2001: The Centenary Election

Edited by

John Warhurst and Marian Simms

C a r s e l d i n c A227843148 2 0 0 1 : t h e c e n t e n a r y e l e c t i o n

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Series Editor &chard Nile

University of Queensland Press in association with the API Network and Curtin University of Technology

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First published in 2002 by the University of Queensland Press PO Box 6042 STLUCIA QLD 4067 mw.uqp.uq.edu.au

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National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry.

2001: The Centenary Election.

Bibliography. Includes index.

1. Australia. Parliament - Elections, 2001. 2. Elections - Australia. I. Warhurst, John, 1948- . 11. Simms, Marion.

324.994 ISBN 0 7022 3303 X,

Contents

Tables Figures Abbreviations Contributors Foreword

Part 1: The Campaign

1 Introduction John Warhurst and Marian Siiiiins

2 International versus domestic issues: The elections for the House of Representatives and the Senate John Warhurst

3 The leadership contest David A d a m

4 The 2001 election campaign: The ideological context Carol Johnson

5 Two men and some boats: The cartoonists in 2001 Haydon Manning and Robert Phiddian

G Turning points: For whom the polls told Murray Goot

7 The media and the 2001 election: Afghans, asylum seekers and anthrax Marian Siinins

8 Reflections Rodney Cavalier

viii xi

xii xiv

xvii

1

9

19

33

41

63

93

105

Contents V i

Part 2 The Parties’ Perspectives

9 The Liberal Party Lynton Crosby

10 The Australian Labor Party Geoff Walsh

11 The National Party campaign Gaye Mluite

12 The Australian Democrats Andrew Bartlett

13 The Greens: The success story of the election Ben Oquist

14 Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Frank Hough

Part 3: States and Regions

15 New South Wales Elaine Thompson

16 Victoria: Flawed jewel in the Labor crown? Nick Economou and Brian Costar

17 Queensland Rae Wear and Ian Ward

18 Western Australia Narelle Miragliotta and Campbell Shaxman

19 South Australia and the Northern Territory Dean Jaensch

20 Tasmania Tony McCall and Marcus Haward

115

125

135

139

145

151

155

171

185

197

203

215

Contetzts V i i

21 Australian Capital Territory Malcolm Mackerras

Part 4: Interests and Issues

22 Business Gwynneth Singleton

223

229

23 Industtial Relations: The Coalition, Labor and the unions 237 I-Iaydon Manning

24 Rural and regional interests: The demise of the rural revolt? 245 Jennifer Curtin and Dennis Woodward

25 In safe hands? Women in the 2001 election Marian Sawer

Part 5: Interpreting the Results

26 Ethnicity and immigration James Jupp

253

261

27 From impossibility to certainty: Explaining the Coalition's 271 victory in 2001 Clive Bean and Ian McAllister '

28 Results Malcolm Mackerras

Notes Bibliography Index

287

319 323 345

Chapter Twent y-S even

From impossibility to certainty: Explaining the Coalition's victory

in 2001

Clive Bean and Ian McAUister

six r ~ ~ o n t l i s beforc tlie Noveinber 2001 federal election, victory for the i l ~ c u m l ~ c n i Coalition Governnient looked to be a near impossibility. By the time lhc election was announced and the campaign began in early October, victory ! ( ~ k c d to hc a ncar cettainty. hdversc reaction to five years of unpopular social i u ~ d econntnic policies wliicli had seen the Government trdl by as much as 1O?h 01' ~ i ~ o t ' e in thc opinion polls in the first half of the year (see, for example, .# h/.rhdi~i//, 8 May 2001), turned after the 11 Septeinber terrorist attacks on the I I n i tcd S t ~ t e s and the debate over refugees and asylum seekers surrounding the Norwcgiai ship, M TY Tuqptl, into a stunning example of the way in which clectoratcs rally in support of incuinbent Governments in umes of external 1hi.cat (Kcgley and Wittltopf 1996, 276-8).

