1992 an Experimental Study of Expressive Voting

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PublicChoice73:251-260,1992.© 1992KluwerAcademicPublishers.Printed n the Netherlands.

An experimental tudyof expressivevoting*

JOHN R. CARTER

Department f Economics,Collegeof theHoly Cross, Worcester,MA 01610

STEPHEND. GUERETTE

EconomicsHonorsGraduate 990,Collegeof theHoly Cross, Worcester,MA 01610

Received11June 1990;accepted31 October1990

Abstract. nthispaperwereport esultsof an initialattempto testthetheoryof expressiveoting.Ourexperimentnvolvesrequiringubjects o votebetween eceiving Aincashor having$Bdo-

nated o charity n theirbehalf.Acrosssubjectswevary heprobabilityhattheirvotewilldecide

whichdisbursements made.As theprobability f beingdecisives lowered, heopportunity ost

of givingexpressiono charitable entimentdecreases; ence,the likelihoodof votingin accor-

dancewithsuch sentiments expected o increase.We findweaksupport or the hypothesis,but

theresultsdo notreplicatewhenwe alter heparameterettings.Limitations f ourdesignaredis-cussed.

1. Introduction

Votershavepreferencesorrealizing ne outcomeoveranother; heyalsohave

preferencesor expressing upportfor one outcome overanother.These two

setsof preferences redistinct.As theprobability f beingdecisivediminishes,voter choicewillbe dominatedby preferencesor expressing upport.Thisis

the essenceof whathasbecomeknownasthetheoryof expressive oting.Fore-

shadowedbyTullock 1971),thetheory s developed ormallybyBrennanand

Buchanan(1984); its positive and normativeramificationsare exploredbyBrennan(1989), Brennanand Lomasky (1985, 1987), Brennanand Pincus

(1987),Lee (1988),and Lomasky 1985). Despite ts intellectualpedigreeand

itspotentially adical mplications,hetheoryof expressive otingremainsone

of the best keptsecrets n publicchoicetoday.1Inthispaperwereportresultsof aninitialattempt o testexperimentallyhe

* Thisresearchwassupported ytheCollegeof theHolyCrossandbya Procter& Gamblegrantto theDepartmentf Economics.Wegratefully cknowledgehe comments nd contributionsf

JamesAndreoni,GeoffreyBrennan,GeorgeKosicki,MichaelPeddle,TomRietz,DavidSchap,JamesShepperd,RoyceSingleton,ToddVladyka,ArlingtonWilliams,an anonymous eferee,andcolleaguesn our departmentesearchworkshop.

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252

theoryof expressive oting.Wefind at bestonlyweaksupport or thetheory,but the meaningfulness f the evidenceis suspectdue to a designproblemwhich we wereunableto solve. Our

hopehere s to stimulate nterest n both

the theoryandthe possibilityof testingit experimentally.

2. Theoryof expressivevoting

Inthetheoryof expressive otinga distinction s drawnbetweenvoters'prefer-encesover outcomesandpreferences verexpressions f support.The distinc-

tion is most clear when the two sets ofpreferences

onflict - whenapersonprefersonealternative, ayA, to be theelectionoutcome,but at the sametime

prefers o express upport orthe otheralternative, ayB. A particularlylean

example nvolvesa protestvote. A personmightclearlyprefer o seecandidate

A electedovercandidateB. At the sametime, the personmightfind satisfac-

tionincastinga protestvotefor candidateB, perhapsbecauseA hasruna par-ticularlyoffensive campaign.Hence, the person prefersA to win but also

prefers o expresssupportfor B. Otherexamplesoften involve a conflictbe-

tweeneconomic nterestand moralsentiment.To takeLomasky's 1985)exam-

ple,a personmightprefer o see SocialSecurity epealedor reasonsof materi-

al self-interest,yet also preferto express supportfor it out of a sense of

obligationto the elderly.These wosortsof preferencesweigh nthe calculusof votingas follows. As-

