2001 v60no6 ANGb - icao.int

V O L U M E 6 0 NUMBER 6 , 2005

ICAOJ O U R N A L

Aircraft Fire ProtectionA FUTURE WITHOUT HALONS

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35835.P2 12/6/05 9:54 AM

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2005VOL. 60, NO.6

ICAO JournalThe magazine of the International Civil Aviation Organization

Editor: Eric MacBurnie Production Clerk: Arlene BarnesEditorial Assistant: Regina Zorman Design Consultant: François-B. Tremblay

THE OBJECTIVES of the Journal are to provide a concise account of the activities of the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization and to feature additional information of interest to Contracting Statesand the international aeronautical world. Copyright © 2005 International Civil Aviation Organization.Unsigned material may be reproduced in full or in part provided that it is accompanied by referenceto ICAO Journal; for rights to reproduce signed articles, please write to the editor.

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Published in Montreal, Canada. Second class mail registration No. 1610. ISSN 1014-8876. Date of publication ofIssue 6/2005: 9 December 2005. Published six times annually in English, French and Spanish.

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FEATURES5 ICAO has finalized a business plan that clearly articulates its goals

and places the accent on measurable performance

6 Slow transition to halon alternatives for aircraft fire suppressionsystems raises concern as halon stockpiles diminish

9 Airport readiness for a possible pandemic such as avian influenzabenefits from the earlier experience with SARS

12 A recent study examines ways to extend the concept of essential air services schemes to the international level

16 Human factors research needs to examine the dilemmas faced by pilots during an emergency or abnormal situation

21 Investigation of a brake fire accident that resulted in injuries duringthe evacuation highlighted an incorrect maintenance procedure

ICAO UPDATE

23 New safety focus is essential, Council President emphasizes in address to civil aviation leaders

COVER

As the article beginning on page 6 explains, the production of halons —a type of chemical used in aircraft fire protection systems — ceased manyyears ago. This could present a problem for the air transport industry,which has been slow to adopt alternative technologies and consequentlyremains heavily dependent on the use of halons for fire suppression.

Roy Ooms/Masterfile photo

THE ICAOCOUNCIL

PresidentDr. ASSAD KOTAITE

1st Vice-PresidentL. A. DUPUIS

2nd Vice-PresidentM. A. AWAN

3rd Vice-PresidentA. SUAZO MORAZÁN

SecretaryDr. TAÏEB CHÉRIFSecretary General

Argentina – D. O. Valente

Australia – S. Clegg

Austria – S. Gehrer

Brazil – P. Bittencourt de Almeida

Cameroon – T. Tekou

Canada – L. A. Dupuis

Chile – G. A. Miranda

China – Y. Zhang

Colombia – J. E. Ortiz Cuenca

Egypt – N. E. Kamel

Ethiopia – M. Belayneh

Finland – L. Lövkvist

France – J.-C. Chouvet

Germany – Dr. H. Mürl

Ghana – K. Kwakwa

Honduras – A. Suazo Morazán

Hungary – Dr. A. Sipos

India – Dr. N. Zaidi

Italy – F. Cristiani

Japan – H. Kono

Lebanon – H. Chaouk

Mexico – R. Kobeh González

Mozambique – D. de Deus

Nigeria – Dr. O. B. Aliu

Pakistan – M. A. Awan

Peru – J. Muñoz-Deacon

Republic Of Korea – S. Rhee

Russian Federation – I. M. Lysenko

Saint Lucia – H. A. Wilson

Saudi Arabia – S. A. R. Hashem

Singapore – K. P. Bong

South Africa – M. D. T. Peege

Spain – L. Adrover

Tunisia – M. Chérif

United Kingdom – N. Denton

United States –

In today’s fast changing aviation environment, knowing the practices of your competitors and others in the field of charges is a necessity. ICAO’s Tariffs for Airports and Air Navigation Services (Doc 7100)contains data on airport and air navigation services charges in more than 180 States

Doc 7100 is available in hard copy and CD-ROM formats for U.S. $350

For more information please contact:Airport and Route Facility Management Section Tel. (514) 954-6098International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

To place an order please contact:Document Sales Unit999 University StreetMontreal, QuebecCanada H3C 5H7Tel. (514) 954-8022Fax (514) 954-6769E-mail: [email protected]

Are your fees too high? Too low? Where to find out? In ICAO’s Tariffs for Airports and Air Navigation Services (Doc 7100)

ICAOElectronic publications

User charges around the world

Man

in F

light

by H

ans

Erni

*

* Detail of a mural on display at the ICAO headquarters building, Montreal.

OLLOWING an intensive andelaborate process, ICAO has com-pleted a business plan that address-

es the organization’s current work pro-gramme (2005-07). A living document,the plan will be reviewed and updatedperiodically.

The newly developed business plan isnot about finances per se, but rather therational allocation of limited human andfinancial resources in an era of budgetaryconstraints. The document contains anaction plan for meeting all of the organiza-tion’s strategic objectives, and spells outthe key activities and critical steps thatneed to be taken by the organization.

While the plan identifies areas wheremore emphasis is needed to reach clearlyarticulated goals, it also identifies ele-ments that can be downgraded or setaside, if necessary, in order to focus moresharply on priorities. Among current toppriorities are ICAO’s activities related toenhancing safety, security, environmentalprotection — specifically, work focusedon engine emissions — air transport sys-tem capacity and efficiency, and regionaland sub-regional issues. Another of theorganization’s current strategic objec-tives is to strengthen law governing inter-national civil aviation.

Included in the ICAO business plan is aset of performance indicators which theorganization will use to assess how well itis advancing toward its objectives.

As ICAO Secretary General TaïebChérif informed delegates to the 35th

Session of the ICAO Assembly in 2004,“Given the increasing demands for theservices of the organization and the sig-

BUSINESS PRACTICES

New ICAO business plan is partof a broad strategy initiative

ICAO has put the finishing touches on a business plan that clearly articulates its goals and places the accent on measurable performance.

nificantly reduced resources, the 2005-07triennium will be a tremendous challengeto us.” The organization, he stressed, willnevertheless deliver all of the criticalservices expected of it by implementingmeasures that would enhance perform-ance despite constraints. Hence the needfor a business plan, part of a broad strate-gy to enhance ICAO’s performance.

“At the core of our strategy is a shift inperception,” Dr. Chérif explained. “It is totransform a perceived crisis into anopportunity. It is to streamline the way wedo business, to continuously re-examinethe work programme of the organizationin order to prioritize activities and remainas responsive to your needs as we havealways been, and perhaps more so.”

In developing the business plan, all linemanagers and supporting staff through-out the organization were consultedabout their roles and activities. Now thatthe plan has been finalized, it will be

updated annually in the context of budg-etary realities. All efforts were made withthe current plan to accommodate theexisting 2005-07 programme budget, butsubsequent business plans are expectedto reverse this sequence, with develop-ment of a programme budget based onthe business plan, the first step in thebudgetary cycle.

With respect to one top priority, avia-tion safety, the current business plan callsfor more emphasis on certain activities,among them the development and imple-mentation of a formal safety managementprocess within ICAO itself (a process thatincludes remedial actions to correct safe-ty deficiencies) as well as support for theadoption of safety management systems

across all safety-related disciplines in allStates. Emphasis is also placed on theUniversal Safety Oversight AuditProgramme (USOAP), implementation of

NUMBER 6, 2005 5

ICAO’s new business plan is ultimately about ensuring that the organization utilizesits resources appropriately, in light of its mission statement and changing priorities.

ICAO SECRETARIAT

F

Jim

Jo

rgen

son

continued on page 29

ODERN aircraft fire protec-tion has historically relied onchemicals known as halons,

but these substances have been recog-nized since the 1980s as being particular-ly destructive to the stratospheric ozonelayer. The end of global halon production,uncertainties in the availability and quali-ty of stockpiles, and the lag in adoptingavailable substitutes raise the concernthat civil aviation is unprepared for afuture without halons.

According to a recent report preparedfor the U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) by ICF Consulting, transi-tion in the United States to the next-gener-ation halon alternatives for aircraft fireprotection systems is impeded by techni-cal, regulatory and procedural issues.*The authors of the report conclude, more-over, that this situation is likely mirrored

AIRCRAFT AIRWORTHINESS

Slow transition to halon alternativesin new aircraft raises concern

Although production of halons has long ceased, the airline industry is still heavily dependent on theiruse in aircraft fire protection systems. This reliance could be problematic considering that stockpilesof halons will expire before newer aircraft reach their retirement date.

in most member States of ICAO and maypose a significant problem for airlinesworldwide. Addressing the potentialimpacts of the transition away from halonswill be most successful through the coor-dinated action of ICAO member States.

Need for ozone protectionOver two decades ago, atmospheric

scientists warned that the annual appear-ance of the Antarctic ozone hole and theprobability of increasing depletion of thestratospheric ozone layer had seriousconsequences for all life forms. Thiscame after discoveries in the mid-1970sthat some man-made chemicals coulddestroy ozone, resulting in increasedultraviolet radiation reaching the Earth(see figure on this page).

Although ozone is a small componentof the atmosphere, the ozone layer playsa vital role in shielding life on Earth fromharmful ultraviolet (UV-B) radiation fromthe sun. Human exposure to UV-B isknown to increase the risk of skin cancer,cataracts, and a suppressed immune sys-tem. UV-B exposure can also damage ter-

restrial plant life, single-cell organismsand aquatic ecosystems.

The evidence that human activities weredestroying the stratospheric ozone layerwas compelling. Emissions of certain man-made chemicals used in many commonproducts such as refrigerators, air condi-tioners, cars, fire extinguishers, foams andcleaning solvents were reaching the strato-sphere, between 10-16 kilometres and upto 50 kilometres above the Earth’s surface,and destroying ozone molecules. With theappearance of the ozone hole, many coun-tries joined efforts for the first time to com-bat this global environmental threat. Over180 countries to date have ratified the land-mark international environmental treaty,the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substancesthat Deplete the Ozone Layer. Parties to theMontreal Protocol are committed to elimi-nating production of ozone-depleting sub-stances by meeting specific phase-outdeadlines.

Almost 20 years later, the parties to theMontreal Protocol are now gauging thesuccess of the ozone protection policiesand regulations that have been imple-mented, and are reviewing atmosphericmeasurements that could indicate thebeginnings of a recovery of the ozonelayer. In addition, they are identifying sec-tors that lag in moving away from the useof ozone depleting substances and conse-quently have the potential to significantlydelay or prevent this recovery.

Halon phase-out. Owing to the highozone depletion potential of halons, theMontreal Protocol called for an end totheir production by 1994. Before produc-tion ceased, however, halons found exten-sive use worldwide as clean, safe andvery effective gaseous fire suppression

6 ICAO JOURNAL

500475450425400375350325300275250225200175150125100

DAVID CATCHPOLE

(UNITED KINGDOM)

DANIEL VERDONIK • BELLA MARANION

(UNITED STATES)

M

The ozone “hole,” visible over Antarctica, in 1979 (left) and 2005.(Dobson Units: Dark Gray < 100 and > 500 DU)

NA

SA im

ages

agents. In particular, two halons emergedas the agents of choice for many militaryand commercial fire protection applica-tions: halon 1301, used in fixed total flood-ing fire extinguishing systems; and halon1211, used for streaming applications, pri-marily in handheld fire extinguishers.

Over the last two decades, the availabil-ity of many substitutes and alternativetechnologies has significantly reduced theneed for halons in virtually all new installa-tions, and in most applications retrofit hasbeen possible to further reduce the needfor halons. In some sectors, however, diffi-cult fire/explosion suppression problemshave posed significant technical chal-lenges in making the transition away fromhalons. This was the case for the military,the merchant marine community, the oiland gas production industry, and the civilaviation industry.

In the military sector today, new facili-ties or new designs of military equipmentno longer require halons (although stock-piles are maintained to service existingequipment that cannot be retrofitted).Military development and testing of halonalternatives have helped in the adoption ofalternatives in other sectors. In the mer-chant shipping sector, halons were bannedfrom use in new ships in 1992 and man-aged stockpiles service pre-1992 vessels.The oil and gas production sector protectsnew facilities using available halon alterna-tives and is managing stockpiles to main-tain existing halon equipment.

In contrast with these sectors, the com-mercial aviation industry has lagged behindin adopting alternatives and new technolo-gies. Existing aircraft and new designs con-tinue to depend on halons for the majorityof their fire protection applications.

Halons and aircraftHalon is used for fire suppression on

civil aircraft in lavatory trash receptacleextinguishing systems, handheld extin-guishers, engine nacelle/auxiliary powerunit (APU) protection systems, and cargocompartment extinguishing systems.

With the exception of lavatory trashreceptacles on some Airbus aeroplanes,all new installations of fire extinguishing


systems for lavatory trash receptacles,engines and cargo compartments usehalon 1301, and all new installations ofhandheld extinguishers use halon 1211.There has been no retrofit of halon sys-tems or portable extinguishers with avail-able alternatives in the existing world-wide fleet of aircraft.In other words, theairline industry isstill heavily depend-ent on halons; giventhe anticipated 25-30 year lifespan ofcommercial aircraft,this dependency islikely to continuewell beyond the timewhen existing recy-cled halon stocksexpire.

With no newhalon productionallowed, commercial aircraft manufac-turers must look either to their ownstockpiles of halons or to the limitedamounts of recycled halons available onthe open market to avoid grounding air-craft because of a lack of appropriate fireprotection. This situation is a majorcause for concern because even if theparties to the Montreal Protocol were toallow future halon production to serviceaircraft safety needs, it is estimated thatthe cost to restart production for a rela-tively small market would result inhalons priced in the U.S. $400 to $600per kilogram range. (This calculationassumes, of course, that a chemical com-pany would be willing to invest in themanufacture of halon.)

Substitutes for halons include both in-kind gaseous agents and not-in-kind alter-natives. In-kind alternatives to halon 1301used in total flooding fire extinguishingsystems include conventional agents suchas carbon dioxide and those addressed inthe U.S. National Fire ProtectionAssociation 2001 standard, Clean AgentFire Extinguishing Systems, which includehydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), hydrochloro-fluorocarbons (HCFCs), a fluoroketoneand inert gases. Not-in-kind halon alterna-

tives include water sprinklers, fine watermist, foam, dry chemicals and aerosols.

Since 1994, when halon productionended in developed countries, initiativessuch as the U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency’s (EPA) Significant New Alter-natives Policy (SNAP) Programme and

the U.K. Halon Alternatives Group(HAG) Toxicological Report on Alter-native Agents to Halon have evaluatedmany substitutes and alternative tech-nologies for replacing halons. Typically,the programmes assess overall risks tohuman health and the environment posedby use of the substitutes and considerinformation such as the substitute chemi-cal’s toxicity, ozone depletion potential,global warming potential, environmentalfate and transport, occupational and end-use exposure, and commercial availabili-ty. The SNAP Programme’s evaluationsand EPA’s determinations of the accept-ability or otherwise of substitutes forhalon 1301 and halon 1211 are publishedthrough formal notices and rules. Thelistings are posted and updated on itswebsite (http://epa.gov/ozone/snap/fire/halo_10_01_04.pdf), and are legally bin-ding in the United States. The latest HAGreport can be found on the websitewww.hunc.org, and is provided for informa-tion only to the general public and regulators.