'l'his chaptcr uses data froin the 2001 Australian Election Study (AES), cotirluctcd hp Clive Bean, David Gow and Ian Mchllister (Bean, Gow and MchlIistct 2002) to investigate political attitudes and voting behaviour in die c1cciir.m. 'I'hc study was funded by tlie Australian Research Council and invc)lvecl R narional survey of political attitudes and behaviour using a self- CO iiiplciitrn questionnaire inailed to respondents so that most would receive it c ) i i die Mondny following the 10 November election. The sample was a

systcmaiic random sample of enrolled voters throughout Australia, drawn by 111 c r\usvalian Electoral Commission. Non-respondents were scnt several rr )Ilc )w-up mailings, including two further copies of the questionnaire, and the Ihal satiipk size was 2010, representing a response rate of 55'/0.

272 Clive Bean and Iatt Mulllister

Orientations towards the election campaign

Given the varying path that the approach to the election took, it is of interest - to consider whether public focus on the election campaign as such better reflected the more cynical tone of an electorate disenchantcd with a Government in its third term evidcnt early in the year or the more sL1pportive tone that appeared to emerge in September and October. Table 27.1 suggests more of the former than t he latter. The 1996 federal election campaign had been notable for its low intensity, especially compared to that of 1993 Pean and McAllister 1997), but the 2001 campaign aroused similarly low public engagement and if anything even less, Only 31% of the AES sarnplc claimed to have taken a good deal of interest in the 2001 campaign, compared with 34% in 1996 and a slightly higher 38% in 1998. The proportions paying a good dcal or some attention to the campaign in newspapers, television and radio again suggest slightly less interest than 1996 and substantially less than in 1998. In all three elections, the relative attention to the three main mass media stays the same: television comes first followed by die press and then radio.

The AES also asked respondents about their use of the internet to get news or information about the 2001 federal election. The responses have changed markedly in the three years since the question was first asked, at the 3998 election. Then, nearly three quarters of the sample said they had no access to the internet; in 2001 only 41% claimed to be similarly placed. Another 50% of the 2001 respondents said they had internet access but didn’t use it for election information, leaving 9% who did use it for this purpose (5% who used it once or twice and 4% who used it several or many times). The 90/0 using the internet for election information in 2001, while still a small proportion of the clectorate, is more than double the equivalent number from three years earlier (Bean and McAUister 2000, 176).

Table 27.1: Orientations towards election campaign 1996-2001 (percentages)

1996 1998 2001 Took “a good deal” of interest in the election campaign overall 34 38 31 Paid “a good deal” or “some” attention to the campaign:

in newspapers 59 63 53 - 70 I4 69 46 5 0 43

4 9 58 43 40

18

- on television - on radio

Used the internet for election news or informadon Watched the televised leaders’ debate Thought Howard performed better in the debate 36 28 Sources: Australian Election Studies, 1996 (n=1797),1998 (n=1897) and 2001 (n=2010).

273 Frolji i711possibilip to certainty: E3tdaiizi7g tbe Coalitioii 5. victory in 200 I

With there having been only one televised debate bemeen the Prime Minister and leader of the Opposition in 1998 and 2001, compared with two in 1996, it is understandable that fewer people would have witnessed the event in the latter. two campaigns, as the table shows to be the case. In terms of who performed better, according to public perceptions John Howard has done worse on each occasion since 1996, with less than one in five respondents ( 1 W o ) believing him to have performed better than IGm Beazley in the 2001 debate. By contrast 56% of the sample thought Beazley performed better, while 26?4/0 ratcd the leaders' performances as about equal.

Volatility and stability

The evidence so far is of a low key election campaign in 2001, which aroused relatively little public interest. In addition to the overt public response they generate, election campaigns also provide opportunities to garner information about key indicators of the broader mood of the electorate and its political trajectory. Such key indicators include data on the potential for electoral stability or volatility, One such indmtor of the volatility of the electoral mood is the proportion of voters who leave their final voting decision until during the election campaign. In 2001,41% of AES respondents said they decided during the campaign period, compared to 59% who had decided before then. This figure is down on that for 1998, which was unusually high (Bean and McAllister 2000, 176) but similar to the level in 1996 (Table 27.2). As in 1998, however, over a quarter (29'/0> said that they seriously thought of giving their first prefercnce vote in the House of Representatives to a different party from the one they actually voted for in 2001.

Traditionally, well over half of the Australian electorate have always voted for the same party throughout their voting lifetime. The proportion of loyal voters by this measure has been declining since the late 1980% however (McAllister and Bean 1997,177), and now it appears to have dipped under 50%.

