1948 - Dna 6033f - Operation Sandstone 1948

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Pf

-.United States Atmo Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear T sonnel Review

*epared by the Defensefor the D

r Agency as Executivent of Defense

Tests

Agency


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Destr oy t hi s r eport when i t i s no l ongerneeded. Do not r eturn t o sender .PLEASE NOTI FY THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY,ATTN: STTI , WASHI NGTON, D. C. 20305, I FYOUR ADDRESS I S I NCORRECT, I F YOU W SH TOBE DELETED FROM THE DI STRI BUTI ON LI ST, ORI F THE ADDRESSEE I S NO LONGER EMPLOYED BYYOUR ORGANI ZATI ON.


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_)LLr.l I I . .L . - . z.Jnr I . - ? . l lY rn vr l l l , J I - rn L , , c x Y m ~ ,

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORECOMPLETINGFORMI. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENTS CATALOG NUMBER

DNA 6033F1. ITLE (end S ub t I t l e ) 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

OPERATI ON SANDSTONE: 1948 Techni cal Report6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

KT-82- 026(R)7. AUTHOR(s) 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)L. H. Berkhouse J . H. Hal l owel l F. W Mcfqul l anS. E. Davi s C. B. Jones M J . Osborn DNA 001-79-C-0274F. R. Gl adeck E.J. Mart i n WE. Rogers3. ERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

Kaman Tempo816 State Street (P. O. Drawer QQ)Santa Barbara, CA 93102

10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASKAREA L WOR K UNIT NUMBERS

Subtask U99QAXHK506-0381. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATEDi rector 19 December 1983Defense Nucl ear Agency 13. UMBER OF PAGESWashi ngton, DC 20305 22214 MONITORING AGENCY NAME d ADDRESS(it different from Controflfng Olfice) 15. SECURITY CLASS. (of l h l a r s p o r l )

UNCLASSI FI ED15a. DECLA5SIFICATION~DOWNGRADlNGSCHEDULE

SI FI FD16. ISTRIBUTION STATEMEN T (01 t h i s R ep & )Approved for publ i c rel ease; di stri buti on unl i mted.

1 8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTESThi s work was sponsored by the Defense Nucl ear Agency under RDT&E RMSS Code835DD794G4 U99QAXMK50609 H2590D. For sal e b: / the F!ati onal Techni calI nformati on Servi ce, Spri ngf i el d, Vi rgi ni a 22161.

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse sfde II neceassry an d ldentlfy by block numbe r )Nucl ear Testi ng Enewetak J TF- 7Nucl ear Test Personnel Revi ew X- RaySANDSTONE YOKEPaci f i c Provi ng Ground ZEBRA

!O. ABSTRACT (Contfrtuue 00 revmae side If nscesaary rrd ldontlfy b y b l o c k numbe r )

SANDSTONE was a three- detonati on atmospheri c nucl ear weapon test ser i esconducted duri nrJ the spri ng of 1948 at Enewetak Atol l i n the l I arshal I sl ands.Report emphasi s i s on the radi ol ogi cal safety of the personnel . Avai l abl erecords on personnel exposure are summari zed.

DD , :zf; ;, 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOW 65 IS OBSOLETE UI J CLASSI FI EDSECURITY CLA~~FICATIOM OF Tws PAGE men Data Ente r ed )


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UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFlCATION OF THIS PAGE When Data Entered)


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FACT SHEET

-*

SANDSTONEwas a three-detonation nuclear weapon test series held at Ene-wetak Atoll, t he Atomic Energy Commissions (AEC) Pacific Proving Ground(PPG) I in the spring of 1948. Located in the Central Pacific Ocean, the PPGconsisted principally of Enewetak* and Bikini atolls in the northwesternMarshall Islands.

_. -Assjgned Local Yj el dName Date l ocat i on (KT)a

X- RAY 15 Apr i l 200- f oot ( 61- meter) tower on Enj ebl I sl and 37YOKE 1 May 200- f oot ( 61~met er ) t ower on Aomon I sl and 49ZEBRA 15 May 200- f oot ( 61- met er) t ower on Runl t I sl and 18- .

Not e:' One kt l oton equal s t he appr oxi mate energy r el ease of a one- t housand-t on TNT expl osl on. _

HI STORI CAL BACKGROUNDOperat i on SANDSTONEwas the second test series to be held in the Marshall

Islands, but it differed from the first series (CROSSROADS n 1946) in that itwas primarily an AEC scientific test- series with the armed forces serving in asupporting role. Its purpose was to proof-test improved-design atomic weapons,whereas the purpose of CROSSROADSwas to test nuclear weapons effects on ships.

The weapons were tested at En&etak by a joint military and civilianorganization designated Joint Task Force 7 (JTF 7). This was a military organi-zation in form, but contained military, civil service, and contractor person-nel of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the AEC. The commander of this forcewas the appointed representative of the AEC and reported to both the JointChiefs of Staff and the Commander in Chief, Pacific.

Peak DOD numerical strength at SANDSTONEwas approximately as follows:Uniformed military 9,890DOD civilians 350DOD contractors 12610, 366

Formerly Eniwetok. A better understanding of the Marshall Islands languagehas permitted a more accurate transliteration of Marshall Island names intoEnglish language spelling.

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Numerous technical experiments were carried out in conjunction with eachof the three detonations. These experiments measured the yield and efficiencyof the devices and attempted to gauge military effects of the explosions. DODpersonnel participated in this test operation as individuals whose duty sta-tions were at the AEC weapon design and development laboratories, as unitsperforming separate experiments, and as units performing various support roles.

An extensive radiological safety (radsafe) program with the followingobjectives was instituted:

1. Keeping personnel radiation exposure at the lowest possi-ble level consistent with medical knowledge of radiationeffects and the importance of the test series

2. Avoiding inadvertent contamination of populated islandsor transient shipping.

This program established an organization to provide radsafe expertise and ser-vices to commanders of the separate components of the task force, who wereresponsible for personnel safety within their commands. Personnel were trainedin radiological safety. Standards governing permissible exposure were estab-lished. The standards were 0.1 roentgen (R) per 24-hour period and a maximumexposure of 3 R for certain approved specific missions. Film badges were issuedto persons likely to be exposed to radiation, as well as a representative groupof the task force. An extensive weather forecasting group was established topredict wind directions and areas of potential fallout. Personnel were evacu-ated from danger areas before each detonation. Reentry to radioactive areaswas restricted to personnel required to retrieve important data, and theirradiation exposures were monitored.

TEST OPERATI ONS AND EXPOSURESEach of the SANDSTONE ower shots produced fallout; however, none of theinhabited islands in the area received appreciable fallout. Kwajalein receivedmeasureable fallout on 3 May, two days after the YOKE shot. The estimated dosefrom fallout for persons who were on Kwajalein for the entire test series wascalculated to be 0.075 R.

Most task force personnel were on Kwajalein or aboard ships. The remainderwere on Enewetak and stayed there for the three shots. The temporary camps onthe northern and eastern islands of the atoll near the detonation sites wereabandoned and dismantled before the shots. Task force ships evacuated the la-goon. except for USS Albemarle (AV-51, USS Mount McKinley (AGC-71, USS Curtiss(AV-41, and USS Bairoko (CVE-1151, which remained in the lagoon near the baseislands on the southern side of the atoll.

Highest DOD exposures for both the Army (6.050 R) and the Navy (5.140 R)were accrued by radiation monitors from the Joint Radiological Safety Group.Only eleven personnel (0.6 percent of those badged) received exposures in ex-cess of the imposed standards of 3 R. In fact, radiation exposure for badgedJTF 7 personnel at SANDSTONEaveraged less than 0. 25 R, and approximately 65percent had zero exposures. Recorded SANDSTONE xposures are summarized in thetable on the following page.

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SANDSTONE Joint Task Forc e 7 Personnel Exposur esExposure Ranges( r oentgens)

Number Over Hi ghBadged 0 0. 001- l l - 2 2 ( R)Ar my 327 168 141 10 8 6. 050% of Total 51 43 3 3Navy 973 730 233 8 2 5. 140% of Total 75 24 1


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PREFACE

Between 1945 and 1962, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) conducted235 atmospheric nuclear weapon tests in the United States and in the Pacificand Atlantic oceans. In all, about 220, 000 Department of Defense (DOD) parti-cipants, both military and civilian, were present at the tests. Of these, ap-proximately 142,000 participated in the Pacific test series and approximatelyanother 4,000 in the single Atlantic test series.

In 1977, 15 years after the last aboveground nuclear weapon test, the Cen-ter for Disease Control (CDC) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-vices noted more leukemia cases than would normally be expected among about3, 200 soldiers who had been present at shot SMOKY, a test of the 1957 PLUMBBOBSeries. Since that initial report by the CDC, the Veterans Administration (VA)has received a number of claims for medical benefits from former military per-sonnel who believe their health may have been affected by their participationin the weapon testing program.

In late 1977, the DOD began a study that provided data to both the CDC andthe VA on potential exposures to ionizing radiation among the military and ci-vilian personnel who participated in the atmospheric testing 15 to 32 yearsearlier. In early 1978, the DOD also organized a Nuclear Test Personnel Review(NTPR) to:

l Identify DOD personnel who had taken part in the atmos-pheric nuclear weapon tests

l Determine the extent of the participants exposure to ion-izing radiation

l Provide public disclosure ofticipation by DOD personnelweapon tests.

This report on Operation SANDSTONE

information concerning par-in the atmospheric nuclear

is one of many volumes that are theproduct of the NTPR. The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), whose Director is theexecutive agent of the NTPR program, prepared the reports, which are based onmilitary and technical documents concerning various aspects of each of thetests. Reports of the NTPR provide a public record of the activities and asso-ciated radiation exposure of DOD personnel for interested former participantsand for use in public health research and Federal policy studies.

Information from which this report was compiled was primarily extractedfrom planning and after-action reports of Joint Task Force 7 (JTF 7) and itssubordinate organizations. Documents were desired that accurately placedpersonnel at the test sites so that their degree of exposure to the ionizingradiation resulting from the tests could be assessed. The search for this in-formation was undertaken in archives and libraries of the Federal Government,in special collections supported by the Federal Government, and by discussionor review with participants.

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For SANDSTONE, the most important archival source is the National Archivesand Record Center, Modern Military Branch, Washington, D.C. The Naval Archivesat the Washington Navy Yard also was helpful, as was the collection housed inthe Air Force Weapons Laboratory Technical Library at Kirtland Air Force Base,Albuquerque, New Mexico. Other archives searched were the Department of Energyarchives at Germantown, Maryland, its Nevada Operations Office archives at LasVegas, and archives of the Test Division of Los Alamos National Laboratory.

