1982 Falkland Islands Invasion.pdf

1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands 1

1982 invasion of the Falkland IslandsOn 2 April 1982, Argentine forces mounted amphibious landings of the Falkland Islands (Spanish: IslasMalvinas). It marked the beginning of the Falklands War.The Argentinians mounted amphibious landings, with the invasion ending with the battle and final surrender ofGovernment House.

DefenceGovernor Sir Rex Hunt was informed by the British Government of a possible Argentine invasion on 1 April. At3:30 pm that day he received a telegram from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stating:

We have apparently reliable evidence that an Argentine task force could be assembling off Stanley at dawntomorrow. You will wish to make your dispositions accordingly.[1]

Forces involvedThe Governor summoned the two senior Royal Marines officers of Naval Party 8901 to Government House inStanley to discuss the options for defending the Falklands. He said during the meeting, "Sounds like the buggersmean it", remaining composed despite the seriousness of the situation that the islands faced.[2]

Major Mike Norman was given overall command of the Marines due to his seniority, while Major Gary Noottbecame the military advisor to Governor Hunt. The total strength was 68 Marines and 11 sailors, which was greaterthan would normally have been available because the garrison was in the process of changing over. Both thereplacements and the troops preparing to leave were in the Falklands at the time of the invasion.[3]

This was decreased to 57 when 22 Royal Marines embarked aboard the Antarctic patrol ship HMS Endurance toobserve Argentine soldiers based at South Georgia. The Royal Navy, on the other hand, states that a total of 85marines were present at Stanley.[4]

Their numbers were reinforced by at least 25 Falkland Islands Defence Force (FIDF) members.[5] Graham Bound, anislander who lived through the Argentine occupation, reports in his book Falkland Islanders At War that the higherfigure of approximately 40 (both serving and past) members of the FIDF reported for duty at their Drill Hall. Theircommanding officer, Major Phil Summers, tasked the volunteer militiamen with guarding such key points as thetelephone exchange, the radio station and the power station. Skipper Jack Sollis, on board the civilian coastal shipForrest, operated his boat as an improvised radar screen station off Stanley. Two other civilians, former Marine JimAlister and a Canadian citizen, Bill Curtiss, also offered their services to the Governor.[]

Operation RosarioThe Argentine amphibious operation began in the late evening of Thursday 1 April, when the destroyer ARASantisima Trinidad disembarked special naval forces south of Stanley. The bulk of the Argentine forces was to landsome hours later from the amphibious warfare ship ARA Cabo San Antonio near the airport, on a beach previouslymarked by frogmen from the submarine ARA Santa Fe.[6]

The operation had been called Azul (Blue) during the planning stage, but it was finally renamed Rosario (Rosary).[7]

Ral RapelliHighlight







ARA Santa FeThe very first move of Operation Rosario was the reconnaissance of Port William by the submarine ARA Santa Feand the landing of 14 members of the tactical divers group near Cape Pembroke, including the commander of thiselite unit, Captain Cufr. The recce mission began as early as 31 March, when the trawler Forrest was spottedthrough the periscope at 10:00 PM off Port Stanley. The next day, the Santa Fe learned that the authorities in Stanleywere aware of the Argentine intentions, so a change of plans was in order. Instead of landing right on Pembroke, thecommandos would initially take a beach near Menguera Point, south of Kidney Island.[8][9]

They left the Santa Fe at 1:40 PM. From the beach, they headed towards Pembroke peninsula in Zodiac boats. Theyreached Yorke Bay at 4:30 AM of 2 April. After planting beacons for the main landing, they took over the airstripand the lighthouse without resistance. Argentine sources claim that they captured a few prisoners. This team waslater given the task of gathering and taking in custody the Royal Marines in their flight out of the islands after theBritish surrender.[10][11]

Attack on Moody Brook barracksOn the night of 1/2 April, the destroyer ARA Santsima Trinidad halted 500 metres off Mullet Creek and lowered 21Gemini assault craft into the water. They contained 84 special forces troopers[12] of Lieutenant-CommanderGuillermo Snchez-Sabarots' 1st Amphibious Commandos Group and a small party[13] underLieutenant-Commander Pedro Giachino, who was normally 2IC of the 1st Marine Infantry Battalion, that was tocapture Government House.[14] The Argentine Rear Admiral Jorge Allara, through a message radioed fromSantisima Trinidad, had requested to Rex Hunt a peaceful surrender, but the proposal was rejected.[14]