Table 27.2: Indicators of volatility and stability 1996-2001 (percentages)

Decided definitely how to vote during campaign period 39 51 41 Seriously thought of giving first preference to another p a q in 22 29 29 the House of Representatives during election campaign

52 49 48 Always voted for same party 76 79 17 Identifier with one of the major parties 17 14 15 Not a patty identifier 19 18 19 Very strong party identifier

Sources: Australian Election Studies, 1996 (n=1797),1998 (n=1897) and 2001 (n=2010).

274 Cfive Bean and Inn MeAlLsieer

In 1996, 52% said they had always voted for the same party, in 1998 the equivalent figure was down to 49% and in 2001 it was 47%). As has so often been the case in the past, there are some hints in these data that greater electoral volatility might be looming, but no dramatic break with past patterns and some indications of a less volatile mood in 2001 coinpared to 1998.

Probably the key ongoing indicator of electoral stability in Australia is party identification, the sense of longstanding loyalty to one or other of the major parties possessed by most voters (Aitldn 1982; McAllistcr 1992). In recent pears a number of authors have suggested that partisan attaclimcnts are showing signs of weakening in Australia (for example Cliwnoclr 1997; Smith 1998), although there has generdy been more resistance to such developments in this country than elsewhere (Dalton 1996). The data in tlic bottom half of Table 27.2 are mixed. Perhaps the most crucial indicator, the proportion of voters identifying with one or other of the major parties (the TAor, Liberal or National parties) shows the number continuing to hover below 8O% and dipping to what is probably a new low of 770/0 in 2001, The proportion bolcling no party identification at all, however, has not rcaclied a corresponcIing peak because minor parties attracted a larger number of identificrs in 2001 than in some past years. In terms of strength of partisan attacliment, the p roporbn holding a very strong identification has continued at about the same level throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century.

Demography, society and the vote

Ongoing partisan attachments represent a force for stability in the Australian party system but underpinning partisanship is a set of even more stablc attributes relating to the demographic and social structure of the elcctorate. Table 27.3 considers data on five key demographic factors, nainely gendcr, age, region, religious denomination and church attendance. Thc data on gender represent a break from past patterns in wlich women wcrc more likely than men to support the conservative patties and men wcrc more lilrely than woincii to support Labor (Renfrow 1994). The 2001 AES suggcsts that on this occasion men were 3% more likely than women to vote for the Libcral- National Coalition parties, while there was no apparent gender difference in support for the Australian Labor Party. Only data from f u h w elections will bc able to determine whether the 2001 figures represent an aberration or die beginning of a new direction in the gender-vote relationship. Somewliat mote women than men voted for the Australian Dcinocrats and, by a lesscr margin, for the Australian Greens. This slim balance was reversed for Padine I-Ianson’s

Table 27.3: Demography a n d voting behaviour in 2001 (percentages)

Labor Lib-Nat. Dem Greens One Nation Other (N) Getider Male 37 48 4 5 4 3 (860)

Age Groilp Under 25 46 33 8 7 4 2 (125) 25 to 44 40 41 8 6 3 2 (649) 45 to 64 34 51 4 6 3 2 (647) 65 and over 34 56 3 2 3 2 (336)

Female 37 45 7 6 3 2 (975)

Rcgion liural 31 51 4 5 6 3 (553) Urban 39 44 G 6 3 2 (1295) lbh@m Denonlilratiotr Catholic 42 44 5 4 4 1 (506) Anglican 33 53 3 3 5 2 (465) Uniting 28 60 6 3 2 2 (232) Other 39 42 5 5 5 3 (257) No Religion 40 33 10 12 1 3 (357) Chiirch Atedunce At least once a month 31 56 4 3 3 3 (347) At least once a year 39 45 4 6 4 2 (398) Less than once a year 36 46 5 6 3 3 (325) Never 40 42 7 6 4 1 (749) Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n=2010).

One Nation party, which derived slightly more support from men than from women. This last finding sits in contrast to the large gender gap in the One Nation vote at the 1998 federal election, where more than twice as many men supported the party as women (Bean and McAllister 2000, 177). One speculative interpretation of the decline in the One Nation following suggested by these data is that it reflects in particular a loss of support among men.

