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Australia • Brazil • Japan • Korea • Mexico • Singapore • Spain • United Kingdom • United States

Election 2008

An American Government Supplement

John A. Clark Western Michigan University

Brian F. Schaffner

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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Election 2008: An American Government Supplement John A. Clark Brian F. Schaffner

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CONTENTS I. The Political and Economic Context in 2008 1 II. Narrowing the Field: The Presidential Primaries 4 The Invisible Primary 4 The Early Primaries 7 Super Tuesday 8 Post Super Tuesday Primaries 10 III. General Election Campaign 12 Understanding the Results 17 IV. The Battle for Congress 21 Senate Elections 22 House Elections 24 Diversity in Congress 25 V. Elections in the States 25 Governors and State Legislatures 25 Ballot Proposals 26 VI. Looking Ahead 27 Endnotes 28

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS John A. Clark is professor of political science at Western Michigan University. He received his doctorate from the Ohio State University. Professor Clark specializes in American political parties, elections, and southern politics. Brian F. Schaffner is a professor in the political science department at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He received his doctorate from Indiana University. He is coauthor (with John F. Bibby) of Politics, Parties and Elections in America (6th ed.). Professor Schaffner specializes in voting behavior, campaigns, and political communication.

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ELECTION 2008

Well before the 2008 presidential election cycle heated up, it was clear that this would be one for the history books. For the first time since 1952, neither the sitting president nor vice president would be their party’s nominee for the presidency. The race attracted large and diverse fields of candidates in both parties, including an African American, a woman, a Hispanic American, a Southern Baptist preacher, and a Mormon among the serious candidates. Changes in the laws governing campaign finance, combined with the large candidate pool, led many observers to conclude that the 2008 campaign would be the most expensive in modern history. The election of Barack Obama, the first African American to win a major party nomination let alone the presidency, was but one of several possible history making story lines, and it was far from the most likely. I. The Political and Economic Context in 2008 Some political scientists have used patterns from past elections to make predictions about the outcomes of presidential contests. These models are usually notable for their simplicity, often relying on just a few basic indicators. They rest on the assumption that the electorate is retrospective in its approach to electoral choices—people look at how a particular party has performed in office and then determine whether that party should remain in office. These retrospective evaluations tend to be summed up nicely by measures of presidential approval and how the public views economic conditions. When the economy is strong and voters are happy with the direction of the country, they tend to reward the party who controls the presidency; when conditions are not as favorable, the president’s party tends to suffer at the polls.

On every conceivable measure, 2008 promised to be a difficult year to run as a Republican. Two years earlier, Democrats had been swept into office based on a rising tide of discontent over wavering economic conditions, a prolonged war in Iraq, and well-publicized ethical scandals involving Republican members of Congress. These factors had given Democrats their first majority in the House of Representatives since 1994 along with a narrow majority in the Senate. But this was only the beginning of the Republican Party’s problems. Economic conditions worsened in 2007 and George Bush became increasingly unpopular as he completed the last two years of his term in the White House.

Economic conditions, which had been tenuous in 2006, quickly deteriorated in 2007. Some of the economic warning signs were difficult for

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average Americans to understand right away. But Americans were very much aware of the fact that inflation was driving up their weekly shopping bills, the decline in housing prices was undermining the value of their homes, and increasing gas prices made their daily commutes much more expensive. By the beginning of 2008, 40% of Americans said that they were worse off economically than they had been a year earlier while only 35% said that they were better off. It was the first time that more Americans felt “worse off” than “better off” economically since the early 1990s. Figure 1: Public’s Perceptions of Economic Conditions

Source: Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers.

With a Republican president in the White House since 2000, most of the public’s unhappiness with the economy was directed at President Bush and the Republican Party. Approval of President Bush was already on the decline far before economic conditions began to worsen. Initially, his unpopularity stemmed from the public’s dissatisfaction with America’s continued presence in Iraq. By early 2008, about 60% of Americans said that invading Iraq had been a mistake and only about one-third of the public thought that the war had been worth fighting. Of course, a flailing economy did not help Bush’s approval ratings and by 2008, fewer than one-in-three Americans approved of the job he was doing as president. Only Richard Nixon had consistently reached such low levels of presidential approval, and that was in the final months of the Watergate scandal before he resigned his office.

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The prolonged conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the worsening economic conditions, and a very unpopular Republican president created an extremely unfavorable climate for Republicans in 2008. Signs of an impending Democratic tidal wave could be seen everywhere. Democrats won special elections for Congress in places like rural Mississippi where just a few years earlier Bush had won over 60% of the vote. The public dissatisfaction with the Republican Party also meant that fewer Americans were willing to affiliate themselves with the party. According to the Pew Center for the People and the Press, the percentage of Americans identifying as Republicans declined to about 25% of registered voters by the middle of 2008. Democratic affiliation stayed relatively stable during this time, which meant that in 2008, Democrats had the largest advantage in party identification that they had enjoyed in decades.

Given all of this, it is probably easy to imagine what political scientists were predicting. Overwhelmingly, political scientists forecast that the Democratic nominee would win the presidential election, with the only real disagreement being in the Democrat’s margin of victory. Most political scientists and pundits also expected Republicans to suffer major losses in Congress for the second election in a row.

Thus, 2008 was not a good year to be a Republican and the fact was not lost on most Republican politicians. Twenty-six Republican members of the House of Representatives chose to retire in 2008 rather than face a difficult reelection bid. In fact, the Republican Party was so resigned to suffering further losses in the House and Senate that the party had a very difficult time raising money to defend their incumbents. The discrepancy could also be seen in the candidates each party fielded for the presidency. On the Republican side, John McCain was the only U.S. Senator to enter the race. He faced off against two former governors (Mitt Romney and Mike Huckabee), a former mayor (Rudolph Giuliani), and several members of the House of Representatives.

On the Democratic side, there was an embarrassment of riches. Barack Obama, the rising star of the Democratic Party, had to defeat not just Senator and former First Lady Hillary Clinton, but also Senators Joe Biden and Chris Dodd, former Vice Presidential candidate John Edwards, and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson. Each of these strategic politicians entered the race because they knew that the Democratic nominee would have the best shot at winning the presidency since Bill Clinton was reelected in 1996. What they probably did not realize was that 2008 would witness the most prolonged and memorable nomination contests in at least forty years.