Minimum performance standards. Keyto the acceptance of one or more of theapproved substitutes has been their abili-ty to demonstrate a fire extinguishing per-formance equivalent to halon in specific

NUMBER 6, 2005 7

Application

LavatoryTrash

Receptacle

February1997

Airbus A340-600

(HFC-236fa)

HFC-125, HFC-227eaHFC-236fa, Envirogel

HFC-227ea HFC-236fa

HandheldExtinguishers

August 2002 NoneHFC-236fa HFC-236fa/HFC-23

HCFC Blend B HCFC Blend E

Envirogel (two versions)

HFC-227ea HFC-236fa

HCFC Blend B

CargoCompartment

April 2003 NoneWater mist Water mist/nitrogen

HFC-125 Bromotrifluoropropene

(“BTP”)

Water mist/nitrogen

EngineNacelle/APU

Not available NoneCF3I, HFC-125 Not available

Date of Finalized

MPS

Status of Testing to MPS

Alternatives tested to MPS

Alternatives meetingMPS requirements

Alternativesinstalled on

aircraft

Status of the development of minimum performance standardsand the testing of halon alternatives.

applications. As such, substitutes forhalons in civil aviation fire extinguishingsystems are evaluated and approvedaccording to the relevant minimum per-formance standards and testing scenariosdeveloped by the International AircraftSystems Fire Protection Working Group(IASFPWG), originally established in1993 by the U.S. Federal AviationAdministration and cooperat-ing agencies and known thenas the International HalonReplacement Working Group.

The recent EPA report onthe transition away fromhalons in the U.S. civil avia-tion sector examined the cur-rent minimum performancestandards and test scenariosas part of the process of iden-tifying transition barriers.The 2004 report concludedthat the minimum perform-ance standards test protocolsfor lavatory trash receptacleextinguishing systems, hand-held extinguishers and cargocompartment protection sys-tems have been adequatelydesigned to provide an equiv-alent level of safety to thatprovided by halons, and thefire test protocols for the halon alterna-tives were found to be realistic withoutbeing excessively stringent.

The exception to the foregoing is in thecase of engine nacelle/APU protectionsystems, where the lack of finalized mini-mum performance standards is a barrierto using alternatives to halons in thisapplication. The table on page 7 summa-rizes the status of the development ofeach minimum performance standard,and lists the substitutes that have beentested and that meet the requirements ofthe relevant, finalized standards.

For aircraft fire protection, having analternative that passes the relevant mini-mum performance standard is only thefirst step in the extended process thatneeds to be completed before installationon board aircraft. There are also regulato-ry and manufacturing procedures that


need to be followed. The 2004 EPA reportalso describes the procedures that needto be completed in the United States inorder for halons to be replaced in thespecified applications on new airframes,along with the estimated time for theircompletion. It highlights the extraordi-nary length of time that has been spentdeveloping the minimum performance

standards, and the slowprogress made in installingalternatives that have satis-factorily completed the test-ing process. However, thereport also indicates thatthere are no obvious immedi-ate incentives for aircraftmanufacturers and airlines tobegin the change away fromthe use of halons, even withthe looming uncertainty offuture halon supplies.

In addition to the longapproval process, the lack of aregulatory requirement toeliminate halon use has oftenbeen cited as a reason for theslow transition away fromhalons in civil aviation.Regulations that allow thecontinued use of recycledhalon have enabled airlines to

avoid the costs of early equipment retire-ment and have not encouraged them toopt for a smooth transition to availablealternatives, as in the other sectors.Current halon needs are consequentlybeing met by using existing stockpiles ordecommissioned systems reaching theend of useful equipment lifetime. Further,the trend is that new aircraft are continu-ing to rely on halons. However, as is truefor all finite resources, the halon stockpilewill diminish and eventually disappear asthe number of remaining halon installa-tions dwindles. Some airlines may havetaken the necessary steps to ensure asecure supply, but most probably rely onservice companies that simply purchasefrom the currently available, but increas-ingly uncertain, market.

Economic barriers to the transitionaway from halons in civil aviation are the

relatively low cost of halons at present andthe comparatively higher cost of alterna-tives — up to 10 times higher in somecases. Therefore, until supplies of recy-cled halon become prohibitively expen-sive to procure or are simply unavailable,the civil aviation industry lacks an eco-nomic incentive to move away fromhalons to the higher-priced alternatives.With a steady or increasing demand and adwindling supply, however, it is clear thatprices of recycled halons will eventuallyrise significantly. This is a reality thatmany in the industry must anticipate andplan for now in order to avoid an uncer-tain and potentially significant economicburden later. Additionally, with the excep-tion of lavatory waste receptacle bottles,the identified alternatives present weightand volume penalties that translate intofurther economic disincentives. However,this should be considered in the contextof overall aircraft operating and equip-ment lifetime costs.

It is notable that despite similar costpenalties in the other sectors that havedifficult problems to overcome, users out-side the civil aviation community havesuccessfully made the transition awayfrom halons by maintaining existing sys-tems (thus retaining the initial equipmentinvestment) while adopting halon alterna-tives in all new installations. This is amodel that civil aviation should follow toprepare itself for the future.

8 ICAO JOURNAL

The availability of substitutes

and alternativetechnologies has

significantlyreduced the need

for halon

* The 2004 EPA report, Review of the Transition Awayfrom Halons in U.S. Civil Aviation Applications, examinesin particular the current minimum performance standardsdeveloped by the International Aircraft Systems FireProtection Working Group (IASFPWG) — formerly knownas the International Halon Replacement Working Group— for the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the U.S.Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the EuropeanJoint Aviation Authorities (JAA) and Transport Canada, aswell as the fire test scenarios employed to evaluate andapprove alternatives to ozone-depleting halons in civilaviation. The report, on which this article is based in part,may be obtained at the EPA website (http://www.epa.gov/ozone/snap/fire/index.html).

David Catchpole ([email protected]), a consultantwith Protechnical Resources Alaska, serves as co-chairof the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)Halons Technical Options Committee. Co-author DanielVerdonik ([email protected]), Director of Environ-mental Programmes at Hughes Associates Inc., alsoserves as co-chair of the UNEP Halons Technical OptionsCommittee. Co-author Bella Maranion ([email protected]), Sector Analyst at the U.S. EnvironmentalProtection Agency, also serves as a member of theUNEP Halons Technical Options Committee.


HE outbreak of severe acuterespiratory syndrome (SARS)that occurred in 2003 dealt a

severe blow to airports and airline oper-ations in the affected countries. ICAOacted swiftly to help contain the impactby developing a set of anti-SARS protec-tive measures. The second phase of theICAO initiative focused on establishing acontingency planfor handling a re-surgence of SARS.This plan is flexi-ble enough that itcan cater to othernewly emerginginfectious diseasessuch as the avianflu, about whichthere is growingconcern.

With the possi-ble threat of anew, and possiblyglobal, pandemic on everyone’s mind, itis timely to review the details of the SARScontingency plan. Although developed inresponse to a particular public health cri-sis, the 2003 plan can serve as the start-ing point for development of a new plantailored to address an emerging disease.

The outbreak of SARS in several coun-tries in south-east Asia and elsewhere inearly 2003 led to intensive consultationsand decisions by those affected. In addi-tion to the combined effort to combat the

PUBLIC HEALTH

Airport readiness for possible pandemic benefits from experience with SARS

With the threat of avian flu on everyone’s mind, the time may be ripe to develop a new airport contingency plan for addressing a pandemic, and, moreover, to establish applicable provisions and guidelines for preventing the spread of communicable diseases by air transport.

contagious disease, ICAO was equallyconcerned about the possibility that airtransport could contribute to the spreadof SARS, and the organization movedquickly when asked by Singapore toassist in the development of anti-SARSprotective measures at airports.

A reactive phase to the outbreak, man-aged by ICAO’s Technical CooperationBureau, was successfully completed inmid-2003. The purpose of this interven-tion was not only to combat the spread ofSARS via air travel, but to fully restore thetravelling public’s confidence in the safe-ty of air transport (see “Inspections of

anti-SARS meas-ures at key air-ports pay divi-dends,” Issue No.7/2003, page 23).

Following thisexperience with apublic health cri-sis, ICAO adopt-ed a more proac-tive approach tothe problem pre-sented by emerg-ing infectious dis-eases. The new

approach includes the development of astandard system to allow a phasedresponse, commensurate with the threatof recurrence of SARS as determined bythe World Health Organization (WHO).This proactive approach matches an epi-demiological risk analysis with differentlevels of readiness to implement the eightprotective measures developed under theauspices of ICAO.

The proposal to set out a standard con-tingency plan received strong support

and was immediately taken up by a num-ber of countries. A meeting to finalize theplan, hosted by the Civil AviationAuthority of Singapore in November2003, was well attended by representa-tives of the concerned authorities, China,the Hong Kong Special AdministrativeRegion, ICAO, the International AirTransport Association (IATA) and theAssociation of Asia Pacific Airlines(AAPA).

NUMBER 6, 2005 9

An official uses a portable infrared sensorsystem to check a passenger’s foreheadtemperature.

ICAO is in the midst of forming a taskteam to provide well informed and timelyadvice to States, airlines and airports inan effort to ensure that the global avia-tion industry can mount a harmonizedresponse should the level of risk ofhuman infection by avian influenza(commonly known as “bird flu”) increasein the future.

The international team will compriseexperts from different sections of ICAO aswell as participants representing theInternational Air Transport Association(IATA) and Airports Council International(ACI). The team will work closely with theWorld Health Organization (WHO) and theUnited Nations Foreign Affairs Office. Whileavian influenza will be the focus of atten-tion, the team will define procedures to beput in place that could address a variety ofpublic health risks which potentially involvethe spread of disease via air travel.

Recently ICAO and other concerned agen-cies participated in a WHO meeting inGeneva to consider the threat posed by avianinfluenza and human pandemic influenza.The meeting’s participants agreed that the

ROLE OF ICAO


JARNAIL SINGH

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE

SILVIO FINKELSTEIN

(ARGENTINA)

ICAO SECRETARIAT

The group of public health and airtransport experts focused on developinga phased response plan in the event ofresurgence of SARS, but with an eye onthe future, it also spelt out a plan thatcould be adapted for any contagious dis-ease that may impact airport or airlineoperations. To implement this phasedplan effectively, an airport needs guide-lines that spell out the policies and pro-cedures.

The guidelines for a phased re-sponse plan need to cover the widestpossible spectrum, ranging from adesirable disease-free environment onone end of the spectrum, to a con-

firmed outbreak of the disease, bothlocally and internationally. (During apandemic phase, all measures outlinedin the airport anti-SARS measuresshould be in place.)

Each phase of the plan needs to beclearly defined by the airport authorityor national aviation authority, preferablywith time lines indicated. It is recom-mended that the various phases bedenoted in either a numerical or colour-coded scheme that takes account of theprevailing national policy. Time lines forthe different phases would have to allowfor sufficient resources to be allocated ateach step.

Other agencies would be involved inimplementing the airport contingencyplan, and the airport authority shouldhave a list of these participating agen-cies. Ideally, an organizational chart

PUBLIC HEALTH

should be drawn up, detailing theworking relationship between thesevarious agencies. The person assignedto be the focal point for coordinationwith the other agencies would normal-ly be the airport’s designated publichealth official.

The contingency plan needs to includea triggering event for each step of thephased response. In normal circum-stances, these “triggers” are defined bynotifications received from the WHOglobal alert and response system.

In the case of larger countries, anational alert may be confined to a limit-ed number of cities. In this situation,

only the airports in the af fectedcities would needto implement theresponse plan.

Where embark-ing passengers areconcerned, a pub-lic health screen-ing process wouldusually be initiatedas soon as WHOhas informed au-thorities that dis-ease transmissionis occurring local-

ly, a notification that is based on an indexcase. The contingency plan should alsospecify the time line for screeningdeparting passengers. Cessation is usu-ally triggered by a WHO declarationthat the affected area has remained freeof disease transmission for a minimumperiod of time and that other importantWHO criteria have been met.

Although the current WHO pre-paredness plan places an emphasis onscreening departing passengers, an air-port authority should also considerimplementing the screening processfor arriving passengers, when this isrecommended by WHO because theglobal alert and response systemshows an outbreak of contagious dis-ease in a specific country or region.This is particularly important if thealert concerns a country or region that

has direct air links. At the same time, itmust be recognized that infected pas-sengers could transit through airportsthat do not have direct links with theairport where the contingency plan isin effect.

The airport contingency plan shouldoutline the basic elements of command,coordination and communication, start-ing with a clear indication of the organi-zation authorized to activate the plan.Such authority would usually be given tothe relevant health ministry, in consulta-tion with the transport ministry. Theplan should feature an activation list onwhich all personnel required for carry-ing out activities related to each step ofthe response are identified, as well asindicating the individual responsible forcontacting personnel.

Lines of communication between theparticipating agencies need to be speltout. An important aspect is arrange-ments, through the appropriate authori-ty, for providing information to the newsmedia as well as educational informationfor the public that may help in prevent-ing panic from arising.

The appropriate authority also needsto designate the ambulances and hospi-tals to be used in addressing the crisis. Aproperly equipped emergency responseroom or control centre also needs to bedesignated.

The possibility that an airport workercould become infected must be takeninto account, and sufficient thoughtgiven to a plan for overcoming any dis-ruption to airport activities resultingfrom such incidents.

Drills and exercises to ensure the con-tingency plan remains workable andeffective should form part of the plan.Essentially, these would be conductedperiodically in order to confirm that theplan can be implemented effectively. Acontinuous process of review is recom-mended, with an audit process put inplace by the national authority.

While the SARS contingency plan canform the basis of planning for any infec-tious disease that could affect an airport,it is important to bear in mind that the

10 ICAO JOURNAL

Minimal Requirements:Periodic review of plan

and exercises

Level of response as determined by

the trigger(s)WHO (Global)National (City)

Regional

Preventimport/export

of cases

SituationalAssessment

APPEARANCEOF

TRIGGER(S)

All Elements Activated

Normal situation: SARS not present either

locally or regionally.

Example of an airport contingency plan flow chart that mightapply to a newly emerging contagious disease.

mode of infection by other diseasescould be different, and similarly, the car-dinal symptoms and signs of the diseasemay not be the same. In such a situation,the process of screening passengerswould have to be modified in accordancewith WHO criteria. For example, theSARS contingency plan included a rec-ommendation for passenger screeningat the arrival point, whereas the WHOpreparedness plan for global influenzadoes not include such a recommenda-tion (except for those flights on whichone or more people have developedsymptoms).

The accompanying flow chart (page10) is an example that might apply to anewly emerging contagious disease, andsummarizes the flow of events related toimplementation of a contingency plan atairports.

