2010-2!24!17!47!18_a Thesis Modified-Victoria Makulilo

8/3/2019 2010-2!24!17!47!18_a Thesis Modified-Victoria Makulilo

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/2010-224174718a-thesis-modified-victoria-makulilo 1/44

Private Financing in Tanzania: A Restraint on Democratization of Higher

Education Access by the Poor?

By

Victoria Makulilo1

1.1 Financing Higher Education in Tanzania: A Historical Perspective

The issue of access to higher education as explained by different models of financing lies on a

continuum of private-citizen responsibility to the general public (government) responsibility.

Financing higher education in Tanzania has broadly gone through three main phases: the free

education phase 1961-1980s, cost sharing phase 1980s-2004 and the loan phase 2004-to date. This

section briefly examines each phase paying attention to the factors, policies and laws that governed

financing of higher education. But it should be noted right from the beginning that while during the

free education phase the government was responsible for financing higher education, in the cost

sharing phase both students and the government shared the cost of financing higher education. In the

loan phase students themselves and/or their parents/guardians are responsible to incur such cost. In the

third phase the role of the government is just to provide needy students with some loans so as to access

higher education. This is, in principle, a process of moving responsibility from the government

(public) to nearly private and individuals.

1.1.1 Free Education Phase 1961-1980s

This phase was landmarked by three events that had some impact on the whole issue of financing

higher education. These events included the post-independent development philosophy in 1961,

establishment of one party state in 1965, and the adoption of Ujamaa (socialist) policies in 1967. At the

time of independence Tanzania was regarded to be democratic though the level of economy was still

relatively low i.e. Tanzania was a new nation emerging from colonial settings. At this particular time,

the country was guided by one major logic, developmentalism and Africanization as, the first president,

J.K Nyerere himself once remarked:

New nations like Tanganyika get their independence after a sustained struggle against colonialism. This

is a nationalist struggle which unites all the people in the country and does not leave room for differences;

and the nationalist movements after achieving independence, form the independent governments of their

countries. But immediately after its formation, the new government is faced with a major task that of the

economic development of the country and the general uplifting of the standard of living of all the people,

through eliminations of poverty, ignorance, and disease. In order for this objective to be successfully

accomplished there is as much need for unity as was required during the struggle for independence.

Similarly, therefore, there is no room for differences (TANU Annual Report 1965).

1 REDET M.A Sponsored Student (2006-2009); who did a thesis on Private Financing in Tanzania: A Restraint on

Democratization of Higher Education Access by the Poor. Currently she is the assistant lecturer at Dar es Salaam University College of Education, in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration.

1



Just like many other African countries, at this precious time the country did not have experts,

professionals as well as educated people to carry out the development agenda, and therefore one

critical issue of the time was to train people to assist in development. It was this great demand for

educated people which forced the country to establish the Dar es Salaam University College of East

Africa in October, 1961. Similarly, the government financed wholly for such education. It should be

noted that at this phase the private sector was relatively small and weak.

In 1965 and 1967 the one party state and the Ujamaa policy were introduced respectively. The total

outcome of these events was to establish a centralized state. At this material time, the guiding

philosophy of the nation was collective ownership of the means of production and equal distribution of

resources. The government was the main producer and provider of goods and services excepting an

important role played by religious organizations. The government was equally the only sole financier

of higher education. Education was viewed as an instrument to achieve developmentalism. Education

for Self-reliance as one of the specific policies to economic developmentalism was adopted. The

objectives of education after independence, therefore, were centered on two things, the achievement of

economic development and building a socialist society. Buchert (1994:90) stresses this point by

asserting that, “the strong belief in education as a guiding tool to development was expressed in the

policy of Education for Self-reliance. This led to investment in mass education and reforms of the

inherited system related to issues of access, equity, and relevance.” The policy made access to higher

education free of charge. In order to have an effective implementation of the policy, an Act of

Parliament No.25 of 1978 was enacted which stipulates that, “subject to the national policy or national

education plans and priorities appropriately specified from time to time, every citizen of the United

Republic of Tanzania shall be entitled to receive such category, nature and level of education as his

ability may permit him.”2

Making education, and higher education in particular, a right to every citizen did have an assured

access to higher education by all groups, irrespective of wealth, religion, gender or ethnic background.

The Act did actually give equal access to massive participation in education by all groups in the

society irrespective of the economic status of the people in the society. The University of East Africa3

for instance comprised of about 60% entries from Tanzania (Mwingira and Pratt, 1967). However,

though the policy was premised upon equality and participation in education, there were inequalities in

terms of gender. Buchert (op.cit .) asserts that “the obvious social differentiation along social lines

which resulted from the unequal provision of education was accompanied by gender inequalities in

2 Tanzania statute (1978) Education Act no. 253 Included the University College of Dar es Salaam that became a full University in 1970 under the Act of Parliament No.

12.

2



education”. For example, the disproportionate number of females as compared to males increased

threefold from 8% of total in 1961 to 24% in 1981.4

1.1.2 Cost Sharing Phase 1980s-2004

In 1970s Tanzania experienced severe economic crisis resulting from the Organization for Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC) crisis of 1973, collapse of East African Community (EAC) in 1977, the

Kagera War of 1978/9, etc. The government attempted to resolve the crisis but failed. It was here,

where the government approached the external forces for some help. The external pressures from

World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO) and the

donor community, just like in many African countries, forced Tanzania to restructure its economy and

politics. The Economic Recovery Program (ERP) of 1983/4, and the Structural Adjustment Program

(SAP) of 1986 were instituted culminating to the privatization of the hitherto state owned companies

and the introduction of market economy. At this particular moment the private sector started to

become stronger, in principle, at the expense of a small government. The role of the government

shifted greatly where it now prepares conducive environment for the private sector under the market

forces to operate smoothly.

The government, therefore, ceased to be the sole producer and provider of services and goods with the

exception of faith-based organization that helped the government in the same. It is here now, the

mushrooming of private universities started. They include the Hurbert Kairuki Memorial University

(HKMU), International Medical and Technological University (IMTU), Tumaini University (TU), and

St. Augustine University of Tanzania (SAUT). These also developed other private institutions of

higher learning. Related to this, the issue of cost-sharing was introduced as a policy in which private

individuals had to pay for a part of cost of services. Cost sharing went through three stages; the first

stage was during the 1992/93 academic year where students and their parents were required to pay

their own fares to and from their respective places of domicile to universities. The second stage was

during the 1993/94 academic year where students were supposed to pay for food, accommodation,

student union fees, and caution money. The third stage of cost sharing required students to pay for

tuition fees, examination fee, books and stationery expenses, special faculty requirements, and field

practice expenses. It was prior to the implementation of this stage that the Higher Education Students’

Loan Board Act was introduced.

Another landmark development of the time was the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992 in

which the issues of human rights became more pronounced in political fora. This made it possible for

people to look at education as a right. The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977

4 Burchert, L. (1994:90)

3



under article 11(2) states that; “every person has the right to self education, and every citizen shall be

free to pursue education in a field of his/her choice up to the highest level according to his/her merits

and ability”. In realization of this, the government enacted the Higher Education Policy in 1999,

committing it to assist all the needy students get financial assistance in order to access higher

education. Related to this, Article 11(3) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977

states that, “the government shall endeavour to ensure that there are equal and adequate opportunities

to all persons to acquire education and vocational training at all levels of schools and other institutions

of learning.5”

The interpretations of Article 11(3) of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) Constitution of 1977

leads to two positions: the first is the protection of the right to education hence preserving democratic

values such as equality, peoples’ participation (access), and freedom of choice (adequate

opportunities). The second is the emphasis over the role of government of ensuring and enabling

citizens to acquire education at all levels according to one’s ability. David Held as quoted in Sorensen

(2005) put it that, in a democratic state “individuals should be free and equal in the determination of

the conditions of their lives; that is they should enjoy equal rights (and accordingly equal obligations)

in specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them so

long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others”. This calls for a bill of rights

that goes beyond to cast a vote to include equal opportunities (access) for participation and for

discovering individual preferences as well as citizens’ final control of political agenda. Those broader

and fundamental objectives and principles are to be put into specific educational policies that should

be part of overall national development strategy, clear achievable objectives, involving all

stakeholders, addressing equity implications, stating clearly about roles and responsibilities, and that

which are simple and possible to implement.6

1.1.3 Loan Phase 2004-to date

During the loan phase, financing education was reformed and a more effective financing plan was

established. The government introduced the loan scheme especially in the higher education so as to

give opportunities for the needy students to access higher education7. The assumption is that there are

students who are able to pay for their education while others are not. It, therefore, became necessary to

find a way in which all groups in the society benefit from the privatized education so that the objective

of development through self reliance could be realized. This was done through formulation of

education reforms in 1995 that led to the formulation of higher education policy of 1999. The reforms

seem to be the best way in which the equity and massive participation strategy could be maintained in5 This entails the core aspects of democracy such as equality and peoples’ participation6 The Tanzania Constitution, 1977.7 National Higher Education Policy, 1999.

4



the new policy.8 The new policy did aim to ensure growing and equitable access to high quality formal

education.

Moreover, the higher education policy did identify distance education as a strategy to increase

participation in higher education. Distance education can be acquired through two main means, which

are, e-learning9, and the Open University of Tanzania (OUT). It is a supposition that students from

“educated families” and those from “rich families” have greater chance to learn online and at the Open

University too. This argument is based on two important factors, the first is there are no loans given to

students who learn online, and second, it concerns the availability of information where the major

source is the Internet. Internet is very expensive indeed and also not reliable in remote areas where

majority poor reside.

In 2004 the Tanzanian Parliament enacted an Act. No. 9 of 2004 (the Loan Act) that established the

Loan Board in continuation of the implementation of the Higher Education Policy of 1999. The Act is

an important instrument in assisting the needy students who can’t immediately pay for their education.

Under the loan scheme, students and/or their families pay for the whole cost. The government only

assists them to get interest free loans.

In Summary, Tanzania adopted liberalization policies in 1980s. These policies emphasized on the

private property and market economy. According to the policies, the state was supposed to play the

role of preparing conducive environment for markets in determining supply of goods and services.

Education until then was considered to be one of the services which was free of charge from 1961 to

1980s. It became commoditized and private individuals as well as sectors were supposed to finance

education services including higher education. Realizing that not all students might have immediate

ability to meet the cost of higher education, the government established a “Government Students’

Loan Scheme” to provide grants/loans to qualifying needy students only. Those with proven ability to

pay were not expected to be provided with government loans/grants. It was hoped that the Loan

Scheme would increase access to higher education by the majority poor. The purpose of this study,

therefore, was to examine the extent to which the Loan Scheme has provided access to opportunities

for the majority poor to pursue higher education. However, the author came with the hypothesis that,

“ Private financing of higher education does not by and large translate itself in increasing democracy

in accessing higher education by the majority poor in Tanzania”.

8 The Tanzania National Website, education reforms in 1995.9 Education obtained through the internet, there are on-line universities that offer degrees, masters and PhD, for example,

Minnesota online, Kaplan University, and Devry University , etc

5



1.2 Considering the Factors Influencing Access to Higher Education

The access to higher education through a loan scheme presents a shift of financing higher education

responsibility from the government to the beneficiaries such as students and /or their families, NGOs,

and private companies including banks. It is suggested that students and their families should finance

education since they are the first and foremost beneficiaries of the education as they enjoy substantial private benefits after students’ graduation through interesting and pleasant jobs10. This is the logic why

they are required to pay for their education costs. Again parents/guardians are expected to pay for the

education because it is their obligation as parents (Merisotis and Wolanin, 2002). The ability to pay

for higher education by parents is determined by family social status which can be measured through

indicators like wealth status, education status, power status, and sex ratio as described hereunder.

However, the main variable of measurement concern is whether the shift of the education financing

responsibility has shifted to facilitate better access or not, particularly access by the poor. There are

some related pertinent concepts to be explained.

(a) Family wealth

This can be measured through family’s income for workers; assets owned by the family such as

furniture, house, car, ‘shamba’, and livestock kept; parents’ occupation such as teaching, accounting,

peasant, businessman/woman, etc

(b) Family education

This can be measured through family’s education level. It means if the members of the family are

highly educated then it is possible for a student from that family to get assistance in terms of finance

and awareness in accessing higher education. Again, it is possible for such family to ascertain loans

from various sources like the banks so that their students pursue higher education.

(c) Family power

This can be measured through political power that the parents possess. For example, a member of

parliament, minister, president, ambassador, village chairman, councilor, regional commissioner, ward

secretary, and the like. The high status of the president, for example, may be an advantage for a child

from that family to access higher education more easily than the child from village chairman. This

argument suggests that, a position like that of president is a good source of income and also the status

of the president is highly respected in the society.

