2010 Demcracy Under Stress ISIS

Democracy under Stress:Civil-Military Relations in South

and Southeast Asia

Co-Edited byPaul Chambers and Aurel Croissant

Democracy under Stress: Civil- Military Relations in South and Southeast AsiaCo-Edited : Paul Chambers and Aurel Croissant

First published by

Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS)

5th floor, Prajadhipok-Rambhaibarni Building,

Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok 10330.

Thailand.

©ISIS Thailand 2010

All rights reserved

ISBN : 978-616-551-119-3

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or

transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical photocopying,

recording or otherwise without prior permission of ISIS Thailand.

This publication is intended to contribute to public information and discussion

and does not represent the collective viewpoint of the publishing institution or

of the institution(S) with which the author is affiliated.

Table of ContentsPreface

List of Contributors i

Reflections on Civil-Military Relations v

Acknowledgements ix

1. Introduction 1

Paul Chambers/Aurel Croissant/Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Section One: Understanding Civilian Control 20

2. Civilian Control of the Military and Democracy: Conceptual 21

and Theoretical Perspectives

Aurel Croissant & David Kuehn

Section Two: Civil-Military Relations in Southeast Asia 62

3. U-Turn to the Past? The Resurgence of the Military in 63

Comtemporary Thai Politics

Paul Chambers

4. Under an Iron Heel: Civil-Military Relations in Burma/Myanmar 102

Win Min

5. Armed Forces as Veto Power: Civil-Military Relations in 126

the Philippines

Katherine Marie G. Hernandez & Herman Joseph S. Kraft

6. Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia 149

Rizal Sukma

Section Three: Civil-Military Relations in South Asia 170

7. Democratic Ambitions under Praetorian Stress – Civil-Military 171

Relations in Pakistan

Siegfried O.Wolf & Seth Kane

8. Factionalized by the Past: The Evolution of Civil-Military 201

Relations in Bangladesh

Siegfried O. Wolf

Preface

In his sweeping work on the state of democracies in the world, Larry

Diamond noted an incipient “democratic recession” that has resulted in losses

for the post-1974 “Third Wave” democratization1. With the Third Wave as the

base period, the corresponding gains have accrued to authoritarian regimes of

different stripes in the developing world. While not all authoritarian regimes

are militaristic in orientation, such as China’s or Vietnam, many are. Indeed,

authoritarianism and militarism are frequently entwined in their fundamental

manifestations.

Against this backdrop, Chulalongkorn University’s Institute of

Security and International Studies (ISIS) is pleased to bring out the present

volume. It investigates renewed and persistent cases of resurgent and latent

authoritarianism in the context of civil-military relations in South and Southeast

Asia, with reference to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the

Philippines, and Thailand. As civil-military relations is a longstanding scholarly

genre, as pondered by Professor Suchit Bunbongkarn in the next section, this

collection of theoretical reassessment and empirical endeavor is not intended

to be profound. It merely adds new evidence to and updates relevant literature

on the role of the military in the domestic politics of six important countries.

In so doing, ISIS highlights one of its core areas of focus in addition to internal

conflict and regional security and economic cooperation.

1 Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout The World, New York: Henry Holt, 2008.

I wish to thank Aurel Croissant and Paul Chambers for approaching ISIS

to pursue this collaborative effort which began with an international academic

conference at Chulalongkorn University. While Professor Croissant was the

pillar on the theoretical approach and underpinnings, Paul Chambers spent

considerable post-conference time at ISIS to streamline the chapters and finalize

the book. Bob Fitts, Bill Klausner and Suchit Bunbongkarn of ISIS provided

valuable editorial advice. Seth Kane, an ISIS visiting scholar at the time, was

instrumental with logistical arrangements and substantive input on one of the

chapters. I am particularly appreciative of the effort and energy of the chapter

contributors and country experts. Finally, the conference presentations and

publication of this book were supported by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and its

then-director, Vesna Rodic, to whom I am most grateful.

Associate Prof. Dr.Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Director, ISIS Thailand

i

List of ContributorsDr. Suchit Bunbongkarn is Professor in Political Science and Chairperson

of the Executive Board and Director of Institute of Security and International

Studies (ISIS - Thailand) Chulalongkorn University. He has served as Chairperson

of the Counter-Corruption Committee, a Judge on the Constitutional Court,

member of the 1997 Constitutional Drafting Assembly, and Dean of the Faculty

of Political Science at Chulalongkorn University. He served once as adviser to

Former Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanond. He obtained his Ph.D. from

the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and has written

numerous articles and books on Thai politics and regional security in English

and Thai.

Dr. Paul Chambers is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Political

Science, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg (Heidelberg University) and

Senior Researcher at the Thai and Southeast Asian Studies Program, Payap

University. His research interests focus on democratization and civil-military

relations in Southeast Asia (particularly Thailand, Cambodia and the Philippines)

as well as the political economy of the Mekong basin. His articles have appeared

in Contemporary Southeast Asia, the Journal of East Asian Studies, the Asian

Journal of Political Science, and Party Politics, among others.

Dr. Aurel Croissant is Professor of Comparative Politics and Director of

the Institute of Political Science at Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg. His

main research focus is on democratization and civil-military relations in East

and Southeast Asia. He has published more than a dozen books in English,

German, and Indonesian and over 90 articles in edited volumes and journals

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including Democratization, German Political Quarterly, Contemporary Southeast

Asia, Asian Perspective, Electoral Studies, and Journal of Comparative Politics.

Katherine Marie G. Hernandez is Assistant Professor of Political Science

at the University of the Philippines and Research Fellow at the Institute for

Strategic and Development Studies (Philippines). Her research interests include

Philippine democratization and security sector reform as well as Asian security

issues. She recently contributed to a draft report on Security Sector Reform (SSR)

in the Philippines for the United Nations Development Program.

Seth Kane is a Master of Arts candidate at the Johns Hopkins School for

Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington DC and was recently a

Visiting Research Fellow at Chulalongkorn University’s Institute for Security and

International Studies (ISIS). With interests in Asian security and civil-military

relations, he has written articles for Asia Times, among others.

Herman Joseph S. Kraft is currently the Executive Director of the Institute

for Strategic and Development Studies (Philippines) and Assistant Professor at

the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines where

he teaches courses in International Relations and Comparative Politics. His

research interests focus on Philippines security issues, security sector reform,

human rights, democratization, and regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region. He has

published articles, reports, and book chapters for the United Nations Development

Program, ASEAN, and Asian Security Studies (Routledge), among others.

David Kuehn is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science,

Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg. He received his Magister Artium (M.A.)

from Heidelberg University in 2006 and from October 2006 to March 2008 was

a lecturer in Comparative Politics there. David’s main research interests are

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iii

democratization studies, civil-military relations, social science methodology and

game theory. His regional focus is East Asia. In his PhD research, he analyzes the

institutionalization of civilian control of the military in the democratic transitions

in South Korea and Taiwan.

Win Min is lecturer in political science at both at the Thai and Southeast

Asian Studies Program of Payap University, Chiang Mai and at the All Ethnic

International Open University Program, Chiang Mai University. The focus of his

past and present research is comparative studies of civil-military relations for

a democratic transition in Burma. He is the co-author of Assessing Burma’s

Ceasefire Accords (Washington D.C.: East-West Center, 2007) and has most

recently published in Asian Survey. He was a member of the All Burma Students

Democratic Front from 1988 to 2000.

Dr. Thitinan Pongsudhirak is Director of the Institute of Security and

International Studies (ISIS) and Associate Professor of International Political

Economy at the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. He has

co-edited and authored three books, including Thailand’s Trade Policy Strategy

and Capacity (with Razeen Sally), and a range of book chapters on Thai

politics, political economy and foreign policy as well as on ASEAN security and

economic cooperation. His articles have appeared in Journal of Democracy,

Journal of International Security Affairs, Global Asia, and East Asian Forum

Quarterly. He is also frequently quoted and his op-eds have regularly appeared

in international and local media. Dr Thitinan received his BA from the University

of California, MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International

Studies, and PhD from the London School of Economics where he was awarded

the United Kingdom’s Best Dissertation Prize.

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Rizal Sukma is Executive Director at the Centre for Strategic and

International Studies, (Indonesia); Chairman of International Relations Division,

Central Executive Board of the Muhammadiyah organization; member of the

board at Syafii Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity; a visiting lecturer

at the Department of International Relations at Muhammadiyah University in

Malang; and a member of the National Committee on Strategic Defense Review,

Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense. He focuses on Southeast Asian security issues,

ASEAN, Indonesian defense/foreign policy, and Indonesian political change and

is the author of numerous internationally-circulated books, journal articles, book

chapters, and reports.

Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf is a lecturer in Political Science at the South Asia

Institute and a Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, both at

Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg. He conducts research on democratization,

civil-military relations, identity, and social movements with a focus on South

Asia. He is co-author of A Political and Economic Dictionary of South Asia

(Routledge: London, 2006); is Deputy/Managing Editor of the Heidelberg Papers

in South Asian and Comparative Politics; and has worked as a consultant for

the German government.

v

Reflections on Civil-Military Relations

The issues involved in civil-military relations, both in Western democracies

and developing countries, have changed over time. In Western Europe and the

United States during the cold war period, the issues raised by a number of

scholars concerned the autonomy of the military and the nature of civilian con-

trol. Samuel Huntington in his book The Soldier and the State suggested that the

‘objective’ control, which allowed the military to be autonomous in maintaining

its professionalism and professional responsibility in the area of national de-

fense, would make the military stay out of politics. Morris Janowitz in his book,

The Professional Soldier, believed that the socialization of the military in the

United States which recognized the democratic value in society and instilled the

concept of ‘citizen soldier’ ensured the military’s acceptance of civilian control.

There have been many later works discussing the concepts and theories

of civil-military relations in democratic countries. But these could not explain

the military’s role in politics in many developing countries during the cold war

period. As a result, a number of research works were carried out to explain

the political role of the military in Asia, Africa and Latin America during this

period. These studies included the motives and the environments for political

interventions, the types of military regimes and the impacts of the interventions

on political development.

When the ‘third wave’ of democratization occurred in the late 1970s and

1980s, the pattern of civil-military relations in many developing countries began

to change. In Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, democratization gained mo-

mentum during the 1980s and forced the military to accept democratic regimes.

vi

In the case of Thailand, there is a concern whether the present state

of civil-military relations will be detrimental to democratic consolidation. This

concern is legitimate since the coup in September 2006 raised a question whether

the army is for or against democratic rule and civilian control. In my opinion,

the recent development of civil-military relations in Thailand has demonstrated

a number of points.

Firstly, a coup to overthrow a civilian regime is now highly unlikely for

a number of reasons. One of them is that the coup in 2006 demonstrated that

launching a coup is one thing, governing the country after the coup is very much

another. Thai military leaders have now realized that the problems facing the

country are too complicated to be solved through military rule. Moreover, there

would be strong resistance against a coup both within and outside the country.

In addition, I believe there has been a change in the military’s political attitude.

That is, there is no desire among military leaders to seek power by getting

involved in politics through launching a coup.

Secondly, if a coup is unlikely in the future, then how can we explain

the nature of civil-military relations at present? Some use the term “military

tutelage”. I am not sure this is an accurate explanation. I don’t think that the

military is strong enough to lead a civilian government in every issue so as to

ensure the government’s stability and survival.

Thirdly, some suggest that the military is a part of the political

establishment. They have argued that the conflict in Thailand at present is a

conflict between the elites and the rural masses. I do not want to argue this

thesis here although I believe that this interpretation or analysis to be rather

superficial. My point is that, when it comes to political issues, the military is

not monolithic. It is simplistic to assume that if they wear the same uniform,

they think alike. Thai military leaders are among the elites but as they do not

operate in a monolithic fashion, the establishment is not necessarily cohesive.

vii

Fourthly, given the problems mentioned above, we can say that civil-

military relations in Thailand at present are too complex to depict with a simple

explanation. Also, in analyzing civil-military relations in Thailand, we should look

beyond the issue of the military’s intervention in politics. There are a number

of issues involving democracy and civil-military relations in this country which

deserve attention. For example, to what extent does the military help develop

democracy; what type of democracy would the military prefer, etc.

Fifthly, what is more important is the role of the military in the areas of

national and regional security. The problems connected with security are now

complex and multifaceted. They include military security, non-traditional security

and human security. These are interrelated. It is worth studying how the military

perceive their role in this respect under the framework of civil-military relations

and of democracy. This is particularly true as civil society and non-government

organizations have now been accepted as playing a part in non-traditional and

human security.

Finally, we have to bear one thing in mind. Civil-military relation are

interactive. We should not focus only on the military side. The civilian side should

be equally considered. Civilian control over the military is unlikely if the civilian

government is weak, unstable, and unable to resolve political, economic or social

crises. Moreover, although the military are trained to fight to win and to manage

violence, this should not always lead to a conclusion that the military dislikes

peace and non-violent means. Sometime, we can see civilian leaders who are

more hawkish than the military. Therefore, to analyze civil-military relations,

we need to strike a balance and consider both the military and the civilian.

viii

Let me end my remarks by saying this. General MacArthur gave a well

remembered address to the U.S. Congress after he was ordered to return to the

U.S. He ended the address by citing a popular ballad among the soldiers of that

day, which has been cited again and again.

‘Old solders never die, they just fade away’

Thus for scholars, I would like to end my remarks by saying:

‘Old scholars always die, but their contributions never fade away’

This is why I mentioned the works of Sam Huntington and Morris

Janowitz in the beginning of my remarks, without which the study of civil-military

relations would not have been as lively as it has been.

Emeritus Prof. Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn

ix

Acknowledgements

The authors of this volume are most grateful for the assistance and advice

from the following individuals: Prof. Dr. Charas Suwanmala (Dean, Faculty of

Political Science, Chulalongkorn University); Prof. William Klausner (Distinguished

Author, ISIS Advisor, and Thai Analyst); Ambassador Roberts Fitts (Director,

American Studies Program – ISIS, Thailand and Former U.S. Ambassador to

Papua New Guinea); Dr. Chris Baker (Distinguished Author and Thai Analyst);

Ms. Pornpimon Trichot (Researcher, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn

University); and Dr. Naruemon Thabchompon (Lecturer, Department of Political

Science and Director, Master of Arts in International Studies (MAIDS) Program,

Chulalongkorn University.

The authors would also like to thank Arisa Ratanapinsiri of Heidelberg

University’s Institute of Political Science for her assistance in formatting as

well as the members of the ISIS Administration Staff—Wanwipha Khanngern,

Wuttinee Kamolpattrakul, Niruth Chuaihnu, and Suntree Jitmeumwai—for their

technical and logistical contributions.

1

ONEIntroduction

Paul Chambers/Aurel Croissant/Thitinan Pongsudhirak

This book focuses on civil-military relations in South and Southeast Asia.

In these sub-regions, the institutionalization of civilian control over the armed

forces has in many countries remained a crucial issue. This owes to the fact that

weak civilian control has generally coincided with democratic frailty. The result

has been a preponderance of power by the military over civilian governments,

a condition that has eroded political rights and civil liberties. While civilian

governments in some countries in South (i.e., India, Sri Lanka) and Southeast

Asia (for example Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei) have, in some respects, managed

to keep their militaries at bay, others appear to be falling prey to the armed

forces’ hegemony in the political realm.1

The past three decades have seen a global trend of democratic transition

going hand in hand with the decline of military regimes and open military

intervention. In 1979, fourteen military regimes held power in sub-Saharan

Africa, nine in Latin America, five in the Arab states and North Africa, three in

Southeast Asia, two in South Asia, and one in East Asia. Since then, democracy

replaced all of the military or “quasi-civilian” regimes2 in Latin America. In the

Middle and Near East, military rule has almost universally transformed into

1 See Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press, 2001.2 Quasi-civilian regimes are military regimes with a civilian window-dressing (civil president, constitution, semi-competitive elections) but which are military in substance in the sense that the military holds political hegemony. Typically, a former general serves as head of state and head of government, see Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics, London: Transaction Publication,, 1962.

2

1 : IntroductIon

civilian strongman rule. In Asia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand

and Pakistan have moved from military domination to democracy or mixed

patterns of civilian-military authority. At the moment of writing this chapter,

there is only one country in Asia in which the military openly rules by force,

Burma/Myanmar.

In spite of this development, asserting civilian control of the armed

forces remains high on the political agenda in many emerging democracies.

The nations of South and Southeast Asia have been no exception. In most of

these countries, the military used to be a key player, ruling through authoritarian

regimes. Even today in 2010, after two decades of democratic development in

East Asia, civilian control is still not an uncontested norm in the region. The

only exception is Myanmar, where soldiers have controlled politics since 1962,

though an opportunity for democratization did appear to open briefly in 1990.

These democratic changes have inspired an entirely new generation

of comparative analyses of democratic change in the region. In recent years,

various comparative studies have been published which deal with institutions

of democratic governance, their internal processes, and their impact on

the consolidation of new democracies in the region.3 Additionally, there are

3 See Jürgen Rüland, Clemens Jürgenmeyer, Michael H. Nelson, Patrick Ziegenhain, Parliaments and Political Change in Asia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2005; Jean Blondel, “Parties and Party Systems in East and Southeast Asia,” in Ian Marsh (ed.), Democratization, Governance and Regionalism in East and Southeast Asia, Routledge, 2006; Benjamin Reilly, Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific, Oxford: University Press, 2006; Roland Rich, Pacific Asia in Quest of Democracy. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007; Xiaoming Huang, Politics in Pacific Asia, New York, 2009; Aurel Croissant, Teresa Schächter, “Institutional Patterns in the New Democracies of Asia: Forms, Origins and Consequences”, Japanese Journal of Political Science, forthcoming 2010. For Asia in particular, see for example Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004; C. Kinnvall and K. Jonsson (eds.), Globalization and Democratization in Asia: The Construction of Identity, Routledge, 2002; William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less, Richmond: Curzon, 2001; M. Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan, Rienner, 2000.

3

democracy under StreSS

several works which analyze relevant political decision-making institutions and

organizations.4

However, the research on Asian politics in the age of democratic transition

still exhibits considerable shortcomings. This is especially the case when it comes

to the question of whether democratic change in the region is being accompanied

by a new political role for the military. While there have been some outstanding

works on the military in Asian politics,5 there has been very little research on

the subject in the past decade. Furthermore, most of this research is confined

to single country studies. There has only been very limited, systematic, in-depth

research on the relationships of politics and the military in multiple cases. For

many reasons, this is startling. First, there are strong theoretical and empirical

arguments in favor of the thesis that civilian control over the military is a sine

qua non for democracy and the consolidation of democracy. As argued in

one of the chapters of this book, without civilian control, liberal democracy

is impossible. Democratic constitutions tend to be worth little more than the

paper on which they are written if the political process is under military control.

Civilian authorities might be legitimized by popular elections to rule; however,

they lack the effective power to govern if soldiers do not follow their command.

4 Allen Hicken, Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Russell J. Dalton, Doh Chull Shin, and Yun-han Chu (eds.), Party Politics in East Asia: Citizens, Elections, and Democratic Development, Boulder ; London: Lynne Rienner, 2008; Andreas Ufen, “Political Party and Party System Institutionalization in Southeast Asia: Lessons for Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 21, No. 3. (July 2008): 327-350; Aurel Croissant, “Die Parteiensysteme neuer Demokratien in Ostasien: Merkmale, Typen und Institutionalisierungsgrad” [Party Systems in East Asian Neo-Democracies: Elements, Patterns and Institutionalization], Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft) 1/2008: 98-125. 5 Recent examples of literature on civil-military relations in Asia include the following: Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance. The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press, 2001; Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives, Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2001. Older works on civil-military relations in Asia are exemplified by the following: Edward A. Olsen and G. Stephen Jurika (eds.) The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies,. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986; Viberto Selochan, editor, The Military, the State, and Development in Asia and the Pacific, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

4

1 : IntroductIon

Second, the so-called “third wave” of democratization6 since 1974 has witnessed

the replacement of authoritarian regimes by democratically elected governments

at an astounding rate, including in Asia. For example, in South Asia, military

rulers had to agree to share their power with democratically elected civilians

in Pakistan in 1987-88, and in Bangladesh in 1990/1. Southeast Asia’s recent

wave of democratization began with the demise of the personal dictatorship of

Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986. Thailand (1988, 1992), Cambodia

(1993), Indonesia (1999) and East Timor (2002) followed in successive order.

Another transition to democracy even briefly seemed to be occurring in Myanmar

in 1990—though it failed.

Despite these regional democratic trends, Thailand, the Philippines,

Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh continue to be beset by unstable

parliamentary institutions, weak rule of law, inchoate systems of political

representation, chronic corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and a lack of

social justice. Meanwhile, the wave of democratization and people-power that

swept through Southeast and South Asia in the 1980s and 1990s has had

little effect on the military government of Myanmar. In addition, Cambodia’s

nascent democracy eroded into a new kind of electoral authoritarianism under

the leadership of Prime Minister Hun Sen in the late 1990s.7 Furthermore,

East Timor, Asia’s youngest nation and one of the United Nations’ prestigious

showcases of post-conflict state building and democratization, continues to stand

in a condition of severe state fragility.8 Moreover, the 1999 military takeover in

6 See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

7 See Duncan McCargo, “Cambodia: Getting away with authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, 16 (2005), 98-112.8 See Aurel Croissant, “The Perils and Promises of Democratization through United Nations Transitional Authority – Lessons from Cambodia and East Timor”, Democratization, 15(3) (2008), 649-668.

5


Pakistan, the 2006 coup in Thailand, the military interventions in Bangladesh in

2006-8, and multiple military mutinies in the Philippines indicate that democracy

in many Asian countries is under deep strain from military interventionism and

adventurism.

Even though a major part of democratization efforts has involved

removing militaries from the political arena and subordinating them under

civilian control, such efforts have encountered a multiplicity of obstacles in most

countries. Apart from Myanmar which today offers a case of failed transition

to democracy in the face of massive military control over political space, in

the emerging democracies of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh,

and especially Pakistan, the military has shown itself more or less resilient in

guarding its prerogatives in the post-authoritarian era. This seriously impedes the

democratically elected authorities’ effective power to govern in these countries

and has facilitated democratic deterioration in virtually all of the countries

analyzed herein.

Such military resilience stems from the fact that its disengagement

from political and economic governance was only partial at best. Indeed,

ambiguous institutional development has accentuated the tentative nature of

civilian supremacy. As such, emerging democracies in South and Southeast Asia

have been plagued by continuing instances of military assertion and a lack of

civilian control, though Indonesia appears to be in better shape than the other

cases. Given the deep entrenchment of the militaries in the respective political

systems, the manifold problems of consolidation of democracy in general, and

the persistence of internal conflict, civilians lack sufficient tools for confronting

the military and can hardly be expected to diminish military decision-making

power in the political arena. The principal problem for emerging democracies in

6

1 : IntroductIon

South and Southeast Asia is how to challenge resilient militaries which threaten

to set their countries on a course for democratic demise.

Ultimately, this monograph represents the culmination of a workshop/

public forum sponsored by the Institute of Security and International Studies

(ISIS) under Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, held on September 1, 2009.

Each country-case chapter has, however, been updated to account for more

recent events. In addition, the cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh have been

included to provide a larger picture of civil-military relations across two sub-

regions of Asia.

The contributions to this volume thus aim to situate civil-military relations

in six countries of South and Southeast Asia, within the context of continuing

democratic stress. Each case presents a different contemporary reality with

regard to the balance of power between civilian governments and the armed

forces. Thailand today is experiencing a military resurgence. On the other

hand, in Indonesia and Bangladesh, the military seems to be at bay. In the

Philippines and Pakistan, the military continues to challenge civilian control.

In Myanmar, the military monopolizes power. All six cases illustrate different

degrees of challenges to democratic control over the military. The authors in

this volume investigate what accounts for these situations, how they reflect the

state of democracy in different countries of South and Southeast Asia and the

implications for democracy of future military challenges to civilian control.

Two concepts are particularly crucial for this volume: democracy and civil-

military relations. The most influential definition of democracy in comparative

politics is provided by Robert Dahl. Dahl makes ‘open contestation’ and ‘public

competition’ the centre of his conception of Polyarchy,9 which includes eight 9 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971,

7


procedural and institutional considerations: 1. Freedom of association, 2. Freedom

of opinion, 3. Right to vote, 4. Right to be appointed to public office, 5. Right

of political elites to compete for votes and support, 6. Existence of alternative,

pluralistic source of information, 7. free and fair elections, 8. institutions, whose

policy depends on elections and other expressions of the citizens’ preferences.10

More recently, a growing number of scholars have used an even broader and

expanded conception of democracy under the banner of liberal democracy.

These more substantial conceptions of democracy also require provisions for

horizontal accountability (checks and balances), the rule of law, and the absence

of reserved domains for the military.11 Meanwhile, civil-military relations are

defined herein as those interactions between the military and civilian actors that

in some way relate to the power to make political decisions. In other words,

civil-military relations are a continuum of distribution of decision making power

between the civilians and the military.12 Civilian control, then, marks one pole of

the continuum of decision making power, a situation in which “civilians make

all the rules and can change them at any time”; yet on the other pole of the

continuum is the military regime, in which military officers make all the rules

and can change them at any time.13

10 Ibid.11 Aurel Croissant, Wolfgang Merkel, “Formal Institutions and Informal Rules in Defective Democracies,” Central European Political Science Review, 1.2 (December 2000): 31-48; Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” in Aurel Croissant/Wolfgang Merkel (eds.): Special Issue of Democratization: “Consolidated or Defective Democracy? Problems of Regime Change,” 11, 5 (2004): 33-58; Wolfgang Merkel, “Democracy through War?,” in: Sonja Grimm/Wolfgang Merkel (eds.): /Special Issue of Democratization: “War and Democratization: Legality, Legitimacy and Effectiveness,” 15, 3 (2008): 487-508; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999; Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, New York: The Free Press, 2008.12 Cf. Claude E. Welch, “Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality.” In Claude E. Welch (ed.), Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries, , Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976, 1-42. 13 Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Paul Chambers, Siegfried Wolf, “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies,” in Democratization, forthcoming 2010.

8

1 : IntroductIon

This monograph is structured into conceptual and empirical sections.

In the first section, Chapter 2 proposes a new approach to the understanding

of civil-military relations in young democracies. Meanwhile, in the second

section, Chapters 3-8 present empirically-based examinations of the specific

interactions between soldiers and civilian governments in six countries of South

and Southeast Asia.

In Chapter 2, Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, highlighting the need

for a universally-accepted definition, conceptualize civilian control as “a set of

decision-making areas” and emphasize the need to view civil-military relations

as a scale of “political decision-making power” which offsets civilian governments

from the armed forces. The authors stress that civilian control is a sine qua

non requirement for the development and consolidation of liberal democracy.

They further contend that the extent of civilian control in emerging democracies

is dependent upon civilian elites’ skills and readiness in developing short or

medium-term tactics for devising institutions that restrict the armed forces’

political activities. The authors then delineate several strategies and contexts in

the institutionalization of civilian control over the military. They conclude that

an understanding of civilian control must transcend an over-concentration on

military coups, adding that though there is no single path to civilian control, the

consolidation of democracy necessitates the purging of armed forces’ prerogatives

from political decision-making.

In Chapter 3, Paul Chambers borrows from the approach introduced in

Chapter 2 to describe the current state of civil-military relations in Thailand.

As such, he disaggregates civil-military relations into the five decision-making

areas of Elite Recruitment, Public Policy, Internal Security, National Defense, and

Military Organization. In three of these areas, the decision-making authority of

9


soldiers vis-à-vis civilians is seen to have risen since the 2006 coup. He states

that the period of 1979 to 2010 has witnessed the steady assertion of political

control by one particular military faction. He adds that even following the end

of direct military rule in late 2007, soldiers have continued to exercise great

power. Indeed, 2009 has seen the military exert autonomy from civilian control.

He concludes that the armed forces have located a politically-strategic “niche,”

becoming an essential actor on Thailand’s political stage. At the same time,

amidst growing military tutelage in politics, the country is increasingly veering

toward democratic erosion.

In Chapter 4, Win Min argues that, given the nature of civil-military

relations in Burma/Myanmar—where military control has long been entrenched—

one must talk about military-civil relations rather than civil-military relations.

He further contends that the up-coming 2010 general elections do not mean a

diminution in armed forces’ supremacy over the country given that the military

will remain largely independent from any elected government. Moreover, he

adds, to ensure their continued rule, Myanmar’s top brass intend to maintain

a preponderance of power by enfeebling civilian sources of power. He further

states that the military leadership will attempt to dominate the country as long

as possible, utilizing prerogatives granted in the 2008 constitution. He concludes

that any political opening and move toward national reconciliation can only occur

from within the armed forces if and only if a reformist senior officer ascends to

the top of the military establishment.

Chapter 5, by Katherine Marie G. Hernandez and Herman Joseph S. Kraft,

sheds light on the state of civil-military relations in the Philippines. They maintain

that, as in other Southeast Asian nations, soldiers have influenced politics and

society, but that multiple insurgencies have provided an excuse for a larger scope

10

1 : IntroductIon

of armed forces involvement in Philippine politics. They continue that, given the

general fragility of civilian governments, the military has exercised enormous

influence in the domestic political arena, allowing it to become a crucial “veto

actor” in competing with the country’s non-military elites. They add that the

nature of the Philippine military precludes it from attempting to take power

directly, instead opting for intervention in a more indirect and latent fashion.

The authors find it unlikely that a reform-minded President will ever successfully

consolidate civilian control. As such, they conclude, soldiers will maintain robust

influence in Philippine politics “for some time to come.”

In Chapter 6, Rizal Sukma affirms that in Indonesia reforms in civil-

military relations have been a top priority since the 1998 fall of General (ret.)

Suharto. At that time, he continues, many believed that military interventions in

politics were a thing of the past. He adds that even today, many insist that the

chance of the armed forces returning to play a political role is “slim.” Though

Sukma agrees that soldiers have mostly departed from the political arena, the

degree to which civilian control over the military has been established “remains

problematic.” Indeed, he adds, after ten years of military reforms, the armed

forces still possess “a degree of autonomy” in relation to the civilian government.

He concludes that, amidst resistance by the armed forces as well as incompetence

and inaptitude by civilian governments, there still remains much to be done to

bring the Indonesian military more fully under civilian control.

Chapters 7 and 8 shift attention to problems of civilian control in South

Asia. In Chapter 7, Siegfried O. Wolf and Seth Kane employ the approach

developed in Chapter 2 to analyze civil-military relations in Pakistan. They argue

that Pakistan has evolved into a classic “praetorian state” where the Army sees

itself as the only true guardian of national sovereignty, political integrity, the

11


principal initiator of any national agenda, and the chief resolver of socio-political

conflicts. They further contend that soldiers hold enormous sway over civilian

governments in terms of political decision-making: elite recruitment, public

policy, internal security, national defense, and military organization. The authors

conclude that the military will certainly maintain itself as the chief stakeholder

in Pakistan’s political system. Furthermore, they stress that though currently the

Army has withdrawn from directly ruling the country, it will definitely resume

its interest in the political process whenever it feels that its professional or

corporate interests are becoming challenged.

Finally, in Chapter 8, Siegfried O. Wolf argues that in Bangladesh, the

armed forces have on occasion managed to play a significant role in politics since

independence in 1971, though their influence appears to be receding. He adds

that a variety of military endogenous and exogenous factors have shaped the

evolution of civil-military relations in Bangladesh. Yet he contends that though

internal and external security needs have contributed to unity among soldiers,

several factors have created a situation inhibiting the build-up of a substantial

regular armed force. These have included factionalism and politicization in

the military, an active civil society, and particularly-effective (though informal)

civilian government strategies, which have in general proven successful in

ensuring civilian control. Wolf concludes that, though the military will continue

playing a major political role in Bangladeshi politics, it will increasingly be

confronted by civilian governments that have successfully led Bangladesh for

close to twenty years.

Ultimately, when comparing the chapters in terms of the prognosis

for civilian control and democracy for each country case, two general trends

can be discerned: long-term, measured in terms of decades, and short-term,

12

1 : IntroductIon

meaning the exact current situation. Over the long-term, political space has

tended to grow (or at least the facade of space in the case Myanmar) in each

of the cases presented. Five countries can at least argue that they possess the

formal trappings of a democracy where voters can determine who governs them.

Of these five, Thailand has transformed itself from absolute monarchy while

Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Indonesia have progressed from being

colonial possessions of European powers. This is not to say that limited rights to

vote were not possible in each of these countries’ previous regimes for certain

citizens. Yet compared to today, such rights were negligible. Again, Myanmar

arises as the bogeyman exception to the trend. Though top generals drew up

a farcical (2008) constitution leading to general elections set for 2010, these

appear to be more or less a veneer behind which leading generals can retain

power. As such, an argument can be made that with regard to the long-term

trend in Myanmar, political space grew after independence but that any civilian

control which was achieved is today virtually sealed over.

Turning to civilian control over the military in the short term, the news

is not good. The fact of the matter is that authoritarianism is on the rise in

Southeast Asia and still undiminished in South Asia. Military actors are playing

an especially interventionist role in the politics of Myanmar—though the election

which has been promised for 2010 may bring forth at the least some sham form

of democracy. Yet soldiers are also politically active in Pakistan and, increasingly,

in Thailand. Meanwhile, the armed forces have successfully applied pressure to

civilian governments in Bangladesh and the Philippines. Finally, the apparent

beacon of civilian control—Indonesia—is also experiencing growing, though

more latent political influence by its military.

13


Ultimately, the countries examined in this volume, offering variations in

degrees of civil-military relations, can be placed across a continuum (see figure

1 below). Indonesia offers a case where democracy has been shorter but more

successful. As for Bangladesh, civilians dominate politics, with soldiers possessing

a lesser albeit political role. Thailand exemplifies a country where the military is

clearly resurgent. The Philippines represents a mid-range case where the state

of civil-military relations remains tentative. In Pakistan, the armed forces exert

enormous power, though civilians at least possess formal power. Myanmar, at

the other end of the continuum from countries with robust civilian control such

as Japan, presents an example of failed democratization where the military has

succeeded in establishing thorough control over political space.

The placing of the six South and Southeast Asian countries along the

continuum in Figure 1 comes from information derived out of the chapters on

the countries in this volume. As for Japan, it is placed on the continuum as an

opposite example from the disproportionately high patterns of military control

existing in other countries of Asia (e.g. Myanmar). Indeed, the case of Japan

exemplifies well-established (since World War II) constraints on the role of the

armed forces in politics and society—a “restrictive approach to maintaining

[civilian] control over the military.”14 It must be emphasized, of course, that this

continuum represents only a very crude “measurement” which aims to illustrate

the approximate position of each of the six cases analyzed in this volume on the

continuum and the distance between the cases instead of clear-cut differentiations

and exact measurements.

14 The positioning of Japan in Figure 1 is based upon information gleaned from the following: P.D. Feaver, Shaun Narine, Takako Hikotani, “Civilian Control and Civil-Military Gaps in the United States, Japan, and China,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 29, No. 1, (2005).

14

1 : IntroductIon

Figure 1: Continuum of Decision-making Control

Bangladesh Indonesia JapanMyanmar Pakistan Thailand

PhilippinesMilitary

Control

Civilian

Control

Table 1 below meanwhile offers an approximation of the position which

the countries examined in this volume might be placed in regard to levels of

civilian control, including the two dimensions of institutionalized and informal

decision-making power. The institutional dimension refers to the formal

powers or regulations which are supposed to guarantee civilian supremacy

over the military when there is civilian control. On the other hand, the informal

(contestational) dimension refers to the actual, de facto conduct of the military

vis-à-vis civilians with regard to political decision-making, despite the law. Again,

Japan has been included, as the ideal contrast—a country possessing both very

high levels of institutional and informal civilian control.

Table 1: Level of Civilian Control across South and Southeast Asia:

Institutionalized and Informal Dimensions

Balance of Decision-making Control in 2010

Institutionalized Dimension

Informal Dimension

Higher Military Control Myanmar MyanmarPakistan

Approximate Equilib-rium of Control between Military and Civilians

PakistanThailand

ThailandPhilippinesBangladeshIndonesia

Higher Civilian Control IndonesiaBangladesh PhilippinesJapan

Japan

15


Table 1 renders a daunting depiction of civilian control’s tenuous standing

vis-à-vis the military in five young democracies of South and Southeast Asia

(with Myanmar democratization efforts stillborn). Though Myanmar’s position is

hardly surprising, the most disheartening situation is located in the right column.

There we find five democratizing states experiencing substantial informal military

control levels (including Indonesia). Of course, these countries’ ratings are not

static but instead fluid. But for Thailand the flow in the level of civilian control has

been on a negative trajectory since the September 19, 2006 military coup d’état.

Such tidings provide meager support for those who consider uniformed usurpers

a phenomenon of the past and any recent informal intervention a mere anomaly.

Skeptics need only look to the enshrinement of greater military prerogatives into

Thailand’s law despite the 2007 return to civilian rule. In this same box exists

Pakistan, a country which, caught in the throes of political pandemonium, has

yet to consolidate democratic processes.

Based upon the analyses of civilian control offered in this volume, any

short-term prospects for civilian control in the young democracies of South and

Southeast Asia are gloomy indeed. This is no time to pretend to view democratic

trends through rose-tinted glasses. The authors herein have sought to identify

a growing challenge to the development and consolidation of democracy in the

region. More than ever, civilian leaders and civil society need to understand

that excluding the military from the political realm is a current issue of critical

importance. Moreover, civilians need to start ensuring that in the dimension of

politics, they maintain institutional control over the military at all times. This

means altering any laws which bestow political authority upon military officials.

At the same time, civilian governments must educate and involve citizens to

increase vigilance in the face of any informal military political intrusions over

16

1 : IntroductIon

the institutionalized rights of civilians to exercise political power. Without such

efforts, civilian control can hardly expect to dislodge the growing influence

of the armed forces in politics and thus diminish current military threats to

democratization.

Works Cited

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University Press, 2004.

Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. Coercion and Governance. The Declining Political Role

of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press, 2001.

Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and

Empirical Perspectives, Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2001.

Blondel, Jean. “Parties and Party Systems in East and Southeast Asia” in Ian

Marsh (ed), Democratization, Governance and Regionalism in East and

Southeast Asia, Routledge, 2006.

Case, William. Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less (Richmond: Curzon,

2001).

Chadda, M. Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan, Rienner,

2000.

Croissant, Aurel, Kuehn, David, Chambers, Paul, Wolf, Siegfried O. “Beyond the

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Emerging Democracies,” in Democratization, forthcoming 2010.

Croissant, Aurel. “Die Parteiensysteme neuer Demokratien in Ostasien: Merkmale,

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Democracies: Elements, Patterns and Institutionalization), Zeitschrift

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Croissant, Aurel, Merkel, Wolfgang. “Formal Institutions and Informal Rules in

Defective Democracies.” Central European Political Science Review. 1.2

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Croissant, Aurel, Schächter, Teresa. “Institutional Patterns in the New

Democracies of Asia. Forms, Origins and Consequences.” Japanese

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Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, New Haven, Yale


Dalton, Russell J., Doh Chull Shin, and Yun-han Chu, editors. Party Politics in

East Asia: Citizens, Elections, and Democratic Development. - Boulder ;

London : Lynne Rienner, 2008.

Diamond, Larry. Developing Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

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---. The Spirit of Democracy, New York: The Free Press, 2008.

Feaver, P.D., Narine, Shaun, Hikotani, Takako. “Civilian Control and Civil-Military

Gaps in the United States, Japan, and China.” Asian Perspective, vol.