sumethat a personmaycast a ballot betweentwo alternativesA and B. The

outcome s determined y majorityrule; n the case of a tie, a randomdevice

isused.Forsimplicity, hecostof voting s omitted.Thepersoncaststhe ballotso as to maximize xpectedutility.LetU(A)be theutilityof realizingA as the

electionoutcome; et V(A)be the utilityof expressing upportfor alternativeA. DefineU(B)andV(B)similarly.Excludinghe vote of ourgenericvoter,oneof five eventsmustoccurbasedon all others'votes:A winsby morethan one

vote;A winsby one;A ties;A losesby one;or A losesby morethanone. Let

P1throughPs be the perceivedprobabilities ssociatedwith theseevents.

Computingheexpectedutilitiesof votingforA andBandsubtracting ields

R = P [U(A) - U(B)] + [V(A) - V(B)], (1)

where

P = 1/2P2+ P3 + V2P4. (2)

P representshe voter'sperceivedprobabilityof beingable to cast a decisive








253

vote. R is the expectedreturnof votingfor A overB and is seento be the sumof two terms.The first is knownas the instrumentaleturnandis equalto thedifferentialutilityof the two prospectiveoutcomes discountedby P. Thesec-

ond is known as the expressive eturnand is equalto the consumptionutilityderived rom the act of votingfor A over B. If R is positive,thepersonvotes

for alternativeA.Notice in equation (1) that as P decreases, he expressivereturncomes to

dominate hecalculusof voting.Twoimplications ollow fromthis.First,andmostgenerally, t meansthat how the personvotes, as wellas whether heper-son votes, will be primarilya consumptionchoicein largeelections,where Ptendsto be exceedingly mall. Second,whenpreferencesover outcomes con-

flict withpreferences verexpressionsof support,then how the personvotescan varysystematicallywiththe probabilityof beingdecisive.

To see this second mplication,assume n equation 1) that the instrumentalreturn s positiveandhence favorsvotingfor A, while theexpressive eturn s

negativeandhencefavorsvotingfor B. Assume further hat abovesomenon-zero value of P, the instrumental eturn nitiallydominatessuchthat the ex-

pectedvote is for A. Thenas P decreases,at some pointthe expressive eturnwillcometo dominate,andthe expectedvote will switchfromA to B. To useour earlier

xample,na smallorclose electiona

personmightforegoa

protestvote, for fear that it wouldhavethe undesired onsequenceof electing heless

preferred andidate;yet in a largeor lopsidedelection,the samevotermightindulgehis or hersentimentsand cast the protestvote, safe in the knowledgethat it would not decide the electionoutcome.

This secondimplicationholds only under certaincircumstances the in-strumentalandexpressive eturnsmusthaveopposite algebraic igns,andtheformermust dominateabovesomenon-zerovalue of P. Hence,of the two im-

plications, t is the lessgeneral.Nonetheless, t is of critical mportance ecause

it is thispredictedinkbetweenvoter choice and theprobabilityof beingdeci-sive that renders hetheory estable nprinciple. nthe nextsection,weattemptto move from principle o practice.

3. Experimental design

3.1. Tullock'sthought experiment

In one of his early paperson incomeredistribution,Tullock(1971: 388-389)presenteda thoughtexperimenthat is suggestiveof howthe theoryof expres-sive voting might be tested. Tullock imagined two related scenarios wherein he

was asked to give money to the poor. In the first, he could simply donate $100

directly to charity. In the second, he could vote to be taxed $100 for the same








254

purpose.The cost of donating o charitywould be simply he $100.Thecostof votingfor the tax would be $100onlyif his vote wasdecisive; hus, the ex-

pectedcost would be $100discounted

bythe

probabilityof

beingdecisive. In

a largeelectorate, he lattercost wouldbeextremelymall. Tullockoffered wo

conjectures.First,he would be morelikelyto vote for the tax thanto donateto the charity.Second,the larger he electorate, he smaller he likelihoodof