(d) Family sex ratio

It is a historical phenomenon that females are less respected in the family than the males. And it has

been clear since in the introduction that the female’s access to higher education has been lower as

compared to male. Again, economically, females are the most vulnerable groups for many are poor,

specifically those from rural areas.

10 Such jobs lead them to live in better houses and higher social status, this is according to Merisotis J. and Wolanin, T.

(2002).

6



1.3 Access Implications on Influence Considered

The National Higher Education Policy of 199911 enlisted several problems including lower enrolment

rates, gender imbalance, poor financing, unregulated and uncontrolled proliferation of tertiary

institutions. The designed measures to solve these problems are such as expansion of public facilities

and encouraging private universities, cost sharing, affirmative action to expand female participation,

and distance education. Such measures do intend to expound the access to higher education, increase

consumer choice and quality.

The above factors can be measured through dependent variable-indicators like admissions in both

public and private universities while paying much attention to enrolment rates. The other indicators

are associated with the financing of higher education which includes the loan board facility, and unit

costs in those universities.

However, one of the contending issues in the financing of education and higher education in particular

is the question of responsibility. The focus is “who should finance education, why and how?”. There

are various theories responding to this question while making analysis on access implications. These

theories are neo-liberal political economy, public good and a rights-based approach to education. This

part reviews various literature on access and financing higher education. A particular emphasis is

made to theories and models that explain who should finance education, why and how. Therefore a

thorough review of these studies will provide a framework in the analysis of private financing in

Tanzania and whether there is democratization of access to higher education by the poor.

2.1 Neo- Liberal Political Economy Approach

Neo-liberal political economy approach proposes for market operations in a conducive environment

prepared by the state. But the theorists oppose vehemently a direct role of the state in the ownership of

parts or whole of the economy12. Their argument implies that the state would be expected to reduce its

central role in the financing of education. The theorists also justify service provision by the market

through market forces of competition, demand and supply mechanisms whereas consumers are

guaranteed with quality as well as wide choice. However, one of the theoretical underpinnings of

liberalists is user fee and cost sharing in accessing the services. Functionally, user fees are to be used

by the state as a mechanism to obligate individual citizen to oversee access as well as quality of

education through paying capability. In the words of Omari (1991:37) that, “user fees in developing

countries are presented in the ways like, cost recovery, cost reduction and in the spirit of relieving the

11 Higher Education in Tanzania: A Case Study (2000) chpt.4 by Mkude, D. 200312 Yash Tandon, 2002 pg 5

7



state of the burden of giving quality, affordable and equitable education to its people,” justifies the

function of user fees in neo-liberal perspective. Taking an example of education as a service, user fees

are the costs incurred by the consumers, i.e. the students, in and during learning. Such user fees and

cost sharing are like tuition fee, meals and accommodation expenses, transport expenses, and other

personal expenses; to mention only a few. This has a negative impact to the poor as Kiondo (1990)

puts it that, “the economic reforms that aim at cutting public expenditure through cost reduction on the

side of the government, present another area where the unprivileged suffer more than the resourceful

classes”. Thus, the re-introduction of fees in social services such as education, means diminishing

educational prospects for the poor.

The theory entrusts to the quality and people’s participation in higher education particularly, through

user fee and cost sharing blindly without taking into account the nature of people who will participate

in accessing education via demand and supply mechanisms. It is precarious to subject higher education

to the whims of market forces since those who are unable to compete are left out, and thus denied

access to that education. This is the major weakness of the approach in democratizing access to higher

education in Tanzania in which the majority poor in the society may miss the opportunity to access

higher education. Practically, it is quite astonishing to find out that though practicing neo-liberal

theory the developed countries have their governments still fully fund their universities and poor

students access higher education for free. One may take an example of the Scandinavian countries. In

support of this, Omari (1991:37) is puzzled as to why “user fees are made in developing countries and

yet developed countries fully fund their universities and uphold the principle that higher education

should be accessible to all applicants who qualify by ability and aspiration irrespective of the ability to

pay”. One may argue that in developing countries like Tanzania there is inappropriate application of

the financing mechanisms that are not grounded on democratic principles of human rights where right

to education is basic.

Neo-liberal theory is, therefore, very useful in the understanding of cost sharing policy in public

services such as education. It is worth acknowledging an assumption that with private provision there

is greater supply of the service, the consumer choices are widened, access to the service is also

increased and finally the quality of the service may be maintained. However, one may argue that, such

an increase of access is not for the poor, but it may be rather for the rich on the ground that the poor

can’t afford the cost appropriated to the service. Wimile (1997) explains this in a phrase that, ‘while

the rich can afford private alternatives, the poor are left in the cold’, meaning that, those who have

wealth will have both public and private consumption alternatives; while the have-nots will have no

alternatives.

8



Therefore, neo-liberal theory overlooks the aspect of ‘the poor’ who can’t purchase the education

service. This is to subject the poor and the rich under equal mechanisms of the market forces that

might be disastrous to the majority poor. This is better explained by Musoke (1993) under a phrase,

“ give a rich man less food and he becomes thin; give the poor man less food and he dies.” This means

that the poor is highly affected when subjected to adverse conditions as compared to the rich man.

Therefore, neo-liberal theory does not give the poor peoples’ access to higher education as Galabawa

(1994) concludes that, for years neo-liberal framework of cost sharing had undermined access to

education among the poor in the country. The approach can only be useful if there are reliable and

clear but affordable mechanisms of financing higher education so that the poor can be guaranteed the

opportunity to access that education.

The financing responsibility advocated by this theory is largely private and individual consumer. This

is to say, individual students and/or their parents/guardians have that responsibility of financing their

education including higher education. The rationale for private financing, among other things, was to

put a relief on government as perceived the sole financier of the education. This was claimed to

diminish the access to universities for so long due to insufficient funds in financing all people who

qualify to join universities. In addition to that, private financing intends to enhance democratization of

access through competition, consumer choice, and equity among consumers, with the aim of attaining

quality and efficient products. These two positions are borne out of neo-liberal orientation that

supports the argument that, “cost-sharing13

can be supported by the presumption of the greater

efficiency and responsiveness of markets, at least where there is both competition, and costs to be

borne by the consumer.” And also, “universities and other institutions of higher education, whether

public or private, having to compete for students and to pay consequences for inefficiencies and/or

unresponsiveness are thought by this viewpoint to be more likely to provide a good education, at times

and in ways desired by the students rather than to operate mainly for the benefit of government or the

convenience of the faculty” (Jonstone, 2002:9).

Cost sharing under this framework is expressed in various forms. These are imposition of fees,

diminution of student’s grants or scholarships, and official engagement of private higher education

sector. The application of tuition fees by the public higher education institutions meant to supplement

institutional costs as a result of minimal or no subsidies extended to the universities from the

government or the taxpayer. This implies that, part of the burden that formerly taxpayers or

government had to carry is now shifted to the parents/guardians and/or students making a relief to

taxpayers. Therefore, tuition fees are a mechanism designed by the government to substitute

government funding of education as a result of withdrawal of the state in funding education. Thus, the

13 Cost sharing is embraced in the form of tuition, user fees, and official encouragement of a tution-dependent private

higher education sector (Johnstone, 2002).

9



access to higher education is determined by the individual themselves through ability to pay tuition

fees.

Mdemu (2002:128), on the other hand, argues that “fees have been introduced in public higher

education institutions as cost sharing in order to shift some costs of education to the students who are

the beneficiaries”. It is important to contend that there are two analytical groups within this major

group of beneficiaries, basing on their socio-economic status. These are students from wealthy

families and those who are from poor families. It is actually impossible to share the costs of education

with poor students. One may ask, what is the rationale of shifting the education costs to students,

especially those with no ability to pay? Mdemu ( Ibid .) explains that, “The government cannot meet all

costs of education to support all students who deserve it due to limited fund”. In addition, Merisotis

and Wolanin (2002:146) provide other three primary reasons that pervade in the USA to justify

students and their families paying tuition fees. First, students enjoy substantial private benefits from

receiving higher education14. Second, parents are expected to pay for the education of their children as

it is their responsibility and their obligation as parents, which is a common cultural value. The third

account arises from political ground that, higher education is a relatively low priority compared to

other public purposes, and thus, parents and students should pay or pay more because government

can’t or will not pay. However, these reasons are also the explanations for the re-introduction of

tuition fees in Tanzania.

Diminution of student’s grants or scholarships is accomplished by “freezing” grant15 or loan level16 or

holding them constant in the face of general inflation this then erodes their real value. It can also be

through diminution of subsidies on students’ loans and through the increase in interest rates, or

reduction in the length of time that interest is not charged, or through reduction in numbers of loans 17

for which the payments for any number of reasons are forgiven. For example, in Australia, students

could borrow and repay as an income contingent loan at a rate of interest that would mirror the

prevailing Australian rate of inflation. In UK as well as the Netherlands, there are need-based grantsand loans that are to be paid as a portion of their earnings or “income contingently”. Therefore,

freezing grants and scholarships as well as holding loan level consequently limit access by the

majority poor as many can’t afford the costs of higher education.

The official engagement of the private higher education sector is a tuition-dependent higher education

with frequent public subsidization. It is in this way where participation of parents and students in

financing higher education is expanded vividly through the introduction of private financing and

14 This is through the interesting and pleasant jobs they have after studies.15 Like what Tanzania have introduced in 2004.16 Like what Tanzania offered, a loan of 2500TShs per day since 2001 to 2006.17 For example, the medical capitation fund was removed from the total loan given from 2006/07 academic year.

10



private universities which are both, for profit and non-profit institutions. The high tuition fees imposed

by private universities, especially for profit ones, do prevent a thorough democratization of access to

higher education by the majority poor students. It is, therefore, convenient to argue that private

financing through various forms of cost sharing perpetuates obstacles for the poor to access higher

education. Its application needs a critical observation of how students from poor families will get

financial assistance in order to access that education. Since higher education is a democratic right of

each Tanzanian, every person has the right to equally access higher education based on each

individual’s ability and not wealth, gender, race, or physical disability.

2.2 Public Good Theory

In economics public good is a good that is non-rival or non-excludable 18. This means, consumption of

the good by one individual does not reduce the amount of the good available for consumption by

others; no one can be effectively excluded from using that good19. For example, if one individual eats

a cake there is no cake left for anyone else; but breathing air or drinking water from a stream does not

significantly reduce the amount of air or water available to others. Musgrave (1969:126,134-35)

explains that

“the condition of non-rivalness in consumption (or, which is the same, the existence of beneficial

consumption externalities) means that the same physical output (the fruits of the same factor input)

is enjoyed by both A and B. This does not mean that the same subjective benefit must be derived, or

even that precisely the same product quality is available to both. Due to non-rivalness of

consumption individual demand curves are added vertically rather than horizontally as in the case of

private goods. ”

There are actually two major categories of public goods; pure public goods and non-pure public

goods. Pure public goods are like national defense.20 The other category is that of service provision

and thus can be provided by either public or private. The main difference between public good and

private good revolves around the issue of who should pay for service. In the case of the public good,

the citizen enjoys the service without any direct costs. But in private good the citizen has to pay for the

service under market forces of supply and demand. The question of education and more specifically

higher education, as a public good has been debated for some time. However, the debate has ended

justifying higher education as a public good. This is well illustrated by Kaul, et al . (2003) under what

they call, ‘A triangle of publicness’ which is put as follow;

The triangle looks at public good from three perspectives. The first is publicness in consumption:

is a good consumed by all? The second is publicness in net benefits: are the goods’ net benefits

equitably distributed? The third is publicness in decision making : who decided to place this good

in the public domain?

18 Defined by Inge Kaul,2000 and also by Paul Samuelson, 195419 Expounded by Paul Samuelson, 195420 Johnson, P. 1994-2005

11



The above illustration justifies higher education as a public good in two main factors. The first is the

role of higher education to all members of the society. It is necessary for majority members to get that

education, especially under this era of globalization, in order to realize individual as well as national

development. The second is the relation between higher education provision and the realization of a

democratic polity. The aspects of equity of access and people’s participation in decision making on

issues that are for people’s benefits can be maintained when higher education is for all. This

proposition is well summarized by Lumumba-Kasongo (2000) who asserted that, “the issues of

democratization of education and collective well-being are related to the notion of public good.” In a

way of simplifying, Kent (1997:181) explains that “public good requires that the individual has a place

in society, a basis for belongingness, for self-esteem and self-support.” It can be argued thus, that

higher education as a public good for national development should be accessible by all members of the

society.