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II. Narrowing the Field: The Presidential Primaries As early as 2004, it was clear that Hillary Clinton would compete for the presidential nomination in 2008. She delayed her announcement until she had won reelection to the Senate in 2006, but in the meantime, she was quietly building a sizeable campaign organization that was raising enormous sums of money. By 2007, few thought that there were any Democrats that could mount an effective challenge to her. At the same time, there was no clear frontrunner among the Republicans. John McCain had taken a tumble in the polls early in 2007 and no candidate appeared capable of becoming a clear frontrunner for the nomination. As a result, many thought that it would be the Republicans whose nomination race would carry on for some time. In hindsight, however, it is easy to see why it was the Democrats, not the Republicans, who endured the longer nomination struggle. The answer lies in an understanding of the so-called invisible primary, the different rules each party uses to select their nominees, and the different campaigns run by Obama and Clinton. The Invisible Primary

Political scientists define the invisible primary as the period of campaigning that takes place before any votes are actually cast. This is the period during which prospective candidates jockey for position in the polls, organize their campaign organizations, and set out to raise as much money as possible for the impending party nomination campaign. The term invisible primary is increasingly a misnomer; in 2008, the invisible primary was quite visible. According to the Project for Excellence in Journalism, news stories about the 2008 presidential campaign accounted for 7.6% of the space in newspapers and television news broadcasts during the first five months of 2007. The candidates for the Democratic nomination appeared at their first debate on April 26th, 2007 and Republicans held their first debate one week later, eight months before the Iowa caucuses. Republicans would debate eleven more times in 2007 with Democrats facing off 13 more times that year.

For the Democrats, the invisible primary effectively winnowed the field to two well-funded candidates. Clinton was the overwhelming favorite to win the Democratic nomination from the beginning. Until 2006, most assumed that Edwards would present the biggest challenge to her candidacy. In fact, few polls that asked about the presidential campaign in 2006 even included Obama in their field of potential candidates. In the meantime, Clinton received support from well over 40% of Democrats being polled, greatly outpacing the rest of the field.

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It was also clear that Clinton was accumulating an enormous war chest of funds that she would be able to use in the 2008 campaign. In 2006, Clinton raised $50 million for her reelection campaign to the U.S. Senate despite the fact that she did not face serious competition for her seat. Federal election laws allow candidates to transfer funds from one campaign to another. Thus, some of the money Clinton was raising in 2006 was a head start for her 2008 presidential campaign.

In the meantime, many assumed Obama would not run in 2008. After all, he was relatively new to the national political landscape, having only entered the Senate in 2005. Mounting a national campaign for president was a challenging prospect for someone with Obama’s limited national exposure, particularly when he would have to defeat one of the most prominent figures in the Democratic Party to win. On the other hand, Obama felt as though 2008 was precisely the year that a relative Washington outsider could effectively compete for the presidency. Thus, on February 10th, 2007, Obama appeared before a crowd of more than 15,000 at the Illinois state capitol building to declare himself a candidate for the Democratic nomination. In doing so, he signaled how he planned to make his inexperience an asset by declaring, “I know I haven't spent a lot of time learning the ways of Washington. But I've been there long enough to know that the ways of Washington must change.”

Despite Obama’s entrance into the campaign, Clinton was still confident. After all, she enjoyed strong support in the polls and was raising large amounts of money. But Obama was raising large sums as well, albeit in a very different way. While Clinton was relying mostly on traditional Democratic donors who could give the maximum contribution to her campaign ($2,300 per donor for the primary campaign), Obama was attracting large numbers of small donors. When the first campaign finance reports were filed in April, 2007, the Washington Post reported that Obama had “stunned political observers” by keeping pace with Clinton’s fundraising during the first three months of the invisible primary.1 The Obama campaign had attracted money from over 100,000 donors, most of whom gave in small amounts on-line. Obama’s early fundraising success did not fade either. In fact, Obama continued to keep pace with Clinton throughout the year and by the fall it was clear that the Democratic nomination would effectively be a two candidate race, with both candidates boasting tremendous war chests.

While Clinton and Obama were raising record sums of money to set themselves apart from the rest of the Democratic field, the Republicans’ invisible primary appeared to be doing little to anoint a frontrunner. As the figure below indicates, no Republican candidate was able to set themselves

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apart from the others in 2007. McCain languished in the polls for much of the year, largely due to his unwavering support for the Iraq War. This relatively unpopular position hurt McCain in the polls and his ability to raise money suffered as well. By July, McCain had spent most of what he had raised and had just $2 million left in his campaign account. This forced him to cut back on his staff and, combined with his declining standing in the polls, most pundits concluded that his candidacy for the nomination would not be successful.

Figure 2: Cumulative Fundraising by Democratic Candidates in 2007

Source: Based on data from the Center for Responsive Politics.

With McCain struggling during the invisible primary, there was an opportunity for other candidates to claim frontrunner status. Giuliani had high name recognition, which helped him in the early polls. However, as Republicans got to know more about him and the other candidates, his support dropped steadily. Romney was able to raise significant sums of money and added over $40 million from his personal fortune to out-spend all of his rivals in 2007. Yet, he was unable to build significant support among Republicans nationwide. Overall, no Republican candidate was distinguishing himself, a fact that was not lost on Republican voters. In July, a CBS/New York Times survey indicated that just 36% of Republicans were satisfied with the candidates who were running for their party’s nomination. On the other side, 61% of Democrats were satisfied with their field of candidates.2 The dissatisfaction led former senator (and current actor) Fred Thompson to enter the race in September. Thompson’s

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candidacy was reflective of the problems each of the candidates was having during the invisible primary as he promptly lost half of his support in the polls after he entered the race.

Figure 3: Support for Republican Candidates, March-December 2007

Source: Pew Center for the People and the Press.

By the end of 2007, the Republican contest was very much up for grabs. Support for Giuliani was plummeting and McCain was rebounding somewhat in the national polls. In addition, Mike Huckabee, a little-known former governor of Arkansas, was suddenly emerging as another candidate to be reckoned with. Huckabee, who attracted support from just 1% of the respondents in a July Pew survey, was now in third place, within striking distance of McCain and Giuliani. The Early Primaries

In 2008, the presidential primaries and caucuses began earlier than ever before. To assure that no state could hold its primary or caucus earlier, Iowa had moved its caucuses up to January 3rd. New Hampshire would hold its primary just five days later. These two early contests have historically played a crucial role in winnowing the field of candidates down to just two or three contenders, a role they fulfilled again in 2008. On the Democratic side, Clinton and Obama appeared to have the resources to compete for the long haul, but Edwards was relying on a victory in Iowa to help give his campaign momentum. Clinton was also hoping that a win in Iowa, followed

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by a victory in New Hampshire, would provide a quick ending to the campaign. Neither candidate got what they wanted from Iowa caucus-goers. Instead, Obama finished first in the caucus, buoyed by record participation in the caucuses by younger Iowans. Edwards finished second, followed by a third place finish for Clinton, who suddenly did not seem as invincible as she once appeared. Obama’s victory was crucial for his campaign. First, it essentially eliminated Edwards and the rest of the field, which meant that those opposed to Clinton would have a candidate to coalesce behind. Second, it signaled to other Democratic voters that Obama could attract significant support from a largely white rural electorate. Third, the favorable news coverage that came with the victory helped further raise Obama’s stature at the national level.