JTF 7 exposure records and an additional file of exposure-related documents(microfilmed by the Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company, Inc., supportcontractor for the Department of Energy/Nevada Operations) have also been veryuseful.

The work was performed under RDT&E RMSS B350079464 U99 QAXMK 06-09 H2590Dfor the Defense Nuclear Agency by personnel from Kaman Tempo. Guidance wasprovided by Mr. Kenneth W. Kaye of the Defense Nuclear Agency.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PageFACT SHEET 1PREFACELI ST OF I LLUSTRATI ONSLI ST OF TABLESChapter

1 OVERVI EWI nt roducti on

Pur poseHl st orl cal Backgr oundReport Or ganl zat l on

Nucl ear Test s and Radt at l on ExposuresExper l ment al Pr ogr am

Weapon Dl agnost l c Exper i mentsYi el d MeasurementsDl agnost l c Measurements

Servi ce TestsOceani c Testl ng Operat l ons

Marshal l I s' l ands Set tl ngSpeci al Pr obl ems I n Testing in the Marshalls

J oi nt Task Force 7J ol nt Task For ce 7 Headquart ersTask Gr oup 7. 1 ( At om c Energy Comm ssl onProvl ng Gr ound Gr oup)

Task Unl t 7. 1. 1 (Scl entl f l c)Measur ements Sect l onFl r l ng and Engl neer l ng Br anchServi ces Sectl on

51316

171717172121232424242626262830323232353536

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TABLE OF CONTENTS ( cont i nued)

Chapter Page1 (cant) Task Gr oup 7. 2 ( Ar my)

Task Gr oup 7. 3 ( Navy)Task Gr oup 7. 4 ( Al r Force)

Task Uni t 7. 4. 1 ( Headquar t ers and Servi ce Uni t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 2 ( Dr one Unl t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 3 ( Phot ogr aphy Uni t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 4 ( Weat her Uni t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 5 ( Ai r Rescue Unl t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 6 ( Ai r ways and Ai r Communl cat l onsServi ce Uni t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 7 ( I nt erl sl and Tr ansport Uni t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 8Task Unl t 7. 4. 9 ( Ll al son Uni t )

Task Gr oup 7. 5 ( J oi nt Secur i t y Gr oup)Task Gr oup 7. 6 ( J ol nt Radl ol ogl cal Saf ety Gr oup)Task Gr oup 7. 7 ( Kwaj al el n I sl and Command)Task Gr oup 7. 8 ( Observer Escor t Gr oup)

RADI OLOGI CAL SAFETYOr ganl zatl on and Responsl bl l l t l es

Task Uni t 7. 6. 1 ( Al r Monl t orl ng Uni t )Task Unl t 7. 6. 2 ( St af f Unl t )Task Unj t 7. 6. 3 ( Operatl ons Unl t )Task Unl t 7. 6. 4 ( Laborator y Unl t )Task Uni t 7. 6. 5 ( Radl ol ogl cal Recor ds Uni t )Task Unl t 7. 6. 6 ( Techni cal Measurement s Unl t )Task Unl t 7. 6. 7 ( Monl t or Uni t )Task Unl t 7. 6. 8 ( Advl sory Unl t )Task Unl t 7. 6. 9 ( Rear Echel on Uni t )

Trai ni ngSaf ety Crl ter l a

Radl atl on Saf ety St andardsRadl at l on Exposure Wai vers

36383943434444444444444445454647484849515252535353545454575758

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Chapter2 ( cant

3

Radl at l on Exposur e RecordsGr oup Exposur e Recor d

Radl ol ogl cal Safet y I nst r ument atl onPersonnel Fi l m Badges and Recor dsPr e- Event Saf ety Measures

Danger AreaFal l out and Lagoon Cont am natl on Pr edi ct i onCommand Br i ef i ngWeat her Predl ct l onEye Pr otecti onEvacuat i on and Reent r y Pl ans

POSTEVENT SAFETY MEASURESCl oud Tracki ngSampl e Recovery Technt quesProtecti ve Cl ot hl ngPer sonnel Decontam1nat l onShl p Decont am nat 1onEqul pment Decont amt nat l onAl rcr af t Decont am natl on

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPERI MENTAL PROGRAMExper l ment al Part l cl patl onWeapon Dl agnost l c Exper i ment s

Radl ochem st ryNeut r on Measur ementNeut r on Gener at l on - - Ross1 Met hodNeut r on Generat l on - - Tel l er MethodGamma- Ray Spect r umGamma- Ray Appearance - - Ross 1 Met hodGamma- Ray Appearance - - Tel l er Met hodTechnl cal Phot ogr aphyBl ast Measur ements

Paqe58595960616166666768686970707676818282898992929494959595959696

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Chapter3 ( cant ) Ser vi ce Test s

Rel nforced Concr ete St r uct uresBl ast Resi st ance of Str uct ur esAl rcraft Bl ast Accel erati onExposure of Bi ol ogi cal Mat eri al sExposure of Materi al s t o Radl atl onEval uat l on of New Radi ol ogi cal I nstr ument sRadl atl on Shl el dl ng by Materi al sEval uat i on of Col l ecti ve ProtectorsResi dual Cr ater Cont am natl onAerl al Survey of Gr ound Cont am nat l onAer i al Sur vey of Cl oud I nt ensl t ySur vey of Cloud Part j c l e Si ze

TEST OPERATI ONSX- RAYYOKEZEBRA

U. S. ARMY PARTI CI PATI ON IN OPERATI ON SANDSTONEHeadquar t ers J oi nt Task Force 7Task Gr oup 7. 1 ( At om c Energy Comm ssl onProvi ng Gr ound Gr oup)Task Gr oup 7. 2 ( Ar my)Task Gr oup 7. 3 ( Navy)Task Gr oup 7. 4 ( Al r For ce)

Task Uni t 7. 4. 1 ( Hq and Servi ce Uni t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 2 ( Dr one Unl t )Task Unl t 7. 4. 3 ( Phot ogr aphy Uni t )

Task Gr oup 7. 5 ( J ol nt Securi t y Gr oup)Task Gr oup 7. 6 ( J ol nt Radi ol ogi cal Saf ety Gr oup)

U. S. NAVY PARTI CI PATI ON IN OPERATI ON SANDSTONE 125Headquar t ers J ol nt Task For ce 7 125

Page9797979898999999

100100100101101102105110114118118118120123123123123124124124

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Chapter Page6 ( cant ) Task Gr oup 7. 1 ( At om c Ener gy Comm ssl onProvi ng Gr ound Gr oup)

Task Gr oup 7. 2 ( Ar my)Task Gr oup 7. 3 ( Navy)

St af f Or ganl zat1onsShl p Uni t sAj r Uni ts

Task Gr oup 7. 4 ( Ai r For ce)Task Gr oup 7. 5 (Joint Securt t y Gr oup)Task Gr oup 7. 6 (Joint Rad! ol ogl cal Saf ety Gr oup)Task Gr oup 7. 7 ( Kwaj al el n I sl and Command)Task Gr oup 7. 8 ( Observer Escor t Gr oup)Non- Task- For ce Shi ps

7 U. S. AI R FORCE PARTI CI PATI ON IN OPERATI ON SANDSTONEHeadquart ers J otnt Task For ce 7Headquart ers Ai r Forces, J oi nt Task For ce 7Task Gr oup 7. 1 ( At om c Ener gy Comm ssl on

Provi ng Gr ound Gr oup)Task Gr oup 7. 4 ( Ai r For ce)

Task Uni t 7. 4. 1 (Hq and Servi ce Uni t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 2 ( Dr one Uni t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 3 ( Phot ogr aphy Unl t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 4 ( Weat her Uni t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 5 ( At r Rescue Uni t )Task Uni t 7. 4. 6 ( Ai r ways and Al r Communl cat l onsSer vi ces Uni t )

t Uni t )ask Uni t 7. 4. 7 ( I nt eri sl and Tr ansporTask Uni t 7. 4. 9 ( Li ai son Uni t )

Task Gr oup 7. 5 ( J oi nt Secur i t y Gr oup)Task Gr oup 7. 6 (Joint Radi ol ogi cal Saf ety Gr oup)

128129130130130146146147147148149149151152152152153153153153154154154154155155155

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Chapter7 ( cant ) Task Gr oup 7. 7 ( Kwaj al el n I sl and Command)

1535t h Al r For ce Base Uni t31- 8 Ai r Weather Ser vi ce Det achment

Of f j cl al ObserversB U. S. MARI NE CORPS PARTI CI PATI ON IN OPERATI ON SANDSTONE

J oi nt Task Force 7 St af fTask Gr oup 7. 3 ( Navy)Task Gr oup 7. 4 ( Al r For ce)Task Gr oup 7. 5 ( J oi nt Secur i t y Gr oup)Task Gr oup 7. 6 ( J oi nt Radi ol ogi cal Saf ety Gr oup)Task Gr oup 7. 7 ( Kwaj al el n I sl and Command)

9 JOINT DEFENSE, ATOM C ENERGY COMMISSION, OTHERGOVERNMENT AGENCI ES, AND CONTRACTOR PARTI CI PATI ONIN OPERATI ON SANDSTONE

J oi nt Def ense Agenci esAt om c Ener gy Comm sst onCont r act ors t o t he At om c Energy Comm ssl onOt her Gover nment Agenci esDepart ment of Def ense Contr act ors