With the current concern aboutavian flu, it may be prudent for aviationauthorities to now develop a similar air-port contingency plan to combat thespread of that disease. It may also betimely to evaluate and possibly pro-ceed with developing ICAO standardsand recommended practices and/orguidelines related to the medical pre-paredness contingency plan. Indeed,the 35th ICAO Assembly held in 2004resolved to take action in this respect.For the first time, the health of passen-gers and crews on international flightswas recognized as an integral elementof safe air travel, with adoption of a res-olution calling for ICAO to review stan-dards relating to health issues, to cre-ate new ones where appropriate, and tosupport further research on the healthconsequences of air transport. Amongother things, ICAO was directed todevelop, as a matter of priority, stan-dards and recommended practices inthe appropriate annexes to theChicago Convention in order toaddress contingency plans to preventthe spread of communicable diseasesby air transport.

As a quick review, following is anabbreviated description of the eight pro-tective measures developed for imple-

PUBLIC HEALTH

mentation at airports — in this case inresponse to the 2003 SARS outbreak.The full description of the recommendedanti-SARS measures is posted at ICAO’swebsite (http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m_med.pl?icao/en/trivia/AvMedSARS.htm). This list of protective measures isto be updated periodically.

As a first step, an airport public healthemergency official should be appointedand made responsible for all protectivemeasures; this person, who is not neces-sarily a physician, coordinates the pro-tective measures at the airport.

Second, warning is given (e.g.posters, PA announcements) to crewand passengers before or immediatelyon entering the airport premises that noone with symptoms of the disease will beallowed to board any flight.

Third, screening of departing passen-gers for symptoms is undertaken inaccordance with WHO recommenda-tions. This is accomplished by interview-ing departing passengers no later than atcheck-in.

Fourth, disembarking passengersarriving from affected areas are normal-ly screened by responding to question-naires, completed during the flight or, atthe latest, immediately upon disem-

barkation. These questionnaires arereviewed at the time of disembarkation.Passengers offering positive responsesare referred for secondary screening.Passengers arriving from non-affectedareas, but who may have been routedthrough an affected area, are normallyscreened as well.

It is important that all passengers areprovided with information about thesymptoms of the disease and the appro-priate public health contact numbers, ifavailable, and that procedures are inplace to respond to the arrival of an air-craft with a possible case on board.

Finally, among the anti-SARS protec-tive measures are two steps concerningairport personnel directly. First of all, air-port workers in a SARS affected regionshould be subject to daily temperaturescreening at the beginning of their workshift. Furthermore, workers need to bereminded by posted information or othermeans of their obligation not to report towork if they are not well. ■■

NUMBER 6, 2005 11

Dr. Jarnail Singh is the Chairman of the Civil AviationMedical Board at the Civil Aviation Authority ofSingapore. Dr. Silvio Finkelstein, an Honorary Advisorat the National Institute of Aviation Medicine inArgentina, served as leader of the ICAO inspectionteam that evaluated anti-SARS measures at severalinternational airports in 2003.

Following the experience with SARS, ICAO adopted a proactive approach to the handling of emerging infectious diseases.

The

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NE important role of any govern-ment is to ensure the provisionof essential services. Although

there is no uniform definition of what con-stitutes an essential service, this mightbe described as any basic economic serv-ice that is necessary for the efficient func-tioning of society. Some essential servic-es, like clean water and electricity, areindispensable to life and health, whileothers are vital to economic prosperityand societal development.

In the air transport sector, the questionof how to assure the provision of essentialair services (EAS) has attracted consider-able interest, especially in an increasinglyliberalized setting.

AIR TRANSPORT ECONOMICS

Study examines ways to extend essentialair services schemes to international level

A recent study concludes that it is feasible for States to implement an international regulatory scheme which can act as a safeguard for international air services of a public service nature, as well as an instrument for the development of tourism routes.

An essential air service is generallyregarded as any service of a public orsocial service nature which a State mayconsider necessary but where the marketmay not have sufficient incentive torespond. Air service to remote destina-tions, for example, may be viewed asindispensable by some States. Many ofthese routes, however, are characterizedby very limited demand or the exception-ally high cost related to external factorsover which airlines have no control. Onsuch “thin” routes, an airline may not beable to cover its operating cost no matterhow much it charges for the service. Insuch situations, services may be limitedor non-existent without some form ofexternal support.

The issue of guaranteeing essential airservices is often related to regional devel-opment, and specifically government pol-

icy aimed at facilitating or even drivingeconomic and social development.Among routes that are not currently oper-ated or that are under-served, there maybe services that are potentially viable andthat can generate substantial spin-off ben-efits to the airport catchment area, givenappropriate support. Without reliable,attractive air services and harmonizedaviation and tourism policies, such bene-fits simply cannot be realized or are atbest constrained.

To secure the provision of air services,domestic- and regional-level essential airservice schemes have been establishedin several jurisdictions where liberaliza-tion or deregulation has already takenplace. Australia’s Remote Air ServiceSubsidy (RASS) scheme, the U.S. EASProgramme, and the European Union’sPublic Service Obligation (PSO) scheme,are some examples. These are mecha-nisms whereby support, in the form of atargeted direct financial subsidy or exclu-sive concession, can be provided to air-lines for operating on specific routes andfor providing certain services in a liberal-ized environment. The mechanismsenable support to be established usingcriteria defined by a legislative body andin accordance with a defined administra-tive process. Until now, however, essen-tial air service schemes have been lesscommon at the international level.

Joint studyIn cooperation with the World Tourism

Organization (WTO), ICAO completed astudy in spring 2005 on how the conceptof support for essential air services couldbe extended to the international arena.The study looks at how existing essential

12 ICAO JOURNAL

TORU HASEGAWA

ICAO SECRETARIAT

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Although government assistance may impact negatively on trade and competition,a targeted direct subsidy for airline operation on a specific route can be justifiedwhen properly designed and applied.

Jim

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air service schemes have supported spe-cific domestic and regional routes, andhow these approaches might be ap-plied in the international context. At thesame time, the study elaborates on theWTO concept known as the essentialtourism development route (ETDR). The“Study of an Essential Service andTourism Development Route Scheme” isdownloadable from the ICAO website(www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m.pl?icao/en/atb/ecp/Services.htm).

The ICAO-WTO study has its origins inthe work of the Fifth Worldwide AirTransport Conference of 2003, whichconcluded that “States should considerthe possibility of identifying and permit-ting assistance for essential service onspecified routes of a public service naturein their air transport relationships.”

The ETDR is a variation of the essen-tial air service concept, and refers to aninternational route between marketsthat generate and attract tourists. This isparticularly the case where the touristdestination is a least developed country,and where an adequate level of service isnot fully supplied or would be at riskunder existing market and regulatoryarrangements.

The study concluded that it is possibleto construct a single international regula-tory scheme known as an essential serv-ice and tourism development route(ESTDR) by applying the basic parame-ters and modalities of existing EASschemes internationally. States could usethis scheme for granting a targeted directsubsidy or regulatory assistance to an air-line operating on a specific internationalroute that may be considered an essentialair service or essential tourism develop-ment route, either separately or jointly.

The objectives of an ESTDR schemeare to assure provision of “lifeline” airservices for remote or peripheral loca-tions anywhere in the world, irrespectiveof profitability, and to facilitate the eco-nomic development of tourism countries,including least developed countries. Inother words, the scheme is expected towork as a safeguard exclusively for assur-ing provision of international air services


of a public service nature, as well as aninstrument used solely for tourism routedevelopment.

Although government assistance mayimpact negatively on trade and competi-tion, a targeted directsubsidy for airline oper-ation on a specific route— when properly de-signed and applied on alimited scale — can bejustified. The subsidymay be considered rea-sonable if it could helpgenerate a sustainableservice that could notbe provided on a for-profit basis, and if theeconomic and socialbenefits outweigh thecost of the subsidy pro-vided and the cost ofinefficiency resultingfrom the potential mar-ket distortion. Theempirical evidence fromdomestic air transport and other sectorsin several developed countries supportsthis hypothesis, indicating that targeteddirect subsidies aimed at meeting partic-ular needs of individual communitieshave marked advantages in terms ofkeeping the cost of subsidies low, guaran-teeing a continued minimum level ofservice, and ensuring that local servicerequirements are met.

Considering the positive impact of exist-ing EAS schemes, together with the com-mon aspects of domestic and internationalair transport economics, there is amplejustification for applying a domestic EASscheme to an international market. Thedemand and cost characteristics of inter-national services are the same as domesticair transport, and are similar to those ofother service sectors. Economicallyspeaking, a number of financially unprof-itable international routes of a public serv-ice nature or important potential fortourism in least developed countriesmight be considered de facto equivalent todomestic and regional routes currentlysupported by existing EAS schemes.

An ESTDR scheme does not have gen-eral applicability at the international level.Since it is an extension of existing EASschemes, its application presupposes theexistence of, or transition towards, a liber-

alized international mar-ket. In exceptional cases,the ESTDR scheme couldbe applied to non-liberal-ized routes that haveuntapped tourism po-tential. The use of thescheme for non-liberal-ized routes should, how-ever, be a last resortbecause traditional airservices agreements al-ready provide implicitassistance to airline op-erations on such routesby limiting competition.In many instances, theairlines themselves maywell be able to offer and exploit creative waysof meeting the service

requirement at a lower cost once theyhave gained some experience in servingthe market.

The seven pillarsWhile most parameters and modalities

of existing EAS schemes are transferableto the international environment, it isimportant to ensure that an ESTDRscheme remains transparent, account-able, non-discriminatory and sufficientlyflexible. As far as possible, it is also nec-essary to ensure that the scheme is mar-ket-oriented to mitigate potential negativeimpacts on the marketplace and toencourage efficiency.

The ICAO-WTO study took a step-by-step analytical approach to the construc-tion of an ESTDR scheme around sevenpillars, specifically those of route selec-tion, service level specification, carrierselection, contract duration, payment ofsubsidies, financing sources and supple-mentary options. Each of these pillars isdescribed briefly below.

Route selection. Eligible routes shouldbe solidly based on socio-economic objec-

NUMBER 6, 2005 13

ESTDR schemes provide an efficient means of

assuring service to particular destinations

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tives and economic justification. TheICAO-WTO study proposed use of a two-stage test in selecting routes; in the firststage, the test would examine in qualita-tive terms whether there is a demonstra-ble need for a particular international air

service. Such needs may include, but notbe limited to, assuring lifeline provisionsto remote or peripheral areas, supportingvital economic sectors (especially in thecase of tourism development areas), andmaintaining international links to majorcommercial and political destinations.

The second stage of the test would be aquantitative economic assessment, basedon demand for air services and airlineoperating costs at both the individualroute and network levels. The candidateroutes should be classified as either notbeing commercially viable (i.e. a routerendering any operation unprofitable) orsustainable as a natural monopoly. Thelatter situation occurs when a single air-line could provide all of the services at alower cost to the consumer than couldtwo or more airlines, and market forces inany event will not support more than oneair carrier.

Service level. An adequate level of airservice should be specified, usually interms of frequency and seating capacity,as a minimum requirement on eachselected route. A number of factors need


to be taken into consideration, amongthem the particular need for air services,the level of demand, the availability ofconnecting air services, the presence ofthird-country airlines, services by non-scheduled operators, and other forms of

available transport. Also to be consideredare air fares and their associated condi-tions, as well as the effect on other air-lines operating or intending to operate onthe route or adjacent routes.

In performing such an exercise, a flex-ible and market-oriented approach isadvocated. Under such an approach, thegoal is to set the capacity requirementonly (e.g. blocked space or part-charterarrangements), leaving the air carrierfree to decide other elements. In this way,the airline’s entrepreneurialism wouldnot be constrained.

Carrier selection. The airline chosen fora route should be selected through acompetitive tendering or biddingprocess, with clearly-defined criteria.Such competitive bidding is advanta-geous because it tends to minimize theextent of subsidy payment. In principle, aState should not confer a special advan-tage on its national airlines, but treatthem on equal terms with other interest-ed airlines, subject to the applicable airservices agreements governing the routeconcerned.

In using an auction to select a carrier,the successful bidder would be either thetender requiring the lowest financial com-pensation or the overall best tender interms of the applicant’s financial sound-ness, proposed business plan, ability todevelop partnerships with the tourismsector, and the amount of compensationrequested.

Some States may wish to award anexclusive concession or licence (i.e. afranchise) to one airline in conjunctionwith, or in place of, a subsidy when theroute is considered to be a sustainablenatural monopoly. Any market protectionmeasure, however, requires legal certain-ty in the form of an air services agree-ment and robust economic justification.

Contract duration. The duration of acontract for provision of essential airservices should be determined carefully,on a case-by-case basis, since it mayserve as an incentive and has implica-tions for efficiency. For example, there isa significant economic trade-off betweenincreasing the investment risk for poten-tial bidders (in the case of short-termcontracts) and creating a strategic advan-tage for the incumbent (in the case of along-term contract). In both cases, butparticularly in the case of long-termarrangements, it may be necessary toprovide for a mid-term review and/orenforcement or monitoring process, suchas an audit. Renegotiation may be neces-sary to deal with unforeseeable develop-ments. Regardless of the length of con-tract, applications to operate an essentialservice and tourism development routeshould be for a transitional or start-upperiod.

Subsidy payments. When the contractincludes payment of a subsidy by way ofcompensation for providing the requiredoperation, this should be paid on a reim-bursable basis. The amount of compensa-tion should correspond to the figure iden-tified in the tender as the expected short-fall between revenues and costs generated

14 ICAO JOURNAL


Toru Hasegawa is an Economist in the Economic PolicySection of the ICAO Air Transport Bureau at ICAOheadquarters, Montreal.

The objectives of an ESTDR scheme are to assure provision of lifeline air services forremote or peripheral locations anywhere in the world, irrespective of profitability,and to facilitate the economic development of tourism countries.

Air

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35835.P15 12/6/05 9:57 AM

MERGENCY and abnormal situa-tions occur aboard aircraft everyday. The seriousness of these

daily occurrences ranges from life-threat-ening and highly time-critical to mundaneand relatively trivial. Fortu-nately, emergency and abnor-mal situations aboard aircraftrarely result in accidents. Yeteven when the aircraft landssafely, shortcomings areoften evident in checklists,procedures, training, crewcoordination, and the way thesituations are managed.

What influences the man-ner in which an emergency orabnormal situation will behandled? To answer thisquestion fully, it is necessaryto first examine pertinentissues within six interrelatedareas:• specific aspects of emer-gency or abnormal situations;• training for emergency andabnormal situations;• economic and regulatorypressures in aviation;• human performance capabilities andlimitations under high workload andstress;• aircraft systems and automation; and• philosophies and policies within theaviation industry.The issues in each of these areas must

AVIATION SAFETY

Many factors affect crew effectiveness inhandling emergency or abnormal situations

A major research effort is required to find solutions for many of the dilemmas faced by flight crewswhen an emergency or abnormal situation arises, and to lay a foundation for best practices that help prevent accidents.

then be explored as they relate to thedesign of procedures and checklists andultimately to crew response, coordina-tion, and management of emergency andabnormal situations in aviation.