Clinton quickly recovered by winning the New Hampshire primary, despite the fact that most of the pre-primary polling suggested she would lose the state. Her surprise victory helped breathe new life into her campaign and she followed up with a victory in the Nevada caucuses on January 19th (Obama actually received one more delegate than Clinton in that state’s caucuses despite receiving fewer votes). The following week, Obama stemmed Clinton’s momentum by winning a decisive victory in the South Carolina primary. The candidates had split the January contests without any candidate taking a clear advantage. Iowa and New Hampshire also played a significant role for the Republicans. Huckabee won in Iowa, a state where he had campaigned heavily during the previous year. Romney finished second in the caucuses with McCain finishing a distant fourth. The poor showing in Iowa meant that McCain needed to win New Hampshire to justify staying in the race, something he did by edging out Romney who finished second again. Huckabee barely campaigned in New Hampshire and finished a distant third in the primary. Romney was able to win in Michigan (a state where his father had once been governor) on January 15th, but McCain followed up his New Hampshire victory with wins in South Carolina and Florida. Thus, by the end of January, the contest for the Republican nomination was essentially a three-person race between the resurgent McCain, an underfunded Huckabee candidacy, and Romney’s struggling campaign. Super Tuesday

While the Democratic and Republican fields had been winnowed down during the January contests, neither race was settled. Looming on the horizon was Super Tuesday, February 5th, when 24 states and territories would have Democratic primaries or caucuses and there would be 21

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Republican contests. Super Tuesday presented an entirely different challenge for the candidates. Primaries and caucuses in small early states like Iowa and New Hampshire allowed even underfunded candidates opportunities to roam the state meeting and greeting candidates. For example, 45% of the public in Iowa and 28% in New Hampshire reported having attended at least one candidate’s campaign event. Nationally, the figure was just 6%.3 The national nature of Super Tuesday meant that candidates had to rely on campaign advertising and other expensive forms of communication to drum up votes in so many states on short notice (there was just a week and a half between the South Carolina primary and Super Tuesday). High name recognition would also be crucial. On the Republican side, Romney had the funds necessary to wage a national campaign while McCain had the national reputation that would be valuable in this type of race. Huckabee had regional appeal, but lacked the resources to mount a significant challenge nationwide. On Super Tuesday, national name recognition won out and McCain was victorious in 9 states while Romney won 7 states and Huckabee won 5. Most importantly, McCain won the states with the most delegates—California, New York, and Illinois—which gave him a commanding delegate lead over his rivals. Romney dropped out of the race just after Super Tuesday and while Huckabee remained in the contest until McCain locked up a majority of delegates, the Republican contest was effectively over after Super Tuesday.

Figure 4: Delegate Accumulation during the Republican Nomination Race

Source: CNN.com.

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The Democratic race played out much differently. Both candidates appeared to have the money necessary to compete nationally and while Clinton held an advantage in name recognition, Obama was quickly closing the gap with her national stature based on momentum from his wins in Iowa and South Carolina. On Super Tuesday, Obama won 14 of the 24 contests. Of course, delegates, not states, are the key to capturing the party nomination. On one hand, Clinton won the states with the most delegates, such as California and New York. On the other hand, Obama won with much bigger margins in smaller states like Alaska, Idaho, and North Dakota. Thus, when it came to delegates, Super Tuesday was essentially a draw and in this case, a tie benefited the upstart challenger. February would prove to be the turning point in the race, putting Clinton behind by a margin from which she would not be able to recover. Post Super Tuesday Primaries

The Clinton campaign had been planning for a knock out on Super Tuesday. Yet, Democratic rules make it far more difficult for any one candidate to quickly accumulate delegates. In fact, the differences in the rules used by the Republican and Democratic parties are essential for understanding why the Republican contest ended so quickly and the Democratic race dragged on for months. In the Republican Party, most primaries allocate delegates in a winner-take-all fashion. Thus, even though McCain won 6 states on Super Tuesday with less than 50% of the vote, he took nearly all of the delegates from those states. Democrats allocate their delegates proportionally, meaning that the percentage of delegates a candidate won from a state was roughly equivalent to the percentage of the vote he or she won in that state. For example, in California, McCain won just 42% of the primary vote, but because of the Republican rules, he received 158 of the 170 Republican delegates (or 93%) at stake in the state. Clinton won 51% of the vote in California’s Democratic primary, but that gave her just 204 of the 370 (or 55%) Democratic delegates up for grabs.

Thus, instead of landing a knockout punch on Super Tuesday, the Clinton campaign found itself in a close race with Obama and, more remarkably, it also found itself out of money. Despite having raised over $100 million in 2007, Clinton had needed to loan her campaign $5 million just to compete in the Super Tuesday states. The campaign was a victim of its own largess, weighed down by high-salaried campaign consultants and other inefficient outlets for the campaign’s cash. Obama, on the other hand, had raised nearly $36 million in January alone (over $1 million per day) and had nearly $20 million in the bank on February 1st. And the Obama campaign appeared to be spending their money more efficiently—even the

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printers at the Chicago headquarters were set up for double-sided printing to conserve paper.

Compounding its financial deficit was the fact that the Clinton campaign essentially lacked a post-Super Tuesday strategy. They were facing a slate of upcoming primaries that suddenly seemed to favor Obama, perhaps because the Clinton campaign had not believed it was necessary to prepare for a campaign in those states. As a result, Obama won ten consecutive contests in February, most by wide margins. During the month, he took an insurmountable lead in pledged delegates and also continued to keep the pressure on the Clinton campaign by raising nearly $2 million per day (about $55 million total) during the month. In the meantime, Clinton was loaning her campaign more money. Figure 5: Delegate Accumulation during Democratic Nomination Campaign

Source: CNN.com. Includes both elected and superdelegates.