Giachino's party had the shortest distance to go: two and a half miles due north. Moody Brook Barracks, thedestination of the main party, was six miles away, over rough Falklands terrain. Lieutenant-CommanderSnchez-Sabarots, in the book The Argentine Fight for The Falklands, describes the main party's progress in thedark:

It was a nice night, with a moon, but the cloud covered the moon for most of the time. It was very hard goingwith our heavy loads; it was hot work. We eventually became split up into three groups. We only had onenight sight; the lead man, Lieutenant Arias had it. One of the groups became separated when a vehicle camealong the track we had to cross. We thought it was a military patrol. Another group lost contact, and the thirdseparation was caused by someone going too fast. This caused my second in command, Lieutenant Bardi, tofall. He suffered a hairline fracture of the ankle and had to be left behind with a man to help him. We were atMoody Brook by 5.30 a.m., just on the limits of the time planned, but with no time for the one hour'sreconnaissance for which we had hoped.[15]

The main party of Argentine Marines assumed that the Moody Brook Barracks contained sleeping Royal Marines.The barracks were quiet, although a light was on in the office of the Royal Marine commander. No sentries wereobserved, and it was a quiet night, apart from the occasional animal call. Lieutenant-Commander Snchez-Sabarotscould hear nothing of any action at Government House, nor from the distant landing beaches; nevertheless, heordered the assault to begin. Lieutenant-Commander Snchez-Sabarots continues his account:

It was still completely dark. We were going to use tear-gas to force the British out of the buildings and capturethem. Our orders were not to cause casualties if possible. That was the most difficult mission of my career. Allour training as commandos was to fight aggressively and inflict maximum casualties on the enemy. Wesurrounded the barracks with machine-gun teams, leaving only one escape route along the peninsula north ofStanley Harbour. Anyone who did get away would not able to reach the town and reinforce the British there.Then we threw the gas grenades into each building. There was no reaction; the barracks were empty.[15]

The noise of the grenades alerted Major Norman to the presence of Argentines on the island, and he thus drove back to Government House. Realising that the attack was coming from Moody Brook, he ordered all troop sections to


converge on the house to enable the defence to be centralised.[2]

Although there were no Royal Marine witnesses to the assault, British descriptions of the state of Moody Brookbarracks afterward contradict the Argentine version of events. After the action, some of the Royal Marines wereallowed to return to barracks to collect personal items. Major Norman describes walls of the barracks as riddled withmachine gun fire and bearing the marks of white phosphorus grenades"a classic houseclearing operation".[2]

Amphibious landing at Yorke Bay

ARA Cabo San Antonio.

Argentine marines and APCs at Stanley, 2 April 1982.

There was a more pressing action on the eastern edgeof Stanley. Twenty US-built LVTP-7A1 Argentinetracked amphibious armoured personnel carriers fromthe 1st Amphibious Vehicles Battalion, carrying D andE Companies of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion(BIM-2) from Puerto Belgrano, had been landed fromthe tank landing ship ARA Cabo San Antonio at YorkeBay, and were being watched by a section of RoyalMarines under the command of Lieutenant BillTrollope.

The armoured column trundled along the Airport Roadinto Stanley, with three Amtracs (Numbers 05, 07 and19) in the vanguard, and, near the Ionospheric ResearchStation, at exactly 7:15 am, was engaged by a sectionof Royal Marines with anti-tank rockets and machineguns. This from Lieutenant-Commander HugoSantilln's official post-battle report:

We were on the last stretch of the road intoStanley. A machine-gun fired from one of thethree white houses about 500 metres away andhit the right-hand Amtrac. The fire was veryaccurate. Then there were some explosions froma rocket launcher, but they were inaccurate,falling a long way from us. We followed our standard operating procedure and took evasive action. TheAmtrac on the right returned fire and took cover in a little depression. Once he was out of danger, I told allthree vehicles to disembark their men. I ordered the crew with the recoilless rifle to fire one round of hollowcharge at the ridge of the roof of the house where the machine-gun was, to cause a bang but not an explosion.We were still following our orders not to inflict casualties. The first round was about a hundred metres short,but the second hit the roof. The British troops then threw a purple smoke grenade; I thought it was their signalto withdraw. They had stopped firing, so Commander Weinstabl started the movement of the two companiesaround the position. Some riflemen in one of the houses started firing then; that was quite uncomfortable. Icouldn't pinpoint their location, but one of my other Amtracs could and asked permission to open up with amortar which he had. I authorized this, but only with three rounds and only at the roofs of the houses. Tworounds fell short, but the third hit right in the centre of the roof; that was incredible. The British ceased firingthen.[15]

The Amtrac on the right manoeuvred itself off the road into a little depression and as it did so, disembarked theMarines inside out of view. This encouraged the Royal Marines to think that Marine Mark Gibbs had scored a directhit on the passenger compartment of the APC.


Lieutenant Bill Trollope, with No. 2 Section, describes the action:Six Armoured Personnel Carriers began advancing at speed down the Airport Road. The first APC wasengaged at a range of about 200 to 250 metres. The first three missiles, two 84 mm and one 66 mm, missed.Subsequently one 66 mm fired by Marine Gibbs, hit the passenger compartment and one 84 mm MarinesBrown and Betts hit the front. Both rounds exploded and no fire was received from that vehicle. Theremaining five APCs which were about 600 to 700 metres away deployed their troops and opened fire. Weengaged them with GPMG, SLR and sniper rifle [Sergeant Shepherd] for about a minute before we threw awhite phosphorus smoke grenade and leap-frogged back to the cover of gardens. Incoming fire at that stagewas fairly heavy, but mostly inaccurate.[16]

Lieutenant Trollope and his men withdrew along Davis Street, running behind the houses with Argentine Marines inhot pursuit, and went to ground firing up the road when it became obvious they could not reach GovernmentHouse.[17]

Battle of Government House and surrender

One of the AmphibiousCommandos after the fall ofStanley's Government House

Lying on a small hillock south of Government House, Lieutenant-Commander PedroGiachino faced the difficulty of capturing this important objective with no radio andwith a force of only sixteen men. He split his force into small groups, placing one oneither side of the house and one at the rear. Unknown to them, the Governor's residencewas the main concentration point of the Royal Marines, who outnumbered theCommandos by two to one.

The first attack against this building came at 6.30 a.m., barely an hour before the YorkeBay amphibious landing, when one of Giachino's platoons, led by Lieutenant GustavoLugo,[18] started to exchange fire with the British troops inside the house.

At the same time, Giachino himself, with four of his subordinates, entered the servants'annexe, believing it to be the rear entrance to the residence. Three Royal Marines,Corporals Sellen and Fleet and Marine Dorey, who were placed to cover the annexe,beat off the first attack. Giachino was hit instantly as he burst through the door, whileLieutenant Diego Garcia Quiroga was shot in the arm. The remaining three retreated tothe maid's quarters.

Giachino was not dead, but very badly wounded. An Argentine paramedic, CorporalErnesto Urbina, attempted to get to Giachino but was wounded by a grenade. Giachino,seeing what had happened, pulled the pin from a hand grenade and threatened to use it.The Royal Marines then attempted to persuade the officer to get rid of the grenade sothat they could give him medical treatment, but he refused, preventing them fromreaching his position. After the surrender of the British forces at Government House,some three hours later, Giachino was taken to Stanley Hospital but died from loss ofblood.[19]


ARA Granville

At the Governor's office, Major Norman received aradio report from Corporal York's section, which waspositioned at Camber peninsula, observing any possibleArgentine ship entering Stanley Harbour. The Corporalproceeded to report on three potential targets in sightand which should he engage first. What are the targets?the Major enquired. Target number one is an aircraftcarrier, target number two is a cruiser, at which pointthe line went dead.