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Finer, Samuel E. The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics,

London, 1962.

Hicken, Allen. Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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Huang, Xiaoming. Politics in Pacific Asia, New York, 2009.

Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth

Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

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The Construction of Identity, Routledge, 2002.

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McCargo, Duncan. “Cambodia: Getting Away with Authoritarianism”, Journal

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Merkel, Wolfgang. “Embedded and Defective Democracies.” in: Aurel Croissant/

Wolfgang Merkel (eds.): Special Issue of Democratization: “Consolidated or

Defective Democracy? Problems of Regime Change.” 11, 5 (2004): 33-58.

---. “Democracy through War?” In: Sonja Grimm/Wolfgang Merkel (eds.): /Special

Issue of Democratization: “War and Democratization: Legality, Legitimacy

and Effectiveness,” 15, 3 (2008): 487-508.

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Ufen, Andreas. “Political Party and Party System Institutionalization in Southeast

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20

1 : IntroductIon

Section One:Understanding Civilian Control

21

TWOCivilian Control of the Military and Democracy:

Conceptual and Theoretical Perspectives1

Aurel Croissant & David Kuehn

Introduction

The last quarter of the twentieth century saw the worldwide advance of

democracy. According to data from the Freedom House-Institute, in 2008 119

(61.6 %) of 193 countries in the world had introduced the procedural minimum

of democracy: free, secret and general elections.2 However, as the twenty-first

century begins, current analyses of democratization trends convey a pessimistic

message, noting the end of the third wave of democratization. As Thomas

Carothers stated in 2002, “by far the majority of countries considered as

‘transitioning’ to democracy in recent years have not achieved a relatively well-

functioning democracy or do not seem to be deepening or advancing whatever

democratic progress they have made.”3 The empirical evidence increasingly

suggests that many new democracies are in serious trouble. They have been

paralyzed by inconclusive and disputed electoral outcomes, incessant political

strife and partisan gridlock; rampant corruption, and recurring political scandals.

More specifically, in Asia, the 2006 coup d’état in Thailand, violent protests in 1 This paper is partly based upon Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control in East Asia’s New Democracies,” Journal of East Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (2009): 187-217 and collaborative work in the re-search project “Democratic Transformation and Civilian Control of the Military: Comparing New Democracies in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia” funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG) and headed by Subrata Mitra and Aurel Croissant. We thank Paul Chambers and Siegfried O. Wolf for helpful comments and suggestions.2 Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Country Reports (Freedom House, 2009), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=21&year=2009.3 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 9.

22

2 : cIvIlIan control of the mIlItary and democracy

Mongolia’s capital Ulan Bator after the parliamentary election of July 2008,

constitutional crisis and a decline of political freedom and civil liberties in the

Philippines, and a President who is under continuous attack for violating human

rights in South Korea seem to testify to a deepening crisis of democracy in the

region.4

Furthermore, for those who thought that with the global wave of

democratization the military would be permanently removed from political

participation in Latin America, East Asia, and Africa, the most recent coup

d’état in Thailand may have been unexpected. Although the frequency of military

coups has steadily decreased since the mid-1970s, there are ample signs to

suggest that the military is still a crucial actor in domestic politics in many

countries, often playing key roles in state and nation-building, political decision-

making, maintaining internal order, and in ensuring national security.5 While

military regimes today are less common compared to the 1960s and 1970s,

depoliticizing political armies, preventing soldiers from staging coup d’états and

institutionalizing civilian control over the military remain as central tasks for

democratic consolidation in many newly democratized nations.

4 See, for example, Doh Chull Shin and Rollin F. Tusalem, “Democratization in East Asia,” in Democratization, ed. Christian W. Haerpfer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 356-376; Yu-tzung Chang, Yun-han Chu, and Min-hua Huang, “The Uneven Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in East Asia,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18, no. 2 (2006): 246-255; Yun-han Chu et al., eds., How East Asians View Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).5 See with regard to Asia, for example, Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Mark Beeson and Alex J. Bellamy, Securing Southeast Asia: The Politics of Security Sector Reform, Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series 6 (London: Routledge, 2008); Croissant and Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control in East Asia’s New Democracies.”. For civil-military relations in Latin America see J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1998); David Pion-Berlin, ed., Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Peter H. Smith, Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

23


This is especially true for Thailand. In the seventy-six years since the

overthrow of the absolute monarchy, Thailand has seen somewhere between

seventeen and twenty-three coups and coup attempts, eighteen constitutions

and fifty-six governments.6 While the country has been undergoing a process

of political transition since 1988, deep-reaching political conflicts and fractions

reemerged in September 2006, when the Thai military staged a coup d’état

against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.7 The return to democracy in

December 2007 did little to heal existing divisions in Thai society. Rather,

the political schism between the pro-Thaksin and anti-Thaksin forces soared

precipitously into rival demonstration movements—the anti-Thaksin People’s

Alliance for Democracy or PAD and the pro-Thaksin United Front for Democracy

against Dictatorship (UDD). In December 2008, the Democrat Party cobbled

together a coalition government and, with support from the armed forces,

has since managed to remain in power. Although formally an elected civilian

government, serious reservations exist in regard to the extent to which the

civilian administration is able to control the military or if it rather functions as

a mere civilian window-dressing for military tutelage (Chambers in this volume).

These events have brought back at least three questions onto the research

agenda of comparative Asian politics and the study of democracy in Asia:

What is civilian control (and what is it not)? What is the relationship between

civilian control and democracy? How can civilian authorities successfully at-

tempt to exercise civilian control over the military and what are the crucial

factors that impact the success or failure of democratic civilian control? As the

contributions to this volume demonstrate, those questions are not only of utmost 6 For the history of civil-military relations in Thailand see Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics: 1981 - 86, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Books and Monograph Series 81 (Singapore, 1989) and Samudavanija Chai-Anan, “Old Soldiers Never Die, They Are Just Bypassed: The Military, Bureaucracy and Globalisation,” in Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, ed. Kevin Hewison (London: Routledge, 1997), 42-57. 7 For the 2006 coup, see, for example, the special issue 38(1) of the Journal of Contemporary Asia

24


importance for Thailand but for many, if not most, political regimes in South

and Southeast Asia, and in the wider Asia-Pacific region. While the case studies

presented here deal with the thorny issue of civil-military relations and civilian

control from an empirical perspective, the remainder of this chapter examines

the aforementioned questions from a conceptual and theoretical point of view.

Seeking to illuminate the challenges of civilian control in young democracies,

this study is structured into five parts. The first part discusses the central term

in the study of civil-military-relations (CMR): civilian control. The second section

presents a conceptualization of civilian control as a set of five decision-making

areas. Section three explores the often postulated but mostly under-theorized

relationship between civilian control and liberal democracy, whereas section

four elaborates on the relationship between agency and strategic behavior and

contextual factors in the process of institutionalizing civilian control in new

democracies. The final section briefly outlines the main implications of the

discussion in this paper for the course of civil-military relations in South and

Southeast Asian nations.

I. What is Civilian Control?

Civil-military relations are those interactions between the military and

civilian actors that in some way relate to the power to make political decisions.89 8 Claude E. Welch, “Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality,” in Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries, ed. Claude E. Welch (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), 2.9 The military or armed forces (the terms are used interchangeably) is defined as those permanent state orga-nizations authorized by law to apply coercive power in order to provide security for society and state primarily against external threats. This definition includes various military sub-organizations and specialized military units under formal command lines, such as military police and military intelligence services. Excluded, therefore, are non-state security forces (private security companies or party militias) and paramilitary units. The focus here is on the functional elites of the military organization, that is, the upper echelons of the officer corps. In contrast, the terms civilians or civilian authorities (used interchangeably henceforth) apply to those non-military segments of the state apparatus which have the authority to formulate, implement and oversee political decisions Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), 3; Martin Edmonds, Armed Services and Society (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), 26; Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 22; Muthiah Alagappa, “Introduction,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in

25


Traditionally, the study of civil-military relations levitated around questions of

who is master and who is servant in civil-military relations and who “guards

the guardians” of the nation. In other words: the question of civilian control is

at the heart of civil-military relations. Even though in recent years, especially

with the fall of the Berlin Wall, democratization processes in eastern Europe,

the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the

proliferation of peace-building missions and programs in so-called post-

conflict societies, the concept of security sector governance or security sector

reform has gained prominence in the academic and policy-oriented literature,10

civilian control remains the central issue in civil-military relations in emerging

democracies.

Despite the long history of civil-military research,11 the field still lacks

a universally accepted definition of civilian control. The “old school of civil-

military relations”12 research has often been dominated by a lack of explicit

and theoretically grounded conceptualization of the boundaries and contents of

civilian control. Rather, most studies relied on meticulous empirical summaries

and historical descriptions of processes and events, refraining from making the

underlying assumptions explicit.13 In addition, the focus of civil-military research

in the 1960s and 1970s has mainly been on the causes, opportunities and

motives of military coups as well as on the forms and performances of military

Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 4. 10 For an overview, see Alexandre Lambert, Democratic Civilian Control of Armed Forces in the Post-Cold War Era (Münster: LIT, 2009). With regard to the application of the concepts to the Southeast Asian region, see Beeson and Bellamy, Securing Southeast Asia.11 Harold D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” The American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (January 1941): 455-468; Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge,: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).12 Anthony Forster, “New Civil-Military Relations and its Research Agendas,” Connections 1, no. 2 (2002): 71.13 Daniel N. Nelson, “Definition, Diagnosis, Therapy: A Civil-Military Critique,” Defense & Security Analysis 18, no. 2 (2002): 157-158.

26


rule. From this perspective, civilian control remained implicitly defined as the

absence of physical military intervention, and actual military rule.14

However, focusing on the coup/no-coup dichotomy runs the risk of

reducing the complexity of civil-military relations to only one extreme and partial

aspect.15 The fallacy, which necessarily follows from a negative definition of

civilian control as absence of coups, is that all other forms, states, and patterns

of civil-military relations necessarily need to be considered as civilian control.

This includes other forms of military misbehavior that are potentially not less

dangerous for the political elites or society at large than the military coup. One

case in point is the “parasitic military” which abuses its political power to draw

more resources from their parent society than needed to provide their core

functions.16 Another example is the carving-out of “reserved domains” for the

armed forces (see below). Furthermore, contrary to the equation of absence of

open intervention and civilian control, the contrary could, in fact, be true. As

Feaver has aptly pointed out, the absence of military coups could also be read

as an indicator for the high degree of the military’s political influence vis-à-vis

civilians. From this perspective, military interventions bear witness to the

political weakness of the officer corps, since the latter is not able to assert their

institutional, corporate or personal interests in any other way.17

In order to avoid the “fallacy of coup-ism.” a definition and conceptualization

of civilian control must go beyond the coup/no-coup dichotomy. It needs to depart 14 Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics 17, no. 3 (April 1965): 386-430; Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); S. E Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall, 1962).15 A. R. Luckham, “A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations,” Government and Opposition 6, no. 1 (1971): 5-35.16 Edmonds, Armed Services and Society, 29-30.17 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 2 (1996): 154-155.

27


from the basic assumption that all militaries engage in some form and to certain

extents in political action.18 Furthermore, such a definition has to bear in mind

that political activity of the military can take various forms.19 The point of refer-

ence for a comprehensive understanding of civilian control must not be whether

the military yields political influence, but how and how much.20

Hence, it is necessary to think of civil-military relations as a continuum

of political decision-making power distributed between the civilian political

leadership and the military. In this sense, civilian control is a relative condition,

i.e., it is possible to distinguish different degrees of civilian control (e.g., strong

or weak, encompassing or limited). “Full-fledged” civilian control, on one pole of

the continuum, refers to the distribution of decision-making power under which

“civilians make all the rules and can change them at any time.”21 Under civilian

control, civilians alone have the power to decide on national policies. Civilians

can delegate decision-making power and the implementation of certain policies

to the military. But, the military has no autonomous decision-making power

outside those areas that were specifically defined by civilians. Furthermore, it is

civilians alone who determine which particular policies, or aspects of policies,

the military implements, and civilians alone define the boundaries between

policy-making and policy-implementation. In addition, civilian authorities are

entitled to, and have the capacity to, effectively control the implementation of

their decisions. They possess sanctioning power vis-à-vis the military, and they

can—in principle—revise their delegation at any time.22 On the other pole of the 18 Edmonds, Armed Services and Society, 95.19 Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 29, no. 1 (2002): 36-40.20 Welch, “Civilian control of the military,” 2; Alan Siaroff, Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, 2. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 89-93.21 Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 4 (1997): 142.22 Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin, “Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits,” Armed Forces & Society 19, no. 1 (1992): 7-26; David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” Comparative Politics 25, no. 1 (1992): 83-102; Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military”; Douglas L. Bland, “Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 27, no. 4 (2001): 525-540.

28


continuum is the military regime, that is, the distribution of power in which

the military controls all decisions concerning political structures, processes,

and policies while civilians do not possess any autonomous political decision-

making power.

II. Civilian Control Conceptualized as a Set of Decision-making

Areas

Following Timothy Colton’s seminal study on the changing range and

forms of political participation of the Soviet military,23 a range of different

approaches have been proposed to capture the different patterns of the

civil-military power relationship.24 Building on this body of work, we organize

the various components of civilian control into five decision-making areas of

civil-military relations: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national

defense, and military organization.

23 Timothy J Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics, Russian Research Center studies 79 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979).24 Edmonds, Armed Services and Society; Alfred C Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1988); Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democ-racies in South America”; Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy; Muthiah Alagappa, “Investigating and Explaining Change: An Analytical Framework,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 29-68; Harold A Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

29


Figure 1: Five decision making areas of civil-military relations25

Internal Security

(C)

(D)

External Defense

Public Policy

(B)

(E)

Military Organization

Elite

Recruitment

(A)

A) Civilian control over elite recruitment is the sine qua non for

democratic rule. The principles of civilian control are violated under the following

conditions: if the military enjoys constitutionally reserved representation in

cabinet and parliament, or has informally recognized or institutionalized veto

powers regarding the appointment of members of the government or public

administration, if the armed forces control aspects of the electoral process, or

if active service personnel hold positions of political leadership.

B) The area of public policy encompasses decision-making and

implementation in all political affairs except security and defense policy, e.g.

fiscal and economic policy, foreign policy and public welfare. Examples of the

breaching of civilian control in this area are any occurrences of autonomous

military policy-making, or the formation of genuine military structures which

take over functions from civilian administrative organizations.

25 Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, “Demokratisierung und zivil-militärische Beziehungen in Ostasien: Theorie und Empirie,” Südostasien aktuell 26, no. 3 (2007): 5-54; Croissant and Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control in East Asia’s New Democracies.”

30


C) Internal security constitutes a third area of civil-military relations:

both new and established democracies deploy their armed forces for disaster

relief, to support the civilian police force and border control troops, or to fight

insurgencies and terrorism.26 However, these activities are compatible with

civilian control only if the decision-making power over the range, duration and

frequency of these missions rests with democratic authorities, and if civilian

institutions are able to monitor military activities.

D) National defense is the core function of any national military. Even in

established democracies, military officers are usually involved in the formulation

of defense policies and often provide expertise to civilian decision-makers. In

fact, effective defense policy-making requires civilians willing to make use of

the military’s professional expertise.27 However, civilian control in this area is

at stake if civilian authorities do not possess the final decision-making power,

cannot control the defense policy agenda, or if civilian institutions are not able

to monitor and sanction the military’s activities.

E) The area of military organization comprises decisions on the size

and organization of the armed forces, their doctrine and command structures,

as well as the general guidelines of recruitment, education, appointment and

equipment. While a certain degree of organizational autonomy is necessary for

the military to fulfill its functions, civilian control is dependent on the ability of

civilians to define the range and boundaries of this “institutional autonomy.”28

Full-fledged civilian control requires that civilian authorities enjoy

uncontested decision-making power in all five areas. Challenges to the civilians’

26 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 2. ed. (London: Routledge, 2006).27 Thomas C Bruneau and Harold A Trinkunas, eds., Global Politics of Defense Reform (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).28 Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America.”

31


ability to make decisions in the five areas by the military can occur in two

distinct forms: institutionalized rules and contestation.29

Institutionalized rules refer to the existence of “military prerogatives.”

that is the military’s “acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise

effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military

areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between

the state and political or social society.”30 These rules perpetually confine the

elected civilians’ decision making power. Examples of military prerogatives can

be found in Ecuador and Turkey, where a role for the armed forces as “guardian

of the nation” is inscribed in each country’s constitution.31 To prevent a military

from acquiring political clout, one condition for civilian control in each of the

five dimensions is that the military must not possess any such institutionalized

prerogatives. At the same time, it must be assured that N develop institutions that

transfer the power to make decisions regarding all policy matters to civilians—

including defense and security policy.

Contestation encompasses all instances of the military challenging

civilian decision-making power by threatening to engage or actually engaging

in illegitimate conduct. While “contestation” is temporally limited, it N poses

a serious threat to civilian control. Hence, civilian control also depends on the

absence of any unlawful, or informal, political interference by the military aimed

at reducing the civilians’ ability to make or change political n, or to have them

implemented. Both conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient

29 Welch, “Civilian control of the military”; Kemp and Hudlin, “Civil Supremacy over the Military”; Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy; Alagappa, “Coercion and governance”; Nelson, “Definition, Diagnosis, Therapy”; Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective; Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics.30 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 93.31 Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, eds., The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc (Boul-der, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 4-5.

32


for civilian control to be existent, i.e., if and only if both conditions are fulfilled,

civilians’ decision-making power is not circumscribed by military influence.

To differentiate between institutionalized and contestational forms of

military attacks on civilian control is an analytical distinction. In political reality,

more often than not both forms occur hand in hand. For example, while some

constitutions (i.e., Chile’s post-authoritarian constitution until the constitutional

reforms of the late 1990s) included some institutionalized military prerogatives,

the military also engaged in contestation, such as holding parades in the streets

of the capital of Santiago de Chile to demonstrate its power to the civilians and

to make sure that civilians did not follow a course in the reform of civil-military

relations that would have threatened the armed forces’ autonomy and corporate

interests.

III. Civilian Control as a Necessary Condition for Liberal Democracy

The literature on civil-military relations in democratic transitions

recognizes the importance of civilian control of the military as a conditio sine

qua non for the consolidation of new democracies.32 However, civilian control

is not equal to democratic control, as the experience of single-party regimes in

communist countries illustrated. The fact that civilians control the military says

little about the former’s political beliefs and practices. Alternatively, as Anthony

Forster aptly notes, “it is a fundamental premise of democratic civilian relations

that civilian control of the military is clearly possible without democracy, but

democracy isn’t possible without civilian control of the military.”33

32 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 250; Larry J. Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, eds., Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).33 Anthony Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 96.

33


Regarding the specific relationship of civilian control and democracy, two

somewhat distinct contrasting perspectives can be discerned in the literature

on democracy and democratization. Some democracy theorists and students

of democratic transition define civilian control as a functional prerequisite of

democratic rule.34 On the other hand, scholars who subscribe to an “inherent”

conception of civilian control define military subordination under civilian

authority as a core aspect of democracy itself. In this perspective, civilian control

is one of the elements that define democracy.35 Regardless of the analytical status

of civilian control vis-à-vis democracy, both positions assume civilian control to

be of fundamental relevance for democratic governance: without civilian control,

there is no democracy.

Democracy can be understood as the realization of three “core values”:36

peoples’ sovereignty, political equality, and civil liberty.37 It remains then to be

asked how weak or absent civilian control influences the realization of these

three democratic principles.

The connection between civilian control of the military and sovereignty of

the people is straightforward. The degree of accountability and responsibility of

elected political representatives to the citizens declines with the degree of military

incursions into the elected civilians’ decision-making power. The larger the

military’s autonomous political decision-making power, the smaller the relevance

of democratic processes as instruments for making political decisions responsive

to the preferences of the people and holding decision makers accountable.

34 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 46.35 E.g., Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, “What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 3 (1991): 75-88.36 Corey Brettschneider, “The Value Theory of Democracy,” Politics Philosophy Economics 5, no. 3 (2006): 270-273.37 Larry J. Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, eds., Assessing the Quality of Democracy (Baltimore: Hopkins University Press, 2005), 22.

34


Weak or outright lack of civilian control also poses a serious obstacle to

the principle of political equality. As democracy is based upon the idea that all

citizens have the equal right of representation and access to the political system,

political privileges for certain political or social groups or individuals contradict

the idea of democratic citizenship.38 The emergence of the armed forces as a

“tutelary power” or military “reserved domains” places one social group (and its

individual members) into a politically privileged position which stands at odds

with the notion of political equality.

Weakly-institutionalized or outright lack of civilian control poses similar

problems for the democratic principle of liberty or individual freedom. This core

value refers to the limitation and mode of exercise of governmental power by

making it subject to legal boundaries and respect for the individual rights of the

citizens.39 In liberal democracies, a range of institutional arrangements safeguards

the citizens’ primary individual rights. Typically, this set of fundamental

rights refers to the life and security of the person, the liberty and freedom of

movement, the freedom of thought and expression, the freedom of assembly and

association, freedom of information, protection against discrimination, special

rights of particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, and due process

rights.40 These rights are in jeopardy if the military is not subject to firm and

effective civilian control. This is so because the lack of civilian control necessarily

violates the institutions of constitutionalism and rule of law which are meant

to guarantee the protection of these rights. A tutelary military is by definition

beyond the checks and balances that are meant to “prevent, redress, or punish

38 Sidney Verba, “Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn Out to Be a Nightmare?” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 04 (2003): 263.39 Marc F. Plattner, “Liberalism and Democracy: Can’t Have One without the Other,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 2 (1998): 171-180.40 David Beetham, “Freedom as the Foundation,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 (2004): 66.

35


the presumably illegal actions (or inactions) of public officials.”41 Similarly, if

the military enjoys autonomous decision-making power in certain policy areas

or if it can implement policies without being monitored by actors who can be

judicially or electorally held accountable, they remain unchecked by institutional

counterweights and are thus effectively lawless.

The question that follows from this is to what extent the lack of civilian

control can be arguably reconciled with calling a regime democratic, or to

phrase it differently: where is the threshold between a democracy under military

tutelage and a military regime? While this question is impossible to answer

with any degree of final authority without empirical evidence, two arguments

deserve closer scrutiny.

First, a political regime cannot be categorized as democratic if the military

has any degree of autonomous political influence in the areas of public policy

and elite recruitment because they touch upon the core elements of the electoral

regime per se. As the functionality of the electoral regime is the defining element

of democratic rule, any conferring of autonomous decision-making power over

these matters to the military violates the core democratic principles of people’s

sovereignty and political equality. If the military controls elite recruitment (area

A of civil-military relations) and the civilian government is subordinate to and

exists only at the disposition of the military, or if the armed forces direct most

other policy areas and oversee the workings of a civilian day-to-day cabinet, the

political regime must be judged as being under military control and can no longer

be considered “minimally” democratic. Political regimes with a literal military

government having full control over state policy and with cabinet members

drawn from the armed forces must be classified as authoritarian.42

41 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Why the Rule of Law Matters,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4 (2004): 37.42 Siaroff, Comparing political regimes, 91.

36


Second, concerning a possible military dominance over security and

defense-related areas, the argument is less theoretically clear-cut: if the military

exerts its influence over internal security-making, national defense, and military

organization without perpetrating gross human rights violations, withholding

civil or participatory rights for active service personnel, or utilizing institutional

autonomies to engage in large-scale graft, a point can be made that a defective

variant of democracy might still be viable.43 Hence, other forms of political

regimes, in which the military exercise a certain degree of oversight over

civilian politicians in these decision-making areas of civil-military relations must

be considered, “incomplete” or “defective” forms of democracy under military

tutelage.44

IV. Strategies and Contexts in the Process of Institutionalizing

Civilian Control

In democratizing regimes the process of (re-) creating civilian supremacy

over the military consists of two components. First, there is the retreat of the

military from direct government. This is by definition a necessary condition for

the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. But, as some cases in Latin

America, Asia and Southern Europe indicate, this retreat may be a matter of

degree and does not need to be complete, at least in the first years of democracy.45

Second, civilian control is institutionalized when civilians’ decision-making power

is not challenged by either institutionalized prerogatives or ad hoc contestation

by the military in any of the five areas. This requires the elimination of military

43 Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 33-58.44 Wolfgang Merkel et al., Defekte Demokratie. Band 1: Theorie (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2003); Siaroff, Comparing political regimes, 90-92.45 Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy; Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization After Twenty Years?,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 115-144.

37


discretionary power and reserved domains, and also the construction of a new

institutional structure of civilian-military interaction.

How can this shift be achieved and which factors determine the success

or failure of crafting civilian control? Thus far, civil-military relations theory

offers only partial and sometimes contradictory, answers to these questions.

While the theory-driven literature on civil-military relations is still dominated by

the professionalism school,46 in recent years the field has experienced attempts

to establish a new tradition of civil-military relations theory. Probably the most

innovative contribution is Peter Feaver’s agency theory of civilian control.47 By

developing a principal-agent model of civil-military relations, Feaver analyzes

dynamic interactions between civilians and the officer corps, arguing that the

subordination of the military agent can be measured by calculating whether

the civilian principal is able and willing to detect and punish military ‘shirking’.

Feaver’s model is a seminal contribution to the study of civil-military

relations in established democracies. It is less suited, however, for explaining

the institutionalization of civilian control in democratic transitions. His a priori

assumption, that civilians are the principals who employ the military agent as

an “armed servant.” is plausible in established democracies, whereas civilians

in newly democratized countries often have to first establish themselves as

principals.48To examine the complexities of civilian control in neo-democracies,

an alternative approach is needed. It incorporates some of Feaver’s arguments,

but is rooted in the neo-institutionalist tradition of an “actors-centered

46 Huntington, The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations; Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait.47 Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique”; Armed Servants: Agency, Aversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).48 Wendy Hunter, “Contradictions of Civilian Control: Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the 1990s,” Third World Quarterly 15, no. 4 (1994): 634.

38


institutionalism.”49 This approach is based upon the theoretical premise that

the degree of civilian control in new democracies depends on the ability and

willingness of civilian elites to develop short- or medium-term strategies for

establishing institutions that restrict the political activities of the armed forces

and tie the actions of military officers to the basic norms and rules of the

democratic regime. While individual politicians and military officers maneuver

to maximize utilities, their options are inherently constrained because they are

operating within the rules of one or more institutions and specific structural

and situational contexts.

Based on the work of Feaver and Trinkunas,50 it is plausible to differentiate

six control strategies. Needless to say, these strategies are ideal-type conceptions;

in real political life, actors most certainly combine elements of more than one

strategy.

1) Appeasement. By granting the military material benefits and

institutional autonomy, civilians set incentives for the armed forces to refrain

from political intervention and to remain loyal to the political regime and

political authorities. The range of appeasement encompasses impunity for

human rights violations, sustaining or raising defense expenditures, providing

guarantees for organizational autonomy and self-governance of the armed

forces, and accepting military prerogatives in certain policy areas. However,

by stabilizing or widening existing military prerogatives and forgoing effective

control mechanisms, appeasement runs the risk of fostering the emergence

of some form of ‘guarded democracy’, in which the military sets the rules of

engagement in civil-military relations.49 Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).50 Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Aversight, and Civil-Military Relations; Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective.

39


2) Monitoring. This strategy aims at creating oversight mechanisms, inside

or outside the armed forces, in order to reduce existing information asymmetries

between civilians and the military and, therefore, to minimize “moral hazard”.

Moral hazard refers to the incentives of the agent to utilize information

asymmetries for its own good, for instance by hiding its true intentions or by

taking hidden action against the will of political authorities. Key instruments

for monitoring the military are special bodies of investigation inside the armed

forces, parliamentary committees, and reporting systems. While monitoring alone

cannot enforce compliance, it is plausible to assume that the very possibility

of detecting misbehavior and the anticipated costs resulting thereof reduce the

probability of military insubordination.51

3) Ascriptive selection. Another fundamental problem in any principal-

agent relation is ‘adverse selection’. As with moral hazard, the threat of adverse

selection is rooted in existing information asymmetries between civilians and

the armed forces. It describes the problem that the civilian principal has in

not being able to know for sure the “type” of the military agent, that is, the

norms, values and interests of the military personnel and their inclination for

shirking. Ascriptive selection aims to reduce the military’s disposition to subvert

civilian control by nominating military personnel based on ascriptive criteria,

thereby hoping to minimize the chance of ‘adverse selection’. Military officers

are appointed according to their perceived loyalty towards the government and

political regime. This strategy is often employed in weakly institutionalized

political regimes where the transaction costs are low.52 However, it may foster

the problem of opportunistic behavior and the politicization of the officer corps,

51 Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Aversight, and Civil-Military Relations, 68-75.52 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 214-226.

40


thus providing ‘solutions’ to the control problem in civil-military relations that

are ineffective or possibly harmful.53

4) Political socialization. This strategy is related to ascriptive selection

insofar as it aims to transform the professional norms and corporate self-image

of the officer corps. With this strategy, however, civilians actively mold the

military’s organizational culture and normative ideals through political education,

the reform of officer training programs, and the reorganization of leadership in

order to strengthen the acceptance of and loyalty to the democratic order and the

organizing principles of democratic civilian control. Obviously, this constitutes a

rather long-term approach and is thus less suited for the short-term enforcement

of civilian control.

5) Counterbalancing. By taking advantage of inter- and intra-agency

rivalries and cleavages among different segments of the security forces, civilians

try to balance military power and strengthen their own position. This strategy

includes alternately favoring different services, creating alternative military forces

outside of the armed forces’ chain of command (such as paramilitary police,

presidential guard, or special security forces under the command of the ministry

of the interior) and other balancing mechanisms. While this strategy allows

civilians to keep military power in check, it may undermine the armed forces’

ability to defend the country against external threats. Moreover, this strategy

may foster problems of opportunistic behavior and politicization among (para-)

military formations, thus increasing the control problem in civil-military relations.

6) Sanctioning. Sanctioning strengthens civilian supremacy by rewarding

compliance and punishing non-compliance. Negative sanctions include

discharges, early retirement or court-martialing of disloyal officers, investigations 53 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 227.

41


by independent agencies and summary purges of the officer corps. By providing

concrete incentives, sanctioning is likely to produce subordination even if the

norms of civil supremacy and professionalism have not yet been internalized

by military officers.54

By analyzing the respective mix of strategies, the degree of civilian control

in any given country can be traced back to the specific decisions of civilian

actors. We assume that the extent and effectiveness of civilian control in new

democracies depends on the robustness of civilian control strategies: the more

robust or ‘intrusive’ the strategies, the more effectively the military’s prerogatives

can be permanently reduced and the armed forces kept under civilian control.

However, civil-military interaction does not take place in a historical or

social vacuum.55 Certain structural and situational factors provide resources,

opportunities and constraints for political elites which shape the civil-military

balance of power. Therefore, we assume that the strategic choices of civilians

and soldiers are also influenced by the specific context in which civil-military

interactions take place; civilians are more likely to choose robust strategies

if the historical, structural and situational contexts provide the opportunity.

Integrating deductive reasoning and empirical observations in civil-military

relations research,56 we distinguish three sets of structural and situational

factors: initial conditions, military-endogenous factors and military-exogenous

factors (see Figure 2).

54 Dale R Herspring, Soldiers, Commissars, and Chaplains: Civil-Military Relations Since Cromwell (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 3.55 Andrew J. Bacevich, “Absent History: A Comment on Dauber, Desch, and Feaver,” Armed Forces and Society 24, no. 3 (1998): 452.56 Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy; Alagappa, “Coercion and governance”; Aurel Croissant, “Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea,” Armed Forces & Society 30, no. 3 (2004): 357-381.

42


Figure 2: Factors and Strategies of Crafting Civilian Control57

Civil-Military Relations

Internal Security

(C)

(D)

External Defense

Public Policy

(B)

(E)


EliteRecruitment

(A)

Control Strategies

Initial Conditions

Mil.-endogenous factors

1.Organizational culture

2.Internal cohesion

3.Economic resources

Mil-exogenous factors

1.Public support of regime

2.Cinilian consensus

3.Active civil sicoiety

4.External threat perception

5.Internal threat perception

6.External actors

57 Croissant, “Riding the Tiger”; Croissant and Kuehn, “Demokratisierung und zivil-militärische Beziehungen in Ostasien: Theorie und Empirie”; based on Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Military: A Threat to Democracy?,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 44, no. 3 (1998): 329-349; and Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy.

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Initial conditions

The characteristics of the non-democratic regime (e.g., single-party,

personalist, or military regime), the type of military rule (hierarchical or

non-hierarchical) and the scope of military prerogatives in the authoritarian

regime have profound implications for the challenges and opportunities for

crafting civilian control in new democracies. Particularly relevant is whether

the armed forces as a corporative agent or military faction were part of the

authoritarian regime coalition, whether the dictatorship was a military regime

or whether the military was subordinate to civilian elites. Where the military

played an important role in the old regime and in the transition to the new

regime, numerous obstacles must be overcome to achieve civilian supremacy.

A military in retreat from government positions usually wants to maintain

monitoring or tutelary capacities over new authorities, which would affirm

authoritarian enclaves within an otherwise democratic regime. More than any

of the other kinds of organizational bases found in non-democratic regimes, a

hierarchically-led and cohesive military possesses the greatest ability to impose

“reserve domains” on the newly-elected government, and this by definition

precludes democratic consolidation. In contrast, if the authoritarian regime is

led by a non-hierarchical military and this regime collapses or is overthrown, it

will be easier to impose civilian democratic control upon the military than if the

regime had been led by a hierarchical military.58 Non-hierarchical military-led

regimes, thus, have some characteristics that make them less of a potential

obstacle to democratic transition and especially to democratic consolidation.59

58 Regarding the distinction between non-hierarchical and hierarchically-led military regimes, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.59 Ibid.

44


The impact of the type of regime on the course of civil-military relations

after transition to democracy, however, is filtered by the mode of transition.60

There is ample empirical evidence to suggest that one of the most pressing

problems of civil-military relations in new democracies is that military officers

are able to secure a continuing role for officers in the policy process. This is

particularly the case if hierarchical military governments have ruled relatively

successfully. Democratic transitions in South America, South Europe and in

some countries in East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa proceeded under heavy

military supervision. Transitions often took off under constitutional frameworks

planned by military-authoritarian rulers or under ad hoc rules prepared to

oversee change. The military thus significantly influenced the pace and agenda

of the transition, affecting the scope and pattern of competition, and occasionally

banned individuals from running for the highest offices. In addition, the military

leadership was able to remain mostly unchanged, at least in the early phases

of the new democratic regime (Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay,

Portugal and Turkey, South Korea;.61 Hence, it is plausible to assume that civilians

will be more likely to employ robust strategies if the military has no control over

the course of the transition to democracy.

Endogenous factors

Endogenous factors are related to internal aspects of the military such

as its organizational cohesiveness, its doctrine and its economic posture. These

factors affect the ability and disposition of the officer corps to resist civilian 60 Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy, 29-45.61 Felipe Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining: Civilians and the Military in Shaping Post-authoritarian Regimes,” in Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 194-222; Alagappa, Coercion and governance; Smith, Democracy in Latin America.

45


control strategies. Three different factors can be discerned. First, an ideologically

coherent military organization is favorable for the institutionalization of civilian

control over the military, if a “tutelary-guardianship”62 role is not part of the

military’s ideology.63 Conversely, an ideologically coherent military organization

which regards political interventions as an integral part of their historical mission

and roles as experts in the management of organized violence and political affairs

offers unfavorable conditions for the enforcement of civilian control.64

Second, the question of whether and to what extent military factionalism

is negative for the enforcement of civilian control depends on conflict intensity,

the degree of factionalism as well as on the dispersion of political power between

“loyal.” “semi-loyal“ and “illoyal“ factions65. Very problematic is the absence of

an overarching loyalty of military factions to the political community since this

increases the threat of an open outbreak of conflicts between segmented groups

within the military. Also problematic is a strong polarization between die-hard

followers of the authoritarian order and supporters of the new democratic

regime. In general, however, it can be assumed, that the more difficult it is to

institutionalize civilian control, the stronger the corporate unity of the armed

forces. A smaller degree of internal cohesion reduces the military’s abilities to

defend its political prerogatives, and thus is conducive to civilian control.66

Also significant is the degree to which democratization affects economic

interests of military groups. The question here is whether the military as

62 Brian Loveman, For La Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1999).63 Rosemary H. T. O’Kane, The Likelihood of Coups (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987); Siaroff, Comparing political regimes, 97.64 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics; Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America; Alagappa, “Coercion and governance .” 65 For the concept of democratic loyal and illoyal agents Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).66 Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy, 30-31.

46


an organization, single factions inside the military or influential individuals,

possesses autonomous economic resources that could render material sanctions

ineffective. These resources might provide military officers incentives to resist

the expansion of civilian control in order to defend their income and economic

interests. Under these conditions the civilians’ ability to cut back military

prerogatives is impeded.67 Therefore, the enforcement of civilian control is

hampered if the armed forces are engaging in entrepreneurial roles because it

makes a crucial difference for civilian governments whether they must implement

their economic policies against the opposition of civilian distributional coalitions,

or whether the military is part of this distributional coalition. In contrast to most

other political groupings, the military cannot only lobby a democratically elected

government, but it also can supplant it.

Exogenous factors

Exogenous factors shape the civil-military balance of power from outside

the military complex. Based on the rich research literature we identify six

different factors.

First, if the norms, rules and procedures of the democratic regime enjoy

sufficient public support because citizens perceive the democratic regime as

well-performing in economic and political terms, then civilians’ power vis-à-vis

the military will be strengthened and the use of robust strategies facilitated.68

A military will find it harder to resist pressure for change in civil-military

relations and push for its own prerogatives when political elites are visibly backed

by a wide array of electorally-strong social and political forces. Vice versa, the 67 Nordlinger, Soldiers in politics.68 Sundhaussen, “The Military.”

47


options for civilians to choose more robust control strategies are less favorable

when the democratic system is widely believed to produce poor outcomes and the

public perceives politicians as being incompetent to deal with society’s problems.

Second, the same holds true when a consensus among civilians on not

involving the military in political controversies is lacking and, instead, political

groups are “knocking on the barracks’ door,”69 seeking support from members

of the armed forces. In fact, often it is the civilians who call on the military for

support either to overthrow or to defend constitutional government. In return, in

many societies, the civilian and “democratically” enacted constitutions attribute

to the military a “moderating” power that “legitimizes” their intervention. On the

other hand, the greater the cohesion of the political elite and consensus among

politicians not to engage the military in partisan politics, the more likely elected

representatives will be able to implement robust control strategies. Furthermore,

the weaker the coherence of the civilian coalition in charge of the democratic

transition, the easier it will be for the military to negotiate their withdrawal on

terms where they retain non-democratic prerogatives which hamper democratic

consolidation.

Third, civilians’ abilities to employ robust strategies will be further

enhanced if an active civil society can exert pressure on the military to accept

civilian supremacy and provides alternative sources of information on defense

issues, which serve as an additional oversight mechanism.70 In addition, civilian

control is easier to accomplish and solidify in case of the prior existence of well-

organized political parties which have stout support among voters and various

69 Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Mlitary Role Expansion,” in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 47-65.70 Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe; Marina Caparini, Philipp H. Fluri, and Ferenc Molnar, eds., Civil Society and the Security Sector: Concepts and Practices in New Democracies (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2006).

48


social strata, thereby providing strong democratic regime leverage against the

military.