Increasingly in recent elections, age has become a substantial discriminator of support for the major parties. In 2001 , the Labor Party’s large margin among the youngest voters, could not counterbalance the Coalition’s even larger advantage among all those voters over the age of 45. Among the minor parties, as in the past the Democrats - and less markedly the Greens - fared better among the young and, like the Greens, found it particularly cliffcult to win support from the over 65s. Turning to region of residence, the consistent but relatively modest relationship whereby rural voters show more support than urban voters for the Coalition parties and urban residents more support than rural for Labor was again evident in 2001, as was stronger support for One Nation in the country compared to the city (Bean and McAllister 2000, 178).

Religion continues to have significant implications for political party support in Australia into the twenty-first century in both its denominational and religiosity dimensions. The bottom section of Table 27.3 shows that in denominational terms, the Liberal and National parties received their strongest support in the 2001 election from adherents of the Anglican and Uniting (including Methodist and Presbyterian) churches, less support froin Catholics and members of other religions and very low levels of support from voters holding no religious affiliation. In contrast, the Labor Party received more support froin Catholics, those with no religion and members of otlier religious denominations and less support from the major Protestant groups. 130th the Democrats and the Greens held a particular attraction to members of the electorate holding no religion. As in the past, the major parties also received contrasting support based on frequency of church attendance, with frequent attendees mnucli more likely to support the Coalition parties, and less likely to support Labor, than those who never attend religious services.

Table 27.4 displays data for a number of key social structural variables, starting with education. I n 2001, die Labor Party reccived more support from those with the highest and lowest levels of education than from those in the middle, while the pattern of support for the Coalition was the reverse of patterns tliat have been evident in the past (Bean and McAllister 2000, 179), with the university educated showing a disinclination to support the conservative parties compared to those with lower levels of educational

Table 27.4: Social structure and voting behaviour in 2001 (percentages)

Labor Lib-Nat. Dem Greens OneNation Other (N) Edimtion N o post-school qualifications 40 48 4 3 4 1 (621) Non-degree qLdifications 35 50 6 4 4 2 (741) University degree 38 37 I 12 2 3 (369)

MYlanual 47 39 4 3 5 2 (550) Nonmanual 30 50 7 7 3 2 (1062) Ei?@yi?ie#/ Self-employed 24 57 5 7 5 3 (296) Government employee 46 37 6 5 3 2 (396) Trde Uiiioii A&wbeuh+ Union inember 47 35 5 7 3 3 (415) Not a union member 32 51 6 5 4 2 (1260) Sii&ctila Cfms Working 45 40 4 4 5 2 (782)

Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n=2010).

occ~pufiol~

Middle 29 55 6 6 2 2 (834)

attainment. Those with a degree instead opted disproportionately for the G r e e n s and, to a lesser extent, the Democrats but not for One Nation.

Though generally seen as the rock on which the Australian party system is b a s e d , occupational class has been decreasing in its electoral impact over recent elections (McAllister and Bean 1997,183-4; Bean and McAllister 2000,179-80). At t h e 2001 election, however, this trend seeins to have been reversed. Class voting registered 17 percentage points on the hlford index (the manual vote for Labor minus the non-manual vote for Labor), an increase o f 7 points on the 1998 figure. The change in 2001 appears t o be largely due to a rediiction in the Labor Party’s appeal to non-manual voters and both the Democrats and the G r e e n s would seein to have been beneficiaries of Labor’s ill fortune, in addition to the Coalition parties. The data suggest that wlicther or not this opening up of occupational class divisions in the Australian electorate continues to lmanifest itself in future elections will crucially depend on how the Labor Party, under its new leadership, deals with the challenge of broadening its electoral a p p e a l while attempting to maintain support from its traditional constituency. As in 1998, but to a lesser degree, manual voters showed a greater propensity to support Pauline I-Ianson’s One Nation Party than non-manuals.

The next set of data in Table 27.4 suggests that any concerns the Government inay have had about a possible backlash from the self-employed. over the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GS’I‘) in July 2000 were groundless, as the self-employed displayed their usual tendency to vote for the Coalition and showed no indication at all of siding with Labor in this election. Just as predictably, electors employed in the public sector were more inclined to support Labor than the conservative parties. This was also true of trade union members and those identifying as worlung class, dthougl1 the corresponding margin in favour of the Liberal and National parties among non-union members and the subjective middle class, respectively, was much more substantial.