Clinton revived her campaign by winning the Texas, Ohio, and Rhode Island primaries (though she lost the Texas caucus) on March 4th and the Pennsylvania primary on April 22nd. Yet, her victories in these contests were not large enough to allow her to overtake Obama’s delegate lead, particularly since he scored victories of his own in Vermont, Wyoming, and Mississippi during the same stretch. The candidates continued to trade victories throughout May and early June with Obama maintaining a comfortable lead in pledged delegates. However, both candidates knew that the ultimate winner would be decided by so-called superdelegates.

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While about three-quarters of the delegates who ultimately decide the Democratic nominee are elected in primaries and caucuses, one-fourth of Democratic delegates are party elites—members of Congress, governors, and members of the Democratic National Committee—who make their own judgment about which candidate should win. Because the race between Obama and Clinton was so close, neither candidate would be able to clinch the nomination based on elected delegates alone.

Because of her standing in the party, Clinton was able to attract support from over one-hundred superdelegates during the invisible primary. Thus, Obama trailed far behind Clinton in superdelegate endorsements for much of the campaign. However, as Obama started winning, he also started accumulating superdelegate support. At the same time, superdelegates were no longer eager to endorse Clinton once it seemed as though she would not become the party’s nominee. After Obama won an impressive victory over Clinton in North Carolina on May 6th, he overtook her in superdelegate support and on the day of the last two primaries in Montana and South Dakota, superdelegates flocked to Obama’s side to give him the delegate total he needed to clinch the Democratic nomination.

As the Democratic primary campaign wound down on June 3rd, the historical significance was clear. This had easily been the most expensive and hardest fought nomination struggle in the modern (post-1968) era of nomination politics. Clinton and Obama spent nearly $500 million on the nomination campaign and they split almost evenly more than 37 million votes cast during the primaries and caucuses. Furthermore, while either candidate would have broken significant historical ground, Obama’s victory meant that he would become the first African American to be a major party’s nominee for president. Obama’s victory also signaled a generational change in the party. Clinton represented the party’s past successes of the 1990s and, not surprisingly, she consistently won more support from older Democrats. Obama, in just his fourth year in the Senate, touted himself as the party’s future and he owed his victory to younger voters who turned out in record numbers in the Democratic primaries. His task now was to bring both wings of the party into the fold for the general election campaign against McCain who had spent the last several months raising money and building a campaign organization while Democrats settled on a nominee. III. General Election Campaign On June 8th, after the final Democratic primaries had ended and Obama had secured enough support to clinch the Democratic nomination, Clinton suspended her campaign for president. Obama was the presumptive

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nominee, a decision that would be ratified in August at the party’s national convention. Obama began his race against McCain with a lead in the polls, at least partly due to the fact that the prolonged race for the nomination had kept him in the news while the press largely ignored McCain. But a prolonged nomination campaign also presented Obama with several challenges. First, McCain had been able to focus on raising large sums of money after he clinched the Republican nomination. This was crucial since Obama would otherwise have had a large advantage over McCain in fundraising. Second, the long campaign for the Democratic nomination had also been a contentious one. Many Democrats who had supported Clinton were unhappy with the outcome and pledged not to support Obama in the general election. In fact, by the end of the nomination campaign, nearly half of Clinton’s supporters had an unfavorable view of Obama and these same supporters predicted that the party would be divided in the general election.4 Thus, Obama would need to use the summer months to win over Clinton supporters while also attempting to reach out to independents. One of the most important decisions Obama made early in his general election campaign was to forego public financing for the general election campaign. Since 1972, candidates for president have had the option of accepting a lump sum of money from the federal government to fund their fall campaigns. In 2008, both candidates had the option of accepting $86 million to spend on the general election, but accepting this money meant the candidates could not raise and spend additional funds in the fall. McCain and Obama both pledged in 2007 to accept this public funding, but Obama changed his mind and became the first candidate ever to refuse this public funding. Obama had raised enormous sums during the primary, sometimes more than $50 million per month, and his campaign calculated that it could exercise a major financial advantage over the Republican nominee if it raised its own money rather than accepted the public funding.

McCain attacked Obama’s broken promise to accept public funding, but the issue was of little interest to voters. Obama was able to partly blunt any criticisms by pointing to the fact that nearly half of his contributions came from people giving $200 or less to the campaign, though one-third came from individuals giving the maximum amount.

Obama’s decision ultimately paid off. By eschewing public funding, Obama was able to exercise a major financial advantage over McCain, particularly during September and October. In the month of September alone, Obama raised over $150 million for his campaign, an average of $5 million per day. McCain was limited to spending the $86 million in public funding he received after the Republican convention, though the Republican Party was allowed to spend on his behalf. But even combined,

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McCain and the RNC could not keep up with Obama. From September 1st through October 15th, Obama and the DNC spent $266.1 million on the presidential campaign while McCain and the RNC spent $176.2 million.5

The Obama campaign spent its fortune in every conceivable way. Television advertising has dominated modern presidential campaigns, and Obama and McCain both spent a large share of their funds on that venue. From April through Election Day, Obama spent over $235 million on television ads while McCain spent $125 million.6 Obama not only had the resources to purchase traditional 30-second advertisements, but also to air 2-minute ads frequently and, the week before the election, to purchase 30 minutes of prime time on NBC, CBS, FOX, MSNBC, BET, Univision, and TV One. The Obama infomercial appeared to be money well-spent as 33.6 million viewers tuned in to watch, an audience that was just a few million shy of the 40 million that watched him deliver his convention speech on television. Obama also pursued truly innovative ways of reaching voters, including extensive internet advertising as well as purchasing ads that appeared in video games.

However, the candidates did far more than just spend on advertising (the “air war”); they also put a tremendous amount of resources into the “ground war”—that is, efforts to reach voters with more targeted messages. These messages were targeted at two groups of voters—those who the campaign thought could still be persuaded and those who were already strongly committed to a particular candidate but who the campaign wanted to make sure actually voted. A survey by the Pew Center for the People & the Press indicated that a majority of the public received mail from at least one of the candidates, 27% received a phone call from somebody working for one of the candidate’s campaigns, and 14% had a representative from one of the campaigns come speak to them in person. Ultimately, the Obama campaign appeared to do a better job of reaching the public in this way as 26% of voters said that they had been called or contacted in person by the Obama campaign while only 19% had been contacted by McCain.7

Despite Obama’s significant financial advantage and the fact that economic and political conditions favored the Democratic nominee, he held just a small edge in the polls throughout the summer leading up to the party conventions at the end of August. The conventions tend to be the first major event of the fall campaign. For four days, the networks cover speeches by party leaders culminating with the nominee’s acceptance speech on the final night. The nominees also introduce their vice presidential running mates during the conventions. Interest in the party conventions has declined over the past few decades because there is no longer much political drama in

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them. However, in 2008, both conventions would make for compelling television.

