1 ~ ' O I ~ M U I ~ A ' l 9 1 O N OF 1NI)IA'S C I I l N A l 'OI , l ( 'Y A N I ) ' 1 ' 1 1 1 ~ ; ROLE OF SAKLIAK K . M . I'ANIKKAH

In thc last chapter Tibet's real position vis-a-vis China and lntlia l ~ a s heen

traced and i n the light of those facts it becomes necessary to examine to what

extent the formulation of India's China policy in the period between 1948-52

was on tlie right track, especially with tlie re-occupation of Tibet by People's

Republic of China. The defeat of India in 1962 war with China is attributed to

a great extent to the wrong policies that were initiated by India following the

o c c u p a t i o ~ ~ of Tibet by Communist China. To understand the Indian policy

towards Cllina (luring this pel-iod (1948-52) t l ~ c role of Si~l.cli~l. K.M. I ' i ~ ~ ~ i k k i ~ r

has to be nnalyzetl as he was 1l1e Ambassador to both Nationalist C l~ ino and Lo

People's Kcpublic of C1iin;t ant1 was one of the principal advisers to Nel~ru on

foreign p o l ~ c y matters. It was Sat.dar K.M. Panikkar who interpreted the emerg-

ing scene i n Asia to suit tlie Indian interests in the formative years of intlepcn-

dent India' \ foreign policy.

But I'anikkar's interpretation of the development in Asia has been criti-

cized in several quarters and i t is alleged that his cretiulity anti ignor;~nce ahout

Chinese intentions in Asia and his advice to Nehru were supposerl to he the

prime reasons for the permanent weakening of 1ndi:l's strategic p o s i t i o ~ ~ vis-;I-

vis, China. Neliru's special Assistant M.O. Mathai says "Seeds for the bedev-

ilment of India-Cl~ina relations were well and truly sown by Ambassador K.M.

Panikkar". ' Even before independence Nehru had tl~ouglit about Cliina and

stated that, "China that miglity country with a mighty past, our neiglibour, has

2 been our friend through ages i~ntl that friendship will endure ant1 grow. Itn-

1. M.O. Matliai, lieminiscences of Nehru Ay?; (Delhi, 1978), p. 168

2. Jawaharlal Nellru, lndias Froeien Policy (Delhi 1971). p.3

~nediately ;tlle~. i~r t lepende~~cr , 111 the lntlia~i I ' ;~ r l i a~ne~~t t11e11 COIISLILUCII~ ASSCIII -

bly (Legislative) tlie would-be relations with the Chinese was tliscussetl ant1

so~i ie I I ~ C I I I ~ I C ~ S were of t l ~ e vicw i l ~ ; ~ t bcc;wsc of i~lcologic;~l. cullur:~l. pl~i lo-

sophical ; I I I ~ politic;~I sy~~~p i t t l i y tlii t t existed from the ancient t ir~ic between tllc

two coulltrles, the two could form a strong union to fight ilnperi;~lism ant1 one

of tllc mcli~llcrs c v c ~ ~ suggcstctl, " l~rt l i ;~ ;uitl C l l i l~ i~ i11.e tIes~ir~e(I 10 01: Iei~dcrs 01'

Asia and joined together with they will be a force to reckon with." ' Thus from

the beginning itself China has been accepted as a friend and all attempt for

establishing strong friendship with her was recognized by the Parliament. But

Jawaharlal Nehru took a very cautions stand on China despite his emphasis on

two thousa~id years old friendship. As the position in China had not fully

crystallizetl as i t would pruve embarrassing later, if any kind o f opinion was 4

expressetl ~ I I the situation. Nehru was congl.ntulated fol- taking such a stand 5

in a debate Iheltl on 8th Marcli 1949 in the Co~ist i tuel~t Assembly (Legislative).

Nehru also 111adc i t clc;u. that I~itlio's i~~ t l epe~ i t l e r~ t fol-eign policy w;ts ;(gainst

interference i n the domestic affairs of any other country ;uitl the thrust of "our

policy will continue to be not only to keep apart from power politics but trying 6 to make iricntlly co-operation possible.

Following the proclamation of People's Republic of China on 1st October

1949. India became the second non-communist country to r e c o g n i x it. Indian

public o p i n i o ~ ~ too favoured aln early recognition. ' Within a 1:w months of

recognition of People's Republic of China, Tibet was i t~vaded by China. As

3. Constituent Assemblv Debates. Vol. 2-3, 1947 p. 1263

4. Ibid

5. Ibid, Vol. 2, 1949 p. 1246

6 . Ibid, pp. 1232 - 34

7. K.M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas (London, 1955). p. 68

8. K.P. Karu~~ukaran, lntlia ill Wor-Id Affair8 (London, 1958). p. 1UO

stated alreadv the invasion of 'l'ibet i n 1950 by China was the heginning of

strains in Sino - Intliiw rel;~tio~lh ;ultl the main charge ligainst 1';111ikkilr is ~ I I ; I ~

lie di(I 11ot L I I I ( I C ~ S ~ ; I I I ( I the Clli t ic~c ~ i ~ i ~ i ~ l , 'l'l~erel'ore I I C f;~iIml 10 ~ c ; ~ l i / . c I I I C I ~ I I C

nature of cotnmunism in China ant1 the real character of n totalitilrian regime

iuntl i t was hc who was responsiltle for changing the word sttzcr;~inly to sover-

eignty. QBy the acceptance o f sovereignty of the Chi~rese ovcr Tibet i t is

claimed Indiu was forced to surrender her treaty rights and privileges. Panikkar

was asked to corl-ect the word from sovereignty too suzer;unty, to express

India's feeling on the matter but Panikkar, "had a nimble reactive and uncom-

mitted mind. ..... and he was not successful in making China aware of the

weight and force of India's attitude on various question". l o Following Tibet's

invasion, Tibetan Government piteously approached the U N to rescue her tronl

the clutches of Chinese Retl A r ~ n y . But India instead of sponsoring tlint plea i n

the Security Council, remainetl indifferent to the matter i l l tlie U N on the basis

of the assurances given by Chou En-lni to Panikkar. I ' By accepting the Chi-

nese sovereignty over Tibet, according to the critics, 111tlin was 11eg;11111g l l ~ ~ -

own stand i n 1947 at the Asian Relations Conference i l l New Delhi, in which

Tibet attentletl as 1111 intlepentlent country. l 2 Indian Atnbiissi~tlor Sartlar Pmikkor 1 .1 was an useful ~ n s t r u ~ n e n t to serve the interests of C l ~ i ~ i e s e Commul~ists . 'fhen

Secretary Get~eral of Ministry of E x t e r n ~ ~ l Affairs, Sri C;iri,j;~ S l ~ ; ~ n h ; ~ r 13;llp;li W A S

much more harsh on Panikkar hy alleging : "What interest the A~ilbassatlor

thinks he may be serving by showing so much solicitutle for the Chinese

Government 's policy of false excuses and wanton high-liandetl~~ess tow;~rds

Tibet passes lily understanding ..... I feel it is my duty to observe that i n han-

9. M.R. Masani, Aeainst The Tide (Delhi 1981). pp. 44 - 45

10. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Neliru - A Bioc~ra~hy, Vo1.2, (Delhi, 1978), 1). 178

11. M.R. Masani, 11. 9, p. 45

12. Hindust;ui 'Times, 6th December, 1963

13. M.R. Mas;uii, 11. 9 p.45

dling the Tibetan issue with the Chinese government, our A~nbassador has

allowed h i ~ ~ ~ s e l f to be influencetl ~ilore by the Chinese point of view, by Chinese

claims, by Chinese inaps and by regard for Chinese susceptibilitics t l~;w by liis ,, I 4 instruction5 or by India's interest.

Panikkar was consideretl to be a cynic allti a great believer in realpolitik

and he is held responsible for i~dvising Nehru to switch sides even when the two

armies in China (Com~nunists and Kuotni~ltang) were locket1 ill o battle. Furtller

Panikkar had started behaving even the11 as Ambassador to People's Republic

of China led by Mao. I S Neliru's brother-in-law ant1 a cl~ampion of Tibetati

independence accuses Panikkar of opportunism. l 6 George Patterson observes

that "many of India's later troubles with China woultl never have arisen, or

certainly not in this generation had some one with more balanced judge~nent

and less liability to erratic enthusiasm been sent as Indian A~nbassador to China

at this critlcal period." l 7 Pattersoti was a self-styled inissionary wlio worked

in Tibet before the communist revolution i n China. According to this niission-

nry: "There is no tloubt t l io t I'anikkar was personally sytlipall~ctic towitrtls tlie

Chinese Ilcvolution, but his l)lin(l acccpt;uicc of' wlii~t Ilc was ioltl i ~ y llic I'cking

r cg i~ne was inexcusable in liis position as A~nbassatlor of' 11icIii111 inL~rests i~n(l

did incalculable harm both at tlie tirne and later." I X Tliis was becac~se Panikkar

was unable to understand the implications of the basic cliarac~er of Retl Cllinese

government. Consequently he developed a co~nplacent attitude which created a

superficial understanding of the People's Republic of China. '' President of

14. S. Gop;ll, n. 10, pp. 178 - 79

15. M.R. Masani, ti. 9, p. 45

16. Raja I~lutlieesingli. m o w on C h i ~ (Lontlon. 1953), p. I I

17. G. P:tttcrso~i, l ' ck i~ i~ Versi~s llcll~i (l,o~itlo~i, 1063). I?, (10

18. Ibicl

19. V.B. Ki~rnik, Clii~icsc I I I V ; I S ~ O I ~ . B ; ~ c k ~ r o ~ ~ t i d i- ((Bonibily, 1900). p[J. 120 - 22

111tliu I < I ~ J C I I ~ ~ I I I I ' I ~ ~ I s ; I ~ too l~elievetl 111111 lie I ' r i ~ ~ ~ e - M i ~ ~ i s i c ~ . wits I I < , I I I & : ~ i ~ i s l c ( l 11y

his Ambassador in Peking and felt "India's approach to Chitlit was ritltlletl with

weakness and proneness to wishful thinking". 20 Another protagonist of Tibetan

indepentlencc accuses Sartlar K.M. Pa~likkar of pro-Clli~~cst. I-cporti~lg froin

Peking and unfortunately Nellru too attached much importance to his views. He

further states th;~t Panikkar being a inan of consideriible clevcrncss ontl erutli-

tion after lengthy analysis, reached the conclusion at about this time (1950-51) 2 I Lhnt Chiilesc C o ~ ~ l n ~ u ~ ~ i s ~ n woultl ~ ~ c v c r I)eco~nc: t l oc l r i~~ ;~ l ly t l o g ~ ~ i ; ~ l i c .

Critics 01' I~)(li:i's C I I ~ I I ~ I policy ;1cc11sc N ~ : I I ~ I J ~ I I I I I l ' ;l~iikki~r O I I t l ~ c issut: 01

abandonmelit of India's historic rights i n Tibet i l l October 1950 with the step-

ping of People's Liberation Army into Tibet and feel tllat Nellru hati thrcc

courses o p c ~ ~ to llini (a) to assert the legal right arising out of '1'1-eaty of 1914

and not to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty over Tibet (b) to tlecide the issue

on its merits 2nd (c) appc;~scn\ent of China untler pressure. l3ut Ncl11-II cllosc

to appease the Chinese and justified India's giving up of its rights in Tibet as

they were a symbol of British imperi I ' 22 'I ISI11.