10 SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL EXPOSURESREFERENCESAppendl xes

A RADI OLOGI CAL STATUS REPORT OF ENEWETAK ATOLL

Page155155156156157157157158159159159

160160161162163163165167

179B GLOSSARY OF TERMSC ENEWETAK I SLAND SYNONYMS

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LI ST OF I LLUSTRATI ONS

Front l spl ece: SANDSTONE Shot X- RAY Fl r ebal lFl qur e

1234

56789

101112

1314151617

18192021

PageThe Cent r al Paci f i c. 19Enewetak At ol l , 1948. 20Aer i al vi ew of Ananl j I sl and, Enewetak At ol l , l n 1948. 28Enewetak I sl and, 1948, showl ng upwl nd ( nor t heast ) endof r unway wl t h j unk revet ment s and B- 17 sampl ers I nf oregr ound. 29Parr y I sl and, 1948; J ol nt Task For ce 7 shl ps I n backgr ound. 29Or ganl zatl on of J ol nt Task Force 7. 31Or ganl zatl on of Headquart ers J ol nt Task For ce 7. 33Or gani zat i on of Task Gr oup 7. 1. 34Or ganl zat l on of Task Gr oup 7. 2. 37Or ganl zat l on of Task Gr oup 7. 4. 41Task Gr oup 7. 6 ( J ol nt Radl ol ogj cal Saf ety Gr oup) . 49Monl t ors cal l br at l ng Vl ct oreen Model 247A I nstr ument s onboard USS Bal r oko ( CVE- 115) before SANDSTONE as t he i nst r uct orobserves. 57Al r patr ol pl ans A, B, and C. 62Al r patr ol pl an Cl . 63Ai r patr ol pl an E. 64Al r patr ol pl an F. 65Dr one B- 17 at Enewet ak af t er shot ZEBRA, approached byt ruck wi th f orkl l f t wl t h extensl on arm to grasp topsampl er box. 71Forkl l f t extensl on arm l i f ts top f i l ter f r om drone B- 17f ol l owl ng shot ZEBRA. 72Two men t ake t op f l l t er box f rom f or kl l f t and pl ace I t on t heground f ol l owi ng shot ZEBRA. 72Man pul l s l anyard to r emove one of t wo f i l t er- paper hol dersf rom top f l l t er unl t f ol l owi ng shot ZEBRA. 73Lanyard pul l s f l l ter- paper hol der f ree f rom top f t l ter unl tf ol l owi ng shot ZEBRA. 73

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LIST OF I LLUSTRATIONS ( cont i nued )Figure

2223

Second fi l t er hol der comes f ree f rom t op f i l ter; man I nbackgr ound t i l t s t op f i l t er unl t f rom anot her dr one.Hard pul l and both hands are r equj r ed to f r ee f i l t er- paperhol der.

24252627

Two men r un I n t o pul l f i l t er hol ders f r om l ower sampl eron B- 17 drone f ol l owl ng shot ZEBRA.Fi l t er papers I n l ead box handed up t o C- 54 pr eparl ng f orf l i ght t o Uni t ed St ates f ol l owl ng shot ZEBRA.Bootl es or shoe cover s used l n Oper at l on SANDSTONE.Per sonnel l eave Enj ebl t l m ng st at l on sever al days f ol l owi ngshot X- RAY.

282930

Oecont am nat l on t r uck and dr one B- 17 vl ewed t hrough cl othes-l l ne at s hower s t ati on on Enewetak I sl and.Shower st at l on on Enewetak; personnel are bel ng monl t oredbef or e dr essi ng i n cl ean cl ot hes.Dr one mai ntenance man rewashes hands f ol l owi ng work on drone8- 17.

3132

Hands ar e r emonl t ored.

33Monl t or ChecKs r adl oact l vl t y f ol l owi ng SANDSTONE shot wl t hpl asti c- wr apped Gei ger- Muel l er I nst r ument .Pi l ot who had j ust moved dr one B- 17 I nt o posl t l on f ordecontamqnatl on I s monl t ored f or r adl oact l ve cont am nat l on.

34 Monl t ors r ecord radl oact l vl t y of SANDSTONE dr one sampl erbef or e decont am natl on.35363738394041

Decont am nat l on of SANDSTONE B- 17 drone sampl er .Decont am nat l on of SANDSTONE B- 17 drone sampl er .Enl l st ed man I s moni t ored f or radl oact l vl t y f ol l owi ngdecontam nat l on of SANDSTONE dr one sampl er .M l l t ary pol l ceman pr events access t o SANDSTONE dr one B- 17f ol l owl ng I t s decont am nat l on.Dr one tank used f or sol 1 sampl l ng operat l on.Dr one t ank l n. r evetment ; hel i copt er hovers overhead tocont r ol t ank af t er I t has been st art ed.Navy Bureau of Yar ds & Docks exper l ment al st r uct uralshapes af t er shot YOKE.

42 Evacuati on of Enj ebl bef ore shot X- RAY.43 Shi p posl t l ons at shot t i me, X- RAY.

Page

7474757577777878797983848586868787939398

104106

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LI ST OF I LLUSTRATI ONS ( cont i nued)

Fi gur e Page444546

Monj t or I n SANDSTONE, X- RAY crater , pr obabl y 6 days af t ert he shot .Shi p posl t l ons at shot t i me.Shi p posi t i ons at shot t i me,

107111115

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LIST OF TABLES

Tabl e Page

6789

101112131415

SANDSTONE detonati ons, Enewet ak, 1948.Task Gr oup 7. 1 per sonnel st r ength.Task Gr oup 7. 2 operat i ng st r ength at Enewetak.Task Gr oup 7. 3 or gani zat j on and personnel st r engt h.Task Gr oup 7. 4 SANDSTONE personnel dl st r l butl on( 26 J anuary 1948) .SANDSTONE al r cr af t .Radl ol ogl cal saf et y equi pment dl st rl but l on.SANDSTONE exper l ment s.SANDSTONE scl ent l f l c per sonnel r adl atl on exposur es.SANDSTONE per sonnel exposures, U. S. Army organl zat l ons.SANDSTONE personnel exposur es, U. S. Navy organl zat l ons.SANDSTONE per sonnel exposures, U. S. Ai r Force organl zat l ons.SANDSTONE personnel exposur es, U. S. Marl ne Corps or ganl zat l ons.SANDSTONE personnel exposur es, c l vl l l ans f rom j oi nt def enseand ot her gover nment agenci es and cont r act ors .Exposures by t ask gr oup f or t he ent i r e SANDSTONE ser l es.

173538404243519091

119126152158161165

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CHAPTER 1OVERVI EW

I NTRODUCTI ONPut- pose

SA N DST ON E as a test seri es in whi ch three nuclear fission devices weredetonated at the Atomic E nergy Commissions (AE C) P acifi c P roving Ground (PP G)at E newetak Atoll* in the spri ng of 1948. Table 1 li sts the detonations.Tabl e 1. SANDSTONE det onat i ons, Enewet ak, 1948.

Assi gned Local Yi el dName Date Locat i on ( KTj aX- RAY 15 Apr i l 200- f oot ( 61- meter) tower on Enj ebl I sl and 37YOKE 1 May 200- f oot ( 61- met er ) t ower on Aomon I sl and 49ZEBRA 15 May 200- f oot ( 61- meter) t ower on Runl t I sl and 18

Not e:' One kl l oton equal s t he appr oxi mate energy r el ease of a one- t housand-t on TNT expl osi on,

This report documents the parti cipation of Department of Defense (DOD)personnel who were active in the test seri es. I ts purpose is to bring togetherthe available information about the atmospheri c nuclear test seri es pert inentto the radiation exposure of DOD personnel , both uni f ormed and ci vi l i an empl oyees. The report explains the reasons why DOD personnel were present atthese tests, li sts the DOD organizations represented, and describes theiractivities. I t discusses the potential radiation exposure involved in theseactiviti es and the measures taken for the protection of DOD personnel. I tpresents the exposures recorded by the part icipating DOD units.Hl st or l cal Backgr ound

Operation SA N DS TON E as primaril y conducted to proof-test new weapon de-signs. I nterest in weapon effects experi ments in these tests was defini telysecondary. A proof-test had not been conducted since the TR I N I TY test in J uly1945, in which the design of the weapon used for the N agasaki attack was-* A better understanding of the M arshall I slands language has permi tted a moreaccurate transliteration of M arshall Islands names into E nglish languagespelli ng. These newer transli terations are used in this report with few ex-ceptions. Appendix C lists the names and their variant spell ings.

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proven. Operation CROSSROADSwas conducted in 1946, chiefly to test the effectsof nuclear detonations on Navy ships.When the President approved the preliminary SANDSTONE test program on

27 June 1947, the United States apparently had only 13 nuclear weapons in itsstockpile. One year later, in spite of heavy emphasis on increased productionof fissionable material, the number of weapons was only about 50, far short ofthe number (estimated at as high as 200) that military planners calculatedwould be required in a war with the Soviet Union. The more efficient weapondesigns proof-tested at SANDSTONE, coupled with the higher production rates offissionable material, allowed the great expansion in the U.S. stockpile evidentby the end of 1949 (Reference D.l).

Meetings were held on 9 July at Los Alamos, New Mexico, to define test re-sponsibilities for SANDSTONE. Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL), theorganization that had developed the wartime atomic weapons and the AEC organi-zation that did research and laboratory development of new nuclear weapon de-signs, was to provide technical leadership and the military services were toprovide supplies and support. Potential test sites in the Marshall Islandswere visited in September 1947, and a site was selected on 11 October 1947(Reference A.8, pp. 140 and 141).

Enewetak Atoll was selected because it was large enough for three shots,and the steady trade winds would carry fallout from the shots over the openocean to the west. These trade winds, and their orientation with respect toEnewetak Island (the major island of the atoll), made a permanent major air-field possible. This was undoubtedly a factor that made Enewetak more desir-able than Bikini Atoll, which had been used for Operation CROSSROADS ReferenceA.5). Figure 1 shows the location of the Marshalls in the Central Pacific andFigure 2 is a map of Enewetak Atoll.

Although inhabited by about 140 people, the dri-Enewetak and the dri-Enjebi , who lived on the islands of Bijire and Aomon, Enewetak Atoll was farremoved from other inhabited islands. Bijire housed the dri-Enjebi, the peoplewhose normal home was Enjebi in the northern islands of the atoll, and Aomonwas occupied by the dri-Enewetak, whose normal home was Enewetak Island on thesouthern side of the atoll. Both of these islands had been the scene of fiercefighting during World War II and later were major military operating areas,requiring the populations removal. In 1946, these people were moved to MeekIsland at Kwajalein Atoll for a short time when Enewetak was considered a pos-sible site for the CROSSROADS est series (References A.9 and A.10).

Ujelang Atoll, 124 nmi (230 km) southwest of Enewetak, was selected as thefuture home for this group of people, and construction of cisterns, watercatchments, latrines, tent frames, and other buildings was begun by a Navyconstruction battalion group on 22 November 1947. Ujelang had been withoutpermanent inhabitants from the time it had been abandoned in the late nine-teenth century by the survivors of a typhoon that swept the atoll.

On 2 December 1947, the United States notified the United Nations SecurityCouncil that it was closing Enewetak Atoll in order to conduct necessary ex-periments relating to nuclear fission. The land area of Enewetak Atoll, its

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BOKAIDRIKDRIKDRIDRILBWIJBOKINWOTME X-RAY (37 KT). .TOWE R

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Fj gur e 2. Enewetak At ol l , 1948.