Corporal York decided to withdraw his section andproceeded to booby trap their Carl Gustav recoillessrifle, before paddling their Gemini assault boat northacross Port William. As he did so, York claimed anArgentine destroyer began pursuing them (the corvetteARA Granville according to Argentine sources). His initiative led to the Gemini reaching an anchored Polish fishingvessel, hiding the small assault boat under her shadow. They patiently waited for a chance, before moving to theshore and landing on a small beach.[14]

Back at Government House, the Argentine commandos' pressure continued unabated. There is some evidence thattheir use of stun grenades and their continuous shift of firing positions during the battle led the Royal Marines insideto believe they were facing a company of marines and were hopelessly outnumbered. Actually, after the failure ofGiachino's platoon to break into the residence, the British were surrounded by only a dozen elite troops. These menwere under Lieutenant Lugo, Giachino's Second-in-Command. The Land Rovers used by the Royal Marines weredisabled by automatic gunfire from the commandos.[20] Governor Hunt called Patrick Watts (at the radio station,Radio Stanley), by telephone and said he believed the assaulting force to be the equivalent of a reinforced company:

We're staying put here, but we are pinned down. We can't move.(...) They must have 200 around usnow. They've been throwing rifle grenades at us; I think there may be mortars, I don't know. They camealong very quickly and very close, and then they retreated. Maybe they are waiting until the APCs[Amtracs] come along and they think they'll lose less casualties that way.[21][22][23]

Consequently, Hunt decided to enter talks with Argentine commanders around 8 o'clock. The liaison wasVice-Commodore Hector Gilobert, the head in the islands of LADE, the Argentine government's airline company.Gilobert and a Governor's deputy went to the Argentine headquarters displaying a white flag. A de facto ceasefirewas put in place at that time which was occasionally breached by small arms fire.[24]

The Governor's envoys found the Argentine commanding post at Stanley's Town Hall. The Argentine chief acceptedthe British offer of a face to face meeting with Rex Hunt at his battered office.


Vice-Commodore Hector Gilobert on his way to Government House

Eight FIDF members taken prisoners by Amphibious Commandosheading to Government House.

While the negotiations were still going on, anotherincident occurred inside the residence. Three Argentinesurvivors of the first skirmish along the compoundinadvertently alerted Major Noott to their presence,while they had been preparing to leave their hidingplace. The Major fired his Sterling submachine guninto the ceiling of the maid's room. According toBritish reports, the stunned commandos tumbled downthe stairs, laying their weapons on the ground. Theybecame the first Argentine prisoners of war of theFalklands War, albeit by then, Governor Hunt hadalready been in contact with Argentine officialsnegotiating the terms of surrender.[25]

The version of the commander of these men, CaptainCufr, who was then at Stanley airport, is that his threesubordinates kept their fighting position right to the endof the hostilities.[26]

Surrender

Admiral Busser, commander in chief of the operation,states that a cease fire was already in place when thethree commandos, after realising that the battle wascoming to a close and that any loss of life at the timewould be futile, laid down their arms to the marines inorder to assist the wounded. Just a few minutes afterthis event, Government house had capitulated.[25]

Meanwhile, the Royal Marines in the House saw theapproaching Amtracs that had been engaged earlier byLieutenant Trollope and his section. The vehicles pushed on toward Moody Brook to link up with Snchez-Sabarotsforces. His amphibious commandos were plodding slowly along the road to reinforce their colleagues besiegingGovernment House after taking some prisoners near the racecourse.[27][28] Major Norman had earlier advised RexHunt that the Royal Marines and the Governor could break out to the countryside and set up a 'seat of government'elsewhere, but when he finally met the commander-in-chief of the Argentine operations, Admiral Busser, he agreedto surrender his troops to the now overwhelming Argentine forces at 9:30 AM.