The protest notes given by Panikkar were very mild ant1 these were not

strong protests to China on the matter and it was not consistent with India's

policy. No previous Government of India or any other Government in the past.

has ever acknowletlged the Chinese claim of sovereignty over 'Tibet. It is most

astountli~ig that the Governmrnt of Inclia tamely gavc up serious efforts to

vindicate their rights secured to them by several treaties, failed to assert the

falsity and untenability of Chinese claims and conceded Chinese sovel-eignty

over Tibet. ' f l~us libcrty of a sr~lall 11atio11 was tlcstroyctl. 2 3

20. D.Das, India from Curzon to Nehru Antl After (London, I969), p. 337

21. G.N. Jansen, Afro - Asia Antl Non - Ali~nment (London, 1966). p. 11 1

22. J.P. Mitter, Bctraval of Tibet (Delhi. 1963), p. 62

23. Ibid

Hugll l{icllartlsol~ wllo scrvetl as 111e olliccr in-cll;~rgc ol' i ~ ~ ( l i ; l l l i'0lilic;ll

Mission in Lhasa in 1947-49 accuses Panikkar of overlooking the intlepentlence

of Tibet. Moreover panikkar hat1 evidence that Cliilla woultl use lorce ilg;linst

Tibet and he still convinced Indian Government that the Chinese would use only

peaceful means. 24 According to another scholar, "on the conquest of Tibet by

China, the versatile A111bass:ttlor calne forwartl with ;I v e r s i o ~ ~ wliicl~ is a1111ost

G o e b b e l s i ; ~ ~ ~ i n t l i s tor t io~~ 01' i ;~cts. 'l'ihet. P;unikknr snit1 11:ltl l lcco~nc :I pi11-l 01'

Clli~li~, ils eilrly ils tile 8th cc~~tu l .y . ' fhc pl.c:;ent i);11;1i L;IIII;I W;IS il~lllitlly :I{ ) -

pointed by the Chinese Gover~l~l lcnt ..... wller~ i'eoplc's IZcp~~blic o l C l i i ~ ~ n was

established in 1949 representatives of Tibet were all PI-esent at all functions in

Peking 2 n d took part in tlri~wing up New China's Economic Progl.;unlne" 2 5 .

I'anikkar i l l intc I95 1 wlicn l ~ c cunlc to I ~ i d i : ~ wit11 t 1 1 ~ ( ' I I ~ I I C S C C L I I ~ L I I . ; I I L I I : I C ~ : I .

tion, glamorize~l Communist (:l~ina i r ~ PI-ess ant1 plntl'ornl ;lnd tlcscril~etl "COIII-

munist Revolution as a part of the great Asian Resurge~lce". When it was

pointed out to him about the presence of a huge army i n Tibet, he saw 11o

reason w l ~ y India should worry about i t . He did not think there was anything

wrong if Chinese troops move about their own territory 26. lndia by not trying

to keep l 'ibet as an independent country was jeopardizing her own security

because 'Sibet could be used as a jumping board to lndia ant1 during tlie Tibetan

crisis G o v e r n ~ n c ~ l t c ~ f Intlia not only f;liletl to co111e to the rescue oC Tibet but

even rejected its request, at the behest of Panikkar, to plead its case against tile

Chinese invasion before the United Nations. 27

The Army too viewed the invasion of Tibet as very hnr~nlul . I t was felt

that Intlinn lcatlers acted wit l~out for-esiglit a r ~ d lntlia's initction in the lace of

24. H. R~chardson, Tibet and its History (Londo~i, 1962). pp. 181 - 82

25. P.C. Chackarvarthi, Indo-China Relations (Calcutta, 1961). pp. 52 - 55

26. lbid

27. D.P. Misllra, Living. An Era - The Nehru Epoch (Delhi, 1970). pp. 268 - 269

Chinese aggrcs s io~~ i l l Tibet w;~s going to be very costly in tlle co~nirlg yci~rs.

? K T I ~ I V S I o l ' l i t c e y I ~ I I I I I ~ I I I I ~ I I I ~ ~ i i ' s e ! i ' I ' I I c

fortner Delc~lcc Secreti~ry o f 111tlin I1.M. 1':itcl i l l this reg;utl s t ; ~ ~ c t l :

Until 1950 when the Government of India gave formal r e c o g ~ ~ i t i o ~ ~ to People's Republic of C l ~ i ~ l a , 1 1 0 t r o ~ ~ b l e win possil)le 11eci111sc 'l'ihct existctl {IS a h ~ ~ l ' f e r betwee11 lntli;~ ill111 ( ' I I ~ I I ~ I .......... will1 I I I C i ~ ~ v i ~ s i o ~ ~ o(. ' l ' i l ) ( ' ~ Illis bul'fcr z o ~ ~ c disappc;~retl :1110 I I I ~ ~ : I ' s I.CSIIS:II to ~ I c : I I I ' I ' ~ ~ ) c I ' s C;ISC i l l ( I N does us little credit and it certainly sl~owetl that as a state we are curio~rsly myopic 29.

Jayaprakash Narayan too felt that on Tibet i t was a majot. mistake of our

foreign policy. This mistake was two fold. The first wns tllat we ;rcceptcti ;In

imperialist (or~l lula . The very idea that one country inny have suzerain power

over ano the~ is imperialist in conception. Tlie second lilistake was to believe

that the powcrful totalitarian state could be trusted to l~onour the autonomy of

a weak state 30. Tlle supporters of Tibetan independence feel that Chinese

takeover of 'l'ibet could have bee11 prevented in order to provitle conlidence to

other smaller states in the region and if India had take11 initiative in this regard 3 1

the Arnerica~ls would have provided necessary support to India on the matter.

The c h a m p i o ~ ~ s of Tibetan independence argue that the independence of Tibet

had a strong i ~ i ~ s i s in history. Tibet was, except for a short period, never under

Chinese rule. she was only under tenuous suzerainty. Even in r l ~ e most

unfavvurable period of its long relations with China, Tibet hat1 no Viceroy from

Peking but ouly an agent known as Ainban and in 1912 Tibetans had assertetl 32

their indepe~ltlence. Therefore Irom the poi111 of 111tlia's ow11 security and lor

28. J.P. Dalv~. M a n Blunder (Bombay. 19691, pp. 15 16

29. H.M. Patel. The Defence of Indu (Delhi, 1963), pp. 3 - 5

30. The Statebman,lst June 1959

31. A.B. Shah. India's Defence and Foreien Policies (Bombay, 1966), p. 87

32. Amiya Rao and B.G. Rao, Six Thousand Davs - Jawaharlal Nehru (Delhi, 1974), pp.

109-10

instilling confidetrce in the slnaller nations o f the rcgion and on grou~rtls t r l

history Tibet's i~rtlependent stntus was unavoitieble tuntl I n t l i ; ~ should have tttkell

up cudgels o n behalf of Tibet at a time when China was involvetl in Korea. But

Nellru wits lctl nslrily by l ~ i s pr i~~cipi t l ntlviser K.M. I'it11ikk;lr i ~ ~ l t l 1';lllikk;tr is

branded as n fellow traveller who instead of reflecting I ~ r t l i ; ~ ' ~ intcl-est nbro;itl

Another i~nportant charge against Sardar K.M. Panikkar is that Ire actetl

against the Indian interests on matters concerning lntlia's frontier with China.

Panikkar had left China in June 1952 feeling gratified that his efforts to bring

about peace i n Korea were about to hear fruit ittntl was ;tlso satislied with the

deve lop~ne~ i t s in Tibet. But "he was too opt i~nis t ic ant1 hati forgotten the most ,, 34 important issue, the frontier which was not taken up by l l i~n . Panikkar was

advised and instructed by his Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs 35 Sir G.S. B;i~pai to raise the bol-tler issue . Bajpai had warned Nellru that to

China, the McMahon line ~ i i i g l ~ t be one of those scars left by Britain in the

course of her aggression; China ]nay seek to heal or erase it o n the basis of

frontier rect~fications that might not be to our liking or to our interests. He

advised Nel11.u to tell Peking that we regard the McMahon line ;IS our bountlitry

and intend to treat it as such. The Chinese could then agree, disagree or by 36 silence indicate their acquiescence . Sardar Patel too hatl war~led Nehru :

We call safely assume that they (China) will tlisown all stipulations which Tibet hat1 entered into with us in the past. That throws into the nlelting pot all the frontier settlements with Tibet ......... 111 Peking we have all Ambassaclor wlio is emine~ttly stlitable for putting across the friendly view but evcn he seems to have fniletl and our Ambassador has heen at great

- --- -- - .- - -

33. S.K. Patel. Foreixn Policv of I I ~ (Lucktlow, 1960). pp. 268 - 260

34. B.N. Mulhick, Mv Years wit11 Nehru - l'llc C11inc;se 13ctr;tv;1l (Dcllii, 107 I ) , pp. 148 -

49

35. Amiya Kao and B.G. Kao, n. 32, pp. 109 - 110

36. Ibid

pains 1 I'iotl ;Il l x p 1 1 1 1 t i 1 1 of justification I'ol- (:hinese 1)olicy ;111tl ;IC-

tions.7'

In Jar~trirry 1952 w l ~ e r ~ 1';111ikkar w;ls ill 111tli;i 11c w;~s s11ow11 tllc i ~ ~ s t r u c -

tions drawn by Ministry of Extel-nal Affairs and approved by Nellru but w l ~ e ~ i

Panikkar went back he did not stick to these instructions and confinetl his

discussions to trade and cultural interests and when tlie Ambassatlor found that

Chou En-lai was not anxious to tliscuss border issues, 1';ulikker 1 1 1 i n linr wit11 ! K the Chinese Prime Minister and did not refer to tlie frontiers. Bajpai who had

by then left Ministry of External Affairs wrote to the new Secretory General o n

tlie mutter saying that, "our ;ittelllpt et being clever iniglit over rc:~cli itself. I

think it is better to be absolutely straight and frank." Panikkar however cull-

vinced Nehru that tlie borcler as a closet1 issue. " Ne1)r.u certainly assurnetl t l ~ ; ~ t

Tibet would inevitably come under Chinese rule but his strong belief was that

with Asia freed from western imperialism, China and India coultl take Asia to

new areas of enlightenment. This was a romantic aspiration which overlooketl

both the rigidity and ruthlessness of c o m ~ n u n i s ~ n . However his Ambassador to