Fourth, by outwardly directing the military’s political energies and

providing electoral incentives for civilians to pay attention to civil-military

relations, an external threat to national security also tends to be conducive to

the institutionalization of civilian control.71

Fifth, the existence of internal security challenges, in contrast, potentially

weakens the legitimacy of the democratic order and civilian elites and strengthens

the military’s role as the ‘non-partisan’ guardian of national integrity, thereby

impeding the institutionalization of civilian control. Indeed, one of the most

often used arguments of generals and colonels to legitimize their interventions

is that the democratic government is unable or unwilling to solve internal crisis

and security threats.72 In fact, the sad story of coup politics in many parts of the

world tells us that the weakness of democratic institutions in settling political

crises within institutions and along the procedures of the democratic regime is

not only the most important trigger for military intervention, but furthermore it

also often generates broad public support for a military coup.73 Intense political

polarization or virulent conflicts form one of the most favorable opportunities

for military intervention. If state sovereignty is challenged by the government

of another country or by guerillas and secessionists, the military is pulled into

domestic political affairs.

Sixth, and lastly, civilians are more likely to adopt robust strategies if

external actors such as international donors, international organizations or 71 Michael C Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).72 Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Rienner, 2000).73 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes, 2. ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

49


national governments generate incentives for the military to internalize the

principle of civilian supremacy or to support civilian attempts to control the

military.74

V. Conclusions

Empirical evidence derived from quantitative analyses of civil-military

relations worldwide shows that military coups have become less frequent

in the past decades. While military interventions and military regimes

have not completely vanished from the face of the earth, their number has

dwindled significantly in the recent three decades, when the “third wave of

democratization”75 led to democratic transitions in former authoritarian regimes

around the globe. According to data presented by Thompson and Li, in the first

three decades after World War II, military officers in the Middle East had on

average staged coups once every eight months, in Africa once every three months

and in Latin America once every ten weeks.76 With the onset of the third wave

of democratization in 1974, the frequency of coup

74 Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, “Democratization as a Global Phenomenonand its Impact on Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 13, no. 5 (2006): 776-790.75 Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).76 William R. Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers, Sage professional papers in comparative politics; 4 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973); Richard P.Y. Li and William R. Thompson, “The “Coup Contagion” Hypothesis,” Jour-nal of Conflict Resolution 19, no. 1 (1975): 63-84.

50


Figure 3: Number of attempted and successful military coups 1960-2006 77

Note: This graph only shows successful and attempted, but failed coups. Not shown are plotted or allegedly

plotted coup attempts.

d’états declined significantly.

Apart from Turkey (1997), Europe saw its last coup attempt in 1981,

when segments of the Spanish Army (unsuccessfully) rebelled against the newly

institutionalized democracy. The latest coup attempt in the Middle East happened

in Egypt in 1981, the latest successful coup was staged in South Yemen, in 1978.

Meanwhile, in Latin America, military interventions have declined significantly.

At present, there are no open military regimes in Europe or Latin America. Only

in parts of Africa and Asia does military intervention remain a realistic threat for

civilian rule, as the recent coups in Pakistan (1999), Thailand (2006), Fiji (2006),

Mauritania (2005, 2008), Guinea (2008) and Honduras (2009) demonstrate.78

77 Croissant and Kuehn, “Demokratisierung und zivil-militärische Beziehungen in Ostasien: Theorie und Empirie”; Croissant and Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control in East Asia’s New Democracies”; based on data from the Polity IV project.78 However, on June 29, 2009, Honduras experienced the first military coup in Central America in a quarter of a century, in which the Honduran military ousted the democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya.

51


Furthermore, the third wave did away with most military regimes in the world.

This is not only true for Latin America, where more than ten military regimes

transitioned to democracy between 1978 and 199079 but also for the Asia-Pacific.

As this chapter is being written, there is only one open military regime in the

region (Burma/Myanmar).

From a simplistic point of reference, this development seems to bode

unambiguously well for civilian control and democratic consolidation. However,

recent studies on democratic transitions draw an ambivalent picture of the state

of civil-military relations in most of the third wave democracies. On the one

hand, they acknowledge the declining relevance of open military interventions for

most of the countries under study. On the other hand, a large number of studies

suggest that the military has not given up its political roles and still intrudes

significantly into the realm of civilian politics in many countries. Particularly the

study of Latin American third wave democracies has provided ample evidence

that current militaries do not refrain from actively engaging in political activities,

but that they have merely changed the form and instruments of asserting their

will vis-à-vis civilian rulers. In this context, it has been argued that the typical

patterns of military political activity in the new Latin American democracies

are the “perverse institutionalization” of reserved domains and discretionary

power by the armed forces over their civilian superiors.80 The armed forces in

today’s Latin America are more interested in carving out respected political

niches within their democratic orders than overturning them.81 And even when

military revolts occurred, they often seemed designed mainly to defend military

79 Smith, Democracy in Latin America.80 Samuel J. Valenzuela, “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings, Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions,” in Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Guillermo A. O’Donnell (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 57-105.81 Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” 83.

52


prerogatives and professional integrity rather than to seek political domination.82

As with Latin America, in South and Southeast Asia, these forms of clandestine

military political power are widespread. There are at least four countries in

these regions in which the political system is under de facto military control

or the fragile and “incomplete” democratic order is subject to military tutelage

(Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines, Thailand).

In order to capture these instances of military political power, a definition

and conceptualization of civilian control must go beyond the coup/no-coup

dichotomy. We thus conceptualize civilian control as a certain distribution of

decision making power between civilians and the military. Civilian control is

that state in the civil-military power relationship in which civilians alone have

the power to decide on national politics. Under civilian control, civilians can

freely choose to delegate decision-making power and the implementation of

certain policies to the military and the military has no autonomous decision-

making power outside those areas that were specifically defined by civilians.

Furthermore, it is civilians alone who determine which particular policies, or

aspects of policies, the military implements, and the civilians alone define the

boundaries between policy-making and policy-implementation.

In regard to the challenge of making democracy sustainable and self-

defendable, comparative studies on civil-military relations in newly democratized

nations demonstrate that there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach or “golden

path” towards civilian control. However, there are a number of lessons to

be learned from past experiences of other societies. First, gradual timing is

crucial. Big bang strategies of reform, punishment or rectification of the past are

unlikely to succeed where the outgoing military regime is strong. Instead, the

82 Smith, Democracy in Latin America, 102-106.

53


institutionalization of civilian control in young democracies is a gradual process,

consisting of two analytically distinct sequences, or “generations.”83 The first

generation challenge is the protection of the democratic civilian regime against

military intervention and the institutionalization of civilian decision-making

power over the political center. In our conceptualization of civilian control, this

means that first, the area of elite recruitment and policy-making needs to be put

under civilian control before civilians’ influence can be extended into spheres of

prior exclusive military domination. The “second generation problems” refer to

this next step of extending and institutionalizing civilian decision-making power

into former domains of the military, particularly internal security and external

defense policy-making. Following this argumentation, newly democratized

countries need to successfully solve “first generation problems” before they can

hope to tackle “second generation problems”. However, Cottey et al. also argue

that although the solution to “first generation problems” is necessary before

going on to the “second generation.” it does not mechanically lead to civilian

control of security policy. This is exemplified by empirical evidence of countries

in Latin America and elsewhere. Even where the military has lost prestige and

is weakened by policy failure, as for example in Argentina, big bang strategies

of wanting to cut back military power too much too quickly are risky. The most

dramatic political consequences are, of course, a breakdown of the transition

process or new military uprisings and attempted coups. In contrast, stability

and consolidation of democracy is greatly facilitated when military officers can

be convinced that their interests, both institutional and individual, will continue

to be represented and served under the new civilian and democratic rules of

the game.84

83 Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic.”84 Huntington, The Third Wave; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.

54


Second, successful crafting of civilian rule depends on the ability of

civilian elites to maintain high levels of public support. A military finds it

harder to resist pressure for change in civil-military relations and to push for

non-democratic prerogatives when political elites are visibly backed by a wide

array of electorally-strong political forces.85

Third, and related to this, militaries find it easier to block transitions from

military autonomy to civilian supremacy if the democratic government fails to

produce effective government, or if important groups desert the pro-democracy

coalition.86 Thus, adherence to the democratic norms and processes, inclusionary

coalition politics by political party elites, and good democratic governance are

crucial parameters for the success of military reform in young democracies.

Fourth, successful transitions to civilian control are easier to accomplish

and to solidify if there exist well-organized political parties which are able to

make and keep commitments, whose membership encompasses most potential

political elites and who have the support among voters and various social strata.

Thus, the institutionalization of stable and full-fledged civilian control

requires more than the transition from open military rule to an elected

government. It demands the complete elimination of existing military prerogatives

and the neutralization of the military’s potential for contestation of civilian

authority and decisions. This, however, also requires a consensus among civilian

elites not to rely on the military to protect their interests against other political

and social groups or elites. Whether Thailand or other South and Southeast

Asian nations, which are currently under “transition to democracy,” fulfil this and

the other requirements of civilian control’s successful institutionalization will be

one of the research questions tackled in the empirical chapters of this volume.

85 Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy.86 Smith, Democracy in Latin America; Siaroff, Comparing political regimes.

55


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Welch, Claude E. “Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality.” In Civilian

Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries,

edited by Claude E. Welch, 1-42. Albany: State University of New York

Press, 1976.

Wilkinson, Paul. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. 2.

ed. London: Routledge, 2006.

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Section Two:Civil-Military Relations in Southeast Asia—Thailand, Myanmar, the Philippines, Indonesia

63

THREEU-Turn to the Past?

The Resurgence of the Military in Contemporary Thai Politics1

Paul Chambers

In horseracing, horse owners hire jockeys to ride horses. The jockeys do not own the

horses. They just ride them. A government is like a jockey. It supervises soldiers but

the real owners are the country and the King. The government supervises and employs

us.... What I mean is that we are the country’s soldiers. Governments come and go.

--Privy Council Chair Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda, July 14, 20062

Introduction

The above remark, from one of Thailand’s most powerful political figures,

locates King and country as the “owners” of military “horses” while a civilian

government is the “jockey” which merely “supervises” them. The comment,

symbolizing the fragile linkage between soldiers and civilians, offers testament

to the post-coup resurrection of military tutelage over elected governments as

well as the de-consolidation of democracy in Thailand.

1 The author would like to thank Dr. Chris Baker for his comments on an earlier draft of the chapter and for providing data used in Figure 5.2 Sutichai Yoon, “Thai Talk: Old Soldiers Never Die; They Raise ‘Career’ Thoroughbreds,” The Nation, 20 July 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

64

3 : u-turn to the paSt? the reSurgence of the mIlItary In contemporary thaI polItIce

Indeed, the armed forces appear to have experienced a revival since Black

May, 1992. Following its massacre of civilians during that month, the military’s

clout appeared to have hit rock bottom in terms of support from the people and

the palace. It seemed reasonable to assume that soldiers might be returning to

the barracks indefinitely. If that were the case, Thailand might finally be joining

the ranks of “Third Wave” democracies in unlinear historical fashion toward

more expansive democratization (Huntington, 1991). During the 1990s, the Thai

armed forces appeared to be becoming indoctrinated under a professionalism

of compliance to elected civilians.

And yet in 2006, there occurred a sudden military coup. The takeover

immediately enhanced the role of soldiers in domestic politics. Even after the

return to civilian governance in 2008 Thailand’s armed forces find themselves

enjoying a privileged position of authority—though this is constrained by

apparent civilian control. Among the emerging democracies of Southeast Asia

today, there is no country other than Thailand which exhibits such explicit

military intrusions over civilian governance. The military occupies a major

position in what Thitinan Pongsudhirak refers to as the “nonelected ‘holy trinity’

of monarchy, military, and bureaucracy.”3 Increasingly, Thai military influence

today exhibits haunting echoes back to the era of pervasive military authority

during the civilian government of Gen. (ret.) Chatchai Chunhavan (1988-91).

Clearly, the armed forces today deserve much greater scrutiny as an

actor on the Thai political landscape. Yet such an enhanced position in society

gives rise to four questions:

1. Exactly how has the balance of power shifted in civil-military relations

from 1992 to the present?

2. In what areas of civilian control do the armed forces today hold the

most sway?

3 Thitinan Pongsudirak, “Thailand Since the Coup,” Journal of Democracy, 19, 4, (October 2008): 140.

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3. What does continuing military involvement say about the

contemporary state of Thai politics?

4. What long-term and short-term patterns can we see in civil-military

relations?

In order to address these questions, the analysis at hand first provides

a brief, broad-spectrum overview about the grand developmental trends in Thai

civil-military relations since 1932. Second, the chapter applies the decision-

making framework introduced by Aurel Croissant and David Kühn (see chapter

2) to shed light on the relations between civilians and militaries in various

areas of decision-making. Based on the analysis of the patterns of distribution

of decision-making authority between civilians and militaries in the five decision-

making areas of civil-military relations, the final section of this chapter discusses

possible scenarios and future traits of the role of the military in Thai politics.

I. Thai Civil-Military Relations Over Time

Across the last eight decades, Thailand’s armed forces have undergone

a circuitous trajectory in terms of civil-military relations. The long-term pattern

(1932-2010) has been one of greater civilian control. Yet, over the short-term

(1988-2010), the armed forces have circled back to exhibit almost the same

amount of prowess they did thirty years ago. One can designate twelve core

phases illustrating alternative levels of military prowess since the overthrow of

the absolute monarchy in1932 (see below).

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Table 1: Phases of Military Influence (1932-2010)

Period Level of Civilian Control

Method Initiated External Events

1932-44 Low Military Coup by anti-monarchist “Promoters”; Government later led by Pro-Axis Phibul Songkram

Global “Great Depression”; World War II

1944-47 High Forced Resignation of pro-Axis military Prime Minister

End of World War II

1947-73 Low Military Coup/anti-communist Phibul returns to power

Beginning of Cold War

1973-76 Medium(Power-sharing [civilian-led])

Military Coup byKrit Sivara faction/royal intervention

End of US military involvement in Southeast Asia

1976-79 Low Military Coup/Class Seven Communist revolutions in Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia

1979-88 Medium(Power-sharing [military-led])

Unelected Military Prime Minister alongside elected Lower House and cabinet

Vietnamese troops in Cambodia

1988-91 Medium(Power-sharing [civilian-led])

Elected civilian government alongside autonomous military

Fall of “Iron Curtain” authoritarian regimes

1991-92 Low Military Coup/Class Five --

1992-2001 High Civilian caretaker/elections following massacre and royal intervention

Increasing number of “Third Wave” liberal democracies

2001-2006 High Election of civilian government Morepseudo-authoritarian populist democracies

2006-2008 Low Military Coup/Queen’s royal guard faction

--

2008-Present Medium(Power-sharing [civilian-led])

Coalition Shift with Military Support/Queen’s royal guard faction

--

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After 1932 military influence over civilians grew precipitously but plunged

to its lowest levels in 1944. Yet a debilitated military was not to last. In 1947,

with support from royalists, the influence of the armed forces ascended once

again, and civilians were under the soldier’s boot until 1973. From 1973-6,

civilians possessed a medium level of influence over soldiers. This owed to

a post-1973 fractured military. Growing instability facilitated the 1976 military

coup and soldiers dominated the political scene for the next three years. In

1979, a power-sharing arrangement was set up whereby an unelected military

prime minister served alongside an elected lower house. Such a system offered

the bare trappings of democracy while guaranteeing military supremacy in non-

regal elite positions of power. This state of affairs continued under unelected

Prime Minister Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda. In 1988, power-sharing was shifted

to allow for a civilian prime minister to be elected PM (Gen. [ret.] Chatchai

Chunhavan). Simultaneously, the military possessed enormous autonomy from

civilian control. The 1991 coup4 ushered in military governance once again. Yet

the fall of this regime after “Black May”1992 contributed to a further emergence

of Thai democracy. From 1992 until 2006, Thai armed forces’ societal influence

vis-à-vis civilians appeared to be at its nadir. But the 2006 coup crushed any

hope that the Thai military’s role in politics was at an end. Indeed, armed

forces clout was institutionally boosted thanks partly to the 2007 constitution

which weakened civilian governance vis-à-vis the armed forces. The return to

a nationally-elected government in 2008 forced soldiers back to their barracks

but at a cost to civilians of institutionally-enhanced prowess by the armed forces.

As such, civilian control diminished to a medium level given that the military

now exercised authority somewhat autonomously from Thailand’s elected Lower

House and partly-elected Senate. Indeed, some in the armed forces reportedly

4 The coup was led by Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon, leader of Class 5 military faction.

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even helped to manipulate the accession to office of PM Abhisit Vechachiwa in

December 2008. Today the sway of the military is on the upswing.

These phases, revealing various alternating degrees of armed forces

authority, demonstrate that Thailand’s military has long played a vigorous role

in Thailand’s polity. Over the long-term, Thailand has experienced a dwindling

of military influence. But, since 2008, the role of soldiers in Thai politics (even

under an elected government) is proving to be nearly as extensive as during the

civilian-led power-sharing period of the late 1980s.

II. Thailand’s Tug-of-War of Civil-Military Decision-making across

Five Areas of Civilian Control

To determine the evolution of Thailand’s civil-military continuum in

decision-making power, one must analyze the five areas introduced in chapter

1: elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defense, and

military organization. Since 1988 alone, six periods in civil-military relations

can be observed: 1) the civilian-led power-sharing era of 1988-91; 2) the

military-installed authoritarian regime of 1991-92; 3) the 1992-2001 era

of democratization; 4) the Thaksin Shinawatra elected administrations of

2001-06; 5) the military-instated government of 2006-08; and 6) the period

since the return to civilian-led power-sharing in early 2008.

1. Elite Recruitment

Thailand’s armed forces have long influenced elite recruitment under

authoritarian rule as well as in periods of “civilian” regimes. However, the

balance of civil-military authority has experienced considerable changes over

time, especially since liberalization of the political order begun in the mid 1980s.

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For example, civil-military relations during the administration of Chatchai

Chunhavan (1988-91) were characterized by civilian-led power sharing. The

armed forces possessed a reserved domain in the Senate and varying levels

of connections with different political parties in parliament (e.g. Chart Thai,

New Aspiration, Rassadorn, Democrat). Informally, soldiers could influence the

procedures of political competition as well as the formation or dissolution of a

government.5

The coup of February 1991 brought authoritarianism back to Thailand

and civilian control remained low through the March 1992 election until

the downfall of the military-dominated government in May. The all-military

National Peace-Keeping Commission coup group appointed civilian PM Anand

Panyarachun and his Council of Ministers to administer the country while an

appointed and unicameral National Legislative Assembly acted as parliament.

These bodies acted under the aegis of the March 1991 interim charter which, in

its ambiguity, facilitated the establishment of a domain of military appointments

within political posts.6 In December 1991, a new constitution came into force. It

allowed for a continuation of the military-dominated Senate, the possibility of a

non-elected PM, and it maintained the eligibility of active-duty military officers

for public office in the Senate. 7 The political prowess of the armed forces was

further accentuated by military Class 5’s establishment of the Samakhitham Party

to act as its surrogate in the Lower House. Samakhitham’s election landslide

propelled Suchinda to the post of PM.8 In May 1992, following the military’s 5 Under the 1978 constitution, from 1989 to 1991, 60.2% Senators were active duty military personnel. The Lower House and Office of Prime Minister, however, remained the domains of civilians. With regard to the Council of Ministers, 23.9% were retired military officials. Source: author’s calculations, based on the sources listed in footnotes 22 and 23. 6 For example, based on the author’s calculations, 52% lawmakers in the unicameral assembly were soldiers (active or retired). See sources in footnote 23. 7 David Murray, Angels and Demons (Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996) 13; Pasuk Phongpaichit, Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 357-8.8 Murray, 5.

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bloody crackdown on demonstrators, Suchinda was forced from office and

Anand returned to lead a brief caretaker government until elections could be

held. However, the military-dominated Senate remained in office though the

Constitution was amended to accommodate the demands of the May uprising, a

major one of which was that the PM must be an elected member of the Lower

House.

The mid-1990s witnessed the apparent flowering of civilian control over

Thailand’s military. Three factors helped to account for this state of affairs.

First, after Black May, the armed forces lost an enormous amount of respect and

political capital. Suchinda’s forced resignation and Anand’s dismissal of three

key generals weakened the military.9 Second, two pro-Prem Army commanders

during the 1990s (Generals Wimol Wongwanich and Surayudh Chulanond)

directed the military to undergo reforms and a restructuring.10 Third, the financial

crisis of 1997 brought down the government of PM Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh,

a charismatic, potential competitor of Prem. This facilitated the return to office

of the Democrat party (closely allied with Prem) and its leader Chuan Leekpai.

Chuan in his second term (1997-2001) took the post of Defense Minister as well

as PM, pushing the military toward more reforms.

In terms of reserved representation for soldiers, 1992-2000 saw a growth

in political space for civilians.11 In the Senate, the informal military reserved

domain for military appointees diminished from 154 or 55.2% out of 270 senators

(1992-96) to 48 or 18.4% out of 260 (1996-2000).12 Still, in a continuing exam-

ple of manipulation, it was rumored that Privy Council Chair (ret.) Gen. Prem

9 Murray, 190-94.10 Duncan McCargo, Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005) 133.11 Surachart Bamrungsuk, “Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads,” Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives, ed. By Muthiah Alagappa (Honolulu: The East-West Center, 2002) 77.12 Author’s calculations based on sources listed in footnote 23.

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interfered in parliamentary politics on November 6, 1997 by influencing 12

members Prajakorn Thai party to defect from the ruling coalition and join the

opposition, thus enabling the Democrat Party to form a coalition government.13

The 1997 constitution meanwhile established that senatorial candidates

could only become part of that body through election. And following that 2000

election, only two per cent of new Senators were ex-military officers.14 In 2001,

telecommunications tycoon and ex-police colonel Thaksin Shinawatra, together

with his political party Thai Rak Thai, won the general election by a landslide.

Other than Thaksin himself, only two retired security sector officials sat on

Thaksin’s first cabinet, including former PM Gen.Chavalit Yongchiayudh (Minister

of Defense).15 In his second term, Thaksin maintained the quota of two former

military personnel other than himself.

Under Thaksin, if anyone was manipulating the procedures of political

competition it was Thaksin himself. Indeed, his clout in 2001 was such that he

was able to exert overriding authority throughout parliament, courts, and even

compete with Gen.Prem in terms of political influence. As for the military, Thaksin

offered posts to numerous soldiers while co-opting Chavalit and the latter’s close

supporters to establish a wedge against Prem until the PM could maneuver his

own cousin Chaisit Shinawatra in to the post of Army Chief.16

The 2006 military coup against Thaksin led to the appointment of non-

elected PM and Prem stalwart Gen.Surayudh Chulanond. Surayudh and his

cabinet of 26 administered the country, with two ministers coming from the

military (longtime Surayud confidant Gen. Boonrawd Somtas at Defense and

13 McCargo, Ukrist, 133.14 Author’s calculations based on sources listed in footnote 23. 15 McCargo, Ukrist, 134-5.16 McCargo, Ukrist, 137.

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Adm. Threera Haocharoen at Transportation). Meanwhile, a National Legislative

Assembly (NLA) was put together to draw up a new constitution. The NLA

was composed of 242 persons, including 76 or 31.4% active/retired military

or police17). While such military representation does not appear to approach

a majority, non-military NLA representatives allied with soldiers in the assembly

to ensure voting majorities.

Political parties, demonstrations, and related activities, were banned by

the junta until July 2007. The military-endorsed constitution of 2007 allowed for

a popular referendum on the charter. Yet soldiers were said to be attempting

to influence rural Thais to vote for it. Martial law was lifted only little-by-little

from provinces considered to be pro-Thaksin in time for the December 2007

pre-election campaign. There were furthermore allegations of covert military

involvement in seeking to influence the election’s outcome.18

Since the return to electoral democracy in December 2007, political

space has slightly widened, seeming to represent a fall-back to the era prior to

Thaksin. Lower House MPs are still elected. Yet the 2007 constitution also called

for a half-appointed (74 members), half-elected (76 members) Upper House.

Following senatorial elections in early 2008, 15.3% of the entire 76 directly

elected/74 appointed Senate is now composed of retired military officials to

make this an indirect reserved domain. Among the 74 appointed Senators, 14

were ex-soldiers for a 9.3% military reserved domain.19 The 2008 cabinets of

civilian pro-Thaksin Prime Ministers Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat

contained 2-3 ex-military men respectively. The government of civilian Democrat

17 Author’s calculations based on “NLA Doesn’t Represent All of the People,” The Nation 13 October 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.18 “Junta’s Media War a Big Mistake,” The Nation, 26 October 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 19 Author’s own calculations based on Thailand, Elected Senators (2008) http://www.senate.go.th/th_senate/English/members_election.pdf; International Parliamentary Union,“Thailand: Senate Election (2008), http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2312.htm.

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Abhisit Vechachiwa (coming to office in late December 2008) contained two

retired military officials.20

With regard to military influence on the procedures of political competition,

this has occurred very recently. On December 2, 2008, the pro-Thaksin People’s

Power party was dissolved, forcing the resignation of Somchai. Thereupon,

throughout December, Anupong and other military elements worked to help

cobble together a coalition government under Democrat Abhisit Vechachiwa

which would exclude Puea Thai.21

Figures 1 and 2 below show the evolution of military or retired military

elite recruitment in Thailand in the cabinet and legislature (1932-Present),

reflecting a general chronological trend: less military representation. Still, one

can see the reappearance of legislative military reserved domain since 2006.

Figure 1: Percentage of (ret.) Military Cabinet Ministers (1932-2010)22

Note: Includes active/retired personnel of the army, air force, navy, and police.

20 Thailand, The Secretariat of the Cabinet website, http://www.cabinet.thaigov.go.th/. 21 Wassana Nanuam, “Government Hopefuls Rendezvous with Anupong ‘the Manager,’”Bangkok Post, 11 December 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 22 Author’s calculations based on data from Thailand, Twenty-four Thai Prime Ministers: History and Name Index, Bangkok: Office of the Parliament, 2007, http://www.cabinet.thaigove.go.th/.

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Figure 2: Percentage of Military in the Legislature (Senate) (1932-2010)23

Note: Includes active/retired personnel of the army, air force, navy, and police.

Today, the level of civilian control when it comes to elite recruitment

stands at a medium level—neither monopolizing nor marginal. Though civilian

authority appears to have reemerged following the late 2007 elections, Thailand’s

military continues to wield considerable influence in terms of political influence

and participation.

2. Public Policy

Public policy has traditionally been a top-down affair in Thailand. From

1988 until 1991, the gradual drawback by the armed forces from dominating

most areas of public policy had led the military to diminish its hold over

influencing most aspects of public policy —except for those pertaining to national

security.24But following the 1991 coup, the military increased its hold over various

policies. Still, the armed forces’ appointment of a civilian (Anand Panyarachun) 23 Author’s calculations based on data from the following: Thailand. Senate in Thailand (Bangkok: Secretariat of the Senate, 2001) 1-3; Thailand, Members of Legislatures 1932-1991 (Bangkok: Parliament Library, 1991); Murray 6; Surachart 161; “NLA Doesn’t Represent All of the People,” The Nation 13 October 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com; International Parliamentary Union , “Thailand: Senate Election 2008 (2008), http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2312.htm; Thailand, Elected Senators (2008) http://www.senate.go.th/th_senate/English/members_election.pdf. 24 James Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations,” Coercion and Governance, the Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. By Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) 203; Pasuk and Baker, 350.

75


as PM and Anand’s appointment of a mostly civilian cabinet showed that the

military was now ready to live with more civilian control over public policy.25

From 1992 until 2006, most public policy was in the hands of civilians

given the growing administrative and political decentralization. Various aspects

of the 1997 “people’s constitution” gave teeth to judicial bodies such as the

Administrative Court, Office of the Ombudsman, and National Counter Corruption

Commission. Chuan and Surayud added a new role for the military in Thai

foreign policy: participation in United Nations peace-keeping missions. Still, the

armed forces continued to play an important though reduced role in relations

with Cambodia, Laos, and Burma because of ambiguous shared borders.26

The 2001 election of Thaksin Shinawatra increased civilian control over

public policy. Indeed, the popularity of the socioeconomic programs initiated by

the Thaksin government ensured people’s continuing support for civilian control

over politics and public policy. Indeed, the Thaksin government represented the

nadir of military influence over Thai public policy. Under Thaksin, elements of

the Thai military were sent in support of US forces in both Afghanistan and

Iraq.27 Though the Thai armed forces took a back seat to Thaksin during this

time, they generally supported the PM’s pro-US tilt.

The 2006 coup brought the military back to a dominant position in

policy formulation as well as implementation. The fact that a military man (Gen.

Surayud) was appointed as PM vouches for the argument that the armed forces

once again dominated public policy despite the fact that most of the cabinet was

composed of civilian appointees.

25 Murray, 194.26 Ockey, 2001, 203.27 See Paul Chambers, “US-Thai Relations After 9/11: A New Era in Cooperation?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26, 3, 2004: 460-479.

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In terms of foreign policy, the Thai military has recently showed an ability

to act independent of civilian authorities. In August 2008, Thailand’s Supreme

Commander injected himself into foreign policy when he warned Cambodia to

“back off” from another border temple claimed by Thailand.28

In addition to national security-related public policy, the military

today has continued to exert control over public policy toward the media.

This owes partly to a tradition of armed forces control over the Ministry of

Communications. Currently the Army controls television channels 5 and 7.29 The

military also influences the media through the fact that some members of the

Mass Communication Organization of Thailand (MCOT) executive board have

been retired soldiers. MCOT owns channels 3 and 9. Regarding radio stations,

the military controlled 245 out of 524 stations in 2002. This amounted to 127

owned by the Army, 21 by the Navy, 36 by the Air Force, 44 by the Police, 3 by

the Ministry of Defense, and 14 by the Military High Command.30 This proportion

remained generally the same in 2008.31 The 2006 coup ushered in greaterstate

control of the media (at least for the period 2006-08). Under the 2006-08

Sonthi Boonyaratklin military government, a Broadcasting Act was implemented

which continued to grant broadcasting concessions to military vested interests.32

Ultimately the armed forces remain deeply involved in regulating, influencing,

and profiting from much of Thailand’s television and radio media.

In 2009, soldiers continued to exert much influence over policies mostly

related to security. Though Thailand’s military was once able to formally set 28 “Cambodia Warned to ‘Back Off,’”Bangkok Post, 5 August 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 29 Channel Five [Thailand], http://portal.tv5.co.th, http://www.ch7.com. 30 Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, Thailand Media Profile, 2002, http://www.freedom.commarts.chula.ac.th/articles/FXSU02-Thailand_media_profile_2002.pdf, 10.31 United States State Department, 2008 Human Rights Report: Thailand, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119058.htm. 32 Chang Noi, “Military Biggest Winner in Political Conflict,” The Nation, 2 February 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

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public policy as it saw fit, this authority is today only informal. Today, amidst

this lingering military sway, civilian control over public policy stands at a

medium level.

3. Internal Security

In Thailand, soldiers have traditionally controlled internal security in the

shadow of the monarchy. Indeed, recent Thai constitutions grant the King and

military enormous power to declare martial law.33

Since promulgation of the 1960 Ministry of Defense Administration Act,

military prerogatives of internal security and rural development have been

enshrined into law. 1965 saw the establishment of the Communist Suppression

Operations Command (CSOC) to coordinate national anti-Communist operations.

In 1974, the name CSOC was changed to ISOC (Internal Security Operations

Command). ISOC helped to launch two ultra-right-wing paramilitary organizations

called Navaphon and Kating Daeng.34

By 1983, the structure of ISOC had been modified such that ISOC was

not officially part of the Army, but rather under the Prime Minister though

the Army Chief served as its director and remained in de facto control of it.

ISOC became the vehicle through which Thailand’s military, in the name of

maintaining internal security, was able to exert considerable authority over the

civilian bureaucracy.35

In 1987, ISOC was again restructured, with the Prime Minister (then

Gen.Prem Tinsulanond) becoming Director and the Army chief moving to be

ISOC deputy chief. But this was only a cosmetic alteration given that the Army 33 E.g. Section 159, 1978 constitution: Section 222, 1997 constitution; Section 188, 2007 constitution. 34 Pasuk and Baker, 307-8. 35 Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics (Singapore: ISEAS, 1990) 51.

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Commander, in his new post as ISOC Deputy Director, “was empowered fully to

act on behalf of the Director-General.36 Some criticized this change as a strategy

by which the Army might be able to extend its powers over civilian agencies.37

ISOC further sought to informally co-opt politicians and political parties thought

to be amenable to ISOC objectives.38

Amidst the growth of ISOC, the military separately in 1976 established

the Capital Security Command (CSC) in Bangkok to preserve order, counter

terrorism, and eradicate the conditions which might help communists win their

struggle.39 But CSC was dissolved after Black May.40

The dwindling of the Thai communist insurgency in the 1980s, the 1991

end of the Cold War and the diminished credibility in the armed forces after

Black May placed ISOC in growing limbo as successive governments could

not agree on what to do with it. Moreover, the 1997 financial crisis increased

financial burdens for the agency as military budget cutbacks left ISOC leaner.

When PM Thaksin Shinawatra entered office in 2001, he delegated

military allies to oversee and influence ISOC. In 2005, the Thaksin administration

passed the Decree on Government Administration in a State of Emergency,

which allowed the Prime Minister to authorize a three-month state of emer-

gency in response to internal or external threats. The committee to administer

states of emergency and issue recommendations to the PM was composed of

19 persons, only four of whom were civilian non-bureaucrats, thus allowing for

36 Chai-anan Sanudavanija, Kusuma Snitwongse, Suchit Bunbongkarn, From Armed Suppression to Political Offensive (Bangkok: ISIS, 1990) 112.37 Suchit, 1990, 52.38 Chai-anan et al., 112.39 Suchit, 1990, 58-59.40 Murray, 190-191.

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more representation by military personnel (See Section 6, Decree on Government

Administration in a State of Emergency, 2005).

In 2006, Thaksin had planned to restructure ISOC, centralizing control

over it in the Office of the Prime Minister. But the coup intervened and afterwards

Army Commander Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratklin served as head of ISOC. Appointed

PM Surayud and the Council for National Security (CNS) coup leaders then

determined that ISOC must be rejuvenated to confront terrorism, to respond

to security challenges (e.g. cyber threats), to coordinate the counterinsurgency

campaign in Thailand’s far South, to unify much of the security bureaucracy,

“as well as taking the lead role for the bureaucracy to counter-balance the

runaway power of any rogue government.”41 The ISOC director was empowered

to simultaneously head up the National Counter Corruption Commission, the

Department of Special Investigation and the Anti Money Laundering Office.

Meanwhile, the coup-group was preparing a new Internal Security Act

(ISA) which would grant ISOC expanded powers over civilians. Indeed, the act

would allow the armed forces to curtail citizens’ civil liberties to promote national

security.42 Thus, the military could now more easily transgress upon the civilian

realm and commit human rights violations with impunity.

Despite opposition, the military-appointed National Legislative Assembly

passed the bill one month before the 2007 general election, and it took effect

February 27, 2008.43 In essence, the new ISA returns to the military many of

41 Avudh Panananda, “Thailand’s Dept. Of Homeland Security,” The Nation, 12 Decembe 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 42 Criticisms by Chulalongkorn professor Surachart Bamrungsuk and former dean of Thammasat University’s Law Faculty, Kamchai Chongchakphan. See “Law Would be a ‘Coup by Stealth,’”The Nation, 15 July 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 43 After the vote, one NLA appointee (Gen. Chockchai Hongthong), in response to criticism that the new act would erode Thai democracy, stated that “People must sacrifice their basic rights for the security of the country” “NLA passes controversial Internal Security Act,” The Nation, 8 November 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

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the powers taken from it in 1992, shifting the civil-military equilibrium back

towards the armed forces. The Act first establishes the army as the principal unit

safeguarding internal security.44 It establishes a structure of control whereby the

Prime Minister is ISOC director, the Army Commander is Deputy Director, and

the Army Chief of Staff is Secretary. This Secretary takes responsibility for the

direction and activity of ISOC. Since late 2007, Army Commander Gen.Anupong

Paochinda and his close associate Army Chief of Staff Gen.Prayuth Chanucha

(seen to be Anupong’s potential successor once the former retires as Army Chief

in 2010) have succeeded in dominating ISOC. Gen Anupong is ISOC deputy head

of ISOC while Gen Prayuth serves as ISOC secretary-general. In 2009, although

PM Abhisit Vechachiwa officially has direct command of ISOC, it is essentially

a military-controlled agency.45

The revised ISOC organizational structure is cosmetically geared to appear

under civilian control—given that the Prime Minister serves as Director while

four other civilian ministers can serve on the ISOC board. But the civilian board

members are outnumbered by bureaucrats (many allied with or belonging to

the military) 19-5. At the same time, the Deputy Director and Secretary (both

soldiers) possess an inordinate amount of autonomy in relation to the Director

(the elected Prime Minister). Finally, ISOC is decentralized toward higher military

control. That is, under the national ISOC board, there are regional and provincial

branches. Each regional branch parallels Thailand’s four military regions. ISA

provides that the Commander of each regional army shall be the director of

each regional ISOC subdivision.46 Thus, regional branches are under the total

control of the armed forces.

44 Thailand, The Defense of Thailand, (Bangkok: Ministry of Defense, Thailand, 2008) 35.45 “Thai Insurgency” 11 June 2009, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1383420. 46 Chapter 1, Section 11, Thailand, Internal Security Act, (Bangkok: Government Gazette, February 19, 2008), http://www.thailawonline.com/en/thai-laws/laws-of-thailand/275-internal-security-act-be-2551-2008.

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Ultimately, the new ISOC provides Thailand’s armed forces a convenient

subterfuge from which they can enhance their power due to and despite the

authority of civilian governments. This is because civilian governments who wish

to govern effectively must cooperate with and lend legitimacy to ISOC, allowing

the armed forces greatly heightened authority. At the same time, soldiers cannot

be officially blamed for launching a violent crackdown since the PM acts as official

ISOC Director. However, the same civilian PM is responsible for negative fallout

related to such operations. As Wassana Nanuam emphasizes, the restructured

ISOC gives the army “a justification for stepping in to handle a political problem

without fear that it will be criticized for trying to intervene in politics.”47

An ISA amnesty clause could meanwhile allow soldiers to get away with

human rights violations as long as they are on duty. Also, the Act does not define

“security threat” and fails to make ISOC answerable to elected representatives in

Parliament.48Moreover, “no declaration of a state of emergency would be required

for the ISOC to exercise its powers. The parliament and courts are given no role

in debating, reviewing or approving the use of these emergency-style powers.”49

In sum, with its enhanced ISA powers and a whopping new Thai Baht 8.2 billion

budget, ISOC can increasingly stifle civil liberties and civilian control, all in the

name of maintaining internal security.

Since the NLA’s passage of the Internal Security Act in December 2007,

ISOC has been used to “promote democracy”. During the countdown to the

December 2007 election ISOC was accused of financially supporting parties

47 Wassana Nanuam, “ISOC to Tackle Political Conflict as a Security Threat,” Bangkok Post, 13 November, 2008,http://www.bangkokpost.com. 48 Don Pathan, “ISOC Must Evolve to Tackle Rising Security Challenges,”The Nation, 15 April 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 49 Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Internal Security Act Threatens Democracy and Human Rights-- Government Proposes Draconian Steps to Institutionalize Military Control, 4 November 2007,http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/04/thailand-internal-security-act-threatens-democracy-and-human-rights.