After the surrender, the Royal Marines and the members of the FIDF were then herded onto the


An Argentine amphibious vehicle from BIM-2 patrolling Stanley

playing fields. Pictures and film were taken of theBritish prisoners arranged face-down on the ground.This was probably an attempt by Argentina todemonstrate the lack of British casualties, but itbackfired: The images galvanised the British publicwhen they were broadcast on television and increasedpublic opposition to the invasion.Soon afterward, the Royal Marines were moved to aC-130 Hercules transport aircraft, which would takethem to Comodoro Rivadavia, where they were to bepicked up by another airliner to Uruguay and on to theUnited Kingdom. Members of FIDF were not taken toArgentina along with members of NP 8901; insteadthey were disarmed and returned to their homes.[29] Asthe Marines were being taken to Montevideo, one ofthem said to an Argentine guard "don't make yourselftoo comfy here mate, we'll be back".[14]

Corporal York's section remained at large. On 4 April, they reached a secluded shepherd's hut owned by a MrsWatson. York had no radio, and due to worries about possible civilian deaths chose to surrender to Argentine forces.They gave their position to the Argentine Army using a local islander's radio, and York subsequently ordered hismen to destroy and then bury their weapons.[30]

In Buenos Aires, huge flag-waving crowds flooded the Plaza de Mayo upon hearing the news. Argentina's losses inthe operation were one dead and three wounded. In London, where the bad news was fully known from Argentinesources, the government was in a state of shock. The crisis prompted the resignation of the British Foreign Secretary,Lord Carrington.[31]

The next day, Argentine forces captured the island chain of South Georgia, 1350km to the east of the Falklands. Inthat action, the Argentines suffered one sailor from the corvette ARA Guerrico and two marines killed (NavyCorporal Patricio Guanca and marine conscripts Mario Almonacid and Jorge Aguila). One British Royal Marine waswounded in an exchange of fire with the Argentine troops. The Marines eventually surrendered when this positionwas bracketed by the Guerrico's main 100mm gun.[32]

Informing LondonAt 4.30pm on 2 April, the Governor's telex operator had this conversation with a Ministry of Defence operative inLondon, announcing that the islands were under Argentine control.[33]

LON (London): HELLO THERE WHAT ARE ALL THESE RUMOURS WE HEAR THIS IS LON FK (Falklands): WE HAVE LOTS OF NEW FRIENDS LON: WHAT ABOUT INVASION RUMOURS FK: THOSE ARE THE FRIENDS I WAS MEANING LON: THEY HAVE LANDED







FK: ABSOLUTELY LON: ARE YOU OPEN FOR TRAFFIC IE NORMAL TELEX SERVICE FK: NO ORDERS ON THAT YET ONE MUST OBEY ORDERS LON: WHOSE ORDERS FK: THE NEW GOVERNORS LON: ARGENTINA FK: YES LON: ARE THE ARGENTINIANS IN CONTROL FK: YES YOU CAN'T ARGUE WITH THOUSANDS OF TROOPS PLUS ENORMOUS NAVYSUPPORT WHEN YOU ARE ONLY 1600 STRONG. STAND BY.

Operation timeline

Operation Rosario

The timeline of the operation was as follows:[6]

A. 21:30 1 April The Type 42 destroyer ARA Santisima Trinidad begins loading naval commandos of theAmphibious Commandos Group into 21 small inflatable motor boats. These set out for Mullet Creek but sail toofar north and are caught up in beds of kelp, which cause problems for the boats. They decide to head for thenearest beach, which is near Lake Point.

B. 23:00 1 April The first group of 84 men lands on an unnamed beach at Lake Point. The group splits into asmaller force led by Lieutenant-Commander Giachino which heads towards Government House, and a largerforce commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Sabarots which heads towards Moody Brook barracks.

C. 04:30 2 April A small advanced team of the Tactical Divers Group is landed undetected from the SubmarineARA Santa Fe near Yorke Bay.

D. 05:30 2 April Lieutenant-Commander Sabarots' force reaches and surrounds the barracks. They throw teargas grenades into the buildings and storm the buildings with heavy machine gun fire. They find the buildingsdeserted.











E. 06:00 2 April 20 FMC Amtracs and several LARC-V stores-carrying vehicles land on Yorke Bay from theassault ship ARA Cabo San Antonio. The force splits into 3 groups: A four Amtrac vanguard. Including one carrying the Army Platoon. The main force of 14 Amtracs. The second in command, a recovery Amtrac and LARC vehicles.

F. 06:30 2 April The first Amtracs meet no resistance. The Army platoon secures the deserted airport,previously swept by Navy tactical divers.