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1agoon, and the waters within 3 miles (5 km) of its seaward sides constitutedthe test area. These islands were part of the Trust Territory of the PacificIslands, a strategic area trusteeship of the United Nations, administered bythe United States. The U.S. agency in charge of the test area itself was theAEC.

On 3 December 1947, military authorities met with the dri-Enewetak anddri-Enjebi to explain the proposed move. Chiefs and members of the councilsvisited Ujelang on the following day and agreed to move upon their return toEnewetak on 5 December. The move of the people and their belongings was com-pleted by 20 December by USS LST-857 (References A.9 and A.lO). The number ofpeople moved is given in contemporary sources as 142, but recent a authorita-tive work cites 136 (Reference A.10).

Report OrganizationSubsequent sections of this overview chapter discuss the form of experi-

mental nuclear weapon test programs with emphasis on the potential radiationexposure of participating DOD personnel. The experimental activities are con-sidered first without particular reference to geographic location of the test-ing and are then related to the geographic limitations on such activities atthe WC. The portion of the experimental program of heaviest DOD participationis emphasized. The chapter concludes with a description of Joint Task Force 7(JTF 7), the organization that conducted SANDSTONE, and indicates how the DODelements within JTF 7 functioned.

Chapter 2 is concerned with the radiological safety (radsafe) aspects ofthe tests. This chapter documents procedures, training, and equipment used toprotect participants from radiation exposure potential inherent in test opera-tions.

Chapter 3 focuses on the role of the DOD in the experimental program ofSANDSTONE n general, leading to a discussion of DOD operations for the testevents in Chapter 4.

Chapters 5 through 8 report participation by the Army, Navy, Air Force andMarine Corps. Chapter 9 summarizes participation of other government agenciesand contractors. A listing of participating units and a statistical character-ization of their personnel exposures are included in these chapters. Personnelexposures are discussed in Chapter 10.

NUCLEAR TESTS AND RADI ATI ON EXPOSURESNuclear testing before 1961 usually consisted of the unconfined detonation

of nuclear devices (usually not weapons) in the atmosphere. Devices might beplaced on a platform or a barge on the surface, placed atop a tower, supportedby a balloon, dropped from an airplane, flown on a rocket, or shot from a can-non. A few were detonated underwater or buried in the earth in undergroundtunnels or shafts. SANDSTONEwas the first operation in the Pacific to detonatenuclear devices on towers.

In theory, personnel could be exposed either by the radiation emitted atthe time of explosion and for about 1 minute thereafter -.- usually referred to21


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as initial radiation -- or the radiation emitted later (residual radiation).Initial radiation is part of the violent nuclear explosion process itself: tobe close enough for initial radiation exposure would place an unprotected ob-server within the area swept by lethal blast and thermal effects.

The neutron component of initial radiation has the property of alteringcertain nonradioactive materials so that they become radioactive. This process,called activation, works on sodium, silicon, calcium, manganese, and iron, aswell as other common materials. Activation products thus formed are added tothe inventory of the radioactive products produced in the nuclear detonationprocess and contribute to the possibility of personnel exposure as residualradiation.

The potential for personnel exposure to residual radiation was much greaterthan the potential for exposure to initial radiation. In the nuclear explosionprocess, fissioning atoms of the heavy elements, uranium and plutonium, splitinto lighter elements, releasing energy. These lighter atoms are themselvesradioactive and decay, forming another generation of descendants from the orig-inal fission products. This process is rapid immediately after the explosionbut slows later and cant inues for years at very low levels of radioactivity.

Overall radioactivity of all the fission products formed decays at a ratethat is closely approximated by a rule that states that for each sevenfoldincrease in time the intensity of the radiation will decrease by a factor often. Thus, a radiation exposure rate of 1 roentgen per hour (R/hr) at 1 hourafter detonation would be expected to be about 0.1 R/hr after 7 hours and 0.01R/hr after 49 hours. This rule seems to be valid for about 6 months followingan explosion, after which the observed decay rate is somewhat faster than thatpredicted by this relationship. Activation products, in general, decay at afaster rate than the fission products.

Fission products and activation products, along with unfissioned uraniumor plutonium from the device, are the components of the radioactive materialin the debris cloud, and this cloud and its fallout are the primary sources ofpotential exposure to residual radiation.

In a nuclear airburst in which the central core of intensely hot material,or fireball, does not touch the surface, weapon residues (including the fissionproducts, activation products resulting from neutron interaction with devicematerials, and unfissioned uranium and/or plutonium) are vaporized. These va-pors condense as the fireball rises and cools, and the particles formed bycondensation are small and smoke-like. They are carried up with the cloud tothe altitude at which its rise stops, usually called the cloud stabilizationaltitude. Spread of this material then depends on winds and weather. If thedetonation is small, cloud stabilization altitude will be in the lower atmos-phere and the material wi.11 act like dust and return to the Earths surface ina matter of weeks. Essentially all debris from detonations with yields equiva-lent to kilotons of TNT will be down within 2 months (Reference A.6). Areas inwhich this fallout material will be deposited will appear on maps as bandsfollowing the winds direction. Larger detonations (yields equivalent to mega-tons of TNT) will have cloud stabilization altitudes in the stratosphere(above about 10 miles [16 km] in the tropics) ; radioactive material from such

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altitudes will not return to Earth for many months and its distribution willbe much wider. Thus, airbursts contribute little potential for radiation expo-sure of personnel at the testing area, although some residual and short-livedradioactivity might come from activated surface materials under the burst ifburst altitude is sufficiently low for neutrons to reach the surface.

Surface and near-surface bursts pose larger potential radiation exposureproblems. These detonations create more radioactive debris because more mate-rial is available for activation within range of neutrons generated by theexplosion. In such detonations the extreme heat vaporizes device materials andactivated earth materials as well. These materials cool in the presence ofadditional material gouged out of the burst crater. This extra material causesthe particles formed as the fireball cools to be larger in size, with radio-activity embedded in them or coating their surfaces. The rising cloud will liftthese particles to altitudes that depend on particle size and shape and thepower of the rising air currents in the cloud, which in turn depend on yieldof the detonation. The largest particles will fall back into the crater or verynear the burst area with the next largest falling nearby. It has been estimatedthat as much as 80 percent of the radioactive debris from a land-surface burstfalls out within the first day following the burst (Reference A.6).

Detonations on the surface of seawater generate particles consisting mainlyof salt and water drops that are smaller and lighter than fallout particlesfrom a land detonation. As a consequence, water-surface bursts produce lessearly fallout than similar weapon%-~detonated on land. Large-yield surfacebursts in the PEG over relatively shallow lagoon waters or on small areas oftruly dry land probably formed a complex combination of land-surface- andwater-surface-burst particle-size characteristics.

Detonations on towers may be considered as low airbursts or ground bursts,depending upon the relative height of the detonation and Its yield. A largerburst will create more fallout than a smaller burst on equal-height towers, notonly because of the additional fission products and weapon debris, but also be-cause it will pull up more earth materials, or even form a crater. In addition,materials of the tower itself provide a source of easily activated materials.Particles of the tower material may also act as centers on which debris vaporsmay condense to form the larger particles that lead to heavier early fallout.Devices that fission uranium or plutonium inefficiently will cause more ofthese radioactive components of the device residue to be dispersed.EXPERI MENTAL PROGRAM

Central to the test series wasIts requirements dictated the form

the experimental program. This program andof the test organization and the detail ofpersonnel participation. SANDSTONEs experimental program incorporated two

aspects, the most important of which was the development of the weapons them-selves ; the second aspect was measuring effects of the detonations on equipmentand structures.

estand

These two aspects serve as a rough measure of the differentiation of inter- ,between the major participants: the AEC interest in weapon development,the DOD interest in military applications of the effects of the explosions.

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The several parts of the weapon development and the effects studies each hadparticular features that led to the possibility of radiation exposure.

Weapon Dl agnost l c Exper l ment sLASL was responsible for conducting experiments designed to measure theoutput of the nuclear devices, specifically radiation, blast, and yield. In

testing devices, weapon designers are interested in two classes of measure-ments : the total energy release of the device, and the rate of release. Totalenergy release measurements are called yield measurements, and the rate ofrelease measurements are called diagnostic measurements.

YIELD MEASUREMENTS.Device yield usually was determined by several methods.two of which involved photo-optical techniques. Growth of the intensely hotand radiating mass of device debris and air that constitute the nuclear fire-ball varies with its yield. Very-high-speed cameras were therefore used torecord this growth, and film records subsequently analyzed to infer yield.Duration and intensity of the energy pulse in the optical-thermal spectralregion also vary with yield; thus, light detectors coupled to recorders werealso used to derive yield.

In addition, yield may be determined by collecting and analyzing radio-activity of a representative sample of the device debris. Inferences are thendrawn regarding the yield, based on knowledge of the materials in the device.

Construction, instrumentation placement, and data recovery for the photo-optical yield determinations usually did not require personnel to be in areaswith a high potential for exposure to radiation. Cameras and light detectorsneed only a clear field of view of the burst point and enough breadth of viewto encompass the fireball . Camera placement did not involve personnel activi-ties at times and places of high radiation levels. Film recovery generally didnot involve high exposure potential, as the photo stations were usually atranges and in directions not heavily contaminated by fallout.

Sampling of device debris, however, necessitated exposure to higher levelsof radioacivity. The technique used in most atmospheric tests was to fly air-craft with collectors directly through portions of the radioactive (or mush-room) cloud, although for some shots rockets and drone aircraft were used.About 90 percent of the fission debris was usually considered to be in theupper portion of the radioactive cloud (Reference A.6).

For SANDSTONE, cloud debris was collected by eight unmanned B-17 droneaircraft. The drones picked up significant amounts of radioactive material ontheir surfaces, posing potential radiation exposure to ground crews involvedin decontamination. Samples collected were radiologically hot and requiredspecial handling as they were taken from the aircraft and prepared for shipmentto laboratories for analysis.

DIAGNOSTIC MEASUREMENTS.The detonation of a nuclear device is a progres-sive release of increasing amounts of nuclear radiation, some of which directlyescapes the device. The rest of the radiant energy interacts with the associ-ated material of the device itself and is converted into differing forms of

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radiation and into the kinetic energy of the remaining materials in a smallfraction of a second. The intensely hot core then reradiates, heating the sur-rounding air and creating a shock wave that propagates outward from the burstpoint.