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opposed to the pro-Thaksin Palang Prachachon party.50 At the same time, ISOC

became more involved in coordinating the southern Thailand counter-insurgency.51

During 2008, the Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat Palang

Prachachon party governments allowed ISOC power to be centralized in the

hands of Army Chief Anupong for fear of otherwise upsetting the anti-Thaksin

senior military leaders. Yet, the ability of Anupong to dominate ISOC allowed

him to deny assistance to the two pro-Thaksin civilian governments whenever

he saw fit.52 Such behavior demonstrated a military refusal to maintain internal

security for elected governments in Thailand. Yet, following the ascension to

power of an anti-Thaksin civilian government at the end of 2008, the armed

forces (as dominated by the anti-Thaksin Queen’s Guard military faction) now

found a need to ensure its protection and survival Thereupon, Anupong’s ISOC

moved from evading responsibility for internal security to guaranteeing it.53

In April, PM Abhisit declared a state of emergency in Bangkok

and surrounding areas, following a flurry of pro-Thaksin anti-government

demonstrations in Bangkok and Pattaya which led to the cancellation of an

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit. The meeting was

re-scheduled to convene in Thailand two months later.54 The military ultimately

50 Wassana Nanuam, “Anupong Rewards his Coup Allies,” Bangkok Post, 19 June 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com; Wassana Nanuam, ISOC Ordered to Promoted Democracy,”Bangkok Post, 20 December 2007, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 51 Don Pathan, “ISOC Must Evolve to Tackle Rising Security Challenges,”The Nation, 15 April 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.52 This is exemplified in Anupong’s refusal to order troops to end the PAD takeover of Government House, break up PAD rallies at Parliament, or stop the PAD seizures of Bangkok’s two international airports. 53 In March 2009 revelations surfaced that Baht1 billion had been apportioned to ISOC for rural projects aimed at weakening the pro-Thaksin red-shirt movement. “Baht1 billion fund for Isoc projects in rural areas,” The Nation, 25 March 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.54 Use of the State of Emergency (rather than ISOC) placed greater power in the hands of Abhisit’s cabinet rather than if the Internal Security Act had been implemented (in which case Gen.Anupong would have had more influence). As such, Minister of Defense Prawit and Minister of the Interior Chaovarat Chanvirakul were able to see to it that the Red Shirts were dispersed. The former was able to exert influence on Anupong while the latter created a royalist state-sponsored militia called the Blue Shirts which was officially under the Ministry of Interior but actually under the control of Newin Chidchob and the Bhumjai Thai Party “Blue Shirts Return,” Siam Report, July 2009, http://www.siamreport.blogspot.com/2009/07/blue-shirts-return.html.

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resorted to force to disperse the protestors.55 ISA has since been used on other

occasions to keep order, prevent any demonstrations, and prohibit the movement

of people applying it in the face of actual and potential pro-Thaksin rallies.56

Ultimately, what are the implications of this revised ISOC for civil-military

relations in Thailand? In terms of civil liberties, ISOC grants greater powers

to the military to decide for itself when internal security interests require it to

run roughshod over political rights, including the use of intelligence-gathering

against civilians. Meanwhile, where ISOC utilizes its new ISA powers, the military

can generally have jurisdiction over non-military personnel. As for separation

between civilian and military police, ISOC has facilitated a merging of functions

and duties for purposes of strengthening domestic protection. Regarding a

declaration of a state of emergency or martial law, the cabinet must initiate such

actions and can be held responsible for abuses of them. Yet ISA allows ISOC

to engage in blanket repression without a state of emergency being declared.

Indeed, given the overwhelming influence of the Army over the ISOC, soldiers

now have much more control over the issuing of such decrees. Finally, with

regard to civilian monitoring of military internal security operations, ISA allows

very little parliamentary or judicial oversight of ISOC programs. Ultimately then,

the emergence of a restructured and strengthened ISOC has paralleled the

erosion of civil liberties as well as civilian predominance over internal security

decisions. As such, civilian control over the military in the area of internal

security has moved from being robust under Thaksin Shinawatra to quite low

under AbhisitVechachiwa.

55 “Thai Army Begins Crackdown on Anti-government Demonstrators,” Thailand News.Net, 13April 2009, http//www.thailandnews.net/story/488936. 56 The military imposed the ISA to keep order during the ASEAN conference in Phuket during July 2009. ISA was also imposed against pro-Thaksin demonstrators in late-August and September, 2009.

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4. National Defense

In Thailand, authority over national or external defense was under

military purview until 1988. However, since the advent of civilian Prime Ministers

beginning with Chatchai Chunhavan (1988-91), authority over national defense

issues has mostly resided in elected civilians (excluding the 1991-2, 2006-8 years

of military rule). Yet, informally, given the porous nature of the border which

Thailand shares with its neighbors and a lack of complete demarcation, Thai

soldiers sometimes involved themselves in hostilities, even initiating hostilities,

with the militaries of Burma, Cambodia, and Lao PDR, without the sanction of

the Thai Prime Minister.

With regard to national defense, civilian Prime Ministers formally possess

authority over policy-making and can monitor military national defense activities.

The PM’s point-man for national defense is the Defense Minister. Yet, where

this minister is is himself/herself a former soldier, the Ministry rarely monitors

military conduct in a thorough manner. This is because such a Defense Minister

often identifies more with the armed forces than the civilian government (which

generally only administers the country for a brief period anyway). The armed

forces have, however, often sought to remain isolated from civilian monitoring

with regard to national defense—a situation deriving from the military’s tradition

of autonomy from civilian intrusions. Still, the external nature of national defense

issues has boded well for civilian control since the military has oriented itself

towards internal order and development. Moreover, with the end of the Cold

War in 1991, the military lost its chief external enemy (communism) and found

itself seeking a new mission. As such, in terms of national defense issues, the

armed forces have receded behind the lead of civilian Prime Ministers. Soldiers

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thus readily cooperated with PM Chuan’s 1999 decision to send Thai troops

abroad as part of a peace-keeping force in East Timor.57

The selection of National Security-related advisors has been another area

where the Thai military has exercised its influence. Regarding the Minister of

Defense, 11 Thai constitutions have allowed active military personnel to occupy

this slot as opposed to 7 (including the most recent one).58 Six elected PMs have

acted as Defense Minister: MR Seni Pramoj (1976); ret.Gen.Chatchai Chunhavan

(1988-91); ret.Gen.Chavalit Yongchaiyudh; Chuan Leekpai (1997-2001); Samak

Sundaravej (2008); and Somchai Wongsawat (2008). In such cases, there has

often been a decentralization of the Defense Ministry. That is, civilians, instead

of challenging the military, have more or less stood aside and allowed soldiers

to dominate the Defense Ministry.59Perhaps the only exceptions to this rule have

been the cases of Chavalit and, to a lesser extent, Chatchai.

Where the PM has not taken the Defense Minister’s slot, civilian

governments have always appointed retired military personnel. Examples include

generals Krit Sivara and Prawit Wongsawan. Placing retired army generals in

the position of Defense Minister is practical for civilian governments desirous

of close cooperation with and support from active senior military leaders. The

goal is to put someone in the Minister’s post who can guarantee military support

for the civilian government in power while influencing the armed forces on a

range of issues. Still, the danger is that this person may align with the active

military chiefs against the civilian government. Thus, the PM must take care to

ensure that the Defense Minister is effective but loyal.60

57 See Ockey, 2001, 187-200; anonymous very senior retired Army official. Personal Interview. 14 August 2009.58 This can be seen in the 1932a, 1932b, 1952 (1932b), 1947, 1959, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1977, 1991a, and 2006 charters. However, the 1946, 1949, 1974, 1978 (Section 148), 1991b, 1997 (Section 207), and 2007 (Section 194) constitutions represent the trend toward requiring the Defense Minister to be a civilian. 59 Mark Tamthai, Personal Interview, October 10, 2008. 60 Anonymous very senior retired Army official. Personal Interview. 14 August 2009.

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Besides the Minister, it is also necessary to maintain civilian control over

the staff personnel in Thailand’s Defense Ministry. These staff personnel are

the advisors to the Defense Minister. They make recommendations regarding

defense budget, troop mobilization, deployments, training, and are collectively

referred to as the Defense Council.

Though the Minister of Defense chairs this 18-person council, only two

other civilians are members. The MOD is also advised by a Permanent Secretary

(currently Gen.Apichart Penkitti) and four deputies. All of these officials are

active military personnel.61

Meanwhile, the Council of Armed Forces Commanders advises the

Minister of Defense and Defense Council on matters of force mobilization and

combat operations. It is an all-military body, chaired by the Supreme Commander

and is also composed of the Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The

Council furthermore commands “joint task forces established in circumstances

affecting order and security in the country.”62 This vaguely defined objective has

the potential to offer the Council a wide array of power.

The National Security Council represents another arena where the military

has exerted great authority. The National Security Council advises the Prime

Minister when the country faces a national security challenge that necessitates

coordinated cabinet action or presents a serious threat to the country’s

sovereignty. The PM chairs this body with civilians outnumbering military officials

which comprise it. As such, the prime minister has been able to dominate “the

workings of the council“63 In July 2009, civilian power on the NSC increased even

more with PM Abhisit Vechachiwa’ appointment of anti-Thaksin civilian Thawil 61 Thailand, Ministry of Defense, Thailand, website, http://www.mod.go.th/eng_mod/index.html. 62 Section 47, Ministry of Defense Administration Act (2008), cited in Thailand, Defense of Thailand, 2008, 32.63 Ministry of Defense website.

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Pliensri as NSC secretary-general despite intense military lobbying. “The NSC

has had 14 secretary-generals over the years, with only three of them civilians.64

Ultimately, in terms of national defense, civilians and soldiers continue to

struggle for control. Civilians have, since the early 1990s, succeeded in chipping

away at the prevailing armed forces influence. Only in informal situations, e.g.

border conflicts, do soldiers sometimes involve themselves in cross-border melees

without the PM’s permission. As for the selection of advisors, the military today

remains dominant at the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, despite the fact that

defense ministers must be civilians, many of these have been retired military

personnel still enjoying close ties with active duty soldiers. Thus, though civilian

influence may seem to have grown in the area of National Defense, it remains

at a medium level.

5. Military Organization

In Thailand, military organization has traditionally derived from

Thailand’s authoritarian era (1932-73; 1976-88). Institutional modifications in

terms of downsizing and increased transparency were implemented in the late

1990s but military organizational autonomy resurrected itself in 2007.

Until the early 1990s, Thailand’s armed forces were a large,

non-tranparent force which lacked proper training, equipment, and whose

decision-making structure often lacked unity and the ability to adequately

coordinate. As the Cold War receded in the late 1980s, questions began to

arise as to the future force size and structure of the armed forces. Black May

1992 (which placed the military in disrepute) as well as the 1997 financial

crisis added impetus to the drive towards a reordered and restructured

64 Wassana Nanuam,“Thawil Firms as NSC Candidate,” Bangkok Post, 2 July 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

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military. These events forced the military to reluctantly shift towards greater

emphasis on restructuring and professionalism.65 Under PM Chuan Leekpai and

Army Commander Surayud Chulanond, a plan emerged to reallocate military

spending, increase professionalism and transparency, and encourage the over-

supply of high-ranking officers to retire early.66 Yet, the plan was hindered

by bureaucratic resistence and administrative disagreements. The advent of

Thaksin’s government decelerated the restructuring. Since the 2006 coup, the

reforms appear to have been put on ice in all but name.

As for military resources, Thailand’s military budget and military-

controlled state enterprises have provided the lion’s share of appropriations.

Of these, defense appropriations derive mostly from the annual parliamentary

budget approval process, though there are also “blind” military appropriations.

Prior to 1992, the military possessed much greater autonomy over its budget.

The National Assembly rarely rejected a defense appropriation and few details

of the military budget were revealed.67 Only since the early 1990s has parliament

seriously scrutinized military appropriations.

In the aftermath of the 1992 Black May massacre, the military under

Army Commander Gen. Wimol Wongwanich, facing massive negative percep-

tions by the public, media, and parliament, reluctantly agreed to a defense

budget reduction for fiscal year 1993-94. The broad mid-1990s decline in

military appropriations continued, owing partly to the 1997 Asian financial

crisis as well as to the growing supremacy of “civilianization” in Thai politics:

65 Thailand, The Defense of Thailand, (Bangkok: Ministry of Defense, Thailand, 1994), Message from the Supreme Commander, 58.66 “Surayud Guns for Reforms,”Bangkok Post, 19 February 1999, http://www.bangkokpost.com; Heiner Hänggi, “Democratization and Security Governance in Southeast Asia,” Paper presented for the International Workshop-Conference “Challenges and Prospects of Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia,” Heidelberg, Germany, 15-17 January 2009, 11.67 Suchit Bunbongkarn, State of the Nation (Singapore, ISEAS, 1996) 65.

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the “people’s constitution” was adopted in 1997.1 Parliamentary scrutiny of

military budgets now grew even more intense, and the result was a decline in

armed forces funding.

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-06) established a new method

for gaining control of military spending by ensuring that military allocation

requests would have to pass through him.2This he did by elevating retired

military cronies and relatives to high positions of power, e.g. Gen. Chaisit

Shinawatra became Army Commander in 2002. As such, Thaksin was able to

ensure a reduction of the military budget. From 2001 to 2006, it declined by

approximately 2% of the national budget (see figure 5). Under Thaksin, civilian

control stood at its greatest apex over military spending.

Yet, the 2006 coup’s voiding of the 1997 constitution and dissolution of

parliament (ending any scrutiny by elected representatives) enabled the armed

forces to run roughshod over civilian control of defense budgeting. One military

official, when asked about the ramifications of the coup, admitted that it helped

the military budget expand rapidly—though at the expense of democracy.3

Under the 2006-2008 military-imposed Surayud government, armed forces

spending spiraled higher and higher, with a 60% budget increase in 2007 and

18% increase in 2008.4 The 2007 constitution meanwhile freed up moneys for

potential military purposes (Section 169).

The return to elected governance in December 2007 paralleled the

continuing growth in military spending. To curry favor with the armed forces

and fearing a potential coup, pro-Thaksin prime ministers Samak Sundaravej 1 In 1997 the Thai defense budget was reduced by 25 percent, the highest decline in years. See Thailand Bureau of the Budget, http://www.bb.go.th/bbhomeeng/.2 McCargo, Ukrist 137.3 Anonymous very senior retired Army official,Personal Interview August 14, 2009.4 “Military Must be Accountable,” Bangkok Post, 2 July 2009, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

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and Somchai Wongsawat did little to restrain military requests for greater

appropriations. Surprisingly, the anti-Thaksin Democrat government of PM

Abhisit Vechachiwa (the rise to power of which was assisted through military

cooperation) insisted on cuts in the military budget request for fiscal year 2010.

Military expenditures had continued to rise from US$3,333 million in 2007

to US$4,190 million in 2008, to US$4,500 million in 2009. The armed forces

sought over US$5000 million for 2010. This was pared down to US$4,400 in the

2010 million budget given the continuing economic crisis [see figures below]).

Few know, of course, if the Abhisit government simultaneously promised any

secret funding. Despite the ability of the Democrat government to reject higher

armed forces appropriations requests, civilian governments in Thailand today

have experienced a loss in their authority vis-à-vis the military since the fall of

Thaksin and enactment of the 2007 constitution.

Figure 3: Thai Military Expenditures (in US$ millions, 1979-2010) 5

5 Source: 1978-1987, 2004-2007data derived from IISS Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Routledge, various years. 1988-2003 data derived from Stockholm Institute for Strategic Studies (SIPRI), Stockholm, various years. 2008 data derived from “Military Spending to Soar A Further 24%,”The Nation, 28 June 2007, http://www.nationmultimedia.com; 2009 and 2010 data derived from “Military Reduces Weapons Request [in Thai]” Thai Post. 21 May 2009. Http://www.thaipost.net/news/210509/5011.

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Figure 4: Thai Military Expenditures (% of GDP 1979-2009) 6

Figure 5: Thai Defense Ministry Expenditures % of National Budget (1991-

2010)7

Another key area of military organization is the rotation of the senior

leadership because these people stand at the top of the military hierarchy and 6 Ibid; “Taxing its Way out of Trouble,” The Nation, 7 May 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. 7 Acknowledgements to Chris Baker; Thailand, Bureau of the Budget, http://www.bb.go.th/bbhomeeng/; 2010 figure is based upon author’s calculation of a Bt151 billion defense budget plus a Bt 6.3 supplemental as a proportion of the total national budget. See “Taxing its Way out of Trouble,” The Nation, 7 May 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com; “Defense Wants Funds for Helicoptors,” The Nation, 26 August 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com. author’s calculations.

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make decisions in the name of the military pyramid. Appointments are always

political though matters of seniority, proven loyalty, ability, and sometimes

professionalism (in that order) are significant.

Traditionally, the complete list would be checked by the Supreme Com-

mander. It would proceed to the Defense Minister who was required to sign off

on it. After this, the Prime Minister approved it, and the palace would endorse

it on the advice of the Privy Council.8 The 2001 advent of Thaksin represented

a challenge to Prem in terms of armed forces promotions. During Thaksin’s

tenure, given his success in eventually dominating top armed forces positions,

senior reshuffles simply became a means for him to rotate and reward his own

expanding military base.

The 2006 coup led to a drastic change in the senior military appointments

system. On December 20, 2007, just prior to the general election, the junta-

created National Legislative Assembly passed a decree which vastly reduces the

power of elected civilians over the reshuffles process. The new law requires that

reshuffles of high-ranking officers be vetted by a committee, whose members

include the army commander, the navy commander, air force commander, the

supreme commander, and the permanent defense secretary as well as the civilian

defense minister and prime minister. In future, if any dispute occurs as to an

appointment, a simple committee vote will settle the dispute. Given that the

unelected military portion of the committee accounts for five votes as opposed

to two for civilians, the new arrangement should heighten military control at

the expense of the authority of civilians with regard to reshuffles.9

8 “It has not been uncommon for reshuffle lists to be upheld until Privy Council head Prem is satisified with them. See James Ockey, “Thailand in 2006: Retreat to Military Rule,” Asian Survey 47, 1 (January/February 2007) 137.9 “PM Loses Army Reshuffle Powers,” Bangkok Post, 2 February 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com.

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Regarding military retirements, the Military Service Act of 1954 mandates

that all armed forces personnel must retire at age 60. Generally, senior military

promotions are timed such that the soldier promoted has only one or two years

left to serve in a top position, and thus has little time to centralize power. For

example, Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratklin, Army Commander and leader of the 2006

coup, was forced to retired at age 60 in 2007. Generally, civilian governments

have had little authority in dismissing soldiers. Transfers by civilians are also

rare.10 More common are instances where a recalcitrant Army Commander is

“retired” or “kicked upstairs” to become the armed forces’ Supreme Commander,

a generally ceremonial position (e.g. Gen. Arthit Kamlang-ek, 1986; Gen.Surayud

Chulanond, 2002). Only when the military is perceived in a negative light by

the public at large, does the clout of civilian PMs enable the latter to dismiss

the former. For example, during the second Anand Panyarachun government,

the appointed civilian PM declared that any coup was “treason against the

country and the throne.”11He thereupon dismissed Army Commander-in-Chief

Gen. Issarapong Noonpakdi, and two other senior generals from their posts.

But times have changed. Currently, given the heightened military influence in

the post-2006 coup climate, civilians must tread carefully in terms of offending

the armed forces. As such, civilian control of military organization today just

barely approaches a level of medium.

From the examination of the aforementioned five decision-making areas,

this study concludes that civilian control over Thailand’s military is on the wane,

relative to the 1992-2006 period. Civilian rule over internal security is especially

minimal, compared to other areas, while the area in which civilian rule is most

extensive is national defense. 10 In 2006, amidst the coup (popular with most Bangkokians), PM Thaksin sought to transfer coup leader Sonthi Boonyaratklin to an inactive posting, but the armed forces refused to follow Thaksin’s lead. 11 Murray 192.

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III. Conclusion: Thailand’s Military—Riding High

In 2010 Thailand is experiencing the growing erosion of civilian control

over its armed forces. Though “the Thai military sees itself as the self-entitled

defender and guardian of Thailand’s political future,”12it sees its role in terms of

preserving nation and monarchy rather than maintaining democracy and answer-

ing to elected officials. Thailand today is living under military tutelage. As such,

democracy is on the wane. One could even say that Thailand has sunk to the

status of faulty or defective democracy.13 Given that the military, in cooperation

with the Privy Council, is exerting growing, unhindered power over Thailand’s

weak civilian governments, one could specify that Thailand is a domain, or

tutelary, defective democracy.14

The introduction to this chapter raised four research questions. (1)

Exactly how has the balance of power shifted in civil-military relations from

1992 to the present? (2) In what areas of civilian control do the armed forces

today hold the most sway? (3) What does continuing military involvement say

about the contemporary state of Thai politics? (4) What long-term and short-

term patterns can we see in civil-military relations? In answer to (1), clearly the

civil-military equilibrium has shifted back in favour of Thailand’s military. As

for (2), the military today holds the most sway in the area of internal security

(e.g. an enhanced ISOC), followed by military organization (e.g. a larger budget), 12 Thitinan Pongsudirak, “Thailand Since the Coup,” Journal of Democracy, 19, 4, (October 2008) 146.13 Croissant and Merkel (2000) state that “defective democracies are systems of political power that boast the existence of a meaningful and effective universal ‘system of elections.’regulating access to political power. At the same time, however, they significantly limit the functioning of institutions that secure basic political and civic participatory rights and freedoms, restrictions of the horizontal checks and limitations on power, and/or limitations on the effective political power of democratically legitimated authorities.” See Aurel Croissant, Aurel; Wolfgang Merkel, “Formal Institutions and Informal Rules in Defective Democracies”, in Central European Political Science Review, 1, 2 (December 2000) 35.14 Merkel (2004) defines domain (tutelary) democracies as regimes where actors not legitimized by democratic vote (e.g. the military, entrepreneurs, multinational corporations) exert partial or total control over certain political spheres which should be under the control of democratically elected authorities. See Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies” Democratization, 11, 5, (December 2004) 49.

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and elite recruitment (e.g. greater influence in the Senate). Regarding (3),

continuing military involvement reflects an increasingly unstable phase in Thai

politics where weak civilian governments must either court the military or be

wary of a potential coup. In answer to (4), the long-term pattern since 1932

demonstrates enhanced civilian clout vis-a-vis the armed forces (most visibly seen

in the diminished number of soldiers in legislative/cabinet postings), while the

short-term pattern reveals that the military has more power today than at any

time since 1992 (evidenced by the 2006 coup from which the 2007 constitution

enshrined greater military powers).

The three-decade period of 1979 to 2010 has represented the gradual

assertion of political control by the military faction of Gen. (ret.) Prem

Tinsulanond over the armed forces. This era encompassed Prem’s own retirement

from the armed forces and ascension to President of the Privy Council. 2005

saw Prem ensure that Gen.Sonthi Boonyaratklin, who had previously served

under Prem-loyalist Gen. (ret.) Surayud Chulanond, was appointed to become

Army Commander, despite the wishes of Thaksin.15 In September 2006, Sonthi,

together with arch-royalist Prem supporters in the armed forces, led the coup

that ousted Thaksin, reportedly at the instigation of Prem.16Surayud was then

appointed as PM while the military ruled directly. Gen. Anupong Paochinda,

previously serving in the pro-Prem 21st battalion of the Royal Guards (the Queen’s

Guard), succeeded Sonthi as Army Commander, and continues in that post today.

The posting of Anupong and his associates reflects the continuing dominance

of former Queen’s Guard officers and, implicitly, of Prem.

15 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Where will Sonthi Lead Army of the Land?” The Nation, March 24, 2006, http://www.nationmultimedia.com; Ukrist Pathmanand, “A Different Coup d’Etat,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1 (Feb-ruary 2008): 126.16 Ukrist Patthmanand, “A Different Coup d’Etat?” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1, February 2008, p.129; Jakrapop Penkair, Personal Interview, 3 March 2009.

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The prospects for Thai civil-military relations are tilting toward intensified

armed forces’ influence. Though the elections of December 2007 appeared

to revitalize Thailand’s process of democratization and the military accepted

the election results, it was reluctant to safeguard the pro-Thaksin civilian

government elected. Indeed, the military stood idly by while unruly crowds

took over Government House, attempted to capture Parliament, and hijacked

two international airports. Moreover, Anupong twice called on PM Somchai to

resign.17 Finally, in mid-December 2008, Thailand’s military became the indirect

arbiter in the formation of a new anti-Thaksin civilian government.18 These events

showed that the military was willing and able to involve itself in unconventional,

indirect political intrusions to the point of re-stacking the coalition.

2009 has been the year of military autonomy from civilian control.

The armed forces today have found their perfect niche. Counseled by Prem,

working behind the scenes with a generally compliant civilian government and

strengthened by the 2007 constitution, the military has made a U-Turn back to

1991 to become Thailand’s crucial clandestine political player. For the armed

forces, indirect domination of civilian governments allows them to augment their

autonomy vis-a-vis civilian authority. Weak civilian governments will come and

go while a strong military institution will endure. Amidst enhanced military

tutelage over politics and society, Thailand today has fallen off the trajectory

toward democratization. Rather, it is increasingly reverting to a domain defective

democracy.19 The military’s augmented budget, Internal Security Act powers,

the Defense Ministry Act, and the Broadcasting Act all attest to the renewed

political strength of soldiers.20 General Prem was right when he insinuated 17 Wassana Nanuam, “The Coup that Never Was” Bangkok Post, 31 October 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 18 Wassana Nanuam, “Government Hopefuls Rendezvous with Anupong, ‘the Manager,’”Bangkok Post, 11 December 2008, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 19 See Croissant and Merkel (2003); Merkel, (2004).20 Chang Noi,“Military Biggest Winner in Political Conflict,” The Nation, 2 February 2009, http://www.

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that the military was the horse ridden by civilian “jockey” governments. Given

intensified military prowess, the civilian government jockey can now at any time

be thrown from the saddle.

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FOURUnder an Iron Heel:

Civil-Military Relations in Burma/Myanmar

Win Min

Introduction

Unlike other Southeast Asian countries which have experienced rule

by the armed forces, Burma/Myanmar has experienced uninterrupted military

control for almost five decades and soldiers remain determined to take a

leading role in the country’s future politics. There is also no indication that the

armed forces are prepared to accept shared political leadership with civilian

counterparts.

This study looks at how and why the military in Burma/Myanmar

came into power, how it has sustained its power for so long, and the impact

of military rule on the country’s political, economic and social sectors. It will

analyze the role of the military and military practices by looking at military

relations with civilian branches of government (administrative, judicial and

legislative) and with broader society. It will also consider the significance of the

2010 elections and the implications of the 2008 constitution on post-election

civil-military relations. Finally, this study will explore possible future scenarios

regarding the top military leadership—scenarios which will shape continuity or

change and post-election civil-military relations.

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The study argues that the nature of civil-military relations in Burma/

Myanmar has been considerably influenced by the country’s history—its

independence struggle, protracted civil war, 1950s parliamentary crisis and

1988 crackdown against pro-democracy demonstrators. It stresses that military

supremacy (i.e. control over civilian branches of government and society) has

been unprecedentedly entrenched over time. Thus in Burma/Myanmar, it makes

more sense to talk about military-civil relations than civil-military relations. The

study also argues that continued military dominance over politics after the 2010

elections is likely, at least in the short term.

Civil-military Relations under an Elected Government (1948-62)

Although the Burma/Myanmar Army was politicized as a liberating force

during the independence struggle, it accepted democratic civilian control after

independence. Indeed, the 1947 constitution enshrined civilian control over

military expenditures, security policy and senior promotions.1 However, the

outbreak of civil war significantly impacted the armed forces thinking about

its size and role. As Muthiah Alagappa has argued regarding Burma/Myanmar

and some other Asian countries, when political means were unsuccessful at

resolving ethnic claims against the state in the post-independence period, the use

of military means to prevent the country’s breakup and to unite the population

led to the rapid expansion in the troop strength of the armed forces of those

countries.2 In Burma/Myanmar, the military quickly sought to expand its size

1 Mary Callahan, “Burma: Soldiers as State Builders,” Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. By Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) 414-415.2 Muthiah Alagappa, “Introduction,” Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. By Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) 4-5.

104

4 : under an Iron heel : cIvIl-mIlItary relatIonS In burma/myanmar

and extend its reach to deal with the multiple anti-government forces operating

throughout the country. 3

The military also expanded its role into non-military areas (administration

and business) to deal with anti-government forces, gradually becoming the

country’s strongest institution, with the ability to seize state power in times of

political crisis.4 According to Alfred Stepan this phenomenon is not uncommon.

When a national army in a developing country is fighting a civil war, the military

is likely to gain interconnected political, social and economic skills that can lead

to the politicization of the military and the expansion of its role to areas such as

politics and economics.5 The Burma/Myanmar army adopted an ideology centered

on nationalism and socialism and began monitoring civilian activities.6 Military

officers saw the army as a unifying force and their successful battle experiences

reinforced their image of themselves as national guardians and saviors.

In 1958, the ruling Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) split

into two factions, leading to a parliamentary crisis that weakened the legiti-

macy of civilian governance in the eyes of the military. Certain military officers

were worried the split could hurt armed forces’ unity.7 In 1958, Prime Minister

U Nu privately conceded to military demands, allowing the armed forces to

temporarily take power. The military then publicized its ideology for the country:

the restoration of peace and the rule of law, the consolidation of democracy,

and the establishment of a socialist economy.8

3 Callahan, 421.4 Callahan, 419-421.5 Alfred Stepan, “The Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed. by Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).6 Callahan, 420.7 Taylor, Robert, “Burma.” Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia, ed. By Zakaria Ahmad and Harold Crouch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) 34.8 Josef Silverstein, Military Rule and Politics of Stagnation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977) 77-79.

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After elections in 1960, it transferred power to the winning AFPFL faction.

Some military officers began to feel they were more competent than civilians

in maintaining political stability and that they should be ready to intervene in

politics whenever perceived political crises appeared. In the early 1960s, a new

split emerged in the ruling AFPFL faction. Then, in early 1962, U Nu engaged

in discussions with ethnic minority leaders regarding greater ethnic autonomy.

In March 1962, Army Chief Gen. Ne Win staged a coup, claiming the military

was saving the country from disintegration, and introducing the idea of the

military as a national unifier.

Military-civil Relations under the Revolutionary Council (1962-74)

The post-coup Revolutionary Council was determined to stay in power

and announced it would transform the country from a parliamentary democracy

into a socialist democracy.9 It abolished the constitution, parliament, political

parties and independent unions; granted executive, legislative and judicial power

to Ne Win; appointed a cabinet of mostly of active military officers and set up

Security and Administration Committees from the national level down to the

village and township ward levels. At the national, divisional and state levels,

military officers dominated the committees. Only at the local level was there

any civilian involvement.10

According to Callahan, the coup “brought army leaders to national political

power and eliminated their civilian competitors once and for all.”11 Government

propaganda portrayed parliamentary democracy and federalism as sources of

9 Silverstein, 81-85.10 Taylor, 38.11 Callahan, 422.

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instability and the military as the only force capable of ensuring national stability

and unity. Private businesses were nationalized and the economy put under

state control. Protests in 1962 and 1964 were quickly suppressed. The junta

announced its socialist ideology and set up the Burma Socialist Programme Party

(BSPP), in which all Revolutionary Council members served as central executive

committee (CEC) members. In 1974, the Council pushed through a constitutional

referendum enshrining a military-backed one-party system.

Military-civil Relations during the Socialist Period (1974-88)

Retired and active military officers dominated BSPP leadership, although

the highest-level decision-making shifted from the military command to the

party’s CEC. Retired Gen. Ne Win became BSPP chairman and president of

the country while 75% of BSPP CEC members were active military officers.

Although participation by active military officers in the BSPP leadership

gradually decreased, retired officers remained dominant. In the early 1980s,

the 13-member BSPP central executive committee was comprised of three active

military officers, nine retired officers and one civilian.

The cabinet, likewise comprised mostly of active or retired military

officers, lacked policy-making authority and merely implemented policies adopted

by the BSPP’s CEC. The parliament merely rubber-stamped BSPP decrees and

until the late 1970s, almost 60% of members of parliament (MPs) were active

and retired military officers.12

The 1974 constitution banned all other political parties and independent

unions and restricted people’s rights to expression and assembly. The BSPP, 12 Taylor, 40.

107


however, established its own mass civilian organizations, led by retired or active

military officers. Aside from brief demonstrations between 1974 and 1976, there

was no serious threat to indirect military rule until 1988.

The BSPP government was relatively cohesive in comparison with the

AFPFL, despite some purges of senior military leaders. It also differed from other

contemporary military regimes in Southeast Asia by being relatively stable13 and

maintaining extensive control over the nationalized economy, thus preventing

the emergence of an independent business community. This power imbalance

between the military and civil society is one of the main factors that enabled the

regime to survive so long. However, due to tight control over the economy, the

BSPP was unable to foster economic development, resulting in the UN’s 1987

declaration of Burma/Myanmar as a least developed country.

In late 1987, students initiated demonstrations after the government’s

abrupt demonetization of major bank notes. In August 1988, the general

public, who had suffered under chronic economic mismanagement, joined the

demonstrations, leading to a country-wide movement calling for multi-party

democracy. During a six-week period when the government lost control and

troops retreated to their barracks, independent unions spontaneously re-emerged

together with press freedom. Civil servants stopped working, joined the

demonstrations and the state bureaucracy ceased to function. In fact, during the

demonstrations the BSPP collapsed as low-level members quit in large numbers.

However, the military remained united, staging a coup in September 1988, while

forcefully ending the demonstrations and killing thousands of demonstrators.

Burma/Myanmar’s civil society had long been weakened under military rule and

13 Ibid., 42.

108


the protestors found it impossible to sustain the demonstrations at the height

of the crackdown.

Military-civil Relations after 1988

The military regime that took power in 1988 called itself the State Law

and Order Restoration Council (SLORC, renaming itself the State Peace and

Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. Unlike in 1962, the regime’s leaders in

1988 quickly announced that its rule would be brief and transitional, paving the

way for multi-party democratic elections. The regime felt compelled to placate

demonstrators and reduce the possibility of further large-scale demonstrations.

The junta then announced that political parties could form and run in upcoming

elections.

Yet, like after the 1962 coup, the military sought to weaken alternative

sources of power which had re-emerged during the 1988 demonstrations.

Independent organizations, student unions and independent media were banned.

Gatherings of five or more people were declared illegal—restrictions which

have remained in place until today. Media censorship became more stringent

and the authorities closed many universities, tightened control on campuses

and arrested prominent civilian leaders. They also revoked the constitution

and dissolved parliament. Gen. Saw Maung, who headed the military in 1988,

became SLORC chairman. Both the SLORC and SPDC have only been comprised

of active military officers. As in 1962, the councils have granted all executive,

legislative and judicial powers to their chairmen. All cabinet ministers were

initially active military officers, although later some retired officers and a few

civilians were included. No parliament was created and the judiciary remains

109


appointed and strongly controlled by the junta. To ensure centralized military

control, military councils have also been organized down to the village and

township ward levels where active and retired military personnel have taken

leading positions in local administration.

The military also established a pro-military National Unity Party (NUP),

comprised of former BSPP members, which nevertheless lost the 1990 elections

to Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD). The junta refused

to transfer power and instead established a National Convention in 1993 to draft

a pro-military constitution. However, the NLD was allocated only 12% of the

representation in the convention, whereas most delegates were handpicked by

the military. Frustrated with the military’s unwillingness to compromise with

other participants, the NLD boycotted the convention in 1995. The military then

dismissed the NLD from the convention and halted the process in 1996.

Unwilling to yield power, the junta has continued to rule without

a constitution. Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrest for 14 of the

past 20 years. Although she was released for periods of time in 1995, 2000 and

2002, this did not lead to a substantial dialogue between the military and the

NLD for a negotiated transition to civilian rule. The armed forces appeared to

believe they had the right to rule, having been in power for so long and seeing

themselves as more competent than civilians to run the country. The junta

leaders were also worried they might be persecuted for past atrocities following

a democratic transition. Nevertheless, the regime recognized that it needed to

make some changes to maintain power.

After 1988, the junta realized an urgent need to weaken the pro-

democracy movement so as to prevent another uprising. The junta seemed

110


worried that urban protesters and the armed opposition might coordinate and

jointly attempt to overthrow it.14 The military initiated ceasefire agreements with

many armed ethnic groups to prevent such coordination. This also served to

weaken the armed ethnic movement at a time when the military was intensifying

attacks against non-ceasefire groups. The junta has also increased the size of the

military to quickly crush any mass movements or armed ethnic resistance that

might emerge in the future and ensure tighter control over government. Troop

strength increased from 180,000 in the late 1980s to 300,000 by 1995, with

the official aim being to reach 500,000 troops.15 This led to an unprecedented

militarization of government bureaucracy. The military has retired many officers

and appointed them to senior positions in the civilian bureaucracy. The leading

generals appear to believe that having retired military officers leading these

departments will prevent civil servants from participating in future anti-regime

demonstrations.

Although the regime won some support by announcing that it would

reinstate a market-economy, the military nonetheless continues to monopolize

the economy under a system akin to crony capitalism, enabling it to control the

business community. For example, the military set up the Trade Council, led by

a top general, and has generally only provided import–export licenses to military

businesses, family members and friends. The military has also established two

conglomerates—the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEH;

established in 1990) and the Myanmar Economic Cooperation (MEC; established

in 1997)—which are led by senior military officers and enjoy tax exemptions

and special permits. UMEH is the largest national firm and its shares are held

by the Directorate of Procurement at the War Office, regional commands and

14 Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed forces: Power Without Glory (Norwalk (US): EastBridge, 2002) 34.15 Andrew Selth, Transforming the Tatmadaw (Canberra: Australian National University, 1996) 19.

111


active and retired military officers. Most major foreign investment has been

channeled through UMEH. Its commercial interests include gem and timber

processing, garment production, food and beverage production, transport, trade,

communications, construction, banking, hotels and tourism services. The MEC

is a similarly enormous enterprise with activities including oil and gas exports.16

After Gen. Saw Maung was forced to retire on grounds of mental illness

in 1992, he was replaced by Gen. Than Shwe, who remains SPDC chairman.

In 1993, Than Shwe set up a pro-military mass organization—the Union

Solidarity and Development Association (USDA)—to help prevent or suppress

pro-democracy demonstrations, support pro-military political campaigns and

serve as a base for a new pro-military political party, similar to Gen. Suharto’s

Golkar Party in Indonesia. Civil servants and students were coaxed or forced

to become members of the USDA, which claims to have 24 million members.

The USDA also provides special privileges to its members, including exclusive

business opportunities, free educational courses and military training. The USDA

orchestrated an assault on Aung San Suu Kyi’s car in 1995 and her motorcade

at Depayin in 2003, where dozens of people were reportedly killed and she was

put back under house arrest. After the NLD boycotted the National Convention,

the USDA organized a series of mass rallies in support of the convention.

Selected members of the association have been given training on leadership,

management, politics, economics, social affairs, and computer technology to

prepare them to work for a pro-military party led by senior USDA leaders that

will run in future elections.

16 Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed forces Since 1948 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009) 182.