G. 06:30 2 April An Argentine force of 16 naval commandos reaches Government House, where they arestopped by 31 Royal Marines, 11 armed Royal Navy personnel and 1 local. Three Argentines are wounded,including the leader of the platoon, Lieutenant-Commander Giachino, who later dies. Another three are latercaptured inside the House, although by then (around 8:00) talks with Argentine officials about the surrender hadalready begun.

H. 07:15 2 April Having met no resistance, the Argentine Amtracs advance on Stanley, when they areambushed from a house about 500 metres from the road. Royal Marines use rockets and machine guns. The RoyalMarines fall back to government house. One of the Amtracs is scarred by machine gun fire, and there is one minorinjury.

I. 08:30 2 April The Argentine Amtrac force secures Stanley. J. Lieutenant Colonel Seineldn's Regiment 25th platoon begin to clear the runway, while Navy tactical divers

provide security on the airport and seize the lighthouse.

Reaction in the United NationsOn 3 April 1982 the United Nations Security Council comprising the 5 permanent members and the 10 electedmembers (Poland, Spain, Ireland, Panama, Guyana, Japan, Jordan, Uganda, Zaire, and Togo) passed the Resolution502 demanding an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the islands and called on the governments ofArgentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution to the situation and refrain from further militaryaction. Panama voted against this resolution, with China, Poland, Spain and the USSR abstaining. All 10 remainingmembers voted for the resolution. [34]

Footnotes[1] Hunt: My Falklands Story (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ hi/ english/ static/ in_depth/ uk/ 2002/ falklands/ my_story/ hunt. stm). BBC. 2002. .

Retrieved 2009-12-31[2] Bound, Graham, Falkland Islanders at war, Pen and Sword Books Limited, ISBN 1-84415-429-7.[3] Battles: The Argentine Invasion (http:/ / www. royal-navy. mod. uk/ server/ show/ nav. 5874) royalnavy.mod.uk. Accessed 26 August 2007.[4] Battles: The Argentine Invasion (http:/ / www. royal-navy. mod. uk/ server/ show/ nav. 5874) royalnavy.mod.uk. Accessed 26 August 2007.[5] Anderson, pp. 1719.[6][6] Mayorga, p. 71[7][7] Ruiz Moreno, page 21[8] Bveda, Jorge (2007). La Odisea del submarino Santa Fe. IPN editores, pp. 56 and 75-76. ISBN 978-950-899-073-0 (Spanish)[9] Voz del Interior newspaper, 1 April 2007 (http:/ / www. nuestromar. org/ noticias/

mar_calmo9269_072007_valio_la_pena_alfredo_cufre_primer_soldado_que_piso_malvinas#prof''La) (Spanish)[10] Bveda, Jorge (2007). La Odisea del submarino Santa Fe. IPN editores, pp. 56 and 75-76. ISBN 978-950-899-073-0 (Spanish)[11] Voz del Interior newspaper, 1 April 2007 (http:/ / www. nuestromar. org/ noticias/

mar_calmo9269_072007_valio_la_pena_alfredo_cufre_primer_soldado_que_piso_malvinas#prof''La) (Spanish)[12] Busser, Operacin Rosario. The force was composed of 76 Amphibious Commandos and 8 members of the Buzos Tcticos (tactical divers)

elite group.[13] The so-called Patrulla Techo (Roof patrol).[14] Naval Party 8901 And the Argentine Invasion (Britain's small wars) (http:/ / www. britains-smallwars. com/ Falklands/ NP8901. html#prof)[15] Middlebrook, pp. 3637.[16] Bound, pp. 5253.[17][17] Bound, page 58