The Democratic National Convention began the day after the Summer Olympics concluded. Obama had announced his choice of Delaware Senator Joe Biden as his vice presidential running mate by sending out a text message to his supporters just a few days earlier. But Biden was hardly the focal point of the public’s attention during this convention. Rather, political pundits obsessed over whether Hillary Clinton would provide an enthusiastic endorsement of the candidate to whom she had narrowly lost the nomination. Not only did Clinton provide a strong endorsement of Obama during her speech on the second night of the convention, but on the third night she interrupted the roll call vote of delegates to move that the convention nominate Obama by acclimation. Her motion was resoundingly passed by the convention, which officially made Obama the first African American presidential nominee of a major political party. Obama would cap off the convention by moving the last night’s proceedings out of the arena and over to Invesco Field where he delivered his acceptance speech to more than 75,000 people.

Often, candidates get a “bump” in the polls following their conventions. The reason is that voters have been subjected to four nights of mostly favorable information about the candidate with little coverage of the opposing campaign. While Obama did enjoy a brief bump in the polls from his convention, it quickly faded. The day after Obama’s speech in Denver, McCain announced that he had selected Alaska Governor Sarah Palin as his running mate. Most everyone was surprised by the selection of the relatively unknown politician. In fact, when campaign aides went to inform Obama and Biden of McCain’s choice, Biden’s first question was, “Who’s Palin?”8 Most Americans were asking the same question and, as a result, the interest in Alaska’s governor was high. In fact, her speech at the Republican National Convention in Minneapolis was watched by almost the same number of viewers who tuned in to Obama’s convention speech a week earlier.

As the Republican National Convention ended and excitement over Palin hit its peak in early September, McCain took his first lead in the national polls since the general election campaign began in June. But this lead was short-lived as excitement over the selection of Palin soon gave way to more sobering news about the worsening financial conditions. During one tumultuous week in mid-September, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, Bank of America agreed to purchase Merrill Lynch, and the federal government announced that it would be forced to rescue AIG. The

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sudden collapse of these financial giants generated even more worries about the economy. Figure 6: Candidate Standing in Gallup Tracking Poll (by week)

Source: Gallup (http://www.gallup.com/poll/109687/Candidate-Support.aspx).

When the difficult economic conditions became the focal point of America’s attention, the Republican nominee was bound to fare poorly. After all, voters generally vote against the party who controls the White House when the economy is struggling. But McCain’s response to the financial crisis did little to help his campaign. His first reaction at a campaign event on September 15th was to note that the “fundamentals of the economy are strong.” While McCain went on to note that the fiscal crisis was serious, the Obama campaign quickly seized on his initial phrase as evidence that McCain was out of touch and did not understand how hard the economy was hitting the American public.

Perhaps realizing his misstep, McCain changed course nine days later and announced abruptly that he was suspending his campaign to return to Washington to help assist in the passage of an economic bailout package. McCain even suggested that he would not show up for the first debate between himself and Obama. Democrats were again quick to criticize McCain’s “erratic” behavior during the week. Ultimately, McCain backed down and participated in the debate, but his debate performance was uneven and public opinion polls indicated that viewers saw Obama as the stronger performer. While McCain was struggling to deal with the worsening financial situation, a large share of the public was beginning to have doubts about

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Palin’s ability to serve as Vice President. A series of highly publicized news interviews with Palin were not well-received by the political pundits or a significant share of the public. Palin’s performance in these interviews and in the vice presidential debate were lampooned on shows such as Saturday Night Live and The Daily Show. Within the span of a few weeks, the percentage of the public who had an unfavorable view of Palin more than doubled.

The financial crisis, Palin’s struggles, and the presidential debates had the effect of solidifying Obama’s lead over McCain in the polls. By the beginning of October, Obama had a 5-7% lead over McCain which would hold steady until election day. Considering that the previous two elections had been decided by razor-thin margins, Obama’s lead was significant and his attempts to broaden the Democratic coalition brought several states that had been consistently Republican into play during the campaign. Obama’s prospects looked strong in Virginia, Colorado and Nevada, states where John Kerry had barely campaigned in 2004. Obama was also competing in states like North Carolina, Indiana, and Montana. During the last two weeks of the campaign, Obama even bought advertising in McCain’s home state of Arizona. Suffering from a major financial deficit and a difficult electoral map, the McCain campaign spent the final weeks focusing their efforts on Pennsylvania, a state where most polls showed him trailing by 5-10%. Understanding the Results

The previous two presidential elections had been so close that in neither case was the outcome definite on election night. In 2000, a protracted recount in Florida delayed a determination of the ultimate winner until December. In 2004, an uncertain outcome in Ohio meant that the public did not know who had won until the day after the election. In the 2008 election, there would be no such drama. The networks were able to call Pennsylvania for Obama before 8:00 pm, indicating that McCain’s last-ditch efforts to win the Democratic-leaning state had not paid off. About 90 minutes later, the networks determined that Obama would win in Ohio, the state that stood between Kerry and the presidency four years earlier. With these states and their electoral votes already decided, the networks were able to call the election for Obama as soon as California, Oregon, Washington, and Hawaii closed their polls at 11:00 pm.

Obama’s victory was historic in many ways. The sole African American member of the U.S. Senate had now become the first African American president. His election to the nation’s highest office came 43 years after passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act which guaranteed black voting rights. He also became the first Democrat since Lyndon Johnson—

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the president who pushed the Voting Rights Act through Congress and signed the legislation—to win more than 50.1% of the national vote.

The 2008 election shared another parallel with 1964, as turnout among eligible voters was at its highest level since Johnson’s reelection campaign. Over 130 million cast ballots for president, representing about 61.2% of adults who were eligible to vote. Turnout appeared to increase among young adults, African Americans, and Hispanics. Both parties invested significant resources in getting voters to the polls. This included efforts to get people to cast their ballots before election day in the 31 states that allow early voting. Over 30 million Americans cast their ballots before election day in 2008. Figure 7: Turnout in Presidential Elections, 1980-2008

Source: United States Election Project (http://elections.gmu.edu) and the Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement.