Moreover, higher education as public good is also justified by the existence of the government which

is capable of maintaining accessibility, equity and affordability of the service to be provided. One of

the justifications for the existence of the state is the provision of services like education, transport,

health, water, etc. Similarly, Gandhi (2000) argues that, the key basic justification remained for the

role of government is the provision of public goods. Thus, the main financier of these services is the

government on behalf of the citizens. For example, Omari (op.cit.) asserted that traditionally education

in general and higher education in particular is to a large extent funded by the state in all countries of

the world, and that about an average of 85% of the fund is provided in the USA and Europe (not UK).

Again, it is in Lockean earlier thinking that the state is legitimated by its redistribution and provision

of public goods to the whole society. This was a result of the human nature and the contract theory.

This justification is in two methods, teleological and emergent justification 21 as it is perceived in moral

philosophy. It is in both methods that the state is justified in the provision of public goods. Garrett

(1992) has expounded the state’s justification to provide public goods as follows;

The public goods justification for the state, so impressive to economists and political scientists, goes

roughly like this. While a market system may allow self-interested individuals to create and allocate

many goods optimally, there exists a class of goods collective or public goods that are not produced

adequately in a market system. These collective goods are goods that all individuals want but for

whose production it is often not individually rational for people voluntarily to do their part to secure

a collectively rational outcome. The state can step in and force us all to contribute toward the

production of these goods, and we can all thereby be made better off.

The above submission explains two important issues in a way of justifying the financing of public

goods by the state. The first explanation is anchored on tax collection by the state. The collected tax

by the state is meant to improve the well-being of the society, and this can be realized through quality

21 Schmidtz’s D. 1991 in Garrett, 1992 A Review of Schmidtz’s Essay.

12



service provision, education is one. The second explanation is directed to the producer of the service,

and it is assumed that the state is able to distribute equally to all people than the other private

producers. Therefore, with state provision of public goods, there are many considerations over the

accessibility, equity and affordability in the society concerned.

In advancements of the same, Samuelson (1954:350,356) puts a contrast between private and public

goods that, “… many though not all of the realistic cases of government activity can be fruitfully

analyzed as some kind of a blend of these two extreme cases” (p.350); the mixtures of private and

public goods (education, the courts, public defense, highway programs, police and fire protection)

have an “element of variability in the benefit that can go to one citizen at the expense of other citizens ”

(p.356). This argument suggests the inability of private provision of the public goods to realize

equitable access of the goods by every citizen. Education as a public good once provided and/or

financed by the private, equity of access is under arrest and the majority poor can’t access higher

education.

The financing responsibility is left to the government as the advocates of this theory contend. It means

that the government is responsible in providing direct financial support to the institutions and the

students as well. The rationale behind this is dictated by the social and economic realities under the

definition of political arena. One of such social and economic realities is egalitarianism.

Egalitarianism is one explanation to government funding as Mkapa (1999:15) did put it in a simpler

way that, “egalitarianism is the basic reason for the monopoly of the provision and financing of

education in Tanzania.” This was, also, put forth by Article 14 of the World Declaration on Higher

Education for the twenty-first century Vision and Action that the role of the state is central in the

process of financing higher education (UNESCO, 1998). Similarly, Jongbloed (2004:1-5) emphasizes

that, “the mechanisms for public funding contain important incentives to achieve higher education’s

three main goals viz.: quality, efficiency, and equity (access).” Thus, “public funding in higher

education is due because higher education provides social as well as economic benefits.”

Generally, public good theory explains largely about the role of the government in the provision and

financing of basic social services like education; but it is silent on the part of weak governments; in

terms of policy making, resource mobilization and allocation, and political stability, which do not

guarantee every citizen an access to higher education. However, the problem of free riders has been

one of the major weaknesses of this theory even though it has been neutralized by taxes that are

applied by government in securing revenues for the provision of the service.

2.3 A Rights-Based Approach to Education

13



The rights-based approach entrusts the government to ensure that all people irrespective of their

wealth, gender, and race, do access education of better quality to any level of that education in each

persons’ ability. It has been a conviction of UNESCO (1998) that ‘education is a fundamental pillar of

human rights, democracy, sustainable development and peace, and shall therefore become accessible

to all throughout life.’ This means that, education is a pertinent tool for understanding human rights,

practicing democracy, and realizing sustainable development. It is a requirement that education should

be accessible to every citizen. Similarly, Breyer (2005:16) wrote in his tract ‘Active Liberty’ that, “the

people and their representatives must have the capacity to exercise their democratic responsibilities.

They should possess the tools, such as information and education, necessary to participate and to

govern effectively.”

It is assumed that the respect and promotion of human rights and particularly the right to education

will lead to access to education by the majority poor and consequently result into sustainable

development of the country. In contrast, denial to education results in denial of one’s human right,

development, peace and the capacity to exercise the democratic responsibilities like participation in

decision making and holding the government accountable. However, the necessary education to

facilitate those democratic responsibilities effectively and efficiently is the higher education,

especially in this twenty first century where life, science, social relations and politics are so complex.

Access to higher education could be assured by the government through formulation of education

policies that include public scholarships and publicly provided education programs. Cohen (2005:506-

507) explains that, “public scholarship is an educational philosophy in which the mission or desired

university outcome is democratic capacity-building among students and contribution to democratic

sovereignty. Public scholarship, therefore, carries an explicit appreciation of education’s special role

and the value of fully integrating scholarship with democratic practice.” However, Cohen and Eberly

(2005:2) expounded that “service and scholarship are too often either divorced from one another or

seen as one and the same. Separating service from the scholarship prevents higher education from

fulfilling its obligation to help build democratic capacity by preparing students-citizens for the habits

and practice of public sovereignty.” It can be summed up that, for any democratic government to

practice democracy, public scholarship is a must component in order to realize equity of access among

the haves and the have-nots. This is only when human rights principles are adhered to promptly. It is

concluded that, “service without scholarship places democratic capacity at risk” (Cohen and Eberly,

2005).

Following the commitment reaffirmed in the council’s 2005 year of citizenship through education, the

major and necessary objective of higher education in any democratic society is “to make education for

democratic citizenship based on all rights and responsibilities of citizens, an essential component of all

14



educational, training, cultural and youth policies and practices.”22 It may be argued that, one of the

ingredients in building a democratic culture by governments is to protect and promote human rights,

right to education is one. On the side of individual citizens, every citizen has that democratic right to

access education to the level of her/his ability. Therefore, in a country like Tanzania, where

democratic consolidation is emphasized greatly, the right to education should be promoted and

protected by the government as well. It is appropriate to use this approach under this study as it will

give better explanations on the access to higher education by the majority poor.

2.4 Eclectic Approach to Financing Higher Education

This approach combines the good things from the public funding model and that of the private

financing model. That means both, the state/government and the private sector, have to finance

education. In this approach individual preferences are first prioritized and societal preferences follow.Thus, the government gives subsidies to the people in order to purchase education. These subsidies are

in form of vouchers and/or grants and loans that have to be repaid after the students have graduated in

the form desired by policy makers. Grants may be in different forms such as, scholarships or bursaries

and be means-tested or targeted in other ways (Woodhall, 2002:111). This form of financial assistance

provided by government is targeted to the most needy students and is not repaid later on. For example,

Great Britain links subsistence grants to its mandatory grants given to all students. In addition, the

subsistence part of the grant is given only to needy students (Colgan, 1994). Similarly, in Kenya, the

needy student receives a maximum amount of the grant of 8,000Ksh. (Ngolovoi, 2006). However, the

provision of grants by the government may be affordable when only a tiny minority of the population

enter higher education but would impose impossible burdens on the public budget as countries expand

access and move towards mass higher education (Woodhall, 2002:115). This presents a justification

for the use of both systems of funding higher education, i.e. grants and loans as complementary forms

of student support to access higher education in order to expand access and move to mass higher

education.

Despite the aforesaid justification on the use of loans as a means to increase access by the majority

poor, there are a lot of complications in the application of loans in democratization of access to higher

education by the majority poor. One of the complications is the presupposition that both the

government and the private sector would have to provide loans to the students from poor families for

they would have to access the privatized higher education. It is equally important to argue that loans

from the private sector (banks and other financial institutions) are meant for the well-off families

basing on two main reasons.

22 Declaration adopted on the Council of Europe at the Third Summit in Warsaw, May 2005.

15



First, is the necessity of guarantor that should be collateral. This simply means the ability of assets to

support borrowing. Small farms and businesses can’t be accepted as collateral. It was, similarly,

commented by Tekleselassie and Johnstone (2002) that, “the home or farm or small business held by a

Ghananian or a Kenyan family can’t be collateralized for a loan at an acceptable rate of interest”.

More so, the need-based student from poor families in Tanzania does not have any collateral in order

to get such loans. Second, is the high interest rate which is imposed to the loan, for example, some

banks in Tanzania charge the interest rate on loans of 17% to 18% for 5 years. This is far above the

student loans provided by the government where the provision of guarantee and subsidized interest

rate charged are lower and loans are assured. In support of the government loans, Woodhall

(2002:117) argues that a few schemes provide with interest free loans, while others charge only the

recurrent rate of inflation, making the loans interest free in real terms. For example, in Germany, loans

are interest-free and must be paid back within 20 years (Colgan, 1994). In Australia, loans are repaid

as an income contingent loan at a rate of interest that would mirror the prevailing Australian rate of

inflation. In other words, the Australian student would repay in real terms whatever had been

‘deferred’ or ‘borrowed’ (Jonstone, 2002:77). In Tanzania, loans are interest-free which should be

paid immediately after graduation within 10 years (Tanzanian HESLB, Act No. 9 of 2004). Therefore,

most of the students will opt for government loans, and in absence of a well designed mechanism for

disbursing loans to the poor, the access to university by those poor will be limited.

Another critical problem that exists in the application of loans is the formula used to distribute loans to

students from poor families. Such formula is commonly known as “means-testing” or “loan formula.”

This formula is used for gathering information about the financial and family circumstances of the

student in a standard form so as to determine paying capability of the student’s family concerned.

Tekleselasie and Johnstone (2002) enlisted five main factors contributing to the difficulty of means

testing in very poor countries of Africa and elsewhere. These were: (a) there may be no effective

taxation of income (outside, perhaps, of civil service). (b) many adults may be employed in second

and third jobs in cash economies where relatively few accurate records may be kept and even fewer may be shared routinely with the government. (c) many families use banks seldom or not at all. Banks

may also have little or no ability or inclination to link either deposits/withdrawals or interest paid on

accounts to individuals and to share this information with authorities. (d) the market value of real

property may not be clearly known. (e) finally, to the extent that real property might be included in

assessing financing means, there may be a few ways to convert this asset to cash instead of selling it.

That is, the possibility of mortgaging or borrowing with the property as collateral may be limited.

Amongst those factors two are the most critical in testing capability of each student. First, is on

gathering useful information that would be in the form of cash or cash equivalents (Merisotis and

16



Wolanin, 2002:150). In the context of Tanzania, particularly, many people are engaged in informal

sector activities where it is difficulty to determine their income generation per month or per year.

Their principle assets are in the form of livestock, land, almost temporary houses, and cheap home

furniture. It is, therefore, very difficult to gather useful information, necessary, and adequate as a basis

in granting loans to students. Second, is the mode of verification as whether the gathered information

through a structured form is true and accurate. Usually, students would provide false information for

the reason that they desperately need the loan and they sometimes cheat rather than miss the loan. It is,

therefore correct to argue that the exercise of verifying information will not be genuine and reduces

the accuracy of determining paying capability of each student’s family.

Notwithstanding, the problems in the application of loans as a means to increase access to higher

education by the majority poor students, loans may take different forms with varying degrees of

subsidy and methods of repayment. These forms are, mortgage-type loans, income contingent loans,

graduated tax, repay loans by working in a specific occupation (e.g. teaching), and through National

Service, for a fixed period of time. Therefore, through such forms students are assured to access higher

education and be made better-off after graduation since “higher education is a profitable private

investment; offering graduates high returns in the form of better job opportunities and higher lifetime

earnings. Again, loans give potential students from poor families, who would otherwise be denied

access to higher education on grounds of poverty, the chance to invest for their own future; by

providing them with financial aid when it is needed and allowing them to repay when they can afford

to do so.”(Woodhall, 2002:113). However, eclectic approach to financing of higher education is very

useful in accentuating access to poor students especially when administered properly.