112


However, there have been intra-military disagreements over how to deal

with Aung San Suu Kyi and the international community. The second and third

highest-ranking officers, Gen. Maung Aye and Gen. Khin Nyunt (former Military

Intelligence chief), did not even know about the planned 2003 attack on Aung

San Suu Kyi’s motorcade until moments before. The attack was carried out by

the USDA in line with a secret order issued by Than Shwe.17 By contrast, Gen.

Maung Aye and his close associates remain aloof from USDA activities. To counter

increasing international pressure after the 2003 attack, the junta appointed Khin

Nyunt as prime minister and announced a seven-point roadmap to “disciplined

democracy,” though without an implementation time frame. Indeed, Khin Nyunt

did respond to the international outcry by negotiating for the NLD’s return to the

National Convention, the completion of which was the first step of the roadmap.

He was also praised internationally as a pragmatist who might willingly work

with the opposition.18

However at the last minute, Than Shwe rejected Khin Nyunt’s agreement

with the NLD.19 This increased already-existing tensions between the combat and

intelligence factions within the military over the extent to which the intelligence

branch should have independent power—leading to the purge of Khin Nyunt

and his intelligence group in 2004. In 2005, Khin Nyunt was sentenced to 44

years imprisonment, but was put under house arrest instead. Many intelligence

officers were given prison sentences from 20 to almost 200 years.

Despite disagreements over NLD participation, the military has continued

to use the seven-point roadmap to erode the relevance of the 1990 election results

and legitimize indirect military rule through a constitutional referendum and 17 “Depayin Tikekhitehmu Than Shwe kotaing Amaintpay, Myanmar Than Ayarshe Haung Pyaw” [Than Shwe himself orders Depayin attack, said a former Burmese/Myanmar diplomat,] VOA (Burmese), May 31, 2008.18 Interview with a senior western diplomat, April 2007.19 Interview with a senior diplomat, April 2005.

113


subsequent elections. In 2004, the National Convention was restarted, without

NLD participation. Instead, the regime allowed ethnic ceasefire groups 10% of

the total seats at the convention, although all their proposals were rejected. The

draft constitution was finally completed in 2007. A week after a deadly cyclone

in May 2008, the junta went ahead with its planned constitutional referendum.

The regime assigned troops to secure referendum polling stations rather than

conduct disaster relief efforts. The junta also initially restricted international

humanitarian access to cyclone-affected areas. According to official statistics, the

constitution was approved by 92% of the voters. However, the NLD and others

claimed the referendum was not free and fair, with numerous allegations of

intimidation and pre-marked ballots.

Post-1988 Protests

Despite the junta’s attempt to prevent further demonstrations after 1988,

there were two major protests, in 1996 and 2007. In 1996, university students

staged a demonstration calling for improvements in the education system. The

regime responded with force, arresting over 100 students. Most universities

were closed for four years, and many universities relocated to suburban areas.

The government also encouraged students to take distance education courses,

so they would have few opportunities to gather or organize on campus.

In 2007, the second largest series of demonstrations after 1988 took place

when the government suddenly removed fuel subsidies leading to a steep increase

in gas prices. The ‘88 Generation Students’ group initiated the demonstrations

but the leaders were soon arrested. Buddhist monks then took up the cause.

The monks peacefully marched through the streets of Rangoon and other cities,

114


chanting Buddhist verses calling for compassion, seeking to persuade the regime

to recognize the impact of its policies on the poor, release political prisoners and

hold a dialogue with the opposition. However, the junta succeeded in stopping

these marches by beating many monks and others, arresting thousands and

killing at least 31 civilians.20 It then organized USDA-led pro-military mass rallies

across the country. In order to manage growing international pressure following

the crackdown, the junta announced a timeframe for the constitutional referen-

dum and subsequent elections. It also appointed a liaison minister who met Aung

San Suu Kyi a few times, although these meetings stopped when international

pressure subsided. In order to silence dissent before the elections, the former

student leaders and monks who led the demonstrations were sentenced to

lengthy prison terms.

The Significance of the 2010 Elections

Approaching the 2010 elections, the junta has shown no willingness to

compromise with the political opposition, despite attempts to gain international

support for the elections. Although there were repeated international and

domestic calls for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, when her house arrest order

expired in May 2009, the junta took advantage of a tourist’s intrusion into her

compound as a pretext to extend her detention at least until the completion of

the 2010 elections. By sentencing her, the junta may want the NLD to decide

by itself not to run in the elections. This derives from the fact that the NLD has

set three pre-conditions for participation: the unconditional release of political

20 “Statement by Mr. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,” Resumed sixth session of the Human Rights Council, December 11, 2007, Geneva.

115


prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi, a review of the 2008 constitution and

the holding of inclusive, free and fair elections under international supervision.

In September 2009, the junta released over 100 political prisoners before

the UN General Assembly meeting to gain international support for the 2010

elections. However, political activists continue to be arrested and over 2,000

political prisoners remain imprisoned.21 In October 2009, the junta’s liaison min-

ister met Aung San Suu Kyi twice after she sent an open letter to Than Shwe

indicating her willingness to cooperate with the junta to lift sanctions. Moreover,

in November 2009, Aung San Suu Kyi was allowed to meet foreign diplomats,

including senior US officials.

As for the status of the ethnic ceasefire groups, the junta has shown little

effort to compromise before the elections.

In August 2009, the regime attacked one of the smaller ceasefires groups,

the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), based in the Kokang

region. The apparent motivation for the attack was the MNDAA’s unwillingness

to concede to demands to transform itself into a border guard force under the

Burma/Myanmar Army’s command. Although other smaller ceasefire groups

have been compelled to become border guard forces, larger ceasefire groups

like the United Wa State Army and the Kachin Independence Organization have

refused to do so.

Although the elections offer some hope for gradual positive change

in civil-military relations, any short-term changes that do occur are unlikely

to be substantial. The military is determined to take any measures it deems

necessary to avoid an outcome similar to 1990 when the pro-regime party lost

21 Human Rights Watch, “Burma’s Forgotten Prisoners,” September 2009.

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the election. Thus, despite the international community’s repeated calls for free,

fair and inclusive elections, the scheduled elections are likely to fall short of these

standards. There will be more restrictions than in 1990 for party registration and

campaigning. Moreover, authorities may use intimidation and ballot manipulation

as in the 2008 referendum to ensure that pro-military parties win.

Senior leaders of the USDA, who are likely to lead a pro-military party,

have launched unofficial election campaigns in various parts of the country by

initiating or promising development and social activities. Aside from senior

USDA leaders, some generals might retire from the military to serve in the CEC

of the new political party. Some cronies, former senior civil servants and local

influential people might also be included to broaden the party’s representation

and increase its chance of winning over 50% of parliamentary seats, and thus

the election. However, the USDA party may not have the full support of everyone

in the army. Many local army commanders have become upset over the USDA’s

increasingly influential role in development activities in their areas. The USDA

also has its own intelligence networks, which were established after the junta

dismantled Khin Nyunt’s military intelligence branch in 2004.

Smaller parties led by individuals handpicked by the SPDC (including

business cronies, local influential people and some retired ceasefire group

leaders—especially those whose groups have agreed to become border guard

forces) may also be set up, or they may be asked to run as individual candidates

to win another 20% of the seats and form part of a coalition government

controlled by the military. Given the military’s efforts to maintain power after

the 2010 elections, the likely representation for the political opposition will be

minimal.

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Implications of the 2008 Constitution

In the 2008 constitution, the military enshrined many of its prerogatives

in order to maintain military control over politics, rather than civilian control

over the military. The six basic principles of the constitution, which are also the

six “consistent objectives,” of the Union state that the military will be enabled “to

participate in the national political leadership role of the State.”22 This principle

of military participation differs from that of other democratic countries where

military influence over political decision-making is conducted indirectly via

lobbying or advice given to civilian leaders. The NLD, ethnic political parties

and to a lesser extent ceasefire groups previously demanded that the military

drop this basic principle, but to no avail.

Not only does the constitution restrict civilian control over the military

in principle, it also lacks any presidential mechanism that could ensure civilian

control over the military in practice. In democracies, the role of presidents or

prime ministers as commanders-in-chief of the armed forces serves as one of the

main mechanisms to ensure civilian control over the military. The head of the

Burma/Myanmar Army will be the commander-in-chief, thus wielding supreme

power over the armed forces without civilian oversight.

The 2008 constitution also grants the military primary responsibility

for internal and external security. Under Chapter 7 of the constitution (dealing

with Defense Services), Article 339 states the “Defense Services shall lead in

safeguarding the Union against all internal and external dangers.”23 In established

democracies, police forces, rather than the army, are mandated with primary

responsibility for managing internal security. This constitutionally-mandated 22 Ministry of Information, Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008) (Naypyitaw: Printing and Publishing Enterprise, September, 2008), 3.23 Ibid., 148.

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role of the military over internal security thus allows the armed forces to

independently respond to protests (which the military has repeatedly declared

to be internal security threats) and to manage law and order.

In addition, the constitution provides for the military to play a major role

in parliament following elections. In practice, however, the military will likely

have even more power in parliament than the constitution explicitly ensures.

The constitution includes a provision requiring 25% of MPs to be active-duty

military officers appointed by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, rather

than popularly elected representatives.24 There is moreover no transitional clause

to gradually phase-out this representation of military personnel in parliament

and it will be very difficult to reduce the number of military seats through

constitutional amendments. This 25% parliamentary block of military officers

provides the military with a veto over future attempts to pass constitutional

amendments, as any such amendments require approval by more than 75%

of MPs. Furthermore, as discussed above, a pro-military party established to

run in the elections is likely to win at least 50% of parliamentary seats due

to restrictions on opposition parties and electoral fraud. The military’s strong

representation in parliament (through the combined block of appointed military

officers and elected pro-military MPs) is likely to be used to ensure that the

parliament elects a president and vice presidents favored by the military rather

than the civilian population.

As another means of ensuring its leading role in national politics, the

military is likely to wield power over the executive branch after the 2010

elections. The constitution states that the president, as head of both state and

government, “shall be well acquainted” with military affairs.25 The implication is 24 Ibid., 39.25 Ibid., 19.

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that only a retired military officer can become president. A constitutional clause

in any case already bars the most famous civilian leader, Aung San Suu Kyi,

from becoming president or vice president due to her marriage to a foreigner.26

The constitution also enables the bloc of appointed military MPs to choose one

of the two vice presidents.27

The constitution furthermore stipulates that at least three active-duty

military officers will serve in the cabinet, though this is likely to be higher in

practice. According to the constitution, the president is to get nominees for three

security ministers (defense, home and border affairs) from the commander-

in-chief and submit these for parliamentary approval.28 The constitution in ad-

dition states that military officers appointed as ministers of defense, security

and border affairs would not need to retire or resign from the armed forces.29

Moreover, it seems that the military also wants to have as many other military

officers as possible serving in the cabinet. This is likely because the president,

as a person with military experience, is likely to choose other military men for

cabinet portfolios. According to the constitution, the president shall coordinate

with the military chief if he/she wants to appoint military officers as ministers

for ministries apart from the three security ministries.30

The charter furthermore explicitly allows the National Defense

and Security Council which comprises more military officers than civilians, to

declare a state of emergency. What constitutes a state of emergency, however,

is left ambiguous.31 This ambiguity gives wide latitude for the military leadership

to announce a state of emergency (in which executive, legislative, and judicial 26 Ibid., 19-20.27 Ibid., 20.28 Ibid., 86.29 Ibid., 87.30 Ibid., 86.31 Ibid., 75, 165.

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power are handed over to the commander-in-chief) or a coup, whenever they

see fit.32 The Council includes both the president and vice presidents together

with the armed forces chief and deputy chief, and the three security ministers.

This arrangement is meant to restrict independent presidential decision-making.

The council is set to become extremely powerful, in part because it can appoint

a new commander-in-chief.33

Not only is the military determined to dominate the executive and

parliamentary branches of government, but the constitution also guarantees

military autonomy (with regard to its management of military affairs) from the

executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. Although the military

technically comes under the executive branch of government, it may use the

National Defense and Security Council to impose its decisions on the executive

branch. In the constitution, there is also no provision for legislative control

over military promotions, the military budget, arms purchases, recruitment

and military activities. Instead, the constitution stipulates that the armed forces

will have the right to “independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of

the armed forces.”34

The constitution furthermore allows the military to run its own court

system to try military personnel, and in matters of military justice, the deci-

sion of the military chief is “final and conclusive.”35 In this way the military can

protect its personnel from being sent to civilian courts for human rights abuses.

The junta has, in addition, enshrined a constitutional amnesty for itself to guard

32 Ibid., 167-8.33 Ibid., 148.34 Ibid., 6.35 Ibid., 148

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against military personnel ever being tried in court for past atrocities, should

parliamentary power ever shift in favor of civilians.36

The military will moreover be largely independent from the executive and

parliament in the management of its budget. Military businesses, like the Union

of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH) and Myanmar Economic Corporation

(MEC), are likely to expand to ensure that the military has independent sources

of revenue apart from the government’s budget. These outside revenues can

offset military budget reductions approved by an elected government. The military

also wants to maintain control over its budget in order to maintain or increase

its strength and support military families. This will make it difficult for any new

government to control the armed forces through budgetary power.

Future Military Leadership Scenarios

After the 2010 elections, a generational shift in the military is likely.

Although Than Shwe has himself managed to consolidate power, he is now in

his mid-‘70s and in declining health. His prowess will wane as his health wanes,

as happened to Ne Win in the late 1990s. Ne Win was put under house arrest

in 2002, while his grandsons and son-in-law, who allegedly plotted a coup, were

sentenced to life-imprisonment.

Nevertheless, Than Shwe has been implementing a strategy to guarantee

his influence over the military and the government until his death. Than Shwe

wants to ensure that he and his family do not end up under house arrest or in

prison as did Ne Win and his family. Than Shwe seems to believe that he can

manage the election process in a way that ensures him a continuing leadership 36 Ibid., 178.

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role in any future government. Given the conditions outlined above, there are

two likely post-election scenarios.

The first scenario is that Than Shwe will hold elections in 2010 as he

stated in October 2009.37 After the elections, he would retire from the military

together with Maung Aye as he told Ban Ki-moon in mid-2009.38 However, in

this scenario Than Shwe would create a patronage position or a body with

which he could continue to influence the government and the military. He might

serve as honorary commander-in-chief or set up a military council, comprised

of SPDC members, similar to that in China. He could lead this council since the

constitution allows the military to manage its affairs as it likes.39 He may then

continue to wield budgetary power over the military as honorary commander-

in-chief or through the council, as Ne Win did as BSPP chairman after retiring

from the position of president.

Than Shwe may also seek to place staunch loyalists in the two top-

most positions under the new constitution: president and commander-in-chief.

Specifically, Than Shwe may like to have his protégé, Gen. Shwe Mann, the third

highest-ranking officer, serve as president, engaging in travel as required, while

Than Shwe remains in Naypyidaw. Than Shwe may have a younger generation

officer, who can serve for two terms, become commander-in-chief. As long as

Than Shwe controls the military, which will continue to be the leading force

in politics, any political, economic or social changes are unlikely, let alone

a reduction in military prerogatives. Than Shwe has resisted domestic and

international advice and pressure and maintains a firm grip over the military.

37 New Light of Myanmar, Senior General Than Shwe addresses second-day session of MWVO conference, October 10, 2009.38 Koyakutty, Haseenah, “UN gains leverage over Myanmar,” Asia Times Online, July 15, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KG15Ae01.html 39 Ministry of Information, 6.

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However, when Than Shwe’s influence wanes, Shwe Mann might have some

independent decision-making power and might be more open to the idea of

gradual change, starting with economic liberalization and, to a lesser degree,

political liberalization.

The second possible scenario is that Than Shwe would be unable to

implement the 2010 elections. He could die suddenly or be removed from power

because of declining health. In this scenario, Maung Aye would likely take Than

Shwe’s position and put his own protégés in key positions. In this scenario, with

Maung Aye taking over, there is a slight chance for dialogue between the military

and the opposition, if sufficient domestic and international pressure emerges.

This is because Maung Aye will not have as firm a grip over the military as

Than Shwe has had and will thus be more vulnerable to pressure. Also, he and

his close associates neither have faith in the USDA nor are much involved in

the group’s activities. In addition, Maung Aye previously engaged in a serious

conversation with Aung San Suu Kyi in one of their secret meetings, while Than

Shwe remained aloof.40

Conclusion

The role of the military, which has increased its size, expanded into non-

military sectors over time and, during the early years of civil war, intervened in

politics under weak and divided civilian rule, is deeply entrenched today, and

is determined to hold onto its prerogatives in the future. In order to maintain

military rule, the generals have ensured a power imbalance by weakening

alternative civilian sources of power. This power imbalance has led to the quick

40 Interview with a former close aide of Aung San Suu Kyi, April 2006, Bangkok.

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collapse of demonstrations which have been harshly dealt with whenever they

have broken out.

After ruling the country for almost half a century, Burma/Myanmar’s

military is deeply politicized, and the administration and civil services have

been militarized as a result. Consequently, there is also a political deadlock

while the country suffers from socio-economic mismanagement. Ideologically,

the military believes it has kept the union together, a critical task the generals

do not believe civilian politicians can handle. They also see themselves as the

saviors of the country and its citizens, protecting them from the threat of ethnic

nationalist armies and foreign influences.

The generals appear worried about losing political and economic

privileges and facing trials for past abuses. In order to avoid the mistakes of

the 1990 elections, the regime is likely to ensure success at any cost in the

up-coming 2010 elections.

It is clear the military leadership wants to maintain as much political

power as possible and will attempt to do so as long possible using and protecting

the powers it has given itself in the 2008 constitution. However, if a reform-

minded senior general were to assume leadership, there might be more space

to begin a process of national reconciliation and political reform. Ideally, this

could even include a diminishing of military prerogatives that would finally lead

to more balanced civil-military relations.

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Works Cited

Alagappa, Muthiah. “Introduction,” Coercion and Governance: The Declining

Political Role of the Military in Asia. Ed. Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 2001.

Callahan, Mary. “Burma: Soldiers as State Builders,” Coercion and Governance:

The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia. Ed. Muthiah Alagappa.


Myoe, Maung Aung. Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since

1948. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.

Ministry of Information. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar

(2008). Naypyitaw: Printing and Publishing Enterprise, September, 2008.

Selth, Andrew. Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory. Norwalk (US):

EastBridge, 2002.

---. Transforming the Tatmadaw. Canberra: Australian National University, 1996.

Silverstein, Josef. Military Rule and Politics of Stagnation. Ithaca: Cornell


Stepan, Alfred, “The Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role

Expansion.” Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future. Ed. Alfred

Stepan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

Taylor, Robert. “Burma.” Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia. Ed.

Zakaria Ahmad and Harold Crouch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Human Rights Watch, “Burma’s Forgotten Prisoners,” September 2009.

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FIVEArmed Forces as Veto Power:

Civil-Military Relations in the Philippines

Katherine Marie G. Hernandez & Herman Joseph S. Kraft1

Philippine society contains an important element that it shares with other

countries in Southeast Asia regardless of the political or economic context. It is

a society where political and to some degree economic conditions are very much

influenced by the interests of the institutionalized military. To a large extent,

there is nothing unusual about this as the literature on civil-military relations in

developing states tends to emphasize the highly influential position of “the man

on the horseback.”2 In the case of the Philippines, however, it is complicated

by a national situation that includes twin insurgencies, violent crime, military

rebellion, the presence of international terrorist networks, and a political culture

that emphasizes unfettered elite competition which gives scope for military

involvement (directly or indirectly) in Philippine politics.

The study and analysis of the Philippine military has received significant

attention from both academic and policymaking circles. However, a few

preliminary observations could be made regarding the state of its literature and

discourse. First, the bulk of the literature remains wedded to the traditional

(military) security paradigm. Second, the concept of civil-military relations largely 1 The authors are both Assistant Professors of Political Science at the University of the Philippines and are research fellows with the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies. The draft paper itself was largely taken from a 2009 report submitted by the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies to the UN Development Program entitled “Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the Philippines: A Preliminary Analysis” in which both authors were involved.2 Samuel Finer. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. London, Pall Mall, Press, 1962.

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focuses on a representation of the military as having been politicized mainly as

a result of the martial law regime under President Ferdinand Marcos. Lastly,

most studies on the Philippine military have not linked it institutionally to the

broader themes or perspectives of democratization and democratic consolidation,

the ongoing peace process in the country and conflict resolution, or to good

democratic governance.

The Development of the Philippine Military

National defense in the Philippines has historically been entrusted to

a fairly small regular military force whose constitutional duty is to defend

the country and the people from both internal and external threats. Known

as the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the AFP, it is divided into several

service branches — army, air force, navy, and up until 1990, constabulary. The

Philippine Army (PA), Philippine Air Force (PAF), and Philippine Navy (PN) are

responsible for national land, air and sea defense, respectively. The Philippine

Constabulary (PC) was the service primarily responsible for the enforcement

of law and order and for rear-area defense during emergencies. The PC was

abolished and replaced by the Philippine National Police (PNP) in 1991. In

addition to the regular armed forces, auxiliary units, such as the Citizen Armed

Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU), are drawn from local communities for

purposes of area defense.3

The Philippine military can trace its origin to the pre-colonial period

although a semblance of a citizen’s armed force could be found during the

3 Rosalie B. Arcala, “Democratization and the Philippine Military: A Comparison of the Approaches Used by the Aquino and Ramos Administrations in Re-Imposing Civilian Supremacy.” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Northeastern University, 2002a, 144-145 .

128

5 : armed forcee aS veto power: cIvIl-mIlItary relatIonS In the phIlIppIneS

country’s struggle for independence from Spain. Military historians particularly

note the active role of armed and organized Filipinos fighting against the

American and Japanese occupation forces.4 However, the modern-day AFP

was patterned after the United States military and began as such by virtue of

Commonwealth Act No.1. (1935). Also known as the National Defense Act, it

formally established the Philippine Army as the first component of the Armed

Forces. The PC already existed though it was primarily a police force under the

Department of the Interior and as such was not considered to be part of the

regular military. The 1935 Constitution established the President as Commander-

in-Chief of the armed forces while the military’s contact with the President passed

through a civilian defense secretary. The legislature exercised oversight functions

over the AFP through its powers of confirmation of military appointments and

promotions, over the defense budget, and investigation in aid of legislation in

cases of wrongdoing in the military.5

However, the US did not limit itself to shaping the structure of the

military. It also determined its roles and functions. Since the US assumed the

provision of external defense for the country, the AFP was left to “concentrate on

internal defense and peace and order”. This, to a large extent, shaped its size,

training, equipment, and supplies.6 Internal security became an umbrella term

encompassing all threats to the government, whether communist or separatist,

armed or unarmed.7 Coming from a postcolonial perspective, Hedman supported

this by concluding that in the end, “neither national interests of security nor the

4 Cesar P. Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2000.5 Carolina G. Hernandez, “The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the Philippines.” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (State University of New York at Buffalo, 1979); Carolina G. Hernandez, “The Role of the Military in Contemporary Philippine Society.” Diliman Review 32, (1984): 16-18.6 The Final Report. The Fact-Finding Commission (to Investigate the Failed Coup of December 1989) Makati: Bookmark Publishers, 1990: 29.7 Arcala 2002a.

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political dynamics of reconstruction” dictated the organization of the Philippine

armed forces.8

The internal orientation of the AFP was first demonstrated with the

emergence of the Hukbalahap9 insurgency. Under the direction of then Defense

Secretary Ramon Magsaysay, the AFP developed a two-pronged approach to the

Huk rebellion: to engage them militarily in a more organized and efficient way

and to show the disaffected populace that the government had their interests in

mind and that the military could be trusted to protect and take care of them.10

The latter came in the form of socioeconomic activities by the military. As

Danguilan stated:

Military troops went on medical missions and provided emergency

treatment and care and distributed relief goods to civilians caught in the crossfire

of combat. They built temporary bridges and roads linking civilians to military

camps which had become distributing (sic) points for medical and food supplies.

They also constructed makeshift [schoolhouses] and drilled water wells in villages

which the military declared free from the influence of the Huks.11

This incremental acquisition of developmental roles associated with

counter-insurgency since the 1950s was institutionalized during the Marcos

period. The relentless internal conflicts from two fronts--communist insurgency

and Moro secessionism—contributed to the civilian government becoming

heavily dependent on the military for national security. The AFP even became

8 Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, “The Philippines: Not So Military, Not So Civil.” In Muthiah Alagappa, Ed. Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001: 170.9 Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon later renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or Army of National Liberation. Originally a peasant movement, it is a group of guerilla fighters that fought the Japanese invaders but rose in arms against the government because of their exclusion in the postwar political order. 10 Hernandez 1979.11 Marilen Danguilan, “Bullets and Bandages: Public Health as a Tool of Engagement in the Philippines.” Research Paper No. 161. Harvard: Harvard School of Public Health (1999):13.

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the apparatus of Marcos to implement martial law as a ‘partner in national

development’. Martial law paved the way for the destruction of the civilian

political institutions of democratic governance, from the legislature to the political

parties and the judiciary. Other changes included the continuous expansion of

military functions to include non-traditional military roles, the institution of

structural changes that ‘merged’ the police with the military through the single

leadership of the PC and the Integrated National Police within the AFP, as well

as the suppression of civil liberties, including elections, freedom of expression

and association. Thus, expansion of the military role amid the destruction of

civilian political institutions of democratic governance resulted in a heightened

sense of political awareness in the AFP of being “the principal wielders of power

over a highly personalized authoritarian regime.”12 Given that the military was

the most important piece of state machinery in the country during martial law

under Marcos, he did not hesitate to increase its budget. Indeed, according

to reports, Marcos infused some 3.5 billion pesos into the AFP from 1973 to

1975.13 This was a 700 per cent increase in the AFP’s pre-martial law budget,

the highest for any state within the Southeast Asian region.14 The AFP also re-

cruited several thousands more into its ranks, swelling the number of regulars

from 70,000 to 275,000, representing an increase of more than 300 per cent.

Apart from this, Marcos appointed military officers to key civilian posts such as

some of the government-owned and controlled corporations.15

It is the crucial powers of appointment and promotion that enabled

Marcos to keep the armed forces under his control. His perfect employment of 12 Carolina Hernandez 1979; 1984; Carolina Hernandez “The Military and Constitutional Change: Problems and Prospects in a Redemocratized Philippines.” Public Policy 1, 1 (1997): 42-61; Felipe B. Miranda, The Politicization of the Military. Quezon City: University Center for Integrative and Development Studies (1992).13 Jose M. Crisol, The Armed Forces and Martial Law. Makati: Agro Publishing Inc (1980).14 Felipe B. Miranda, “The Military.” In R.J. May and Francisco Nemenzo, Eds. The Philippines After Marcos. London: Croom Helm, (1985).15 Hernandez 1979.

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what Huntington called ‘subjective civilian control’ of presidential prerogatives

frequently transgressed the formal chain of command by the retention of

generals loyal to him beyond the retirement age, and favoring his own choices

over the more qualified.16 This inevitably had increasing implications for the

professionalism of the military. Thus, it was no surprise that there would be

discontent among the junior officers. In time, they would hatch a plot to oust

Marcos using the context of mass protests against the alleged stealing of the

election results by the Marcos government following the snap presidential

elections of February 1986. Led by then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile

and inspired by the perceived professionalism of then Vice Chief of Staff General

Fidel V. Ramos, the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM)17 broke away

from the AFP chain of command and joined the rest of the anti-Marcos groups

already protesting against the dictatorship, particularly since the assassination of

his principal political rival, Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. in August 1983.

The ‘restoration of democracy’ after the 1986 People Power Revolt had

tremendous implications for the country’s security forces. Given its critical role

in maintaining the dictatorship and in the transition, it was necessary that

democratic civilian control be instituted and the military’s role clarified.

The adoption of the 1987 Constitution reasserted and installed the

supremacy of civilian authority over the military and provided oversight

institutions over the AFP, such as legislative power over the budget and

confirmation of military appointments and promotions, as well as the participation

of the Philippine Commission on Human Rights in military appointments and

promotions. The institutional and functional separation of the national police

16 Ibid; see Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil Military Relations, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957. 17 Originally, this was known as the ‘We Belong’ movement.

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from the military was also effected.18 The Philippine National Police (PNP) - after a

period of transition - was to assume from the AFP the primary role of preserving

internal security including the suppression of insurgency, leaving to the AFP the

primary role of ensuring external security. However, due to the serious nature

of the communist insurgency and the Moro separatist movement, as well as

the PNP’s limited resources, the AFP remained in charge of fighting these two

armed groups19. This situation warranted the continuing frontline function of

the military in counterinsurgency operations.20

Democratic transitions, however, could be both volati le and

‘accommodationist’, especially when it involves a coalition of diverse political

forces. The varying interests of a very mixed group of actors had to be

accommodated by the state, even if such a policy was potentially untenable.

In this context, the military became an influential stakeholder in the Aquino

administration, particularly its key leaders. Hernandez, for example, noted

the accession of the government to demands for: (1) increases in pay; (2) the

removal of cabinet officials perceived as left-leaning or hostile to the military;(3)

holding back on the prosecution of military officers and personnel accused of

human rights violations; and (4) the suppression of internal conflicts through a

military-preferred approach.”21

However, as the experiences of democratic transformation facilitated

by a military coup showed, the Philippines also became vulnerable to military

adventurism. The Aquino administration was challenged by seven coup attempts 18 This separation required the abolition of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), which was formerly the AFP’s fourth major service. Only three have remained: the Philippine Army, the Philippine Air Force, and the Philippine Navy. 19 Republic Act 8551 or the “Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998” restored the AFP’s primary role in counterinsurgency.20 Arcala 2002a; Carolina G. Hernandez and Maria Cecilia T. Ubarra. “Restoring and Strengthening Civilian Control: Best Practices in Civil-Military Relations in the Philippines.” Quezon City: Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc (1999).21 Hernandez 1997: 46-47.

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from politicized and disgruntled junior officers. Some of these had been the

leaders of the coup plot that, coupled with the Marcos government’s attempt to

steal the results of the 1986 snap election, led to the first People Power Revolt.

Several factors contributed to the failure of these coup attempts to capture state

power. Among them was the lack of popular support, the senior command

remaining loyal to the civilian government, and the latent US support to the

regime.22 The last coup attempt of the 1980s which occurred in December 1989

was the most serious that pushed the government to form a fact-finding body to

inquire into its causes and make recommendations to prevent a reoccurrence.

The investigative body, popularly known as the Davide Commission after

the name of its chairman, conducted an intensive probe not only on the issues

that surrounded the December 1989 coup attempt, but also systematically studied

the military as a political institution in the Philippines. The final report of the

Commission contained findings and recommendations crucial to reforming the

military and institutionalizing democratic civilian control. It also revealed the

lingering problems internal to the armed forces including inadequate pay and

benefits, lack of logistical support and services to soldiers in the field, favoritism

in promotions, and prevalent corruption in the military and the government. In

the end, the probe not only emphasized the importance of military reform, but

also stressed the need for the civilian government to get its act together, fulfill

the promises of democratization and popular empowerment, and to work for

genuine national development.23

Several more reforms were instituted in light of the coup attempts against

the civilian government. Established in 1990, the Office of Ethical Standards

and Public Accountability (OESPA) was given exclusive jurisdiction over active 22 The Final Report 1990: 495.23 Ibid.

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AFP personnel involved in major graft and corruption cases. Moreover, a Code

of Ethics for the AFP was adopted and serves as the guideline of behavior for

all uniformed personnel.24 This provided clearer institutional guidelines on the

lines of accountability relating to civil-military relations. In the end, however,

the issues regarding the code’s effectiveness involved less the unwillingness of

the military to be subjected to civilian authority as it was the inability of civilian

authorities to credibly and effectively exercise that authority.

One consequence of perceptions of weakness in the civilian bureaucracy

and institutions is the prevalence of the appointment of retired military officers

to the country’s strategic executive offices and civilian bureaucracy, as well as

retired officer’s election to the legislature and to local government positions. An

investigative study by Glenda Gloria concluded that retired officer’s appointment

to strategic positions such as the country’s defense and foreign affairs

departments could be attributed to two factors: the soldier’s socialization and

the nature of the regime. Military role expansion into community development

and counterinsurgency enabled soldiers to assume civilian functions with duties

that trained them for eventual appointment to the bureaucracy, an indication

of the failure on the part of country’s civilian political institutions to discharge

their development tasks in conflict and post-conflict areas. Moreover, Gloria

also argued that the regimes which followed the 1986 People Power Revolt also

accepted, and/or possibly “encouraged, the influence and participation of the

military in running the country’s state affairs.”25

Reform Efforts and Initiatives

24 Hernandez and Ubarra 1999.25 Glenda Gloria, We Were Soldiers: Military Men in Politics and the Bureaucracy. Makati City: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003: 33.

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The process of reforming the Philippine armed forces initiated by

President Corazon Aquino was continued by subsequent administrations. The

reforms undertaken by the Ramos administration, however, were situated within

a general government policy of supporting unification and reconciliation with all

adversarial groups – whether they be communist insurgents, Moro secessionists,

and even military rebels that staged the various coup attempts against the Aquino

government. Ramos succeeded in forging a peace agreement with the Moro

National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996 and in putting a temporary halt to

military adventurism by granting unconditional amnesty to the rebel military.

Ramos experience as a former military officer may have given him an advantage

in knowing how to deal with a restive military. However, it was less a factor

in addressing the problem of military adventurism than the amnesty program

his administration instituted and the general perception within the military that

(unlike Aquino) he would not be coddling left-wing politicians in the government.

Many of the soldiers who rebelled during the Aquino administration returned

to the AFP and redeemed themselves with loyal and distinguished service to

the state under Ramos. While this ended the coup attempts during his watch,

thereby creating an environment conducive to economic growth, there are those

that continue to express the belief that the extension of unconditional amnesty to

rebel soldiers could have undermined military discipline and stymied democratic

civil-military relations.26

This problem with the Ramos amnesty policy emerged when a group of

junior military officers27 conducted a mutiny in July 2003 against President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo. The failed coup was known as the Oakwood Mutiny, named

after the hotel which the Magdalo group used to stage its attempt. This seeming 26 Hernandez 1997.27 This group was called Magdalo from its adoption of rites of recruitment used by the Katipunan in the Philippine Revolution of 1896.

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re-emergence of restiveness within the military showed that elements within the

military continued to harbor dissatisfaction with civilian institutions and were

willing to use force to impose an alternative political rule. A more dangerous

development, however, is the emergence of a military which has become more

aware and confident about its ability to influence political affairs.

Arroyo was installed through a non-violent revolt after the aborted

impeachment proceedings against her predecessor, Joseph Ejercito Estrada.

Arguably, the role played by the military in this event produced far-reaching

consequences for civil-military relations in the Philippines. Indeed, it could be

argued that the withdrawal of allegiance of the AFP and PNP was the crucial

factor in Estrada’s ouster. The subsequent success of the Arroyo Administration

in surviving a number of overthrow attempts by opposition political forces also

owed much to the continued loyalty of the upper levels of the military leadership

(and the fact that the rest of the military largely remained loyal the chain of

command). To a great extent, the AFP emerged as a consequential veto power

in the political landscape of the Philippines.

After a careful investigation into the root causes and the issues

surrounding the Oakwood mutiny, the Feliciano Commission was formed to

report on the reasons behind its occurrence. It concluded that the causes

behind military restiveness included widespread corruption in the military and

government, the poor plight of soldiers in combat, and rampant favoritism and

politicization of the military.28 However, the mutiny also highlighted the failure

of the previous administrations to institutionalize democratic civilian control

and implement the recommendations of the Davide Commission, particularly the

enforcement of the law against previous offenders. The Feliciano Commission 28 The Report of the Fact-Finding Commission Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 78 of the President of the Republic of the Philippines dated July 30, 2003, 17 October 2003.

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recommendations sought to address the legitimate grievances of the soldiers,

to improve their welfare, to professionalize the military, and to avert future

military adventurism. Unfortunately, the implementation and enforcement of

these recommendations remain uneven at best.

In a recent paper, Hernandez (2004a) argued that not only did the mutiny

set back the process of democratizing civil-military relations in the Philippines,

but it also showed that civil-military relations remained essentially the same

as that existing prior to 1986. This was characterized by an enlarged military

role - including responsibility against domestic armed threats to the government

and national development functions, questions of the incumbent’s political

legitimacy, weak civilian oversight institutions, poor socioeconomic conditions,

and the US factor.29

Among the steps that the Arroyo administration undertook soon after

the mutiny were the improvement of remuneration packages for officers and

enlisted personnel of the AFP, and the appointment of credible and reform-

oriented personnel to strategic positions within the country’s defense and

security establishments. Examples are the appointment of an undersecretary

for Internal Control at the Department of National Defense (DND) in order

to ensure transparency and good governance generally in the defense’s and

military’s financial and procurement systems, creation of a special adviser to

personally monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the Feliciano

Commission, and addition of a civilian secretary of the DND.30

29 Carolina G. Hernandez, “Rebuilding Democratic Institutions: Civil-Military Relations in Philippine Democratic Governance.” Paper presented at the International Symposium on Asia’s New Democracies: Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea Compared co-organized by the Asian Foundation in Taiwan (AFIT) and Center for Asia Pacific Area Studies (CAPAS) of Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, 2004a.30 Since 1986, the country has had only three civilian (not retired AFP/PC/PNP officer) Secretaries of National Defense (or SND), namely Orlando Mercado, Avelino Cruz, Jr., and Gilbert Teodoro. See Carolina G. Hernandez Carolina G. Hernandez, “Security Sector Governance and Practices in Asia.” Journal of Security Sector Management 3,1 (2005): 3-4.

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In the coming years, the military reform agenda needs to encompass

more areas including the formulation of a more viable and efficient retirement

and separation benefits system for soldiers. Other issues require legislative

action, such as amending the country’s defunct National Defense Act, setting

the tenure for top military officers, and providing for a separate retirement

scheme for the AFP.

The Continuing Dominance of a Military Approach to Armed

Conflict

If democratizing civil-military relations is one crucial component of reform

of the armed forces, addressing the country’s peace problem is another significant

issue. The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report (PHDR) recognized the

impact of both the occurrence and persistence of armed conflict in countries that

registered low in human development. While poverty remains a major social

problem in the Philippines, the general feeling of deprivation breeds discontent

with the existing status quo. More often than not, groups excluded from the

benefits of development resort to violent means to dramatize their grievances

and/or achieve their goals. It is therefore not surprising that the PHDR reported

that the state of ‘unpeace’ is most evident in the poorest areas of the country.

Conflict has largely been shown to undermine human development. The PHDR

established that conflict is a costly state of affairs – affecting lives, property,

cultural identity, social cohesion, and human dignity. Its spillover effects, whether

economic (foregone investment and lost output), political (loss of political stability

and legitimacy) or social (prevalence of prejudice, socio-cultural tension, and

crime) are serious and pervasive.31

31 The 2005 PHDR has underscored SSR as one of the key reforms that should be undertaken in the current peace efforts in the country. This entails orienting the military and the police to recognize the peace policy of the government. SSR includes strengthening civilian control, professionalization, insulation from partisan politics, and curbing corruption. Also noteworthy is the Report’s stress that SSR contains measures that will improve

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To date, the AFP remains the primary institution safeguarding the

country against armed conflict. As the only country in Southeast Asia with

a resilient communist insurgency paired with a Muslim secessionist movement,

the government remains highly dependent on an overly military approach in

addressing each.32 A more holistic perspective in addressing domestic armed

conflict has yet to be fully developed and implemented by both the military and

civilian sectors of government. The balance between the right hand (primarily

the use of military force) and the left hand (socioeconomic/political measures

to address root causes and win the hearts and minds of the people) has tended

to tilt in favor of one side, depending on the overall political, economic, and

social environmental context, the strategic situation on the ground, and on the

personality and policy preferences of political leaders.33

In her assessment of the performance of the military approach to

achieving peace in the Philippines, Hernandez (2005) argued that not only did

the counterinsurgency or the military role in domestic conflict strengthen the

position of the military vis-à-vis the civilian government in handling the task of

conflict resolution, it also fanned the flames that ignited the twin insurgencies.