Finally, the subjective middle class were less likely than the worlung class to s u p p o r t One Nation, as had also been true in 1998 (Bean and McAllister 2000, 179-80). The general impression from the data reviewed in Tables 27.3 and 27.4, however, is that the decline in One Nation support between 1998 and 2001 has bcen accompanied by a weakening of the socio-demographic basis of the party’s vote over the same period (for previous analyses of the One Nation vote see, for example, Goot 1998; Charnock 1999; Bean 2000; Goot and Watson 2001; Denernark and Bowler 2002).

278 Chve Bean md Ian McAlkster

Issues in the 2001 election

If social structure provides the ongoing backdrop to Australian politics that remains relatively stable from one election to the next, it is the policy issues that are debated in the campaign that provide the foreground in any electoral contest. In the 2001 election the interest in issues partly revolved around the question of whether the more traditional social and political issues, such as health and taxation, would be overshadowed by the highly topical issues surrouiiding the asylum seekers on the Tampa and the threat of terrorism highlighted by the events of 11 September. In assessing his victory immediately after the election, Howard claimed that the Coalition’s win was not based on tlie asyluin-seeker issue (Courier-Mai/, 12 November 2001). Our initial analysis of data on election issues from the AES provides qualified support for this view

Table 27.5 provides the percentages of voters saying whether each of twelve election issues was extremely important when they were deciding how to vote. The first column in the table shows the percentage for all voters and then the remaining columns show the views held by voters of different parties. Only two issues aroused a particularly high level of concern ainong voters: health (which has now been at or near the top of the list for several elcctions) and education - respectively lib% and 65% of all voters rated these issues as extrcinely important. Labor, Greens and Democrats voters showed particular concern over these two issues, with Liberal-National voters rating them lower. The next issue was well behind the top two and interestingly it was the issue of terrorism (with 54% rating it as extremely important). In party terms there was a reversal of concern level, with Coalition voters and especially One Nation voters

Table 27.5: Importance of election issues in 2001 (percentages describing issue as extremely important)

Voters All Labor Lib-Nat Dem Green OneNation Other

Immigration 50 44 54 47 47 75 29 Education 65 76 55 74 77 55 64 The envi r onmenr 47 51 36 65 85 54 44 GST 46 63 34 41 30 52 46

23 17 22 27 28 Iiidiistrial rclntions 25 29 I-Iealth and Medicare 66 76 58 63 76 63 56 Refugees and asylum seekers 51 43 56 55 55 79 46 DeFence and national security 52 46 60 35 29 67 38

Worker cntitleinents 36 49 25 24 36 49 38 Terrorism 54 48 63 31 28 68 38 Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n=2010).

Taxadon 45 49 45 27 20 50 36

Uneinployinen t 48 59 39 43 49 47 38

280 CLue Bean mMln Iait McAllister

an advantage to Labor on an issue and negatively signed scores an advantage to the Coalition. On this basis, amongst all voters, the Liberal-National parties had an advantage on six of the twelve issues, albeit small in some cases, while Labor had an advantage on five, with neither party gaining an advantage on the issue of the GST.

Of the individual issues, refugees and asylum seekers, terrorism and iininigration recorded the largest differentials across the whole electorate, all in the Coalition’s favour, followed by defence ancl national security. Labor had a sizeable advantage on education and slimmer advantages on health and Medicare and worlrer entitlements. Labor voters perennially say they are closer to the Labor Party on all issues while Liberal-National voters give the converse position, so it is the data for minor party voters that in some ways provide the most interesting results. On the issues of refugees and asylum seelrers and terrorism, where the 1,iberal-Nationals had the largest advantage over Labor, all of the ininor party voters indicated that the Coalition’s policies were closer to their own views than Labor’s, although only by slim margins in the case of the Democrats and Greens. In addition it is noteworthy that o n these two issues even Labor voters only favoured their party’s policies over the Coalition’s by a fairly slender margin. The issue with the next biggest advantage to thc Coalition, immigration, had more mixed support among the minor parties, with One Nation and other voters strongly supporting the Coalition’s stance but Green ancl Democrat voters favouring Labor. Most minor party supporters felt closer to the Coalition on defence and national security, except for the Greens, and only tnarginally so for the Democrats.