Therefore, the eclectic approach to the financing of education is very useful in explaining the current

policy of financing higher education in Tanzania and the move to democratize access to university by

the poor. It helps to uncover the role of the government as the main financier of the education in this

era of liberalization of services where wealth is the predominant feature in the accessing of servicessuch as education. It is easier then to explain whether the Tanzanian government in particular has been

able to facilitate private financing in democratizing the poor’s access to university education.

3.1 The Loan Scheme and Students’ Access to Higher Education

The students’ access to higher education is determined by the model of financing education and the

extent to which the government is involved in realizing democracy in accessing education. Private

financing of higher education is one of the models of financing education which is currently applied in

Tanzania. The government is involved in facilitating private financing through loans. The

establishment of the Loan Board under the Higher Education Student’s Loans Board Act of 2004

17



(which shall be referred to as the Loan Act) came as a mechanism to regulate private financing in

Tanzania. This part examines the extent to which the poor have been able to access higher education

through private financing.

The Loan Board is, therefore, a government institution that aims at, among other things, formulating

the mechanism for determining eligible students for payment of loans under the Act. In effect, the

Loan Board introduced Higher Education Students’ Loans Regulations, 2005 as a statutory instrument

and also Guidelines as departmental practice to guide the loan applicants, parents, guardians, and

general public with information on how to access the loan23. However, the Loan Board again

introduced specific formula as a mechanism for determining eligible students (poor) for payment of

loans. This formula is known as ‘means testing’. Therefore, the statutory instruments, guidelines, and

‘means testing’ form the foundation of government’s facilitation in democratizing access to higher

education by the majority poor under private financing of higher education in Tanzania.

The issue of access to loans is very challenging since it concerns opportunities and ability. As a rule

every person will struggle to his/her ability in order to have the opportunity to access loans.

Sometimes, cheating might be a strategy used by persons with the ability to pay and have the

opportunity to access loans at the expense of the poor. However, the main rule that regulates students’

access to loan is contained in section 16 (1) of the Loan Act. This rule provides that for a student to

qualify for a loan from the Loan Board she/he must be a needy and eligible student .

The term “needy student” is neither defined in the loan Act nor in the regulations. However the

2006/2007 Guidelines24 define the term “needy student” to mean a student who really deserves

financial assistance. This definition presupposes a student from a low economic class (status) i.e. the

poor. Contrary to this, the guidelines provide further in paragraph 3.10, groups of students who fall

within the definition of the term “needy student”. There are five groups, these are: a.) an orphan, b.) a

disabled student or a student who has disabled poor parents, c.) a student from a poor single family, d.)

a student from marginalized and disadvantaged groups and, e.) a student from a low income threshold

family earning national minimum wage or below.

The 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 Guidelines25 similarly define the term needy student to mean a student

who really deserves financial assistance 26. However these guidelines have slightly modified the groups

of students who fall within the definition of the term needy student. In these guidelines, a poor orphan

23

See, paragraph 1.0 of the 2006/2007 Guidelines.24 See paragraph 2.3.1 of the Revised Guidelines and Criteria for Granting Student Loan Starting 2006/2007 Academic

Year.25 See Guidelines and Criteria for Granting Student Loan for 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 Academic Years.26 See paragraphs 2.3 and 2.3.1 of 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 guidelines respectively.

18



and a poor disabled student have been substituted for an orphan and a disabled student respectively. It

shows vividly that, through the definition of the term “needy student” by the guidelines a student from

poor family (low economic class) will have lesser priority in accessing loans than the one from a

family portraying various degrees of destitution like orphan and disabled. It is in this way where the

student from poor family is restricted to access financial assistance that was intended for. However,

the practice has shown that many of the applicants tend to express themselves as orphans so as to

access loans. The impact of defining a needy student as an orphan or disabled is to deny access to

many poor students in absence of accuracy in verifying the necessary information.

Moreover, the definition of the term “needy student” in the guidelines has been influenced by rule 4(3)

of the Regulations. Rule 4(3) of the regulations provides that in determining eligibility for assistance

under section 17 (1) (d) of the Loan Act27, a student shall be given priority in consideration for loans,

if he is (a.) an orphan, (b.) an applicant with disability (c.) an applicant from a single parent family (d.)

applicants from vulnerable groups (e.) female applicants pursuing or intending to pursue sciences,

engineering and technological course; or (f.) applicants from low income threshold family whose

expenditure does not exceed a minimum sum to be determined by the Loan Board from time to time. It

is argued that rule 4(3) of the regulations is a rule of priority. It applies only to a small group of needy

students envisaged in section 17 (d) of the Loan Act. This is the reason why even rule 4(3) of the

regulations makes a cross-reference to section 17(1) (d) of the Loan Act which is a broader rule

applicable to a large group of needy students.

It is submitted that construing narrowly the term “needy students” as the guidelines do may deny

access for loan to many needy students. This is clearly indicated by the dynamics of definition of the

term “needy student”. For instance, the 2006/2007 Guidelines define the term needy student with

reference to ‘physical disability’, ‘orphanage’ and ‘low income’. However the 2008/2009 Guidelines

qualified ‘physical disability’ and ‘orphanage’ with the ‘poor’. This means, students from lower social

status i.e. students from poor income threshold, that are not orphans or disabled would have lesser

priority and chance, and may be denied access. It is further, submitted that the term “needy student”

under the guidelines is not certain and clear. Therefore, in its current form, it is restrictive and

exclusive to a great number of needy students who really deserve financial assistance.

Like “needy student”, the term “eligible student” is not defined in the Loan Act and in the regulations.

However section 17(1) of the Loan Act provides criteria for determining an eligible student28. It is,

27 Section 17 (1)(d) of the Loan Act provides that a student is eligible for consideration for a loan if he is a person who has

no financial assistance from any other source or sources To cover the item or items of cost for which the application is

made.28 See part 3.3.2 of this chapter for further discussion of the term eligible student.

19



therefore, submitted that an eligible student is any applicant who fulfills the criteria under section

17(1) of the Loan Act. However, eligibility and conditions for loan are governed by sections 17, 18 of

the Loan Act and rule 38 of the regulations. Section 17 lays down the criteria for eligibility for loan

while section 18 lays down conditions for access to loan. However, rule 38 of the regulations governs

criteria for eligibility for advancement for loan to postgraduate students.

Section 17 of the Loan Act lays the foundation of determining equitable access among students. It is a

general provision for eligibility of loan to students who are enrolled in higher education. Also, it

applies to any loan applicant irrespective of the level of his studies. It makes no distinction between

undergraduate and postgraduate students. However, it is important to note that if section 17(1) (b) of

the Loan Act is read together with section 3 of the same Act, on definition of the term ‘accredited

institution, it is apt clear that section 17 applies to higher learning institutions licensed to offer courses

which lead to an attainment of degrees or advanced diplomas. It must be made clear here, that degree

programs include both undergraduate and postgraduate programs. Thus, there are five criteria under

section 17(1) of the Loan Act for eligibility for student’s loan. This section provides that a student

shall be eligible for consideration for a loan under this Act if: (a.) he is a Tanzanian student (b.) he has

been admitted to an Accredited Institution (c.) he has made a written application in the prescribed

form (d.) he is a person who has no financial assistance from any other source or sources to cover the

item or items of cost for which the application is made (e.) he is a continuing student applicant, who

has passed the examinations necessary to enable him to advance to the following year or stage of

study.

The criteria set out in section 17(1) (a) to (e) of the Loan Act are cumulative. They are not meant to

apply in the alternative. This means, any loan applicant must fulfill all the criteria in paragraphs (a) to

(e) before he/she can be considered for loan. It is quite astonishing when the Loan Board invites for

applicants even before students who intend to apply for loan have not received their final results in

order to qualify for the university admission. One may depict the trend that it is a start of denying

access to education by the majority poor. The examination of the criteria for loan will provide an

assessment of the poor’s access to university.

The first criterion for eligibility is that the loan applicant must be a Tanzanian student29. By the term

Tanzanian student, it simply means that the student must be a citizen of the URT whether or not he is a

resident of the URT30. Since Tanzania has currently no citizenship identification cards, it is practically

difficult to determine which applicant is a Tanzanian and which one is not, just on the basis of

29 Section 17(1) (a) of the Loan Act.30 Ibid, section 3.

20



information supplied by the loan applicants in the application forms. Similarly, those who are able to

pay for their education and be able to forge for citizenship will have access at the expense of the poor.

The second criterion is that the loan applicant must have been admitted to an accredited institution31.

An accredited institution may be a university or college. Admission to any of these institutions

automatically fulfills the requirements of section 17 (1) (b) of the Loan Act. It must be pointed out that

admission criteria vary from one institution of higher learning to another. It was, plainly, put by

Verghese (2004:19) that “in many countries, the competition for admission to public universities is

very high. In general, those who do not get admission to public universities seek admission in private

universities. In other words, chances are that the academic profile of the participants may be lower

when compared to those of their counterparts in the public universities.” Admission officers in private

universities admitted this during field research on an interview with the researcher that most students

who fail to be admitted in public universities seek admission in private universities. This suggests that

the entry qualifications or cut-off points for admission in private universities are lower than those in

public universities. However, such variations are not supposed to deviate from the entry qualifications

for admissions approved by the Tanzania Commission for Universities (TCU)32. Thus, admission to an

accredited institution puts all applicants at an equal level.

Inconsistently, the guidelines33 put academic merits as one of the criteria for eligibility for a loan.

There are two categories of academic qualifications. The direct academic qualifications for Advanced

Secondary School Leavers (ASSL) or form six leavers34 and equivalent qualifications for holders of

Ordinary Diploma and Full Technician Certificate (FTC). The 2006/2007 Guidelines provide that first

applicants with direct qualifications must possess academic scores between 6 and 15 for physical

sciences and between 8 and 15 points35 for humanities to be eligible for a loan36. These are classified

as first and second divisions/classes. Applicants with equivalent academic qualifications must possess

minimum of second class grade or an average of “B” score, if the equivalent qualification is not

graded37. Basing on the above argument of varying criteria in admitting students, it is appropriate to

say students admitted with third division/class like those in private universities and OUT are definitely

denied access to loan (Field data, 2007). One may conclude that most students from poor families who

do not get division I or II in their A-level results, can’t access the loan, hence they are denied access to

higher education.

31 Section 17(1) (b) of the Loan Act.32 TCU is a statutory body charged with the function of accrediting higher learning institutions in Tanzania.33

2006/2007; 2007/2008 and 2008/200934 Form six leavers are also known as A-level students.35The score points are weighed as A=5, B=4, C=3, D=2, E=1, S=0.5 and F=036 See paragraph 3.8 of the 2006/2007 Guidelines37 Ibid

21



Again, the modifications in the 2007/2008 Guidelines continued restricting poor students basing on

gender. For first applicants from form six, the applicants were required to possess first division/class if

they were male and division two if they were female38. However, applicants with Ordinary Diploma

were supposed to possess at least second class grade or an average of “B” scores if the Diploma is not

graded. Applicants with FTC qualifications were supposed to possess an average of “C” grade 39. The

2008/2009 Guidelines40 retain the academic qualifications from the 2007/2008 Guidelines with slight

modification. The Guidelines have abolished the differences between male and female applicants with

regard to their academic qualifications. In the next academic year (i.e. 2008/2009) both male and

female applicants must possess either division one or division two to be eligible for the loan.

Therefore, the academic merits introduced by the Loan Board through the guidelines are inconsistent

with the requirement of section 17 (1) (b) of the Loan Act and eventually inhibit the poor’s access to

university. While the former provision of the law requires the applicant only to obtain admission to an

accredited institution41 to be considered for a loan, the guidelines demand the applicants to possess

additional academic qualifications which are restrictive and stringent. It is argued that, in most cases

the academic criteria demanded by the Loan Board are always higher than academic qualifications

needed for admission purposes at OUT42 and in private universities and thus denies majority poor to

access university education. For example, the minimum general entry requirement at OUT for direct

entry from school43 applicants are passes in five (5) approved subjects in Ordinary Certificate of

Secondary Education Examination ( OCSEE) and two principal level passes in Advanced Certificate

of Secondary Education Examination( ACSEE)44. Accordingly, a student with third division/class in

Advanced level secondary school education is admitted at OUT and private universities in Tanzania

(Field data, 2007); but not in other public universities.

The third criterion is that, the applicant must have made an application in the prescribed forms45. In

these application forms, the loan applicant supplies information which will be assessed by the Loan

Board in order to determine whether the applicant is a needy and eligible student (this is means

testing). There are two sets of loan application forms. The first set is for first loan applicants. This set

comprises the HESLB-SLF 1 and HESLB-SLF 2. The former form is an application form while the

latter is a student’s loan agreement. The second set of forms applies to continuing student loan

38 See paragraph 3.3 of 2007/2008 Guidelines.39 Ibid, paragraph 3.5.40 See paragraph 3.3.41

Private university or public university.42 The Open University of Tanzania is a public university offering education on open and distance learning model.43 Students who have completed form six.44 See, The Open University of Tanzania Prospectus for 2007/2008 at p. 1245 Section 17(1) (c) of the Loan Act.