China and advisor K.M. Panikkar too agreed with him as 1le was immensely

impressed by the new China. Despite his close and frequent contacts with tlie

Chincse Pri~rlc. Minister llc ditl I I O ~ rnisc the questioll o l I ' ~ I I I I I ~ ~ : I . . 0 1 1 t11c ot11t:r 4 0 . hand he was pliilosophizing O I I Sino-Intlian frientlsliip. rliia (1ucstio11 01' t11c

frontier was not taken up by the <;overnment in consultation wit11 tllc Ambas-

sador and Panikkar hail decitletl on a policy o f "you neeti not raise it, but

declare it openly." 41 Paiiikkar's position appeared to he justifietl when Chou

37. D. Uns. w ~ ' ; ~ l c l ' s Cor~-os~>o~i t lc~lc~ , Vol. 10, (Ali~nctl;~l):~tl, 1074). p1). 340 - 17

38. S. Gop;ri. 11. 10 p. 178

39. lbitl, p. 170

40. D. Woodman, Mimalavan Frontier, (Lontlon, 1969), p. 218

41. W.F.ViurEekelen, Intlia~~ Foreien Policy and tlie Border Diswute (Tlie I4ague, 1964),

pp. 173-74

En-lili nevcr cl~lcs~iollc(l i t cvcn :~ i lc r Ncllru in;ltlc lltc SI:IL~IIICIII 1)11l>IicIy 111:11

the "McMahon line is our bouutlary wit11 the n ~ a p or without the lnitp." Nel~r-u

later adrnitted that he had a lingering doubt concerning the proble~ii of frorltier

but IIC 11oj~c~l I I I ; I I " I ~ I I J S ~ 01 Ii111c ; I I I ( I ~ V C I I I S wi l l co111irt11 l l ~ t : Iro1111cl~ : I I I ( ~ 11y Il l ( '

timc perhaps w11c11 the ch:tl lc~~gc to i t ~ ; I I I I C wc wollltl 1)c i l l n I I I I I ( . I \ S ( ~ O I I C I : I .

position to lace it." ' I L 'I'lius thc decisiol~ taken o n Cliina Oy Nc111.u wcrc! ~ ) o l

based on his "unl-ealistic assessnlcllt of China's s t rc~~gt l i ant1 intcltt or Itis fnilul-c

to attach importance to this issue but because he allowed his views and those

of his senior atlviscrs to bc set aside by an AmO:~ssatItrr wll(r r : ~ t i o ~ ~ i ~ I i z c ~ I :I

shirking of u~tplcasa~~tness. ' . " '

After ;I close look at the cliarges raised above in the light of the docu-

ments availitble and on the basis of existing reality at that time, it is difficult

to conclude that K.M. Panikkar had misled his Pritne Minister. His advises to

Nehru wel-e based (III prag~n;ttisln a~itl I c 1 s i t t ~ a i o ~ i I was the ollly

approach India coud take vis-;I-vis Chino.

Panikkar has been accused of advising Nehru to switch over sides when

civil war was waging in Cl~in;~. If by April 1949 Panikkar had asked Nellru to

switch ovcl- sides i t only proves Panikkar's capacity to judge the future course

of political events in China based on deep knowledge of the developments in

China, as ;~ l so on his ability to assess 011 the spot tlie fluctuating political ant1

social forces in China. In ot i~er words Paliikknr was able to illonitor tlie coc~rsc

of the civil war. When K . P . S Menon was appointed as the first Amb:ls.;ador to

China in 1947 Nehru gave him guidelines with specific I-elnarks about C:hil~a. In

China, Nehru said,

the situation is difficult because of the civil war that is going on. 1 have

42. lbid

43. S . Gopal, n. 10, p. 181

been (111 very I'ricntlly te~-tns will1 Chiong Kai-shek : I I I ~ wc h t r l r l c:1c11 oll~cv i n ~ S I ~ X I I I . I I I ~ I V C bee11 illso l'ricn(Ily wi111 S O I I I C ul' Lhc ~ I L ~ I I I I I I I : I I ~ C : I I I I I I I I I I - nist 1ci1tlcl.s of North W ~ 5 t 111ougIi I hnvc not I I I ~ I I l~cni . 1 1 W O I I I ( I i11)11ei11~ even 1.1-om the Americ:un ieports th:it neither p;lrly i n the Chinese tlispulc is free fro111 blame. If Atnesican statesmen say so in spite of their violent dislike to everything communistic then it seems clear that the Chinese communists have no bad case. Out Ambassador in China while tnaintaining close and friendly relations with Chiang-Kai-shek's government should n o t allow himself to be a partisan in the civil conflict. Nor should we say anything disparaging to either side. Some wortls I have used or written have been exploited by the Chinese government as against the North West communist government. I have regretted this. If our Atnbassador i n China has any opportunity, without causing ill-will to the Chinese government, to visit the North West areas he should seize i t and explain to the leaders there our general policy of friendship and nun-interference." 44

If this was the advise of Nehru to K.P.S Menon in 1947, in 1948 to Sardar

K.M. Panikkar it would definitely not have been different.

It has been st;iteti by the critics of Panikkar that i t was on his ntlvice that

Nchru hurrictlly cxtentlctl ~ l ~ c i.t'cogniticr~~ to I1col)lc's i<cl)ul~lic 0 1 ( ' I I ~ I I ; I willl-

out prior co~lditicins like seeking secognition of T i b e ~ t ~ n intlepentlence f ~ . o n ~ the

Chinese befuse its recognition by India. The Central People's Governn~ent of

the People's IZepublic of Cl~ina was proclai~netl i n Peking o ~ i 1st Octohcr 1049

of which Milo l ' sc 1'ung was t l ~ c C l ~ ; ~ i r ~ n : ~ n ;~ntl C'hou E11-1:ii W:IS the l ' v i ~ ~ ~ e

Minister and Foreign Minister. (:l~ou En-lai immediately after the procl~umation

of People's Republic of China, summoned foreign rep[-esentative i n Peking ~ u ~ t l

handed to t l ie~u a communic;\tio~i inviting the establish~nent of tliploniotic vela-

tions. Neliru'\ reply whicl~ ;trrivctl two days later, was couched i l l very frieutlly

4 5 terms i n d i c ; ~ ~ i ~ l g that there woultl be ~111 early recognition. 1'anikk;lr t l i t l ntrt

advise in favour i~nmetliate recognition of the new regime as Kuomintang w;~s

still in occup~~ t ion not only of Canton but of vast at-eas i n southe;~st inclutling

Szechuan, Yunu~ui and Sinkiang ontl the civil war was unlikely to cntl on tllc

44. K.P.S. Mcnon, M;tnv Worltls (Ho~nbay, 1971), p. 230

45. K.M. PalliLkar, n. 7. p. 61

46 mainland lor another two or three months. The < i o v e r ~ l ~ l l e ~ l ~ was d e f ~ ~ ~ i ~ e l y

c o ~ ~ c e r n e d about the q u e s t i o ~ ~ of rccognitio~l o f People's l<cpul>lic oi Clli11~1 at

that time, ihut according to India11 Atnbassatlor in Peking :

While there was no tlil'l'cre~ice of opinio~i as to tlie necessity of recogniz- ing the new Chine, there was :I difference among the le;ltlers ahout its timing. The conservative members of tlie Congress leadersliip including C.R;~jagopalachari, who was then Governor - General ant1 Sartlor Vallabhai Patel - Deputy Prime Minister - wanted to go slow on tlie matter. They were supported in this attitude by a powerful section of tlie civil service including I suspect some of the senior officials of the Foreign Office. My own view, to which I gave free expression, was that we should recognize the new regime when Kuomintang authority on the mainla~ul China ceascct to exist. 47

The d~fference of opinion between Patel and Nehru o n the matter is evi-

dent from tile correspondence between them 011 6th December 1949. 1':ltel i l l his

letter wrotc :

It seeins your intention is to recognize China soon aftel- tllc UN session ends, even if it mealls tllat others are not ready by the11 or ;Ire not pre- pared t o tlo so. My own feeling is that we do not stand to gain allything substantial by giving a lead in tlie matter and that while recognition must come Yooner or later. i f we are in the colnp;lny of others, i t woulil he wortllwllile dclayi~lg a b i ~ . After all us membel-s of tlie U N O . ir we ; I I I ;1c1 in ~nu tua l consent it is better to do so than to act alone or even with one or two other powers.

Patel further observes,

I have seen the Canadian reply to your message. They would also like to wait until the Colombo consultations are over. I feel myself that if we can do so without sacrificing any essential principle or point of our foreign policy we might as well do. In case however, you feel that we nus st recognize China earlier than others, I feel that we might have ;I discussion i n the cabinet. 4 8

46. Ibid

47. lbid

48. D. Das, 11. 37, Vol-X, pp. X6 - X X

Nehru responded to Patel by stating :

The UN session ends within a week. There was no intention of recogniz- ing tlie new regime in China immediately after session. 13111 I -o~~gl i ly tile date given by us to tlie Co~ntnonwealth governments has been by Christ- mas time. In this matter UK Government is anxious to recognize Cllina early and even before some of the Co~n~nonwea l th countries. During all our discussion in London and elsewhere it was recognized hy others that it might be desirable for India to accord recognition eilrlier than some of tlie c~lliers, I1111 i n consu l t a t i o~~ with ~ I I C I I I . Our atlviscrs ; I I I . 0 1 ' tlic ( I ~ I ~ I I ~ ~ I I

that i t woultl tlefinitely be hernlful to r e c o g ~ ~ i z e t l~enl ;~f'tcr tlle ( : ~ I I I I I I I ~ I I I - .

wealth countries have done so. I t would mean that we have no policy of our own, but follow the dictates of other countries.. If you like I shall put it up before the cabinet. But the date depends o n so tiiany factors that i t will have to be left ope!). Most members of tlie cabinet have hardly fol- loweti these intricate convers;~tions ant1 c o ~ ~ s u l t ; i t i o ~ ~ s . 13111 i t ' you arc i n - tcrestctl 1 shall ol' coursc, consult you beforc t i ~ c t ~ ,'"

l'lie rcasoll for the tlclay i n recognizing People's Republic of China 11;ts

been expl;iinetl by Krislina Menon, who was also close to Nel~ru in F o r e i g ~ ~

Affairs. I le too states illat l n ~ l i ; ~ wi111tc~1 Britain to ~rcc t rg~~izc l i ~ s t 1 )cc~usc t l~cy

told us t11;it they would do so. Moreover India thought as ;I C o n ~ ~ n o n w e a l t h

country w ~ t h particular relatio~ls witli UK and ruled by Labour government,

lntlia shoulil be 1);itlent ant1 act jointly. lJlti~llatcly UI-i t ;un tlraggctl its feet ant1

India recognizctl China on 30th December 1949. Krislin;~ Mcnon w;is also very

50 clear that Panikkar did not pl;~y any role leading to the tlecision to recognize.

Thus recognition of People's Republic of China by India was clone witli full

5 1 backing of the public opinion and this act on the part of Nehru was an act

of political maturity and not to do so would be going against the stubborn

reality. (I'cople's Republic of Chinil was proclaimetl on 1st October 1949 and

on 2nd October 1945) USSR recognized it followetl by co~nmunis t st;~tes of

4 9 lhitl

50. M. Brechcr, h j . k w t l World I'olitics - Krisl~no Mcnon's Vicw ol'llic Worl(l (120~lt lo~~.

l968), 1). 108

51. N. Jelley, Iiitlia China Relations, 1947 - 1977 (Delhi, 15)79), p. 9

Europe and hy the time India recognized it was Inore than three mo~l ths . )

Panikkar was lleld responsible f o r d e c l a r i ~ ~ g Intlin's st:~ncl ;~ccept ing Chi-

nese sovereignty over Tibet in Octobcr 1950 when Clli~lesc ; I I . I I I ~ wits 111ovi1lg

into Tibet. 'l'he Secretary Genelo1 01' Ministry of E x t e r ~ ~ n l Alfairs late Sir G.S.