Specific aspects of abnormal situations.Emergency and abnormal situations varyalong several dimensions. Determiningthe degree of time criticality and level ofthreat — two of these dimensions — iscrucial and can be especially difficult

when the cues presented to the crew arecontradictory or ambiguous. Is the oddsmell an indication of a fire or merelycommonplace output from the air condi-tioning system? The crew of SwissairFlight 111 was unable to tell initially.

The complexity, amount of increasedworkload, and degree to which a situation

is novel or familiar, are other dimensionsalong which these situations may vary.Many non-normal situations involve a sin-gle, well-isolated malfunction. However,even these situations often go beyond thescope of published procedures andchecklists.

It is important to keep in mind thatsome situations may be so time-critical ormay unfold so quickly that all energy andattention must be given to controlling and

landing the aeroplane withfew resources to spare foreven consulting a checklist.Such was the case in 1988,when an 18-foot section offuselage separated from aBoeing 737-200 that was lev-elling off at 24,000 feet. Theflight crew estimated thatthey completed — largelyfrom memory — all or signif-icant parts of 17 differentchecklists in the 13 minutesit took for them to completean emergency descent andlanding.

Training for abnormal situa-tions. Training is another im-portant factor that significant-ly affects how an emergencyor abnormal situation is han-dled. In the United States,training is generally driven by

the need to complete Federal AviationAdministration (FAA) mandated manoeu-vres described in FAR Part 121. Trainingunder the Advanced Qualification Pro-gramme (AQP) allows more flexibility buthere, too, time constraints and cost tend torestrict the range and depth of training foremergencies.

16 ICAO JOURNAL

Human performance under high stress and workload needs to betaken into account when developing procedures and checkliststo be followed in an emergency or abnormal situation.

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BARBARA K. BURIAN

IMMANUEL BARSHI • KEY DISMUKES

NASA AMES RESEARCH CENTER

(UNITED STATES)

E

Under both AQP and FAR Part 121crews rarely, if ever, face a situation in thesimulator for which there is no checklistor procedure, even though this can be thecase in actual emergencies. Likewise, theyrarely encounter an event for which thechecklist procedures do not work asexpected — the light on the overheadpanel goes out, the crossfeed opens, theengine fire is contained.1 It is typically onlyin line-oriented flight training (LOFT) orline operational evaluation (LOE) simula-tor sessions, if even then, that crews mightbe required to avoid other traffic or dealwith deteriorating weather conditionswhile responding to an emergency. Thusthe degree to which training truly reflectsreal-life emergency and abnormal situa-tions with all of their real-world demands,especially with regard to communicatingand coordinating a response with others,is often limited.

Despite these drawbacks, however,flight crews do benefit from the trainingfor emergency and abnormal events theycurrently receive. In a review of 107reports involving emergency or abnor-mal situations filed with the U.S. AviationSafety Reporting System (ASRS), re-searchers found 25 described situationsthat appear to have been handled quitewell.2

Nineteen of these 25 reports involvedwhat might be called “textbook” abnor-mal or emergency situations — those sit-uations that generally involve only a sin-gle system malfunction (as opposed tomultiple problems), are highly trainedand practiced in a simulator, and forwhich good checklists exist. As one ASRSreporter remarked, “Our simulator train-ing really paid off. This was my firstengine shutdown in 20 years of flying,and it felt like I had done it a thousandtimes before!”

Thus, most textbook emergencieswere handled smoothly and as planned.Most of the ASRS reports which werereviewed, however, described events thatwere not textbook emergencies (85 inall), and the vast majority of these (93 per-cent) involved a problem with the way inwhich the flight crew or others respond-

AVIATION SAFETY

ed to the situation, and/or with the mate-rials and resources they were to use (seeaccompanying table).

Economic and regulatory pressures. Asmentioned above, regulatory and eco-nomic pressures significantly affect train-ing for emergencies. To a large degree,regulatory requirements dictate what istrained and, in a vicious circle, economicpressures then dictate that what is notrequired by regula-tion is not trained.The latter occursbecause the timedevoted to varioustypes of training isregarded by mostairlines as beingfixed at a certainnumber of days per year. Pulling crewsoff the line to participate in training hastremendous economic impact on an air-line and adding to the training “footprint”is avoided if at all possible.

Economic pressures can affect the han-dling of emergency or abnormal situa-tions in other ways as well. For example,flight crews may also feel some reluc-tance to divert to an alternate airport ormay divert to one where maintenance orother services are available rather thanone that is closer. Pilots’ fears of report-ing requirements or regulatory actionmay affect their decisions whether or notto declare an emergency with Air TrafficControl, and real or perceived pressuresfrom companies can also have profoundimplications for how situations are han-dled. In one safety report, for instance, apilot admitted: “Had there been an actualengine fire, the fear of being punished bymy employer for causing a customerdelay may have raised safety concernsbecause of my reluctance to perform therequired engine shutdown.”

Human performance. Most emergencyand abnormal situations increase theworkload on the flight deck. Sometimesthis increase is transitory and limited, butat other times it is great and continues forthe remainder of the flight. In high work-load situations, crew errors and less-than-optimal responses often can be linked

directly to inherent limitations in humancognitive processes. These are limita-tions all humans experience when facedwith threat, or when under stress or over-loaded with essential tasks.

Studies reveal that cognitive perform-ance is significantly compromised understress. When experiencing stress, humanattention narrows — a phenomenon refer-red to as tunnelling. Tunnelling restricts

scanning the fullrange of environmen-tal cues, causing theindividual to focusnarrowly on whatare perceived to bethe most salient orthreatening cues. Thus,under stress pilots

may focus on a single cockpit indicatorand not notice other indications also rele-vant to their situation.

Additionally, working memory capacityand the length of time information can beheld in working memory decrease understress. Working memory is the crucialresource that allows individuals to holdand manipulate information cognitively.When working memory capacity isexceeded, individuals’ ability to analysesituations and devise solutions is drasti-cally impaired.

Therefore, when experiencing stressand high workload, crews are vulnerableto missing important cues related to theirsituation and can experience difficultymaking sense of information, especiallywhen it is incomplete, ambiguous, or con-tradictory. Pilots’ problem-solving abili-ties may be impaired, and they will gener-ally have difficulty performing complexmental calculations, such as figuringlanding distances on a wet runway withreduced flaps.

Stress-induced limitations on humanperformance capabilities are often over-looked when considering how crewsrespond to emergency and abnormal sit-uations. Researchers at NASA recentlyconducted an in-depth analysis of sever-al airline accidents and determined thatnormal cognitive limitations experi-enced by all humans when dealing with

NUMBER 6, 2005 17

Crewresponse

TextbookEmergency

Non-TextbookEmergency

Totals

HandledWell 19 6 25

Not HandledWell 3 79 82

Totals 22 85 107

Crew performance in handling emergencies(based on study of 107 ASRS reports)

stress, concurrent task demands, andtime pressure, underlie those errorsmade by the accident crews. As is dis-cussed below, human performance limi-tations have implications for appropriatechecklist design.

Aircraft systems and automation.Various automated aircraft and warningsystems can also affect the handling ofemergency and abnormal situations.For example, in 1991, while an MD-81’sengines were surging, the automaticthrust restoration (ATR) feature on theaircraft increased the engine powerwithout the pilots’ knowledge. Thisincreased the intensity of surging,which contributed to the failure of bothengines. During the investigation ofthis accident it was discovered that thepilots and the air carrier were unawarethat the ATR feature even existed onthe aircraft.

The numbers and types of warningsand warning systems aboard modern air-craft have greatly increased in recentyears. The large number of warnings canresult in information overload as crewsattempt to make sense of the variousalerts and respond properly. This is espe-cially true when multiple or contradictorywarnings are presented in close succes-sion or at the same time.

AVIATION SAFETY

These issues were involved in 1996,when erroneous information was sent toa Boeing 757 captain’s airspeed indicatorby the left air data computer because of ablocked pitot tube. Although the crewagreed that the back-up airspeed indica-tor was correct, they never attempted tofly the aircraft manually by reference to it.Instead, the first officer selected AltitudeHold but the power setting was too low tomaintain altitude and the aircraft crashedsoon afterward.

It can be difficult for flight crews todetermine the most appropriate level ofautomation to use during emergency andabnormal situations. In some casesautomation can help reduce crew work-load, but attempting to use some aspectsof automation can also impair a crew’sability to respond appropriately.

Additionally, pilots may become soaccustomed to using automation to fly theaircraft that they may have trouble revert-ing to manual flying when required by anemergency. As stated in one ASRS report,“We were both very absorbed in flying theaircraft by hand, as it’s something we don’toften do.”

Finally, crews have difficulty determin-ing the correct response when theyreceive a warning that has a long-standinghistory of being unreliable, as foreseen in

this ASRS excerpt: “The cargo compart-ment smoke alarm system has a mainte-nance history of false warnings. The fre-quency of these reports is going to leadsome crews to ignore the warnings.”

Indeed, between 1994 and 1999, theratio of false cargo smoke alarms to realcargo smoke alarms was 200 to 1. Makingan unnecessary diversion and emergencylanding when an alarm is false can havetremendous costs and safety implica-tions. However, not diverting when thereis a fire can have even greater costs andsafety ramifications.

Philosophies, policies and practices.Almost everyone in the industry — frommanufacturers to instructors to directorsof flight operations to line pilots — hasideas about how emergency and abnor-mal situations should be managed. Theseideas derive from individual experiences,beliefs and perspectives related to vari-ous cost-benefit trade-offs. Often, theseideas are not explicitly expressed in awritten document but are evident inchoices made throughout the aviationindustry, choices such as: (1) the direc-tions and information given to crews inchecklists; (2) the types of scenariosemphasized during training; (3) the degree

18 ICAO JOURNAL


1. Restrictions in simulator design may limit the typesof problems that can be presented to flight crews. Forexample, it may not be possible to program some sim-ulators so that a light on the panel remains illuminat-ed after a crew has correctly completed the pertinentchecklist procedures.

2. ASRS reports are filed voluntarily; therefore thenumbers presented in this article related to thesereports cannot be considered representative. Theyonly indicate frequencies within the set of reportsused in the study, not the rates of occurrence in avia-tion operations.

This article was co-authored by Barbara K. Burian, aSenior Research Associate with the San Jose StateUniversity Foundation at the NASA Ames ResearchCenter; Immanuel Barshi, a Research Psychologist atthe NASA Ames Research Center; and Key Dismukes,Chief Scientist for Human Factors in the Human FactorsResearch and Technology Division at the NASA AmesResearch Center. Dr. Burian directs the Emergency andAbnormal Situations Study sponsored by NASA AmesResearch Center, and can be reached at [email protected].

The article is an abridged version of a U.S. NationalAeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) technicalmemorandum (NASA/TM-2005-213462), The Challengeof Aviation Emergency and Abnormal Situations, pub-lished in June 2005. The TM, including an extensive listof references that do not appear here, is available inelectronic form at the NASA Ames Research Centerwebsite (http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/eas).

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The degree to which training reflects real-life emergency and abnormal situations,especially with regard to communicating and coordinating a response with others, isoften limited.

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35835.P20 12/6/05 1:41 PM

N 2 July 2003, a Boeing 747-438aircraft with 350 passengers, 14cabin crew and four flight crew

members was operated on a scheduledpassenger flight from Singapore toSydney. The flight crew included the pilotin command (PIC), the co-pilot, a secondofficer and a second officer pilot underinitial training.

Due to the forecast weather for Sydneyand the expected arrival time within theairport’s curfew period, the crewrequested additional fuel in Singapore toallow for possible holding at Sydney or adiversion to Brisbane. That gave the air-craft an expected landing weight atSydney of 270,700 kilograms (596,780lb), approximately 15,000 kilograms lessthan the maximum allowable landingweight. The co-pilot was the handlingpilot for the flight.

At approximately 0508 local time, indarkness, the flight crew commenced aninstrument landing system (ILS)approach to Runway 34 Left (34L) atSydney Airport. After commencing theapproach, the aircraft encountered avarying tailwind. The landing referenceairspeed was 150 knots for the flap 30configuration and the planned aircraftlanding weight. During the approach, the

ACCIDENT REPORT

Use of incorrect grease during maintenanceled to wheel fire and evacuation of B747

The investigation of a brake fire accident that resulted in serious injuries during the evacuationfound that incorrect and excessive grease had been applied to the landing gear axles, and that anover-wing slide failed because it was punctured by an object probably worn or carried by a passenger.

Sydney tower controller advised the crewthat the surface wind was 180 degreesmagnetic at 14 knots, with a tailwind com-ponent of 13 knots. [Runway 34L was inuse despite the southerly wind because ofnoise abatement procedures. The airporthad in force a curfew that operated from2300 to 0600 daily, but limited internation-al passenger jet arrivals were permittedbetween 0500 and 0600 provided thatarriving aircraft used Runway 34L anddeployed no more than idle reversethrust during the landing roll.]

The crew planned to exit the runway atTaxiway Golf to facilitate a minimal taxidistance to their allocated parking bay,and had set the automatic wheel brakesto position three for the landing.1 Thelanding distance available to TaxiwayGolf was 2,826 metres (9,270 ft), which

was more than adequate for the prevail-ing conditions, with an automatic wheelbrake setting of three being appropriatefor the conditions.

At approximately 0511, the aircrafttouched down about 430 metres past thethreshold of Runway 34L at an airspeed of164 knots with a tailwind of approximate-ly 12 knots. The landing was normal andsoon after touchdown the spoilers auto-matically deployed and the auto-brakesactivated. The flight crew advised thecontrol tower that the aircraft’s flightmanagement computer (FMC) had indi-cated a tailwind component of 18 knotsdown to approximately 100 feet on finalapproach, and 11 knots at touchdown.

Approximately five seconds after land-ing, at 150 knots indicated airspeed, theco-pilot selected the reverse thrust levers

NUMBER 6, 2005 21

ACCIDENT REPORTThis article is comprised of extracts from the acci-dent report released by the Australian TransportSafety Bureau in March 2005. The report may beviewed in its entirety at the ATSB website(www.atsb.gov.au/aviation/pdf/200302980.pdf).

AUSTRALIAN TRANSPORT

SAFETY BUREAU

Factors contributing to brake fires after a B747 landing at Sydney included presence of incorrect and excessive grease on the landing gear axles, inadvertentdeselection of reverse thrust, and heat generated by the brakes on the landing rolland subsequent taxiing.

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to the idle reverse position. Recordedflight data confirmed that the reversethrust levers were raised to the idlereverse detent with the thrust reversersbeginning to deploy normally. However,before any of the reversers reached thefully deployed position, and within twoseconds of their selection, the reversethrust levers returned to the retractedposition and the thrust reversers beganto retract. The aircraft’s speed at thattime was 136 knots. None of the crewmembers reported noticing that thethrust reversers had deselected and the

ACCIDENT REPORT

engines remained at forward idle thrustfor the remainder of the landing roll.