22



applicants. This set comprises HESLB-SLF 2 and HESLB-SLF 3. The latter form is an application

form for loan for continuing students. However, the application of this criterion has been in main three

forms up to the moment, for the purpose of insuring appropriateness and effectiveness in

democratization of access to university by the poor. In its very start students were needed to apply for

100%; during its implementation other students were required to reapply for 60% only; and at the

moment all students are needed to apply where the Loan Board determines the percentage to be given.

The purpose here is to analyze the latter two forms in detail.

The 2007/2008 Guidelines introduced the criterion that required loan applicants to pay 40% tuition

fee46. However, this new criterion applied only to all first year students enrolled in the academic year

2006/2007 at UDSM (Main Campus), Dar es Salaam University College of Education (DUCE),

Mkwawa University College of Education (MUCE), the then University College of Lands and

Architectural Studies, Institute of Journalism and Mass Communication and Sokoine University of

Agriculture (SUA). This new criterion was termed re-means testing. Accordingly all first year students

in the above mentioned higher learning institutions were directed to re-fill the loan application forms 47.

The re-means testing which required first year students in public universities to pay 40 % tuition fee

was unlawful and was intended to further restrict access to higher education by poor students. There

are three reasons to justify this conclusion. First, the application of 40% tuition fee to all students

equally disregarding their differential wealth stati is to jeopardize poor students and consequently

deny their access to university education. However, the 2006/2007 first year students were already in

receipt of loans from the Loan Board; this means that, they applied and after a scrutiny of their

application, the Loan Board was satisfied that those students were needy students. They were not able

to meet the costs for their studies. Therefore, subjecting the same students to means testing, in the

same academic year; by compelling them to pay 40% tuition fee was unlawful. This is because means

testing may only be employed once in each academic year. Second, the guidelines introduced a

requirement that was in total contravention of section 17 (1) (d) of the Loan Act. Third, the

requirement to pay 40% was discriminatory as it only applied to students in public universities but not

to private universities; and also it applied to first years but not to other students in other levels.

In the following Guidelines i.e. 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 the Loan Board modified the 40% tuition

fees and introduced the “loan formula” or “Means Testing”. This is a mechanism employed by the

Loan Board to determine a needy student48. The Loan Board assesses the financial ability of a student,

his parents or guardian in order to determine whether an applicant is a needy student. As pointed out,46 See paragraph 5.4 of the 2007/2008 Guidelines.47 Ibid48 See Paragraph 6 of the 2005/2006 Guidelines.

23



an applicant is supposed to supply certain information in the application forms to enable the Loan

Board to make assessment. In practice loan application forms are the means-testing instrument.

However, the means testing results form the basis of the amount of loan to be awarded to loan

applicants49. Accordingly, means testing results have been categorized as A (100%), B (80%), C

(60%), D (40%), E (20%), and F (0%)50.

There are two major problems emanating from the application of the instrument that hinders the actual

assessment of the students and their families. These include accuracy of the supplied information and

verification. Starting with the problem of accuracy of the information to be supplied, the instrument

requires evidence like birth certificate, salary slips, house title deed, and receipts over expenditure, etc.

Since the applicant’s ultimate goal is to obtain loan, he/she is likely to supply false information which

will justify a student as needy. In the Tanzanian environment, most people live without birth

certificates, house title deeds, and work in the informal sector where actual income aggregation can’t

be determined.

It is very difficult for the Loan Board to obtain this information correctly. This is strongly supported

by Otieno (2004:88) that, “obviously the information provided by the students (even when full

objectivity is assumed), is not representative enough to place students into realistic, nationally

accepted norms of income and expenditure groups. If adequate information could be obtained on the

financial backgrounds of students, it would be more practical mechanism for determining need and

hence allocation of loans”. The experts from both public and private universities responded that the

current environment of Tanzania does not allow proper functioning of means testing in a structured

form (Field data, 2007). Although, the Loan Act creates an offence under section 23(1) (b) on false

information51 the Loan Board has no sufficient mechanism to verify the correctness of the information

supplied by loan applicants.

The second problem is on verification of the information. The means of verifying the correctness of

the information is poor since there are no enough resources, time and enough skilled labour. For

instance, there is no valuation team for the assets that students and their families have. The time for

assessment by the Loan Board is usually short, hardly one month for freshers and two months for

continuing students. It is a huge task, for instance, to process about 55,576 loan applicants in

2007/2008 basing on inadequate data and the poor information to applicants. Geoffrey Kiwele was

complaining that, “the Board has the poorest information dissemination strategy, only meant for

students who live in urban areas with access to televisions, radios and newspapers. He commented 49 See paragraph 4.1 of the 2007/2008 Guidelines; see also paragraph 4.1 of the 2008/2009 Guidelines50 Ibid51 See also paragraphs 5.1 and 5.1 of the 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 Guidelines respectively.

24



that even if such important information to students was carried in newspapers, not many of them

could get it on time.” (Sunday Observer of 16th September, 2007). Again, the responses from the

students, potential beneficiaries, university managements, and private owners signified the point that

the Loan Board has the poorest information system. And this explains the unnecessary delays,

students’ day-to-day demonstrations, and the ongoing misunderstandings between students and

managements (Field data, 2007).

The findings of this study observed that the Loans Board assessment of the forms is not properly done.

For example, a student made his application for loan and submitted all necessary documents that could

be used as evidence to his inability to pay even 20%, yet the Loan Board gave him 60% after ‘means

testing’. However, the student made an appeal with the same documents that were previously

submitted. The corrections were made after one semester and he got 100% instead (Field data, 2007).

However, there were many similar examples portrayed by students from public universities

concerning the appeals for earlier Loan Board’s assessment. Many students got their grades changing

from grade B to grade A and from grade C to grade B after the appeal. Again, there was a claim that

was reported by students from the College of Business Education (CBE) who claimed to know some

students who were studying Diploma courses to have accessed loans from the Loan Board illegally in

2005/2006 academic year (MwanaHalisi Newspaper of April 2-8, 2008:14). Therefore, the inability of

the Loan Board to assess students properly makes it difficult to identify the poor and needy students.

This is to deny poor and needy students the right to access higher education.

It is submitted that the ineffective means-testing instrument which is currently used by the Loan Board

is unable to identify the faults that are in the information submitted by the students. Otieno (2004:88)

summarizes this by the statement that, “the inadequacy of means-testing instrument is that it fails to

categorize the students in realistic clusters such as expenditure groups”. This is to say, means testing is

practically unworkable in Africa and Tanzania in particular. The Loans Board advances loans just on

assumptions based on unverified information. In effect loans are granted to many students who do not

qualify as needy students. It was supported by the Prime Minister, Mizengo Pinda, that;

the formula which is currently used by the loans board is inefficient and ineffective

since it fails to identify the real needy students and those who are not. And it is true

that the formula is not proper in identifying the needy students. It is our objective to

make sure that the loan beneficiaries are really the students from poor families

(Mwananchi, May 4, 2007:3).

From the Prime Minister’s words, one may argue that, means testing does not democratize access to

loans by the majority poor. Therefore, private financing of education in Tanzania limits the poor’s

access to universities. Table 1 shows how wealth status determines students’ access to university

education.

25



Table 1: Access to Public Universities as Influenced by Family Wealth Status

Access to Public Universities

Family Social Status Loan percentage Other Sources percentage Total percentage

Wealth

Level

H 95 68 30 83 125 71

L 45 32 6 17 51 29

Total 140 80 36 20 176 100Source: Field data, 2007

Note: “H” means high and “L” means low

Table 1 suggests that about 80% of students do access public university education through government

loans and 20% of them access university through other sources like parents/guardians, private

organizations, NGOs, government organizations, etc. The study also noted that, students from high

wealth families have higher chances of accessing higher education for about 68% against 32% of

students from low socio-economic status, who purely rely on the loan facility. This suggests that there

is a great difference in percentages in terms of access between the higher and the lower income

applicants. Thus, students from poor families are denied their right to access higher education through

the loan facility.

The scenario is even worse in the private university education. Private universities may be categorized

into three basing on the nature of the institution and hence predict the nature of access to private

universities. There are state-supported private universities, non-for-profit private universities, and for-

profit private universities (Varghese, 2004:8). There is a greater linkage between the nature of theinstitution and the access to that institution in the sense that, the nature of the institution determines

the sources of finance for the institution to operate hence higher or lower tuition fees. State-supported

institutions receive funding from the government, which might be minimal or substantial but the

government can regulate even the amount of fees levied by the institution. Non-for-profit institutions

are owned and operated by trusts that rely heavily on endowment and fees collected from the students.

Some of them are self-financing institutions and some are supported by religious agencies. For

example, SAUT, TU, and Zanzibar Universities in Tanzania are supported by religious agencies like

Roman Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran Church, and ‘Daar-ul-imaan’ respectively. The for-profit

institutions were granted legitimacy in 1990s due to the involvement of publicly traded corporations

that own and run multi-campus universities. According to Ruth (2001) these universities trade the

stocks and shares of educational institutions. They mostly rely on student fees as a major source of

financing the institutions, and at times are affiliated to universities based abroad (Varghese, 2004).

This is the case for IMTU Dar es Salaam which is a product of Vignan Educational Foundation,

Bangalore India.

26



It is convenient to argue that most Tanzanian private universities depend substantially on student fees

as a major source of institutional funding. It is equally important to say that tuition fees in private

universities are much higher as compared to the public universities that still obtain government

support. For instance, Tuition fee at IMTU is 4500USD approximately 5,400,000Tsh and UDSM is

600,000Tsh-1,200,000Tsh. It makes sense to argue that private universities given the higher level of

fees levied by these institutions especially the for-profit ones, attract and encourage students from a

better socio-economic background. This is supported by Verghese’s (2004) observation that since

private universities are self-financing institutions, fees charged will also be high and students coming

to those institutions are those with paying capacities. This situation creates a cleavage between those

who can afford and those who can’t, and in the long-term impacts on equity of access.

In Tanzania, for instance, for about seven years (1997/98 to 2003/04) students in private universities

incurred all costs52 with their families and it simply implies that they were students from well to do

families (Field data, 2007). Even after the commencement of the Loan Board that was established to

advance loans to poor students in order to access university education of either public or private, there

had been limitations in ensuring access to private universities by the majority poor. The first limitation

is the insufficient finance to meet all the costs for the education by the poor, and second is the

ineffective means-testing that can’t identify the poor and needy as explained above. The findings of

this study point out that majority of students who access private universities are those from high social

status families. This means that, they can afford to secure various sources of finance including

government loans, in the presence of ineffective and insufficient means testing. Table 2 shows such

variation very clearly.

Table 2: Access to Private Universities as Influenced by Family Wealth Status.

Access to Private Universities

Family Social Status Loan percentage Other Sources percentage Total percentage

Wealth

Level

H 34 67 32 86 66 75

L 17 33 5 14 22 25

Total 51 58 37 42 88 100Source: Field Data, 2007.


Table 2 shows that the number of students who access private universities through loans is 58%

whereas those who access private universities through other sources are 42%. This implies that

students who access private university education are not solely dependent on government loans as

many of them are from families that can pay for their education. It may be argued that the inability of

the designed means-testing to have the needy students could have largely excluded the poor, and at the

same time enable many students from high wealth status to have better access to private universities.

52 This implies direct costs, indirect costs, transport costs, communication costs, and any other costs that might be incurred

by the students during a course of study.

27



Table 2 demonstrates the same as it shows 67% of students from high wealth families accessing

private university education at the expense of the majority poor students. This is to say, means testing

is not functioning well as poor students are denied access to university so greatly. The Minister for

Education, professor Maghembe admitted this when talking to Mzumbe university community. He

said, “Again, the problem emanates from the students themselves, they do not give concrete

information about their family social status, as many tend to identify themselves as orphans especially

when they are here; and thus it becomes very difficult to identify who is a liar and who tells the truth.”

(Mwanchi, March 7, 2008). From the outlined models of private financing it was made clear that

without viable mechanisms of assisting the poor by the government in place majority poor students are

denied access to higher education. Therefore, the have-nots may hardly access higher education under

the management of the current loan arrangements by the Loan Board in Tanzania.