Bajpai even suspected Panikker to be a "Pro-communist" 5 2 But the tilet i s t l ~ i ~ t

the note sent by Ministry of External Affairs had out-of cryptogr:~phic error

used the word 'sovereignty' instead of 'suzerainty' regarding the status of Ti-

bet.53 The moment the error was noticed another note was sent to Indian

Embassy in Peking asking Panikkar to correct the error. But Panikkar refused

to amend t l ~ c word ant1 he wrote to Nehru why it should not bc amentled ant1 54 .

Nellru w;ls c:or~vi~lcetl by P;rnikk;~r's ohserva~io~rs , O I I l l ~ c I I I ~ I I I ( ~ ~ . I'llc 1 1 0 1 1

correction ( 1 1 ' 111tlia11 st:ultl on (.:II~II;I's s u z e r a i ~ ~ l y over 'l'ibcl i~rslc:~cl o l sovcr-

eigrlty let1 lo sharp rcoctiorl i l l t l ~ c I 'nrli ; l~ne~~t o n 7111 D c c c ~ r ~ h c r 1050. Ncllru

clnririetl t l ~ c p o s i t i o ~ ~ in tlrc l 'o l lowi~~g wortls, "tllat I usctl lllc wort1 s t ~ z c ~ . ; ~ i ~ l t y

not sovereignty. .I.herc is a sligllt t l i lk rer~ce tllougl~ 1101 illucl~" 5 5 111 thc sinlrle

spcccli llc i~ l so iustifictl it as ;I " l ~ i ~ t ~ ~ r i c i l l 1;1ct" : I I I ~ 1cIt tl1:11 ;I c o t ~ ~ ~ t r y l i k ~ 111(l i ;1

cannot talk ;lbout "sovereignty or suzerilinty over all area oulsitlc its ow11 ., 56 im~nediatc i.allge. Panikkar did not amend the word fearing tlrnt i t woultl be

de t r i~ner~ta l to India's prestigc and in the changed circumstances 11ltlin woultl

not gain by insisting on the difference. 57 In the words of Panikkar : "It would

have been ridiculous." j8

52. T.N. KLLLII, (Dellii, 1979). 11. 28

53. S. Gop;~l, n. 10, p. 105

54. T.N. Kaul n . 52, p. 44

55. J. Neliru, 11. 2, 1). 302

56. Ibitl, p. 303

57. T.N. K;lul, n. 52, p. 44

58. Ibid

Tlie s ~ t u ; ~ t i o ~ l was also nor conducive as tlie Chinese were knocking at the

gates of l 'ibet ctntl tlie press 111 111tlin untler the influence of wesccrll ncws

agencies was talking ;)bout the 'l'ibcti~~r it~v;tsio~i. llntlcl- such c i t - c l t ~ ~ ~ s l ; c ~ ~ c c s rllc

correction of the word 'sovereignty' on subtle legalistic grounds to 'suzerainty'

would have heightened the tension between India and Cliina when Inili;~ was t ~ o t

prepared for i t . " Panikkar 11i111self clarifies the position on Tibet thus,

The olily area where our interests overlapped was iri l'ihet ant1 knowing the importance that every Chinese Government, inclutling Kuo~llintang Government had stressed to the exclusive Chinese territory over the area, and even before I had started for Peking come to the conclusion that the British policy (which we were supposed to have inheritetl) of looking upon Tibet as an area in wllicl~ we had special politic;~l interest coulil not be maintained. The Prime Minister llatl also in general ; I~I -ee t l with this view. "'I

Tlie fact that Indian Prime-Minister attached tou 1nucl1 of i~nportatnce to

Panikkar's views is not surprising hecause, "Neliru e~~cour;lgetl in t lependc~~ce

h l judgement", which Panikkar had. According to Neliru's last I'ol-eign sccretal-y

Gundevia, "Nehru wanted strong and convincing arguments on his policies from 6 2 his advisors". Nehru's enipll;ltic statement in Parliament on 7th December

was that India t l i t l not have any political interest il l Tibet i ~ n t l o n the basis this

stand Panikkar's advice to Neliru not to replace the word sovel-eigtlty with h.!

suzerainty seems not to be inimical to Intlian interest.

Linked to the controversy of suzerainty versus sovereignty was the ques-

tion of indepe~ltlence of Tibet. I t is genernlly believed th;lt Piinikki~r W ~ I S ~ I I S ~ I . L I -

mental in removing this buffer zone between India ant1 China mni111y but this

- -

59. Ibitl, p. 45

0 K.M. I'ic~c~l\h;~r, 11. 7. 1). 102

61. A.P. Saxena, Nellru a ~ d Public Administration (Dellli, 1990). p. 140

62. Y.D. Gun;~tlevia, W e the Archives (Hytlerabatl, 19X4), p. 200

63. J. Nehru, 11. 2, p. 302

accusation cannot be sustained because Nehru had told the Parliilment o n 7th 04

December 1050 that i t can onl) be a desire to have ;I buffer state. 0 1 1 tlie

same issue l'anikkar has been accused of preventing Nehru from giving asylum

to Dalai Lanl ;~ i l l Novc~nber 1950, hut the facts are contrilry to tllesc allega-

tions.

Rega rd~ng the independence of Tibet, though Neliru hatl snit1 i t was a

mere desire India did think i n tcrlns of a militnry option ant1 t l ~ c thcn lZorcign

Secretary K.I'.S Menon in tlie early 1950s convened a meeting of Intelligence

Bureau Chiel'. Ambassador to China and the Chief of the Arrny Staff to discuss

this option. Hut the Army Chief' General Cari;rppa ruled out such it11 opt ioi~ on

grounds of paucity of rnen as well as Indian Army's inability to fight tlie

Chinese on high attitudes with their better equipment. " 111 this meeting also

Panikkar hat1 strongly objected to any military action by Intliu owing to its

futility ,h6 71'l~e decision not to interfere wit11 Tibet 's position was taken by

Neliru even bel'ore India becanle intlepentlent. On 8th April I047 the (iover11-

rnent of India under I<ord M o u ~ ~ t b a t t e ~ ~ with Nehru as vice-chairman made tll'

following policy tlccision i n the matter of relationship between China ilncl Tiltct

The condition in which India's well being may be assured ant1 full evolu- tion be achieved of her inherent capacity to emerge as n potent but be- nevolent force in the worltl affairs, particuli~rly in Asin, tlelnnntl not ~nere ly the development of internal unity ;wd strength hut also the nlainten;wce of friendly relations with her neighbours. To prejudice 11cr reli~tions with so i m p o r t i ~ ~ ~ t a neighbour i ~ s China with aggressive support o f unqunlifierl Tibetali independence is tllerefore a policy c ~ f few attractions. I t follows that while the Government of India are glad to recognize iuid wish to sec the Tibeta11 autonomy mainteinetl they are not p~-ep:r~-txl t(1 ( 1 0 more th:111 encourage this i n a fricntlly manner. We are certainly not tlisposetl to t i~kc any initiative wllicl~ ~ n i g l ~ t bring In(1ii1 into ~ ( ~ n l l i c t wit11 i n I t l~is issue. 'l'he ;~ui lut le whic l~ I n t l i n 1)roposetl to ;itlop1 ini~y 1ics1 lic (lcscriI)c(l

64. Ibicl, 11. 303

65. B.N. Mullick, n. 34, pp.80 - X I

66. Ibid

as that 0 1 ' Iici~cvole~it spcct;~tor rcntly ot all t i ~ ~ ~ c s sl~oultl t l ~ c ol)l)ortu~lily occur to use the gootl oflices to further ;I mutually satisfactory settlement between China and Tibet. I t shoultl be atltletl recollecti~lg ill particular the participation of Tibetan goodwill mission in the recent session of tlie Cliinese National Assembly. that the Governmc~it of 111di:l wol~l(l 11ot for a moment consider objec:tion to or interfere with ;II IY :lrri~ngenlent t l i i i t

Tibet might come to tiircctly wit11 chin;^. (17

Thus Panikkar's stand o n Tibet's status was correct u ~ t l he was etlvoc;~t-

ing a policy which was not to clash with India's interest. This nttitutle was onee

again confirmed by Nehru in a11 address to the Parliament on 30tl1 March 1959

when he said :

Our ;rttituile and the position of all previous Governments in India ant1 elsewhere had historically been the recognition of some kind of suzerainty or sovereignty of China river Tibet and the Tibetan autonomy. The 1nc;l- sure of' the ;lutonomy has varietl depending upon tlie relative strength ;111tl

weakness of China and Tibet wliicli have varietl i n the last 11u11dreil

The supporte~-s o f T i h e t ; ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ i l e p e n t l c ~ ~ c c cite tllc Asia11 llcl;~iiotis Co~i lc r -

ence i n New Dellii held ill M;trcll - April 1947 to prove their point wl1e11 tlic

Tibetan delegates attended the conference as an ini lepeni le~~t ilelegation u~ltler 69 its own flag and were no way connected with tlie Chinese representative

M.R. Masani too states that at tlie Asian Relations Conference .l'ihet was rep-

resented independently and at that time Nehru and his ailvisers clitl not have any

doubt about Tibet "being a sovereign indepentlent state." 70 The fact is that the

Chinese at t l i ; ~ t time also liutl protesteil to Nehru following wl~icli the 111;lp of

Asia sliowi~rg Tibet outsiilc CIIIII:I W:IS w i t l i l r w ~ i 'I'IIc I I I ~ I ~ W:LS 11ot o ~ ~ l y

67. K. Gup~n. Citctl I'ro~n'l'r;~r~slL~.ol' I'owcr. Vol. 10, i n S i ~ ~ ~ i - l ~ ~ ( l i i l ~ l Ilelittio~is 1948 - 3 2

(Calcutta, 19X7), p. 57

68. J. Nehru, 11. 2 , pp. 313 - 17

69. Ricl~al.tlso~~, n. 24, p. 168

70. M.R. Milsalii, 11. 9, pp. 44 - 45

71. Richardson, n. 24, p. 168

witl ldrawn but according to its organizer Professor Appadorai, the Secretary

General o f 11idian Council o f Wor ld Affairs, " I t needetl a l l the pe rs~~ ;~s i ve power

o f K.P.S Menon, wl iu was tlicrr 1ntli:l's Agent (;enern1 i n Chin;r to ccl~ivincc 1 1 1 ~

Chinese t11;rI rlo pol i t ic ;~ l conclusio~rs could be 111-awn I ' r o ~ l ~ tlrc i';lcl tIi;~t :I

cultural org:lniz:ltio~i l ike the 1ritli;ln Council of Worl t l Al'l'airs 1l;ltl se l l1 ;I sc~;r -

rate i r~v i tn t io l i to T ibet ;u~tl to sccurc tlieir particip;itior~ ill tlic c o ~ ~ l c r c ~ r c c . Il

was also agrcetl to 11% different terrn l i ke representatives i~ ls tcn i l o f tlelegntes ,, 72 .

to describe persons f rom Tibet attentling the conference. I'lie menibership

o f Asian Kelatiorls Conference was thus not an i n d i c a t i o ~ ~ oS being a sovereign

state. There were many delegates wllo were pol i t ica l ly no~r-sovereign l ike the

Central Asian Republics o f Soviet Union Jews o f Palestine and the Arab League

observers.