The way that Obama won the presidential election represented a significant departure from recent Democratic presidential campaigns. In 2000 and 2004, Democratic hopes were largely tied to winning Florida or Ohio to complete a narrow majority in the Electoral College. In both cases, this strategy fell short. Determined to expand the number of ways they could get to 270 electoral votes, the Obama campaign competed successfully in particular southern and southwestern states that have increasingly more urban and affluent electorates (Virginia, North Carolina, Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada). Obama also expanded the playing field in the Midwest by running an active campaign in Iowa and even

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Indiana, a state where Kerry received less than 40% of the vote just four years earlier. Ultimately, Obama prevailed in eight states that Kerry lost in 2004—Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Ohio.

Looking only at the states that Obama won fails to fully capture the inroads he made in 2008. The table below lists the 12 states where Obama improved on Kerry’s 2004 totals by at least 7%. Obama won nearly 11% more of the vote than Kerry did in Indiana due at least partly to significant support from young voters. In 2004, 18-29 year olds made up just 14% of the Indiana electorate and narrowly supported Bush over Kerry; four years later, this age group accounted for 19% of Indiana voters and 63% supported for Obama. Indeed, first time voters made up 13% of Indiana’s electorate, and Obama won two out of every three of these new voters. Table 1: States with Largest Increases in Democratic Vote Share State 2004 Dem. Vote 2008 Dem. Vote Change Hawaii 54.0% 71.9% 17.8% Indiana 39.3% 49.9% 10.7% North Dakota 35.5% 44.7% 9.2% Montana 38.6% 47.2% 8.6% Delaware 53.4% 61.9% 8.6% Nebraska 32.7% 41.1% 8.4% Utah 26.0% 34.2% 8.2% Vermont 58.9% 67.0% 8.1% New Mexico 49.1% 56.6% 7.6% Nevada 47.9% 55.1% 7.2% Virginia 45.5% 52.6% 7.1%

In 2004, Nevada, New Mexico, and Colorado were won narrowly by Bush. Yet, in 2008, Obama won these states by fairly safe margins. Part of the reason for his success in these states can be attributed to the Latino vote. In Nevada, Hispanics grew from 10% of the electorate in 2004 to 15% in 2008. Furthermore, while 60% of Nevada Hispanics voted for Kerry in 2004, 76% went for Obama in 2008. The increasing significance of the Latino vote was also clear in New Mexico where Hispanics made up 41% of the electorate in 2008, up from 32% in 2004. In Colorado, Hispanics made up 13% of the electorate, up from just 8% four years earlier.

Obama even made significant progress in states he did not win. Mountain West states like North Dakota and Montana were competitive for the first time in a decade. Obama also performed significantly better in Nebraska and even won a single electoral vote from the state. Nebraska

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allocates one electoral vote to the winner of each of its congressional districts (the other two electoral votes go to the winner of the state vote); Obama narrowly beat McCain in the 2nd congressional district.

Using exit polls—surveys of voters as they leave the voting booth—we can get a sense of which groups were instrumental to Obama’s victory at the national level. The exit polls revealed the difficult political landscape for McCain, primarily when it comes the balance of party affiliation in the electorate. In 2004, an equal share of voters identified as Republicans compared to Democrats; in 2008, Democrats made up 39% of the electorate compared to just 32% who were Republicans. At a basic level, Obama’s victory can be explained simply by the fact that the public is less Republican than it was four years ago.

However, digging deeper into the exit poll data reveals that Obama’s victory can also be attributed to his performance among three key constituencies—women, younger voters, and racial/ethnic minorities.

Women: Obama won women by 13% over McCain. That is the second largest gender gap since 1980 (only Clinton's 16% advantage in 1996 was larger). At the same time, Obama broke even with men. In fact, Obama's share of the male vote (49%) was the highest for any Democratic candidate since before 1980. Nevertheless, 56% of his support came from women, compared to 44% from men.

Figure 8: Democratic Margin Among Three Key Groups, 1980-2008

Based on exit poll data compiled by the New York Times (http://nytimes.com).

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African Americans and Hispanics: Obama performed slightly better among white voters than Kerry did in 2004; however, Obama’s coalition was more multi-racial and multi-ethnic compared to Kerry’s. African Americans made up a larger share (13%) of the electorate than they had in any of the past eight presidential elections. In addition, Obama won 95% of the black vote, a modest improvement over the 88% that supported Kerry. Ultimately, African Americans accounted for 23% of Obama’s support. Hispanic voters continued a pattern that began in 2006 by renewing their strong support for Democratic candidates. Obama captured two-thirds of Hispanic voters, who made up 8% of the electorate in 2008. Hispanics made up 11% of Obama voters.

Young Voters: Obama won two-thirds of voters 18 to 29 years old. This is the fifth straight presidential election that Democrats have won the youth vote. However, Obama's margin with this group is substantially greater than any previous Democratic nominee. In fact, since before 1980, no candidate has won any age group by as big a margin as Obama won the 18-29 year old vote in this election. Ultimately, young voters accounted for 23% of Obama’s supporters. IV. The Battle for Congress The stage for the 2008 congressional elections was set in 2006, when Democrats captured control of both the House and Senate for the first time since 1994. The number of seats that switched parties was substantial—28 in the House and six in the Senate—but even more impressive was the consistency of the Democratic success. No congressional seats or governorships held by the Democrats going into the elections were captured by Republicans, even when no incumbent was running for reelection. The Democratic majorities were slim, 236-199 in the House and 49-49 in the Senate (two independents caucused with the Democrats, giving them majority status). Still, few observers doubted that the party would retain control in both houses.

The conditions leading up to the 2008 elections were different across chambers. In the Senate, where only a third of the seats are contested in any given election cycle, Republicans had to defend 23 seats while only 12 Democratic seats were up for election (two of the Republican seats were special elections to fill unexpired terms). Several popular Republicans decided not to seek reelection, including Virginia’s John Warner, Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, and New Mexico’s Pete Domenici. Republicans had difficulty recruiting highly qualified candidates in several key races, making the challenge of picking up seats even more daunting. Some

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speculated that Democrats might win a 60-seat majority, which would allow a unified Democratic party to stop any Republican filibusters.

Every seat in the House is up for election every two years, so the GOP’s chances of restoring their majority might have seemed better than in the Senate. Several Democrats first elected in 2006 had won narrowly in strongly Republican districts, and most observers agreed that the “low hanging fruit”—seats held by vulnerable Republicans—had already been captured in the previous election cycle. At the same time, House incumbents who run for reelection are rarely defeated, and Republicans were defending a larger number of open seats where no incumbent was running than were the Democrats.