The vulnerable position of civilian authority during the Aquino transition

regime also eroded as the military was given much leeway in counterinsurgency

operations.34 In comparison, the Ramos administration was more sensitive to

the issues of uneven development and economic discontent as root causes of

the rule of law, human rights, and cultural sensitivity among the core security actors See Human Development Network (HDN). Philippine Human Development Report: Peace, Human Security and Human Development in the Philippines. Manila: HDN, 2005: 50).32 Francisco Nemenzo, “Comments on Government Responses to Armed Communism and Secessionist Rebellion in the Philippines.” In Steven R. Dorr and Deborah J. Mitchell, Eds. Governments and Rebellion in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985.33 Hernandez (2005): 1-8.34 Rosalie B. Arcala, “Re-Imposing Civilian Supremacy over the Military in the Face of Insurgent Threat: A Comparison of the Peruvian and Philippine Experiences During Democratic Consolidation.” Danyag 7(1): 3-28, 2002b.

140


the resilience of the insurgent movements and sought to emphasize policies

that addressed these issues rather than to rely on a purely military approach

to the conflicts. It pursued a combination of military action and socioeconomic

programs. This policy was unfortunately discontinued under the short-lived

Estrada administration which saw the rise in the strength both of the communist

insurgency and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Failing to reach a

negotiated settlement, Estrada opted for an all-out war against the MILF, taking

its main stronghold, Camp Abubakar, in Mindanao in 2000.

The current Arroyo administration is pursuing combined right and left

hand approaches in dealing with armed conflict. Successful cases of peace at

the local level being established (the island of Bohol has been a case in point)

indicate that good governance has been more effective in reducing the likelihood

of the reoccurrence of conflict than continued use of a military approach. This

strategy, however, requires greater involvement of local government institutions

rather than the national government. In this context, the unevenness of capacity

in different local government units becomes a factor in the sustainability of peace

in any area. At the same time, peace talks involving the national government

have been selective in nature. The government was on the verge of a peace

agreement with the MILF while negotiations have been stalled with the National

Democratic Front (NDF) since the Estrada administration. The salience of global

terrorism and its suspected links with these non-state armed groups have also

complicated the peace processes.

The issue of human rights and extrajudicial killings

Human rights have been a central concern of civil-military relations in

the Philippines. The military’s demands for the removal of key cabinet officials

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in the Aquino administration, those deemed to be “leftists”, had human rights as

one of the key related issues. These “leftists” were officials who from the Marcos

administration onwards had been critical of the human rights record of the AFP,

especially in the context of its counter-insurgency efforts against the CPP-NPA.

The issue continued to be a sticking point in relations between the military and

the civilian political leadership which had to answer to criticisms from civil

society. It remains a major point of concern under the Arroyo Administration.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo established an Independent

Commission to look into the increasingly embarrassing stories of unaddressed

killings of media personnel and anti-government activists. On 22 January, 2007,

that Commission’s report was finally made public.35 This Melo Report stated that

since 2001, there had been a noticeable increase in the number of activists who

had been killed, usually not in firefights. In the report, the Commission, led by

former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo, noted the disparity

in the numbers involved claimed by different groups. The human rights group

Karapatan claimed that at least 724 activists had been killed since President

Arroyo came to power. Amnesty International, meanwhile, officially listed 244

victims. Task Force Usig of the Philippine National Police, which was responsible

for the investigation of these killings, reported that there were 111 cases in

all. Whatever the number, the Commission’s report correctly stressed that the

number was worrisome. More importantly, this number had become a mortifying

issue for the Arroyo Administration within the international community. U.S.

Ambassador to the Philippines Kristine Kenney and representatives from the

European Union voiced the concerns of their governments and criticized the

Philippine government over the increasing number of extrajudicial killings of

35 Report of the Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings. (Created under Administrative Order No. 157), Melo Report. Jose A. R. Melo, Chair. (submitted January 22, 2007).

142


purported leftist activists in the Philippines. The UN Rapporteur on Extrajudicial

Killings, Philip Alston, undertook a 10-day fact-finding mission at the end of

which he noted that he was convinced that a quite high number of killings

involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and/or its agents even as

he absolved the Arroyo Administration of blame.36

The involvement of the military in these killings was generally indirect,

and the Melo Commission Report castigates it more for its lack of aggressiveness

in pursuing investigations of reports that pointed to the involvement of individuals

or groups that may be associated with the AFP. The Commission’s report did

not in the end identify those who were directly responsible for the killings.

Generally, however, the Commission reported that killings were done in broad

daylight against non-combatants (albeit known members of legal organizations

associated with the Left) assassinated usually by motorcycle-riding hooded

killers. What is perhaps telling are the statements emanating from senior mili-

tary officials which seem to accept, if not condone, vigilantism as a “necessary”

part of violent conflict.37 Despite the claim made by senior military officials

interviewed by Commission that the AFP does not consider assassinations to be

an acceptable part of warfare, the facts that these assassinations were likely to

have been committed by individuals or groups associated with AFP units and

that there had been little action taken against the individuals responsible, at

the very least pointed to these activities being accepted or even condoned by

military authorities. The Melo Commission, however, very clearly noted that

36 Philippine Inquirer, “Alston Report: AFP Behind Killings.” October 28, 2007, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquir-erheadlines/nation/view/20071128-103513/Alston_report%3A_AFP_behind_killings. 37 During the interviews conducted by the Melo Commission, Major General Jovito Palparan (now retired) confirmed a number of statements he had made about collateral damage, civilians killed or wounded in crossfires, and vigilante action against communists. While he repeatedly said he did not condone anyone in the military acting in this way, the report indicated that he had a cavalierly attitude towards the cases of political activists being killed by unknown gunmen in his area of jurisdiction and that he had offered “encouragement and ‘inspiration’ to those who may have been responsible for the killings.” See the Melo Commission Report 2007.

143


accusations made concerning killings involving political activists directly point

to the culpability of the military or at least forces under the command of the

military, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit

(CAFGU).38 The Commission’s report also noted various cases of the deaths of

journalists and broadcasters in different parts of the country. According to the

PNP there have been 26 media persons killed since 2001. While the investigations

into the killings of political activists have thus far yielded very few results in

terms of arrests and cases filed (despite well-known public pronouncements by

Karapatan that the military is to be blamed), the cases involving the killings of

media personnel have in fact been for the most part resolved.39

While legal institutions have yet to establish the clear involvement of

military personnel in these acts, there have been reports of statements made

by military officers which are telling. There is a certain attitude within the

military officer corps (and undoubtedly within the rank and file as well) that

these kinds of operations are both militarily and politically necessary if the war

against the communist insurgency is to be won.40 Human rights abuses, particu-

larly the killing of persons from the opposition, have become a natural part of

the political environment because of the lack of action on the part of the state

to bring those responsible to justice. But, this is precisely the result of a situa-

tion wherein the state is unwilling to act against those that support it because

it needs that support to survive. The unwillingness or inability of the state to

act against those that support it but which at the same time commit human

rights abuses and violations makes it easy for those who have the resources

to create private armies. Indeed, there is an evident lack of incentive to follow 38 Ibid.39 Then PNP Deputy Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr. reported that 21 cases have been filed of the 26 reported cases involving the killing of media personalities. The remaining five are undergoing investigation. (The Melo Commission Report 2007).40 Gloria 2003.

144


the law. As an institution, the AFP is probably very frustrated over the political

conditions that make the war against the NPA and the Muslim secessionists

unwinnable militarily. These include the non-provision of needed resources to

conduct a successful counter-insurgency war.

Conclusion

As noted from the start, civil-military relations in the Philippines retains

elements shared with other states in the region. The major difference lies in

the fact that the Philippine government faces twin armed conflicts, the resilient

nationwide communist insurgency and the multiple secessionist movements

in Mindanao. These have provided the foundations for an increased military

involvement in government. Combined with what has traditionally been weak

civilian political institutions, it gives the military significant influence over

domestic political decisions.

In more recent contexts, this influence has increasingly taken the form

of the military being an important veto actor in the competition among the

country’s political elites. Yet, this veto actor role only makes sense in the context

of a political system where the military does not really seek to capture political

power for itself (despite all the instances of attempted coups), and instead

institutionally (through the upper ranks of the military leadership) aligns itself

with certain political factions. The question is whether a seriously reform minded

and popular President would be able to swing the balance clearly in favor of

civilian authority, thereby keeping the military’s political influence limited to the

role which the constitution mandates. The nature of Philippine politics, with its

weak institutions and extensive (sometimes violent) competition between the

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country’s political elites, makes this unlikely. In this context, it seems that the

military will continue to have a strong influence in Philippine politics for some

time to come.

Works Cited

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of the Approaches Used by the Aquino and Ramos Administrations

in Re-Imposing Civilian Supremacy.” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,

Northeastern University, 2002a.

---. “Re-Imposing Civilian Supremacy over the Military in the Face of Insurgent

Threat: A Comparison of the Peruvian and Philippine Experiences During

Democratic Consolidation.” Danyag 7(1): 3-28, 2002b.

Crisol, Jose M. The Armed Forces and Martial Law. Makati: Agro Publishing

Inc, 1980.

Danguilan, Marilen. “Bullets and Bandages: Public Health as a Tool of Engagement

in the Philippines.” Research Paper No. 161. Harvard: Harvard School

of Public Health, 1999.

The Final Report. The Fact-Finding Commission (to Investigate the Failed Coup

of December 1989) Makati: Bookmark Publishers, 1990.

Finer, Samuel. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics.

London, Pall Mall, Press, 1962.

Gloria, Glenda. We Were Soldiers: Military Men in Politics and the Bureaucracy.

Makati City: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003.

Hall, Rosalie Arcala. Democracy in the Trenches: Re-Imposing Civilian Supremacy

in Counterinsurgency Operations in Three Iloilo Communities. Final report

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submitted to the University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and

Development Studies, 2004.

Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. “The Philippines: Not So Military, Not So Civil.” In Muthiah

Alagappa, Ed. Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of

the Military in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Hernandez, Carolina G. “Security Sector Governance and Practices in Asia.”

Journal of Security Sector Management 3(1): 1-8, 2005.

---. “Rebuilding Democratic Institutions: Civil-Military Relations in Philippine

Democratic Governance.” Paper presented at the International Symposium

on Asia’s New Democracies: Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea

Compared co-organized by the Asian Foundation in Taiwan (AFIT) and

Center for Asia Pacific Area Studies (CAPAS) of Academia Sinica, Taipei,

Taiwan, 2004a.

---, Carolina G. “Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces

of the Philippines.” Background paper for the 2005 Philippine Human

Development Report, 2004b.

Hernandez, Carolina G. and Maria Cecilia T. Ubarra. “Restoring and

Strengthening Civilian Control: Best Practices in Civil-Military Relations

in the Philippines.” Quezon City: Institute for Strategic and Development

Studies, Inc, 1999.

Hernandez, Carolina G. “The Military and Constitutional Change: Problems and

Prospects in a Redemocratized Philippines.” Public Policy 1, 1 (1997):

42-61.

---. “The Philippine Military and Civilian Control: Under Marcos and Beyond.”

Third World Quarterly 5, 3 (1985): 908-912.

---. “The Role of the Military in Contemporary Philippine Society.” Diliman

Review 32, 1 (1984): 16-18.

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---. “The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the Philippines.” Unpublished

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---. “The Military.” In R.J. May and Francisco Nemenzo, Eds. The Philippines

After Marcos. London: Croom Helm, 1985.

Nemenzo, Francisco. “Comments on Government Responses to Armed

Communism and Secessionist Rebellion in the Philippines.” In Steven

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Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985.

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The Report of the Fact-Finding Commission Pursuant to Administrative Order

No. 78 of the President of the Republic of the Philippines dated July 30,

2003, 17 October 2003.

149

SIXCivi l-Mi l i tary Relat ions in Post-

Authoritarian IndonesiaRizal Sukma

Introduction

The restructuring of civil-military relations in Indonesia has been a major

agenda of political reform since the collapse of the military-backed New Order

regime led by General (ret.) Suharto in May 1998. After more than four decades

of authoritarian rule, Indonesia was once again presented with an opportunity to

return to democracy and reinstate democratic civilian rule.1 More importantly, the

collapse of authoritarian rule marked the beginning of an end to the military’s

dominant role in the country’s domestic politics. For the first time since 1957,

the primacy and legitimacy of Indonesia’s military (TNI)2 as both a political and

defensive force –justified and legalised by dwi fungsi (dual function) doctrine--

was seriously contested and challenged. Indeed, with the downfall of President

Suharto, the TNI soon found itself under heavy criticism and pressure that it

should withdraw from politics sooner rather than later.

Responding to such pressures, the TNI had no choice but to declare its

intention to undertake a reformasi internal (internal reform) and adjust its role

1 Indonesia was a parliamentary democracy from 1950-1957. The first opportunity to reinstate democracy came in 1966 with the collapse of Sukarno’s regime. However, the military-backed New Order regime that replaced Sukarno quickly consolidated its power and, instead of restoring democratic rule, reinstated and indeed refined the authoritarian mode of governance.2 Indonesia’s military changed its name from Indonesia’s Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indone-sia, ABRI) to Indonesia’s Defense Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) in April 1999.

150

6 : cIvIl-mIlItary relatIonS In poSt-authorItarIan IndoneSIa

in accordance with public demands. In October 1998, four months after the

collapse of the New Order regime, the military issued a reform plan called “new

paradigm” (Paradigma Baru) detailing how it might reform itself. It was declared

that the military would redefine (redefinisi), reposition (reposisi) and reactualise

(reaktualisasi) itself within a new democratic Indonesia. More importantly, the

military also accepted the decision by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR)

to reduce, and later relinquish, seats reserved for the military in the House of

Representatives (DPR). It also declared that the military would no longer play a

political role and instead would concentrate only on its defense function. When

these measures were introduced and implemented, it became clear that the

military --once the most powerful supporter of authoritarianism under the New

Order regime-- finally had begun to succumb to pressures from democratic forces

to withdraw from the political arena. Consequently, the nature of civil-military

relations in Indonesia began to change in a significant way.

Indeed, after more than a decade of military reform, it is generally

believed that the chance and possibility for Indonesia’s military to once again

re-establish its political role has become increasingly slim. The reform process

has proceeded in such a way that it has become most unlikely for the military to

overturn the democratic civilian rule and re-establish its dominance in politics.

While the militaries in two other Southeast Asian democracies --the Philippines

and Thailand-- continue to exercise significant political role and influence, the

Indonesian military, despite its previous role as the most dominant force in the

country’s domestic politics since 1966, is no longer involved in politik praktis

(practical or day-to-day politics).

However, a closer look at Indonesia’s military reform over the last decade

would suggest that the process is far from complete. While the military has

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largely withdrawn from politics, the extent to which Indonesia has been able to

establish civilian control over the military remains problematic. Despite a decade

of military reform, the military continues to exercise a degree of autonomy vis-

à-vis the civilian government. Indeed, while the first stage of reforms (military

withdrawal from politics) has been fully or partially implemented, the progression

toward the second stage (establishing objective civilian control of the military

and defense reform proper) remains fraught with difficulties and challenges. This

study explains why the first stage of reform has been a success and examines

the problems and challenges in moving military reform to the second stage.

Military and Politics

Before Reformasi3

The military’s involvement in Indonesia’s domestic politics did not begin

with the inception of Suharto’s New Order in 1966. It had started during the

revolutionary war against the Dutch in 1945-1949, which led to the claim

that the military was not only identified with the birth of Indonesia, but it

also participated in creating the Republic. In that context, its central role in

defending the country and managing state affairs is seen not only as a sacred

duty but also as a manifestation of historical entitlement. In other words, the

Indonesian military has from the outset viewed its role in the new Republic as

“the shareholders” rather than “the executive agents.”4

3 The discussion in this section is primarily taken from Rizal Sukma, “Military and Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” in Thang D. Nguyen and Frank-Jurgen Richter, eds., Indonesia Matters: Diversity, Unity and Stability in Fragile Times (Singapore: Times Media, 2003).4 Guy Pauker, “The Role of the Military in Indonesia,” in John Johnston, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 207.

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The military sense of political entitlement grew stronger when the

parliamentary democracy system, opted for by the founders of the Republic since

1950, failed to create stable civilian governments. The fluidity of the civilian

political structure, manifested in successive coalition governments, always led to

a constant struggle between government and opposition in parliament. As such,

the military, especially the army, soon found itself enmeshed within the political

struggle between government and opposition in parliament as each group

sought allies. Therefore, it is not surprising that many army leaders regarded

civilian attempts to politicize internal army divisions as an act of interference

in its internal affairs. As resentment against civilian governments intensified,

the army found it difficult to isolate itself from politics. The first major political

crisis took place on 17 October 1952 when a group of army officers organised

a large civilian demonstration in Jakarta and demanded that President Sukarno

dissolve the parliament.5 Military leaders contended that they did this due to the

incompetence of civilian governments in governing the country.

But instead, Sukarno dismissed the army chief of staff Colonel Abdul Haris

Nasution. The Army, however, managed to consolidate and settle its internal

differences leading to the reappointment of Nasution in October 1955 as army

chief of staff. Its role and position within the society, and especially vis-à-vis the

government, strengthened significantly when the army succeeded in crushing

a number of regional rebellions, especially in Sumatra and Sulawesi. Indeed, it

was after this success that the army began to expand its non-military role into

political, administrative, and economic functions.

The second opportunity for the military to assert its political significance

further came in the mid-1950s when President Sukarno himself began to cast 5 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, revised edition (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 29-30.

153


doubts over the parliamentary system and political parties. As his disenchantment

with multi-party system increased, Sukarno spoke of the need to “bury” political

parties—a viewpoint shared by the military leadership, especially General

Nasution. Following the collapse of the parliamentary system in 1957, Nasution

provided a legal basis for the army’s continued political role by formulating a

doctrine called jalan tengah (the middle way) which later became known as dwi

fungsi. According to Nasution, Indonesia’s military was neither a government tool

nor a force that monopolised state power. Rather, it was an unalienable part of

the people, equal to other social forces, obliged to give content to independence

and entitled to participate actively in the national development process.

Therefore, when President Sukarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly

and reinstalled the presidential system in 1959, the move was enthusiastically

endorsed by the military, paving the way for the introduction of Guided

Democracy. The military leadership, especially General Nasution, clearly saw

in Guided Democracy an opportunity for the army to put his jalan tengah into

practice. Within this system, the army immediately served as one of the central

players together with President Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party

(PKI). Indeed, it has been noted that “the implementation of Guided Democracy

represented a convergence of interests between President Sukarno and the

leadership of ABRI (Indonesia’s Armed Forces).”6

The army’s growing political role during the period of Guided Democracy,

however, was not without challenge. In a balance of power game played skilfully

by President Sukarno, ABRI found itself under heavy and constant pressure from

the PKI. Aware of ABRI’s political significance, President Sukarno often used the

6 J. Soedjati Djiwandono, “ Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: The Case of ABRI’s Dual Functions,” in David R. Mares, ed., Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe (Boulder, Col.,: Westview Press, 1998), p. 49.

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PKI to limit ABRI’s space for manoeuvring, a role embraced enthusiastically by

the PKI with the object of undermining ABRI’s chance to monopolise power after

Sukarno’s departure from power. The balance, however, tipped towards ABRI

following bizarre events on September-October 1965, providing an opportunity

for the military to crush the PKI. In a still-baffling series of events on the morning

of 1 October, the PKI soon found itself in a critical position when a group of

army dissidents, with participation of communist youth elements, attempted to

stage a coup and killed six top army leaders in the process.

The Army, under the leadership of Commander of Army Strategic Reserve

(KOSTRAD) Major-General Suharto, managed to put down the coup attempt

and quickly blamed it on the PKI leadership. An outburst of anti-communist

fury then erupted, resulting in unprecedented massacres against people even

suspected of membership in the PKI. With active involvement of significant seg-

ments of society in the pogrom, the PKI –once the third largest communist party

in the world-- was destroyed and annihilated in a few weeks. After eliminat-

ing the PKI, the military –in a coalition with civilian political forces— removed

President Sukarno from power in 1966. The road towards unchallenged political

ascendancy for the military soon opened wide with the initiation of General

Suharto’s New Order government.

Under the New Order, the military immediately moved to consolidate

its newly-acquired power by strengthening its legitimacy as a power-holder

through the reaffirmation of dwi fungsi doctrine, reducing the role and influence

of political parties, creating its own civilian political electoral vehicle through

which military aspirations could be legitimately channelled (Golkar), expanding

its presence in government and administration at national and regional levels,

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and de-politicising the society.1 What emerged as a result was a unique feature of

the New Order political system characterised by a blend of military and civilian

rule, in which the former had an overriding say in almost all state affairs.

Political participation from civilian politicians was permitted as long as they

were supportive of the regime’s position and policies. As one leading architect

of the New Order, General Maraden Pangabean, remarked: “as a political force,

at the present time ABRI is leading and commanding.”2

ABRI’s motivation in dominating state power was obviously not confined

to political interests only. As its control over state power was now virtually un-

challenged, ABRI soon expanded its corporate interests in business.3 Under the

New Order, ABRI’s involvement in business expanded rapidly through a vast

number of companies, many under the disguise of yayasan (foundations). Each

service has its own yayasan, such as Kartika Eka Paksi for the Army, Yayasan

Sosial Bhumyamca for the Navy, and Yayasan Angkatan Udara Adi Upaya for

the Air Force.4

ABRI’s primacy in politics and economic interests was sustained through

a combination of rational economic development on the one hand, and skilful

and ruthless way of exercising power to assure an ordered society on the

other. Within such a system, President Suharto and his military-backed New

1 For further discussion on the military’s strategy in dominating political power in Indonesia, see Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship (London: Routledge, 1999), especially Chapter 4.2 Remark at the Second Army Seminar held in Bandung, 25-31 August 1966, quoted in Hidayat Mukmin, TNI Dalam Politik Luar Negeri: Studi Kasus Penyelesaian Konfrontasi Indonesia-Malaysia (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1991), pp. 74-75.3 In the early 1950s, faced with a paltry defense budget, regional military commanders were forced to find non-budgetary sources to finance their troops and operational costs, often with the help of Indonesian businessmen of Chinese descent. Suharto himself was known to have been involved in such practices during his tenure as a regional military commander in Central Java back in 1950s. See Ruth McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army,” Indonesia, No. 11 (April 1971).4 For a brief but useful discussion on ABRI’s involvement in business, see Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia (St. Leonard: Allen & Unwin, 1996), Chapter 5. For a more comprehensive discussion on this issue, see Indria Samego, et. al., Bila ABRI Berbisnis [When ABRI is Involved in Business] (Jakarta: Mizan, 1998).

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Order government employed a calculated display of rewards and punishments

as a way to ensure acquiescence and loyalty and deter defiance and challenge.

What emerged out of this combination was a strong authoritarian state with an

impressive record of economic growth that lasted for more than three decades

until the outbreak of the world economic crisis in mid-1997. Opposition was

regarded as unconstitutional, and any challenge to the New Order government

was dealt with harshly. In other words, the military ensured that the cost of

defiance would exceed the benefits of loyalty.

However, ABRI’s position as the most powerful institution changed as

the influence and personal power of President Suharto grew stronger and the

generational gap between him and successive military leaderships widened.

During the first two decades of the New Order, it was difficult to draw a clear

distinction between Suharto and ABRI. Suharto’s clout derived mainly from

ABRI’s support, and he was a primus inter pares within the core of ABRI

leadership. However, since the early 1980s, Suharto’s position had gradually

become more powerful and, by the mid-1980s, “President Suharto was then

very clearly the pre-eminent figure on the stage, having edged aside all possible

challengers to his authority, from within the Armed Forces or elsewhere.”5

At the same time, the decline of ABRI’s influence and power vis-à-

vis Suharto was becoming more evident. Suharto managed to ensure that

credit for successfully improving the national economy went largely to himself

instead of to ABRI as an institution. After being the backbone of the New Order

government for more than 20 years, ABRI was faced with the fact that Suharto

had himself become the supreme political force in Indonesia. Meanwhile other

forces, including ABRI, only constituted major players in a game where no 5 Jamie Mackie, “Indonesian Political Developments, 1987-1988,” in Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie, eds., Indonesia Assessment 1988 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1989), p. 18.

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one but Suharto exercised complete control over the rules. ABRI’s influence

in determining the shape of state policies was seriously constrained by that of

Suharto himself.6 In that context, ABRI leaders realised that its political role and

influence was extremely dependent upon Suharto. Therefore, since the end of

the 1980s ABRI was obliged to play a role as “the guardian of the palace” with

the object of ensuring the survival of New Order regime and keeping President

Suharto in power. Such a role brought ABRI into a direct collision course with

society when Suharto was finally forced to step down by student-led reform

movement (gerakan reformasi) in May 1998.7

The First Stage of Reform:

Successes amid Difficulties

It has been previously mentioned that the main demand by pro-democracy

forces in Indonesia was military withdrawal from politics. This ultimatum was

primarily manifested in the pressures on the military to relinquish its dual

function doctrine that justified the military’s role and dominance in politics.

Pressure against the military had been motivated primarily by the excesses of

military power over three decades of Suharto’s rule during which the military

had played a role as the strongest supporter of the New Order’s authoritarian

system. As cases of military abuse of power and violations of human rights

were publicly exposed, society came to the conclusion that the military should 6 For further discussion on the changing relations between ABRI and Suharto, see Sukma, Indonesia and China, pp. 169-177.7 For a comprehensive discussion on the role and position of ABRI during the political crisis on May 1998, see Marcus Mietzner, “From Suharto to Habibie: The Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam During the Transition,” in Geoff Forrester, ed., Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), pp. 65-102. See also Jun Honna, “The Military in Transition: Between Reform and Power Struggle,” in Yuri Sato, ed., Indonesia Entering a New Era: Abdurrahman Wahid Government and Its Challenge (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, March 2000).

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be subject to civilian control. Consequently, the military’s role in politics was

seen as an obstruction to democracy in Indonesia, and therefore, such a role

should be relinquished. However, at the beginning of the reformasi era, no one

outside the military seemed to know how to bring that about.

Indeed, under Suharto’s immediate successor, President BJ. Habibie, the

reform of the military was very much left to the ABRI leadership itself. Under

General Wiranto (both as Minister of Defense and ABRI Commander-in-Chief),

ABRI soon embarked upon a series of initiatives aimed at restoring its image

by introducing a number of measures:

(1) the separation of the police and the military;

(2) the liquidation of social-political posts within the military at national

and regional levels;

(3) the replacement of the Office of Social and Political Affairs (Kassospol)

with the Office of Territorial Affairs (Kaster);

(4) the liquidation of posts responsible for assigning active members of

the military to undertake civilian positions,8

(5) the requirement for military officers to choose between military or

civilian careers, either through early retirement or tours of duty,

(6) a reduction in the reserved number of military representatives within

the national and local parliaments,

(7) the termination of ABRI’s involvement in day-to-day politics,

(8) the severance of ABRI’s organisational ties with Golkar and the taking

of an equidistance position with all political parties,

(9) the exercise of neutrality in elections,

8 For a discussion on this function of the military, see Ian MacFarling, The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia (Canberra: Australian Defense Studies Centre, 1996), Chapter 7.

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(10) change in the relationship between TNI (Indonesian Defense Force)

and the associations affiliated with the TNI,

(11) revision of the TNI doctrines according to the spirit of reform and

the role of TNI in the 21st century, and

(12) changing the name of ABRI to TNI.

Through these measures, the military wanted to display its commitment

to adjust its role in the post-authoritarian era. The effects of these measures,

however, have not been insignificant. Some of the promises for change had

indeed been fulfilled within the first two years of democratic transition. The

military, for the first time since 1966, had also accepted the appointment of a

civilian as Defense Minister and a non-Army officer as the Commander of TNI.

The military also agreed to move the deadline for the abolition of its reserved

seats in Parliament to an earlier date, from 2009 to 2004. The internal security

function has now been transferred to the Police, and the role of the military is

now confined to that of defense only. The legal basis for this important change

is Decree No. VII/2000 of the MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly), which

stipulates that the (internal) security function (keamanan) is now assigned to the

Police, while the military is only responsible for defense (pertahanan).

It is important to note that while concrete initiatives for reform have come

from the military itself, a more comprehensive reform began with the process

of legislation. By 1999, the Ministry of Defense started the process of revising

defense and military-related laws in the country. This process was made possible

by the presence and active involvement of civil society and reform-minded

generals within a civilian-led Ministry of Defense. It is important to note that

the approach that put emphasis on the importance of legislation in the early

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stage of reform later proved to be an important element of Indonesia’s military

reform when the process began to slow down by 2004. Indeed, even though the

process seems to have stalled today, there are several regulations that would

make it extremely difficult for the military to return to politics.

Two pieces of legislation, Law No. 3/2002 on State Defense and Law No.

34/2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces, constitute the most important laws

in that regard. The role and functions of the military and the police are then

defined further in these two new acts. According to State Defense Act No.2/2002,

the TNI is “a defense instrument of the unitary Republic of Indonesia” (Article

10). The Act also stipulates that the military has four main functions: (a) to

uphold national sovereignty and maintain a state’s territorial integrity; (b) to

safeguard the safety of the people and the nation, (c) to undertake military

operations other than war; and (d) to participate actively in international and

regional peace-keeping missions. Meanwhile, the National Police Act No. 2/2002

establishes the Police as an instrument of the state responsible for guarding

public security and order and tasked to protect, guide, and serve the public as

well as uphold the law. Law No. 2/2002 also clearly stipulates that the Police

are a civilian force responsible for internal security matters.

The process of reforming the military, however, was not without

difficulties. Indeed, as democratization started, there was a degree of resistance

from elements of the military opposed to moving the reform process beyond what

the TNI has envisaged earlier in its own-initiated reform. The TNI remained

politically influential, especially in policy formulation of national security related

issues. To a lesser degree, the TNI has also been able to exercise its independence

vis-à-vis the president on matters considered military internal affairs such as

promotion within its ranks and the trial of military personnel accused of human

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rights violations. For example, the Commander of Army Strategic Reserve

(KOSTRAD), Lieutenant-General Djadja Suparman publicly warned in December

1999 that “the investigation against some generals will make soldiers angry and

act wantonly.”9 Such a warning was then widely seen as a threat by the military

to the then civilian President Abdurrahman Wahid.

The military has also resisted any attempt to relinquish the territorial

command system (koter). Those who argued for the dismantling of koter believed

that this system –in which the military organisational structures are designed to

follow the civilian administration down to the village level—has in the past served

as an instrument for the military to maintain complete control over Indonesia’s

politics. In September 2001, for example, Minister of Defense Matori Abdul Djalil

maintained that the Koter system was to be gradually abolished.10 However, when

in January 2002 the military indicated that it wanted an expansion of Koter,

by establishing a new Regional Military Command (Kodam) in Aceh, Minister

Djalil was unable to overrule the plan. The military continues to argue that the

koter system is needed to maintain Indonesia’s territorial integrity, to enable the

military to defend the country from armed secessionist threats, and to assure

internal stability in the face of communal and religious violence if the Police

cannot perform their role in this area. However, it is important to note that

while the koter system remains in place until today, it has ceased to function

as the political vehicle for the military.

Indonesia’s military has also continued to be involved in business. Despite

growing public criticism, the armed forces initially insisted that its involvement

in business was both justified and needed. It argued that the budget provided

by the government had never been able to match the military’s overall defense 9 Media Indonesia, 15 December 1999.10 Koran Tempo, 25 September 2001.

162


requirements. Commander of TNI General Endriartono Sutarto argued that “the

military is forced to get involved in business because the welfare of the soldiers

has not been met yet [by the budget].”11 A similar argument was also given by

the civilian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono when he stated that the business

activities of the TNI were a way to help improve a soldier’s welfare.12 However,

the continuation of the military’s involvement in business is now close to an end.

The Law No. 24/2004 clearly stipulates that the government should take over

all military business by October 2009. The government and the military have

no other choice but to terminate its involvement in business. Indeed, despite

various technical difficulties, the process of taking over the military businesses

by the government is almost completed, with most of the business units being

either closed down or sold to civilian companies.13

The problem of military justice constitutes another area where the military

has been able to resist comprehensive reform. Despite the decision by the MPR

in 1999 stipulating that any military personnel that commit ordinary crimes

should also be subject to civilian courts, the process of passing the new bill on

military justice has dragged on for more than four years. The military continues

to raise its objections to the bill arguing that it is not yet the appropriate time

to try any military personnel in a civilian court. It has proposed a joint military-

civilian court to deal with such cases. The Parliament, for its part, continues to

insist that a full civilian court must be implemented. At the time of this writing,

it is not yet clear how these different positions would be reconciled. One possible

11 Tempo Interaktif, 30-31 August 2002, http://www.tempointeraktif.com.12 The Jakarta Post, 14 June 2000.13 For a comprehensive discussion on military’s involvement in business, see Rizal Sukma and Clara Joewono, “The Imperative of Good Governance: The Military and Business in Indonesia,” study report for the Sasakawa Peace Foundation’s project on “Governance and Asia’s Corporation in the Aftermath of the Crisis,” January 2006. On the problem of taking over military business in Indonesia, see Lex Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, Out of Business and On Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia (Washington, DC: The Brooking Institution, 2007).

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scenario is through the introduction of a period of transition during which a

joint civilian-military court would be utilized before a full civilian court could

finally begin to function.

The Next Stage of Reform:

The Problem of Civilian Control and Defense Reform

Despite the introduction of swift reform measures that forced the military

out of politics, the process of reforming civil-military relations in Indonesia is

still far from complete. Within the Indonesian context, two problems stand out.

The first is the problem of civilian control of the military characterised by the

dilemma of civilian incompetence. The second is the problem of defense reform

proper, especially with regard to reforming the system of defense planning,

programming and budgeting (PPB), re-formulating defense strategy and policies,

developing defense capability, and reforming the organisational structures of the

military. These two problems constitute two main agendas for the next stage of

military reform in the country.

With regard to the first problem, the process of democratic consolidation

also requires the presence of a democratic and effective civilian control over

the military. This should go beyond the requirement to push the military out of

politics. Yet the agenda for reforming civil-military relations cannot be confined

to the imperative of preventing military intervention in politics. It should also

address the problem of how civilian political institutions can exercise an effective

oversight role and the responsibility in formulating defense-related policies.

Within the Indonesian context, there has been significant improvement in the

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role of the Parliament. Indeed, the Parliament has begun to play an increasingly

important role in determining the defense budget and military procurements.

In general, however, civilian political forces, especially political parties,

are still facing a number of constraints and limitations in playing a strategic

role in creating democratic civil-military relations, especially with regard to

strengthening civilian control over the military. Even though civilian political

forces are now free from military intervention and influence, and indeed are in a

better political position, they have not been able to maximise that new position.

Both governmental institutions and civilian political forces are still constrained

by formidable problems in exercising their authority over the military.

The first problem is the half-hearted attitude of the successive civilian

governments in power. The civilian power elites are still worried about the

influential position of the military in politics, and still perceive the TNI as a

formidable political force. Moreover, Indonesia’s highly competitive political

system, characterized by intense political struggle among major political

groups, preserves the space for the military to retain political significance and

influence. For example, many political parties and civilian leaders still seek the

support from the military in the competition among themselves. Civilian political

forces have been reluctant to initiate policy measures that might harm military

interests. In other words, fractured civilian elites complicate the reform process.

The willingness to compromise is still too great so that some drastic measures

which are needed to promote further reform are often delayed. Within this

context, the military has managed to preserve a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis

the civilian government.

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The second problem concerns the lack of defense expertise among the

civilian leadership. As most Indonesian civilian elites are only familiar with the

political role of the military, the focus of attention has been mostly on the issue

of the military and politics. Meanwhile, effective control of the military also

requires concrete measures on defense reform. Eradicating the political role

of the military constitutes only half of the required military reform. Changing

defense policies --especially regarding strategy, defense posture, doctrines, and

education –should also be seen as an essential part of military reform. In this

context, it is not easy to convince the military to subscribe to the principle of

civilian supremacy if they perceive that the civilian authorities have no adequate

knowledge of defense issues. Most civilian expertise on defense issues has come

from sources outside the government and political parties, namely from the

limited number of civilian academics. The fact that the Ministry of Defense is

still dominated by military officers only reinforces this problem.

The third problem, related to the second one, has been the inability of ci-

vilian governments to provide a clear and comprehensive framework for defense

reform. For example, the government has not been able to change Indonesia’s

defense strategy and policy to suit new circumstances and challenges. The na-

tional defense strategy is still based on the Army’s experience during the 1945-

1948 revolutionary war against the Dutch. Similarly, despite demands by pro-

democracy forces on the need for changing the koter system, the government has

no plan to undertake a major overhaul of the system. The procurement system,

in which the military still decides to purchase the equipment it wants, remains

largely intact despite the attempt by the Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono

in 2005 to bring the authority on this issue under the control of the Ministry of

Defense.14 The major defense review undertaken in 2002-2003 has produced no 14 Marcus Mientzner, The Politics of Military reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance, Policy Studies 23 (Washington DC: East-West Center, 2006), p. 53.

166


immediate effect on how Indonesia’s defense policies and capability might be

restructured in the future. In short, the mindset thinking of the military, rather

than that of civilian politicians and government officials, continues to influence

Indonesia’s defense strategy and policies.

Conclusion

After more than a decade since democratization began in 1998, Indonesia

has achieved a degree of progress in restructuring its civil-military relations

through a number of reforms. The military’s role in politics has been curtailed,

and it has now been confined only to that of defense. Military officers, for

example, are now banned from running for public office and occupying civilian

positions within the ministry, except within few state institutions as regulated

by law. The internal security function, which had been the core function of the

military, has now been transferred to the Police, which was separated from

the military in April 2001. Other measures, such as the take-over of military

businesses, have also proceeded, even though the process is yet to be fully

complete. More importantly, the Parliament has also begun to exercise oversight

functions over the military. In other words, a decade of military refom in

Indonesia has led to a military withdrawal from politics.

However, the process of reforming civil-military relations in Indonesia is

still an ongoing process. The military continues to resist reform in the military

justice sector and the culture of impunity remains evident. The problem of

civilian control of the military is still marred by civilian incompetence and lack

of expertise. The problem of defense reform proper, especially with regard to

reforming the system of defense planning, programming and budgeting (PPB),

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re-formulating defense strategy and policies, developing defense capabilities, and

reforming the organisational structures of the military is still far from complete.

In other words, while the reform has brought about significant progress, much

still needs to be done to completely bring the Indonesian military under civilian

control.

Works Cited

Crouch, Harold. The Army and Politics in Indonesia, revised edition (Ithaca and

London: Cornell University Press, 1988).

Honna, Jun. “The Military in Transition: Between Reform and Power Struggle.”

in Yuri Sato, ed., Indonesia Entering a New Era: Abdurrahman Wahid

Government and Its Challenge (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies,

March 2000).