[18][18] Busser, page 259[19][19] Busser, page 277[20] Insight team Sunday Time (1982), Chapter VIII: An Ungentlemanly Act, page 88[21][21] Bound, page 60[22][22] Way, p. 134, increases the number of Argentine troops around the House to 600.[23] Insight team Sunday Time (1982), Chapter VIII: An Ungentlemanly Act, page 89[24] Insight team Sunday Time (1982), Chapter I: Surrender (I), page 20.[25][25] Busser, page 40[26] Insight team Sunday Time (1982), Chapter I: Surrender (I), page 20. Instead, in an article published by an Argentine newspaper, the 1982

commander of the Tactical Divers Group (Buzos Tcticos) states that the three men withstood a fierce three-hour gun battle with the RoyalMarines. La Voz del Interior newspaper, 1 April 2007 (http:/ / www. nuestromar. org/ noticias/mar_calmo9269_072007_valio_la_pena_alfredo_cufre_primer_soldado_que_piso_malvinas#prof) (Spanish)

[27] En su trayecto [el grupo de comandos] recibi la rendicin de una patrulla de ocho soldados ingleses, en proximidades del Hipdromo, ymomentos despus se encontraron, de acuerdo con lo previsto y como hemos visto, con la Vanguardia de la Fuerza de Desembarco, que debarastrillar la parte norte de la pennsula de Camber. Mayorga, page 77

[28] These troops seem to have been FIDF men on patrol around Stanley's racecourse in order to prevent helicopter landings ( Telegraph.co.uk(http:/ / www. telegraph. co. uk/ news/ main. jhtml?xml=/ news/ 2007/ 04/ 02/ wfalk02. xml#prof)).

[29][29] Bound, pp. 35 ff.[30] Middlebrook, Martin (1985). Operation Corporate: the Falklands War, 1982. Viking, p. 52. ISBN 0-670-80223-9[31] Theakston, Kevin (2004). British foreign secretaries since 1974. Routledge, p. 134. ISBN 0-7146-5656-9[32] Argentine Invasion of South Georgia (http:/ / www. britains-smallwars. com/ Falklands/ South-Georgia. html#prof)[33] Duncan, Andrew, The Falklands War, Marshall Cavendish Books Limited, ISBN 1-84415-429-7[34] United Nations Security Council S-RES-502(1982) (http:/ / www. undemocracy. com/ S-RES-502(1982)''Resolution''& #32;502& #32;) on

3 April 1982 (retrieved 2008-07-20)

References Sir Lawrence Freedman (2005). Official History of the Falklands Campaign (2 vols.). Routledge.

ISBN978-0-415-41911-6. Anderson, Duncan (2002). The Falklands War 1982 (Osprey Essential Histories). Osprey Publisher.

ISBN1-84176-422-1. Martin Middlebrook (1989). The Fight For The Malvinas: The Argentine Forces In The Falklands War. Viking.

ISBN0-14-010767-3. Insight Team Sunday Times (1982). War in the Falklands: the Full Story. The Sunday Times.

ISBN0-06-015082-3. Graham Bound (2002). Falklands Islanders At War. Pen and Sword Books. ISBN0-85052-836-4. Martin Middlebrook (2003). The Argentine Fight for the Falklands. Pen and Sword Books. ISBN0-85052-978-6. John Smith (1984). 74 days - An Islander's Diary of the Falklands Occupation. Century Publishing.

ISBN0-7126-0361-1. Peter Way, editor (1983). The Falklands War in 14 parts. Marshall Cavendish. Carlos Busser (1984). Operacin Rosario (Informe oficial de la Marina Argentina). Editorial Atlntida.

ISBN950-08-0324-0. (Spanish) Contraalmirante Horacio A. Mayorga (1998). No Vencidos. Ed. Planeta. ISBN950-742-976-X. (Spanish) Benigno Hctor Andrada (1983). Guerra area en las Malvinas. Emec editores. ISBN978-950-04-0191-3.

(Spanish)

Ruiz Moreno, Isidoro (1987). Comandos en accin. Emec editores. (Spanish)


External links Lieutenant Commander Richard D. Chenette, Marine Corps Command and Staff College "Operation Rosario":

(http:/ / www. globalsecurity. org/ military/ library/ report/ 1987/ CRD. htm) Falklands Island Invasion, Operation Rosario (http:/ / www. naval-history. net/ F15invasion. htm) Falklands Islands Defence Force remembers its role (http:/ / www. telegraph. co. uk/ news/ main. jhtml?xml=/

news/ 2007/ 04/ 02/ wfalk02. xml) RAF account of the Invasion, apparently an excerpt from Way's book (http:/ / www. raf. mod. uk/ falklands/ inv1.