In the weeks leading up to election day, the same forces that propelled Obama to victory—the economy and enthusiasm generated by the Obama campaign in key states—also shaped congressional elections. Democrats picked up about 20 seats in the House and at least six in the Senate, giving the new president strong majorities in each chamber.9 At least three (and as many as six) Senate incumbents, all Republicans, lost their reelection bids. Between 17 and 19 House incumbents were defeated, most of them Republicans. Senate Elections

The 2008 Senate elections featured a little bit of everything that makes politics interesting: scandal, celebrities, upsets, and plenty of close races. Several contests were dramatically affected by the sharp economic downturn in early September. Others became competitive when the Obama campaign’s 50-state strategy began to pay dividends, particularly in the southern and border states of North Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, and Kentucky. Recounts in Alaska and Minnesota and a run-off in Georgia left the final margin in question until December. If the Democrats defeated GOP incumbents to capture all three seats—and retained the support of the Senate’s two independents—they would reach the magical threshold of 60 seats to become the first filibuster-proof majority since the aftermath of the Watergate scandal in 1974.

Regardless of their outcomes, the three closest Senate races reflect the difficulty Senate Republicans faced in 2008. Ted Stevens of Alaska, the longest-serving Republican in the Senate, was convicted of accepting bribes shortly before the election. Stevens appeared to retain the seat on election night, but later returns rendered the decision too close to call. Norm Coleman of Minnesota faced a remarkably strong challenge from the best-known celebrity candidate in 2008, comedian and former “Saturday Night Live” writer Al Franken. The liberal Franken ran a serious campaign that

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would ultimately come down to a few hundred contested ballots. While Franken’s candidacy may seem unusual, Minnesotans also elected former professional wrestler Jesse Ventura to a four-year term as governor ten years earlier. Finally, Saxby Chambliss of Georgia was damaged by his support for the massive bailout bill passed by Congress shortly before the election. Chambliss won a plurality of the vote against Democrat Jim Martin, but Georgia election law requires a candidate to win a majority of the votes cast in the election. A third candidate received about 3% of the vote, enough to force a December run-off election between Chambliss and Martin.

One of the most remarkable upsets involved Elizabeth Dole, the wife of former Senate Republican leader and presidential candidate Robert Dole and a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 2000 in her own right. Dole was elected to the Senate from North Carolina in 2002, a state where she was born but had not lived regularly in since 1959. Her years of prior experience in Washington catapulted her to an important leadership position in the Senate. As chair of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, she was responsible for helping other Republicans win Senate seats. Dole’s reelection bid was damaged when it was discovered that she rarely returned to North Carolina during her first term, and challenger Kay Hagan took a narrow lead in the polls when the economic collapse hurt Dole even more. Senator Dole then unleashed one of the most important television ads of this election cycle. Her ad accused Hagan of meeting with the Godless Americans PAC and questioned what kinds of deals were made to garner their support. The ad closed with picture of Hagan and a woman’s voice saying, “There is no God.” Hagan’s outraged response—that she was a Christian, a church elder, and a long-time Sunday school teacher—seemed to undermine the allegations and made Dole appear desperate. The ad backfired and Hagan swept to a rather easy 53%-44% victory.

Other notable Democratic winners included former governor Mark Warner of Virginia (no relation to the man he replaced, retiring Republican John Warner); former governor Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire, who was victorious over incumbent John Sununu; and the Udall cousins, Tom and Mark, who picked up open seats previously held by Republicans in New Mexico and Colorado, respectively.

The final Senate lineup will include two new members appointed to fill the seats vacated by President Obama and Vice President Biden. Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich will select a replacement to fill the remaining two years of Obama’s term. In Delaware, Biden was reelected to a new term in this cycle. His replacement will serve until 2010, when a special

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election will be held for the final four years of the term. Other changes could result if additional seats are vacated by sitting senators who accept positions in the Obama administration.

One final question mark involves the fate of Connecticut Senator Joe Lieberman, who was elected as an independent in 2006 but caucused with the Democrats. Lieberman was Al Gore’s vice presidential running mate in 2000 and made his own unsuccessful bid for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2004. In 2006, he was defeated for renomination by a challenger in the Democratic primary before retaining his seat by running as an independent in the general election. Lieberman campaigned heavily on behalf of John McCain and was featured prominently at the Republican convention. Many have speculated that he was McCain’s first choice as running mate before political realities led McCain to select Sarah Palin. Although he was officially an independent, Lieberman retained his committee seniority and was awarded the chairmanship of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in exchange for his support in organizing the evenly divided Senate on behalf of the Democrats. Given his support for McCain, many Democrats would like to see him stripped of his position as chair in the new Senate. House Elections

By some measures, the gain of 20 House seats by Democrats seemed small compared to Barack Obama’s Electoral College landslide. Yet, it was the first time in over 50 years that either party had gained 20 or more House seats in consecutive elections. Combined with the party’s earlier gains in 2006, their 255-175 seat margin (with five races yet to be decided) gives them the largest majority in the House since before the Republican landslide of 1994. All but four Democratic incumbents were reelected, and the Democrats retained all six of their open seats. Meanwhile, at least 13 Republican incumbents were defeated, and almost half of the GOP’s open seats flipped to the Democrats.

Although the incumbency reelection rate approached 96% in 2008, there were a few notable defeats in both parties. On the Democratic side, the four defeated incumbents were in their first terms in office. Nick Lampson of Texas and Tim Mahoney of Florida were elected in 2006 when the Republican incumbents they challenged were implicated in scandals, while Nancy Boyda won a surprising upset in Kansas. In 2008, all three were defeated as Republicans reclaimed the seats. Don Cazayoux of Louisiana won a special election the previous May in another Republican-leaning district, then lost the seat to a Republican challenger when an independent candidate siphoned off some of the African-American vote.