As the aircraft decelerated through100 knots, the PIC assessed that a high-er rate of deceleration was required toallow exiting the runway at TaxiwayGolf. He directed the co-pilot to disarmthe automatic wheel brakes and to applymanual braking. The co-pilot took thoseactions, reducing the aircraft’s speed toapproximately 10 knots by the TaxiwayGolf turn-off.

When the aircraft was aligned with thedesignated parking bay, the flight crewinstructed the cabin crew, via the passen-ger address system (PA), to disarm2 thecabin doors. The flight crew thenobserved a “BRAKE TEMP” message onthe primary engine indication and crewalerting system (EICAS) display screenon the flight deck instrument panel. ThePIC checked the landing gear displaypage on the secondary EICAS screen andobserved that the wheel brake tempera-ture on wheel number 12 — the rear rightwheel on the right body landing gear —was showing an amber five indication.

As soon as the aircraft stopped, theground crew commenced their aircraftarrival procedures. One of the groundengineers (GE1) connected his headsetat the nose landing gear for communica-tion with the flight crew, and advisedthem that the wheel chocks were inplace. The aircraft’s flashing beacon wasturned off and the co-pilot advised theground engineer of the aircraft’s status,including the hot brakes information. Inthe meantime, the cabin crew had dis-

armed the doors, and some passengerswere standing holding their cabin bag-gage in readiness to disembark, eventhough the seat-belt sign was still illumi-nated. There was a slight delay before theseat-belt sign was extinguished becausethe PIC had been dealing with the“BRAKE TEMP” message.

On the ground, the second groundengineer (GE2) and a number of ramppersonnel positioned on the right side ofthe aircraft noticed a fire in the right winglanding gear. GE2 immediately told GE1of the fire, who then advised the flightcrew. The PIC asked GE1 to confirm thatthere was a fire, and GE1 confirmed this.Communication between the flight crewand GE1 then ceased. The aircraft’s flash-ing beacon was then turned back on tosignal ramp personnel to remain clear ofthe aircraft.

The PIC then made an “Alert” PA tothe aircraft cabin instructing all passen-gers to pay attention, to remain seatedand await further instructions. All aircraftcabin doors except Door L1 remainedclosed and disarmed. A small number ofpassengers had already left the aircraft.

Within seconds of making the alertannouncement, the PIC gave the order“evacuate, evacuate, evacuate,” and acti-vated the emergency evacuation signalsystem, causing the main cabin lightingto extinguish and the cabin emergencylighting to illuminate. It was still dark out-side, but the aircraft and surroundingarea were illuminated by tarmac flood-lighting. The cabin crew commencedevacuation procedures immediately, withthe first passenger escape slide, recordedon the airport security camera video,deploying at 0519:09.

22 ICAO JOURNAL

Aeroshell 33

Aeroshell 22

In November 2000, one of the operator’sBoeing 747s that had recently completed

maintenance sustained a brake fire. Onthat occasion, the wheel interior andbrake void were found to contain excessiveamounts of grease, including Aeroshell 33[a general purpose grease that was usedinstead of the correct grease, Aeroshell22]. That incident resulted in the operatorissuing a safety alert bulletin to the main-tenance facility that had carried out themaintenance tasks, highlighting the inci-dent and the importance of following cor-rect maintenance procedures.

On 3 July 2003, the day after the sub-ject occurrence, another of the operator’sBoeing 747s experienced a brake fireshortly after reaching the parking bay fol-lowing a landing at Sydney. That aircraftalso landed on Runway 34L during the

Examination of the wheel axle revealed the presence of two different types ofgrease, one a general purpose grease (Aeroshell 33) that was not approved for use inthis part of the landing gear.

1. The automatic braking system on Boeing 747-400series aircraft allowed the crew to preselect a desireddeceleration rate during the landing roll (there were sixsettings: RTO, 1, 2, 3, 4 and MAX). Brake torque wasautomatically adjusted to achieve a programmed rate ofdeceleration depending on, among other factors, theamount of reverse thrust that the crew had selected.For example, at a given automatic brake setting, ifreverse thrust was not used, higher brake torqueswould be required than if reverse thrust was used.

2. The doors had two operating modes. Disarmedmode allowed the doors to be open without deploy-ment of the escape slides. Armed mode automaticallyactivated the escape slide on door opening.


OTHER BRAKE FIREOCCURRENCES


NUMBER 6, 2005 23

While emphasizing that the global aviation system remainsfundamentally safe despite a series of recent accidents,ICAO Council President Dr. Assad Kotaite told a gathering ofcivil aviation leaders recently that regulators and the industryare under pressure to act quickly and decisively in preventingfurther accidents.

Although 2003 and 2004 were the safest years since 1945, heinformed directors of civil aviation (DCA) from the NorthAmerican, Central American and Caribbean region at a meetingin Tegucigalpa, Honduras on 11 October, “the unusually highnumber of fatal accidents we experienced this summer hasagain focused public attention on the safety of air transport.”

In response, Dr. Kotaite added, ICAO has decided to con-vene a two-day global conference on the subject of aviationsafety early next year. The gathering of the world’s directorsgeneral of civil aviation (DGCAs) at ICAO headquarters inMarch will focus on shaping a renewed global strategy foraviation safety (see accompanying article, page 25).

Dr. Kotaite urged delegates of the meeting, sponsored bythe Government of Honduras and the Central AmericanCorporation for Air Navigation Services (COCESNA), to par-ticipate actively in the forthcoming conference. The world-wide meeting of DGCAs will review the current status of avi-ation safety, identify ways to further improve safety, and con-sider enhancement of the safety framework to meet theevolving needs of international civil aviation.

The Council President cited reasons why global aviationremains fundamentally safe, in particular ICAO initiatives toaddress safety concerns. The Universal Safety OversightAudit Programme (USOAP) has been quite effective, henoted, in assessing the level of implementation of safety-related standards and recommended practices (SARPs).More recently, the ICAO Assembly in 2004 adopted a unifiedstrategy to resolve safety-related deficiencies, and ICAO isnow establishing a safety management process to help meetthat objective while also encouraging Contracting States toestablish safety management systems. Dr. Kotaite also high-lighted a measure promoting greater transparency of safetydeficiencies as yet another important initiative.

“We all know that standards and procedures alone will notprevent accidents,” Dr. Kotaite reminded the delegates.“They must be implemented and they must be enforced, sys-tematically, consistently and continually.” This is why ICAO’sfocus has shifted from one of developing standards to resolv-ing safety deficiencies. USOAP audits have highlighted thefact that correcting deficiencies remains a serious challengefor many States.

ICAO’s new unified strategy also strongly promotes theestablishment of regional or sub-regional safety oversightorganizations, the President added. Regional safety oversight

organizations can provide an excellent framework for opti-mizing resources and for recruiting, training and retainingqualified personnel.

The President underscored the importance of regionalbodies such as COCESNA/Central American Agency forAviation Safety (ACSA), which was established with the aimof helping States of the region comply with SARPs, and theRegional Aviation Safety Oversight System (RASOS), set upin the Caribbean for the same purpose.

In the case of ACSA, for example, all Central AmericanStates are pooling their resources and achieving significantimprovements in meeting their safety oversight obligations.“By your actions,” Dr. Kotaite stated, “you have inspired oth-ers … to foster the creation of regional or sub-regional part-nerships. You have thereby demonstrated how the right com-bination of technical knowledge and political support canbring about remarkable results.”

Dr. Kotaite reviewed developments in the field of security,noting that ICAO’s newly formed Universal Security AuditProgramme (USAP) had so far audited 97 States, including11 from the North American, Central American andCaribbean region. He added that ICAO, through its regionaloffice, had made sustained efforts to assist States, territoriesand international organizations in obtaining aviation securitytraining, and that the Government of Canada had providedfunding for a security awareness training programme con-ducted by ICAO and Transport Canada.

The President stressed the importance of information forsecurity and safety alike. In terms of safety, he said, theunobstructed flow of related information should be embraced

ICAO UPDATE New safety focus essential, Council President emphasizes

Pictured following a meeting in Tegucigalpa, Honduras are (l-r):Adan Suazo Morazán, Representative of Honduras on theCouncil of ICAO; Eduardo Marin, Executive President ofCOCESNA; Alberto Díaz Lobo, Vice-President of the Republicof Honduras; Dr. Kotaite; Jorge Carranza, Minister of Transportof Honduras; and Eduardo Pavón Cámbar, Vice-Minister ofTransport of Honduras.

Recent accidents highlight the need to implement SARPs rather than develop new standards, Dr. Kotaite stresses in address to civil aviation leaders

24 ICAO JOURNAL

by everyone involved in air transport. In security as well, hesaid, information is “the basis of progress.”

The meeting, the second of its kind, was attended by 73participants from 18 States and territories and seven interna-tional organizations. The first-ever meeting of directors ofcivil aviation of North America, Central America and theCaribbean was held in Grand Cayman in October 2002.

Discussions with government leaders. While in Honduras from10 to 13 October, the Council President discussed aviation mat-ters with the Vice-President of Honduras (in his capacity asActing President), the Minister and Vice-Minister of PublicWorks, Transport and Housing, the Vice-Minister of ForeignAffairs, and the DGCA (see photo, page 23). Their discussionscovered the significant progress made by Honduras in imple-menting the recommendations of ICAO safety and security auditteams, and ratification by Honduras of amendments to theChicago Convention and other international air law instruments.

The Council President also visited COCESNA’s office, andmet with its Executive President and other officials. He alsotoured the modern air traffic control centre that COCESNAoperates. During the DCA meeting, COCESNA organized aceremony to pay tribute to Dr. Kotaite, in recognition of hiscontribution to the development of international civil aviationover a period of 50 years. ■■

MRTD SYMPOSIUM

A symposium on ICAO-standard machine readable trav-el documents (MRTDs) and biometric enhancement heldin Montreal in late September attracted nearly 300 par-ticipants from 58 Contracting States, eight internationalorganizations and more than 50 companies and institu-tions. Experts highlighted various elements of the ICAOprogramme established to assist States in their transitionto either the ICAO standard machine-readable passportor the e-passport. A concurrent exhibition, with 13 par-ticipating companies, highlighted MRTD-related prod-ucts and services.

States encouraged to supportICAO’s security plan of actionICAO continues to encourage member States to provide fund-ing for the implementation of the ICAO aviation security plan ofaction, recently disseminating a letter inviting the States topledge financial contributions on a systematic basis in order toensure the proper planning and execution of security-relatedprogrammes over the remainder of the 2005-07 triennium.

While the ICAO aviation security plan of action, establishedsoon after the events of 11 September 2001, depends on vol-untary contributions, ICAO is exploring ways to progressivelyintegrate the activities into its regular programme budget. Inthe meantime, regular financial contributions by donor Statesare vital. Many aspects of the plan of action also rely on con-tributions in-kind by States, in particular through the second-ment of auditors to the Universal Security Audit Programme(USAP), a key component of the plan of action, as well asinstructors needed to conduct ICAO courses, and assistancegiven directly to States in need of security expertise.

In urging States to make pledges, late last year ICAO dis-seminated a package of information on achievements todate, as well as financial details concerning actual and sug-gested levels of contributions. More recently, the organizationinformed Contracting States on the financial status of theplan of action, including the level of contributions received upto the end of September. The projected activities of theremainder of this triennium, and a summary of other majoraccomplishments completed under the plan of action duringthe first three quarters of 2005, are posted on the ICAO web-site and will be updated on a regular basis. ■■

Secretariat restructured to focusmore sharply on new prioritiesICAO recently merged two of the 10 sections within its AirNavigation Bureau and has created a new unit that will con-centrate on managing the organization’s unified safety strat-egy. The changes reflect a shift in priorities, with new empha-sis on a more active approach to the implementation of ICAOstandards as opposed to their development, and a new focus

on the safety management process and the creation of safe-ty management systems among the world’s civil aviationadministrations and the industry at large.

The newly formed Flight Safety Section (FLS) succeeds thePersonnel Licensing and Training Practices (PEL/TRG) Sectionand the Operations and Airworthiness (OPS/AIR) Section. TheFLS Section is responsible for the development of standardsand recommended practices (SARPs); procedures and guid-ance material related to the operation, registration, certificationand airworthiness of aircraft; the design of instrument proce-dures; licensing and training of personnel; the units of meas-urement used in aviation operations; and the safe transport ofdangerous goods by air. The FLS Section has shared respon-sibility with ICAO’s Air Transport Bureau in the development ofSARPs related to aircraft noise and engine emissions.

The new section is also responsible for training and safetyinitiatives including the ICAO Aviation Training Programme,the Flight Safety and Human Factors Programme and thePrevention of Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) Programme,as well as activities related to safety management systemsand safety aspects of air transport liberalization and imple-mentation of aviation security programmes.

The newly created Unified Strategy Programme (USP) Unitis responsible for implementing the unified strategy to resolvesafety-related deficiencies which was adopted by the ICAOAssembly in 2004. The unified strategy involves a shift infocus away from developing standards towards facilitatingtheir implementation. ■■

NUMBER 6, 2005 25

Conference to develop a safetyframework for the 21st centuryICAO will convene a global safety conference at its Montrealheadquarters in March 2006 to address safety concerns thathave arisen following a series of fatal accidents that tookplace earlier this year.

The worldwide safety conference, scheduled to take placefrom 20 to 22 March, will be attended by directors general ofcivil aviation (DGCAs) from ICAO’s 189 Contracting States.The DGCAs will gather in Montreal to assess the current sta-tus of aviation safety and identify ways to achieve significantimprovements. The primary aim of the conference is to devel-op a safety framework for the 21st century in an assertive,coordinated and transparent manner. As such, transparencyand sharing of information will be among the major issues tobe discussed.

Although the global air transport system is fundamentallysafe, explained ICAO Council President Dr. Assad Kotaite,the recent fatal accidents “focused attention on the urgentneed to eliminate remaining systemic deficiencies.”

The forthcoming conference is arguably the most significantinternational meeting on aviation safety since a similar DGCAconference held in 1997 authorized the organization to performregular and mandatory safety audits on a systematic basis in allICAO Contracting States. The highly successful initiative arisingfrom the 1997 conference, known as the Universal SafetyOversight Audit Programme (USOAP), was launched in 1999after it received the ICAO Assembly’s endorsement.

“The time is now ripe to review and bring all of our safetyinitiatives under the umbrella of a global strategy, while incor-porating any new element that will further strengthen aviationsafety, based on transparency and sharing of information,”Dr. Kotaite stated.

Earlier this year the President called for more effectiveinformation sharing between all stakeholders, asserting thatthere must be “an unobstructed flow of safety-related infor-mation by everyone involved in air transport, at every leveland across every safety discipline. At the same time, airlinesand regulators must put in place safety management sys-tems that can make use of this information.” ■■

Council elects vice-presidents andcommittee chairmen for 2005-06The ICAO Council has elected three vice-presidents to servefor the 2005-06 period. The newly appointed vice-presidentsare: Lionel Dupuis, Representative of Canada (First Vice-President); Mokhtar Ahmed Awan, Representative ofPakistan (Second Vice-President); and Adan Suazo Morazán,Representative of Honduras (Third Vice-President).