The Jakarta Post. 14 June 2000.

Koran Tempo. 25 September 2001.

MacFarling, Ian. The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military

Politics in Indonesia (Canberra: Australian Defense Studies Centre, 1996).

Mackie, James. “Indonesian Political Developments, 1987-1988.” in Hal Hill and

Jamie Mackie, eds., Indonesia Assessment 1988 (Canberra: Australian

National University, 1989.

Media Indonesia. 15 December 1999.

Mietzner, Marcus. The Politics of Military reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia:

Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance, Policy Studies

23 (Washington DC: East-West Center, 2006),

168


---. “From Suharto to Habibie: The Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam

During the Transition,” in Geoff Forrester, ed., Post-Suharto Indonesia:

Renewal or Chaos? (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).

McVey, Ruth. “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army”,

Indonesia, No. 11 (April 1971).

Mukmin, Hidayat. TNI Dalam Politik Luar Negeri: Studi Kasus Penyelesaian

Konfrontasi Indonesia-Malaysia (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1991).

Pauker, Guy. “The Role of the Military in Indonesia,” in John Johnston, ed., The

Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1962),

Rieffel, Lex and Pramodhawardani, Jaleswari. Out of Business and On Budget:

The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia (Washington, DC: The

Brooking Institution, 2007).

Djiwandono, J. Soedjati. “Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: The Case of ABRI’s

Dual Functions,” in David R. Mares, ed., Civil-Military Relations: Building

Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and

Central Europe (Boulder, Col.,: Westview Press, 1998.

Lowry, Robert. The Armed Forces of Indonesia (St. Leonard: Allen & Unwin,

1996).

Samego, Indria, et. al. Bila ABRI Berbisnis [When ABRI is Involved in Business]

(Jakarta: Mizan, 1998).

Sukma, Rizal and Joewono, Clara. “The Imperative of Good Governance: The

Military and Business in Indonesia,” study report for the Sasakawa

Peace Foundation’s project on “Governance and Asia’s Corporation in

the Aftermath of the Crisis,” January 2006.

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---. “Military and Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” in Thang D. Nguyen and

Frank-Jurgen Richter, eds., Indonesia Matters: Diversity, Unity and

Stability in Fragile Times (Singapore: Times Media, 2003).

---. Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship (London:

Routledge, 1999).

Tempo Interaktif. 30-31 August 2002. http://www.tempointeraktif.com.

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Section Three:Civil-Military Relations in South Asia—

Pakistan and Bangladesh

171

SEVENDemocratic Ambitions under

Praetorian Stress – Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

Siegfried O.Wolf & Seth Kane

The complexity of the challenges in the process of state-building in

a decolonized environment tends to reduce the distance between military and

civilian realms in numerous young Asian states, especially in Pakistan. Here,

the inherited “colonial notion of civilian supremacy over the military and the

military’s aloofness from politics”1 underwent a gradual but significant change,

after independence, leading to various regime-types oscillating between military

dictatorship and elected political authoritarianism.2

In this context, Pakistan became considered over time as a potentially

classic example of a praetorian state,3 in which the Army perceives itself as the

sole guardian of the country’s national sovereignty and physical, political and

moral integrity, the chief initiator of the national agenda and the major arbiter

of conflict between social and political forces.4 In order to maintain this role the 1 See Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Democracy in Pakistan. Assessment Paper prepared for the Project on State of Democracy in South Asia, 2007. 2 See Subrata K. Mitra/Siegfried O.Wolf and Jivanta Schöttli, A Political and Economic Dictionary of South Asia. London: Routledge, 2006; also table 1.3 See Amos Perlmutter, The Military in Politics in modern Times. on professionals, praetorians, and revolutionary soldiers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977; Veena Kukreja, Civil-Military Relations in South Asia. Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991; Aqil Shah, “Pakistan’s ‘Armoured’ Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 14, Number 4, (October 2003): 26-40.4 See Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000; Brian Cloughley, War, Coups and Terror. Pakistan’s Army in Years of Turmoil. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2008b; Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Pakistan Military: Change and Continuity under General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. Singapore:

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7 : democratIc ambItIonS under praetorIan StreSS - cIvIl-mIlItary relatIon In pakIStan

military developed a critical outlook on its corporate interests prioritizing the

achievement of its goals independent from the ‘disappointing’ civilian (political)

sphere.5 Such autonomy was exemplified through modernization, including

procurement of arms and equipment, or sophisticated training. An essential

point of origin for the longevity and recurrent positions of the armed forces in

the business of the state was that it occurred in the form of direct and indirect

military intervention.6

Having this in mind, the following enquiry will explore the patterns of

civil-military relations in Pakistan, how these evolved and the short as well as

long-term perspectives for civilian control. The study will focus in particular on

the period preceding and including the rule of General Pervez Musharraf (who

led the country from 1999 to 2008) in which the fundamental cornerstones of

civil-military relations were put in place—a situation which has been essential

to judge the trajectory of democracy in Pakistan. In this context the work will

argue that Pakistan until now has never experienced a form of civil-military

relations which is generally described as “civilian supremacy”—a condition which

has been seen, for example, in India and Sri Lanka, or at least formally in the

Philippines. Even during the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime, which is categorised

by various eminent scholars7 as the period with the highest degree of military

subordination under civilian rule, the term “civilian supremacy” appears as a

misnomer8 During this time, the Armed Forces were not only able to recover from ISAS, 2009; Mohammad Waseem, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan. Paper presented at ISAS Symposium, Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics, 24-25 May, 2007.5 See Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters. A Political Autobiography. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. 6 See Waseem 2007, 4.7 E.g. Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. London: Pluto Press, 2007; Ayesha Siddiqa, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99. In search of a Policy. Lahore: Sang-E-Meel Publications, 2003; Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan. New Delhi: NO Publisher’s and Distributers, 1985; Waseem 2007; Rizvi 2000.8 Here one can state, this was primarily the military decision to move away from direct rule („planned disengagement“, which allowed a process called „controlled civilisation“ which started in 1962. See Rizvi 2000, 10.

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the “1971 military debacle” against India, but also strengthened their positions

and sharpened their ability to participate more directly in politics again. This

phenomenon was most obvious during the “bloodless” coup of General Zia-ul-

Haq against Z.A. Bhutto in 1977. Yet ultimately, Pakistan’s political history can

be divided into five different periods with reference to military influence over

the political decision-making process (see table 1).

Table 1: Patterns of Rule in Pakistan

Structure of Leadership* Duration Period

Direct Military Rule 17 years 1958-1962: Ayub Khan1962-1971: Yahya Khan1977-1985: Zia-ul-Haq1999-2002: Pervez Musharraf

Elected government under a military president**

15 Years 1962-1969: Ayub Khan1985-1988: Zia-ul-Haq2002-2007: Pervez Musharraf

Elected government under a civilian president ***

11 years1988-1999

(1) 1988 - 1990: Benazir Bhutto(2) 1990 - 1993: Nawaz Sharif(3) 1993 - 1996: Benazir Bhutto(4) 1997 - 1999: Nawaz Sharif

Semi-Civilian (non-elected) political government****

11 years1947-1958

(1) 1947-1951: Liaquat Ali Khan(2) 1951-1953: Muhammad Ali Bogra(3) 1953-1955: Chaudry Muhammad Ali(4) 1956-1957: Husey Shahhed Suhrawardy(5) 1957-1958: Sir Feroz Khan Noon

Civil-Military Equilibrium ***** 6 years 1971-1977: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Notes: * The formulated structures of leadership for the various periods represent models to express the dominant style of governance and political management; Interim-governments and Prime-Minister under Military President/rule are not taken into account; ** Also referred to as a post-military period, this specifies the military exercise of political influence via a retired or serving general as president; *** Also known as the ‘Rule of Troika’, the armed forces influences the political decision-making-process under civilian governments from the sidelines; **** supremacy of non-parliamentary forces (bureaucracy) under formal parliamentary rule; ***** The rule of Z.A. Bhutto is here called Equilibrium, not Civilian Supremacy despite the fact that civilians had gained extensive civilian control, but the limits were still set by the military.1

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To tackle the puzzle of comprehending civil-military relations in Pakistan,

this study applies the decision-making framework introduced in chapter 2 (which

chapter 3 on Thailand also utilized). The chapter analyzes the relations between

civilians and the armed forces in selected areas of political decision-making to

better understand past and current trends of democratization and civilian control.

Elite Recruitment

All four military rulers, due to various reasons, were not capable of

securing public support and searched for legitimacy via the introduction of a

‘controlled democracy’.1 Therefore, they launched processes of “civilianization

through elections”.2 In this context, their portfolio of institutional measures

consisted of abrogating or suspending the constitutions as well as carrying

out ‘constitutional engineering’. To gain legal and constitutional cover, they

focused primarily on two changes in the political-institutional framework. These

included first, the transfer of powers from the Prime Minister and Parliament

to the President; and second, the introduction of constitutional provisions and

institutions which relate to electoral democracy and its constituting elements

such as elections, political parties and elected assemblies.3 Analyzing each

military ruler’s influence on the electoral process, one can identify various kinds

of “electoral projects” during their periods of rule at the national as well as the

regional level. Motivated by the drive for legitimacy, in most of the cases (besides

Yahya Khan), they especially tried to use the “idea of local body elections at

1 See Pervaiz Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan. New York: New York University Press, 2002: 141.2 See Waseem 2007, 6.3 All National and Provincial Assemblies. See Harsh Sethi (ed.), State of Democracy in South Asia. A Report. New Delhi: Centre for Study of Developing Societies (2008): 40, 47.

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the ‘grassroots’ (district) level to become politically accepted and establish the

legitimization of military rule.4

This had a serious impact on the development of the party system,

in which the military authorities played a remarkably ambiguous part.5 The

military’s role in the parliamentary sphere gained particular momentum given

that political parties and their representatives, both inside as well as outside the

parliamentary sphere, lacked the ability to develop a constructive relationship

between government and opposition, given that parties and parliament were each

riven by personal rivalries and bitter conflicts among key civilian political players.

For example, General Ayub Khan (1958-1962) utilised this as an argument,

directly after staging a coup, to issue the Elective Bodies Disqualification

Order, aiming to ban all activities of politicians in the dimensions of political

participation and contestation.6 This was a significant step towards abandon the

1956 constitution, paving the way for the launch of his new ‘electoral vision,’

which became embedded in the 1962 constitution. This ‘Basic Democrat System’

thereupon re-established political parties.7 Ayub Khan’s successor General Yahya

Khan (1962-1971) also immediately undertook institutional steps to gain political

control over civilians. He abrogated the 1962 Constitution, declared martial law

and banned all political activities including the dissolution of all assemblies and

cabinets.8 To get a ‘controlled’ electoral process started, he introduced the Legal

Framework Order (LFO), providing him with the right to call for the gathering

4 See Abdul S. Khakwani, “Civil-military relations in Pakistan: the case of the recent military intervention (October 12, 1999) and the its implications for Pakistan’s security milieu“, ACDIS Occasional Papers (May 2003): 15,16.5 See Kirk Cambell, Civil-Military Relations and Political Liberalization: A Comparative Study of the Military’s Corporateness and Political Values in Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Pakistan. Dissertation, George Washington University (2009): 404.6 “A choice was given to the politicians, either withdraw from political activities for six years or be tried for their misdeeds”. See Cheema 2002, 136.7 See Cambel 2009, 405.8 See Cheema, 2002, 142; see also table 2.

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of the new National Assembly as well as the date for election. A remarkable

instrument, the LFO was also used to a wide extent by Generals Zia-ul-Haq

(1977-1985) and Pervez Musharraf (1999-2002).

However, Yahya’s decision not to accept the results of the 1970 general

elections resulted not only in the secession of the Country’s Eastern Wing (today

Bangladesh) but opened a corridor for full-scale manipulation of electoral as well

as constitutional institutions and processes. Being influenced by this political

behaviour, Zia-ul-Haq was able to impose a “trojan horse” into the political

system of Pakistan for all future military interventions. Without abrogating the

1973 Constitution as a whole,9 he launched the Eighth Amendment in 1985,

giving him the legal right to dismiss all assemblies and strengthen the role

of the President.10 This was a tool which was used various times to dissolve

civilian governments. In his search for legitimacy Zia also opted for a kind of

‘rudimentary democracy’ on the basis of a party-less election on the local level

for the National Assembly. In 1988 he dismissed the civilian Prime Minister for

the second time (Mohammad Khan Junejo) as well as all assemblies, a trend

which was set by Ayub and continued by all his military successors (see table 2).

9 Only parts of it, see Cheema 2002, 146.10 The President was granted the power to dismiss and appoint the Prime Minister, the armed forces chiefs, supreme court and high court judges, governors and many other top officials.

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Table 2: Dissolutions of Governments/National Assemblies: 1947-2009Year Parliament

Dissolved byDismissal of Government

Type of Dismissed

Government

New Leadership Habitus

New Installed Regime-type

1953 Ghulam Muhammad (Appointed Civilian+)

Khawaja Nazimuddin(Appointed Civilian*)

Civilian(Bureaucratised)

Governor General** (civilian)

Civilian (Bureaucratised)

1954 Ghulam Muhammad(Appointed Civilian+)

M. Ali Bogra(Appointed Civilian***)

Civilian(Bureaucratised)

Governor General (Bureaucrat)

Civilian (Militarized-

Bureaucracy****)

1957 General Iskander Mirza (Elected Civilian+)

H. Shaheed Suhrawardy

(Appointed Civilian++)

Civilian Governor General (Militarized-

Bureaucrat+++)

Civilian (Militarized-Bureaucracy)

1958 General Iskander Mirza (Elected Civilian+ *****)

Malik Feroz Khan Noon (Appointed

Civilian++++)


President (Bureaucrat)


1958 General Ayub Khan(Military, by Coup)

Iskander Mirza(Elected Civilian)


C-in-C (Chief Martial Law

Administrator), later President

Military

1969 P General Yahya Khan (Military,

appointed)

General Ayub Khan(Military, by Coup)

Military C-in-C (Chief Martial Law

Administrator)

Military

1977 P General Zia-ul-Haq (Military, by Coup)

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto(Elected Civilian)

Military C-in-C (Chief Martial Law

Administrator)

Military

1988 General Zia-ul-Haq (Military, by Coup)

M. Khan Junejo(Appointed Civilian)

Military President Military (civilianised)

1990 Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Civilian+)

Benazir Bhutto(Elected Civilian)

Civilian(Militarized-Bureaucracy)


Civilian (militarized-bureaucratic influence)

1993 Ghulam Ishaq Khan(Civilian+)

Mian Nawaz Sharif(Elected Civilian)




1996 Faroop Leghari (Civilian+)

Benazir Bhutto(Elected Civilian)


President Civilian (militarized-bureaucratic influence)

1999 Pervez Musharraf(Military)

Mian Nawaz Sharif(Elected Civilian)

Civilian(re-Civilianised- Bureaucracy)

COAS (Chief Executive); later

President


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Year Parliament Dissolved by

Dismissal of Government

Type of Dismissed

Government

New Leadership Habitus

New Installed Regime-type

2001 Chief Executive Pervez Musharraf

(Military)

PresidentMohammad Rafiq

Tarar

Military (civilianised)

President(Self-appointed)


2008 Yousaf Raza Gillani Pervez Musharraf (Military)

Civilian Prime Minister/President (civilian)

Civilian

Note: +All dismissals by Civilians are backed by the Military; *selected/appointed by the cabinet, dominated by bureaucrats; ** “In the newly independent dominion political authority was transferred to a Governor-General and a Constitutional Assembly the members of which were taken from those deputies of the Indian Central Assembly who had opted for Pakistan”2; *** Governor General of Pakistan Ghulam Muhammad dismissed civil-ian PM Khawaja Nazimuddin; **** The crucial features which turned the Bureaucratised-Civilian into a Civilian-Militarized-Bureaucracy type of regime were (1) the Amadiyya riots of 1953, which underlined the inability of civilian bureaucrats to control state affairs without military support (a process which had already started in 1948 with the police riots in Dhaka/East Pakistan and student protests during that year); (2) that Ghulam Muhammad ensured the support of the Army for the dismissal of the Nizamuddin government3; ***** Ghulam Muhammad (a former Army General) was, in 1956, officially elected President though all presidential elections are carried out indirectly by the assemblies; ++ Appointed by Governor General (GG) of Pakistan Iskander Mirza despite the fact that he was informally forced out of office by the bureaucratic-military establishment under GG Mirza; +++ In this sense, “Militarized” means – a civilian with a military mindset based on socialization (training, education and service) in the armed forces; ++++ Based on the 1956 constitution, Khan was appointed by the President (before Governor General).4

Ultimately, besides the myriad of institutional-constitutional interference,

military rulers nevertheless challenged the civilian decision-making in all facets

of this area. They exercised various forms of malfeasance and fraud during

the election campaign, manipulating election timing and rigging ballots. The

two mainstream national political parties, Pakistan People’s Party (led by the

Bhutto dynasty) and the Pakistan Muslim League (led by Nawaz Sharif), were

‘systematically constrained by the military’.11 Where the military did not ban

politicians and political party activity under martial law, the armed forces tried to

control these politicos basically in two ways: First, soldiers searched for a civilian

governing partner in periods of military rule. They co-opted and extensively

supported Islamist parties, tried to unite and/or organize multi-party coalitions

(especially under Zia-ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf), or enforced break-ups of 11 See Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: the Parallel State. London: Routledge, 2008, 24.

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existing parties to create a pro-military party (e.g. PML-Q under Ayub Khan)

as well as the reshaped of existing parties (e.g, the Muslim League)12. These

parties were used as the military’s political proxies during direct as well as

indirect rule. Second, in the cases of the civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto

and Nawaz Sharif, soldiers intervened actively in party politics13 to organize

parties in opposition, initiating (a) vote(s) of confidence and party defections

(“horse trading”) as well as harassing and monitoring politicians. In addition

to such methods, the military had a third ace up their sleeve. The military ruler

(e.g. Ayub Khan) placed “elected officials at various levels of governance under

the chairmanship of appointed officials”.14 Such tactics, useful in ensuring a

preponderance of military power over civilian control, were to some extent used

in Bangladesh (e.g the foundation of the Bangladesh National Party under Gen.

Ziaur Rahman in 1978) and Thailand (e.g. the military-created Samakkhitham

Party contested elections in 1992) as well.

In general one can state, that these methods for influencing the elite-

recruiting process have not been clearly delineated into separate models. Instead,

they have overlapped and have been applied by the top brass not only under

direct military control but also under civilian rule in 1971-1977 as well as in

1988-1999 and 1988-1999.15 Since the last general election in 2008, the civilians

appeared to be increasingly in charge in terms of elite recruitment, which can

be exemplified in the dissolution of the political wing of the military intelligence

service ISI.16 However, the military continues to wield enormous power behind

the scenes.12 Ayub Khan “re-animated” the Muslim League under the name “Convention Muslim League”. See Cheema 2002, 139-40.13 Especially the Mehran Bank Scandal.14 See Cheema 2002, 142.15 See Rizvi 2000, 192-3; Shah 2003, 28-31; Cambell 2009, 405f.16 See Frédéric Grare, Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2009): 44.

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Public Policy

It is crucial here to mention that key sections of Pakistan’s public policies,

especially foreign policy (e.g. India-Pakistan relations, Kashmir conflict) have

been perceived as both inseparable from and subordinate to national defense

policy by the top echelons of the armed forces. Indeed, there is a mutual chain of

logic within the military which links all policy fields: foreign and defense policies

are a matter of survival and as such it seriously affects domestic policy.17 This view

is also found in the civilian sphere; Pakistan’s security and territorial integrity

is more important than economic development. Although such development and

self-reliance contribute to the strengthening of the nation’s defense capability,

the defense requirements of her sovereignty have to be met first”.18 However, the

dominance of the military in this area is a product of external as well as internal

factors, but the internal are the most significant ones (which is actually true for

all areas). Indeed, civilians supported the gradually-emerging role of the armed

forces as an actor in decision-making in all public policy fields, especially foreign,

economic and financial (budgetary) policies. Here, the military was first a men-

tor as well as an arbitrator and then the monopolist. It was able to manipulate

and control not only the institutions of decision-making but also the political

behavior of civilian actors. In addition, the armed forces were able to extend

and consolidate their influence over the appointment of military officers (active

as well as retired) in managing and controlling positions of civilian authorities

and ministries.19

17 See Smruti Pattanaik, “Civil-Military coordination and defense decision-making in Pakistan,” Strategic Analysis, Volume 24, Issue 5 (2000): 939-968.18 See Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence. (Reproduced in PDF form by Sani H. Panhwar, www.bhutto.org), 2009, 117.19 See Rizvi 2000, 104; Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military relations in Pakistan. From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, 35.

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With regard to foreign policy, the military had its own angle and exercised

“considerable influence over key areas” in this field.20 It has implemented the

two most and exclusive pillars of the country’s foreign policy, first, the issue of

Afghanistan, embedded in the concepts of Territorial Integrity and Strategic

Depth,21 and second, the issue of India, which it viewed as an arch enemy

especially with regard to the area of Kashmir. One has to point out that there

was not much space to manoeuvre for civilians in the field of foreign policy. Since

the first years after independence until today the various supreme commanders

fixed the determinants of Pakistan’s future foreign policy, e.g. the connection with

the West (especially the US) or Pakistan’s China-Policy. However, Z.A. Bhutto

and Nawaz Sharif were able to extent civilian influence at least temporarily over

various crucial issues. This differed from Benazir Bhutto since her decision-

making power at least during her first term as prime minister can be described

in her own words: “I am in office not in power”.22 Due to the post-Musharraf-trend

whereby the army “officially” retreated23 from politics and administration, the

new civilian government is now at least able to establish a “civilian masquerade”

in decision-making affecting Indo-Pakistan relations as well as in matters of

regional integration and economic cooperation. However, stating that, due to

an extraordinary security situation, civilians and soldiers would share a very

similar notion regarding foreign policy affairs led to a misunderstanding of the

historical and contemporary dynamics in Pakistan’s civil-military relations. 20 See Ian Talbot, ”Does the Army Shape Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,” Jaffrelot, Christophe (ed.). Pakistan. Nationalism without a Nation? New Delhi: Manohar, 2002, 331.21 The concept of Strategic Depth by the Pakistani Military envisions a government in Afghanistan, controlled or at least influenced by Pakistan, to counterbalance India as well as to suppress the demands of Pashtun tribes over Pakistani areas, in other words to secure Territorial Integrity and avoid incisions in Pakistani sovereignty. See (Lt. Gen.) Asad Durrani, “Whither Strategic Depth?” Nation/Post (Pakistan), May 27, 2006; Frédéric Grare, Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era, Carnergie Papers, Number 72, October (2006): 1-24.22 Benazir Bhutto quoted in Christian Lamb, Waiting for Allah. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991, 107.23 This „pull out“, enforced by the current Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Lt. General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, found its further expression in the withdrawal of the Army’ support from the Musharraf presidency in favor of the reintroduction of fair and unchallenged electoral processes. Additionally the military removed a certain number of soldiers from civilian bureaucratic posts.

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The armed forces also removed the issue of nuclearization from the

sphere of civilian influence,24 an area of control which it has managed until

today. There is a particularly serious gap between civilians and soldiers in

the decision-making process in the nuclear weapon programme (Project 706

or Kajuta Project), which remains under military control,25 e.g. until today no

civilian prime minister received permission to visit a nuclear facility. While the

civilian government dissociates the state from the first use option of nuclear

weapons, the top brass of the military immediately confronts such statements

with the reference that civilians were not authorised to make such decisions.26

In this context, an extraordinarily delicate situation was created by the nuclear

proliferation activities of A. Q. Khan who is widely suspected of having close ties

with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and elites of the armed forces. Serving

largely the interest of the Army, these deals were made outside the civilian realm.

Another crucial issue which is part of Public Policy is the national budget.

Since most public affairs in Pakistan are linked with national security, the area

of public policy has often been under the control of top military echelons. In

addition, given that the state budget—which is controlled by the military—is the

central element for all political agenda setting and implementation, there is little

left over for civilians to control.27 Due to the ability of the Army to expand its role

as the “guarantor” of the physical and ideological survival of state and nation, it

has grown to become a major actor in decision-making in state budgeting and

consequently benefits the most from state allocations.

24 See Kotera Bhimaya, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: Civil-Military Relations and Decision-Making,” Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 7 (July 1994): 647-661. 25 See Talbot 2002, 323-4; Bhimaya 2004; Siddiqa 2003, 67.26 See James Traub, “Can Pakistan Be Governed?,” New York Times, April 5, 2009; James Lamont and Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan In Trade And Arms Offer To India,” Financial Times, November 23, 2008.27 See table 3.

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Table 3: Budgetary Allocations in Pakistan (in % of GDP): Defense versus

Development28

In addition, the military has carved out a role and position in the public

and private sectors, including industry, business, agriculture, education and

scientific development, health care, communications and transportation.29 This

phenomenon, described in terms of Siddiqa’s concept of MILBUS30, diminished

the relevance of the state budget as a means of controlling the military especially

since the army has its own independent sources of funding. The military’s self-

granted high degree of financial autonomy is enforced by military aid from

third actors from abroad, mainly the USA, which has contributed substantially

to the unofficial ‘defense-budget’ outside any civilian control. However, military

hegemony over decision-making in the field of Public Policy is best indicated

by the permanent high level of the military budget.31 The main reasons, and

28 Source: Siddiqa, 2007, 1997.29 See Rizvi 2000, 233; Khakwani 2003, 12.30 She coined this term to describe the military interests in the economic affairs of Pakistani society. An argument is made, that the military creates its own financial resources independent of the official defense budget, outside of civilian control. Subsequently, MILBUS is identified as a phenomenon which exemplifies the military aim to secure its material corporate interest and personal benefits of soldiers, demonstrating the armed forces’ intention to carry out necessary political influence. See Siddiqa, 2007.31 See table 3.

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subsequently the conditions which were used as arguments for shaping the

budgets such as striving for military parity with India,32 are outlined in the next

section (National Defense).

Table 4: Defense Expenditures in Pakistan in Billions (Pakistan Rupees)33

With regard to the political economy, one can state that the military, under

the rule of Zia-ul-Haq, started to build up a hegemonic position in the realm of

the civil-military bureaucracy complex. As such, the Army did not just act as

an agency-cluster which only implements decisions but also as an entity which

takes part in the decision-making process especially in terms of economic and

welfare policy. Under Musharraf the Army finally became the country’s most

important player in the “generation and distribution of economic resources and

wealth”.34 Ultimately, realising their own interests and substantially determining 32 See Veena Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts, and Crises. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, 78.33 Source: 1947-1977 data derived from Economic Survey, Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, various years; Rizvi, 2000, 63; 1978-1987; 2004-2007 data derived from IISS Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Routledge, various years; 1988-2003 data derived from Stockholm Institute for Strategic Studies (SIPRI). SIPRI military expenditure database, Stockholm [http://www.sipri.org], 1988-2008.34 See S. Akbar Zaidi, The Political Economy of Military Rule in Pakistan: The Musharraf Regime. Singapore: ISAS Working Paper, No. 31, (9 January 2008): 1-24; Siddiqa 2007.

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all sectors of the economy, the army undermined the formal decision-making

process through their informal networks and enclaves (the aforementioned

MILBUS) and hampered the setup of control mechanisms in the discussed

area through a form of enforcement lacking transparency and accountability, a

situation which has continued until today.

National Defense

Since the country’s birth, the military has been deeply involved in defense

policy-making, beginning with the conflict with India over Kashmir in 1947-48

which provided a defining moment35. In addition, a political practice developed

in which matters of national security became the sole responsibility of the higher

defense administration and military echelons. However, one has to stress that

decisions about defense affairs were solely in the hands of the military’s top

soldier, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army36 and there was little effort made to

institutionalize a coordinated and joint system of decision-making in this entire

area, neither from civilians nor from (Army) soldiers.37 As a result Pakistan’s

first official decision-making structure38 featured a two-fold lack of coordination

between the civilian and the military sphere as well as within the military domain

itself. The latter one was determined by a significant imbalance between the

three services Army, Navy and Air Force39. This inchoate structure of coordinating 35 E.g. the civilian government of M.A. Jinnah had to drop its plan to invade Kashmir with regular forces, still under the command of a British Commander-in-Chief, after the latter’s refusal. Even though this decision did not reflect the wishes of the Pakistani Officers Corps, it opened the pathway for the military’s role in the national defense policy of the country. See Shafqat 1997, 26; Talbot 2002, 315.36 See Siddiqa 2003, 37.37 See Cheema 2002, 37.38 A purely parliamentary Cabinet Committee for Defense (DCC) which should be responsible for determining the size, role, and shape of the armed forces, a subordinated Ministry of Defense (MoD), which has to carry out admin-istrative control over the Commander-in-Chiefs of three services (Army, Air Force, Navy), who were rudimentarily organized through the Commander-in-Chiefs Committee with the option to attend the DCC.39 Operation Grand Slam which led to the 1965 war with India was decided and carried out only by the Army

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civil-military and ‘intra-military’ relations missed the establishment of an external

and internal military checks-and-balances systems which opened up the window

of opportunity for the Army to intervene unhampered (either against civilians

or against the two other services) into politics. Therefore, since the creation of

the Pakistani military, the Army branch has tried to avoid the implementation

of a clear chain of command deriving from civilian authority to the military

and furthermore it has made several attempts to build up prerogatives in the

political arena.

For example, the first attempt to create such an institutional role was

carried out by Ayub Khan by forming the National Advisory Council (NAC), to

give his military regime a ‘civilian mask’.40 This idea found its new format within

the National Security Council (NSC), introduced by Ayub Khan and resumed by

Pervez Musharraf during his military reign. Zia-ul-Haq established the Eighth

Amendment to build up the president as an ‘institutional proxy’ of the military

in the political decision-making process. Another example of his strategy of using

existing institutions was the strengthening of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

(JCSC). In addition, one has to mention the 1996 creation of the Council of

Defense and National Security (CDNS), a remarkable measure designed to

formalize political influence of the military even under a civilian regime.

To sum up, defense decision-making was never a coordinated effort

between the civilian and military spheres in Pakistan, especially regarding issues

of entering a war or carrying out ‘armed encounters’ which were perceived

as purely a matter of the military establishment. Furthermore, all significant

decisions dealing with national security affairs, even those which do not directly

involve the use of force, were made autonomously by soldiers, not by the foreign without informing the Navy and Air Force. See Siddiqa 2003, 37, Pattanaik 2000.40 See Pattanaik 2000.

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ministry (e.g. to join the western defense alliance systems SEATO [Southeast

Asian Treaty Organization] and CENTO [Central Treaty Organization]).41 However,

the concept of joint planning for national defense in the policy-making process

gradually gained more momentum and had its pinnacle (up until today) under

Z.A. Bhutto, who offered a new system of civil-military relations (“command and

control concept”) through Article 243 (1) of the 1973 Constitution as well as his

“1976 White Paper on Higher Defense Organisation”42 which will be discussed

below under the section pertaining to Military Organization. The defense

decision-making-system, which was amended in 1988, placed civilians at the

top of the ladder.43 In a nutshell, to institutionalize control over national defense

decision-making, civilians and militaries each have utilized a two-fold scheme:

For civilians seeking to gain supremacy, a negative and a positive strategy of

institution building was applied whereby they set up a totally new system of

decision-making and tried to eliminate existing formal military prerogatives. To

avoid this challenge from civilians, soldiers resisted and created new institutions

as well as instrumentalizing existing (civilian) institutions.

Internal Security

Since independence, Pakistan has been in a state of political flux and

the military has been involved in various forms of state-building activities (e.g.

41 See Rizvi 2000, 77; Aziz 2008, 57.42 See Siddiqa 2003, 38-9.43 Siddiqa (2003, 38) summarizes this new (second) concept of decision-making in national defense as follows: “The responsibility for national defense with the head of the government and the chairperson of The Cabinet Committee for Defense, who, in both the cases, was the Prime Minister, The cabinet on the whole responsible to the parliament. The commander-in Chiefs of the three services re-designated as Chief-of-Staffs now came under the control of the Prime Minister. This system was further amended in 1988 placing the President as Supreme Commander.” In addition a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (headed by a General) was created. Significant here is that this committee is working on the basis of consensus decisions, which is significant for the aim of installing a balance between the three services.

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infrastructure development, water and energy supply schemes) as well as internal

security operations.44 According to the decision-making process one can state

that in general the armed forces tried not to be drawn into the “handling of law

and order situations”45. Meanwhile, all Pakistani governments have requested

the military to deliver such aid-to-civilians-power, a phenomenon which has

been permitted by Pakistan’s various constitutions. However, this aid-to-

civilians-power was one of the main sources for the military’s self-confidence

and legitimacy to intervene in Pakistani politics. To face the aforementioned

internal security threats, beginning under Ayub Khan, the military prescribed

a function for itself that includes both the management of traditional external

security challenges as well as internal security threats. With regard to the

latter, it promoted an image of itself as the “ultimate guarantor of the country’s

internal stability and territorial integrity.46 Indeed, the military was seen by its

top brass as the most sophisticated instrument to tackle the socio-economic and

political challenges of the country. Furthermore, the notion spread that not only

the task of implementation but also decision-making could not rest completely

in civilian hands.47

Table 5: Decisions for Internal Security Operations

IncidentStructure of Leadership

Carrying Out an Internal Operation

Civilian Choice Military Choice

East Pakistan - Dhaka-Police riots: 1948 Civilian Yes Yes

Punjab (Anti-Ahmadiyya) riots: 1953 Civilian Yes Yes

44 See table 5.45 This is understood as aid-to-civilian-power missions, the objective of which has been to restore civilian authority in law and order crises or to cope with natural calamities (e.g. in East Pakistan there occurred the Bengali-Urdu language crisis; various food crises; and the Dhaka police riots; while West Pakistan was confronted with the Karachi riots and the Ahmedia crisis, all of which transpired in the 1950s). See Cheema 2002, 122.46 See Talbot 2002, 322.47 See Pattanaik 2000.

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IncidentStructure of Leadership

Carrying Out an Internal Operation

Civilian Choice Military Choice

Karachi-riots: 1986 Military No Yes

Secession of East Pakistan: 1970/71 Military Yes Yes

Sindh crises: 1990 Civilian No Yes

Sindh, Operation Clean-Up: May 1992 Civilian Yes Yes

Kurram Agency - Shia-Sunni conflict: September 1996

Civilian Yes Yes

North Western Frontier Province (NWFP): 2004

Military Dominance

No Yes

Baluchistan: 2005 Military Dominance

No Yes

Baluchistan (Bajaur District): 2006 Military Dominance

No Yes

Swat-District: 2007 Military Dominance

No Yes

Lal Masjid (Red Mosque): July 2007 Military Dominance

No Yes

Swat-District, Malakand Division, Opera-tion Rah-e-Rast: 2009

Civilian Yes Yes

South-Waziristan Agency, Operation Rah-e-Nijat: 2009

Civilian Yes Yes

Note: Requested by the local (civilian) Sindh government5.

Today, the military continues serving civilian demands to deal with

counterinsurgencies but finds itself in an ambiguous situation. It is still mentally

trapped in the ‘old’ threat scenario shaped and dominated by India, which is still

perceived in conservative circles as the arch enemy.48As such, the armed forces 48 The ongoing Composite Dialogue (started in 2004) and the India-Pakistan Joint Statement of Sharm-El-Sheikh in July 2009 can be interpreted as a change in the perceptions among the moderate elite of Pakistan and India to reshape their relationship, emphasizing the need for establishing a sustainable peace process amidst socio-political and economic cooperation.

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have generally over-concentrated their attention and resources on the external

dimension of security. Indeed, this focus on India is coupled with the fact that,

the top brass still decides autonomously the quality of internal threat perceptions.

In other words, it decides what and to which extent an internal phenomenon

is identified as a threat and who is a combatant, e.g. the militant extremists

(separatists and/or Islamic fundamentalists, Pakistan/and or Afghan Talibans).

Here, the Pakistani Army has tended to ignore civilian demands to be prepared

for the changing threat scenario characterized by internal security operations

and a rapprochement in the realm of India-Pakistan relations. The long-standing

unwillingness to shift major contingents of regular troops from the Eastern

(Indian) border towards the West in order to be engaged in the “Global War

against Terror,” the ongoing procurement of weapon systems, mainly aimed for

the use in a traditional territorial confrontation in a conventional war with India,

as well as the hesitation to withdraw support for militant groups in compromising

the decision of the civilian government to assist the international community

(especially the USA) in combating terrorism49, are examples of undermining the

civilian authority. The military’s ongoing refusal to dissolve its linkages with

cross-border-terrorism and its insistence on the nuclear first-use-option must be

interpreted. Indeed, the army still wants to formulate and implement its specific

policy agenda outside the civilian decision-making process. This includes also the

size, scope and duration of domestic missions like the Operations Rah-e-Rast50

49 However, COAS Lt. General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani announced that the army will make future serious efforts to invest in training army units in counterinsurgency operations. See Brian Cloughley, “Pakistan’s Army and National Security,” Briefing Paper, University of Bradford: Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Brief Number 47, (22nd April 2009): 10.50 Operation Rast-e-Rath (27 April-30 June 2009) refers to a full-fledged military action in the Swat district of the Malakand Division of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan, aiming to crush the followers of the militant organization Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) as well as Taliban elements, operating in this area. Subsequently to counter similar extremist elements in the South Waziristan Agency, Operation Rah-e-Nijat was carried out. See Noor Ul Haq. “The Operation Rah-e-Rast,” IPRI Factfile, Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute (2009): 1-165.

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or Rah-e-Nijat, which remains nontransparent for civilians even if the latter

have had the chance to decide on carrying out a specific internal security task.


On the whole, one can state that the developments in the area of Military

Organization before Pakistan joined the “War Against Global Terror” in 2001

can be divided roughly into two periods, with the year 1971 as the first critical

turning point in which the Armed Forces were defeated by India for a third time

with significant implications for the military’s soft- and hardware dimensions.

During the first period, which began after independence in 1947, there was little

military organization to speak of and soldiers had to face serious administrative

and management challenges. These were not only caused by the partition

process but also through the occurrence of unstable civilian governments

combined with the lack of capacity in managing state affairs. With regard to

the hardware-dimension, the armed forces had to build “from scratch” and

were additionally overloaded with permanent “aid-to-civilian-power” missions.51

Regarding the software dimension, the military had to undergo an extensive

process of “Nationalization and Re-organization”.52 However, in this period the

top brass gained influence in determining all matters of military organization

up to the point in which the officers’ corps rejected any civilian influence in

internal affairs. In the second period, beginning in 1971, these processes were

at least temporarily and seriously hampered owing to the national saga of losing

East Pakistan (which became Bangladesh in 1971) as well as the recognition of

growing Indian military and economic superiority. The newly-elected government

51 See Cohen 1984, 33.52 See Rizvi 1987, 30-34.

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of Z.A. Bhutto as well as his democratic successors tried to bring the unfortunate

autonomous self-management of the discredited military to an end.53 Therefore,

civilian governments identified four benchmarks towards achieving civilian

control: (1) creating a military balance within the three services and to ensure

co-operation between all relevant military services and agencies; (2) gaining

direct control over the command structure; and (3) reducing the dependency

of the government and administrative authorities in law-and order situations;

and (4) developing defense-related institutions.54 To implement this, the civilians

identified over time various measures to challenge the military’s post-colonial

swaraj55, corresponding to the four benchmarks above:

First, civilians (especially Z.A. Bhutto) eroded the hegemonic position of

the military in general and the army in particular by aiming for major structural

changes in the command structure among the three services.56 This can be

exemplified in the fact that the civilians try to balance the dominant position of

the army (especially to reduce the influence of the army chief) by modernising

the navy and the air force of Pakistan. The overall aim was to bring the three

services under the closer guidance of the Ministry of Defense (MoD).57

Second, to secure influence over military organization (especially the

hardware dimension), civilians reshuffled not only the command structure

of the armed forces, but also tried to interfere in the process of appointing

53 The concrete strategies of action are more thoroughly elaborated later in this chapter. See Cohen 1984, 123.54 See Shafqat 1997, 174; Siddiqa 2003, 37-42.55 The term swaraj is used widely across South Asia; literally it means self-rule or self-determination (see Mitra/Wolf/Schöttli 2006, 386). Here it refers to the notion that the military should secure its corporate interest autonomously.56 He re-designated the Cs-in-C as Chiefs of Staff. The three Chiefs were put under the command of a newly established Joint Chiefs of Staffs Committee (JCSC, an institution for joint planning and control of the military), with the President as the Commander-in-Chief. The tenure of the Chiefs of Staff initially fixed at four years, was reduced to three years in 1975. See Siddiqa 2003, 37-8.57 See Siddiqa 2007, 62.