beingdecisive,and hence the morelikelyhe would be to vote for the tax.Tullock'svoting scenario,togetherwith his secondconjecture,suggestsa

laboratory xperiment.Assignsubjects o groupsof varying ize.Requirehemto usemajority ule o choosebetweenhaving$Acashpaidto eachgroupmem-

beror$Bcharitydonatedon the behalfof eachgroupmember.Fixthe$Acashat a valuesuchthat the instrumental eturn avors the cash. Assumethatthe

expressive eturn avorsthecharity.Thenvarygroupsize,and hencetheprob-

abilityof beingdecisive,andthereby est the hypothesis hatsubjectswillvotefor charitywithgreater requencyas P decreases.

Thisdesign,however,has at least two limitations.First,it is likelyto be ex-

pensive,becauseone or moregroupsmust be quitelarge n order o generatelow probabilities f beingdecisive.2Second,thedesignpreserves n externali-

ty whichis inherent n majorityrule but which is problematic or testingthe

hypothesis.By voting for charity, subjectswould be voting implicityto taxboth themselves ndothermembers f theirgroup.As groupsize is varied, he

aggregate mountof charityaswell as thecostof charitywouldvarysystemati-cally, thusviolatingthe implicitceterisparibuscondition of the hypothesis.3

3.2. Design

Ourresponse o the above limitationswas to eliminate he useof majorityruleand to test the calculusof expressive otingequation 1)directly.Specifically,we designedour experimentaround individualsratherthan groups,and we

varied heprobability f beingdecisiveexperimentally.Ourresultingdesignre-

quired ubjects o votebetweenbeingpaid$Acash orhaving$Bcharitydonat-

ed anonymouslyo UnitedWayon theirbehalf.Usingrandomassignment f

subjects,weexplicitlyvaried heprobabilityhat theirvote woulddecidewhich

of the two disbursementswas made.Assuminga charitable entimenton the

partof subjects,as theprobability f beingdecisivewasdecreased,heoppor-tunitycost of giving expression o the charitable entimentwouldfall. Given

suitableparameter aluesforA andB, the derivedhypothesiswas thatsubjectswith lower probabilitiesof being decisive would be more likelyto vote for

charity.4Weoperationalizedheprobability f beingdecisiveusinga methodsimilar

to thatdevelopedby Gretherand Plott (1979) n theirstudyof the preference








255

reversalphenomenon. n the instructions, ubjectswere old that theirswould

be the only ballotcast, but that their ballotmightor mightnot decide which

alternativecash

orcharity)

wouldbe the outcome.The actualoutcomewould

be decidedas follows: At thetop of theirballot would be a randomlyassignednumberX, whichrepresentedhe numberof chancesout of 100that theirbal-

lot would decide he outcome. After theirballot wascast, a numberwould be

randomlydrawn rom a box filledwithcardsnumbered to 99. If thenumber

drawnwas lessthanX, then theirballot woulddecide he outcome.If thenum-

ber wasgreater han or equalto X, then theirballot would be disregardednd

insteada coinflipwoulddecide he outcome.Ineffect, then,therewereXchan-

ces in 100(oran X%chance) hat their ballot wouldactually"count";other-wise,theirballot would be ignoredand a coin flipwoulddecide he outcome.5

3.3. Procedure

Subjectswererecruited rom economicsandaccounting lasses.All hadcom-

pletedat leastone course n economics.Theywere old thattheexperimentn-

volvedthe economicsof votingbehaviorand wouldtakeapproximatelyifteenminutes.Theywerepromised wo dollarsfor participating.The experimentwas conductedby appointment nd involvedanexperimenternd an individu-

alsubject.Theexperimentereganbypaying hesubject wo dollarsand assur-

ing completeanonymity.The experimenterhen readaloud fromprinted n-

structions,as thesubjectreadsilently.Includedwereexamplesof hypotheticalvotes and outcomes;the final two exampleswerecompletedverballyby the