Further another striking cvitlence o f Tibetari intlcpentle~ice was given ill

July 1949 when the Tibct;ui Govcrnnrcr~t nsketl the wllolc o l tlic (:liincse ofl' ici;~l

J . ! , t~ l iss ion a t l 2 I r : ~ s ; ~ al~cl so~l tc <:lli~lcse 11.;1ders lo IC;IL'C ' l ' i l ~c l . I'll<, 'I'~~ICI:III ; I~ . I~ I J I I

was i n July 1949 nt a t ime whelr China was in llle gr i l l of c i v i l war ;II~(I :IS st:~le(l

i n the prevlous chapter the 'I'il)et;ui posit ion w i th C l l in ;~ i s always rcl;ltive tlrnt

is i f C l i in ;~ i s weak Tibet asserts otherwise i f China i s strong 'l ' i l ic~ i s l~ell) lcss.

Even on 18th November 1949 the Chinese Ambnss;ltlor to 11idi:r ol' tlic N i ~ t i o ~ r -

alist G o v c ~ n m c ~ i ~ t lcl ivcrctl :I note l o Min is l ry (11' i Ix~crn:rl Al'1'airs r c p ~ ~ ( l i i l t i ~ r g

the S im l ;~ ( 'onverl l io~r of 1914 wli icl i i s rcg;~rtletl as o ~ ~ c o f IIIC S ~ I O I I ~ b;rsis for

7 4 Tibetan i l~t lcpe~rt lcncc. I'rior to this note tlie K u o ~ ~ r i n t n ~ l g (;ovcr11111cr1t li;~cI

sent four ~ ~ o t c s to the i l l - i t i s l i c~r~bassy ill C l i i ~ i o ~.eputl i ;rt i~rg S i ~ i l l i ~ C ~ I I V C I I L ~ ~ I I

o f 1914 alr t l l l ic facts rel;ltctl 111 l l ic bountl;lry. 75

72. App;ltl(~r;ii, Co r~ le~~~vor ;u -~ 111tli;l ( l lcl l i i . 1988). y. 235

73. liichartlson, n. 24, p. 170

74. K. Ciupto, Soot l i~ l i t on Sine-l~~dian I<el;rtion~ (Colcutt;~. I98 I), 11. 40

75. Ibid

I,, tile ye;lr 191(1-12 periotl when Dalai Liuiia lived i l l i ~ l t l i n ulltler tile

benevolence of British raj, he was not allowed to dabble i n politics. But he still

tried to involve tlle British in support of his cause against the Chinese. When

I l e L'oulltl tlictc was I I ~ l'avoc~r:~IiIe respollse I ' r o l ~ ~ tlic l%ritisl~, lie I I I ; I ( I G ;I secret

;~pproi~cll to 'l'sttr. A I I ~ I I I L I C I I to Itis C I I I ~ > ; I ~ ~ ; I S S ~ I I ~ I ~ L tile 'I'siir ~ I I I S W C I ~ ~ Y I 111s st:crel

letter t l ~ r o u p l ~ lltc 15ritisll < i ( rv t : r r~n~c~~t . 7h'l'111~s wl~cr~evcr I):~li~i 1.i111ii1 Itils st:lyed

in Illdin he Ilns tried anti- chin;^ tn;tnoeuvres. 1';11iikka1- s e ~ ~ s i r i g tlie (1:111gt>r i l l -

volvetl in p ~ v i n g asylum to 1)alni 12;~rlia at t l ~ i t t stitgc i~tlvisctl N c l l r ~ ~ ;~gni~isL

asylum to the Dalai Lr~rni~, because Dalcli Lama's stay ;I( tl1;11 lnonlcrlt coultl

have poisolied the Sino-Indian relations which were then at n very i~ebulous

stage and the prospects of peace in which India was interested would have got

destroyed. Here it is important to note that in the subsequent years especially

since 1959 tlie asylum given to Dalai Lama contributed to the worsening of

Sino - Indian relations because Tibet was used as an instrument in tlie cold war

with the support of vestetl interests so that Tibetan cause coultl be used for

needling the communist regimc ill China. The BBC correspontle~~t Chris Mullel1

in an article in Far Eastern Economic Review had given a tliorougli exposure

of the cont~nuing anti-China activities of tlie l ' ibeta~i rebels o n the soil of lntlin.

T l ~ e y were ir~tlulging in Cl~i i~ i i hiliting i~j)pitre~itly wit11 C ~ I I I I ) I C ~ C i ~ i ~ l > l ~ ~ i i t y . 7 7

India's Deputy Pritne Minister Sardar Patel anti the first Secretary genertil

both had warned Nehru that not raising the frontier issue witli t l ~ e Cliinese was

going to be very harmful i n tlie long run especially after tlie invasion of Tibet

as "they cart tlisown all the stipulations which Tibet hat1 entered into witli us 7 X in the pas[." Uajpai wanted India to take advantage oC the gootl r e l n t i o ~ ~ s

witli Cliinn in the beginning of 1950s and politically also India was in a good

76. Richal.tlson, n. 24, pp. 177 - 79

77. Chris Mullin,'TibetanCo~ispiracy'Far Eastern Economic Keview.5th September 1975

78. Mrs. A~niya Kao and B.G. Rno, n. 32, pp. 109 - 210

p i I I S I C I I I : ~ c t i c i s I 11o111it.l I I . ~ ~ O ~ : I I I ! ~ I J ~ ~

with Tibet's recognition to our ndvantage. 7" Nehru on tile otllcl. 11a11tl went by

Panikkar's atlvice that India s l~ould not rake up the border c lucs t io~~ :untl ac-

cepted Panikkar's other advice on the matter, that is, to declare publicly that

McMahon line is our bountlnry. 'l'hcrcTorc (111 20111 Novc11111cr 1050 Nchru

declared in Parliament that : "Our maps show that the McMahon line is our

boundary. Map or no map. The fact remains that we stand by tliat houndary ant1 .. K O we will not allow anybody to colne across that I)ountl:~ry. 'l'l~is S I ~ I ~ ~ I I I ~ I I I

on the part of Nehru to a great extent was also due to Sardal- Patel's letter

dated 7th Novelilber 1950 in which Pate1 had stated that Chinese anlbitions

covered not only the Himalayart slopes on our side but Assarn also. To assure

the public further Nehru made the bold statement on 7th December 1950 in

Parliament that China should be in no doubt that India would clefend the Hi-

malayan borders, "whether India had the necessary military resources or not, 1

would fight aggression whethcr i t came fro111 the nlountain or tlnc sea." X 2 011

6th December 1950 also he told the Parliament that the Himalayas formed

India's traditional boundary in the north. 83 This statement Nehru had already

made in Parliament on 17th March 1950.

Nehru. though he indulgcd i n rhetoric was ;tgoi~lst any kintl ol' alie11;ttion

with the Chinese because that would put India entirely o n thc wrong side ot

relationship with China. Nehru also knew that if India had insisted on giving up

extra territorial rights in Tibet only in exchange for ratification of the McMaIion

line and S i ~ n l a Convention it would have ended in disaster because i l l any cast:

79. S. Gopal. n. 10, p. 177

80. Parllarnentarv Deb-, Vo1.5, 1950, Cols 155-56

81. D.Das, n. 37, pp. 345 - 47

82. , . , 8th December 1950

83. J. Nehru, n. 2, pp. 302 - 3

C l l i ~ ~ a wo111d not have agreetl to I~idia 's continuance in Tibet n ~ ~ d t l~ere was 110

way by wliicli India coultl enforce them. l 'he alterni~tive to i t was the use of X4

force whicl~ India was not capable of.

The deliberate silellce by India oti the frontier issue in the early 1950

becomes clear by Nel~ru 's statement in Rajya Sabha on 9th Dece~nber 1959 ant1

why i t was not raised dur i~ ig the signing of 1954 treaty i l l April. Nel~ru 's

biographer accuses Panikkar of deliberately skipping this aspect t l u r i ~ ~ g liis

meeting w ~ r h Chou En-lai i n February 1952 "ignoring instructions of his Mill-

istry and t 'ri~ne Minister." 's He further says that "Chinese liad sccurctl all they

wanted illid hat1 given away l~ t t l e ..... But the chalice of secur111g :I clei11- i111d

explicit recognition of India's frc~ntier at a time w l ~ e ~ i intli:~ 11:ltl s o ~ n e t l i i ~ ~ g lo

offer in return had bee11 lost." This lle says was clue to all A~iib;~ssntlor, " w l ~ o

rationalizetl a shirking of unpleasiu~tness" '' Nehru's s t a t e ~ n e ~ l t 011 9111 Deceni-

ber 1959 i l l Kajya S;tbha stated sometliing contrary to these accusntio~is :IS i t

Right I'ronr 1950 or at any rate from 1951 w11c11 Chilicse Sol-ccs c:rlirc illto Tibet we liatl this proble~n before us ....... o f two powerful states conling face wit11 each other 011 ;I [ I -ementlo~~s bol-tler. 111 tliose c:~rly yc:~rs of the Chinese Republic P n ~ ~ i k k i ~ r w ;~s our A~nh:~ss ;~ t lor Ll~cre ; I I I ( I I re;~(I t11ro11g11 his notes on the subject ant1 our notes to L I ~ I I I i111c1 our ( I ec i s io~~s . 1;ro111 tile very first tl;~y ;c~ltl ; I I I tile t i~iie this p r o b l e ~ ~ ~ c;tllle l>cf(~~. t : 11s I I I 0111-

fronticr ...... Tlic qucstio~i was wlietlicr we sl~oultl wise i t i l l :III :~cutc lor111 il l tIii11 sI:~ge. WC tlccitletl !lot to. i ~ ~ l t l still wc (lo 1101 st:(. I I I ) \ V wt' C ( I I I I ( I have tlccitlctl that othet.wisc ....... wit11 all 1 1 1 ~ . 111;ctcria1 t11;lt was 1)el'orc 11s at the time we tlecitletl t h ; ~ ~ we must make clear i n every possible way ~ I I ; I I our frontier was in our opi11io11. clear i n our maps, clear in our st;ltenlents clear lo C l ~ i ~ i a ~ u ~ d to our own people of course, a ~ ~ t l l~oltl fly i t stick by it. Why shoultl we go about asking China to raise this question wlien we felt sure about it? Why invite tliscussion about a thing on which we 1i:ltl

tlouht .... we h;~d declared i t i n Parliament ant1 we tleclaretl i t before the

84. B.N. Mullick, 11. 10, p. 178

85. S. Gopill, 11. 10, p. 178

86. Ibid, pp. 186 - 87

07

l i e I I ~ ~ I I I I I I I ~ I a11 t11:11. ''

The Chinese Ciovern~l le~~t t l i t l 1101 cll;~llengc thesc stntelncllls or 111cli;ul

maps thereby convincing India that in the absence of any reaction to India's

well known position it was acquiescence by China if not acceptance. Mno

remarked to Panikkar's successor that these two Asian countries should not

have to fear from each other and China did not feel any kind of threat from her

south west frontier. *"t is not that tlie Government of India tlitl not think of

the possibility o f linking the bot~ndary issue with 1954 agreel)lellt but i t was

fully realized by the Governn~ent that quid pro quo was not possible. The

Chi~lese wcre in Tihct ~uld i f 1111lin tlid not r e c o g ~ ~ i z e i t , woultl not hnvc :~ll 'ec~etl

~11e1ii. Nc11ru hild realizetl that a frierltlly neighbour was thc best way to

safeguard o ~ ~ e ' s frontier. Nehru and Panikkar had a better ~~nderst:uncling of the

situz~tion becnuse they were conscious of the fact that 11ltlia woultl not be able

to change them or Sriglnte~r the111 by stressing on such c o ~ l d i t i o ~ ~ s 1.01- n treaty.

