this

financial void needed to deliver sub-national development objectives? The abolishment of

RDAs has also created a significant financial void. For example, during the 2007-2008

funding period, the nine RDAs collectively had a Single Programme budget of 2.3 bn

(Pugalis, 2010). Further, the Coalitions deficit reduction plan has witnessed the retrenchment

of economic regeneration budgets. The public sector was unquestionably the most prominent

co-partners in the majority of European-funded projects in England. Contributions from the

private sector have historically been hampered by state aid regulations and projects bidding

for the first round of RGF assistance were unable to match fund with ERDF. The latter is a

prime example of the disjointed practice evidenced during the space of transition. This would

imply that the dismantling of regional machinery was reactionary rather than proactively

transformative. Indeed, the governments economic transition plan lacks strategic awareness

and coherence (Pugalis and Townsend, 2012). The vacuum left by the RDAs could

potentially derail existing EU projects reliant on Single Programme funding and cause

significant repercussions for longer-term regeneration projects post 2013. As a consequence,

England languishes in a position of service delivery organizations fighting for fewer pots of

money, each with less money in them (Broughton et al., 2011, p. 89). Yet, a glimmer of

optimism is provided by Broughton and colleagues, who suggest that intensified competition

for resources could open up opportunities for collaboration. As with any policy shift,

adapting to change can render new and innovative working practices. From the wreckage of

demolished regional institutions, new softer spaces of governance (Allmendinger and


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Haughton, 2009; Haughton and Allmendinger, 2007; Haughton and Allmendinger, 2008;

Haughton et al., 2009) and soft policy instruments (Hutton, 2007) are anticipated to emerge.

Operating in the interstices of formal politico-bureaucratic-legal policies, processes and

organisational confines, the strategies of softer spaces occupy and help connect multi-scalar

decision-making arenas, whereby strategies try to integrate European, national and sub-

national policies and priorities. Actions within the strategies have overlapping geographies

and actor constellations. And there are few regulatory requirements involved: the emphasis is

on utilising existing funds and instruments and coordinating them. The strategies act as a

bridgebetween vision and implementation (Stead, 2011, p. 165). Not necessarily replacing

more formalised harder spaces and processes, softer ways of operating are

complementary. They have a pragmatic approach (Ibid.).

Sixthly, with the production of new geographies of governance, particularly concerning the

formation of LEPs, what is the anticipated impact on the medium to long term administration

of future rounds of EU Structural Funding? Transitional arrangements are intended to apply

up until the remainder of the 2007-2013 programme. However, post-2013, how will

Englands sub-national territories align with European policy? Without regional institutions,

how will negotiations, relations and representations with the EU unfold? For instance, will

the Coalition Government renationalise EU regional policy and financial support? (Bentley

et al., 2010). Such a move would not only further contradict the Coalitions localism rhetoric,

but would present challenges for European territorial policy.

Seventhly, what will be the role of LEPs in respect of European funding and what voice will

they have in Europe? The role of LEPs within the management and delivery of European

funding programmes is still to be clearly defined. The Coal ition Governments intention is

that spending decisions provided to England from the EU budget 2014-20 should be taken at

the local level (HM Government 2010b). However, there has been no indication from

government that they intend to devolve the management of European funding to LEPs (Mott

MacDonald, 2011). Whilst ministers have suggested that LEPs will play an important role

in this respect, soundings from civil servants suggest that this will be little more than

supporting and/or endorsing funding bids. Thus, it would appear LEPs are expected to play a

role, albeit marginal, in shaping the next round of European funding rather than providing the

form of management oversight and integration of funding streams previously undertaken by

the RDAs. Moreover, the impracticality of 30-plus entities providing management and


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administrative responsibility of European funds brings into doubt the ability of LEPs to

reflect and support the functional economic areas theypurport to serve (HM Government,

2010b). As one of the few constants amongst significant change, local authorities are

appropriate bodies to help address many of the dilemmas presented by the Coalitions sub-

national policy review (Walburn, 2011), in terms of performing a substantial role in the

prioritisation, coordination and management of European funds. Yet, despite numerous

international precedents, the Coalition appears to be following a steady flow of UK

Governments that have variously proclaimed to decentralise powers, although each has failed

to relinquish central control.