subject.With eachexamplea pie chartwasprovidedwhichbothsummarized

the method of deciding he outcome anddepicted he assignedprobabilityofbeingdecisive.When the experimenterwas confident that the subjectunder-stood howthe outcomewouldbedetermined,heexperimenter avethe ballot

to the subjectand left the room. The ballot included he subject'srandomlyassignedprobabilityof being decisive,abbreviatednstructionswith a sum-

marypiechart,andblanks ormarkinghepreferred lternative ndrecordingstudent dentification ndpostoffice boxnumbers.Thesubjectcompleted he

ballot, dropped t in a box withotherballots, and concluded he experiment

with a briefquestionnaire.Afterenoughballotswere accumulatedo preserveanonymity,we opened

theballots and determinedhe individualoutcomes n accordancewith the in-

structions.Subjectswere then notified of the outcomesand, if appropriate,how they couldpick up theircashpayments.6








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3.4. Parametervalues

Ourexperiment equiredpredetermined

alues for theprobability

ofbeingdecisiveX, theamountof cashA, andthe amountof charityB. We varied he

probabilityX over thevalues0%, 1%, 10%,20%, and 100%.Becauseequa-tion (1) is linear n P, we could includethe two polar probabilities, hereby

helpingour chance of detectingany systematicrelationshipbetweenvoter

choiceand decisiveness.We keptthe other threeprobabilitiesow because nmost electorates he objectiveprobabilityof beingdecisive s small.

As noted in Section2 above,a systematic elationshipbetweenvoter choice

anddecisivenesss predictedonlyif abovesomenon-zeroprobability

fbeingdecisive,the instrumental eturndominatesan expressive eturnof the oppo-

sitealgebraic ign. Inourdesign,we assumed hat therepresentativeubject'sexpressivereturn would favor the charity. Hence, we needed to set the

parameters A cash and $B charitysuch that when the probabilityof beingdecisivewas 100%,the instrumental eturnwouldfavor the cash and would

dominate he expressive eturnfor charity.Hereis whereour designraninto a problem.In brief, withthe probability

X fixedat 100%,small-sample retests uggested hat the cash mustexceed he

charitybya substantial mount norder o inducesubjects o vote for thecash.With$A > $B, however,this created he possibilityof an implicitthird out-

come: if cash was the experimental utcome, subjectscould use the cashtodonatedirectlyto charity.WithA = $6 and B= $2, for example,if subjectsreceived he cash, they could donate$2 to charityand still realize for them-

selves$4 minustransaction osts. If subjectsrecognized hispossibility, hen

the instrumental eturnwould necessarily avor the cash, assumingsuitablylowtransaction osts.Thisbyitselfwouldpresentnoproblem,becauseourtest

required hat cashbe the preferredoutcome.A seriousproblemwouldarise,however, f thepossibilityof directdonationweakened he moral ugof votingfor charity.In particular,f the possibilityof directdonationcausedsubjectsnot only to prefer he cash outcomebut also to preferto expresssupport or

the cashoutcome,then our designwould fail to test the hypothesis.Uncertainof the extent to whichthe direct donationpossibilitywould be

recognizedand how it would affect the expressivereturn to charity, we

proceededo runourexperiment n a fullsample.Sixty-four ubjectswere est-

ed with A = $6 and B = $2, and an additional thirty-two were tested with A = $9and B= $2.

4. Results and discussion

Results for our experiment with A= $6 cash and B = $2 charity are reported in

the top half of Table 1. According to our hypothesis, subjects should be more








257

Table1. Distribution f voter choices

1. Voter hoices etween6cashand$2charityN = 64)

Probabilityhat ballot is decisive0% 1% 10% 20% 100%

Votingfor cash 7 4 7 8 13

(58.3%) (36.4%) (58.3%) (72.7%) (72.2%)Votingfor charity 5 7 5 3 5

(41.7%) (63.6%) (41.7%) (27.3%) (27.8%)