While the overall balance of opinion favoured thc Labor Party on fewer issues, Labor’s main advantage came on the two issues with the Iiighest importance ratings. Not only Labor voters, but all minor party voters saw the Labor Party’s policies on health and education as closer to their own views than the Coalidon’s policies by sizeable margins. The much less highly rated issue of worker entitlements also saw all the minor party voters strongly siding with Labor, On the broad issue of taxation and the more specific issue of the GST, only voters for other minor parties and Independent candidates favoured the Coalition’s policies, while Democrats, Greens and One Nation voters (especially on the GST) favoured Labor.

The party leaders

In his post-election analysis of tlie results delivered to the National Press Club, the federal director of the Liberal Party, Lynton Crosby, argued that the

Coalition’s election victory had been (‘about leadership” and that the Coalition’s Stance on i s S ~ e S like refugees and asylum seekers provided evidence of the strength of this leadership (Awstrakatz, 22 November 2001). As a campaign strategy, the emphasis on leadership, especially the leadership of a Prime Millister not noted for having a high level of personal popularity, was reminiscent of Paul Keating’s risky attempt to redefine leadership in terms of policy leadership rather than personality during the 1996 election campaign (Bean and McAllister 1997, 201), As in the case of Keating, although with less clramauc consequences, the data from the 2001 AES provide little indication that the strategy was successful in its own right.

Table 27.7 contains suminary scores for the leaders of the major and minor parties and for the parties themselves on a scale in whch zero represents a strong dislilre, 5 represents a neutral position and 10 represents a strong liking for the leader or party. Among the sample of voters in the 2001 AES, Beazley, not Howard, was the most popular leader, with a mean rating of 5.7. Howard came close behind with a score of 5,6 and John Anderson, the leader of the National Party, received a mean rating of 4.9. Of the minor party leaders, the Australian Democrats leader, Natasha Stott Despoja (5.0) was more popular with the electorate than Bob Brown of the Greens (4.4). Pauline Hanson, and her One Nation party, both recorded very low ratings of 2.G, although these scores were not quite as low as I-Ianson and One Nation received in the 1998 AES (Bean and McAllister 2000,184-5). Neither of the two leaders in waiting, Peter Costello or Simon Crean, proved popular with the electorate, registering scores of 4.3 and 4.0 respectively,

The standard deviation scores show that Howard and the Liberal Party generated greater polarisation in the electorate than Beazley and the Labor Party, Coinparison of the leader and party ratings indicate that Howard was

Table 27.7: Summary evaluations of leaders and parties in 2001 (means on 0-10 scale)

Mean StdDev Mean StdDev IQm Bcrzley 5.1 2.8 Labor 5.5 2.8 J c h I-Io\varcI 5.6 3.2 Liberal 5.6 3.2 Johii Anclerson 4.9 2.4 National 4.7 2.6 Natasha Stott Despoja 5.0 2.5 Democrats 4.6 2.5 Pauline I-Iansnii 2.6 2.9 OneNation 2.6 3.0

Peter Costello 4.3 2.8 Sitnon Crean 4.0 2.5 Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n=2010).

Bob Brown 4.4 2.6 Greens 4.7 2.7

282 Clive Reaiz am1 lrin McALli.rter

neither more nor less popular than the party lie led, while Beazley was iimre popular than the Labor Party, suggesting that on balance Beaxley’s leadership was an asset to his party in a way that Howard was not. Talien together, all of these factors imply that any leadership effect on voting behaviour would favour Beazley and the Labor Party over Howard and the Liberals.

More detailed questions about leadership clualities were asked about four of the eight leaders considered thus far. AES respondents were asked how well they thought each of tlie qualities listed in Table 27.8 described, in turn, Howard, Beazley, I-Ianson and Stott Despoja. Comparing the major party leaders, we see that Beazley was seen as being more compassionate, honest and trustworthy than Howard while the two were judged about equally - and both very highly - on intelligence and knowledge. At the other extrctnc, both were seen as cqually uninspiring. Howard was rated clearly ahead of Bcazlcy in terms of being sensible and, notably, for providing strong leadership, a quality that was very much a wealrness in relative terms for Beazley. The large differential and Howard‘s high score on strong leadership provides some evidcnce of p ~ y off froin the Coalition’s strategy of einphasising lcadership in the cainpign, particularly when it is contrasted with I-Ioward’s weak showing on this quality in the previous election (Bean and McAllister 2000, 185-6).