Concluding remarks, dilemmas and unanswered questions

The geographies of the state are once again in sudden motion in England. Unique to this

latest round of destabilised institutional settings and socio-political contestation, is the

profound European quandary. How will the EU view these changes? Will England be further

out of step with a Europe of Regions? Across many parts of England, particularly the assisted

areas, localities have struggled economically for decades following the first round of

industrial restructuring in the 1930s. Consequently, economic regeneration funding, whether

direct grants to businesses, to help upskill and/or retrain the prospective labour force, or

infrastructural improvements, is an essential public policy. European funding performs a

decisive role at the sharp end of delivery. Matched against other means of funding, it can

often be the deciding factor in a project progressing or not. It is within this context that the

disbanding of the English regions presents some significant policy consequences for those

places in the greatest need of European support. The new direction for English sub-national

policy also poses some important challenges for compatibility with European policy-

legislation. The paper concludes with some remarks on identified dilemmas and those

questions which remain unanswered.

Carrying a profoundly anti-regionalist ideology, upon appointment to government the

Coalition quickly embarked on the dismantling of RDAs, GORs, Regional Leaders Boards,

Regional Select Committees and Regional Observatories. Subsequently, the territorial

landscape of England has been radically altered in little over a year into the Coalition

Governments tenure. With public consultation noticeably absent in the quest to make

changes under the banner of localism, some of the potentially more powerful aspects of


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economic regeneration have been centralised with the remaining responsibilities localised as

a new round of, almost compulsive (Jones, 2010), reorganisation was ushered in. More

alarmingly, Englands scalar politics, organisational reorganisations and endless policy

adaptations has repercussions beyond its own shores. Centralising tendencies over the past

few decades have put England somewhat out of step with the rest of Europe (Crouch and

Marquand, 1989). With the rejection of regions in 2010, this disconnect shows no signs of

waning.

The transitional governance arrangement for the management and administration of structural

funds in England is an emerging and not altogether clear landscape. In the short-term, the

disbanding of RDAs resulted in the transfer of ERDF, ESF and RDPE programmes to central

government control with management administered across a confusing array of scales.

However, this state rescaling strategy presents significant policy implications for European

funding and raises some serious questions. Firstly, the rejection of regions places the

Coalition Government out of step with the rest of Europe. Secondly, it is anticipated that the

voice of sub-national territories of England will diminish in the European arena. Thirdly, if

the EU does recognise Englands new territorial structure, how will the Coalition

Government select an appropriate geographical scale for the administration of the 2014-

2020 Structural Funds? Fourthly, which institutional delivery bodies, and at what territorial

scale, will the Coalition propose to take forward the longer-term management of European

structural funding? Fifthly, and linked to the previous open question, how will such a

proposition be viewed by the EU? At this juncture it is unclear whether the management of

European funding will be undertaken by Whitehall, LEPs, groupings of local authorities, or

perhaps a new institutional configuration.

In light of the EUs goal of territorial cohesion, through the application of integrated and

multi-level governance arrangements, it remains to be seen what impact Englands disparate

governance arrangements for the management of European funding will have upon regional

economies they set out to serve. Accordingly, a fundamental question arises: is it all worth it?

The emergent policy, which remains in motion, will require time to implement and a much

longer period to bed in. Schizophrenic policy shifts have quashed far too many promising

policy innovations. Vince Cable, the Business Secretary, appears to recognise the pitfalls of

such an approach, claiming that [t]he perils of short-termism have been all too apparent over

the past few years ... great damage has been done by speculating on a short-term bubble in


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property values rather than investing in economic production (Cable, 2010). But will he be

in office long enough to heed his own advice? Expressing more hope than conviction,

Walburn has pleaded that out of the wreckage of organizational mayhem which has affected

local economic development in recent years, something more permanent and effective might

emerge at last (Walburn, 2011, p. 80). Only time will tell, but the changes being

implemented by the Coalition appear to be more reactive than transformative, which is out of

step with incremental policy evolution practised elsewhere across Europe.


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