It is, therefore, submitted that in the absence of other sources of finance to assist poor students to

access higher education and the presence of unworkable means-testing, students from poor families

are denied access to private universities so greatly. While it was observed by this study that the limited

access by the poor is so strong in private universities than the public ones, Zanzibar University

displayed a different scenario where the majority poor have accessed higher education. The following

section is a thorough observation of the prevailing conditions to the democratization of access by the

poor at Zanzibar University.

Zanzibar University: A Different Case

Zanzibar University is one of the private universities in Zanzibar located in Tunguu. It was registered

by TCU as a private university with certificate of full registration No. 003 of 4th May, 2000 (TCU

Newsletter, 2006). There are two more universities in Zanzibar, the State University of Zanzibar

(SUZA), which is public and Chukwani College of Education, which is private. They make up the

three universities in Zanzibar (Zanzinet, 2004). Before the establishment of those universities in

Zanzibar, students who wanted to join universities had to apply to the universities in the Tanzania

mainland, such as UDSM, MUCHS, SUA and HKMU (Zanzinet, 2004). This situation among others,

contributed greatly to the lower enrolment of Zanzibaries into university education and thus denied

them the basic right to education. Zanzibar was historically backward in education, and more

specifically, university education. One of the main reasons for its backwardness is poverty as

explained by weak foundation of the economies.

The major economic sectors in Zanzibar are agriculture, trade, industries and tourism. In agriculture,

cloves and food crops like rice, cassava, sweet potato, bananas, yams, and cocoyam form the basic

28



source of income. For many years, Zanzibar was a leading producer of cloves in the world but the age

of clove trees, diseases, agronomic and a number of human-related factors have caused a steep decline

in the annual production levels. In trade and industries, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar

(RGZ) had initially closed doors for citizens wishing to pursue trading opportunities with the external

world (Zanzinet, 2004). In tourism, the benefits are difficult to measure due to mainly two conflicting

ideas. First is the creation of employment opportunities and the rise in prices of goods and services;

and second is the opinion that Zanzibar does not benefit from tourism because most of the visitors pay

directly to foreign agencies in their respective countries before beginning their journey to the spice

island. The only visitors who seem to pay directly to local agencies are ‘backpack tourists’ i.e. tourists

whose expenditure while in the country is very minimal (Zanzinet, 2004).

Therefore, it is evident that, most of the Zanzibaris live in poor conditions since the major sources of

income of the country yield little benefits to the people. It was observed by this study, after

interviewing the Dean of Students that most of the government employees are paid lower salaries that

amounts to 60,000/- Tshs. per month. It is for this reason that there had been various non-

governmental interventions to assist students to access university education. These are Zanzibar

government under the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, NGO (Daar-ul-imaan) and the

Loans Board. With such interventions, democratization of access by the poor is portrayed. Table 3

shows how poor students have been able to access university education in Zanzibar.

Table 3: Access to Zanzibar University as Influenced by Family Wealth Status

Access to Zanzibar University

Family Social Status Loan Percentage Other Sources Percentage Total Percentage

Wealth

Level

H 2 25 5 25 7 25

L 6 75 15 75 21 75

Total 8 29 20 71 28 100

Source: Field Data, 2008.


The responses show that students who access Zanzibar University through other sources is 71% and

those who access the university through loans is 29%. This implies that the access to university

through other sources is higher than that of the Loan Board. Moreover, it is about 75% of students

from low wealth status who have accessed Zanzibar University through other sources like Religious

NGOs, RGZ, Ministry of Education, etc. Therefore, although loans are central in democratizing access

by the poor, they seem to play an insignificant role in the current situation in Zanzibar and Tanzania in

general. Moreover, the beneficiaries are not satisfied with the assistance as it is insufficient and needs

supplements. The management faces managerial problems due to the fact that not only the Loan Board

usually delays payment for tuition fees but also the remaining percent that has to be paid by the

students is not being paid in time.

29



Back to the criteria for loan, the fourth criterion is that an applicant must be a person who has no

financial assistance from any other source or sources to cover the item or items of cost for which the

application is made53. In other words, an applicant who have other sources should not be categorized

as a needy student. This however, implies that such a needy student who is not able to secure other

sources of finance will have full support of the costs of education such as tuition fees, meals and

accommodation, books and stationary expenses and special faculty requirements, research expenses or

field work expenses. The findings of the study have observed that most of the students who got loans

had other sources of finance like employment, parents, NGO support, business organizations’

sponsorship like Vodacom, Celtel (now Zain), etc. One of the explaining factors is the inadequate

financial support given from the Loan Board. For example, the government standard norm (100%) is

150,000 Tsh. per month; whereas, TU charges 150,000 Tsh. per month for meals only, and IMTU, on

the other hand, charges 240,000 Tsh. per month for meals and accommodation (Field data, 2007). This

shows that students who receive loans from the Loan Board have to supplement education costs from

their own sources like salaries for workers, parents/guardians, and other relatives. This observation

may lead to two concluding stances. The first is that, the Loan Board advances loans on an assumption

that the beneficiaries have other sources of finances and this disapproves the logic of the needy student

under the Act. The second stance is that, the Loan Board advances loans to the students from families

with high wealth who will be able to supplement the costs of education. Table 4 gives a clear

demonstration of the same from public and private universities.

Table 4: Showing Inadequate financial Support Provided by the Loan Board

Access to Loan (inpercents)

No. Studentsin PublicUniversities

No. Studentsin PrivateUniversities

41- 60 42 22

61- 80 70 20

81- 100 28 9

Total 140 51

Source: Field Data, 2007.

The above responses suggest that about 80% of students from public universities do get 40% to 80%

of the loan and only 20% students receive 100%. On the other hand, it is about 86.3% of students from

private universities who receive a loan of 40% to 80% and only 17.7% students receive 100%. This

implies that the Loan Board advances loans to students who are able to supplement the remaining

percent of the education costs. However, students who really deserve financial support, i.e. the poor

who manage to secure loans from the Loan Board only live miserably in the course of study. The

responses from the university management both public and private, verified that most of the poor

students live a miserable life at the universities. They even demonstrated that these students usually

53 Section 17(1)(d) of the Loan Act.

30



have one meal per day. They expressed further the severity of the situation that the most needy

students who depend entirely on the loan need to use part of it to cover the remaining percent of

tuition fees to the institutions. And that, about 40% of those students supplement tuition fee with a

loan for meals and accommodation (Field data, 2007). This has severe impact on their living standard

as well as the quality of their education. It was similarly put by Nyaigotti-Chacha (2002:143) that;

Most students contend with harsh lives in universities during the tenure of studies, with

some engaging in corrupt business deals in the campuses in order to supplement their

finances. On the other hand, those unscrupulous who ‘cheat’ their way into getting loans

at the expense of deserving cases tend to have excess money, which encourages many,

vices at the various universities.

Therefore, various respondents such as the Director for Planning in the Ministry of the then MSTHE,

and private universities owners confirmed, during an interview with the researcher, that about 70% of

Tanzanians are not able to pay for their education (Field data, 2007). And thus, one argues that there is

a systematic denial of the poor’s access to higher education through private financing.

The fifth criterion is that an applicant must be a continuing student, who has passed the examinations

necessary to enable him to advance to the following year or stage of study54. This criterion excludes

freshers55 from applying for loan. Although in practice freshers are allowed to make application for

loan, it is not clearly known which enabling provision of law allows the Loan Board to grant loan to

this group of applicants. Such inconsistencies may lead to denied access by the majority poor. On the

other hand, loans to postgraduate students are governed by Rule 38 of the Regulations. The Rule lays

down three main criteria for advancement of loan to postgraduate students. The first criterion is that

the applicant must have no outstanding loan; the second criterion requires that the applicant must be

pursuing a course of prime importance. A course of prime importance is determined on merit by the

Loan Board from time to time56. The third criterion is that if the applicant is a loan beneficiary, he/she

must have shown good will by repaying regularly the previous loan. However, the analysis of the

application and effectiveness of these criteria for loan will be discussed in detail after a useful

discussion of the conditions imposed by the Loan Board in issuance of loans to poor students.

There are five criteria for issuance of loans to postgraduate students under these guidelines. First, the

applicant must complete loan application forms (SLF 1 and SLF 2)57; second, the applicant must be a

holder of first degree or advanced diploma with a minimum of upper second class58; third, the

applicant must be a teaching academic staff at a public learning institutions in Tanzania59; fourth, the

54 Ibid, 17(1) (e).55

Freshers are first year students who have just been enrolled to a university.56 See Rule 38(3) of the Regulations.57 Ibid paragraph 3.10.158 Ibid paragraph 3.10.259 Ibid paragraph 3.10.3

31



applicant must bear a recommendation letter from employer ( public higher learning institution)

addressed to the Board supporting the request for postgraduate loan60 and fifth, the applicant must

have started to repay a previous loan, if he or she is a beneficiary 61. It must be noted that the criteria

provided in the 2008/2009 Guidelines for postgraduate applicants are inconsistent with Rule 38 of the

regulations62. This is because, Rule 38 does not confine itself to a specific class of people. As pointed

out, Rule 38 of the regulations governs loans to postgraduate students. It is interesting to note that the

Loan Act does not provide criteria for loan eligibility for postgraduate applicants. One may ask, has

the regulations gone too far?

It is submitted that, the regulations can’t supersede the provisions of an Act of Parliament under which

it is made. This being the case, Rule 38 of the regulations must have been held inconsistent with

section 17 of the Loan Act, which generally provides eligibility criteria for loan applicants from the

Loan Board. The legal implication of this inconsistency is to render Rule 38 of the regulations void63.

However, this must be tested in the court of law to declare the Rule null and void. If the legal status of

Rule 38 of the regulations is set aside, the principal criterion for eligibility for loan for postgraduate

studies is that, an applicant must have no outstanding loan. This criterion applies only to a loan

applicant who previously had been a beneficiary of loan from the Loan Board. The second criterion

requires that the applicant must be pursuing a course of prime importance. The former has to be

determined on merit by the Loan Board from time to time 64. It is acknowledged that, in its life time,

the Loan Board has never determined a course of prime importance. This is a potential systemic denial

of poor students to access higher education to their ability.

It is further noted that, the guidelines differentiate between undergraduate and postgraduate students

for purposes of loan application. Different criteria apply to loan applicants belonging to these classes.

The 2005/2006 Guidelines did not put different criteria for loan applicants for undergraduate and

postgraduate. The implication behind is equal treatment of both undergraduates and postgraduates as

the Loan Act provides. The 2006/2007 Guidelines restricted loan to postgraduate applicants, unless the

course addresses national priority skill requirements65. The same provision was used and carried in the

2007/2008 Guidelines66. However, postgraduate students were denied their right to access higher

education with the application of such guidelines. The turning point to the issuance of loans to

postgraduate students is found in the 2008/2009 Guidelines. These Guidelines provide that beginning

60 Ibid paragraph 3.10.461 Ibid paragraph 3.10.562 Read parts 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.1 (B) of this dissertation63

Section 36(1) of the Interpretation of Law Act, Cap. 1 R.E 2002 provides that, a subsidiary legislation shall be void tothe extent of inconsistency if it is inconsistent with the provisions of the written law.64 See rule 38(3) of the Regulations.65 See paragraph 5.0 of the 2006/2007 Guideline.66 See paragraph 3.10 of the 2007/2008 Guidelines.

32



in the academic year 2008/2009, loans will be issued for postgraduate studies (Masters and PhD

Programmes)67. However, in this category, loans are restricted only to academic staff of the public

higher education institutions68. There are two implications on this. First, there is a clear distinction

between public and private universities in terms of democratizing access to university by the poor.

That means the equal treatment of people69 in realization of democratic values is overruled in that

process. Second, the government uses the Loan Board to exempt itself from the primary responsibility

of educating her workers to the level of their ability. This is to relegate human resources principles and

human rights at large.

Moreover, the Guidelines have three more criteria for guiding the issuance of loans to poor students.

These are full-time programmes versus part-time programmes; quota allocation; and priority courses.

Starting with full-time programmes versus part-time programmes, with the exception of the 2005/2006

Guidelines, the 2006/2007, 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 Guidelines require an applicant to be registered

for full-time programmes. There is, however, one exception to this requirement, students from OUT

are allowed to apply for the loan70. This criterion is neither found in the Loan Act nor the regulations.

In practice, however, this provision restricts part-time and on-line students from accessing loan. This

is to deny access to the poor who will have an opportunity to study on-line or on part-time bases.