Weapon diagnosticians used sophisticated techniques to follow the processesthat occur during the device detonation. Detectors and collectors were run upto, and sometimes inside, the device case so that the radiation being sampledcould be directly channeled some distance away and be recorded by instrumenta-tion designed to survive the ensuing blast. To enhance its transport, radiationwas conducted through pipes (often evacuated or filled with special gases)from the device to stations where recording instrumentation was located orwhere the information could be retransmitted to a survivable recording station.

Radiation measurements are based upon the effects that result from theinteraction of the radiation with matter. Fluorescence is one such effect.Materials that fluoresce with radiation exposure were placed in view of camerasor light detectors to provide a record of the variation of fluorescent inten-sity with time, thereby providing an indirect measurement of the radiationenvironment.

Other methods of detecting radiation involve the shielding (attenuation)properties of earth materials, water, and other substances. These materialsare also used to baffle or collimate radiation to ensure that radiation isdirected toward the detecting instrument.

Radiofrequency energy produced by the detonation can be detected by radioreceivers and, with the addition of filtering and processing circuitry, canalso provide information about the energy flow from the explosion. Such mea-surements permit remote placement of receiving and recording instruments.

The potential for radiation exposure of personnel associated with weapondiagnostic experiments depended upon the proximity of the measurement or datarecovery point to surface zero and the time lapse between the detonation andthe data collection.

The primary radiation exposure potential in the vicinity of surface zerois from fission products and materials made radioactive by neutron activationof device and earth materials. Thus, the distance from surface zero is a prin-cipal factor in assessing exposure to persons engaged in the experimentalprogram.

Since radiation decays with time, the time lapse between the detonationand exposure is a critical factor in dose assessment. Primary recording mediafor weapon diagnostic experiments were photographic films from oscilloscope,streak, or framing cameras located in survivable bunkers near the detonationpoint. Because radiation fogs film in time, these films and other time-sensitive data were removed from the bunkers by helicopter-borne personnelwithin hours of the detonation to minimize damage by fogging. This recoveryconstituted the main potential for exposure of weapon diagnostics participants.

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Servi ce Test sThese experiments were designed to measure the effects of detonations onequipment and structures. They were requested by the military services, ap-

proved by the AEC, and conducted by a variety of task force organizations.The potential for radiation exposure of personnel responsible for recoverydepended in general upon the proximity of the instruments to the device and

the elapsed time between detonation and instrument recovery. If the recoverywas not time-sensitive, the exposure was very low.

OCEANI C TESTI NG OPERATI ONSNuclear test operations in the Pacific posed problems in logistics and in

the management of radioactive contamination because of the limited land areaand the remoteness of Enewetak Atoll.

Marshall Islands SettlngThe Marshall Islands are in the easternmost part of the area known as Mi-

cronesia (tiny islands). The Marshalls are spread over 770 thousand m 2 ( 2million km21 of the Earths surface,70 mi2 but the total land area is only about(180 km2). Two parallel chains form the islands: Ratak (or Sunrise)to the east, and Ralik (or Sunset) to the west; Enewetak is in the Ralik chainat its northern extreme (Figures 1 and 2).

A typical atoll, Enewetak is a coral cap set on truncated, submerged vol-canic peaks that rise to considerable heights from the ocean floor. Coral andsand have gradually built up narrow islands into a ring-like formation withopen ocean on the outside and a relatively sheltered lagoon on the inside.Enewetak has three passages, Southwest Passage, Wide Entrance, and Deep En-trance, that permit access to its lagoon from the sea. All the islands arelow-lying, with elevations seldom over 20 f eet ( 6 meters) above high tide.

During nuclear testing, the more populated, support-oriented sections werethe south and southeast areas of the atoll where the larger islands are lo-cated. Devices were detonated on the northern islands and over the northernreefs. The western sections of the atoll were not involved in test activitiesexcept for limited use as instrumentation sites.

Elliptically shaped, Enewetak Atoll is approximately 550 nmi (about 1,020km) southwest of Wake Island and 2,380 nmi (4,410 km) southwest of Honolulu.It encloses a lagoon 17 by 23 miles (27 by 37 km) and has a total land area of2.75 mi2 (7.12 km2), with elevations averaging 10 feet (3 meters) abovemean sea level. The support section of Enewetak (Enewetak, Parry, and Japtanislands) constitutes about 34 percent of the atolls land surface. The stringof islands from Runit to Bokoluo, the detonation area, constitutes about 32percent. The various names used for the islands of the atoll are listed inAppendix C, Is land Synonyms.

The climate of Enewetak Atoll is tropical marine, generally warm and humid.Temperature changes are slight, ranging from 70 O to 9O0F (21 to 32OC).Rainfall is moderate, and prolonged droughts may occur. North of Enewetak is

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open ocean for over a thousand miles, with the only inhabited island beingWake. East of Enewetak are several atolls including Bikini, Rongelap, Rongerik,Ailinginae, and Utirik. Rongelap, the nearest inhabited atoll, is a little over260 nmi (about 480 km) from Enewetak. Storms are infrequent, although typhoonsoccur; nevertheless, both wind and sea are continuous erosional agents. Al-though possible at any time, most tropical storms occur from September toDecember. Much cumulus cloud cover exists in the area.

The Enewetak region incorporates three basic wind systems. The northeasttrade winds extend from the surface to 25,000 or 30,000 feet (7.6 or 9.1 km),the upper westerlies from the top of the trades to the base of the tropopauseat 55,000 to 60,000 feet (16.8 to 18.3 km), and the Krakatoa easterlies fromthe tropopause into the stratosphere. These systems are all basically east-to-west or west-to-east currents. Day-to-day changes reflect the relatively smallnorth-south components, which are markedly variable. Greatest variation occursin the upper westerlies, particularly during late summer and fall.

The steady northeast trade winds in the lower levels cause the water atthe surface of the lagoon to flow from northeast to southwest, where it sinksto the bottom and returns along the lower levels of the lagoon, rises to thesurface along the eastern arc of the reefs and islands, and is moved by thewinds to the southwest again. The lagoon waters moving in this closed loopalso mix with those of the open ocean, resulting in a flushing action. Flushingis rapid and has two major routes. The first is directly through the easternreefs to the western reefs: the second is in through Deep Entrance betweenJaptan and Parry and out Wide Entrance west of Enewetak Island. These tworoutes also function to keep the waters of the northern part of the lagoonseparate from the southern waters.

The islands of Enewetak Atoll had been used for growing coconuts from thetime of their German possession in the nineteenth century, but during the 1944assault and capture of the atoll by American forces, the coconut stands hadbeen destroyed on the islands of Enjebi, Enewetak, and Parry. On those islandson which the coconut stands had not been destroyed, the lack of normal carewas evident (Figure 3) as the low-growing native shrubbery advanced.

After the fighting, an airstrip was built on Enewetak Island, but littleattempt was made to clear battle debris (Reference A.lO). Facilities andstructures on the islands were in poor condition in the fall of 1947. In addi-tion, surplus American property purchased by the Chinese had to be removedfrom the island. Many of the islands had short piers that were in poor repair.Airstrips had to be built and submarine cable laid. The overall constructionplan for the proving ground required three test-firing sites, a 200-foot(61-meter) tower on each site, and instrument stations. Photographic towersalso had to be erected and a control station built.

By Christmas 1947, construction was progressing on schedule, and the re-habilitation of living and messing facilities at Enewetak was well underway. Acauseway between Aomon and Bijire was constructed by a private company.

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JOINT TASK FORCE 7On 18 October 1947, JTF 7 was activated and assigned the code name,Switchman. Incorporated into its organization were elements of the fourmilitary services, other government agencies including the AEC, and civilian

organizations under contract. The AEC, charged with responsibility for nuclearenergy development by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, designated Commander JTF7 (CJTF 7) as its representative. JTF 7 was also subordinate to the JointChiefs of Staff (JCS). These relationships are illustrated in Figure 6.

The resulting organization, though complex, worked well enough, as it con-formed with the realities of the situation. The realities were that the testswere being conducted to develop nuclear weapons, an activity limited by law toa civilian agency, the AEC. The tests were mainly being conducted in an areathat came under the jurisdiction of the AEC (in the sense that the A EC was theU.S. government agency primarily responsible for the islands that were includedin the test area>. Furthermore, the territory was remote from the United Statesand required special supply and security arrangements appropriate to militaryoperations. Finally, the organization for which the weapons were being devel-oped was the U.S. military establishment. The mission of the task force wasto, construct a proving ground, under the scientific direction of the AEC,and conduct proof testing of atomic weapons on the Enewetak Atoll (ReferenceC.5, p. 2-6). Any military service tests or experiments were to be conductedon a noninterference basis.

The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) was the tri-service mili-tary organization formed to manage the receipt, storage, safety, security, andinspection of atomic weapons, if and when the military was required to usethem. It was most interested in participating in the SANDSTONE ests and coor-dinated with LASL early in the planning. AFSWP was to provide military person-nel to be integrated into Task Group (TG) 7.1 (AEC Proving Ground Group), and116 personnel were assigned to this organization.

The armed services furnished personnel, equipment, and services necessaryto ensure security, proper operation, and logistic support. The joint taskforce was divided into functional and service-branch oriented task groups.

The test director of TG 7.1 was responsible to the AEC for direction oftechnical test activities and policies. All military experiments were underhis direction. TG 7.2 (Army Task Group) was commanded by an Army general offi-cer who was also Commander, Enewetak Atoll. He was responsible for constructionand security on the atoll as well as billeting, transportation, sanitation,retreat ion, medical facilities, and utilities maintenance for all units. TG7.3 (Naval Task Group), commanded by a Navy flag officer, was responsible forthe operational control of all TG 7.3 units, augmenting air-sea rescue byavailable aircraft and ships as required, offshore patrol of a circular areafrom the center of Enewetak Atoll commensurate with available aircraft andsurface craft, operation of a boat pool, ship security, helicopter operationsexcept when attached to the Air Force, and laying of submarine cable. TG 7.4(Air Task Group) commanded by an Air Force general officer, was responsiblefor all air operations, meteorological services, interisland air transporta-tion, air-sea rescue, and aerial photography. TG 7.5 (Joint Security Group)was responsible for advising appropriate commanders relative to security

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I II TASK GROUP 7.1AEC PROVING GROUND G ROUP

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFITEST DIRECTOR

TASK UNIT 7.1.1SCIENTIFIC UNIT

LOS ALAMOS LABORATORY -SCIENTIFIC DIRECTORDEPUTY SCIENTIFIC D IRECTOR

1.DEPUTY COMMANDER _ DEPUTY COMMANDERNAVY AIR FORCE

LEGENDCOMMAND

-- ---TECHNICAL DIRECTION-------COORDINATION

/

JOINT RADIOLOGICAL

Fi gur e 6. Or gani zat i on of Joint Task For ce 7, SANDSTONE.