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and dismissing top military leaders58. In addition civilians began to monitor

the activities of the military and its associated security agencies, e.g. Benazir

Bhutto, who set up a commission to monitor and investigate the activities of

the intelligence services.59

Third, to reduce its dependency on the army in maintaining law and

order the civilians relied on the creation of countervailing forces. Here, the most

significant landmark was established by Z.A. Bhutto in creating the Federal Secu-

rity Force (FSF) as a paramilitary power purely under civilian command to reduce

the government’s dependency on the military in internal law issues and order

situations. However, the civilian governments of contemporary Pakistan, which

faces significant threats from terrorists and militant secessionist movements, have

in general depended heavily on military-supported internal security missions.

Fourth, as an extraordinary step towards the building of institutions for

civilian control Z.A. Bhutto introduced in 1976 the White Paper on Defense

Organization to outline the civilian Government’s defense and strategic policy

and institutional arrangements for a Higher Defense Organisation (HDO), to

reorganize the hierarchy and mechanisms of Pakistan’s defenses.60 Another

important measure in building up institutions was linked with the reform of

the defense industry sector including the procurement of arms and weapons

technology. This has been a section of Military Organization particularly difficult

to control in Pakistan for two reasons: (a) it is influenced to a great extent by the

58 Here, Z.A. Bhutto dismissed Air Marshal Rahim Khan as well as Lt. Gen. Hamid Khan. Benazir Bhutto took advantage of a failed ISI mission (‘Jalalabad assault’) and replaced the ISI head General Humdid Gul with General Shamsur Rahman Kallue (1989). Nawaz Sharif forced to dismiss COAS Jehangir Karamat and tried to dismiss Musharraf. However, Gul Hassan’s compulsory retirement through Sharif represents the high point of civilian supremacy (Pattanaik 2000) followed finally by the combined efforts of civilian pressure groups to force President General Musharraf to “take off his uniform”. 59 See Talbot 2002, 325.60 See J. Hittle, “Civilian Participation in the Formulation of Defense Policy,” Defense Journal, (April 1999).

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up and downs in the US-Pakistan relationship, as well as relations with China61

and France; and (b) the military echelons “are highly motivated to play their

part” with military equipment not only seen in the context of fulfilling ‘military

functions` but also as vital for maintaining political power.62 However, the various

arrangements with external actors about arms supply and technology transfer

(especially in nuclear technology) are exclusively handled by the military brass

without consulting any civilian governments. There is also a preponderance

of the armed forces in the sector of defense production. Civilians were neither

able to develop and formulate their own agenda63 in building up a Pakistani

defense production industry nor could they implement it in the form of a physical

infrastructure (Defense Production Division). Here one has to state that those

facilities like the Pakistan Ordnance Factories Complex (POF), Heavy Industries

Taxila (HIT) or the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC)64 are outside of any

kind of effective civilian control. The fact that they are state-owned and that

the defense bureaucracy operates [still] under the tremendous influence of the

armed forces has contributed immensely to the consolidation of the military’s

omnipotent position in decision-making in this field.

Civilian decision-making in the field of military organisation is today

perceived by the officers’ corps as an outside influence and resisted as such. It

is something which “is against the institutional norms of the armed forces and

will translate into risks and threats for organisational coherency” leading not 61 “The Chinese contribution to the building up of Pakistan’s defense industries, which surpasses contributions of other countries by an impressive margin, gained momentum during the regimes of Z.A. Bhutto and Zia (i.e. the period 1971 to 1988).” See Cheema 2002, 159.62 See Siddiqa 2003, 57.63 Which includes the following goals: (1) To achieve maximum self-reliance in the production of defense materiel; (2) To accelerate the pace of technological development, (3) To maximise industrial potential in the production and procurement of defense stores; (4) To attain economies of scale through optimum production and procurement. See Cheema 2002, 160.64 Other establishments are Defense Science and Technology Organisation, the Military Vehicle Research and Development Establishment, the Armament Research and Development Establishment, the Margalla Electronic Establishment or the Institute of Optronics e.g. See Cheema 2002, 160-163.

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only to a disturbance of the inherent lines of authority but also to politicising

and destabilising effects.65 To sum up, civilian decision-making regarding the

soft- as well as hardware of military organisation is perceived by most soldiers

as efforts trying to create dissension within the ranks, especially among the corps

commander and recognized as a measure to disintegrate the unity of command.66

Such civilian supremacy is as such vehemently avoided by the military.

Conclusion – ‘Enlightened Exit’ or ‘Strategic Fallback’

In the final analysis, the Pakistani military retains enormous clout in

political decision-making. Indeed, it has informally “assumed control as well

as oversight of Public Policy, merged issues of security with politics, played the

role as an agency for defining security and has constrained civilian authority”.67

In addition, generals maintain a veto in vital foreign policy, Internal Security as

well as National Defense matters. Finally, with regard to Military Organization,

the defense budget remains insulated from civilians.

There are, however, indications of some increases in civilian control.

First, the armed forces have begun to confine themselves largely to planning

the hardware of military organization such as force structure, equipment, and

supplies, as well as the software of shifting its approach to former doctrines

including the process of identifying new combatants. Second, there are also

growing indications that the traditional alliance between the armed forces

and civilian bureaucracy (especially regarding the ministries of Defense (Mod),

Finance (MoF) and Foreign Affairs) is gradually dissolving because of competing 65 See Khakwani 2003, 11.66 Tarique Niazi, “Ouster of the Prime Monster,” Aftab Alam (ed.). Pakistan’s Fourth Military Coup. Delhi: Raj Publications, 2001; Khakwani 2003.67 See Wassem 2007:3.

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corporate interests as well as mutual perceptions of disappointing performances.

Third, in the area of Elite Recruitment, the military’s acceptance of the results

of the 2008 general elections as well as the dissolution of the political wing of

the ISI can be interpreted as a boon for civilian decision making in this area.

Today it seems that Pakistan has moved towards a higher degree of

civilian control after alternating periods of direct and indirect military rule. It

appears that the military, at least formally, is becoming increasingly separated

from civilian affairs, and the Army may transform itself in the near future into

a “politically sterile and neutral”68 agent of its principal, the state. But to what

extent can one talk about a sustainable process of democratization or instead

a democratic interlude remains unclear.

To sum up, it seems a significant feature of the armed forces in Pakistan

that they will not accept any civil-military scenario in which they have no for-

mal or informal role. Indeed, the informal military influence in decision-making

will very likely remain in the future as a norm rather than an exception. The

army will undoubtedly continue as the major stakeholder in the political power

structure of Pakistan. Ultimately, though the armed forces may withdraw from

formal politics, this does not mean that they will abandon their interest in the

political process if their professional and corporate interests are challenged.

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EIGHTFactionalized by the Past:

The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Bangladesh

Siegfried O. Wolf

Civil-military relations in a post-colonial state are largely determined

by the way it comes into existence. Bangladesh was born as a result of two

traumatic events1, of which the latter led the country finally to its independence.

The victorious liberated political elites started with a multi-party democracy

but were soon forced to undergo a variety of regime changes, from an original

parliamentary system to a presidential one. Subsequently, Bangladesh turned

from an electoral democracy to growing authoritarianism which evolved into a

praetorian polity and then reverted to a democratic form of government.2

It is interesting to note that in all of this political turmoil, unlike in

other post-colonial countries, the military was not able to gain from its crucial

contribution to the liberation of the country any political capital3 in the

transformative phase. Due to its small size, various internal schisms within the

military rank-and-file, and the fact that the regular military was neither well-

1 The first one was the so-called Partition of British India as a consequence of the transfer of power from the colonial ruler to the two newly independent states of Pakistan, divided into West- and East Pakistan, by India. The second one was the War of Liberation, in which East Pakistan successfully fought against the Western wing for succession.2 See Emajuddin Amaded, “The Military and Democracy in Bangladesh,” R. J. May and Viberto Selochan (eds.), The Military and Democracy in Asia and Pacific, 2004, 104.3 Here understood as institutional integration into the political system, socio-political prestige, recognition by the civilians within the decision-making process.

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8 : factIonalIzed by the paSt: the evolutIon of cIvIl-mIlItary relatIonS In bangla

established within the political power structure of Bangladesh, nor did it possess

the basis for becoming well-established.4 Herein, the chapter argues that societal

cleavages in Bangladesh have been mainly responsible for the factionalism and

the intensive politicization in the country. However, the military has played a

major role in politics, which it has dominated for more than 13 years, an era

which has included two direct periods of military rule5.

To analyse this phenomenon, this chapter draws upon notions that

a certain set of factors, exogenous and endogenous, are framing civil-military

relations in the country, which traces the origins, social background and rea-

sons for intervention by the Bangladesh armed forces in politics (as outlined

in chapter 2).

Conditional Factors

The roots of the cleavages and politicization responsible for military

factionalism can be identified in the British colonial period. They were extended

and confirmed by the basically military-bureaucratic elites of West Pakistan

who sought to impose and maintain a repressive pattern of rule over what was

then called East Pakistan. This gulf resulted in a violently repressed secessionist

movement and consequently in the war of liberation of 1971. This was an event

the consequences of which created an incisive polarisation within society, which

found its expression in rapidly increasing politicization between two diametrically

opposed poles dominating not only the political but also the societal spheres of

contemporary Bangladesh. This split is marked today by the arch-rivalry of two 4 Ibid., 106; Golam Hossain, “Overthrow of the Mujib Rule,” Narindra Kr. Singh, Volume 14: Post Independence Political Reconstruction in Bangladesh, New Delhi: Anmol Publications (2003): 83-96.5 Ziaur Rahman’s regime lasted from August 1975 to May 1981 and Ershad’s rule from March 1982 until December 1990.

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leading political parties, the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh National

Party (BNP), leading to various essential political and constitutional crises.

Here one has to emphasize that this confrontation had extraordinary effects

on civil-military relations, creating cross-cutting cleavages through civilian and

military spheres.

However, the relationship between soldiers and civilians, first of all,

has been determined by the history of the regular Bangladesh Armed Forces

(BAF), a unit which has been “the lineal descendant of the British Indian and

Pakistan Army”.6 The military inherited not only the institutional framework of

its predecessors but also awareness of political power7 and the mindset of the

colonial army which contributed to a suspicion of politicians as well as anti-

democratic attitudes.8 But this heritage did not lead apriori to an orientation

against civilian rule and to the high degree of politicization among the soldiers.

Generally, the War of Independence removed the colonial feature of the

physical and social distance9 between civilians and soldiers. The former regular

units of the freedom fighters were soon aware that the country possessed

incoherent political leadership as well as weak and fragile political institutions.

Here, they experienced the fact that the civilians who led and carried out the

armed confrontation against West Pakistan were divided into various parallel

and rival governments.10 From the soldier’s point of view, the struggle suffered

from fratricidal conflicts and the lack of a strict chain of unified command. Even 6 See Ahamed 2004, 114.7 This is due to the specific role of the British Indian Army to maintain the ‘Law and Order’ as well as to promote the British economic and political interest. Here one can state, that it was expected that the colonial troops are political neutral, “but the politics of colonialism itself was against such bureaucratic neutrality”. See Khan 1981, 551; Ahamed 2004, 112. 8 See L. Rudolph and S.H. Rudolph, “Generals and politicians in India,” Pacific Affairs, 37:1 (1964): 5-19; Ahamed 2004, 113.9 See H. Alavi, “The army and bureaucracy in Pakistan,” International Socialist Journal, 3:14 (1966): 140-181; Ahamed 2004, 113.10 See Hossain 2003, 87; Ahmed 1983, 10.

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after independence the political and administrative spheres were divided into a

Mujibunagar and non-Mujibunagar camp. The first camp perceived themselves as

the real heroes who went into exile and looked upon and denounced the second

group as collaborators. This second group remained in Bangladesh during the

1971 struggle.11 However, despite the fact that the fully-fledged struggle of 1971

was waged mainly by East Pakistan’s ‘Liberation Army’, Bangladesh gained its

independence finally through the military intervention of neighbouring India12.

Despite initial democratic tendencies, the newly independent government

soon displayed the characteristics of an autocratic regime. The Bangladesh

Armed Forces had to observe how the newly independent democratic regime

turned gradually into a family- centered political dynasty revolving around its

kingpin Mujibur Rahman. In other words, from the regular soldier’s point of

view, the war of liberation simply led to the establishment of an increasingly

undemocratic civilian master, hostile to the military establishment and perceived

as a “serious threat to the existence of the armed forces” in Bangladesh.13 Indeed,

civilians and soldiers developed a relationship which was “marked by reciprocal

mistrust and suspicion”.14

11 See Rounaq Jahan, “Bangladesh in 1973: Management of Factional Politics,” Asian Survey, 14:2 (February 1974): 129f; Rounaq Jahan, “Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State,” Asian Survey, 12:2 (February 1973): 200, 205.12 Which gave already diplomatic and material support, hosted the exile Mujibnagar government People’s Republic of Bangladesh under Tajuddin Ahmed. 13 See Hossein 2003, 93.14 See Syed Imtiaz Ahmed, “Civilian supremacy in democracies with ‘fault lines’: The role of the parliamentary standing committee on defense in Bangladesh,” Democratization, Volume 13, Issue 2 (April 2006): 286.

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Military Endogenous Factors

Military factionalism15

Within the societal and political-administrative sphere, the military was

also hit by widespread factional tension.16 Despite religious, linguistic and ethnic

homogeneity the military organisation could not emerge as a cohesive actor. The

1971 War of Independence and its consequences led to serious internal rivalries

within all ranks. In the context of various schisms, different military groups

“tried continuously to promote their factions within the military organisation”.17

(1) Here, most significantly there was an existential confrontation between

those who (could) participate in the War of Liberation and those which did

not. This schism was enforced by the way in which the struggle was organised.

The major force during the Bangladesh Liberation War was the Mukti Bahini18

(Liberation Army). This force was composed of two major components, Bengali

personnel serving in the regular units of the Pakistan armed forces and civilians.

Together with the Mujib Bahini19 and numerous independent armed gangs, it

was the major entity waging the armed independence struggle. However, the

incorporation of these fighting elements from the independence struggle created

the most significant schism between the ‘freedom fighters’ who took an active

part in the armed struggle and the so-called ‘repatriates’ from West Pakistan20.

Deep conflict between these two groups derived from the fact that the first

group received more favourable socio-political treatment, benefits and privileges 15 See Table 1.16 See Jahan 1974, 130; Lawrence Lifschulz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution. London: Zed Books, 1979, 85-88; Ahamed 2004, 107-8.17 See Hossain 2003, 85.18 It succeeded the Mukti Fauj, an earlier secessionist armed force. Most of the soldiers therein were trained and equipped by India which fought for the country’s liberation from West Pakistani forces.19 A paramilitary force loyal to the leading East Pakistan politician Mujibur Rahman.20 See Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “The Fall of the Military Dictator: 1991 Elections and the Prospect of Civilian Rule in Bangladesh,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 2 (1992): 204.

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from the government. Conversely, the freedom fighters “felt insecure given

the numerical superiority of the repatriates” who were in the regular forces.21

Another significant factor which led to various conflicts among the “regulars”

was that the repatriates, despite the fact that they provided the bulk of the

personnel, were underrepresented within the officers’ corps. This confrontation

peaked with the state’s portrayal of the freedom fighters as war heroes and the

repatriates as collaborators22.

(2) A second schism can be identified between the traditional army

establishment (repatriates as well as freedom fighters) and post-independence

formations such as the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (JRB, National Security Force).

The newly-established civilian government under Mujibur Rahman (1971-75)

became suspicious of the regular armed forces and in 1972 built up the JRB as

a counterforce to assist the regime as a law enforcing agency to meet internal

security challenges23. Here one has to mention that most of the freedom fighters

joined the JRB, and not the regular defense services in which the repatriates

were dominating. This paramilitary force was organised under Mujibur’s office

and was primarily composed of his loyalists. However, the establishment of a

second parallel armed force with its own separated command structure in the

country did not find much support among traditional military organizations,

especially the repatriates. However, this conflict transformed itself subsequently

into a permanent confrontation between the regular and paramilitary forces.

Despite the fact that the JRB is integrated within the Bangladesh Armed Forces24,

21 See Ahmed 2006, 286.22 An equation which is also used in the conflict among the civil servants and technocrats (see also Conditional Factors). 23 See S.S. Islam, “Polity and Politics During Mujib Era,” Singh, Nagendra Kr. Encyclopaedia of Bangladesh, Volume 14: Post Independence Political Reconstruction in Bangladesh, New Delhi: Anmol Publications (2003): 11.24 See Zillur R. Khan, “Politicization of the Bangladesh Military: A Response to Perceived Shortcomings of Civilian Government,” Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 5 (May 1981): 554.

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armed clashes between paramilitaries and regulars have continued until today

(e.g. the 2009 Pilkhana revolt25).

(3) It is generally understood that the guerrilla character of the War of

Separation crafted an environment in which radical politicization could thrive

among the East Pakistani combatants, which created another schism. In other

words, on one side there were those people which retained or adopted the

outlook of a conservative (professional) soldier (especially repatriates) and on

the other side there were those who were in different ways associated/attached

with political groups during the liberation war and/or inspired by their political

agendas and ideologies, especially the leftist groups which will be elaborated

in more detail below.

(4) In addition, there has been a generation-conflict, not only within the

‘camp’ of the freedom fighters but also among the repatriates. The creation

of the Mujib Bahini under the leadership of some Young Turks of the Awami

League was not only deepening frictions within the porous central command

but was also deeply resented by the senior leaders of the party including the

Government-in-Exile. However, following independence in Bangladesh, it gained

momentum within the regular forces through frequent upheavals of young of-

ficers against their senior colleagues and the civilian regime which they were

supporting, leading to numerous coups attempts.

25 During a parade of the Bangladesh Rifles (a paramilitary border force) on the 25/26 February 2009, a substantial part of the commanding officers was exterminated.

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An ideologically coherent military organization

Since independence, Bangladeshi society in general and the military

in particular have been plagued by ideological conflicts.26 Thus, societal

fragmentation has found its expression reflected in various military factions.

The most crucial points of dissension have oscillated around attitudes towards

(1) India, (2) Secularism; and (3) Socialism. All three of these cleavages can

be condensed into a pro- or anti-Mujibism27 stand and have also been deeply

influenced by the overall schism between freedom fighters versus repatriates.

In other words, the disputes over Mujibism produced an ideological diffusivity

which factionalised the armed forces of Bangladesh already at the initial stage.28

(1) With regard to the India cleavage one can state that most of the groups

in the defense services in Bangladesh shared a common anti-Indian orientation.29

A pre-Independence feature of what became the Bangladeshi Armed Forces

regulars--trained by West Pakistanis in West Pakistan--was the identification of

India as the arch-enemy. This, however, soon turned into a broader phenomenon

because many of the Bangladesh “freedom fighters” faction were increasingly

convinced that the Indians “were robbing the Bangladesh military of the glory

of liberating their motherland”.30 The anti-Indian feeling was also enhanced by

the fact that they [the Indians] captured all the sophisticated weapon systems

left behind by the defeated armed forces of West Pakistan. In addition, the

coincidence that the Mujiburnagar Government stayed in India during the War of

Liberation bolstered rumors that India had always tried to influence the political

26 See Khan 1981, 552.27 This term refers to Mujibur Rahman, also called the Father of the Nation, who tried to impinge his ideological commitments upon the new Bangladesh state and his people.28 See Ahamed 2004, 107.29 See Jahan 1974, 134-5; Ahamed 2004, 108.30 See Ahamed 2004, 108; Jérémie Codron, “Putting Factions ‘Back in’ the Civil-Military Relations Equation Genesis, Maturation and Distortion of the Bangladeshi Army“, South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal (2007).

209


development of the newly independent country. In this context, the set-up of the

Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini as a paramilitary force under Mujib’s control was seen

as a bridgehead of India into Bangladeshi politics,31 to protect and control an

Indian-friendly government as well as India’s interest. Here, the signing of the

“Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace” between India and Mujib was

seen as “surrendering national interest to India”.32 This proved to be a dangerous

move since Bangladesh’s regular forces perceived that the civilian government

had betrayed the country for its own sake to maintain power. Indeed, “this anti-

Indian feeling gradually developed not only into an anti-Mujib feeling because

of Mujib’s pro-Indian foreign policy”33 but also united elements of “repatriates”

and “freedom fighters” into a new faction. Moreover, this was a phenomenon

enforced by the fact that post-independence military recruits had started to

challenge the monopolistic position of the “freedom fighters” and joined the

“repatriates” (Maniruzzaman 1992, 204) in challenging the pro-Indian civilians.

(2) The Secularism-cleavage gained political significance after the fall

of the civilian government of Mujibur Rahman. Secularism comprised two

intermingling dimensions, the role of Islam as well as the notion of nationalism.

As in Pakistan, the military rulers in Bangladesh (especially Ziaur Rahman)

“managed to develop a successful populist and religiously coloured nationalist

discourse”.34 Subsequently, to challenge the secular civilians promoting Bengali

language-inspired nationalism they developed the notion of an Islamic-inspired

Bangladeshi nationalism. Islam was identified as an essential religious element

of national (Bangladeshi) identity35, to diminish the significance of the pre-1975

31 See Ahamed 2004, 108.32 See Hossain 2003, 90-1.33 See Ahamed 2004, 109.34 See Codron 2007.35 Therefore Bangladesh has to be an Islamic state.

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former ideological main building blocks of national identity – secularism and

language (Bengali nationalism) favoured by the civilians.

(3) The Socialism-cleavage includes the confrontation between a pro-

China camp and a pro-Soviet Union camp, as two politicising pivots. After the

formation of Pakistan, major cultural, political, economic and administrative

grievances existed between West Pakistan and East Pakistan. In this context,

various socialist and communist elements during the War of Liberation were

coming into existence, which identified the war against West Pakistan not only

as a struggle for independence but also as a “class struggle”. As such, the

Bangladesh armed forces inherited a remarkable ‘leftist cleavage’ which finds

its expression in the confrontation between a pro-Maoist (Peking) and pro-

Marxist-Leninist (Moscow) stand. The first tendency was in favour of a kind of

productive army on the pattern of the Chinese People’s Army as a model for the

Bangladesh defense forces. In other words, the army had to be an “inseparable

part of the country’s production system”36 and be seen as an opposite version

of the anti-production-oriented standing (conventional) army.37 The argument

made was that the country could not afford to maintain a sufficient standing

army to deal with any external threat.38

To sum up, despite this common bond of “anti-Mujibism” the ideological

cleavages led to such a high degree of politicization that the regular armed

forces were not able to transform into an unifying force or develop a ‘corps

d’ esprit’. In contrast, all the aforementioned schisms and cleavages led finally

to two stereotypical categories of soldiers: 1) the secular, pro-Indian and pro-

Moscow freedom fighters; and 2) the anti-secular, anti-Indian and pro-Peking

36 See Hossain 2003, 87.37 See Lifschultz 1979, 85ff, Ahamed 2004, 108.38 See Khan 1981, 552.

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repatriates.39 These two categories must be seen as ideal-types since they are

composed of numerous, partly overlapping factions.

Table1: Periods of Factionalism (based on selected cleavages/schisms) and

state of politicization of the armed forces

Period*Regime Type

Cleavage/Schism:

Participation in the War of

Liberation

Cleavage/Schism:India

Cleavage/Schism:

“Socialism”

Cleavage/Schism:

“Regular/Paramilitary”

Cleavages/ Schism:

“Secularism”

State of politicization of the Armed Forces: High, intense factionalism

Mujibur Rahman1971-75

Civilian High High High High High

Ziaur Rahman1975-81

Military Low High High Medium High

State of politicization of the Armed Forces: Process of de-politicization, enhancement of internal cohesion

Hussain M. Ershad1982-90

Military Low Medium/low Low Low High

Khaleda Zia(BNP):1991-1996

Civilian High Medium Low High Medium

State of politicization of the Armed Forces: Process of re-politicization (civil-military crisis of 1996); renewed factionalism through political parties (AL & BNP)

Sheikh Hasina (AL)1996-2001

Civilian High Medium Low High Medium

Khaleda Zia2001-06

Civilian Medium Medium Low Medium High

Sheikh Hasina (AL) 2009-

Civilian Medium Medium Low High Medium/Low

Note * Interim (Caretaker) Governments are not taken into account.

Source: Author’s own compilation based upon a review of the literature. 39 See Ahamed 2004, 107.

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Internal Cohesion

Despite schisms and cleavages, various successful internal security

operations from the early years have existed until today in the form of com-

bined measures of the regular defense forces, paramilitary Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini

and the police to assist the civilian government in law and order situations.

This has improved, at least temporally, internal cohesion among the regulars.40

But instead of establishing effective cooperation between civilians as well as

their paramilitary forces and the regular forces, this relationship between both

turned into an even more hostile one. The perception of the army that Bangla-

desh’s corrupt, clientelistic, senior political leaders have been unable to handle

state affairs has enhanced the belief among the military top brass that there

is an immediate need for the establishment of homogeneous and integrated

armed forces as well as a political role for them. This has marked a significant

development in their mindset, which indicates the growth of something which

can be seen as a form of internal cohesion. Yet without the support of both

senior officers and the military rank and file, a political move by a single faction

of the armed forces would be impossible. Nevertheless, despite various moves

toward greater integration and unification among soldiers, the military rulers

Ziaur Rahman (1975-81) and Hussain Mohammed Ershad (1982-90) still had

to ensure the loyalty of the mass of soldiery. Therefore measures of military

re-organization were undertaken (especially by Rahman after the unsuccessful

1977 coup against him), mainly through the incorporation of the bulk of the

paramilitary force within the regular command structure, which helped to reduce

the impact of ideological confusion, at least temporarily.

40 E.g. the combined operations of the police, Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini and the armed forces in July 1973, December 1973 as well as April and May 1974 (see Hossain 2003, 88) or in 2002 Operation Clean Heart/Joint Drive Operation in 2002.

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Degree to which democratization affects economic interests of Bangladeshi

military groups

Here it has to be first noted that the political environment was confronted

with socio-economic developments which gave very few opportunities for the

building up of a large regular armed force. The lesson from West Pakistan

not to create a military-bureaucratic leviathan convinced the ruling civilians

not to mobilise the limited resources to invest in the hardware as well as

software dimension of the military organization (see Chapter 2 for definitions

of “hardware” and “software”). The regular armed forces had to experience not

only the curtailment of most of the pre-independence privileges and available

resources offered by the military ruler of West Pakistan, but also had to

observe the fast-deteriorating socio-economic situation of its soldiers. This was

particularly frustrating, because most of the military infrastructure was destroyed

during the war. In this context, the civilian government was perceived as a

serious threat to the most basic corporate interests of the military.41 Additionally,

it was “faulted for its lack of basic understanding of the politics of budgeting,

especially in respect to the military”.42 To sum up, this deterioration of economic

conditions under democratic rule has increased the politicization of the regulars43

and tensions between civilians and soldiers as well as between regulars and

paramilitary forces over resources.44

41 See Ahamed 2004, 108; Ahmed 2006, 286.42 See Kahn 1981, 552.43 See Khan 1981, 552.44 See Codron 2007.

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Military Exogenous Factors

Public support and Consensus among civilians

In general, though the armed forces have been highly politicized, the

people of Bangladesh have been deeply committed to democratic order.45 Despite

growing political turmoil today one can state that a democratic (civilian) regime

is the most preferable form of government in Bangladesh (see table 2).46 This

root of democracy can be traced not only to colonial history but also to the

peculiar form of a two-fold process towards the country’s independence: from

Britain first, and then West Pakistan later. According to Ahamed47 during British

rule in India, Bengalis were in the forefront of freedom movements there. Their

anti-colonialism can be described as agitations “for a democratic polity and was

deeply rooted in the democratic ethos“.48 In this sense, beside the resistance

against economic exploitation, one of the main motivations to take up arms

against West Pakistan in 1971 was to restore the democratic system and enforce

the political implementation of electoral results of the 1970 national elections.

But while the Bangladeshi seems to be traditionally committed to democratic

ideals, governing elites until today were not able to establish and consolidate

an effective and functioning democratic order. Additionally, the high degree of

factionalism and corruption combined with a weak performance in governance

and administration led among other things to the decline of the socio-economic

situation of most Bangladeshi people. Facing an economic squeeze and an

unequal sharing of austerity, coupled with the allegation of widespread disastrous

patron-client relationships),49 the masses turned against the ruling civilians

45 See Ahamed 2004, 115.46 See Harsh Sethi (ed.), State of Democracy in South Asia. A Report. New Delhi: Centre for Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), 2008. 48ff.47 See Ahamed 2004, 115.48 See Ahamed 2004, 115.49 See Jahan 1974, 125.

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as well as military elites. This created a civilian consensus working in two

directions: on one side, against the civilian rule of Mujibur Rahman including

the acceptance of the first direct intervention of armed forces into politics and

subsequently military rule in 1975 by Major General Ziaur Rahman. On the

other side, it created various pro-democracy movements against the military

rulers, who “were forced to relent and restore democratic institutions”.50 The

most sustained was in 1990 as General Ershad was compelled to leave office, at

present the last man-in-uniform in government. To sum up, civilian consensus

is one of the most crucial factors in the civilian-military equation, producing an

active civil society in Bangladesh.

Table 2: Preferable form of government in Bangladesh (in %)

Democracy is preferableSometimes dictatorship is

betterDoesn’t’ matter to me

69 6 25

Source: Sethi 2008.

Active Civil Society

Bangladesh is thus characterised by a very active civil society. Social

movements in particular have played a significant role (starting with the

language (bangla) movement in the 1950s), peaking in the war of independence

and subsequently in the formation of Bangladesh. Since then social movements

have been prominent in organizing broad sections of society in an effort to

overthrow undemocratic regimes, both civilian and military. The student wings

of the political parties have especially played a vital role, acting independently,

and organizing platforms on which other sections of the society could join.

Besides students, today civil society is composed of the intelligentsia, lawyers 50 See Sethi 2008, 48.

216


of the Supreme Court, labor unions, non-governmental organizations, and the

media, appearing thus as a well- organized force which is one of the country’s

most significant political actors.51

Internal Security Challenges

Directly after coming to existence, Bangladesh was forced to face its most

serious internal security threat. Due to their notion of an unfinished revolution

(independence of 1971 did not led to an end of the class struggle) the extremist

pro-Chinese communist groups attempted to instigate a second revolution

through armed struggle. They gathered together in armed underground gangs

(together with other former freedom fighters52) to overthrow the Indian-supported

government which “represent[s] the exploiting classes”.53 Another vestige from

the War of Liberation was the existence of the so-called Razakkars54, which

were challenging the state-building process. It is significant to mention that the

subsequent security operations helped to consolidate the military organization

of the regulars as well as enhance the politicization among their ranks.

Nevertheless, they proved their loyalty towards the civil-political authority in

carrying out what the civilian government had demanded: the suppression of

the militant pro-Chinese, anti-Indian communist threat.

However, due to Bangladesh’s comparatively homogenous society, sub-

nationalist movements based on ethnic and religious lines (generally recognized

as one of the most serious challenges in South Asia) have not emerged. The

most significant separatist movement of ethnic groups has been that of the 51 See Ahmed 2006, 267-8, 289.52 These militants destabilised in particular the countryside where many of them became marauders. See Khan 1981, 553. 53 See Ahamed 2004, 104; Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “Bangladesh in 1975: the fall of the Mujib regime and its aftermath,” Asian Survey, 16:2 (1976): 119-29.54 The Razakkars were East Pakistani paramilitary troops supported by West Pakistan helping to crackdown the secessionist movement.

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Chittagong Hill Tracts. This conflict created a corps d` esprit among the military

regulars because virtually all of soldiers have shared the experience of having

to undergo service in this area.

Finally, there is the increasing challenge of terrorism. Until recently

Bangladeshi officials denied the existence of terrorist structures. Nevertheless,

in the last few years the government banned various Islamic organizations, a

move interpreted by observers as a sign of increasing concern that Bangladesh

might become a base from which both South- and Southeast Asian terrorists

could operate. This threat is gaining momentum because it might renew certain

cleavages like secularism and the conflict between regulars and paramilitary

groups.

External Factors, actors and threats

With regard to the external dimension, two major pivots can be identified:

concern about India’s intentions as the regional hegemon and the country’s

strong dependence on foreign development assistance. According to the latter

factor, the need to secure economic aid from all possible sources has been one

of the main concerns of the civilian leadership as well as the military top brass.

Here especially, two external actors taking increasing influence in Bangladeshi

domestic politics have to be mentioned: the UN and foreign donors. Today,

the Bangladeshi armed forces is one of the largest contributing forces to the

United Nations for peace-maintaining operations across the globe, e.g. UNIIMOG

(Iraq), UNIKOM (Kuwait), UNMIH (Haiti), UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia) and UNMEE

(Ethiopia/Eritrea). Here, the UN has not hesitated to warn Bangladesh that if it is

not democratic, the UN will cut it off from these lucrative peacekeeping duties (as

in January 2007). The threat of losing these financial benefits can be identified

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as a crucial factor for the soldiers as individuals and the army as an institution

in giving up political ambitions.55 In addition, the changing international

environment after the end of the cold war had a significant impact on necessary

development aid. As with the UN, foreign donors56 modified the patterns of their

support, making aid to Bangladesh dependent on the enhancement of democracy

as well as non-interference of the armed forces into politics. In this context, one

can state that the internal actors substantially “boosted the confidence of the

civil society”57 and the pro-democratic forces.

Besides this dependency, there is no serious external threat perception

towards the integrity and sovereignty of Bangladesh among the country’s ruling

elite. However, India and the US are seen as the most significant external actors

in Bangladesh. Whereas India’s involvement in domestic politics is undoubtedly

proven due to many factors including geo-strategic proximity,58 United States

involvement has been more opaque. However, since the regime and policy

changes (towards a more hostile stand against the Delhi-Moscow axis), US

support and influence regarding Bangladesh’s ruling elite has been increasing.59

Beside the civil society and media, the external dimension can be identified as a

major determinant in civil-military relations in Bangladesh and a crucial factor

for the withdrawal of the military from politics.

Civilian Strategies vis-à-vis the Military

In Bangladesh, civilian governments have developed a myriad of strategies

which they use to deal with the military. These strategies refer back to the

tactics elaborated upon in Chapter 2. Indeed, the strategies of the Bangladeshi 55 See Codron 2007.56 Like the Consortium for providing foreign aid to Bangladesh.57 See Ahmed 2006, 288.58 Bangladesh is totally surrounded by India. See Khan 1981, 553.59 See Ahamed 1973, 209.

219


civilian administrations (Mujibur Rahman [1971-75], Khaleda Zia [1991-96],

Sheik Hasina [1996-2001; 2009-]) were based on a mixture of sanctioning the

majority of the regular forces consisting mainly of the “repatriates” faction,

ascriptive selection by supporting “freedom fighters” among the officers corps,

and counterbalancing the regular defense services with the political paramilitary

force Rakkhi Bahini. In addition, negative discrimination was used, by not

recognizing the contribution of the regular forces in the process of state-building

as well as disassociating them from all security and defense affairs60. Here one

has to state that sanctioning, negative discrimination, and ascriptive selection61

were a combined measure to create disunity among the regular forces and

enforce the effect of the strategy of counterbalancing. According to Hossain62, the

civilian governments thus aimed “to reduce the influence of the Pakistani-trained

Bengalee military and to counterbalance other freedom fighters belonging to

different ideological groups”.

However, the most significant feature in the context of the application

of this portfolio of strategies is that it was carried out not by formal political

institutions but by informal channels, though it was initiated by the leading

Awami League and the charismatic leadership of its linchpin Mujibur Rahman.

This led finally to a civil-military situation which is roughly characterised by

two rival camps comprising elements of both the civilian and military spheres.

60 See complaints of the Commander-in-Chief General (ret.) M.A.G. Osmani quoted in Hossain 2003, 89. 61 According to Hossain 2003, 85 this included the following measures: The Awami League government gave two years of seniority to the “freedom fighters” and “the repatriates” resulting in these junior officers taking positions away from other officers. These latter, repatriated to West Pakistan, were either retired unceremoniously or transferred to civilian posts, which was disliked by many in the cantonments of the army and had to suffer under deteriorating economic conditions. 62 See Hossain 2003, 89.

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Conclusion

In the final analysis, civil-military relations in Bangladesh have tended

to be typified by a myriad of cleavages as well as factions, all of which have

been responsible for rudimentary institutionalization and a predominance of

informality. Indeed it is significant to mention, that the institutionalization of

civilian control has not necessarily derived from the use of civilian strategies.

In contrast, since independence civil-military relations have been characterized

by non-institutionalization and informal rules. This is a major reason why

the intense societal cleavages have been able to find unhampered access to

the politically and socio-culturally isolated armed forces (in the British and

Pakistani tradition), a phenomenon which has helped to create and maintain

military factionalism. Subsequently, the high degree of politicization among the

soldiers through the entire rank and file made non-institutionalized civilian

control vulnerable to party politics and personal rivalries until today. To tackle

this challenge, military efforts (especially those by Ershad) to enhance internal

cohesion through military organization reforms were undertaken. But these

processes of professionalism and institutionalization led to a situation in which

specific cleavages were only temporarily frozen. The post-1991 civilian era of

oscillating democratic governments have witnessed various examples of the

thawing of these historical conflicts which civilian leaders have used to gain,

maintain and ensure political legitimacy as well as power, bringing factions

back into the informal intermingling of civilian and military spheres. Therefore,

civilians in particular were not in favour of institutionalizing their relations with

the armed forces.

However, today it seems that the lack of institutionalized civilian control

is increasingly filled by some civil society actors (especially NGOs) and media

221


as well as external actors (especially donors and the UN). This is a situation

which the military is well aware of, trying to keep an accepted balance between

ensuring its own corporate interests, avoiding political influence, fulfilling its aid-

to-civilian-power duties and maintaining its external and internal reputation as

a trust-worthy agent, attempting to locate its position within the contemporary

and future political-institutional framework of Bangladesh. Ultimately, while the

armed forces of Bangladesh will continue to be a major player in Bangladeshi

politics, they will increasingly be compelled to contend with civilian governments

which have succeeded in leading the country for almost two decades.

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