Second, The Loan Board is vested with power to determine the maximum number of eligible students

to be granted loans in any one particular year 71. For the first time, the Loan Board invoked these

powers to limit the quota of loan allocation to higher education institutions in the academic year

2006/2007. This was for only public universities. The following guidelines have no mention of any

exact number the Loan Board could disburse to needy students. There are only projections of the

number of total applicants in each year set by the Loan Board. It was responded by the Director for

Planning, Research and Consultancy of HESLB during a face-to-face interview with the researcher

that the Loan Board has no exact number of the students to be granted loans in each year. He said in

2005/2006 the Loan Board granted loans to about 42,729 students; whereas in 2006/2007 about

47,554 students got loans from the Loans Board; and in 2007/2008 the estimate is 55,981 students by

the end of May or early June 2008. However, in the mid-march 2008 about 55,576 students had

already got loans from the Loan Board (Field data, 2008). This has an impact of generally denying

access to higher education as private universities receives a small proportion of quota allocation due to

the “division criterion.”

67

See paragraph 3.10 of the 2008/2009 Guidelines.68 Ibid69 The essential element of democracy in any democratic polity.70 See paragraphs 6.7, 3.2 and 3.2 of the 2006/2007, 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 Guidelines respectively.71 See section 7 (1) (i) of the Loan Act; See also paragraph 7 of the 2006/2007 Guidelines.

33



Third, the Load Board has blended some courses through its guidelines as priority courses. Such

courses include medicine, pharmacy, engineering, architecture, agriculture and science. In practice,

when the qualifications of students in humanities collide with a student in science subjects, the latter

will prevail. This has in effect discriminated access by students in humanities. On the other hand,

private universities which offer medical science courses are still priority courses. But the Loan Board

does not give full support to such courses. For instance, IMTU charges tuition fees of USD4500

(approx. 5.6 mil. Tsh) per year. However, the Loan Board grants a maximum loan of 2.6 mil Tshs.

only for the student with grade A after means-testing. The rest of the amount (3 mil. Tsh.) has to be

paid by the students and/or their parents/guardians (Field data, 2008). Students from poor families

automatically can’t afford to supplement the remaining 3 mil Tshs. as their income households do not

exceed 300,000 Tshs per month. It was, generally, put by the World Bank (2000) that countries that

have introduced or raised fees are at risk of experiencing an increase in access disparities in absence of

effective and well-targeted student aid mechanisms. One of the mechanisms is prioritization of

courses. It is submitted that, the Loans Board through prioritization of courses has restricted access to

loans by the poor students and denied potential access to higher education eventually.

Apart from the inadequacies of the means-testing instrument, there are two main conditions imposed

by the Loan Board in granting loans72. These conditions do limit access to university education by the

poor. The first condition is that the Loan Board may demand security to be furnished in order to

secure the loan73. Security is a valuable item like a house, commercial premise, big building, motor

vehicle, etc. The puzzle here is, does the poor person have security? Why does the Loan Board invent

this condition? Is there a commitment to assist the poor? However, it is proper to argue that poor

students are denied access to university education with the application of this condition. It was crystal

clear when the study observed that among the 292 questioned students on whether their families own

movable or immovable properties. It was only 36% of all sampled students who have none of the

properties to own and only 29% students among them managed to secure loans illegally since they had

not fulfilled the condition (Field data, 2007). This scenario suggests denied access to loan by the

majority poor.

The second condition is requirement of a guarantor. This condition requires every recipient of the loan

to have a guarantor who will be liable to the Loan Board in case of default of repayment. The usual

practices show that sometimes students indicate their fellow students to be guarantors, and this distorts

the whole meaning of imposing this condition. With such inconsistency, therefore, there will be more

72 See section 18 of the Loan Act.73 The loan is interest-free

34



cases of default for repayment, which will eventually reduce the amount of funds that would be used

to assist other poor students and thus inhibit democratization of their access to university.

Generally, the guidelines which are issued in each academic year have been restricting students from

poor families to access higher education. One may probe whether the issuance of such guidelines in

each academic year intends to guide applicants in the process of accessing loans or deliberately

discriminate the poor from accessing loans. It is suggested that the practice of the Loan Board to issue

guidelines has to be stopped since it has no legal justification and denies access by the poor.

Therefore, in the absence of viable mechanism to assist the poor to access higher education, private

financing of the education limits the poor access to the education.

4.1 Conclusions and Recommendations

Private financing of higher education is the inherent feature of the comodification of services,

including education. It came as a result of liberalization policies of cost sharing in the 1980s. The

policies were a result of economic hardship which faced Tanzania following the oil crisis of the 1973

that affected the world’s economies. The policy of Education for Self-reliance that was implemented

previously made equal access to education by majority Tanzanians regardless of the aspects of wealth,

race, sex and any other forms of discrimination. However, the policy has been greatly changed. The

referred changes were in two main ways, namely, provision and financing of higher education. The

provision of higher education got shifted from the government as the sole provider to the partnership

of government and the private sector. This change has led to the establishment of private universities

and accreditation of institution, i.e. TCU has the responsibility of registering universities as well as

assuring quality of the provision of university education by the providers. With the establishment of

private universities, the volume of services has increased and the consumer choices are widened too.

One may probe the extent to which such increase as a means to democratize access to university

education by all Tanzanians has succeeded as the majority poor are left in the ‘cold’.

The financing of higher education was diversified to include the private sector, students and their

families, private companies, government, and NGOs. This diversification of financing education did

consider the fact that there are those students who are poor and can’t access higher education if not

assisted by the government. The establishment of the loan scheme seemed to be central and its

commencement was one of the strategies to assist the poor by the government and it started in 1994. It

is crystal clear that the introduction of loan scheme and tuition fees was a starting point of denying

access to the public universities by the majority poor through “conditional” loans74

. The access to

74 Loans that were provided basing on admission criterion whereby all who were admitted under government sponsorship

had to get loans in some items and the rest were supplemented by grants.

35



private universities has been mainly for students from well-to-do families as tuitions are very high and

thus unaffordable.

Following the establishment of Loan Board by the Act of Parliament No.9 of 2004, with the

subsequent regulations and guidelines, the new criteria set for students’ eligibility to government loans

are ambiguous and restrictive75. The findings of this study observed various fractures that are

embedded in the regulations and guidelines and thus deny access to higher education by the majority

poor in Tanzania. Means-testing as the only mechanism used by the Loan Board is inefficient and

ineffective indeed, and it can’t give the actual picture of who is needy or otherwise. Loans are

distributed to the students who do not qualify for such. It also allows for many chances of cheating

given the fact that the source data to inform the Loan Board’s decision making are the potential

beneficiaries of the application.

It was observed that an application for loan is usually done by filling in some forms that intend to

evaluate each applicant’s socio-economic status so as to identify the needy students. The designing of

the forms is meant to expose the total income and expenditure of each applicant’s family. Most

Tanzanians do not keep records of their expenditure nor their incomes except the employed ones who

get salary by the end of each month. It is evident that employed Tanzanians are fewer as compared to

those who have self-employment in informal sectors. This is the point where many students tend to

express themselves as students from poor peasant families or small businesses.

In a nutshell, generally, the Loans Board has not been able to identify the needy students since its

establishment. The continuing amendments on the definition of poor and needy student that are being

done by the Loans Board in each academic year do not match with the criterion for loan under the

Loan Act i.e. ‘division criterion’ which denies access by the poor who usually get lower division

status in their final examinations. The means-testing which is currently being implemented by the

Loan Board is ineffective and inefficient. It makes fewer students from poor families, who manage to

get a smaller percentage of the loan to live miserably while at the universities. This in turn impacts

negatively on students’ academic performances. Therefore, so long as the enabling factor to access

higher education by poor and needy students is not benefiting the intended students, the democratized

access through private financing is not realized to the majority poor.

Moreover, the present denial of access by the majority poor in Tanzania is a function of both, the

silent policy commitments and the weak legal and institutional framework in assisting students from

75 Loans that are designed to suit one major group in the society, the poor or needy, so as to maintain equity of access to

universities.

36



poor families by the government. It should be noted that the government is the foremost responsible

organ in educating its citizen to the level of university education. And this could be in two main ways,

namely financing higher education and ensuring equitable access to such education through effective

policies. In order to realize the right to education to every individual in the society while observing

equity of access by the government the study recommends the following.

First, a thorough review of the policy, especially Loan Scheme, which informs the introduction of

private financing in Tanzania, should be undertaken. The government has to review the necessity of

introducing private financing and the essentiality of higher education in contemporary Tanzania. The

usual argument that there are severe constraints on public budget does not hold water since the

government has tax capacity or public revenue potential of about 20% of GDP. The World Bank

suggests that an appropriate share of GDP for education is about 5% (25% of revenues assuming a tax

capacity of 20% of GDP) of which 1% of GDP should be devoted to higher education (about 5% of

revenues)76 yet such level of the resource does not reach higher education.

Merrisotis and Wolanin (2002:154) have outlined possible reasons for the inability of government to

ascertain public revenue of about 20% of GDP; these are, flawed tax systems, weak government tax

collection, corruption, and inappropriate spending priorities. However, these are useful explanations

that might reveal the situation in Tanzania. The government is caught up on issues of corruption which

are clearly seen under the rent seeking behavior of the government officials while signing public

contracts. The current scandals on RADAR 77, RICHMOND78, EPA79, and Kiwira coal mine80 are

relevant examples of the inability of Tanzanian government to fully fund higher education. It is

recommended that, the government has to redress such issues promptly before imposing private

financing or else for the very poor families, private financing as a preferred means to increasing higher

education revenues seems to be like trying to squeeze blood from a stone. 81 If the government solves

those problems and still experiences inadequate public revenues for higher education, private

financing could be applied with caution as described hereunder.

76 The World Bank, (2001) Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education, p.6777 The contract signed by the government in the purchase of overpriced radar for the country’s aviation industry. The radar

was bought at USD 14 million, Voice of America.com78 The contract was signed in a suspect of generating an emergency energy between the Tanzanian government and the

Richmond Development Corporation. The contract made the government to loose USD 172 million, The Citizen of 26

June 2008.79 This is the short name for External Payment Arrears. The Presidential Investigating Team had discovered the loss of

USD 133million at the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) and it led President of Tanzania, J. Kikwete to fire the BoT Governor

Daudi Balali, the East African Business Week (Kampala) Newspaper of 7 April 2008.80 This is associated with the loss of about 11,752,350,148.00 Tshs by the Tanzanian government as a result of

maladministration of the then Minister for Finance, Basil Mramba and Minister for Fuels and Minerals, Daniel Yona,

Tanzania Daima Newspaper of 26 November 2008.81 Merisotis and Wolanin, 2002 p.154

37



(a) The loan policy and legal framework that guide the process of granting loan to students should be

reviewed in depth. Students should be given full support in all items as required so that the poor and

needy students could have an opportunity to access quality education in and during the course of

study. However, this can be realized by doing two things. One is setting the specific number of

students to be granted loans in both public and private universities. Two is for the Loan Board to find

more sources of fund instead of depending entirely on government funding and loan repayment. That

is how the government can promote and respect human rights fully, right to education being one of

them.

(b) “Means testing” is ineffective and inefficient in the Tanzanian environment and it should be

abolished. This is because needs analysis using a design of forms is subjective and exposed to

manipulation and misinformation. But again, it uses social indicators in determining ability to pay.

There are so many practical problems such as, it needs labour intensive in the scrutinization of the

forms to its accuracy of information. For instance, the difficulty and high cost of verifying information

about ability to pay of families could be minimized or made more manageable by only verifying the

accuracy of the information for a sample of those who apply. The efficacy of sampling or spot-

checking depends on the severity of the penalty for cheating, the certainty that the penalty will be

applied if cheating is discovered, and the thoroughness of the verification for the sample (Merisotis

and Wolanin, 2002:152).

(c) This is the criterion for loan. Since it has been difficult to determine the criteria for loan then the

Loans Board has been concentrating on the merging of division criterion and physical disabilities. It is

necessary to put it clear that, the admission criterion could be prominent so that the poor could have

access to both public and private universities.

Second, it has been observed in this study that many Tanzanians are in the informal sector, and thus

their incomes depend on various sources. The study has also revealed that the majority of them have

the ability to pay for their education. The study therefore, recommends that those who have the ability

to pay should have to do that, so as to give a wide chance for the poor to access the government loans.

However, there are still other options for a person from well to-do families, i.e. loans from the banks

and other agencies. He/she has all necessary attributes to qualify for a loan from the banks as such an

example of the collateral that the banks do require.

Third, since those who usually cheat in order to get loans from the Loan Board are from the Tanzanian

community and the community does know them, it is recommended that the public identifies and

reports them to the authorities for further actions. For example, the claim of CBE students to access

38



loans illegally as described above should have been sent to the relevant authorities for apprehension.