Turning to the other two leaders represented in Table 27.8, it is clear thnc Stott Despoja has a leadership profile, as perceived by AES respondents, not unlike those of the major party leaders, especially that of Beazley. SLott Despoja’s most highly favoured quality was intelligence, but shc also scored relatively well on being knowledgeable, honest, sensible and compassionate, while receiving lower ratings on strength of leadership xnd being inspiring (although the latter was not as much of a weakness for Stott Despoja as it w a s

Table 27.8: Leadership qualities as perceived by voters in 2001 (percentages saying quality describes leader extremely

well or quite well)

John Kiln Pnuline Natssha SLott Howard Beazley Hmson Despoja

Intelligent 82 83 21 79 Compassionate 54 76 27 64 Sensible 74 67 18 64 Provides strong leadership 72 45 20 46 Honest 55 63 40 65 Knowkdgeable 78 76 15 61 Inspiring 35 36 17 42 Trusnvorthy 50 56 26 57 Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n=2010).

for Howard and Beazley). Hanson, in contrast, has a completely different profile, with none of the leadership qualities seen to describe her well and only the quality of honesty - easily Hanson’s most highly rated characteristic - registering even in the range of the lowest scores for each of the other three leaders.

The election result in summary

The oL1tcolne of any electoral contest hinges on the factors fiat matter most in Cleterinidng PeOple’S votes. In the find section of this chapter we address this questioll by considering together all of the relevant influences we have I.xeii discussing. This is where, for example, we get the opportunity to see which of the key issues really did make a difference to the election outcome. T h e procedure involves conducting a multivariate analysis which simultaneously isolates the separate influence on the vote of each of the socio- deinograpllic variables in Tables 27.3 and 27.4, party identification, the twelve carnpnign issues in Tables 27.5 and 27.6 and the leadership ratings in Table 27.7. The results for those variables with statistically significant effects are shown in ’Table 27.9,

Six varhbles with significant effects on voting choice feature in the table: lmty identification, three issues variables and ratings of the two major party leaders. None of the demographic or social structural variables achieved statistical significance. The coefficients clearly show that party identification colithues to be the pre-eminent influence on electoral behaviour in Australia. The unstandardised coefficient in the first column can be interpreted as meaning that Coalition identifiers were some 54% more likely than Labor identifiers to vote for the Liberal or National parties, net of all other influences. Three issue variables - taxation and the GST, immigration together with refugees and asylum seekers and education - recorded significant and positive impacts on the vote. Somewhat surprisinglF gben its relauvely modest importance rating discussed earlier, the most substantial impact came from the coiilbined tax variable. The immigration issue and education alsb had more modest effects. Despite its high importance radng on the surface, health, which has Leen an influential variable in the last several federal elecuons, had no statistically significant impact in 2001.

Tlie pattern for the impact of leadership in Australian elections is that the lnajor party leaders consistently influence the vote for the two major pary

grottps but none of the secondary leaders do. SO it was in the 2001 elecuon- Voter attimdes to Howard and Beazley produced effects of similar magnitude,

284 Clive Bean and Ian McAllister

the negative sign on the Beazley Coefficients simply meaning that those who favoured the Labor leader were less likely to vote for the Coalition. Th~is, net of other factors, voters who indicated that they strongly liked Howard were around 16% more likely to vote for the Coalition rather than Labor tlian those who strongly disliked him. The reverse was true for Beazley. Meanwhile none

Table 27.9: Multivariate analysis of influences on voting behaviour in 2001 (regression coefficients)

Unstandardised coefficient Standardised coefficient Party identification 5 3 .52 Taxation/ GST .22 .15

Education .05 .04 Immigration/refugees , -08 .os

John Howard .16 .12 IGm Beazley -.I6 -.lo R-squared -74

Source: Australian Election Study, 2001 (n=2010).

Note: Entries in the table are significant at 11 < .05 or better.

The equation in Table 27.9 was estimated by ordinary least squares regression analysis with pdnvise deletion of missing data. The dependent variable, vote in the 2001 federal election, was scored 0 for Labor, 0.5 for minor parties and independent candidates and 1 for Tiberal-National. Party identification was likewise scored 0 for Labor, 0.5 for ininor parties or no party identification and 1 for Liberal-National. Apart from age, scorecl in years, all other independent variables were either 0-1 dummy variables or scaled to run from a low score of 0 to a high score of 1.