As in the later years i t became very clear that any pre-conditiorl would not hove

worked out and i t would have led to breakdown of negotii~tions as happened

in the 1960's. Hence Nehru's and Panikkar's thinking was very pragmatic ;wtl

if they had done otherwise as Nehru pointed out, "the result woulti have been

that they woultl have achieved their tlominance over Tibet nntl the only t l~ ing

is that we woultl have quurrelletl with them we would II ; IVC collie to n b r e ; ~ k i ~ ~ g

point with them ~ w t l the trouble on the frontier woultl have co111c i~ l~~ne t l i n t e ly

not now but years back we woultl have to face it." 0 1

Panikkar's advice helped Nehru from the sheer i~nprudence of rais i t~g tlie

question ol the 1cg;ility of M c M ; ~ h o ~ l line or the s ;~c l .oso~~ct I I ; ~ ~ L I I . C ol' 'I'i11c~'s

88. J. Nehru, n. 2, pp. 371 - 78

89. S. Gopal, n. 10, p. 179

90. J.Nehn~. n. 2, pp. 371 - 88

91. Ibid

au to~ lo~ny . I l l t i ~ i ~ ; ~ t u ~ ~ ~ s wo~~lcl 1101 11i1ve fitted i t I ~ c s I A s lile I ~ I C I I .

Moreover 1 1 i k 1 1 I C O I I S C I ~ I I S 01 the I'LICI t l ~ i l t I I C ~ I ~ I C ~ 111tlii1 1101. Cliilli~ 92 trusted each other. He also further states that it~irnedintely i~ f t c r Cliillcse

occupation lie hatl otlvisetl Nehru to extend the area o l ; ~ t l m i ~ ~ i s t r n t i o ~ ~ tcl the

McMahon lille so that the ; I ~ C ; I Ixtwecn I l i ~ l ~ a l : ~ y i ~ ~ ~ crest line i111t1 the i t ~ t ~ l l ~ i l l s

of Assiun cc~ultl be brought ulltlcr eliective jur is t l ic t io~~ of tllc ( ;OVCI . I I I I ICI I~ o l 9 .{

India before bortlcr talks were initiiitetl with Cliinii. l'lic s l~ l i s ec l~~c~ i t ycilrs

prove i l ~ n t this iltlvicc i l ~ r ~ ~ r : t l O I I I to hc l'r11i11'11l ils 1'111. I I S I I I C ML.M:IIIIIII l i ~ l r W I I S

c o ~ i c ~ r ~ i c t l .

The unsigned :irticle o f 2nd December 1963 i n the Hintlustan 'l'i~lles untler

the title of "l'anikknr's Role as Envoy i n Peking" states th;~t "G.S. 1311jpai, tlie

Secretary General of Ministry cif Exterlial Affairs was of tlie opinion that tlie

question o f (:hinn's sovereig~ily over Tibet coultl not bc tre:~tcd ;IS ; I I I isol;~tctl

subject arid that number of othcr connected issues, also covereti by several

treaties and conventions culrni~lating in the Sirnla c o ~ i v e i ~ t i o l ~ of 1914 would

also be required to be considered". But the letter sent by tlie Ministry of

External Affairs officials to China on 31st October 1950 is silent over the

question that tlie Chinese sovereignty over Tibet is related or linked to several

treaties and conventions culminating in tlie Simla convel~lion. The fact is t l i ; ~ t

the Chiang Kni-slick Governmellt ques t io~~ed the stipulations of the Si~i i la con-

vention of 1'114 i n respect o i 111clo - 'Sihet;~n l'rontier :IS well :IS Al~gl, , ~ 'l.i11et:111 9'1 trade r egu la t~o~ l i n several comlnunications sent i n 1947. 'l'his coulcl be the

reason why Ministry of Exter11:lI Affairs officials refrained from lnaking any

specific reference to Simla conft:~-ence and tried to justify tile extl-;I -~--tc~-~-itori:~l

rights on the grou~itls of "usage ant1 agreements". Al~otlier instance of lack of

92. K.M. Panlkkar, Antobiotrrooliy (London, 1971). p. 246

93. lbid

94. K. Gupta n. 74, p. 40

clarity on the Indo-Tibetan trade agreement during the British t i ~ n e is evident

i n Aitc111so11's Treaties. For cxa~np le t l l e nirrotive I-elating to tllc ' l ' i b e t ; ~ ~ ~ 1r;~tlc.

On page I9 of Aitchison's Treaties volutne XIV (first printed i l l 1929 ant1

reprinted i n 1939) the original tlraft about the Tibet;un trade agreement states:

"The (1908) Regulations were subject to revision after 10 years; but though

certain modifications were made as a result of the abortive Tripartite conven- n 95

tion of 1914, they still remain tlie basis of Indo-Tibetan trade arrangements.

But the same Aitchison's Treaties volume XIV on page 21 states : "A new set

of trade regulations between (ireat Britain and Tibet was conclutied i~nt ler this

(1914) Collvention to replace the earlier regulations of 1x03 ant1 1908". '1.11~

detailed text o f Anglo-Tibet?ul Trade Regulations werc printed o n pages 39-41

of Aitclliso~l's Treaties volunie XIV ignoring tlie statelnent 1n;ltle earlier i n tile '1 h

narrative I I ~ I the abortive nature of the c o ~ ~ v e n t i o ~ ~ of' 1014, 'l'l~us tllc

contrntiictio~i i n the Aitcllison's TI-eaty itself p o i n ~ s out lo tllc c o ~ ~ l u s i c ~ ~ ~ i t

could create in the minds of Ministry of External Aff'airs offici;~ls. S;lrtlar K.M.

Panikkar prob;~bly could have been aware of this fact which may be the reason

why he hat1 advised Nehru to extend tlie administration and post the Army units

to the McMallon line.

Moreover i f Intlia h;ui s o ~ ~ g h t the ratific;~tion of S iml ;~ conven~ion of 1014

in excli;~ngc for ;tb;ultloning of' Intli;~'s rights ;untl privileges i l l 'l'ilict. tllc ('llincsc

woultl h;lvc relccte(l i t outrightly lor the s i ~ i ~ p l e rci~son 1I1i11 by r i l ' y i ~ ~ tile

Simla convention China woultl have accepted the intlepentlence of 'Sihet ant1 its

rigllt to C I I I C I - into treilties, wl~icll wol~lcl II ; IVC OCCII ;I 11cgi1liot1 o( ils clili111 O V C I .

Tibet. 11 was this rcalizatioll wllicll inotlc Intel. on Ncliru to a t ln~i t 1111 0111

December 195') in P a r l i a ~ n e n ~ while explaining the stand on lntlia's liolicy witli

i i I ~ I I C t i pro I ; r o c 1 1 w I I I S i l l gctling t l ~ c l'ro111ier

r c t ~ ~ ~ i z e l l ~ y ( : I I I I I ; I 011 L11e 0;1sis 111 I014 C O I I V C I I ~ ~ ~ I I Ilcltl i l l S I I I I I ~ I .

The c ~ i t i c s of C l i i ~ ~ n policy fail to realize t l ~ n l ally r e - c ~ l i t i o ~ ~ w o ~ ~ l t l

have been no use because Cliou En-lai had told F'anikkar o n 24111 Scpte~nber

1951 that lie was "anxious to safeguard the comtnercial and cultural interests

of lndia in Tibet" and the "stabilization of Tibetan frontier" was to be discussetl

and finalizetl by lndia, Cliina and Nepal". 97 Arguments could be based on l~igli

tiioral principles but these canllot and will not i ~ ~ f l u e n c e f o r e i g ~ ~ policy matters,

a fact wliicli critics of Intlin's China policy failed to realize or untlcrsta~itl. 111

this regard i t slioultl be accepted tliat tlie 1954 agreelllellt bet wee^^ 111tli~1 and

China was possible because India was willing to give up all tliat i t inherited

from the British and Neliru was against retaining all tliat stood for imperialism

and he was fully conscious of the fact that preconditions would ruin the

negotiation ilncl in the subsecluent years i t was the pre-contlition of ; ~ s k i ~ ~ g

China to vacate Aksai Chi11 which took the crisis to a point of no retur~i . The

India's actual position on 'Tibet has been aptly stated by Krislina Menon :

" India's position in Tibet was I-ather peculiar. She was the only c o u ~ ~ t r y repre-

sented at the Tihetan capital. But Indian representative was tl~el-e in iui uncle-

fined capacity and was more or less successor of tlie original British represen-

tative who strayetl into Tibet and stayed there" 98

But ill India ;I strong groitp of officials, po1itici;uis 311d ~ ~ ~ c ~ i i l ~ e r s o l press

were advocating t1i;lt India continue tlie British i111peri;11 p o s i t i o ~ ~ 0 1 1 C l i i ~ ~ i ~ il~id

Tibet. The protagonists of Tibetan independeuce l~at l the support of tlie west

and USA w l ~ i c l ~ was equally particular about tlie i~ ldepen t l e~~ce (11' Tibet not i l l

tlie interest of lndia but 1nai111v to needle tlie c o m m u ~ ~ i s t Governnient i n Chitin

97. S. Gopal, n. 10, p. 177

98. TheHllltlu, 17th August 1950

and to cllcck t l ~ c co~nbined power i r f comlnunist movemenl of Sino-Soviet

i~lli;uicc. 'rllc (:llincsc wcre et111;1lly tlcterlni~lctl to c o ~ ~ s o l i t l ; ~ t c l l~c i r s l ~ . c ~ ~ g t l ~ i l l

Tibet to 11r~11cct tllc ~ I I I ' ; I I I ~ ( ' ~ I I I I ~ I I I I I ~ S I < ; O V C ~ I I I I I C I I I i l l ( : I I ~ I I ; I .