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control measures, for safeguarding classified information, for security of theinstrumentation islands, and for providing couriers. TG 7.6 (Joint RadiologicalSafety Group) was responsible for the operational detection and determinationof intensities and types of radioactivity. This group furnished monitors toaccompany all parties returning to an area of possible radioactivity. TG 7.7(Kwajalein Island Group) was responsible for billeting, transportation, sani-tation, recreation, medical faciljties, and utilities maintenance for all JTF7 units on Kwajalein, for the military security of the island, and for con-struction on Kwajalein. A radsafe officer from the staff of CJTF 7 was assignedto TG 7.7 to determine radiological exposure potential for all personnel, in-cluding precautions necessary to protecttion and determination of intensities(Observer Escort Group) was responsiblearea. Thirty spaces each were allocatedobservers.

personnel against exposure and detec-and types of radioactivity. TG 7.8for escorting observers in the testto the AEC and the armed forces for

During peak manning periods the Army provided approximately 2,124 personnelfor SANDSTONE, the Navy 5,850, the Air Force 1,800, and AFSWP 116. Approxl-mately 350 nonservice civilians from LASL, DOD, and various other contractororganizations participated. The Navy provided a total of 28 Navy ships, 11small craft, 6 helicopters, 6 patrol seaplanes, 3 large land-based patrol air-craft, and 2 small aircraft. The Air Force supported SANDSTONE perations withover 60 other aircraft.Joint Task Force 7 Headquarters

Figure 7 shows the organization of Hq JTF 7. CJTF 7 had three principaldeputies, one of whom was the Test Director and in charge of TG 7.1. The jointstaff and the comptroller were patterned after other military organizations.During test operations, Hq JTF 7 was located on USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7) ;some staff members were also on USS Albemarle (AV-51, USS Curtiss (AV-41, andUSS Bairoko (CVE-115). Total strength of Hq JTF 7 during April and May wasapproximately 175 personnel, with approximately 96 stationed on Mount McKinley(Reference C.5, p. 3-A9).

Task Group 7.1 (Atomc Energy Commssl on Provi ng Ground Group)Fi gure 8 shows the organi zati on of TG 7.1, which was the heart of the task

force. It was responsible for preparing and firing the three nuclear devices.preparing and conducting all experimental programs, and operating and main-taining all atoll base facilities except those on Enewetak Island, which weremanned by TG 7.2. TG 7.1 contained both scientific and military civilian per-sonne 1. Subordinate task units are discussed subsequently. In the forwardarea, TG 7.1 was composed of 283 personnel from LASL; AFSWP; Naval ResearchLaboratory: Naval Ordnance Laboratory: Argonne National Laboratory: Edgerton,Germeshausen & Grier, Inc.: Aberdeen Provingsonne 1; David Taylor Model Basin: and the Milists task group strength figures.

Ground: AEC; Navy Bureau of Per-litary Liaison Committee. Table 2

TASK UNIT 7.1.1 (SCIENTIFIC). Task Unit (TU) 7.1.1 was staffed primarilywith scientists from LASL who were assisted by military personnel as well asscientists from other AEC installations and outside agencies. Its nucleus of

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J-l

?ADJUTANTGENERALPROVOSTMARSHAL

+IHEADQUARTERSCOMMANDANT

CHIEF OF STAFF

ATOMIC ENERGYCOMMISSIONTEST DIRECTORTASK GROUP 7.1

COMMANDERTASK GROUP 7.2

L--I-

METEOROLOGISTPHOTOGRAPHICOFFICER

I 1COMMANDER OF

AIR FORCESI

TASK GROUP 7.6RADIOLOGICAL

SURGEONTRANSPORTATIONORDNANCEOUARTERMASTER

LATOMIC ENERGY

COMMISSIONSTAFF

L 1

ATOMIC ENERGYCOMMISSIONOPERATING

Fi gur e 7. Or ganl zat l on of Headquar t ers , Joint Task Force 7, SANDSTONE.

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COMMANDERTASK GROUP 7.1TEST DIRECTOR

DEPUTY TEST DIRECTOR

STAFF +m

COMMANDER TASK UNIT 7.1.1SCIENTIFIC DIRECTOR

STAFF ~ DEPUTY SCIENTIFIC DIRECTOR

MEASUREMENTS SECTION $q +

THEORETICAL PHYSICSRADIOCHEMISTRYMEASUREMENT OFNEUTRONSNEUTRON GENERATION

LAJ 9LAJ 10LAJ-11LAJ 12

METHOD l -ROSS1 METHOD LLAJ 13METHOD 2-TELLER METHODGAMMA RAY SPECTRUMGAMMA RAY APPEARANCEMETHOD l -ROSS1 METHODMETHOD 2--TELLER METHODTECHNICAL PHOTOGRAPHY6 LAST

Fl gur e 8. Or ganl zat l on of Task Gr oup 7. 1, Oper at i on SANDSTONE.

ASSEMBLYENGINEERINGCOMMUNICATIONSTIMING ANDFIRINGCONSTRUCTION

LAJ 14 LOGISTICSLAJ 15 ADMINISTRATIONLAJ 16 CIRCUITS ANDMAPS

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Tabl e 2. Task Gr oup 7. 1 personnel st r engt h, SANDSTONE.

Agency Number ofPersonnelLos Al amos Scl ent l f l c Labor atoryAr med Forces Speci al Weapons Proj ectNaval Research Laborat oryNaval Or dnance Labor at oryAr gonne Nat i onal Laborat oryEdger t on, Germeshausen b Gr l er , Inc.Aberdeen Pr ovi ng Gr ound, Ar myAt om c Energy Comm ssi onBureau of Personnel , Depart ment of t he NavyDavi d Tayl or Model Basi n, NavyM l l tary Li ai son Comm t tee, Atom c EnergyComm ssi on

Tot al

7711623206

128

12621-

283Source: Reference C. 5, p. l - 24.

LASL personnel was assigned to LASLs newly created J-Division, and personnelfrom other divisions were also transferred to J-Division (Reference C.5, p.l-24).

The mission of the scientiEic task unit was to provide equipment and per-sonnel and to prepare detailed plans for and to conduct the scientific andtechnical phases of the proof-tests. It fired the devices and made necessaryobservations. TU 7.1.1 was divided into Measurements Section, Firing andEngineering Branch, and Services Section.

Measurements Section. The responsibilities of this section were dividedinto four phases: (1) planning experiments, (2) preparing an experiments hand-book, (3) consulting with experimenters at Enewetak. and (4) interpreting re-sults of the experiments. The nucleus of the group consisted of three civiliansfrom LASL. This section included J-l through J-8, which conducted experimentsin theoretical physics, radiochemistry, neutron measurements, neutron genera-tion, gamma-ray spectrum, gamma-ray appearance, technical photography, andblast.

Firinq and Enqlneerinq Branch. An assistant Scientific Director was re-sponsible for the engineering and firing work. He selected a staff of engineersfrom Sandia Branch of LASL to carry out his duties. This branch was responsiblefor the following activities:

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l Weapon assembly and handlingl Ships modifications and installationsl Engineering0 Communications liaisona Firing circuitry liaisona Construction liaisona Industrial safety.

Services Section. Services Section included J-14 through J-16 -- Logistics,Administration, and Circuits and Maps. Logistics (J-14) was a service group incharge of procurement, shipping, and property control.J-15 (Administration) was primarily concerned with personnel matters,

including employment of personnel at LASL,, preparation of all personnel underthe Scientific Director for overseas travel, arrangements for travel to andfrom the test area, and multiple problems arising from maintaining personnelat the forward base. Other minor responsibilities included provision of officespace, equipment and services, housing at LASL, and similar functions overseas.

J-16 (Circuits and Maps) was responsible for preparing maps and plansindicating the location of all experimental installations and undergroundcables and wires. This group was also responsible for coordinating cable-layingduring the construction period (Reference C. 40, pp. 33, 115, 129).

Task Group 7.2 (Army)Most Army personnel in JTF 7 were assigned to TG 7.2. The group was acti-

vated on 15 October 1947. CTG 7.2 was also Atoll Commander for JTF 7. Figure 9shows the TG 7.2 organization. Table 3 lists units involved and enumerates thepersonnel at Enewetak. This task group was engaged in construction throughoutthe atoll and operated base facilities at Enewetak Island and the atoll.

During the operational shot phase, TG 7.2 personnel provided the followingservices for all units ashore on the atoll:

0 Construct ionl Maintenance of ordnance wheeled vehiclesl Atoll ground defense and general securityl Operation of transient billetingl Bakery and messinga Repair and maintenance services for utilities and

facilitiesl Operation and maintenance of off-island radio

communicationsl Transportationl Counterintelligence

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L- PERSONNE L LIGHT AVIATIONSECTION COMBAT

INFORMATIONL-

CENTERPHOTO SECTION

1 FINANCE 1

I1 SIG,,] pz--1

L AIR WEATHERSERVICE I

1217th COMPOSITESERVICE PLATOON1218th COMPOSITESERVICE PLATOON1219th COMPOSITE

I L COMPOSITE SIGNALI I I I DETACHMENT

_-------P-F

ADMINISTRATION ONLY

1

I- UTILITIES ENGINEERING SUPPLYAND MAINTENANCEl- EMBARKATION ----------t-

PORT DIRECTORDUARTERMASTERLAUNDRYORDNANCEMAINTENANCEAND SUPF-LVSIGNAL SIJPPLVTRANSPORTATIONCOMPANY SUPPLYMEDICAL SUPPLY

tPOST EXCHANGESUPPLYSPECIAL SERVICESSUPPLY

532nd ENGINEER BOAT &

I BASE HOSPITAL IFi gur e 9. Or ganl zat l on of Task Gr oup 7. 2, SANDSTONE.