The Council also elected the chairmen of the five Councilcommittees for a one-year period. Those appointed are: AirTransport Committee, Harold Wilson (Saint Lucia); JointSupport Committee, Igor Lysenko (Russian Federation);Finance Committee, Simon Clegg (Australia); UnlawfulInterference Committee, Horst Mürl (Germany); and TechnicalCooperation Committee, Olumuyiwa B. Aliu (Nigeria).

The ICAO Council, the governing body of ICAO, comprisesrepresentatives of 36 States elected by the ICAO Assembly. ■■

Cairo seminar focuses on regionalcooperation for safety oversightICAO conducted a four-day seminar on regional cooperationfor safety oversight at Cairo, Egypt in September 2005.Attended by 60 participants from various regions, the semi-nar, an element of ICAO’s unified strategy to resolve safety-related deficiencies, provided a forum for operational staff ofexisting and emerging regional entities from around the worldto share experiences and exchange safety oversight-relatedinformation and materials.

Hosted by the Egyptian Ministry of Civil Aviation, the sem-inar was opened on 19 September by ICAO CouncilPresident Dr. Assad Kotaite, who stressed the importance ofcooperation to the enhancement of safety. “Any improve-ment in safety on a worldwide basis,” the President empha-sized, “depends on the collaboration of all stakeholders.”

Dr. Kotaite pointed to an innovative regional programme thatfocuses on the cooperative development of operational safetyand continuing airworthiness. COSCAP — as it is known forshort — is a good example of how partnerships are beingformed to enhance aviation safety. A dedicated forum for pro-moting continuing dialogue, coordination and cooperation inmatters related to flight safety, the programme has created anenvironment for harmonization and advancement in safetyoversight policies, procedures and regulations. To date, sevenCOSCAPs are in place worldwide, and four more programmesare to be established in the next two years.

The seminar in Cairo represented the beginning of a seriesof efforts taken by ICAO to raise the level of commitmentamong States for their safety oversight obligations. The cam-paign is also intended to assist States in overcoming theirsafety-related deficiencies. “Our hope is that you will becomebetter acquainted with the tools and databases of ICAOdesigned to facilitate the exchange of information regardingsafety oversight,” Dr. Kotaite informed participants.

“What is important above all is that a commitment for theestablishment of a regional safety oversight system be madeat the highest levels of government,” the Council Presidentexplained. “States within a region must agree to cometogether to share their experiences and resources. Strong

Dr. Kotaite met with Ahmed Shafiq, the Minister of CivilAviation of Egypt (at left), as well as other government andindustry leaders during a visit to Cairo in September.

foundation on which to build a legal edifice. The clarity, logicand depth of the Chicago Convention are such that “we findit today almost unchanged, in spite of the major political,economic and social upheavals of the second half of the 20th

century and the stormy beginning to the 21st century.”Several legal instruments concerning international civil avi-

ation have been adopted by the international community inthe ensuing decades, among them the Montreal Conventionof 1999 — in force since November 2003 — which modern-izes and consolidates into a single legal instrument a set ofinternational instruments of private international law govern-ing air carrier liability. More recently, Dr. Kotaite observed,ICAO has focused on modernizing the 1952 RomeConvention. In light of recent trends and developments ininternational liability law, a group of legal experts is develop-ing a new draft convention that will address third-party dam-age caused by foreign aircraft.

“I expect the new convention to be another fine example ofuniversal acceptance,” Dr. Kotaite predicted. “As an interna-tionalist associated with ICAO for the past 52 years, I haveobserved the progressive and steady evolution of legalinstruments toward internationalism.”

For the past 60 years, he added, conventions on air lawhave reflected the evolution of air transport and of society,including change in an era of globalization.

Discussions with Hungarian authorities. While in Budapestfrom 1 to 5 November, the Council President met with high-level government officials on matters related to civil aviation.Accompanied by the Representative of Hungary on theCouncil of ICAO, Dr. Kotaite met with the Minister of Economyand Transport and with the Director General of Civil Aviation,concurrently the President of the European Civil AviationCommission (ECAC). Dr. Kotaite also met with industry offi-cials, including the Chief Operating Officer of Budapest Airportand the Director General of the HungaroControl Centre.Discussions with the Hungarian authorities focused primarilyon issues related to safety, security and the environment. ■■

26 ICAO JOURNAL

partnerships with stakeholders, such as industry and finan-cial institutions, can further improve regional aviation safetyoversight by helping to secure the necessary assistance.”

Discussions with Egyptian authorities. During his visit toCairo from 17 to 22 September, the Council President dis-cussed a wide range of aviation issues with government andindustry leaders. Dr. Kotaite — accompanied by the ICAORegional Director for the Middle East Office — met with theMinister of Civil Aviation of Egypt, the Chairman of the CivilAviation Authority, the Deputy Assistant Minister of ForeignAffairs, and the First Under Secretary General of the Leagueof Arab States. The Council President also met with theDirector General of the Arab Civil Aviation Commission(ACAC) and the President of EgyptAir. Discussions withEgyptian authorities covered safety, security, ratification ofcertain air law instruments, technical cooperation activities,and the ICAO regional office and meeting facilities providedby the Government of Egypt under a special agreement withICAO. Also discussed was coordination on civil aviation mat-ters between the League of Arab States, ACAC and the ICAOregional office.

During his stay in Egypt Dr. Kotaite toured the new state-of-the-art Aviation Medical Centre in Cairo as well as theEgyptAir Training Centre, which is equipped with a number offlight simulators; both facilities offer training and assistanceto personnel from other countries. The Council President alsovisited the ICAO Middle East Office, where he addressed thestaff on the unified strategy recently adopted by ICAO and oncurrent budgetary constraints facing the organization. ■■

Legal framework needs continualstrengthening, lawyers toldIn his keynote address to the European Air Law Associationannual conference in Budapest on 4 November, ICAOCouncil President Dr. Assad Kotaite focused on safety con-cerns and recent initiatives to address them, as well as avia-tion security and air law matters.

“As we move in the direction of safer, more secure andincreasingly liberalized air transport,” he informed the gather-ing of lawyers, “we need to continually strengthen the globalaviation legal framework.”

The 1944 Chicago Convention, he remarked, is a strong

ICAO Council President Dr. Assad Kotaite discussed aviation mat-ters with Hungarian authorities during a recent visit to Budapest.Pictured at a meeting on 3 November are (l-r): Dr. Attila Sipos,Representative of Hungary on the Council of ICAO; Dr. Kotaite; Dr.Laszlo Kiss, DGCA of Hungary and President of ECAC; and JánosKóka, Minister of Economy and Transport of Hungary.

IFFAS issues its firstannual reportIn its first published annual report, the International FinancialFacility for Aviation Safety (IFFAS) indicated that it received atotal of U.S. $354,000 in contributions during 2004. In addi-tion, IFFAS benefited from a donation of $105,900 from theAgence Intergouvernementale de la Francophonie which wasused to help defray its administrative costs.

Since it was established by ICAO in December 2002, IFFAShas received total contributions of approximately $2.8 mil-lion. IFFAS was set up with the goal of financing safety-relat-ed projects for which States cannot otherwise obtain thenecessary financial resources.

IFFAS has so far considered assistance for 10 projectssince it became operational in mid-2003. Based on recom-mendations from a panel of experts, to date it has funded fiveprojects in five different regions, with a total of 25 States ben-efiting from financial assistance in the form of grants. All ofthe selected projects are of a regional or sub-regional natureand involve States defined by the United Nations as leastdeveloped countries. ■■

NUMBER 6, 2005 27

ICAO membership growsThe Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste became aContracting State of the International Civil AviationOrganization on 3 September 2005, shortly after ICAO wasnotified of the country’s adherence to Convention onInternational Civil Aviation, also known as the ChicagoConvention. The development brings the total number ofICAO Contracting States to 189.

ICAO was founded in 1944, when 52 States signed theChicago Convention. ■■

Questionnaire focuses on land-useplanning around airportsICAO recently disseminated a questionnaire to its memberStates on land-use planning measures related to airports, atthe same time urging States to promote appropriate land-useplanning practices around airports. The organization notedthat the 2005 theme for the United Nations World Envi-ronment Day, “Green Cities,” provided an opportunity for pro-moting such measures.

The questionnaire, to be returned to ICAO headquarters by15 December 2005, requested information on current Statepolicy on land-use planning and management related tolands adjacent to airports, as well as State best practices andunsuccessful practices.

Guidance on land-use planning is available in the ICAOAirport Planning Manual. Part 2 of the manual, Land Use andEnvironmental Control (Document 9184), contains a descrip-tion of current practices in certain countries. As well as land-use planning guidance, the document examines environmen-tal control in terms of airport development and operations.

ICAO’s Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection(CAEP) continues to update guidance material contained inthe manual. CAEP is also in the process of updating a circu-lar on the recommended method for computing noise con-tours around airports. Circular 205 is being revised in order tooffer States the best possible information on aircraft noisemodelling. ■■

Regional air navigation systemplanners meet in BangkokThe group of experts responsible for air navigation planningand implementation in the Asia/Pacific region met in Bangkokin late August to address a number of technical and opera-tional issues. The 16th meeting of the regional group wasattended by 95 participants from 25 States and three organ-izations. Among other things, the Asia/Pacific Air NavigationPlanning and Implementation Regional Group (APANPIRG)conducted a thorough review of the current and futureAsia/Pacific air traffic services (ATS) route network and devel-oped a route catalogue as a planning tool. It also discusseddevelopment of a model contingency plan that could be usedby States in the region to prepare national contingency plansfor addressing situations such as labour disruptions or natu-ral disasters that may affect civil aviation operations. In addi-tion, the regional strategy for implementing GNSS in theAsia/Pacific region was updated. ■■

Council President presented withaward for half-century of serviceICAO Council President Dr. Assad Kotaite was in London from18 to 22 October to accept an award presented by His RoyalHighness Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh, on behalf of theInternational Association of Institutes of Navigation (IAIN) onthe occasion of its 30th anniversary (see photo). The CouncilPresident also met with high-level government officials to dis-cuss aviation matters.

The John Harrison Award was bestowed on Dr. Kotaite at aceremony at the Royal Geographic Society headquarters inrecognition of the Council President’s half-century contribu-tion to the development of international civil aviation, andwas followed by a reception attended by Prince Philip.

During his stay in London, Dr. Kotaite met with theSecretary of State for Transport of the United Kingdom, theDirector General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and other high-levelofficials from the Department of Transport. Discussions withthe U.K. authorities focused mainly on the DGCA conferenceon aviation safety to be held at ICAO in March 2006 (seeaccompanying article, page 25), and on the progressive inte-gration of the Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP)into ICAO’s regular programme budget. Also discussed werestrategies for implementing remedial action for safety- andsecurity-related deficiencies around the world, a subject thatit was agreed should be considered by the forthcomingDGCA conference and the next ordinary session of the ICAOAssembly in 2007.

While in the United Kingdom, Dr. Kotaite also participated inmeetings of the Aviation Study Group of Oxford University’sLinacre College at the Royal Air Force Club on 20 October andat the Royal Aeronautical Society on 21 October.

Dr. Kotaite accepts the John Harrison Award from His RoyalHighness Prince Philip in London on 19 October. The award wasbestowed on Dr. Kotaite by the International Association ofInstitutes of Navigation (IAIN) in recognition of the Council Pre-sident’s half-century contribution to the development of internation-al civil aviation. ■■

28 ICAO JOURNAL

ICAO Council appointmentAmbassador Jean-Christophe Chouvethas been appointed Representative ofFrance on the Council of ICAO. Histenure commenced on 21 September2005.

Mr. Chouvet has pursued studies atthe Institut d’Études Politiques in Parisand the École Nationale d’Administra-tion, and holds a Diploma of AdvancedStudies specializing in monetary andbanking economics.

In 1980, Mr. Chouvet joined theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of France, where he held positionsof increasing responsibility. In 1988, he was appointed DeputyDirector for Human Rights at the Ministry’s Department ofLegal Affairs. Other positions held by Mr. Chouvet includethose of Deputy Director of the Office of the Minister ofForeign Trade; Director of the Office of the Minister Delegateof Trade and the Craft Industries; and Inspector of ForeignAffairs. In 1997, Mr. Chouvet was appointed to the post ofDiplomatic Adviser to the President of the National Assembly.Prior to his most recent appointment, he served as theDeputy Director of Economic and Financial Affairs of theMinistry of Foreign Affairs, and as Policy Officer for NewInformation and Communication Technologies.

Mr. Chouvet is an alumnus of the École Nationaled’Administration (“Voltaire” Class of 1980) and a Chevalier ofthe National Order of Merit. ■■

J.-C. Chouvet(France)

ICAO Council appointmentOlumuyiwa Benard Aliu was appoint-ed the Representative of Nigeria onthe Council of ICAO in January 2005.

A Doctor of Technical Sciences spe-cializing in aeronautics, Dr. Aliu hasover the course of his career receivedtraining in several aviation disciplinesin a number of academic and industri-al institutes in Nigeria as well as inCanada, Egypt and several countriesin Europe. He commenced his aviationtraining at the then Kyiv Institute of

Civil Engineers (since renamed the Kyiv InternationalUniversity of Civil Aviation), where he graduated with a Masterof Science degree in aeronautical engineering. Dr. Aliuacquired a doctorate in 1987. He also obtained an aircraftmaintenance engineer licence, with airframe and engine rat-ings on several aircraft types.

Dr. Aliu’s professional experience includes several yearswith the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA), where heheld positions of increasing responsibility in safety oversightand economic regulation. He played an active role in thedevelopment of the NCAA’s Department of Air Transport. AsDirector, Air Transport Regulation, he coordinated activities inthe regulation of air transport, licensing and economic policy,domestic and international operations, and the negotiation ofbilateral and multilateral agreements. He was also assignedthe role of Acting Director General of the Nigerian CAA onseveral occasions, and has also served as a technical advis-er/assistant to the Minister of Civil Aviation.

Dr. Aliu has participated in many international air transportconferences and seminars, and was a member of the NigerianDelegation to the last three regular sessions of the ICAOAssembly. ■■

Dr. O.B. Aliu(Nigeria)

Large-scale technical cooperationprojects under wayNew large-scale technical cooperation projects are beingimplemented by ICAO in Egypt and Guatemala, and severalongoing projects have been allocated additional funding.

Valued at $600,000 (all financial figures in U.S. dollars), thenew project in Egypt is aimed at updating and upgradingtraining standards at the National Civil Aviation TrainingOrganization (NCATO). The project, funded entirely by theGovernment of Egypt, has an expected duration of one year.The preparatory phase has been finalized and project opera-tions are scheduled to begin in January 2006.