1';lnikk:lr being ;I kcell ol>servc~- of worltl politics ntlvisctl N c l ~ r t ~ ; I ~ : I I I I S ~

taking ;uny atlvellturous step (111 the basis of the advice of pro- wester^^ officials

i n the Millistry of Exter~lal Affairs. The public;~tion of ;I I'cw slutlies li;~vc

proved how correct Panikkar was in his assesslilelrt. 'I'llese stutlies (a) The

Politics of Lying (1973) by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. (b) CIA and

the Cult of intelligence (1974) by Fletcher Prouty. (c) The Secret Team (1979)

prove very convi~~ci l igly liow t l ~ c wester11 countries wcre keen 1111 using Tibet

to tlestabil~/,c tlre Cllil~esc colnn~i~l i is t goverlllllclrt. N u t I t ~ i k k ~ r ' :~tlvicc lo

Nellru on tlic 1ll;ttter illvitctl t l~c suspicio~i of tlrel~ Secretary (;cllcr:~l 01' M i l ~ i s l ~ y

of External Affail-s Sir G.S. Uqjpai and the Secretary General s c ~ l t T .N . Knul

(ICS) to Cliin;~ with the illstruction, "to keep an eye on our ;uiib;~ss;itlor Siu-clar

K.M. Phnikkar - who is inclined to take too much pro Chinese views" '9.~. Kaul on the other liantl justifies P:inikkar3s st;tlitl i111d li~rks the situ;~tion i l l Tihet

to the s i t u : ~ t i o ~ ~ i l i t l in facet1 i l l l insh~nir : I I I ~ Goa ;kt least ill principle tllnt is " l l~c

right of a s~ ivcrc ig l~ country t t r s;~ltgu;u-tl its sovcrcig~lty over ; ) I 1 its 11;trts : I I I ~

to ellsure its territorial i~ltcgritv." "Io The westcr11 powcl-s cspcci;~lly A ~ l ~ c r i c ; ~

ant1 U K w;i~itecl lo create all tilleasy u l ~ ~ i o s p l ~ e r c 0 1 1 l l ~ e issue of 'l'ihet. A

co~~cc r t c i l i11lc111l)l was III ; I(~C Op Illese co11111ries 0111 01' tlicir C O I I I I I I L I I I ~ S I ~ ) l ~ o l ~ i i ~ ,

to create i111 ilnpression ;unolig intlial~ public that i t is i l l Intli;~li iliterest to

prevent the military occupn t io~~ of Tibet. The c o ~ n ~ n a ~ l t l a ~ i t General of D c f e ~ ~ c c

Services Staff C'ollegc i n Wellillgton (T;lmil N ; ~ t l u ) W.1l.A i,e~ir;iigl~e c o ~ r t l c ~ ~ l ~ ~ c t l

Indian le;ltlers tor tlieir lack of foresight and il~nctioli, i l l view of (:hi~lese n c t i o ~ ~

in Tibet ~uitl the fact thi~t l i i ~ n ; ~ l ; ~ y a s hat1 become the boulltlary with ;I Ii~rge

99. T.N. Kaul, n . 52, p. 28

100. lbid

powerful a~itl expansionist C l i i ~ ~ n . lo ' The attitude of the west is best tlefinetl

by Walter ( 'rocker, in his study o ~ i Neliru :

Tlie beliaviour of the press. not only in India but especially in US. IJK n n t l other Western countries (luring the various Sino - 11liIia11 co~if l ic ts ...... was ;ui eye opener eve11 1 0 the (liplomats fa~i i i l i ;~r with the u~ireli;~hility of 11111~Il ;111(I 1 1 1 1 ~ ~ ~ 1 1 ~ 1 1 ~ 0 1 1 ~ 1 1 ~ ~ ~ 0 1 ' SOIIIC IlCWSpIIJ>CI.S ~ ~ l ) O ~ l i l l J!.... ' 1 ' 1 1 ~ I.CI)OI.I-

ing i l l c e r t i ~ i ~ ~ I I I ~ I S S ci!.c111:1tio11 I I C W S ~ ) ; I ~ ) C ~ S i n I I I C IISA :III(I I I K was W O I S ( :

tlliln i ~ ~ i ~ c e ~ ~ r i ~ l e i t W ~ I S o l t e~ l grossly I'i~brici~te(I ....... ' 1 ' 11~ r e l )o r l i~~g b y some (liplomatic missions was not lnucli better .... 'l'oo ill:uiy of these reports copied untruthful newspapers or sent back to their Govern t l~e~ i t what they knew their Governtnents would like to believe. "'"

The altitude of the English press is reflected in an article i l l The Econo-

mist, dated 10th December, 1949, where it is argued that it was up to lntlia to

take the in~t iat ive i n the matter of Tibet ant1 i f Intlin tlecitles to support the

indepe~ltlence o f .fibel as ;I huller state b e t w e c ~ ~ itself ;lntl C:lli~~a. I3ritnit1 ant1

USA wot~ltl tlo well lo e x l c ~ ~ t l the iorlllnl recog~li t io~l lo i t . Nchru with cull-

c i s of I s I I s e r I S r I I lX01 Nov~1111)cr I050 stittt:~

that : " I t is i ~ ~ t c r e s t i ~ ~ g to iiotc r l i ; ~ t UK i111tl LISA ; I ~ ~ ~ I C ; I ~ S lo l)c i i ~ ~ x i o u s i t 1 ; ~ ( l t l

to the u~~ l ' r i e~~ t l l i nes s of lntlia i111d Chillit Lowi~r(Is C ~ I C I I o t l~e r . I t is illso i ~ ~ l e r c s t -

ing to i i ~ i t l ~11i1t lJSSli tloes no1 view wit11 fi~vour ;111y l'rie~rtlsllil~ 11ctwcc11 111~li:l

and China towards each other." lo' It was this understantlil~g of USA, U K allti

USSR by Nehru which would have convinced him of Panikkar's views on the

matter. Neliru was not all that naive to overlook some of the l';~cts of reality

just because Piunikkar ativiscd him so. The Americilns 2nd the other Western

countries wanted India to pull "Tibetan chest nuts out of Chinese fire" and they

would wntcll the furl from a tlistance. Tlie westerti powers wa~itetl to pre-

vent India iintl China from c o r n i ~ ~ g close as frie~ldly lnt l~n ant1 C ~ I I I I ~ w o ~ ~ l t l kecp

101. J.P. Dilivi, 11. 28. p. 15

102.Citetl f~olin K. Gupta, n. 74, pp. 37 - 3X

103.D. Das. n. 37, pp. 342 - 47

104.T.N. Kiiul, 11. 52, p. 141

the cold war out of Asin antl the absence of colt1 war in Asia woultl have been

de t r imc~~ta l to t l~cir i11Ieres1 ill \vorltl politics. 'l'hc US coi~sulaic i i t ( ' ;~lct~il;c was

used by tlie C.1.A to drive a wetlge between liitlia ~uitl C h i ~ ~ a by nl;~kinp, all

kinds of promises to the Tibetan emissaries and tlie Kuomint;uig clroppetl leaf- 105 lets and eve11 arms and radio transmitters to their agents in Tibet. Sucll

actions from India naturally aroused suspicion in the iiiinds of alrently suspi-

cious Peking government tliougli Indian government had no role in it. Panikkar

was aware ot this suspicion antl states : "During that time India ant1 China were

on fairly good terms but it woultl not be correct to say that they trusted each

other completely. It would be truer to say that each was vigil;~ntly observing,

the other. Although Mao, Chou and others were cordial to me ...... I could feel

their distrust o f our foreign policy. We too had our suspicions about their

policy. In diplor~l;lcy this is not ~rriusual .... I-lowever i n our relations with China IOh we had to bc eve11 inore tlia~i unusually circumspect." Tlie C l ~ i ~ l e s e suspicio~i

of India could have been due to the notes sent by lntlia tluriiig ar~tl oil the evt.

of Tibetan "liberation" to the Chinese, wliicli had expressed u i~due colicern i n

matters of Tibet especially after India had recognizetl Chiria's "Sovereignly"

over Tibet. I t was in this background Panikkar ctecidetl not to correct the erl-01-

of using tlie word "Sovereignty" by the Indian Govern~iielit clue to an "over-

sight". In the words of T.N. Kaul : "I have no doubt in my mind that Panikkar

was right oil inoral, political ant1 stri~legic consi t lerai io~~ n~ltl in the sl~trrt ~11it1

long term interests of India. We hat1 a hostile neighbour in P ; l k i s t ; ~ ~ ~ backetl b s

tile USA anti the west especi;~lly on Kashmir question. l'lle Soviet Onions

relation wit11 India were still in the process of f o r t ~ ~ u l : ~ t i o i ~ ;111(1 1i;10 11ot yet

become friendly." ""

105.lbitl, pp 44 - 45

106.K.M. Pal~ikkar, n. 92, pp. 240 - 41

107.T.N. K:ILI~, n. 52, pp. 44 - 45

'l'lle ( ' I I I I I C S I : s1ro11gIy S L I S O C ~ : I C ( I 1I1;it 'l'il)ct C O L I I ( I I ) I ' I I S C I ~ 1)y 1111: A I I I C I I C ; I I I ~

for sabotagiug or destabilizing the nascent C O I I I I ~ I I I I ~ S I C ~ O V ~ I - I I I I I ~ I I ~ i n CII~II ; I .

This suspicion was not without basis as a protagonist of 'fibeta11 i ~ ~ d e p e ~ i t l e i ~ c c

has stated : "There was certain ; u ) io l~n~ of jus t i f ica t io~~ Cor s ~ ~ s p i c i o n s regartling

the American intentions vis-a-vis Tibet ... There wns L20vell Tllomns's (A~ner i -

can radio operator) much publicized visit in 1949. The f t r l lowi~~g year ;I copy

of booklet I l o c ~ ~ i l i t ~ r y I r i c I ' i ~ ~ I ' A c i c troo[)s O I I '1'il)et W A S

circulating i n certain quarters i n Knl i~npo~lg imtl its existence wits i ~ ~ ~ ( l o l ~ h t e t l l y

known to the Cllinese ;lgenls thcre Fi11;llly tile escape of i>:ll:~i I . ; I I ~ ; I ' s hrother

Tnkstcr l < i ~ ~ ~ l ) o c l ~ c I ' L I ~ N t i1 An~crico i l l July 0 I was clc;~rly :I

major f ac lo~ in thc ; i l t c r ~ n t i o ~ ~ ol C:lii~la's policy in i'ihcl ... with 'l':~kstcr l<inl})ochc

in America, the possibility of A~nerican intervention may well have seemed

imminent and when Dalai Lama was hastily installed in power i n 1950 by the

Tibetail Governrncnt, the Clli~iese must have decided that lor~g-term peiiceful

measures wcre no longer practicable. I t was ~~ecessn r i ly LO innkc prcpnri~tio~ls

to forest;~ll action by Tibeta11 exiles i n India ;uid bring Tibet quickly L I I I ~ I C ~

complete Chinese control." I U X The anti-China activities of the Tibetan rebels

in India was a tlominont Scotul-c al~tl i t hi~tl the s ~ ~ p p o r c of Cew p ro -wcs t c r~~

Indian polit~cians. 'Shus the Tihetan rebels were indulging i n China baiting with

impunity. .l'he west, especially America, was trying to trap Indin by nlienatillg

her frorn China so that pressure on account of this would make her succumb

to the pressures of west on compro~nising in the Kas l~mir issue with Pakistan.

The Ang lo~A~ner i can designs o n the matter were clear in 1962 when Du~lc:ul

Sandys ant1 Dean Rusk came to India to assess India's arliis require~nents

against the Chinese attack. The Sandys-Rusk team tried to pressurize India to

make concessions to Pakistan on Kiishmir. Io9 Therefore Nehru's acceptance of

Panikkar's advise on the Sirlo-11itlian relations vis-a-vis Tibet was the best

108.G. Patterson n . 17, p. 156

109.T.N. K;luI, 11. 52, p. 117

policy whicll India coultl have udoptetl nt that' tirne. Nehru ' s policy on China

was on the r ight track and Panikkar did not push "Nehru in to it" 110 as gen-

er ;~l ly irssumetl by the cri t ics of lntlia's China Policy.