2. Voterchoicesbetween$9 cash and$2 charity N = 32)

Probabilityhat ballot is decisive

0% 1% 10% 20% 100%

Votingfor cash 3 3 1 3 2

(50.0%) (50.00%0) (16.7%) (50.0%) (25.0%)Votingorcharity 3 3 5 3 6

(50.0%) (50.0%) (83.3%) (50.0%) (75.0%)

Column ercentagesreshownnparentheses.

likelyto vote for the cash thehigher s the probability f beingdecisiveX. Asseen, there s sometendency n our data for the proportionof subjectsvotingfor cashto increasewith X. To test for statistical ignificance,we estimateda

simpleprobitmodel relatingsubjects'votes for cash to their probabilityof

beingdecisiveX. The estimatedprobitwas as follows(with -statisticsnparen-theses):

Z = 0.1064 + 0.0053 X (3)

(0.528) (1.363)

Thecoefficienton X is significantat the 10% evel(one-tailed).Based on the

probit estimate,as the probabilityof being decisive increasesfrom 0% to

100%, the predictedprobabilityof voting for cash increasesfrom 54% to74%.7

Theseresultsprovideat bestonlyweaksupport orthehypothesis.Two fac-

tors, however,causeus to question heirmeaningfulness.First,as seenin the

bottom half of Table 1, the resultsdid not replicate or a smallersampleofthirty-two ubjectswithA = $9andB= $2. Inthiscaseno significant elation-

ship was found betweenvoter choice and the probabilityof beingdecisive.8Mostsurprising, nlytwo of eightsubjectsvoted forthe cash whentheirvoteswerecertain o bedecisive.Second, here sreason o believe hatthepossibilityof donatingdirectly o charitysubstantially ffectedsubjects'choices.After

casting heirballots,subjectscompleteda questionnairesking hemto explain








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brieflywhat considerations ed them to vote as they did. Of those subjects

voting for the cash, approximatelyhree-fifthsmentionedthe possibilityof

directdonation;many

confessed hatthey

"rationalized" heir vote for cashbasedon thispossibility.As notedabove,if recognitionof thedirectdonation

optionundercutheexpressive ppealof votingforcharity, hen for thesesub-

jects we failedto test the hypothesis.Beforeconcluding, t is worthsteppingback from our specifichypothesis

andtakinga broader ook at the data.Aggregating crossprobability lasses,twenty-fivesubjectsvoted for $2 charityover $6 cash; an additional wentyvoted for $2charityover$9cash. The issuenaturally aised s whyalmosthalf

of oursubjectsvoted for charity.Onepossibility s thattheypreferred harityas the outcome,meaning hat they valued$2 charityat somethingexceeding$6 or $9. If sucha degreeof purealtruismseemsimplausible, hen a second

possibilitygainscredence: hey derivedsatisfactionfrom the veryact of ex-

pressing upport or charity.If this is the case, then our dataprovideat least

indirectsupport or the theoryof expressivevoting.

5. Concludingremarks

It is surprisingo usthat thetheoryof expressive otinghas not receivedmore

attentionby publicchoice scholars.As an extensionof rationalvotertheory,it asserts hatinlargeelectorateshe decisionof how to vote, as well as the deci-sion of whether o vote, is a consumptionchoice.If correct,thetheoryof ex-

pressivevotingcanhelp explainwhyideologyand notions of justicearelikelyto be of substantialmportancendemocratic olitics Brennan,1989;Kaltand

Zupan, 1984).It can also explainhow in circumstanceswhere economicin-

terest and moral sentimentconflict, democraticpoliticscangeneratepolicieswhicha majority upportsbut does not prefer(Brennanand Lomasky,1985;

Lomasky,1985).In principle he theoryof expressivevotingis testablebecause t includesa

falsifiablehypothesis.When nstrumentalndexpressive eturns onflict,with

the formerdominating bovesomenon-zeroprobability f beingdecisive, hen

voterchoicewillsystematicallyarywith decisiveness.Ourapproacho testingthishypothesiswas to require ubjects o votebetweenreceiving ashorhaving

a charitable onationmadeon theirbehalf.Perhapsdue to a strongexpressiveappealof charity,we found that we could inducethe requisiteconditionsof

the hypothesisonly by fixing the cashto exceed the charityby a significantamount.This,however,createdanimplicit hirdalternative f donatingdirect-

lyto charity.Manyof oursubjects ecognizedhis thirdalternative ndreport-ed they were influencedby it, henceconfoundingour empiricalresults.