The issue wrirbles were computed by combining the importance ratings with the party closer to the respondent, so that at one end those who rated the issue as extremely important and felt closer to the Labor Party on the issue were scored 0 and at the other end of the scale those who raced the issue as extremely important ancl felt closer to the coalition parties on the issue were scored 1. Four pairs of issues that were particularly highly correlatcd (with bivariate correlations of greater than 0.7) were collapscd into combined variables for the analysis. The pairs were: taxation combined 'with the GST, immigration combined with refugees and asylum seekers, defence and national security combined with terrorism and unemployment combined with worker entitlements.

For party identification and the issue variables, the calculations showing the impact of these factors on the p r t y balance were mide by multiplying the unstandardised regression coefficient by the amount by which thc mean of the variable deviated from the neutral point of 0.5, For party identZcation, the deviation was 4-0.03, for taxation it \vas 0.00, for iminigration/rcfugees and asylum seekers it was t0.13 and for education it was -0.10. In die case of the leadership variables, the calculation involved multiplying the difference between Howard's and Beazley's mean ratings (-0.01) by the regression coefficient for Howard, wluch effectively indicates the difference it would have inade if Iioward had had the same popularity level as Bcazley

.Pram i7zpassibiLi~~i io certuinijr Explaitaing the Coalition k victory in 200 I 285

of o h r h-dership figures listed in Table 27.7 had any impact on the major party vote.

Some of the variables in Table 27.9 had greater implications for the party balance in the election than others. Taxation, for example, despite the size of its impact, had no ilnplications for the ultimate electoral balance because those fRvouring the Coalition on the issue cancelled out those favouring Labor. The balance of opinion o n the iminigration/refugees issue cleirly favoured the Coalition while the balance on education clearly favoured Labor. Party idc titification provided a clear advantage to the Coalition and the leadership effects narrowly favoured Labor. If we make calculations which combine the effects of these variables on voter behaviour with the balance of opinion in favour of one or other party (details of which are given in the tec?x5cd appetidix), we find that the Coalition’s vote was enhanced by the party identification effect (by around 1.6%) and by the issue of immigration combined with refugees and asylum seekers (!~y around 1.0%)’ while Labor benefited by about 0.5% due to education and by the very narrow margin of 0.2‘%1 on the basis of leadership. In Combination, these measurable effects on the election thus conferred a net advantage of just under 2% to the Coalition.

In conclusion, as argued at the beginning of this chapter, it would seem that the Coalition’s electoral fortunes had well and truly turned around before the election campaign began and in that sense there was a degree of inevitability about the outconic which reinforced the view that what had seemed like an impossiLle victory six months earlier had already become inevitable, In this context, it is understandable that the factors identified in this analysis as impacting on the vote balance hardly had enormous influences, Nonetheless, the chapter was able to address a number of key arguments about the nature of the Coalition’s victory, For example, the andysis shows that, contrary to some estimations, leadership, in terms of the popular images of the party leaders, could not be considered a factor that added to the Coalition victory - if anything, it slightly detracted from it.

The analysis also shows that concern at the election over the problem of ucfL1geees and asylum seekers - in combination with the broader issue of iininigration to which it relates - did help the Coalition win the 2901 ballot, although as a specific election issue this factor perhaps had a lesser net impact on the vote balance than many may have assumed. What this analysis cannot tell LIS, liowever, is the extent to which particular aspects of the debate, such as the Governinent’s handling of the now notorious “children overboard affair” - in & i c h senior Ministers during the election campaign made claims about tlie behavioL1r of asylum seek& later shown to be false ( A z ~ ~ f ~ ~ ~ a % 20 and 28

286 Cliue Bean and Ion ibfcAlli.sjer

February 2002) - made a difference one way or the other. It is also possible that the Labor Party’s loss of support among non-manual voters may at least in part have been due to reactions within this group to Labor’s stance oil asyluin seckews, which was not saongIy differentiated from that of the Government. In addition to specific aspects of the asylum seeker issue, there is also the widcr question of border protection in its various inanifestations and fLxther analysis is required of the influence of this factor on the political behaviour of tlie Australian electorate.