A project in Guatemala to modernize La Aurora InternationalAirport commenced in 2005 for a two-year period with morethan $38.5 million in funding. Funded entirely by theGovernment of Guatemala, the project entails construction ofa taxiway, ramp and landside roads; the enlargement andmodernization of the international terminal building; relocationand remodelling of hangars and the cargo terminal; and tech-nical assistance in the preparation of a master plan, new aero-nautical laws and procurement of equipment.

Major ongoing technical cooperation projects that havebeen allocated new funding include two projects in Argentinaconcerned respectively with human resources and imple-mentation of communications, navigation and surveillance(CNS) services, with newly approved funding of $2.8 millioneach; updating of installations and services at the TocumenInternational Airport in Panama City, Panama, with more than$1.9 million in additional funds; a project to improve search

Panel proposes amendments relatedto data link applicationsThe first meeting of the ICAO Operational Data Link Panel(OPLINKP), formerly known as the Automatic DependentSurveillance Panel, assessed ongoing data link trials andfinalized material that will assist in the implementation of airtraffic services (ATS) data link applications.

The meeting, held at ICAO headquarters from 12 to 23September, drafted proposals for the amendment of a varietyof ICAO annexes and the Procedures for Air NavigationServices (PANS), as well as completing complementary guid-ance material. The amendments proposed by the panel con-cern a number of data link applications, with particularemphasis on ATS interfacility data communications (AIDC),automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) andcontroller-pilot data link communications (CPDLC).

The panel also completed development of suitable provi-sions relating to the use of required communication perform-ance (RCP) in the provision of air traffic services. The ICAOAir Navigation Commission is scheduled to review the panel’sreport early in the new year.

The OPLINKP meeting was attended by experts from 12 States and three international organizations. ■■

NUMBER 6, 2005 29

ICAO’s business plancontinued from page 5

ICAO standards and recommended practices (SARPs), train-ing, performance monitoring, and providing assistance toStates. The sharpened focus could come at the expense of otherICAO activities, if necessary — in this case, in all likelihood, thedevelopment of new SARPs.

Looking more closely at safety objectives, the business planputs the accent on results, and not necessarily on conducting tra-ditional activities that can contribute to safety. In distinguishingthe more important priorities related to USOAP, for instance, theplan stresses the actual outcome of safety oversight audits andnot simply their completion. The goal is to achieve greater com-pliance with ICAO standards worldwide. This results-orientedapproach reflects the unified safety strategy adopted by ICAO atits 35th Assembly. Similarly, the business plan puts the onus onresults in terms of ICAO’s various other activities.

The business plan is important, from a safety standpoint, ifonly because it recognizes that it may not be realistic to achieveall objectives, no matter how laudable, but that it is possible todefine safety priorities and allocate resources accordingly. Thisis the framework needed for addressing the issues of greatestconcern and for implementing solutions that produce the great-est benefits. Where safety is concerned, the business planoffers the kind of perspective necessary to identify the rootcauses that underlie safety lapses, rather than their variedsymptoms. It places the emphasis on achieving results byaddressing these root causes.

As with any business plan, which tends to rely on the avail-ability of good data, ICAO’s decisions about safety priorities willbe based largely on the safety information at hand. Thisreliance underscores the need to collect quality data from theworld’s air transport industry.

In the world of air transport, a business plan serves as thefoundation for a safety management system. Similarly, ICAO’sbusiness plan contributes to safety by focusing on priorities andresponding to changing times, in this case highlighting theneed to ensure the effective regulatory oversight of a chal-lenged, but rapidly growing, air transport industry. ■■

Transition to halon alternativescontinued from page 8

Action plan. The current understanding of the status ofhalon supplies indicates that the time available for making thetransition to halon alternatives may be much less than airlinesrealize. Thus, to avert a situation where aircraft are groundedbecause halons are unavailable, a plan of action by regulatoryauthorities is necessary to ensure that the industry can main-tain a safe environment for the flying public. To this end, theparties to the Montreal Protocol have requested that their tech-nical advisers cooperate with ICAO on developing an actionplan for the aviation sector. The following course of action hasbeen recommended and agreed to by the parties:• the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)Halons Technical Options Committee (HTOC) will use itsexpertise to make a best estimate of the available halon supply,costs, and current emissions rate. These data will be given toICAO for distribution to its member States;• ICAO will issue a State Letter to member States in 2006, invit-ing them to require the use of proven alternatives in new air-craft designs to the extent practicable;• the ICAO Secretariat will introduce an ICAO/HTOC workingpaper on the subject of phasing out halons at the next regular

and rescue services in African Civil Aviation Commission(AFCAC) member States with more than $844,500 in newfunding; a project to carry out European geostationary navi-gation overlay service (EGNOS) trials in the Caribbean andSouth American region, with additional funding of $557,000(with the goal of developing tests and studies to assess thetechnical and operational benefits that the satellite-basedaugmentation test system can bring to the region); and a proj-ect in Saudi Arabia focused on strengthening the capacity ofthe Presidency of Civil Aviation that has been extended byone year with an additional $6.7 million in funding. ■■

Contingency plancontinued from page 9

primary method of preventing, or delaying, a global outbreak ofhuman influenza is to quickly identify emergence of a virusstrain capable of efficient transmission between humans andthen rapidly introduce effective containment measures in theaffected region.

Proposed measures involve quarantining those affected andanyone who has been in contact with an affected person, whileisolating the region where the outbreak occurred. At the sametime, the general population in and around the affected regionwould be provided with antiviral drugs (e.g. “Tamiflu”) for aperiod of some weeks as a preventive measure. By this means,the spread of a local outbreak could be delayed, providing sometime to develop a specific vaccine. Such a strategy criticallydepends on good disease surveillance and rapid deployment ofcontainment measures, both of which might be difficult inmany parts of the world where an outbreak is likely.

Where specific aviation measures are concerned, during theSARS outbreak in 2003 airport screening of passengers proba-bly contributed to the successful control of the disease.However, influenza behaves differently from SARS, and it is notcertain how effective screening would be. An individual infect-ed with the influenza virus may be contagious 24 hours afterbeing infected, a condition that can last for 48 hours beforesymptoms, including fever, appear. With SARS, symptomsappear at around the time the patient becomes contagious, soaffected individuals can be more effectively identified by use oftemperature measurement. ICAO and other concerned organi-zations continue to work with the WHO to define the mosteffective response at international airports affected by aninfluenza outbreak.

The plan developed by ICAO for combating SARS was veryuseful. For the first time, airports and the wider aviation indus-try considered how to deal with an outbreak of a contagious dis-ease, and many of the procedures outlined are helpful in defin-ing an approach to future outbreaks. The current threat fromhighly pathogenic human influenza may not be directly analo-gous to that of SARS, but the work done in 2003, combined withcurrent efforts, should provide a solid foundation on which tobase a generic preparedness plan for aviation for any foresee-able future pandemic. ■■

30 ICAO JOURNAL

Essential air servicescontinued from page 14

by the service, plus a reasonable profit for the employment ofcapital. In the interests of good governance and transparency,the requested compensation amount and the reimbursementneed to be thoroughly assessed. The risks of overcompensationand inefficiency resulting from allocation of common or jointcosts to more than one route could be partially mitigated byattracting a sufficient number of potential bidders to an auction.

Sources of financing. Having called for a tender, the Stateshould have prime responsibility for securing the funds neededfor paying subsidies. The issue of the kind of taxes that couldbe levied to help finance subsidies has to be examined careful-ly, with the goal of minimizing the distortion of the nationaleconomy. If the State faces budgetary constraints or othernational spending priorities, it would need to arrange for finan-cial support from outside bodies. Among examples are bilater-al aid from the other party of the air services agreement andthird-party aid from international agencies. A pragmatic way tosupplement public financing would be to form a public-privatepartnership by bringing together national and local govern-ments (with the open participation of other interested States),tourism entities, local businesses, airports and airlines.

Supplementary options. Subsidizing air services may not besufficient for route development, which might be achievedmore effectively if an ESTDR scheme is organized strategicallyas one part of an integrated package. There are two types ofmeasures for supplementing an ESTDR scheme. One, a supply-side measure, is a way of sharing the financial risk of a newservice with an airline by giving various kinds of indirect subsi-dies and incentives to the air carrier, thereby reducing its oper-ating cost and raising the profile of the destination. The other isa demand-side measure, such as promotional and marketingactivities and the provision of incentives for tourism entities,thereby breaking the “chicken-and-egg” dilemma facing avia-tion and tourism development and generating sufficientinbound traffic for the route’s long-term viability. Any supple-mentary measure, however, should be governed by the sameconditions and principles as those applied to an ESTDR schemebecause of the potential for distortion of the market.

Interrelated elements. The seven pillars that constitute anESTDR scheme are interrelated and have a degree of iteration.For example, the specification of adequacy (the second pillar)affects the second stage of the route selection test (the first pil-

ICAO Council appointmentDaniel Oscar Valente has beenappointed Representative of Argentinaon the Council of ICAO. Mr. Valente’stenure commenced on 1 August 2005.

A graduate of the Military AviationSchool, Mr. Valente holds an air trans-port pilot licence and flight instructorrating. His flying career encompassesboth military and civil activity, includ-ing experience as a test pilot. He hasalso served as an air navigation aidsinspector.

Mr. Valente trained in managerial and educational fields atthe Advanced School of Air Warfare in Argentina, and alsotrained at the U.S. Air Force’s Air University and the NavalPostgraduate School in the United States. He has attendedcourses at the National Institute of Air and Space Law inArgentina and studied for a master’s degree in internationalrelations at the National University of La Plata. Mr. Valentereceived a Bachelor’s Degree in air and airspace systemsfrom the Aeronautical University Institute.

In the civil aviation field, Mr. Valente served as Head of theOperations Division in the Air Regions Command, a postinvolving matters related to aviation safety and security.Concurrently, he was involved in the process of awarding air-port concessions in Argentina, and also worked as a civil avi-ation duties inspector and airline inspector.

Mr. Valente played a role in creating the Aircraft FireFighting and Rescue Training Centre in Argentina, and indeveloping and managing the institutional evaluation processfor education in the Air Force.

Mr. Valente has been an instructor at military trainingschools and a professor at the Aeronautical UniversityInstitute in his country, where he served on the board thatdrafted the university’s statutes. He has published a numberof articles in the Spanish and Portuguese editions of the AirPower Journal. ■■

D.O. Valente(Argentina)

only in the lavatory fire extinguishing systems of certain Airbusaircraft, which is a poor reflection on the extensive research andtesting efforts that have been expended on aviation applicationsto date.

The aviation industry should be encouraged by regulators tofollow the lead of other user communities which have had simi-lar difficult problems to overcome, but which, nonetheless, havesuccessfully moved away from halons by maintaining existinghalon systems (thus retaining that initial equipment invest-ment) and adopting halon alternatives in all new installations. Acommitment to a plan of action that persuades the aviation sec-tor to transition away from halons safely and smoothly wouldserve the best interests of airlines, the public, and the globalenvironment. ■■

session of the ICAO Assembly in 2007; and• if the ICAO Assembly endorses the working paper’s recom-mendation to use alternatives in new aircraft designs wherepracticable, States will then be required to use halon alterna-tives for identified applications in new airframe designs firstcertificated on or after 1 January 2009.

Conclusions. The airline industry is still heavily dependenton halons for its fire suppression needs. Given the anticipatedlifespan of commercial aircraft, this situation is likely to contin-ue well beyond the day when existing recycled halon stocksexpire. This is a major cause for concern.

Halon alternatives in almost all civil aviation applicationshave passed tests based on the relevant minimum performancestandards. However, the timing of the inclusion of these halonalternatives in new aircraft designs remains uncertain, andunless the processes of designing, conforming, qualifying andcertifying new extinguishing systems on commercial aircraftare made a priority by the approval authorities — and expedit-ed accordingly — they will represent significant barriers to thetransition away from halons. Currently, alternatives are used

NUMBER 6, 2005 31

Secondly, an ESTDR scheme would encourage debate on theissue of State aid and subsidies, a debate that would focus onthe merits of State support for the provision of specific servicesinstead of specific air carriers. It is widely acknowledged thatgeneric direct subsidies for airlines on the basis of their finan-cial needs as a whole, and implicit subsidies in the form ofcross-subsidization among routes, are unlikely to stimulate eco-nomic efficiency. Such assistance is usually not transparent andmay not be compatible with the increasingly competitive mar-ketplace. The proposed ESTDR scheme could eventuallyreplace such generic and implicit support for airlines with tar-get direct subsidies on a route-by-route basis, thus enablingStates to take a more efficient and transparent approach to thequestion of airline support. ■■

lar) because the level of frequency and capacity affects demandand the airline’s cost on the route concerned. In addition, sup-plementary measures (the seventh pillar) could indirectly con-tribute to reducing an airline’s operating costs, thus lesseningthe State’s financial burden for payment of subsidies (the fifthpillar) in the longer run. In order to understand the complexinterdependencies of the seven pillars, and to make economiccases for a quantitative assessment, one requires a soundknowledge of basic economic theories as well as expertise ofroute and network planning.

In addition to the seven pillars, the study examined possibleregulatory arrangements for implementing an ESTDR scheme.The simplest approach is to implement the scheme unilaterallythrough national laws, rules and/or regulations, but in a“reduced” form that neither guarantees a monopoly operationnor imposes restrictions on elements such as flight frequency,capacity, and/or tariffs offered by airlines of the other States. Aunilateral approach may be the most feasible in practical terms,because it enables an individual country to implement thescheme fairly quickly at a single stroke.

A more complex approach is to conclude a special clause foran ESTDR scheme under a bilateral, regional or plurilateral airservices agreement between the States concerned. By takingthis approach, a State could implement the scheme in its “full-scale” form, which could give legal certainty to restrictions inthe form of market access, frequency, capacity, number of des-ignated airlines, and tariffs. The study developed a modelannex on essential service and tourism development routeswhich can be used in air services agreements at the discretionof States.

Implementation of the scheme, where applicable, is leftentirely in the hands of States. It requires coordination betweenauthorities if used bilaterally or multilaterally, as well as elabo-ration of the objectives, criteria and procedures which would beneeded to ensure a high degree of transparency, and willing-ness at a policy level to take up an EAS concept internationally.

Conclusion. Growing and widespread liberalization, privati-zation and globalization call for regulatory change with respectto State assistance for international airline operations. This isespecially the case where air services need to be preservedbecause of socio-economic needs, but are threatened by weakfinancial prospects and commercial uncertainty. An ESTDRscheme provides an efficient regulatory means of assuringservice to particular destinations. It also optimizes the benefitsof air services for economic and social transformation wheresuch services simply could not be supported by market forcesalone. For least developed countries, the use of this schemecould plug them into tourism development through aviation,and generate even broader economic benefits than the publicservice objective.

Moreover, an ESTDR scheme has two potential positiveeffects. First, the scheme could support and even promote lib-eralization by attracting widespread support for such an initia-tive. Concerns about continued participation in international airtransport may result in the reluctance of some States toembrace the liberalization process. The scheme — whichwould work as a safeguard for the assurance of international airservices — may help to alleviate these concerns, and could actas an incentive in the negotiation of liberalized air servicesagreements.