html#prof) British veteran returns to South Georgia Islands (http:/ / www. mod. uk/ DefenceInternet/ DefenceNews/

HistoryAndHonour/ FalklandsHeroReturnsToSceneOfHisTriumph. htm#prof)

Article Sources and Contributors 12

Article Sources and Contributors1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=497889448 Contributors: Acroterion, Againme, AlexeiSeptimus, AndrewHowse, Apcbg, Art LaPella,Astrotrain, Axeman89, Az81964444, Badgerpatrol, Bastin, Bender235, Betacommand, Bleachedwhale, Bluezy, Bobblewik, Brainhell, CMD Beaker, Canglesea, Canterbury Tail, Caranchoche,Cardiffchestnut, Cazabobos, Ceyockey, Chase me ladies, I'm the Cavalry, Chiton magnificus, CommonsDelinker, Confused coyote, Courcelles, Dabbler, DagosNavy, Darkieboy236, Dblecros,Dcandeto, Deipnosophista, Deltabeignet, Dentren, Detruncate, Dhartung, Dilcoe, Download, Dwilke, ESkog, Elorangutan, Eric Blatant, Etm157, FlamingSilmaril, Flix11, Frietjes, GaiusCornelius, Generalmesse, Geoff B, GeorgeLouis, Goatchurch, Grada1824, GraemeLeggett, Gusreed, H1523702, Hammersfan, Haymouse, Howcheng, Hydraton31, IamNear, Ingolfson, J.delanoy,JMOprof, JackofOz, JimWhitaker, John of Reading, Jor70, Kahastok, Kernel Saunters, Kevin W., Ktotam, LGF1992UK, Leandrod, Lightmouse, Lotje, LtNOWIS, MacRusgail,Marianocecowski, Mariya Oktyabrskaya, Mark Arsten, Mauls, McPhail, Megapixie, Michellecrisp, Mr T (Based), Ms2ger, Narson, Neurolysis, Nkcs, Oli Filth, OneEuropeanHeart, Penfish,Phil1972, Philip Stevens, Pieceof, Polylerus, Qwerty123123123, R.F.La Fontaine, RA0808, Reenem, Rjwilmsi, Rnt20, Rockitcheyne, Ronpillao, Ryan4314, Ryepup, Sam Blacketer, SchutteGod,SeanLegassick, Sebastiankessel, Sintaku, Snigbrook, Spellmaster, Springnuts, SqueakBox, SunCreator, Swedish fusilier, TShilo12, Tabletop, Tevildo, Toddy1, TreveX, Ukexpat, Valentinian,Vintagekits, VladimirIlichHndel, Wee Curry Monster, Wikibob, Woohookitty, WookMuff, Xnigiancos, Xorkl000, YixilTesiphon, , 112 anonymous edits

Image Sources, Licenses and ContributorsFile:ARA-San-Antonio.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:ARA-San-Antonio.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Armada ArgentinaFile:Argentine Amtrac.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Argentine_Amtrac.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Argentine official photographerFile:Comando Anfibio 1982.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Comando_Anfibio_1982.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Original uploader was DagosNavyat en.wikipediaFile:P33ARAGranville.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:P33ARAGranville.jpg License: Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 Contributors: Balcer, DagosNavy,Jameslwoodward, Jeff G., Jor70, Martin.Otero, RamaFile:Gilobert.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Gilobert.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Rafael Wollmann.File:FIDF-Pows-a.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:FIDF-Pows-a.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: unknown Argentine serviceman.File:Amtrack-82.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Amtrack-82.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Official Argentine Navy photographerFile:Operation Azul.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Operation_Azul.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Electionworld, EuTuga, Megapixie, 2 anonymousedits

LicenseCreative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported//creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

1982 invasion of the Falkland IslandsDefence Forces involved

Operation RosarioARA Santa FeAttack on Moody Brook barracks Amphibious landing at Yorke BayBattle of Government House and surrenderSurrender

Informing LondonOperation timelineReaction in the United NationsFootnotesReferencesExternal links

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