Therefore, the public should work close with the government in making sure the financial assistance is

directed to the real needy students.

Fourth, it is widely known that one of the roles of civil society is to influence policy formulation so as

to have effective policies. The poor financing policy in Tanzania needs major changes. It is urged that

the civil society takes part effectively so that workable polices in the context of Tanzania are invented.

One of the policies, for instance, is tuition policy; the influence might be in lowering tuition fee by

giving subsidies to the private universities especially. This is the only way to improve access among

Tanzanians for the benefit of all.

Fifth, the civil society has the ability of making the public aware of the role of the government and the

individual citizen in developmental process. It is recommended that the civil society should use its

convincing ability to advise those with the ability to pay for their education should do so. Lastly, it is

recommended that civil society should conscientize the public and the government on the role of

higher education in the contemporary world of science and technology. Higher education is very

essential in all aspects of life such as economic, socio-political and cultural so as to address the

challenges of globalization. Its financing needs greater attention of both the general public and the

government.

Generally, the above recommendations should not be taken as enough without the public forum

including all stakeholders i.e. students, parents, business organizations, NGOs, the government, and

the community at large should be called to give out viable mechanisms that can be applied in the

context of Tanzania in the future.

39



REFERENCES

Abeli, W.S. (2007) “Expanding Access to Higher Education in Tanzania: A Reflection,”a paper presented at the 14th Annual Consultative Meeting on Institutional Transformation Programme, 16th-17th August, 2007.

Abegaz, B.M (1995) “Universities in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities of International Cooperation”,

DAE/AAU .

Assie-Lumumba, N. (2006) Higher Education in Africa: Crises, Reforms and Transformation, CODESRIA

working paper series, Imprimerie Saint Paul, Dakar, Senegal.

Bakari, M. and Mushi, S. S. (2005) “Prerequisites for Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania”, In democraticTransition in East Africa, E&D limited, REDET.

Burchert, L. (1994) Education in the Development of Tanzania 1919-1990, Dar es Salaam,. Mkuki Na Nyota.

Breyer, S, (2005) Active Liberty, Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, New York, Knopf.

Clottey, P. (2007) Tanzania: Opposition Parties Want Corrupt Government officials to Resign. Voice of

America News of 22nd January 2007. www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-01/2007-01-22-voa2.cfm on16th January 2009.

Cohen, J. (2005) “Public Scholarship” In Sherrod, L. et al. (eds.) Youth Activism: An International Encyclopedia, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood.

Cohen, J. and Eberly, R. (2005) Higher Education, Democratic Capacity and Public Scholarship, Campus

Compact 20th Anniversary.

Colgan, C. (1994) Administering Higher Education in a Democratic Society: Financing Higher Education;Who Pays? Freedom Paper No. 5, California, USA, ICS Press.

Cooksey, B. and Levey, L. et al (2001) The Partnership for Higher Education in Africa: Higher Education inTanzania: A Case Study, New York, Carnegie Corporation.

Council of Europe, (2005) “Declaration on 2005 Year of Citizenship through Education,” Adopted at the Third Summit on Warsaw, May 2005.

Council of Europe, (2006) “Declaration on Higher Education and Democratic Culture” Adopted in Strasbourg on 23rd June 2006.

Dahl, R. (1989) Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven and London, Yale University Press.

Dalton, R. J. et al. (2007) “Popular Conceptions of the Meaning of Democracy: Democratic understanding inUnlikely Places,” University of California, Irivine. Paper 07’03.

ESAURP (1987) University Capacity in Eastern and Southern African Countries, England, James Currey Ltd.

Galabawa, J. (1994) “State and Non-state financing of primary Schools in Tanzania. Papers in Education and Development, Vol. 15, pp 35-50.

Gandhi, J. (2000) “Improving Public Administration in a competitive World,” in ADB (2000 ), To Serve and To Preserve.

Garrett, D. (1992) A Review of David Schmidtz’s, The Limit of Government: An essayon The Public Goods

Argument , Westview Press, in Humane Studies Review, Vol. 7 No. 2 Spring 1992.

Huber, E. et al. (1997) “The Paradoxes of Contemporary democracy: Formal, Participatory and social

democracy,” Comparative politics vol. 29/3:323-342.

40

http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-01/2007-01-22-voa2.cfm





Ingel, K. (2000) Global Public Goods: A New Way to Balance the World’s Books, New York, Oxford

University Press.

Ishengoma, J. (2004) “Cost sharing in Higher Education in Tanzania: Fact or Fiction?” Journal of Higher Education in Africa, Vol.2, No.2

Johnson, P.M (1994-2005) A Glossary of Economy Terms, Haley Center, University of Auburn.

Johnstone, B. (2001) “The Finance and Politics of Cost Sharing in the Higher Education,” A paper presented to

the International Conference on the Economics of Education, Beijing, China, May 16-19.

Jongbloed, B. (2004) Higher Education Funding Mechanisms: options, trade-offs and dilemmas, The

Netherlands, University of Twente, CHEPS.

Jumanne, A. S. (1999) “The effects of cost sharing on the Training of Grade III A Teachers in Tanzania”.

Unpublished M.A Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam.

Kaul, L. et al., eds., (2003) Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, New York, Oxford

University Press.

Kent, T. ed., (1997) In Pursuit of the Public Good: Essays in honour of Allan J. MacEachen, Montreal, Buffalo,

McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Kiondo, A. (1990) “The Nature of Economic Reforms in Tanzania” in TAAMULI, a political science forum,

Vol. 1&2, UDSM.

Kikwete, J.M. (2008) “The second speech by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, delivered to the

parliament”, Dodoma, 21st August, 2008.

Lumumba-Kasongo, T., (2000) Dynamics and Policy Implications of the Global Reforms at the end of the

second millennium, Brill, Leiden, Boston.

Luhwago, R. (2008) Tanzania: Mwakyembe Denounces ‘Defenders” of Richmond . The Citizen (Dar es

Salaam) of 26th June 2008. www.allafrica.com/stories/20080626059.html on 16th January 2009.

LHRC (2005) Globalization and Workers’ Rights in Tanzania: A report on the findings of the Field Research

on the impact of the rights of workers in Tanzania.

Marshall, T. (1992) Citizenship and Social Class, ed. T. Bottomore, London: Pluto Press publishers.

Merisotis, J. and Wolanin, T. (2002) ‘Means Testing: Is it viable in Eastern and Southern Africa?’A Paper

presented to the conference on Financing of Higher Education in Eastern and Southern Africa, in March, 25

th

– 26th.

Mdemu, P.N. (2002) “Higher Education Tuition Policies,” Presented at the International Conference on Higher Education in Eastern and Southern Africa,25th-26th March, 2002.

Mpangala, G.P. (2000) “University Crises and Tanzanian Society, in Mbwette, T. S. A. & A.G.M. Ishumi

(2000) Managing University Crises, Dar es Salaam University Press.

Mkapa, B.M. (1999) “Speech by the President of United Republic of Tanzania, delivered to the community of

Dar es Salaam”, Nkrumah Hall, 16th Feb. 1999.

Mkude, D. et al, (2003) Higher Education in Tanzania: A case study, Partnership for Higher Education inAfrica, Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota.

41

http://www.allafrica.com/stories/20080626059.html




Mshana, J.S. and Mashalla, Y.J.S (2004) “Donor Policies for Higher Education: A case for University of Dar

es Salaam”. Nyerere Week Conference, University of Dar es Salaam.

MSTHE, (2000) “Cost sharing in Education.” Some basic statistics on Higher Learning Institutions in Tanzania

1995/6 – 1999/2000.

Musgrave, R.A (1969) “Provision for Social Good” in Margolis, J. and Guitton, H. (eds.), Public Economics,

London, McMillan.

Musoke, I. K. (1993) “The social impact of the move towards an economy on selected social categories in

Tanzania,” in On the road to a market based economy in Tanzania, a conference organized by Department of

Political Science and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung at University of Dar es Salaam.

Mwananchi Newspaper, Friday March 7, 2008.

MwanaHALISI Newspaper, Wednesday April 2-8, 2008.

Mwananchi Newspaper, Sunday May 4, 2008.

Nyerere, J.K (1967) Education for Self-Reliance, Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania.

Nyaigotti-Chacha, C. (2002) “Tuition Fees In Universities: Parental Contribution,” A Paper Presented at the

International Conference on Financing of Higher Education in Eastern and Southern Africa, 25th-26th March,

2002.

Omari, I. M. (1999) Higher Education at Crossroads in Africa, Nairobi: Mangraphics Ltd.

Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, New Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press.

Przeworski, et al. (2000) Democracy and development: political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-

1990, New York, Cambridge University Press.

Rubara, E. (2007) Students are still unhappy with loaning system. Sunday Observer of 16th September, 2007.

www.ippmedia.com/ipp/observer/2007/09/16/98507.html, on 14th may, 2008.

Ruch, R. (2001) Higher Education Incorporated: The Rise of For-profit University, USA, The John Hopkins

University Press.

Said, D. (2008) Tanzania: Ruling Party in Danger over $133 million EPA Scandal . The East African Business

Week (Kampala) of 7th April 2008. www.allafrica.com/stories/200804071155.html on 16th January 2009.

Samuelson, P.A (1954) “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure” A Review of Economics and Statistics 36(4):

387-389.

Schumpeter, J. (1943) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York, Harper.

Shivji, I. G. (1989) The Concept of Human Rights in Africa, London, CODESRIA BOOK SERIES.

Sorensen, G. (2003) “Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World”,

University of Aarthus, Westview Press.

Tanzania Statutes, (1978) Educational Act. No. 25 of 1978, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer.

Tanzania Daima Newspaper, Wednesday November 26, 2008. www.freemedia.co.tz/daima/habari.php?

id=171

TANU Annual Report, 1965.

42

http://www.ippmedia.com/ipp/observer/2007/09/16/98507.html








The Higher Education Students’ Loans Board Guidelines and Criteria for Issuance of Student Loans for

2005/2006 Academic Year.




2007/2008 Academic Year.The Higher Education Students’ Loans Board Guidelines and Criteria for Issuance of Student Loans for


The Higher Education Students’ Loans Board Act. 2004, Tanzania.

The Higher Education Students’ Loans Regulations 2005, Tanzania.

The Inter-University Council for East Africa Newsletter No. 33, September, 2006.

The Tanzania Commission for Universities, Newsletter, Vol. 1 No. 3 January – September, 2006.

UDSM ITP (2004) Ten Years Experience of the Institutional Transformation second Edition, University of Dar es salaam.

UDSM Newsletter, Vol. 6, No. 2, December, 2006.

UNESCO, (1998) World Declaration on Higher Education for the 21st Century: Vision and Action.

URT, (1995) Ministry of Education and Culture, Education and Training Policy.

URT, (1998) The Constitution of Tanzania, 1977.

URT, (1999) Ministry of Science and Technology and Higher Education National Policy.

URT (2008) Higher Education Students’ Loan Application Forms: HESLB-SLF 1, HESLB –SLF 2, and

HESLB-SLF 3. www.heslb.go.tz on 14th may, 2008

URT (2008) Higher Education Students’ Loan Agreement Form, www.heslb.go.tz on 14th may, 2008

Varghese, N.V. (2004) Private Higher Education in Africa, UNESCO Grant or IIEP, International Institute for

Educational Planning, http:/www.Unesco.org/iiep

Wimile, H. M. (1997) “State and Persons with Disability in Tanzania: Impact of Cost-sharing in Vocational

Rehabilitation Training”, M.A Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam.

Woodhall, M. (2002) “Student Loans: Potentials, Problems and Lessons from International Experience”, A

Paper Presented at the International Conference on Financing of Higher Education in Eastern and Southern Africa, 25th-26th March, 2002.

World Bank (2000) Higher Education in Developing Countries: Peril and Promise The Task Force on Higher

Education.

World Declaration on Higher Education for the Twenty-First Century: Vision and Actions, 1998.

Yash Tandon, (2002) “The Keynesian State and its Limits”, Seatini, Harare.

Yash Tandon (1979) “In Defense of Democracy”. Inaugural Lecture Series no. 14, University of Dar es SalaamPress, Tanzania.

43

http://www.heslb.go.tz/







Zanzinet Forum where Zanzibaris Meet, Zanzibar economic Sectors. File://E:Zanzibar Economic Sectors.htm.

Accessed on 23rd April, 2008.

44

2010-2!24!17!47!18_a Thesis Modified-Victoria Makulilo

Documents

Transcript of 2010-2!24!17!47!18_a Thesis Modified-Victoria Makulilo