Tlie llivergence of opinion between Sardar K.M. Panikkar and s o m e of the

Ministry of External Affairs senior officials inclutling the Secretary General

G.S. I3;ijp;li ;Ippe;lrs to he clue lo their t l i f f e r e ~ ~ t backgrountl. T h e senior off ic i ;~ls

of Ministrv of External Affairs like Baipai were products of British colonial

~ I ~ ~ i i i s ~ r ~ t i o n , ;111(1 wo~ilcl l l i~ve i l ~ o u p h t ant1 advised tnore o r less on pro-

western n1l1tlel~K.M. Panikkar on the o ther hand became one of the key advisors

o f Nehru hrc ;~l ise of his "glittel.ing intellect" and he h;ld c ; ~ u g h t the a t t e~ l t ion

of Nehru way back in 1924. ' r h e Secretary General and other key officials of

Ministry o l External Affairs including Sri K.P.S. Menon would have been upset

by the fact that Nehru as early as 1949 had said that h e had conf idence in, "only

th ree of h is d ip lo tna t s , namely Kr i shna M e n o n , K.M. P a n i k k a r a n d Dr .

Radhakrishnan. 9 , I I I Nehru's confitfence i n Panikkar was because he was a rare

hlentl of \c l io l ;~r ant1 man o f ;~ffni rs "and usetl his profound knowledge of

1iisto1-y lo rhc sei-vice ol' conten1por;Iry events." I~lence s o m e of the Western

ScI1olat.s l l i~ve clcscr-ihetl Snrt l i~r K.M. 1';lnikk;lr as ;I "key~n;ln in world affairs,

I I ? :111t1 " the ahlest cliplomat i l l the worltl." Escor t Reid on the o ther hand says

., I I : 1 th;lt I';rnikh;!r" w;is ;III evil ge i t i~ ts . T h e cri t ics of P i~n ikknr Iinve been hi~rsl i

o n hiin 0111 Ali~ii C;lmphell l o l ~ n s o ~ ~ , Mounth;ltten's press at tache, has m ; ~ d e the

f o l l o w i ~ ~ g ol)servation which ilptly proves why the a

by his crilics both i n lnt l i ;~ a~ l t l foreign are i l l cc

'., ' . .A\<*

1 10. Ihid, 4 5 \' . -.. -~

I I I . K. ( i o l ~ a . "l<c11~inscenceso1K.PS. Menon" in Asian Studies V o ~ d 1 , p. 58

I I o l I{irtlwootl i\ (I(~,o~ltlon, 1953). p. 185 ant1 W. Lip~litun in

Schles~nger and R.H. Rover, Tlie Generill and the President(New York, 1952), p. 133

I 1 3 . 11. I<c1(1. l > ~ ~ ~ ~ o J 1 1 5 _ & ~ 1 , I I , I I I I ~ I O I I . I ' JK I ). 1). 105

He is i111 I~istoriitt~, politici;~n ant1 journnlist, it nii111 of protligious leilr~ti~lg and profound judgement i~ntl no mean practitio~ier in tlie (lying art of c o ~ ~ v e r s i ~ t i o ~ ~ ..... The more I see of Pa~iikkar the more impressetl I atn by his intellectual power iuitl political slirewdness. Ile is tlie !-;we blend of scholar ; u ~ t l ;I miut of itl'fi~irs who c;ltl 0ri11g his 1)1.ol'o~111tl ~ I I O W I C I I ~ C 01' history to the service of co111e11tpor;lry evenls. Ilc is o11c 111' ;11?ovc I I ; I I I ' - ; I . tlozcft 111et1 who ~l i i ty well hitvc grcitt i t t l l~~et tce i l l tltc s I t :~ l ) i~~g 01' I t ~ t l i i ~ t ~

policy at liolne and abroad ... t le had his enemies ant1 there ;Ire s o ~ n e who assert that he is ambitious and untrustworthy, hut I suspect he suffers I'rotll I IK jcitlousy of lltosc who rcscnl beiltg co~t l ro t~ tc t l with ;I superior intellect. I t is the occup;ttionitl risk of every clevcr I I I ~ I I I 1 0 111: r ~ g i ~ r t l ~ ( I its i l i t~~gcrous by their less gillctl l ) r c [ l ~ r c ~ ~ . ' I 4

The tou~ltlation for cortlial~[y between two great powers 01 Asia was laid

by Sardar K . M . I'anikkar ant1 i l Intlia was able to enhance its prestige as n

mediator in world affairs i t was because Pa~iikkar cultivatetl the Clii~lese oon-

fidence in 111clia by his g e ~ l l ~ i ~ l c ton-alig~~~ne~it-bi~setl atlvice to Neltru. Uut l'or

these positiolis by India in its relations with China, Neliru woultl not have

played the role of an "honest peace broker." Neliru's biographer says : "By the

end of 1950 Neliru liad become a worltl figul-e whose stature liad little relation 115 to his country's strength." This would not have been possible if India had

strained her relations with Chinese on tlie issue of Tibet, though Tibet did cast

a dark sliatlow O I I Intlia China ~clationsliip for a bt-ief period bel'ore Piutikkilr

restored the friendly relations. I I6

The Cliina policy consitlerations on realistic terms is defiltetl by one of

Panikkar's tletractors and India's first Foreign Secretary K.P.S Menon who had

accused Panikkar of "going to rhe other side." He sitys :

In 1950 Chinese troops invatletl Tibet ant1 critics o f Government o l lntli;~ denounced its allegetl inaction on that occasion. They even say [ha[ Intlia gave away Tibet to China as if Tibet had been India's t o be given away. The fact is that Tibet never enjoyed an independent status ill i~tterniltio~ial

114.A. Johnson Chunpbell, Mission with Mountbatten (Bombay, 195 I), p. 80

115,s. Gopal, n. 10, p. 111

116.M. Brecher, Neliru : A Political Bio~r i& (London, 1959), p. 572

eyes, I.;VCII ~;re;~t I j r i t i i in w ] ~ i c l i c;lnie 11e;irest to tile recognitio11 01' TiI?et3s independence recognizctl i t subject to Chinesc s o v c l c i g ~ ~ t y ill ltl A :I!- ways i-cg;r~-tletl Tibet as ;III ill tegratetl part o f ( ' l~ in ;~ unt i l tllc . f ihc tn~ l question became a convenient tool i n the colt l war. 'I7

The tllrust o f lntl ia's foreign policy i n the im~nct l ia te yc i~rs ;~ f tc r intlepen-

dence, wit11 the nascent n a t i o ~ ~ l ' ;~cing al l kinds o f prolilems wns aptly tlescrihetl

by Nehru's sister Vijny;1l;iks111111 IJuntlit ill ;III interview 11) ;in A ~ l l c r i c : ~ ~ ~ news-

paper - New York t leral t l ' l 'rihu~le on 1st January 1951 j u s ~ i f y i n g I';u~ikk;u"s

role i n preventing war wi th <:hinn wl l ic l i w;ls ;I greiltcr tl1re;il to Int l i :~n t l ~ a ~ i

Communism in Asia. 118

I n the subsequent years if' our relntionsliip w i th <:liina go1 tletcrior:~tetl i t

was not tluc to the policies :~tlvisctl by Panikkar ;~nd ;idoptc(I by NCII~LI Out hy

certain att i t i~t les which both C l i i ~ l n and India had t:lken on the trontiel- later ;uid

the 1959 revolt i n T ibet coupletl wi th the stay o f Dalai Lama i n India. To say

that Sardar K.M. Panikkar misletl Nehru o n India's China pol icy woultl be ;I

misnomer because one o f the Foreign Secretaries o f Nehru i n Inte 1950 and

beginning of 1960 Subirnal Dutt had denied these k i n d o f allegations that he

was relying too much on his senior advisers - a matter on w l ~ i c h crit ics i n his

own party often complained. According to S.Dutt, "they (the cr i t ics) tentletl to

attribute the responsibility Tor tllosc policies w l ~ i c h tllcy tlislikccl to his o l l i c i i ~ l

ntlviscrs. 'l ' l leir suspicion wits cnl i rc ly grol~ntl lcss. N c l ~ r l ~ woult l I1c t l ~ c l; ist 111;111

to accept tlict;~tion f rom iunyhotly, :inti to surrentler his jutlgcmcnl." 11') 'l'llerc-

Fore, N e l l r ~ ~ 11;itl i lo i~csit; i t io~r I pc~int ing out tllc wlongs, C~I~IIIII~(I~:LI Oy 11is

of f ic ials ant1 i f they st i l l pcrsistctl in wronj! d o i ~ l g 1111 hntl I i lcsit;~tion i n

removing t l i c n ~ i111tl trictl L I I [)col?lc ill their [)I;icc. 1 2 0 . ['his truly cx l~ l ;~ ins

117. K.P.S. Menull. Twi l i~hL 111 C h (Uo~nbay. 1972), p. 258

118.K. Gupta n. Ill, p. 58

119,s. Dutt. K i t h Nehru in Fo re i~n Office (Calcutta, 1977). p. 285

120,s. Gopal, S e l e c t e d W o r k s V~awaharlall. 6, (Delhi, 1972), p. 6

Nel~ru 's v i e ~ s of tlie role of his office inclutling his colleagues i l l tlie Ciovcr~i-

ment. Therelore if Neliru had judged that Pa~iikkar wns mislc;itli~ig l i i~n Ill:

would have ~lcfinitely recnlletl i t i ~ r ~ . Nellru Ii;rtl no rzscrv;~tic~n r e g ; ~ ~ . ~ l i ~ r g J';~~rili!i;~r's

style of functioning I'i~nikkor t(lo was only going by t l ~ e e x i s t i ~ ~ g reality a1111

Nehru never gave him categorical orders on the matters related to Chinil.

The ;tbove tliscussion cle;~rly negates the statement tli;\t scetls for [lie

bedevilmen1 of India Cliina r e ln t io~~s wer-e truly sown by tlie A~~~bass ;c t lor S:~rtIilr

K.M. Panikhar. The establislime~it of People's Republic of China in 1949 under

the leadersh~p of Mao caused a geopolitical shift in tlie worltl ba la~ice of

power. The nor1 recognition of Communist China by USA and otller western

countries anti refusal of USA to allow China to occupy lier seat in tlie United

Nation as a permanent member of the Security Council aggravated tlie coltl

war tension in Asia t l~ereby t l i reateni~~g the peace and stability i n tlie continent.

It was in this situation that Sardar K.M. Pa~iikkar advised Nehru to pursue a

constructive policy witli China s o that a good beginning coultl be matle on note

of cordiality. I t was this cortii;~l relatiorlsl~ip witli Cliiri:~ which en;~bled lndi ;~,

in a very sliort time, within achieving lier independe~ice to come to the forefro~it

as spokesman of hundreds of nill lions of Asian people constituting half the

world's popul;~t io~i . 111 the subsequent yei1l.s if this rel;~tionsliip was hroke~l i t

was not due to tlie cortliality of early years but due to reasons explninetl i l l the

subsequelit chapters. Panikkar was able to reatl tlie existing situntion to the best

of India's interest especially in the context of n;lsty brickeri~igs created bv

western oriented officials in tlie External Affairs Ministry ;IS well as by inis-

guided patriotism with his intellectual power political shrewt lnes~ ant1 profound

knowledge of history. Panikkar contributed to the service of contemporary

events, which only a scholar ant1 man of affairs could do.