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One of the most interesting Republican loses involved Connecticut’s Christopher Shays. Shays, a moderate Republican, was first elected to the House in 1987. After years of overwhelming victories, Shays escaped defeat by narrow margins in 2004 and 2006 and was the sole remaining Republican House member from the New England region of the country. While most attention on party realignment focuses on the emergence of the Republican Party in the South, the simultaneous success of northeastern Democrats is newsworthy, too. From 1994-2006, Republican majorities in the House were founded on the ability to be competitive in all regions of the U.S. However, Republicans have lost a significant share of their non-southern seats during the past two elections and now southern members make up nearly half of the House Republican Caucus. Diversity in Congress

The U.S. Congress used to be considered a bastion of old white men. While persons of color remain underrepresented, the Congress as a whole is increasingly diverse along gender lines. Barack Obama was the Senate’s only African American member, and Republican John Sununu of New Hampshire, an Arab American, lost his reelection bid. None of the Senate’s three Hispanic American or two Asian American members was up for election in 2008. The number of racial and ethnic minorities elected to House seats has remained virtually unchanged since 2002. There are 37 African Americans, 24 Hispanic Americans, and three Arab Americans in the new House. In contrast, record numbers of women will serve in the new Congress, with 17 in the Senate and 74 in the House. The election of Jared Polis in Colorado brings the number of openly gay House members up to three.10 V. Elections in the States While much of the nation was fixated on the presidential race and the future of the Congress, thousands of candidates for state and local offices were also campaigning. In 36 states, voters had the opportunity to act on 153 statewide ballot proposals and countless other local issues. The story of the 2008 elections is not complete without attention to these races. Governors and State Legislators

If the national mantra was one of change and the tide favored Democrats, election results in the states were mixed. Eleven states held gubernatorial elections in 2008, as opposed to the 36 states that elected

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governors in 2006. Eight governors ran for reelection, four from each party. All eight were reelected, all but one by substantial margins. Democratic candidates captured all three open seats, including one (Missouri) that had been held by a Republican.

The results at the state legislative level were even less definitive. Democrats were able to take control of five legislative chambers (lower chambers in Delaware, Ohio, and Wisconsin, upper chambers in New York and Nevada). Republicans took over both houses in Tennessee and the upper chambers of Montana and Oklahoma. Alaska’s senate, which had been under Republican control, was evenly split following the election. These results mask several cycles of Democratic gains at the state legislative level. The party went from having control over 16 legislatures in 2003 to 27 in 2009, while Republican control slipped from 21 to 14 over the same period.11 In terms of individual seats, Democrats went from less than 50% of all seats to control of almost 57% of state house seats and 53% of state senate seats.

Democratic women made gains in state legislative races in 2008, picking up a total of 61 seats nationwide. Republican women, in contrast, lost 26 seats. Still, the gains were enough to set a record for women in state legislatures. For the first time in history, women will control a majority of the seats in a state legislative chamber after capturing 13 of the 24 seats in the New Hampshire senate.12 Ballot Proposals

Ballot proposals in 2008 covered a wide range of issues. Most are fairly mundane, yet a few deal with issues that spark considerable controversy among voters. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures,13 previous attempts to ban same-sex marriage were successful 28 of 29 times. The one exception, Arizona in 2006, was reversed in 2008. California and Florida approved gay marriage bans, too, while voters in Arkansas voted to prohibit unmarried couples from adopting children or serving as foster parents. The California proposal, which passed by a 52%-48% margin, was especially significant. After voters there approved a statutory ban in 2000, the state supreme court ruled that it violated the state constitution. This year’s proposal took the form of a constitutional amendment, leaving the marital status of same-sex couples in that state in limbo.

Other hot-button issues on state ballots included affirmative action and abortion. Colorado became the first state to reject an affirmative action ban, while Nebraska voters passed one. Both proposals were sponsored by Ward Connerly, the California activist whose previous efforts were

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successful in California, Michigan, and Washington. Restrictions on abortion were defeated narrowly in California and South Dakota, while an attempt to extend legal rights to fetuses from the moment of conception was overwhelmingly defeated in Colorado. A Michigan proposal to support embryonic stem cell research passed over the opposition of right-to-life groups, including the Catholic Church.

While rules governing ballot proposals vary from state to state, a few patterns are clear. First, voters tend to think that ballot proposals enhance the power of ordinary citizens, but most research suggests that such proposals strengthen narrow interests rather than the public at large. Second, proposals often seem incredibly complicated or overly simplistic. In either case, it is not clear that most voters have the tools at their disposal to cast an informed ballot. Finally, although the costs may be high, the continued success of certain types of issues suggests that interested citizens and groups will use the ballot box to advance their causes well into the future. VI. Looking Ahead When he is sworn in on January 20th, Obama appears poised to begin his presidency in a position of strength. He won a greater share of the popular vote than any presidential candidate since George H.W. Bush in 1988 and his popularity only seemed to increase after the election. By mid-November, Gallup polls indicated that two of every three Americans had a favorable view of Obama and a Pew survey found that two-thirds believed that his first term would be successful. In addition to support from the public, President Obama will also benefit from the fact that Democrats control both the executive and legislative branches of the Federal government for the first time since 1994.

However, the challenges facing Obama and the Democratic-controlled Congress are daunting. Many economists expect the current downturn to continue into a severe recession, and reports of business failures and layoffs seem to occur daily. Meanwhile, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are stretching the American military, the budget, and public resolve to the brink. During the past two elections, Republicans learned that when a party has unified control of government the public tends to hold that party accountable for government’s successes and failures. Thus, the 2010 elections will undoubtedly serve as the first referendum on how Democrats handle their turn in power.

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Endnotes

1 Balz, Dan. “Fundraising Totals Challenge Early Campaign Assumptions.” Washington Post. Tuesday, April 17, 2007; A01 2 The CBS News/New York Times Poll of 1,554 national respondents was conducted July 9-17, 2007. 3 “Iowa, NH Voters Heavily Courted, Dems Have Edge in Personal Contact.” Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. December 7, 2007. 4 “McCain’s Negatives Mostly Political, Obama’s More Personal.” Pew Center for the People and the Press. May 29, 2008. 5 Based on information provided by the Campaign Finance Institute (http://cfinst.org). 6 According to data complied by the New York Times (http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/advertising/index.html). 7 These figures are based on national exit polls. 8 According to an account reported in Newsweek’s post-election edition. 9 As of this writing, the winners of five House races and three Senate races had not been determined. 10 For female candidates, see the press release issued by the Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University (http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/press_room/news/documents/PressRelease_11-5-08updated.pdf). For other groups, see “Minority Report,” National Journal Hotline, November 5, 2008 (http://www.nationaljournal.com/hotline/hl_20081104_4052.php). 11 The remaining legislatures were split except for Nebraska, which has a unicameral, nonpartisan assembly. Data on state legislative results come from the National Conference of State Legislators (http://www.ncsl.org). 12 Center for American Women and Politics press release (http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/press_room/news/documents/PressRelease_11-11-08updated.pdf). 13 See Jennie Drage Bowser, “2008 Ballot Measure Results,” National Conference of State Legislators (http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/statevote/2008_Ballot_Results.htm).