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Tabl e 3. Task Gr oup 7. 2 oper at i ng s t r engt h at Enewet ak, SANDSTONE,Uni t Strength

1220t h Pr ovl sl onal Engl neer Batt al i on( 1217t h, 1218t h Composi t e Servj cePl at oons; Hq & Hq Det achment, 18thEngi neer Const r uct i on Company;1219t h Sl gnal Servi ce Pl atoon wi t hat t ached Composj t e Si gnal Det achment)2nd Engi neer Speci al Br i gade( 532nd EB&SR, Hq & Hq Company D,Company E, and Medi cal Det achment )461st Transpor t at i on Amphl bl ous Truck Company

Hq 854t h Tr ansport at l on Por t Company

Naval Shore Base Det achment, wl t h NavySl gnal TeamPhoto Team No. 7

401st CI C Det achment

26 of f i cers2 warr ant of f i cer s468 enl l st ed men

49 of f i cers4 warr ant of f i cers566 enl l st ed men1 of f i cer26 enl l st ed men8 of f i cers272 enl i st ed men7 of f i cers110 enl i st ed men2 of f i cers4 enl l st ed men2 of f i cers50 enl i st ed men

Sources: Personnel Rost ers TG 7. 2, 31 March 1948; SANDSTONEReport s 3 and 4)

0 Sani t at i onl Operation of port and port headquarters0 Special services (recreation) facilitjes0 Medical and dental services0 Financial services.

Task Gr oup 7. 3 ( Navy)The Navy task group provided support at Enewetak Atoll for the scientificprograms and carried out surface and air operations in and around the atoll.

The main tasks of TG 7. 3 were t o:l Deliver nuclear components to Enewetak Atolll Provide mobile facilities for devices at the test sitel Conduct surface and air security measures In the Enewetak

Danger Area38


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l Provide intra-atoll water transportl Plan for evacuation of all personnel from the atolll Transport personnel and scientific and naval equipment to

and from the atolll Provide living accommodations for task group personnell Lay cablea Provide offshore patrol.

In order to carry out these tasks, TG 7.3 was organized into eight functionaltask units.

Most of the naval vessels stayed at Enewetak during the test series exceptfor the destroyers, which routinely were on surveillance patrols of the area.The flagship, Mount McKinley, was anchored off Parry Island for all threeshots. GSS Comstock (LSD-191 was the mother ship for the boat pool, which pro-vided water transportation for all task units during SANDSTONE. Most TG 7.3personnel remained on board ships except for those involved in scientificoperations. Table 4 provides the personnel strength for TG 7.3.

Task Gr oup 7.4 (Air Force)The SANDSTONE TG 7.4 mission was local air transport, cloud sampling,

weather data, communications, search and rescue, and photographic support.Specific missions were to:l Provide and operate aircraft for experimental programs andcloud sampling operationsa Provide and operate aircraft to gather weather datal Provide and operate weather observation posts at Enewetak,

Rongerik, Majuro, Kwajaleln, and Wake0 Provide and operate JTF 7 Weather Central on Mount McKinleyl Provide and operate liaison-type aircraft for intra-atolltransportation at Enewetaka Provide and operate aircraft for search and rescue opera-

tions within 300 nmi (556 km) of Enewetakl Provide photographic coverage of Operation SANDSTONE.

Air Force personnel in SANDSTONEwere in many task force organizations inaddition to manning TG 7.4. Within Hq JTF 7, there were 55 Air Force personnel,22 on the JTF 7 staff and 33 working for Commander Air Forces. Commander AirForces was also a deputy to the task force commander and had his own staff andcommand authority for TG 7.4. TG 7.4 was organized as shown in Figure 10.Table 5 shows GF 7.4 personnel distributed by task unit.

Providing and operating aircraft in support of SANDSTONEwas the primaryfunction of TG 7.4. Table 6 shows types and numbers of aircraft used at SAND-STONE by TG 7.3 and TG 7.4.

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Tabl e 4. Task Gr oup 7. 3 organl zat l on andpersonnel st r engt h, SANDSTONE.l ask Uni t/ Desi gnati on Strength

7.3.1 Fl agshi p US,Mo_unt_C?cKi n&y (AGC- 7)7.3.2 ~- Mai n Naval l ask Uni t, Enewetak

USS_P!ckaway ( APA-222)USS Warri ck (AKA-89)USS_Curt i ss (AV- 4)USS_YYncey ( AKA-93)USS Al bemarl c (AV- 5)USS_LST~- 45USSLST - 2T9!J SS LST:P!!

7.3. 3 - - Of f - Shore PatrolUSS Garrl Tners Bay ( AVP-39)USS.H~QL~_W Tucker ( DDR-875)USS__Roqer- - (DDR- 876)USS Perki ns (DDR-877)USS SpanqTer~ ( DE - 696)USS~~Ge_oo_rqeDE- 697)USS Raby ( OE- 698)USS M4h (Dt- 699)USS Curr i er (DE-700)Patrol Squadron (MS) 6 DetachmentDevel opmental Squadron 4 DetachmentAVR #C- 26638AVR #C- 26653

7. 3. 4 . - Hel l copter Uni tUSS Bal roko (CVE-115) w th 4 H03S and? Hl l helt copters

7.3. 5 - - Servi ces Uni tUSS- - Arequ&a (AF - 31)USS PasA (AU- 3)YOG-64Yw 94a

7.3. 6 . - Cabl e Uni tLSM250LSM378Naval Si gnal Uni t No. 1

7.3. 7 - - Boat Pool UnitUSS Comst ock (LSD- 19)USS Askarl (ARL- 30)LCI 549LCl (L) - 1054tcT(Lj - 1090tcT-472atcT - 494aLcl - l T94aLcT - 1345a

578

290l b155514853 I666053

1732332342331351411431381361535466

710

7616411

614354

252164182121

Varl ous smal l boats: 4 LCTs, 2 AVRs, 28 LCMs32 LCVPs, 1 LCPR, 6 LCPLs, 2 PPBs, 2 50- foot M s,2 35- Foot MBs, 1 MWB.

7.3. 8 - - Evacuati on and Reentry Uni tUni ts f rom other task uni ts as assl gned

l otal 5,984Note:aNo data avai l abl e.Sources: Data from CNO OP 981-10 Aug 87 and

Reference C. 4, p. XVI I - 34.

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LEGEND

I I

- COMMANDCHIEF OF STAFF ------OPERATIONALCONTROL ONLY

A- l A- 2ADMINISTRATION INTELLIGENCEAND SECURITY

4 CHAPLAIN 1

-I EGALj STATISTICS 1 ,L__

riASK UNIT 7.4.1HEADQUARTERSAND SERVICES TASK UNIT 7.43PHOTOGRAPHYI II TASK UNIT 7.42DRONESI I

-- -COORDINATION

I--- +------I

Ii_----, ,I

Fi gur e 10. Or ganl zat l on of Task Gr oup 7. 4, SANDSTONE.

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Tabl e 5. Task Gr oup 7. 4 SANDSTONE personnel di st r i but i on( 26 J anuar y 1948) .Uni t Command Of f i cers Al r men Ci vi l i ans Tot al s

Hq JTF 7Commander Ai rForces, J TF 7TU 7. 4. 1TU 7. 4. 2TU 7. 4. 3TU 7. 4. 4TU 7. 4. 5TU 7. 4. 6TU 7. 4. 7TU 7. 4. 9

M xedSAC 12 10APG 66 518APG 105 376APG 43 102ATC 47 185ATC 13 20ATC 4 109ATC 12 35M xed 2 11

17 5 -- 22a_- 22a_- 584. - 48119 164-- 232- - 33- - 113- - 47_- 13

Notes:aU. S. Ai r Force str engt h onl y, does not I ncl ude other servj ces.SAC - - St r at egi c Ai r CommandAPG - - Ai r Pr ovi ng Gr oundATC - - Ai r Transpor t CommandSour ce: Ref erence C. 5, p. 3- A- 12.

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Tabl e 6. SANDSTONE al r cr af t ,Type Quant i t y Task Uni t M ssl on

PBM- 5 6 7. 3. 3PB- 1W ( B- 176) 3 7. 3. 3OB- 17G 12 7. 4. 298- 176 12 7. 4. 2c- 54 2 7. 4. 3F- 13a 3 7. 4. 3WB- 29 8 7. 4. 4SB- 17 2 7. 4. 5OA- 10 2 7. 4. 5H03S 4 7. 4. 5HTL 2 7. 4. 5PBM- 5 2 7. 4. 5

Of f shore ai r pat rolOf f shor e ai r pat rolDr one cont r ol l er sDr one sampl er sPhot ographyPhot ographyWeather r econnai ssanceSearch and r escueSearch and r escueSearch and r escuebSearch and r escuebSearch and r escuebI nteratoand sampI nteratoLl al sonLl al son

11 t r anspor tl e return11 t r anspor t

c-54c- 47L- 4L- 5

1132

11

7. 4. 77. 4. 77. 4. 97. 4. 9

Not es:aAn F- 13 was a 8- 29 modl f l ed f or photogr aphy.bNavy suppl l ed two PBM seapl anes f or search and r escue on shotdays onl y and f our H03S and two HTL hel l copt ers. The hel l cop-t ers were used f or scl ent i f l c support on shot days and f orhi gh- pr i or i t y l nt erl sl and t r ansport at i on on nonshot days.Sour ces: Reference C. 3, pp. VI I I - 5, 26, 32, 60; Ref er ence C. 4,pp. XVI I - 35) .

TASK UNIT 7. 4. 1 (HEADQUARTERS ND SERVICE UNIT). This uni t formed Hq TG 7.4and provided TG 7.4 aircraft with supply and maintenance support. It also per-formed most of the base housekeeping services for Air Force units on Kwajalein,where it was stationed.

TASK UNIT 7.4.2 (DRONEUNIT). This uni t was made up of 460 men from the 1stExperimental Guided Missiles Group at Eglin Field, Florida. Men from this taskunit operated 24 B-17s, 12 of which were drone control aircraft and 12 wereunmanned cloud sampling aircraEt. Contaminated drones were landed at Enewetak,where the radioactive cloud sample filters were removed by LASL personnel. The

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drones were decontaminated at Enewetak and then returned to Kwajalein wherethe unit was stationed.TASK UNIT 7.4.3 (PHOTOGRAPHY NIT). This unit had separate suborganizations

to accomplish its diverse missions. Aerial photography was done by the 311thAir Division using C-54s and F-13s. Documentary photography was done by seventeams on various ships and attached to various task groups. Tower photographywas done by another team. A film processing laboratory was also set up onboard Curtiss. Additional personnel for TU 7.4.3 came from Lookout MountainLaboratory, LASL, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.