Inorder o meaningfullyest theexpressive oting hypothesis, t is clear hat








259

ourexperimental esignneedsmodification.To succeed, hepresentapproachrequires nalternativewhichhas clearexpressive ppeal,and whichcanbe ren-

deredby

theexperimenter

ut cannotbepurchased irectlybysubjects.

If suchan alternative xists, we have not yet been cleverenoughto discover t.

Notes

1. For comments riticalof the theory,see Hudelson 1987)andSaraydar1987).2. Also, thedesignassumes hatsubjects ancorrectly iscern owerprobabilitiesnlarger roups,

an assumptionhatmight tself be worth esting.

3. Theexternalitywould combinewiththepublic-good spectof charity o make thecharity helikelypreferred utcome.Suppose, orexample, hatfifty subjectsweredecidingby majorityrulewhether achwould receive$2 cashor eachwouldhave$2donated o charityon theirbe-

half. If the charityalternative assed,a subjectwouldenjoy $100of charity.If the subjectvalued$100of charityatmore han$2,thenboththeinstrumentalndexpressiveeturnswould

favor the charity.4. We assumed hat the expressive eturn avoredvotingfor charityand was derived rom a

charitable entiment.Aswillbenoted nthenextsubsection, recautions ere aken o preservetheanonymity f subjects' otes.Nonetheless,t is certainly ossible hattheexpressiveeturn

wasbasedon a desire o please heexperimenter.Whether ucha desirequalifies nthiscontext

as a charitable entiments aninteresting uestion.It is at leastarguablehat moralsentimentsare reducible o a desire orapproval rom others.As Brennan ndLomasky 1985:196)note,"Theseothersmaybe actualspectators r a hypotheticalImpartial pectator.'"' ntheend,it is not critical o ourexperimentwhetherubjectsprojectedheexperimenters an actual pec-tatoror listened o theirowninnervoice. What s critical s that theexpressiveeturn,whatever

its origin,favoredvotingfor the charity.5. It is easyto show that a subject'schoiceproblemreduces o the calculusof expressive oting

equation 1). Letx = X%. Assume hat the subjectvotes for A. Theballotwillbe used with

probability to determine he outcome, n whichcasethe outcomewillbe A. A coinflip willbe usedwithprobability1-x); giventhe coin flip, the outcomewillbeA withprobability .5

or B withthe sameprobability.Hence,EU(Vote orA) = xU(A) + 0.5(1-x)[U(A)+ U(B)] +V(A).Similarly,EU(Vote orB) = xU(B)+ 0.5(1-x)[U(A)+ U(B)]+ V(B). Subtractingieldsequation (1) with x = P.

6. Completenstructions ndsampleballotare included n an appendix vailable rom us uponrequest.

7. Morespecifically,orX equal o 0%o, %0/,0%,20%,and100%, hecorrespondingstimated

probabilities f votingfor cashare54%,54%/o,6%,58%o,nd74%. Theproportion f correct

predictionswas 0.609. We alsoconducted simple est of independence. ollapsingheproba-bilitiesof beingdecisive nto threecategories 0%to 1%, 10%to 20%/o,nd 100%)yieldeda

chi-square f 2.801 with a p-valueof 0.246(d.f. =2).8. Theestimatedprobitwas as follows(witht-statistics n parentheses):

Z = -0.1695 - 0.0051 X (4)

(-0.604) (-0.876)

Theproportionof correctpredictionswas 0.625.Thechi-squarewas 1.422 with a p-valueof0.491 (d.f. = 2).








260

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1992 an Experimental Study of Expressive Voting

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