Emergency and abnormal situationscontinued from page 18

of emphasis placed on crews strictly completing all relevantnon-normal checklists; and (4) how workload is distributed onthe flight deck during an emergency. The implications thesephilosophies have for checklist design and response to emer-gencies is explored further below.

Checklist and procedure design. The preceding review ofsafety issues within six interrelated areas provides a context forconsidering the design of checklists and procedures that guideand direct crew responses.

It is, of course, impossible to develop procedures and check-

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32 ICAO JOURNAL

3. The EAS study is funded through NASA’s Aviation Safety Programme. Moreinformation about EAS can be found at http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/eas.

lists for every possible situation. If this were somehow possible,the quick reference handbook (QRH) that contains them (inpaper form) would be so large that finding the proper checklist,or remembering it even existed, would be exceedingly difficult.However, checklists and procedures should exist for emer-gency or abnormal situations that are common or that can bereasonably predicted. As one ASRS reporter observed, “Therewas no checklist in the aircraft or company publications thataddressed a ‘landing gear cannot be retracted’ scenario. Hadthere been one, the problem may have been easily rectified.”

Checklists and procedures must also include all of the neces-sary steps or information required to respond appropriately,and they must be consistent with guidance given to crews inother documents. For example, in an ASRS report a pilotdescribed how a checklist had been consulted in response to analert that occurred during taxi-out. The checklist identified thealert as a maintenance item with no flight-related conse-quences. However, the minimum equipment list (MEL) identi-fied the same alert as a “no take-off” item, which the crew didnot discover until after taking off.

Human performance capabilities and limitations under highstress and workload should also influence the design and con-tent of emergency and abnormal checklists and procedures.Obviously, attention should be given to the wording, organiza-tion and structure of these checklists to ensure that directionsand information are complete, clear, and easy to follow andunderstand, as the following report excerpt highlights. “I calledfor the QRH for the loss of hydraulic pressure. While the cap-tain read the QRH procedure, he was having some difficultyidentifying the exact nature of the failure as well as the propercorrective action. While attempting to help the Captain with theQRH, I missed the 11,000 foot crossing restriction ... The QRH[for this aircraft] is a bit confusing in places and actually con-tains mistakes.”

There are a number of dilemmas facing checklist designerswith regard to human capabilities and limitations, however. Forexample, some highly time-critical situations may require thatcrews complete some actions from memory, without referenceto a printed checklist. Under stress, however, normally reliablememory processes can fail. Which items on a checklistabsolutely must be performed by memory, if any, and whichshould or could be performed by reference to a printed check-list? Definitive answers are unknown but several airlines andsome manufacturers are revising their procedures to minimizethe use of checklist memory items.

The need to navigate within a checklist, or to switch between

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checklists, can also be problematic. It is easy to lose one’s placeor jump to the wrong item or checklist when dealing with themany distractions, interruptions, and competing demands thattypically occur during these situations. At the same time, tryingto integrate all the information needed from multiple checklistsinto a single checklist may make the procedure quite lengthyand difficult to follow.

Electronic checklists may resolve a number of the difficultiesassociated with paper checklists. Sensors located throughout anaircraft can be linked to some types of electronic checklists,thus allowing the exact checklist for a particular condition to bedisplayed automatically. Because less time is needed to accessthe checklist, the number of memory items needed may bereduced. Linking within, and between, checklists can sendpilots to the correct branch of items or proper additional check-lists when jumping is required, reducing the likelihood ofchecklist navigation errors. Even with the advantages of elec-tronic checklists, however, other obstacles remain, such as dif-ficulty in locating a checklist that cannot be displayed automati-cally. Also, economic realities may constrain many companiesfrom making a shift from paper to electronic checklists.

The design and content of emergency and abnormal check-lists are inextricably linked to how well they function and howpilots use them. At an international symposium on emergencyand abnormal situations in aviation, sponsored by the NASAAmes Research Center in June 2003, Capt. Bill Jones, of the AirLine Pilots Association International, likened an emergency orabnormal checklist to a parachute. To paraphrase, rarely does amilitary pilot pack his or her own parachute; instead, a para-chute packer is relied upon to do the job with precision and skill.The pilot fervently hopes to never need to use the parachute,but if it is required, it must work as intended and may be theonly thing between the pilot and death. Likewise, emergencyand abnormal checklists must be developed with precision andskill. Pilots hope that they are never needed, but when they arenecessary, they must function as intended, and may be indis-pensable in helping to avert catastrophe.

Need for research effort. Clearly, many factors affect howcrews respond to emergency and abnormal situations and howwell those situations are resolved. This article provides anoverview of the many (but not all) broad issues raised by non-normal situations, but does not address many details of theseissues, nor does it provide solutions for the dilemmas identified.A major research effort is required to do that. To that end, ateam of researchers in the Human Factors Research andTechnology Division at NASA Ames Research Center has beenworking to better understand the issues in managing emer-gency and abnormal situations.

The overriding goal of the Emergency and AbnormalSituations (EAS) Study3 is to develop guidance for procedureand checklist development and certification, training, crewcoordination, and situation management, drawing on knowl-edge of the operational environment, human performance limi-tations and capabilities, and cognitive vulnerabilities in real-world emergency and abnormal situations. By laying a founda-tion for establishing best practices, safety specialists hope toprevent the emergency and abnormal situations of tomorrowfrom becoming accidents. ■■

NUMBER 6, 2005 33

were lubricated to varying degrees during scheduled mainte-nance and at wheel and brake replacement. These proceduresranged from lubrication of selected points on the bogies (e.g.after a brake/wheel change or post-landing gear wash) to theentire landing gear lubrication procedure carried out duringheavier scheduled maintenance. The operator followed themanufacturer’s lubrication procedures, which listed four differ-ent types of grease to be used on the landing gears.

Although the manufacturer’s procedures contained diagramsthat clearly showed the locations to apply the appropriate lubri-cant, maintenance personnel worked from the operator’s worksheets that give general details of components to lubricate, allmaterials to be used and a reference to the manufacturer’smaintenance manual (for access to the lubrication diagrams),requiring personnel to independently obtain the relevant draw-ings. Both the aircraft manufacturer’s and the operator’s main-tenance procedures included the instruction to wipe away anyexcess grease after lubrication had been carried out.

Both Aeroshell 33 and Aeroshell 22 grease had been suppliedto the operator in large tins that were identical in colour. Afterthe accident, however, the operator changed procedures toensure that Aeroshell 33 grease was obtained in clearly markedcartridges.

Examination of the deflated slide. The over-wing escape slideR3 deflated after the slide had been used by a number of pas-sengers. Video evidence established that the slide deflated 32seconds after inflation.

Macroscopic and microscopic examination of the site of tear

Accident reportcontinued from page 22

During the evacuation, one flight crew member and threepassengers were seriously injured. The most serious injuryoccurred when the over-wing slide at Door 3 Right (R3) deflat-ed with a passenger seated on the slide. Landing heavily on thetarmac, the passenger received a fractured vertebra thatrequired surgery. A further four passengers and one cabincrew member were treated for minor injuries.

Three fires broke out. A brake fire occurred on the number 13wheel — the forward left wheel on the right-wing landing gear— with flames rising 20 centimetres above the top of the tireand giving off a substantial amount of smoke. An additional twobrake fires ignited on the right body landing gear, one of whichwas extinguished by the Aerodrome Rescue and Fire FightingService [the two other fires burned themselves out].

Landing gear examination. An examination of the axles afterwheels 9 and 13 were removed revealed the presence of thecorrect Aeroshell 22 grease and a green-blue grease later iden-tified as Aeroshell 33 [a general purpose grease]. Although notrecommended for use in the high temperature axle area as ithad a lower flashpoint than the approved Aeroshell 22 grease,Aeroshell 33 was an approved lubricant for other areas of thelanding gear. The Aeroshell 33 grease was most predominanton the inboard area of the axle, with the correct Aeroshell 22grease visible toward the axle’s outer region.

Operator’s maintenance practices. The aircraft’s landing gears

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Brake fire occurrencescontinued from page 22

curfew period, with a tailwind component of eight knots. Thelanding and deceleration were normal and idle reverse thrustwas used. The fire occurred on wheel number 11, which had abrake temperature indication of five. On that occasion, the fireself-extinguished before ground crew could apply an extin-guisher. Examination of the landing gear revealed the presenceof Aeroshell 33 grease and an excessive amount of greasearound the wheel and brake unit. The brake unit was found tobe worn and towards the end of its serviceable life.

After the incident on 3 July, the operator conducted a surveyof its Boeing 747 fleet to examine the landing gear axles forsigns of incorrect grease application and the presence of exces-sive amounts of grease. After examining 12 aircraft, the opera-tor found two aircraft (the subject accident aircraft and the air-craft from 3 July) that had both incorrect type and excessivegrease present. One other aircraft showed signs of excessivegrease, with no other aircraft in its fleet displaying evidence ofAeroshell 33 on the axles.

As a result, the operator issued a maintenance memo high-lighting the precautions to be taken when lubricating wheel andbrake assemblies. The memo also provided a warning in regardto the use of incorrect Aeroshell 33 grease on axles. ■■

1.The inadvertent deselection of reverse thrust.2.The undetected deselection of reverse thrust.3.The decision to utilize Taxiway Golf to minimize the taxi dis-tance led to the requirement for additional manual braking dur-ing the latter part of the landing roll.

Significant factors with respect to the brake fire:1. Incorrect grease of a lower flash point was applied to thelanding gear axles during maintenance.2.Excessive amounts of grease were present on landing gearwheels and brake voids.3.The worn brake units generated a higher peak temperatureover a short time frame.4. Inadvertent deselection of reverse thrust during the landingroll resulted in increased auto-brake and manual brake applications.5. Use of Runway 34L and Taxiway Golf minimized the taxi distanceto the terminal, reducing the effective brake unit cooling time.

Significant factors with respect to the evacuation and slidefailure:1.Passengers standing in the aisles with cabin baggage at thetime of the evacuation announcement caused congestion.2.A number of passengers evacuated down the slide in posses-sion of their cabin baggage and personal belongings.3.During passenger evacuation the R3 slide sustained an over-load failure of its fabric fibres when punctured by a blunt-edgedobject.4.The use of the over-wing slides during the evacuation pre-sented passengers with the potential hazard of being placed inclose proximity to the fire source.

Recommendations. As a result of the investigation, theAustralian Transport Safety Bureau recommended a review ofthe procedures for the deployment of over-wing slides duringknown brake fire situations. The ATSB recommendations wereaddressed to the operator and to the Australian Civil AviationSafety Authority. ■■

initiation revealed that the fabric of the central tube had beenabraded over a short distance on the upper side of the longitu-dinal and transverse tear junction prior to the initiation of fabrictearing and pressure release. This surface abrasion is consis-tent with sliding contact between the slide and a blunt-edgedobject in the direction of sliding from the wing to the ground.

Conclusions. Among findings related to the aircraft werethe following:• A “BRAKE TEMP” advisory message on the right body land-ing gear was indicated after the aircraft parked at the terminal.• A fire ignited on the right wing landing gear, followed by twofurther fires on the right body landing gear.• The brake units associated with the fires were found to beworn, but within serviceable limits.• The presence of an incorrect grease was found on all of themain landing gear axles.• Excessive amounts of grease were observed around thewheels and brake units of all the landing gears.• The maintenance equipment used to lubricate the landinggear was not clearly labelled to identify the different types ofgrease they contained.• During the evacuation, three aircraft doors were opened inthe disarmed mode.• Failure of the R3 slide was considered to be due to overloadof the fabric fibres.

Among findings related to the flight crew were:• The crew assessed the weather conditions to be within oper-ational limits for landing.• An appropriate auto-brake selection was made.• The PIC advised “idle reverse thrust only” requirement andplaced his hand over the co-pilot’s on the thrust reverser controls.• Inadvertent deselection of reverse thrust occurred duringthe landing roll.• None of the flight crew noticed the deselection of reverse thrust.• Application of manual braking was required to exit the run-way at Taxiway Golf.• The flight crew observed a hot brake indication and report-ed it to the ground crew.• On receiving confirmation of a brake fire, the PIC initiated anevacuation.• The flight crew did not advise the cabin crew of the nature ofthe emergency when the evacuation was announced.• The co-pilot was injured while evacuating down the right upperdeck slide while carrying a three kilogram fire extinguisher.

Among the findings related to the cabin crew were:• Some cabin crew members did not control passengers leav-ing their seats while the seat-belt signs were illuminated.• Some passengers were not prevented from evacuating withcabin baggage.• The cabin crew did not evacuate the aircraft to assist the pas-sengers on the ground.

Findings related to the aircraft maintenance engineers andother ground staff:• Poor or inadequate maintenance practices during lubrication ofthe landing gear resulted in the presence of incorrect and exces-sive amounts of grease on the landing gear wheels and brakes.• There was no training provided to the ground staff for air-craft emergency evacuation situations at airport terminals.

Significant factors. Significant factors identified withrespect to flight crew actions were:

IN THESPOTLIGHT ...

MONTREAL CONVENTION RATIFICATIONSwitzerland deposited its instrument of ratification of theMontreal Convention of 1999 during a brief ceremony atICAO headquarters on 7 July 2005, bringing the number of parties to the Convention, which entered into force on 4 November 2003, to 66. Shown on the occasion are (l-r):Laurent Noël, Legal and International Affairs, Federal Officeof Civil Aviation (FOCA), Switzerland; Matthias Suhr, GeneralSecretary and Member of the Board, FOCA; and DenysWibaux, Director of the ICAO Legal Bureau.

RATIFICATION BY COSTA RICACosta Rica deposited its instrument of ratification of the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives during a brief ceremony at ICAO headquarters on 12 July 2005. Shown on the occasion are (l-r): Paola Porras Pastrana, Consul, Consulate of Costa Rica in Montreal; Carlos Miranda, Ambassador of CostaRica in Ottawa; ICAO Secretary General Dr. Taïeb Chérif; and Denys Wibaux, Director of the ICAO Legal Bureau.

SAFETY SEMINAR IN MOSCOWICAO conducted a seminar on runway safety and air traffic services (ATS) safetymanagement in Moscow from 12 to 15 September 2005. The event, sponsoredjointly with the Federal Authority for Transport Oversight (FATO), was attendedby 128 participants from 23 States and six international organizations. Theseminar brought to an end a three-year campaign to promote awareness of runway safety — specifically the prevention of runway incursions — as well asATS safety management through seminars conducted in all seven ICAO regions.

WORKSHOP IN LIMAA workshop on forecasting and economic planning was conducted byICAO in Lima, Peru from 5 to 9 September 2005. The regional workshop,designed for countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, was attendedby 29 participants from seven States and two international organizations.The workshop focused on forecasting methods, CNS/ATM implementationeconomics and business case development, airport and air navigationplanning, future prospects for the region, and other economic and planning issues.

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2001 v60no6 ANGb - icao.int

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