TASK UNIT 7.4.4 (WEATHERUNIT). This unit was composed of two separategroups that collected weather data. Weather reconnaissance was done by the514th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron operating eight WB-29s out of Kwajalein.These aircraft were also used to track the radioactive cloud after each shotfor up to 5 days. For cloud-tracking operations a monitor from TG 7.6 wasaboard each aircraft. Cloud-tracking aircraft always returned with exteriorcontamination, requiring monitoring and personnel decontamination operations(Reference C.43, p. 91). The second group was the weather reporting portion ofthe task unit. Two persons were stationed aboard Mount McKinley. One of thesewas in charge of JTF 7 Weather Central. Weather reports from several otheratolls were furnished daily to Weather Central.

TASK UNIT 7.4.5 (AIR RESCUE UNIT). This task unit was made up of personnelof the 5th Air Rescue Squadron from MacDill AFB, Florida, who flew two OA-10and two SB-17 rescue aircraft. They were stationed at Kwajalein but were atEnewetak on shot days. The Navy provided six helicopters from Bairoko and twoPBMs on shot days.

TASK UNIT 7.4.6 (AIRWAYSAND AIR COMMUNICATIONSERVICE [AACS] UNIT). Thisunit was responsible for TG 7.4 communications and for airbase navigationalaids at Enewetak and Kwajalein. The 71st AACS Group, Hickam Field, Hawaii,provided 27 men: 86 more came from several units in the United States.

TASK UNIT 7.4.7 (INTERISLAND TRANSPORT UNIT). This unit operated 11 C-54and 3 C-47 aircraft from the Kwajalein Air Base, ferried personnel and equip-ment to and from Enewetak, and conducted aerial radiological surveys of ground-level radiation at shot sites. The C-54s also flew radioactive cloud samplesand exposed film to the United States. This task unit, which consisted of 47men, also borrowed personnel and aircraft from the 1535th Air Force Base Unit,which was permanently stationed on Kwajalein.

TASK UNIT 7.4.8. This unit was used only to control the movement of TG 7.4personnel to and from the PPG.

TASK UNIT 7.4.9 (LIAISON UNIT). This unit operated 13 fixed-wing light air-craft and 6 helicopters to transport men and equipment to the various islandsof Enewetak Atoll. Thirteen Air Force personnel were assigned to this unitalong with Navy pilots who flew the helicopters off Bairoko.

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Task Group 7.5 (Joint Securi ty Group)The missions assigned to TG 7.5 were:

l Travel control (air and water)l Protection of technical installationsa Security survey of the atolll Dissemination of security informationl Establishment and implementation of security clearances in

the forward area.In addition, TG 7.5 personnel guarded the drones when they landed at Enewetak.Five TG 7.5 courier teams escorted the radioactive cloud sample filters andfilm back to the United States. Approximately 30 AFSWP personnel from the 38thEngineer Battalion were sent to TG 7. 5 as special guards (Reference C.5, p.5-l). On 24 January 1948, two officers and thirty-three enlisted militarypolice arrived to strengthen units on Enjebi, Aomon, Runit, and Parry.

Task Group 7.6 (Joint Radi ol ogl cal Safety Group)On 29 February 1948, TG 7.6 was divided into the following units for oper-

ational purposes (Reference C.35, p. 37):l TU 7.6.1 Air Monitor Unit (based on Kwajalein)l TU 7.6.2 Staff Unitl TU 7.6.3 Operations Unitl TU 7.6.4 Laboratory Unitl TU 7.6.5 Radiological Records Unita TU 7.6.6 Technical Measurements Unitl TU 7.6.7 Monitor Unitl TU 7.6.8 Advisory Unitl TU 7.6.9 Rear Echelon Unit.

The primary responsibility of the Air Monitor Unit was to ensure the radio-logical safety of TG 7.4 and also to obtain, compile, and evaluate data likelyto be of value to the AEC or DOD. It consisted of 24 Air Force officers (Ref-erence C.35, p. 86).

The Staff Unit administered services such as communications, logistics,historical records, photographic liaison, and athletics. It was also concernedwith personnel morale. This unit consisted of six officers and eight enlistedmen.

The Operations Unit supported CJTF 7 and CTG 7.6 planning and radsafeoperations. It maintained current information on all radioactive areas and onthe location of all monitors and parties engaged in radiological operations.It controlled operations of all radsafe mssi ons. The unit consisted of sevenofficers.

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The Laboratory Unit performed all laboratory work required to supportradsafe operations including: repair and calibration of instruments: develop-ing. reading, and calibrating personnel film badges: measurement of decayrates of radioactive samples: and determination of the radiation exposurepotential from radioactive materials. It also prepared comparative records ofinstrument performance. The unit consisted of two officers, eight enlistedmen, and two civilians.

The Radiological Records Unit calculated exposures of all personnel whoentered radioactive areas and submitted its findings. It prepared all necessaryreports concerning exposures and overexposures and made recommendations to CTG7.6. The unit also established a medical review board to consider and commenton all findings of radiological overexposure. It consisted of one officer, oneenlisted man. and one civilian.

The Technical Measurements Unit supervised and coordinated all technicalmeasurement projects assigned to TG 7.6. It consisted of five officers, fourenlisted men, and two civilians.

The Monitor Unit provided monitors and equipment for all radsafe missions,including decontamination operations. This unit consisted of nine Army offi-cers, twelve Navy officers, one Pubic Health Service officer, and four Armyenlisted men.

The Advisory Unit acted in an advisory capacity to the task force radsafeofficer on medical and technical matters. It consisted of three civilians.

The Rear Echelon Unit consisted of one officer. He maintained liaison withsupporting activities in the continental United States.

TG 7.6 arrived on Enewetak Atoll by 16 March 1948. In addition to itsradsafe duties, TG 7.6 also conducted several experiments, which are describedin Chapter 3 (References C.35 and B.6.1).

Task Group 7.7 (Kwajalein Island Command)A permanent garrison of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel existed onKwajalein Island at the time of SANDSTONE. Most of TG 7.4 was stationed on

Kwajalein. Commander Navy Base Kwajalein was designated as CTG 7.7 to facili-tate integration of Kwajalein into the planning and operation of SANDSTONE. Hewas responsible for billeting, transportation, sanitation, recreation, medicalfacilities, and utilities maintenance for all task force units ashore onKwajalein. He was also responsible for military security and all constructionat Kwajalein. TU 7.7.3 was the Joint Control and Liaison Office. TU 7.7.4 wasthe Aviation Engineer Unit (926th Aviation Engineer Battalion) and did allconstruction in preparation for TG 7.4.

The Kwajalein Island Command had two Air Force units assigned to assistduring SANDSTONE. One, the 1535th Air Force Base Unit, supplied personnel andaircraft for TU 7.4.7. The other was the 31-8 Air Weather Service Detach-ment, which had 23 men on Kwajalein to support SANDSTONEwith air weatherinformation.

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Task Gr oup 7. 8 ( Observer Escort Gr oup)TG 7. 8 was organized to escort official observers and was assisted by per-

sonnel and facilities of TG 7.2. TG 7.2 arranged for observers accommodations,transportation, and activities ashore. Five or six officers of TG 7.2 wereassigned to observer parties to provide information (Reference C.3, p. VI,C-8-9).

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CHAPTER 2RADI OLOGI CAL SAFETY

Radiological safety (radsafe) for Operation SANDSTONEwas defined as acommand responsibility in Joint Task Force 7 Field Order 1. One task group, TG7.6, was given primary responsibility for ensuring the health and safety ofthe task force in the face of potential exposure to radioactivity (ReferenceC.43, Appendix B-l). Activities of TG 7.6 had the following objectives (Refer-ence C.43, Appendix B, Annex A):

1. Inform Commander Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF 7) regardingsafe employment of personnel in radioactive areas

2. Inform CJTF 7 about radiological hazards that might causeinjury or sickness3. Prepare instructions outlining precautions necessary toprotect personnel from radiation exposure4. Reevaluate the hazards of radioactive areas as radiologi-

cal work progressed5. Advise the Task Force Surgeon on diagnosis and treatment

of illness or injury resulting from, or associated with,exposure to radioactivity.

The radsafe plan for TG 7.6 was derived primarily from the Joint Task ForceField Orders. It detailed the application of safety criteria during operationsand included procedures for training, installing equipment aboard task forceships, monitoring, and decontaminating personnel and equipment.

ORGANI ZATI ON AND RESPONSI BI LI TI ESOverall organization planning and authority for radiological safety restedwith CJTF 7. The commanders staff, specifically the Staff Radiological Safety

Officer, was responsible for radsafe planning. The Staff Radiological SafetyOfficer coordinated radsafe information during shot operations and maintainedliaison with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific (CINCPAC) regarding radio-logical contamination outside the Pacific Proving Ground (PPG) (Reference C.43,p. 4) . Elements of control existed at all command levels, and operationalcontrol was implemented through normal command channels. For example, partyleaders in radioactive areas were responsible for the radiological safety oftheir personnel.

CTG 7.6 exercised control of a functional group composed of Army, Navy,Air Force, U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS), and various civilian personnel.Carrying out the safety policy within a separate activity allowed coordinationof effort without impeding the overall operation (Reference C.43, p. 4). CTG7.6 performed the following tasks (Reference C.43, Appendix B-l):

1. Organization and command of a joint radsafe group composedof radsafe monitors and supporting personnel

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2. Support of all operations in radioactive areas by supply-ing radiological monitors and equipment3. Promulgation of radsafe regulations and reporting their

infractions4. Detection and determination of the intensity and types of

radioactivity encountered in all radioactive areas5. Organization and supervision of personnel decontamination

as necessary.TG 7.6 was divided into the task units shown in Figure 11. Descriptions of

major functions of the task units follow.

AIR MONITOR UNIT

TASK UNIT 7.6.2STAFF UNIT14 MILITARY

TASK GROUP 7.6JOINT RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY GROUP

TASK UNIT 7.6.4LABORATORY UNIT

10 MILITARY 2 CIVILIANS

TASK UNIT 7.6.5RADIOLOGICAL RECORDS UNIT

2 MILITARY 1 CIVILIAN IDVISORY UNIT3 CIVILIANS

Fi gure 11. Task Group 7. 6 ( J otnt Radi ol ogl cal Safety Group),Operat i on SANDSTONE.

Task Uni t 7. 6. 1 (Ai r Monl torl ng Uni t]Task Unit (TU) 7.6.1 was composed of 24 Air Force officer monitors. It

operated from Kw

1948 - Dna 6033f - Operation Sandstone 1948

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